Page:The Democracy of the Merit System p16.jpg

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

16

therefore, aristocratic. You confute him by authoritative statistics proving that in Massachusetts there were during the last eight years among 9323 successful candidates only 157 college men, and that even in the federal service the college graduates form less that 10 per cent. of the successful candidates, and in those branches of the service which require no scientific education, only 6 per cent.—He will tell you that under the merit system a life tenure of office prevails in the public service which is obnoxious to our institutions. Your answer is, that according to the fundamental principle of the merit system, the tenure of the public servant is determined by the efficiency with which he performs his duties, and that his tenure is therefore not a life-tenure, but a merit tenure; and that merit tenure is the vital principle of a good service.—Your spoilsman further insists that a man at the head of a public office knows best what kind of men he wants to do the work under him, and that it is therefore most reasonable to permit him full liberty in the choice of his help. You reply that this rule may hold good as to the conduct of private business where the head of an establishment enjoys real freedom in the selection of his clerks or agents; but that according to universal experience, a public officer under the spoils system is not permitted that freedom; that whenever he has any place to fill he is instantly set upon by party managers, or bosses, or other politicians of influence, who urge upon him their creatures or favorites; that he is apt to be compelled by a fierce pressure to accept men as his subordinates whom his own judgment would have rejected; that the so-called freedom of the head of an office to select his help really means nothing but the freedom of influential politicians to select that help for him and to keep such favorites in place not so long as he likes, but as long as they like; that against such pressure he can find effective protection only in a law or rule making competitive examinations of candidates obligatory, thus excluding favoritism and influence; that the more conscientious an officer is in his desire to serve the public good, the more heartily he welcomes such a law; and that this is not mere theory or guess, but a stubborn fact to which every candid man who has had the experience of official life will unqualifiedly bear his testimony.

Being thus baffled at every point in detail, your antagonist