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Genl. Butterfield is therefore mistaken. One of my Staff Officers, who was present, when Genl. Hooker gave me his orders in person, states that I was ordered to throw forward my nearest Brigade, Tyndale’s, at once, and to follow up the movement with the rest of my command. This has the weight of the testimony in its favor, and it agrees with my recollections. The difference, however, is not very material, as the manner in which I executed the order, answered even Genl. Hooker’s version of the story. The troops were soon in motion, and even Genl. Hooker admits, that the turning out of the troops was splendid. As soon as the alarm was given, and before the order to march had reached me, I had sent one of my Aides to the 2d and 8d Brigades, to bring the columns from the camps down towards the road. Then, leaving my Chief of Staff behind for the purpose of superintending the movement of the 2d and 3d Brigades, which were ordered to follow the 1st, I placed myself at the head of Tyndale’s column, and directed its march towards the firing. It is proved, that the orders I left to my Chief of Staff to transmit, were correctly given, first by Capt. Greenhut, Asst. Adjt.-General of the 3d Brigade, who received them, and then by Lieut. Kluetsch, who heard them communicated to the Commander of the 2d Brigade. These orders were not only correctly given, but also correctly executed, for it is proved, that the troops marched without delay, and in the right direction, following the advance.
No military man will pretend that these orders were not answering the object and fitting the circumstances. The ground over which I had to march was not reconnoitered outside of the road. The only indication we had of the intentions of the enemy was the firing at Wauhatchie. If the attack on Geary was serious, it was not only possible, but probable, that the enemy would occupy some position in the valley in order to protect their rear. This would have been correct, and was, therefore, probable. Whether we would meet them, where, and in what strength, we had to find out; and in order to find it out I placed myself at the head of the advance.
To give, in this state of absolute uncertainty, special instructions to brigades marching in the rear, to do this or to do that, would have been absurd; their part in the action depended upon circumstances, and the circumstances had first to be ascertained. My orders covered this case completely; according to them my brigades were to be at hand to be used as circumstances would demand. And the testimony shows clearly enough that they would have been at hand had not other agencies interfered.
Relying upon their following me, I pushed forward, skirmishers in advance. The evidence shows that on the ground as it then was, troops could not be moved with more speed. When opposite the hill now known as
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