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Petri Privilegium/II/Chapter 2

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CHAPTER II.

ON THE OPPORTUNENESS OF DEFINING THE PONTIFICAL INFALLIBILITY.

Hitherto our subjects have been obvious, and our way easy and clear. But now we approach to matters over which it is not possible, either to pass in silence or to venture on the declaration of any final judgment. I mean, the subjects with which the Œcumenical Council will occupy itself. You are already well aware that the preparatory congregations are seven in number, and that the matters distributed to them comprehend faith, philosophy, discipline, the relations of the Church with civil society, education, and the like.

We have heard on all sides that the Council will define this and that doctrine as of faith; then, again, we are assured that the moderation of wise men will prevent any such definitions. We learn, chiefly indeed from those who are out of the unity of the Church, but upon alleged communications from the most learned and most distinguished, as well as the wisest and most moderate, of the bishops and theologians in the Catholic Church, that this will be, and that will not be, entertained by the Œcumenical Council.

It can hardly be necessary, reverend and dear brethren, to say to you that all these confident assurances are pleasant illusions. None but those who are admitted to the work of preparing for the Council know what is in preparation, and they are all bound by the Pontifical Secret. From them, nothing can be known; from others, nothing can be learned. As S. Augustine said: 'Nemo dare potest quod non habet.' We may therefore dismiss all those confidential communications.

But beyond this, they who believe, as we do, that an Œcumenical Council deliberates and decrees by an assistance over which human partisanship, political calculation, private interests, controversial rivalries, and human errors have no power to prevail, will have no anxiety as to the result, and no eager predispositions to express. If the Council should decide contrary to their previous judgment, they would rejoice to be corrected by its unerring guidance; if it should refrain from pronouncing on matters on which they previously believed a decision to be opportune or even necessary, they would with their whole heart submit their judgment, and believe that such a decision would be not only not necessary, but not even opportune. In this sense of perfect submission, springing from faith in the perpetual and infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, all Catholics will await the final result of the first Council of the Vatican. All this hot anxiety as to its decrees belongs to minds used to the contentions of convocations which may err, or to the debates of Parliaments in which parties rule the day. But to those who believe with undoubting faith that the acts of the coming Council, whatsoever they be, will be not only infallibly true, but wise and opportune, and that the result, whatsoever it be, will lay down a rule of faith in matters of belief, and a rule of thought and judgment in matters of prudence, there can be no anxiety, or impulsive desire for this or for that result. They will remain in a calm equilibrium of mind and will, ready with promptness and with joy to accept whatsoever decrees come forth as the wisest and the best. 'He that believeth, let him not hasten.'[1]

With this temper of mind, and with this submission of will, I may now take up the chief topic of the Pastoral Letter addressed to you two years ago on the Centenary of S. Peter; but, in doing so, I shall endeavour to lay it before you with the arguments adduced, hinc inde, on either side. We have been often told of late that one subject to be defined by the Council will be the infallibility of the Pope. They who tell us this are chiefly those who, being out of the unity of the Church, believe this doctrine to be false; and they rely upon statements made, as they allege, by Catholics few and rare in number, who do not believe the doctrine to be true, or by Catholics who, believing the doctrine to be true, nevertheless are of opinion that to define it would not be opportune.

With those who are without, we have nothing now to do. With the handful of Catholics who do not believe the infallibility of the Vicar of Jesus Christ speaking ex cathedrâ, we will not now occupy ourselves. But the opinion of those who believe the doctrine to be true, but its definition to be inopportune, deserves a full and considerate examination. We will endeavour so to weigh it, in preparation of heart to accept whatsoever may be decided by the supreme authority of the Church.

Once for all, let me repeat that we are now about to weigh the reasons, not for or against the truth of the proposition 'that the Vicar of Jesus Christ, speaking ex cathedrâ in matters of faith and morals, cannot err;' but assuming, for the time, that this proposition is certainly true, whether it be opportune, that is, timely, prudent, and expedient, that it should be defined.


I. Reasons against the Definition.

1. It may be said that no necessity or urgent reason can now be found for the promulgation of such a definition, inasmuch as the whole Episcopate and the whole priesthood of the Catholic Church, a few only excepted, together with the whole body of the faithful, have always received, and have even in these times received with veneration, docility and joy, the doctrinal decisions which have been published by Pontiffs, and recently by Pius the Ninth.

2. That for the determination of all controversies, and for the solution of all doubts, the decree of the Council of Florence respecting the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff as universal doctor, together with the profession of faith enjoined by Pius IV. in conformity with the mind of the Council of Trent, is sufficient.

3. That in order to decide and to determine this question fully and precisely, it would not be enough to declare simply the Pope to be infallible; but it would be necessary, at the same time, to declare, and that by a dogmatic decree, the form and the mode in which the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is to be manifested: which would be a difficult question, and would involve the authority of the Holy See in many new and grave complications.

4. That the making of such a definition would be exposed to this intrinsic difficulty. Suppose the bishops not to be unanimous, what course should then be taken? Suppose, again, that they were unanimous in declaring the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff to be a doctrine revealed by Jesus Christ, and always and in all churches traditionally taught and believed, would they not, in the very act of defining the dogma, seem to profess that there is no authority in defining the faith inherent in the Episcopate?

5. That such a definition would be of doubtful utility, and would rather hinder the hope of re-uniting the Eastern Churches to the Holy See, for the genius of the Greek and Oriental mind is such as to recoil from every new word. It is well known what serious and endless controversies the single phrase 'Filioque' has stirred up. For which reason, in the profession of faith enjoined by Gregory XIII. for the Greeks, and by Urban VIII. and Benedict XIV. for the other Orientals, the very words of the Florentine Decree, without any change or addition, were retained.

6. That such a definition would retard also the return which we so much desire of Protestants to the unity of the Church; inasmuch as the new dogma would excite and increase in large numbers a prejudice against the Catholic Church, and especially against the Roman Pontiff, and thereby render it more difficult for them to understand and to embrace the faith, by raising a suspicion that the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility is a novelty unknown in earlier ages.

7. That this question, concerning which it is by no means certain that there is any necessity to define it, might possibly raise divergencies among the bishops, who now are of one mind and heart in reverence and obedience to the Holy See; a result which would be most disastrous.

8. That it is not impossible that the defining of the Pope's infallibility might cause doubts, or, what is worse, dissensions among Catholics who are otherwise sound, and perfectly and willingly submissive, from conviction, to the authority of the Church; and that, because certain historical facts and documents are not as yet sufficiently explained; so that in many countries the minds of men are not sufficiently prepared for such a definition.

9. That such a new decree would be no remedy for the perversity and contumacy of the few persons who reject the decisions of the Supreme Pontiff, and appeal from them to a General Council, as the only judge of controversies; forasmuch as their aberrations come not from error of intellect, but from perversity of will. The infallible authority of Almighty God does not hinder men from rejecting the truth He has taught, and following their own errors. 'They have Moses and the prophets, let them hear them; if they hear not them, neither will they believe' the definitions of the Church. There is a difference, also, between a definition of the infallibility of the Pope and that of any other Christian doctrine. In the latter case, the authority of the Church may be sufficient to overcome any doubt. In the former it is this very authority, the principle and fountain of all certainty in faith, which is in question. Would it not, therefore, be more prudent to spare the weakness of those who are not yet able to bear this definition, which, though many think it to be useful, nobody thinks to be necessary? Would not the example of Our Lord and the Apostles commend to us this mode of proceeding?

10. That it may be feared lest, by a perversion of the true sense of such a decree, some may be induced to ignore and to despise the authority given by our Lord to bishops, especially in the condemnation of rash and pernicious opinions in philosophy and theology.

11. That it may also be feared lest bishops, whom for some years the Apostolic authority has been calling into activity, in order that they should not straightway send to Rome all doubts about books and matters of which it is their office to judge, might, by such a definition, be rendered more backward in exercising their episcopal office of judges of doctrine.

12. That it would soon probably follow from such a definition, by reason of the nature of man, that not only matter of doctrine on which the supreme decision of the Church is desired, but also many other kinds of business would be sent to Rome, there to be judged, decided, and solved; so that everything would crowd in to the centre of unity. And great as is the erudition, experience, justice, prudence, and authority of the Roman Congregations, such a course would not be for the prosperity of the Universal Church; for the Church, as the Holy Ghost teaches, is a body, but the health of a body depends on the force and motion of all and each of the members. 'If all were one member, where were the body?' (1 Cor. xii. 19.) Nobody doubts that the chief member of the body is the head, and that in it, as in its centre and seat, the vital force resides; and yet no one will say that the soul resides in the head alone, which is rather diffused as its form throughout the members of the whole body.

These, then, are reasons for judging that a dogmatic decision on the infallibility of the Pope would not be opportune. Let that suffice which has been already declared, and has been believed by all; namely, that the Church, whether congregated in Council, or dispersed throughout the world, but in the Successor of Peter always one, is always infallible, and that the Supreme Pontiff, according to the words of the Council of Florence, is 'the teacher of the whole Church and of all Christians.' But as to the mysterious gift of infallibility, which by God is bestowed upon the Episcopate united to the Pope, and at the same time is bestowed in a special manner on the Supreme Pontiff, and by which gift the Church, whether in an Œcumenical Council or by the Pope without a Council, guards and explains the truths of revelation, it is not expedient to make further declarations unless a proved necessity demand, which necessity at present does not exist.

II. Answers to the Reasons against the Definition.

On the other hand it is urged:

1. That if the Episcopate, priesthood, and people, are, with so few exceptions, unanimous in receiving with submission and assent the Pontifical Acts, there would not only be no risk in promulgating such a decree, but they would rejoice to see the formal reason of that Catholic submission justified by an authoritative definition; or, if the number of those who refuse submission be more numerous, a necessity thereby is proved for the declaration of the truth.

2. That the Decree of the Council of Florence ought to be sufficient; and would be, if it were not misinterpreted by those who deny the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff, speaking ex cathedrâ. The existence of this misinterpretation by Gallicans and by Anglicans shows that the decree is not sufficient.

3. That the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope, held, as it is alleged, by all but a small number, is already subject to the questions as to the form and mode of its exercise. These questions will not become less clear by being defined; and by being made more clear, the complications which now arise from want of a clear declaration will be avoided. Erroneous or doubtful opinions give rise to complications; but truth excludes doubt and obscurity in proportion as it is precisely defined.

4. That if the bishops were not unanimous as to the making of a definition, no doubt the prudence of the Council would know what course to take. The Council of Trent made no definition of the Immaculate Conception. It went to the very verge, but no further. If the bishops were unanimous in declaring the prerogatives of the Head of the Church, they would not thereby abdicate or divest themselves of any privileges or endowments divinely conferred upon the Episcopate. The divine endowments of the Church are not at war with each other. The Apostles did not cease to be infallible because their Head was so. The infallibility of the Church does not diminish the infallibility of Councils. The endowments of the body are the prerogatives of the head, and both have their proper sphere and their full and legitimate exercise. No bishop alone is infallible, nor is the whole Episcopate infallible without its Head. Of what, then, could they divest themselves by declaring their Head to be infallible?

5. That the hope of reunion with the East is alone to be found in the explicit recognition of the divine prerogatives of the Church. Reunion on anything short of this, on any base, obscure, ambiguous, or equivocal, would not endure for a day. The rent would be made worse. The Decree of the Council of Florence, which is alleged to be sufficient, was not sufficient for the Greeks. They accepted it, but as soon as they were again at Constantinople they threw it to the winds. Reunion is not to be gained or to be sought by reducing its conditions, like a bargain, to the minimum; but by an explicit and precise acceptance of the truth. Gregory XIII., Urban VIII., Benedict XIV., kept strictly to the Florentine Decree, because no other existed then. No other exists at this day; and the question is, whether the events of the last three centuries do not demand a more precise declaration of the supreme authority.

6. That the return of Protestants to the Church is more retarded now by the apparent contradiction among Catholics on the subject of infallibility, than it could be by the definition of the infallibility of the Pope. They now reject the infallibility of the Church altogether, because they believe that we are divided, and therefore in doubt about it. What we seem to doubt, they are encouraged to deny. We seem to be in doubt because we are divided, not about the infallibility of the Church, but about the infallibility of its Head. They believe this answer to be a subterfuge. So long as the infallibility of the Pope is not authoritatively declared, they cover themselves under the shelter of those Catholics who deny it. And to our shame, they borrow their belief that the opinion is a novelty, not to be found in earlier ages, from ourselves. The Gallicans put weapons into their hands, which they use against all infallibility whatsoever.

7. That no divergence among the bishops is to be feared, the unanimity alleged above may assure us. But if it were to exist, in what would it be of greater moment than in respect to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception at the Council of Trent? The prudence of the Council, both natural and supernatural, would know how to deal with such a contingency; and if divergence in anything should arise, no diminution of filial and cordial obedience to the Holy See could follow in those things where all are unanimous.

8. That if the pastors of the Church be unanimous, there is no fear of dissensions or doubts among the faithful. Rather, the dissensions and doubts, if any now exist, arise from the allegation that the pastors are not unanimous as to the infallibility of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. It is of the highest moment to expose and extinguish this false allegation, so boldly and invidiously made by heretics and schismatics of every name. For this reason alone the sooner the unanimity of the pastors of the Church can be manifested the better, both for truth and for the salvation of souls. The same reason holds as to the supposed historical difficulties. They have been examined and exposed over and over again; but they will be perpetually repeated, and with increased confidence, so long as the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff shall seem to be left undefined. Where the Church has spoken, the faithful are not open to seduction. While the Church is silent, the spirits of error are clamorous and plausible. A definition would silence all voices but the voice of the Church.

9. That such a decree would satisfy those who, out of heretical perversity, oppose the Faith, or out of ignorance and insubordination excommunicate themselves by appealing from the Supreme Pontiff to a General Council, is not to be expected. But if there be a hope for them, it would be in rendering clear beyond all possibility of question the divine certainty of Faith; and this is closely connected with the divine authority of the Head of the Church. The example of our Lord in sparing the infirmities of the weak, who were as yet unable to bear mysteries not yet revealed, is no warrant for keeping back any revealed truth because men will not believe the revelation already made. This would tacitly assume that the infallibility of the Vicar of Jesus Christ is not a revealed truth. If it be a revealed truth, our Lord's example is not in point; still less that of the Apostles, who 'kept back nothing,' and declared to the faithful 'all the counsel of God.'[2]

10. That the perverse interpretation or abuse of a decree must always be only partial, and can never be either widespread or permanent in the Church, and can therefore afford no reason against its being made, if the proper reasons exist for making it; and that the definition of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff can in no way lessen the authority of bishops as judges of doctrine in their own flocks, but on the contrary give great support to all their legitimate acts. It does not appear how bishops should be more authoritative because their Head is less so.

11. That, for the same reason, it does not appear probable that bishops would be less active as pastors and judges in their own churches because the doctrine which they already unanimously believe had received its formal definition. If the belief of its truth does not now produce these consequences, it does not yet appear why the definition of that truth should do so.

12. That, lastly, no centralisation of the ordinary administration of the Universal Church could legitimately follow or be in any way promoted by a definition of the infallibility of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, speaking ex cathedrâ, in matters of faith and morals. Such a definition belongs to a higher order, with which the ordinary pastoral office of bishops can rarely have any immediate contact. Questions of faith and morals, on which the Church has not already judged, very rarely arise in any diocese. The infallibility here in question has no relation to the multifarious administration of dioceses. Such a definition as we speak of would either have no appreciable influence on the ordinary administration of bishops; or if any, only in the way of giving certainty and solidity to the judicial acts and pastoral jurisdiction of the Episcopate throughout the world.

For these reasons, it appears to some that the objections to such a definition have no sufficient weight to dissuade the Council from making it.


III. Reasons for the Definition.

Such then, reverend and dear brethren, is a brief statement of the arguments for and against, as to the question whether such a definition be opportune. Thus far we have weighed only the objections and the answers. Those who believe that such a definition would be not only opportune, but is urgently required by the circumstances of these times, give their reasons as follows:—

1. They think such a definition would be opportune because the doctrine is true; for if true, can it be said with prudence that to declare it is not opportune? Is not this question already closed by the fact that God has thought it opportune to reveal it? Can it be permitted to us to think that what He has thought it opportune to reveal, it is not opportune for us to declare? It is true indeed that, in revealing the Faith, God in His wisdom and compassion was slow, deliberate, and gradual, measuring His light to the infirmities of the human intelligence, and preparing the minds of men for a fuller manifestation, both of His presence and His kingdom. But this divine procedure, binding as it may be on us in dealing with heathen nations who have never heard His name, is in no way binding, nay, is not even permissible, in dealing with those who have been baptized into the full revelation of faith. From them nothing may be kept back. With them no economy can be admitted. There is now no 'disciplina arcani' among the members of His mystical Body. They are illuminated to know 'the Truth as it is in Jesus' in all its fulness: 'that which you hear in the ear, preach ye upon the housetops.'[3]

By 'opportune,' then, in the mind of the objector, must be meant something politic or diplomatic, some calculations of local expediency in respect to nations and governments. This sense of opportunity is proper to legislatures and cabinets in deliberating on public utilities and opinions; but in the Church of God, and in the truth of revelation, it is always opportune to declare what God has willed that man should know. Nay, more than opportune: if the infallibility of the Vicar of Jesus Christ be a doctrine of Jesus Christ, 'necessity lieth upon us, and woe unto us if we preach not the gospel.'[4] It may, however, be said that many revealed truths are not defined; and that it does not follow that any doctrine ought to be defined, only because it is true.

2. This is indeed certain, but a further reason for defining it is easy to find. This revealed truth has been denied. There are two reasons for which the Church from the beginning has defined the doctrines of faith: the one, to make them clear, definite, and precise; the other, to reaffirm, and to defend them, when they have been called in question. If the infallibility of the visible Head of the Church had never been denied, it might not have been necessary to define it now. The true doctrine of justification was never defined till it was denied. The nature of inspiration has never yet been defined, but the denial which is now widespread may one day demand it. In like manner the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff has been denied. Its definition therefore becomes necessary. We affirm that it was never formally denied before the period of the Council of Constance, and that this modern denial of the truth renders its definition necessary. We are told by objectors that the denial is far more ancient and widespread: that only makes the definition all the more necessary. They who, to make the doctrine appear doubtful, or to prove it to be false, represent the denial of it to be ancient and widespread, in that proportion increase the necessity of declaring it by a dogmatic decree. Such a denial as emanated from the so-called Assembly of the French clergy in 1682 would amply suffice to show that the definition would be opportune.

3. And further: the denial of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff has already generated extensive doubt as to the truth of the doctrine. We are asked, if the doctrine be revealed, how is it that you allow it to be denied? If you are not doubtful about it, why not put an end to doubt by declaring it to be true? It is certain that not only Protestants believe the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility to be an open question among Catholics, but some Catholics are tempted to believe it to be theologically doubtful, and therefore not revealed; irreconcilable with history; a modern exaggeration arising from the adulation of courtiers and the ambition of popes. In France, to deny it has become a test of political independence. In England, some Catholics are stunned and frightened by the pretentious assumption of patristic learning and historical criticism of anonymous writers, until they doubt, or shrink in false shame from believing a truth for which their fathers died. The contact of the Catholics of England with the Catholics of France, good and beneficial as it has been, nevertheless introduced among us both books and habits of thought which were of the Gallican school. This has spread among us an opinion that the infallibility of the Pope, if possibly true, is nevertheless doubtful; and this doubt, dormant and harmless as it maybe in pious and simple minds, who are never put to the test about it, and if tested would instinctively go right in spite of intellectual perplexities, is in restless and active minds full of danger, above all in a Protestant country, and in the midst of all manner of controversial warfare, The admission of a doubt as to any revealed doctrine is fatal to faith in that doctrine.

4. It would appear, not only to be opportune that this doctrine should be placed beyond the reach of doubt by a dogmatic decree, but that such a decree would be specially opportune at this time, because the formal and systematic denial of the truth in question has arisen since the last General Council.

It may at first sight appear that this statement is at variance with the common assertion of theologians, that the denial of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff had its rise in the circumstances of the Council of Constance. Two distinct periods must be noted in this subject. From the Council of Constance to the Council of Trent this denial was confined to the opinions of a handful of men, and to the disputation of the schools in France. So little was it known elsewhere, that when the Church met in the Council of Florence, it made, without hesitation, its celebrated decree on the prerogatives of the Roman Pontiff as the Universal Pastor and Doctor of the Church. Nevertheless the erroneous opinion lingered on from the time of Gerson, Peter d'Ailly, and Almain, in what De Marca calls the 'Old Sorbonne,' to distinguish it from the Sorbonne of his own day. It is certain, then, that before the Council of Trent this opinion had not assumed the systematic and elaborate form given to it by the Assembly of 1682, and by those who have defended the Four Articles. This modern and dogmatic form of the denial of the Pope's infallibility, ex cathedrâ, was completed in the seventeenth century, that is, since the last General Council.

5. Now, if the next General Council meet and separate without taking any notice of this denial, one of two inferences may perhaps be drawn. It may be said that Gallicanism has obtained its place among tolerated opinions; or, at least, that it may be held with impunity. It does not readily appear what could be said in answer to this. It would be hardly enough to say that it was not thought opportune to meet so grave a denial of a doctrine universally taught everywhere out of France, nor to carry into execution the acts of Alexander VIII., Innocent XI., and Pius VI., who have authoritatively censured it. 'Qui tacet, consentire videtur.'

6. It cannot be said that the denial of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is obscure, unobtrusive, and latent. It is patent, notorious, importunate, and organised. It exists, not indeed in power, as once it did in France; but it exists still. Its roots are yet in the soil and alive. It exists in a handful of active and hostile minds in England and in Germany, and it has been taken up by Protestants in both countries as a weapon of controversy or of contumely against the Catholic Church, and especially the Holy See. To find or to invent a division among us is their only hope. To foment the least divergence into a conflict is their chief policy. There can be no doubt that Gallicanism affords them their most advantageous attack. Catholics are visibly united on all doctrines of faith, even on the Immaculate Conception; but on the infallibility of the Pope, Gallicanism has caused a divergence, which Protestants think or pretend to be a contradiction in faith. The combined action of Gallicanism within the Church and of Protestants without it, has given to this erroneous opinion a notoriety in the last two centuries, and especially in France and England, which takes it out of the category of imperfect and innocuous errors which may be left to evaporate or to be absorbed. It has inscribed itself in the history of the Church, and will live on until, by the Church, it is finally condemned.

7. Prudence would require the condemnation of any notorious error which may hereafter produce ill effects; but the denial of infallibility in the Head of the Church has already produced ill effects; nevertheless, so long as no condemnation is stamped upon the error, it will always pass for a tolerated opinion. Impunity is taken for acquittal. The faithful will never believe that it is wrong to do that which they see done every day, and even by ecclesiastics, without note of censure. They do not know that three popes have condemned the denial of their infallibility; and if they did they would justly say, 'But as we are not bound to believe the infallibility of the Pope, therefore his condemning the denial of his infallibility proves nothing. If he be infallible, why are we not told so; if he be not infallible, where is the harm of saying so?' The effect of this upon the doctrinal authority of the Church is gravely injurious. When it is affirmed that Scripture and tradition, and theological reason, and the acts of Councils, and the declarations of Pontiffs, all attest the infallibility of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, speaking ex cathedrâ, and that three Pontiffs have prohibited the denial of it, and that the whole consensus of theologians, with the exception of a handful, and that a transient and national school, all alike declare the same, we are met at once by the question, 'Why, then, is it permitted to deny it? What may be done with impunity cannot be wrong.' 'Where there is no law, there is no transgression.' This may not be logical; but the answer to this is not obvious.

8. And further, the prolonged existence of this error keeps up a theological and practical disunion in mind and feeling among the faithful. Let the truth be declared, whichever way it go. Truth generates union and peace; doubt generates secret antipathies, contentions, and mistrusts. We live in an age and country where Catholics are compelled to hear, and, if not to read, at least to know, what the public opinion and public press of an anti-Catholic people can say against the Faith and the Church. They hear that their pastors are Ultramontanes; that they are exaggerated and extreme; one-sided and partisan, ignorant, superficial, and untruthful in history, untrusty in reasoning. All this they hear, perhaps, with offence and pain; but it leaves its blight behind. Secret doubts and misgivings arise. They say to themselves: 'Perhaps, after all, there is some truth in all this. If there were none, could it have been so often and so confidently said? Where there is smoke, there is fire.' A small number of Catholics, also for what motives God knows have added to this scandal, partly by writings bearing their names, partly by anonymous writing in Protestant papers and reviews. All this would expire like smoke when the hearth is cold, if there were an authoritative declaration of the truth. Till then, they who, in the face of every kind of malevolent imputation and impertinent criticism, defend that which the Theological Schools of the whole Church, under the direct sanction of the Holy See, have both taught and teach in every Catholic country, must patiently bear the petulant and pretentious criticism of anti-Catholic minds, aided, unhappily, by some who bear at least the Catholic name. They will not, indeed, be unwilling to bear it for the truth's sake, nor do they care for any contempt for their own; but they have a continual sorrow for the scandal of the weak, the hindrance of truth, the perversion of minds, the alienation of hearts, the party spirit, the mistrust among brethren, and, worst of all, the mistrust of flocks in their pastors, which are caused by these animosities and infidelities.

9. Of these scandals, a direct effect is that the action of truth, both within and without the Church, at least in this country, is enfeebled. All who have experience in the state of minds out of the Church, and in their painful approaches towards it, and all whose duty it has been to hear and to read the objections of those who enter not in themselves and hinder those who are entering, will know that the alleged doubts about infallibility and the supposed extravagances of Ultramontanes return in every case with the constancy and monotony of the tide. The effect of this is to confuse, perplex, and indispose the will. A dubious authority, like a dubious law, imposes no obligation. No one will submit to he knows not what. The contentions of Gallicanism and Ultramontanism obscure the authority of the Church, and make it seem to be doubtful. Utterly false and unreasonable as this is, it has its effect in alarming, confusing the mind, and rendering it incapable of discernment, and the will indisposed to submission.

On our own people within, thank God, such temptations have less power; but every priest will know by his experience what misery and mischief has been done to timid or scrupulous, or, again, to rash and contentious minds. It must never be forgotten that faith, like humility and purity, is a grace of the Holy Spirit. It is to be matured and strengthened by truth and by obedience; it may be endangered and extinguished by falsehood and disobedience. But doubt is the shadow of falsehood and the prelude of unbelief. If there be any truth of the faith in which ambiguity is perilous, it is the Divine and infallible authority on which all faith reposes. The infallibility of the Vicar of Jesus Christ is the infallibility of the Church in its Head, and is the chief condition through which its own infallibility is manifested to the world. To convert this, which is the principle of Divine certainty, into a doubtful question, and one of the highest endowments of the Mystical Body, into a subject of domestic strife and fraternal alienation, is a master-stroke of the Enemy of Truth and souls.

10. It is some times alleged that if the infallibility of the Pope, speaking ex cathedrâ, were defined, it would meet with widespread refusal. Not so: rather, like the Immaculate Conception, it would be met by universal acceptance. The same prophets in sackcloth prophesied unbelief, contention and schism, before the Immaculate Conception was defined. We were then told that there was not a trace of it in antiquity; that the Fathers were against it; that Schoolmen and Saints denied it; that to define it would separate the Church of to-day from the Church of the past, remove faith from the broad tradition of the Christian world to the airy basis of the Pope's authority, draw narrower the conditions of communion by adding a new test, and fatally divide the 'Latin Church.' The answer is before men's eyes. Nevertheless, we have volumes of matter, undigested and misunderstood, from Fathers and Schoolmen, published and republished, without a trace of consciousness that a complete exposure of all this incoherence has again and again been made. The same is now the prophecy as to the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. There is no trace of it in antiquity; the Fathers knew nothing of it; the Schoolmen are against it; the Saints ignore it; the Councils exclude the notion of it; the tradition of thirteen hundred years refutes it; the adulation and ambition, the ignorance and the servility of the Roman Curia have invented a novelty which all the independent, learned, and noble-minded of all countries have, with irresistible logic and surpassing erudition, in vain resisted. We are told that this novelty is all that is now wanting to narrow the Roman Church to its Latin dimensions; that its definition will at once exclude all the independent, learned, and noble minds lingering and suffering within its oppressive unity; that, as true friends of the 'Latin Church,' they urge us, with all cordial solicitude, to refrain from declaring the Roman Pontiff to be infallible; that our true policy is comprehension, the concession of points to which their patristic learning forbids submission, the explaining away of the Council of Trent to admit the Thirty-nine Articles according to Sancta Clara; that if, unhappily, under the blind pressure of the ignorant and the courtly adulation of the ambitious, and, above all, the subtle management of the Jesuits, this crowning aberration be added to the Roman theology, the Latin Church will finally stand convicted by Scripture, Antiquity, Fathers, Schoolmen, Councils, Historical Science, and all that is independent, learned, noble, and masculine in its own communion, and be thereby delivered over to its own infatuation and downfall. To these self-complacent advisers it is enough to say, 'Ubi Petrus ibi Ecclesia.' There is not to be found a theological truth, not as yet imposed as of faith, for which such a cumulus of proof exists of every kind and of every age, and under every one of the loci theologici, as for the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. The evidence of the belief of the universal Church in the immaculate sinlessness and pre-eminent sanctification of the Mother of God, vast as it is, does not approach, either in extent or in explicitness, to the evidence for the infallibility, that is, the stability of faith in the Successor of Peter. There is no truth which already so pervades the mind of the whole Church, by unbroken tradition from the beginning; nor any which would meet with a more universal and unanimous acceptance on its definition and promulgation. Even in France, the only country in which, for a time, and under the pressure of political causes, the doctrine has been opposed, the opposition exists no longer as a theology or a school. 'La doctrine française,' as its friends truly but unwarily call it, lingers as a national tradition; surviving rather as a reminiscence than as a conviction.

11. The definition of the Immaculate Conception has filled up and completed the analogy of the new creation, and of the Second Adam and the Second Eve. It has also rendered precise and complete the doctrines of original sin and of grace. In like manner the treatise of Divine Faith has one part as yet undetermined, which would be completed by the completion of the doctrine of infallibility. The virtue of divine faith has for its formal motive the veracity of God, and for its ordinary means of knowing the revelations of God, the proposition of the Church. But if the proponent be fallible, the certainty on which the revelation comes to us cannot be divine. The Church, by the divine assistance of the Holy Ghost, is infallible, and the certainty of the truths proposed by it to our faith is divine. But if the Head of the Church be fallible, the certainty of truths because proposed by him—as, for instance, the Immaculate Conception—cannot be divine, and is therefore fallible; but if fallible, it cannot exclude doubt, and for that reason cannot generate faith. Where faith is, doubt cannot be; and where doubt is, faith ceases to be. The treatise of Divine Faith is therefore incomplete so long as the infallibility of the proponent be not fully defined.

12. The same is true as to the treatise de Ecclesia. The infallibility of the Church dispersed or congregated is matter of necessary faith. The infallibility of the eighteen General Councils in which the Church has been congregated is also of necessary faith. But the Church, during the last eighteen centuries, has done a multitude of acts by its Head alone. Are these acts infallible or not? For instance, the declaration of original sin by Innocent I., and of the Canon by Pope Gelasius; and more recently, of the Immaculate Conception by Pius IX. What does the treatise de Ecclesia teach as to the Head of the Church and his prerogatives? Are his declarations and condemnations in matters of faith and morals fallible or infallible? The question has been formally raised, and is of the greatest practical moment. Until it be solved, the treatise de Ecclesia is so far incomplete.

13. The practical importance of this question will be manifest at once by remembering that for three hundred years the Pontiffs have elaborately and expressly condemned a long series of propositions in theology and philosophy. The 'Theses Damnatæ' are very numerous. Now, are these fallible or infallible? Do they require of us the assent of faith, resting upon the Divine authority from which they emanate; or are they venerable utterances, to be respected indeed always, with assent if we agree with them, with silence if we do not? Has the Church, then, for three hundred years, been mistaking doubtful utterances for certainties; and that in matters of faith and morality, involving the absolution of souls from sin? They who deny the infallibility of the Pontiffs have here a hard task to reconcile their theory with fidelity to conscience and to truth.

14. But to pass from the region of theology to that of politics. The definition of the infallibility of the Pontiffs, speaking ex cathedrâ, is needed to exclude from the minds of Catholics the exaggerated spirit of national independence and pride which has, in these last centuries, so profoundly afflicted the Church. If there be anything which a Catholic Englishman ought to know, it is the subtile, stealthy influence by which the national spirit invades and assimilates the Church to itself; and the bitter fruits of heresy and schism which that assimilation legitimately bears. The history of England, from S. Thomas of Canterbury to Henry VIII., is a series of steady encroachments of the civil power upon the liberty of the Church, in all its operations, in its possessions, discipline, elections, tribunals, appeals, and jurisdictions. The whole English Church became charged and saturated by the secular spirit; its whole mind was clouded, and its whole will was bribed, till under Henry VIII., by a few acts of intimidation, its resistance was quelled; and it fell, whole and altogether, under the power of the Crown. The schism once complete, the work of heresy was inevitable, and was pursued at leisure. Such might have been also the history of France from Charles VII. to Louis XIV. The French monarchy confirmed its hold on the Church of France. The process of subjugating the ecclesiastical liberties to the parliaments and tribunals of the country was steadily pursued; but the Church of a great nation, or rather of an aggregate of nations, in close contact and affinity with the Holy See, with the memories and even the present influences of Avignon in the midst of it, could not fall under a royal master, as the Church of an island, far off and detached from Rome, fell under the violence of a royal tyrant. The great Church of France was led, indeed, to the verge of danger through its national traditions, but it has never passed the line. English nationalism became the Anglican schism. French nationalism checked itself at the Gallican Articles. The Anglican Reformation has no perils for the Catholic Church; it is external to it, in open heresy and schism. Gallicanism is within its unity, and is neither schism nor heresy. It is a very seductive form of national Catholicism, which, without breaking unity, or positively violating faith, soothes the pride to which all great nations are tempted, and encourages the civil power to patronise the local Church by a tutelage fatal to its liberty. It is therefore certain that Gallicanism is more dangerous to Catholics than Anglicanism. The latter is a plague of which we are not susceptible; the former is a disease which may easily be taken. Gallicanism is also the last form of Regalism yet lingering in the Church. The Imperialism of Constantinople and of Germany is gone. Time has rendered it obsolete, because impossible; the ecclesiastical prerogatives of medieval Europe have likewise expired, with the religious unity which alone rendered them just. But the unity of the French nation renders it yet possible that influences and claims inconsistent with the liberty of the Church may still exist. Anything that fosters this idea of National Churches, independent, except in a few vital relations, of the Holy See, powerfully excites a spirit which is not filial. An Episcopate which depends as little as it can upon the Pope, rears a laity which depends as little as possible upon the Episcopate. I am not saying that such is the spirit of the noble and Catholic people of France at this day; but I should not be going too far if I were to give this as a description of Gallicanism, and of the spirit and tendencies generated by it. So long as the Articles of 1682 remain as a standard of orthodoxy, this spirit and tendency will be kept alive. When these Articles are buried, one of the worst germs of Regalism will be extinct.

In speaking of France, I think it a duty to guard against a misunderstanding which appears—contrary, I must believe, to all reason and justice—to have arisen from some words addressed by me to you, reverend and dear brethren, two years ago, in a Pastoral on the eighteenth Centenary of S. Peter's Martyrdom.[5] In speaking of the supremacy of S. Peter's See, it was inevitable that I should speak on the subject of Gallicanism; but I endeavoured so to do it as to avoid wounding, by the lightest word, the profound Catholic instincts of our brethren in France. Many of its most eminent sons, both ecclesiastics and laity, have so spoken to me of what I then said as to assure me that my words gave them no cause to think me wanting in heartfelt veneration and affection for the Church in France, glorious in all its history for martyrs, confessors, and saints; fruitful in all deeds of fidelity to the Holy See, and of charity to all mankind. I should not only grieve, but I should hold myself guilty of a high crime against humility, charity, and justice if I had so spoken; and I desire here and now, if any word of mine shall seem to be wanting in veneration and admiration for the Church and people of France, hereby to disclaim all fault, except for the want of skill in dealing with a delicate but inevitable subject. I make this declaration now by way of preface to what I am about to add. In the Pastoral of 1867 I was recalling to your mind the history of Gallicanism, and my words were these:—'The boldness or the unconsciousness with which Gallicanism is sometimes put forward as an opinion which Catholics are free to hold without blame, and as a basis on which Churches are to unite under the shelter of Bossuet, and as a standard of Catholic moderation in rebuke of ultramontane excesses, makes it seasonable to tell its history. Gallicanism is no more than a transient and modern opinion which arose in France, without warrant or antecedents in the ancient Theological Schools of the French Church; a royal theology, as suddenly developed and as parenthetical as the Thirty-nine Articles, affirmed only by a small number out of the numerous Episcopate of France, indignantly rejected by many of them; condemned in succession by three Pontiffs; declared by the Universities of Louvain and Douai to be erroneous; retracted by the bishops of France; condemned by Spain, Hungary, and other countries, and condemned over again in the bull "Auctorem Fidei."'[6] Whether I am justified in using these words, the next chapter will show.

Now, in the following chapter I will give the outline of the history of the doctrine of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff; and in doing so sufficient evidence will, I hope, appear by the way to justify the assertions of the above quotation. What will appear may be thus stated:—

1. That Gallicanism has no warrant in the doctrinal practice or tradition of the Church, either in France or at large, in the thousand years preceding the Council of Constance.

2. That the first traces of Gallicanism are to be found about the time of that Council.

3. That after the Council of Constance they were rapidly and almost altogether effaced from the theology of the Church in France, until their revival in 1682.

4. That the Articles of 1682 were conceived by Jansenists, and carried through by political and oppressive means contrary to the sense of the Church in France.

5. That the Theological Faculties of the Sorbonne, and of France generally, nobly resisted and refused to teach them.

I am the more anxious to render this testimony to the Church in France, and to the Sorbonne, because I never fully knew, till I read the evidence published in this year by M. Gérin, how nobly that illustrious Church contended against the Articles of 1682.

  1. Isaias xxviii. 16.
  2. Acts xx. 20, 27.
  3. S. Matthew x. 27.
  4. 1 Cor. ix. 16.
  5. Two pamphlets have appeared in Paris, the one by the Abbé St. Pol, Chanoine Honoraire, the other by the Abbé d'Upalgaz, de l'Université d'Alcalá. In both, and almost in the same words, I am censured for saying that Gallicanism produced the great French Revolution. No proposition so shallow was uttered by me. What I really did say, and here repeat, is, that, as the despotism of the Tudors corrupted the Church in England, and produced both Anglicanism and the revolutions which have destroyed it; so also the despotism of certain French monarchs paralysed the liberty of the Church, and produced both Gallicanism and the revolutionary reaction which has effaced Gallicanism in France. It is a little daring, and hardly respectful, to tell us that the martyred clergy of 1799 died for Gallicanism.
  6. The Centenary of S. Peter, etc., p. 41.