main active, thus giving rise to a subconscious state. This supposition, that a cortical process may exist without coalescing at all with the general system, is a somewhat novel assumption, and it is in my opinion the weakest point of the theory. It would require the further assumption that a cortical system, once coordinated, tends to resist the introduction of a new element into it, and for this there is some introspective evidence.
For consistency's sake the dynamic conceptions which I would apply to mental states in consciousness must be applied also to these mental states existing subconsciously. Subconscious ideas and sensations must be capable of development in intensity and in perfection of finish, so to speak; must be able to awaken associated ideas, to produce bodily movements, to affect secretion and other metabolic processes. It would appear possible that the dissociated processes underlying them may suddenly effect union with the upper system, thus intruding the subconscious state into the upper consciousness. When it does not actually effect union it is conceivable that some of its results, such as its associated ideas or emotional consequents, may appear in the upper consciousness. It is also conceivable that its mere existence may disturb the normal tension of the cortical activities, what has been termed the psychostatic equilibrium of the cortex, and thus affect the upper consciousness. A mental state supposed to be thus growing and working subconsciously has been happily termed by Pierre Janet a mental parasite or neoplasm. For all these inferences, which I have stated as deductions from the hypothesis that there exist mental states dissociated from the normal consciousness, there is a great deal of direct evidence, and it is upon an inductive study of that evidence that the hypothesis is based; but the limitations of space prevent my giving concrete illustrations.
