The Proletarian Revolution in Russia/Part 1/Chapter 4
IV
PROBLEMS IN TACTICS
On April 17, 1917, I was called upon to report on tactical problems at a meeting of Bolsheviki in Petrograd. The meeting consisted of delegates to the All-Russian Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Soviets, who were about to depart and therefore could not allow me to postpone my discussion. At the close of the meeting the chairman, Comrade Zinoviev, suggested in the name of the whole assembly that I repeat my report immediately at the meeting of Bolshevik and Menshevik delegates, who wished to consider the question of unifying the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party.
I there read the "theses" which were published in Pravda on April 20 The theses and my report created discord among the Bolsheviki themselves and the staff of Pravda. After a number of consultations, we unanimously concluded that it would be expedient to openly discuss our differences, thus providing material for the All-Russian Congress of our party (Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, united with the Central Committee) which was to meet in Petrograd on May 3.
Complying with this decision I published the following, making no pretension to studying the question on all sides, but wishing only to point out the principal arguments, especially those essential for the practical problems of the working class movement.
I
An Estimate of the Moment
Marxism demands of us, the most exact, objective analysis of the relations of classes and the concrete peculiarties of each historic moment. We, the Bolsheviki, have always tried to be true to this demand, absolutely necessary from the standpoint of any scientific interpretation of poitics.
"Our teachings are not a dogma, but a guide to action"—so said Marx and Engels, who always scorned mere learning and the repetition of "formulæ" capable only of formulating general propositions, which necessarily vary in accord with the variations in the economic bases of the political and all other aspects of the historical process.
By means of this objective and precise analysis of facts must the party of the revolutionary proletariat be guided now in the solution of the problems and the forms of its activity.
In my first "Letter from Abroad" ("The First Stage of the First Revolution,' printed in this book as the first chapter, "The Bourgeois Revolution") published in Pravda, and in my "theses," I define the prevailing "moment in Russia" as a period of transition from the first stage of the Revolution to the second. Therefore, I considered the basic slogan, the "order of the day" at that time to be: "Workers, you have displayed marvels of proletarian heroism in the civil war against Czarism; you must now display marvels of proletarian organization in ,order to prepare your victory in the second stage of the Revolution."
What, then, does the first stage consist of?
In the passing of the state power to the bourgeoisie.
Before the March Revolution of 1917, the state power in Russia was in the hands of the old class—the nobility and the landholders, headed by Nicholas Romanoff.
After the March Revolution, the state power passed into the hands of a new class, of another class—the bourgeoisie.
The passing of the state power from one class to another is the first principle of a revolution, not only in a strictly scientific sense, but also in a practical political sense.
To that extent, the bourgeois, or the bourgeois democratic, revolution in Russia is completed.
But at this point we hear the shouts of objectors, who call themselves "old Bolsheviki": "Didn't we always maintain that a bourgeois democratic revolution is ended by a 'revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry'? Is the agrarian revolution, which is a phase of the bourgeois democratic revolution, completed? On the contrary, is it rather not a fact that it has not yet begun?"
My answer is: Bolshevist slogans and ideas in general have been confirmed by history; but concretely, things have developed somewhat differently than was expected, assumed a more original, peculiar and varied form.
To ignore, to forget this fact would mean to resemble those "old Bolsheviki," who more than once have played a sad role in the history of our party by repeating senseless "learned formulæ" instead of studying the peculiarities of the new, the living, reality of things.
"The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" in a certain form and, to a certain extent, is a reality of the Russian Revolution. But this "formula" foresees only a certain relation and co-operation of these classes and not the concrete political institutions which realize this relation and co-operation. "The Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates"—this is the "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" expressed in life itself.
This formula has already become old. Life has brought it out of the realm of formulae into the realm of reality, has clothed it with flesh and blood, and by thus making it concrete has changed its aspect.
In the "order of the day" there is a new problem: the split within this dictatorship between the proletarian elements (the anti-war internationalists and "communists" who stand for transition to the commune), and the petty bourgeois elements (Cheidse, Tseretelli, Stieklov, Social-Revolutionists and other "revolutionary" anti-defeatists opponents of the movement toward the commune, adherents of "support" of the bourgeoisie and the.bourgeois government.)
He who now speaks only of a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" is behind the times, and because of that has de facto gone over to the petite bourgeoisie against the proletarian class struggle: he should be relegated to the museum of "Bolshevist" pre-revolutionary relics.
Revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry has already been realized, but in a very original way, with a number of new and important aspects and differences. It is now necessary to understand that incontestable truth. A Marxist must take into consideration the true facts and living reality of today,, and not continue clinging to the theory of yesterday, which, like every other theory, at its best only outlines the fundamtntal and the general, only approaches a conception of the complexity of life.
"Theory, my friend, is gray, but green is the eternal tree of life."
Whoever questions the "completeness" of the bourgeois revolution from the old standpoint sacrifices living Marxism to a dead letter.
According to the old conception, it follows that after the rule of the bourgeoisie may and must follow the rule of the proletariat and peasantry—their dictatorship.
But in reality, it has happened otherwise: a new and novel combination of one and the other. There is in existence together and at the same time the, rule of the bourgeoisie (the government of Lvov and Guchkov) and the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry which voluntarily relinquishes power to the bourgeoisie, voluntarily converting itself into an appendage of the bourgeoisie. For we must not forget that in Petrograd, in fact, power is in the hands of the workmen and soldiers; the new government does not and cannot use violence against the workmen and soldiers, as there are neither police nor militia, or a bureaucracy, despotically ruling the people. This is a fact. And this is precisely the fact characteristic of a state of the type of the Paris Commune.
This fact does not fit into the old grooves.
One should know how to adapt theory to life, but not repeat the obsolete words "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" in general.
Let us approach this problem from another angle, in order the better to understand it.
A Marxist must not leave the firm ground of the analysis of class relations. The bourgeoisie is in power. But does not the mass of the peasants also constitute a bourgeoisie of a different type, of a different class character? Whence does it follow that this class can not come into power "completing" the bourgeois-democratic revolution? Thus often argue the "old Bolsheviki."
My answer is—it is fully possible. But a Marxist, in the consideration of the moment, must not consider the possible but the actual.
And reality shows us the fact that freely elected soldiers' and peasants' delegates freely enter the second, the accessory government, developing and strengthening it, and just as freely they yield power to the bourgeoisie—a phenomenon which does not violate the theory of Marxism, as we always knew and repeatedly pointed out that the bourgeoisie is in power not only by the use of violence, but by the lack of class consciousness and organization of the masses.
In the face of the reality of today, it is ridiculous to turn away from the fact and to speak of "possibilities."
It is possible that the peasantry will take all the land, and all power. Not only do I not forget this possibility, not only do I not limit my horizon to this one day, but directly and precisely I formulate an agrarian program in line with a new phenomenon: a deeper split between the workers and the poorest peasants on one, side, and the peasant owners on the other.
But another thing is possible: it is possible that the peasants will listen to the advice of the petty bourgeois party of Social-Revolutionists, which is under the influence of the bourgeoisie, which advises waiting for the Constituent Assembly, although until now the date of its convocation has not been set.[1]
It is possible that the peasants will adhere to and prolong their agreement with the bourgeoisie, an agreement concluded now by them with the aid of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, not only formally but actually. Everything is possible. It would be the greatest error to forget the agrarian movement and the agrarian program. But it would be just as great an error to forget the reality, which shows the fact of agreement, or, using a less judicial and more exact expression, the fact of class co-operation between the bourgeoisie and the peasantry.
When this fact will cease to be a fact, when the peasantry will separate from the bourgeoisie, take the land and use their power against the bourgeoisie—then it will be a new stage of a bourgeois-democratic revolution.
A Marxist, who, in view of the possibility of the future stage, forgets his duties now when the peasantry is in agreement with the bourgeoisie, is liable to become a petit bourgeois himself. For he, in fact, would preach to the proletariat confidence in the petite bourgeoisie ("this petite bourgeoisie, this peasantry, must separate from the bourgeoisie even during the bourgeois-democratic revolution.") This Marxist, in view of the "possibility" of a sweet and pleasant future, when the peasantry will not be the tail of the bourgeois kite, will not be the ally of the Social-Revolutionists, the Cheidses, Tseretellis, Stieklovs, will not be the supplement of the bourgeois government—he, in view of the "possibility" of this pleasant future, would forget the unpleasant present. Now, while the peasantry still remains an appendage of the bourgeoisie, the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, still plays the role of an auxiliary of the bourgeois government, opposed to "His Majesty" Lvov.
This hypothetical Marxist would resemble the milk and water Louis Blanc, or the sugary Kautskian, but never a revolutionary Marxist!
But aren't we in danger of falling into subjectivism, into a desire to jump from an incomplete revolution of a petty bourgeois character with traces of an incomplete peasant revolution, to a Socialist revolution?
If I said: "without the Czar, but a workers' government,"—this danger would confront me.
But I did not say this. I said that there cannot in Russia be any other government (not considering the bourgeois) than the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. I said that the state power in Russia can be transferred now from Lvov and Guchkov only to these very same Soviets, and it is in just these bodies that the peasants, the soldiers and the petite bourgeoisie predominate, to express it in Marxian terms, involving not ordinary and professional but class characteristics.
I have absolutely assured myself in my "theses" from jumping over the peasantry, or the petite bourgeoisie; insured myself against every kind of adventure in the "usurpation of power" by a workers' government, against conspiratorial Blanquism, since I have specifically pointed out to the experience of the Paris Commune. And this experience, as is well known and as was pointed out in detail by Marx in 1871, and by Engels in 1891, entirely eliminated Blanquism, completely secured the direct, immediate, unconditional rule of the majority and the activity of the masses only to the extent of the conscious will of this majority.
Definitely and absolutely, I have centered my "theses" on the struggle for power … power within the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. In order not to permit even the shadow of a doubt in this regard, I have twice emphasiezd in the "theses" the necessity of patient, persistent educational work, of spreading understanding, "adapted to the practical needs of the masses."
Ignorant persons or renegade Marxists, such as Plekhanov and the like, can clamor about Anarchism, Blanquism, etc. But whoever wishes to think and learn can not fail to understand that Blanquism consists in the usurpation of power by a minority, whereas the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates constitute the conscious, direct organization of the majority of the people. The task which is comprised in the struggle for influence within such an organization of the majority in the Soviets, can not be submerged in the swamp of Blanquism. And it can not be submerged in the swamp of Anarchism, as Anarchism is a negation of the necessity of government and governmental power during the period of transition from the rule of the bourgeoisie to the rule of the proletariat. Specifically and directly, eliminating every possibility of doubt, I start with the necessity of a government for this transition period; but, according to Marx and the experience of the Paris Commune, not the usual parliamentary-bourgeois form of government, but a government without a permanent army, without a police exposed to the people, without a bureaucracy imposed upon the people.
If Plekhanov shouts about "Anarchism" at the top of his voice in his Edinstvo, this again indicates his break with Marxism. To my challenge in Pravda (No. 26) that he explain the teachings on government of Marx and Engels, formulated in 1871, in 1872 and 1875, Plekhanov has had and will have nothing to say, evades the question and instead vituperates in the spirit of a petit bourgeois.
The teachings; of Marx on government are completely misunderstood by the former Marxist, Plekhanov. (By the way, the germs of this misunderstanding were apparent in his pamphlet on "Socialism and Anarchism.")
***
Let us see how Comrade Kamenev, in his article in No. 27 of Pravda, formulates his "disagreement" with my "theses" and my views expressed above. It will help us to understand them more clearly.
"As to the general plan of Comrade Lenin," writes Comrade Kamenev, "it seems to us unacceptable, as it assumes that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is completed, and is based upon an immediate transformation of this revolution into a Socialist revolution."
Two important errors are indicated in this formulation.
First: The question of the "completeness" of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is incorrectly put. This question is presented in that abstract, simple, one-colored form which does not correspond to objective reality. Whoever so puts the question, whoever now asks the question: "is the bourgeois-democratic revolution completed?"—and only that—deprives himself of the possibility of understanding an extremely complex, "two-colored" reality. This is in theory. But in practice, he surrenders helplessly to the petit bourgeois revolutionary spirit.
Indeed, reality shows us both the transition of power to the bourgeoisie ("completed" bourgeois-democratic revolution of an ordinary type) and the existence, together with the present bourgeois government, of an accessory government, which represents the "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry." This latter, which is "also a government," of its own accord has yielded power to the bourgeoisie and attached itself to the bourgeois government.
Is this reality included in the old-Bolshevist formula of Comrade Kamenev—"the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not completed"?
No. The formula has become old. It is good for nothing. It is dead. Vain will be all efforts to revive it.
Second: A practical question. It is uncertain whether there can be even now a particular "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" completely independent of the bourgeois government. It is impossible to base our Marxian tactics on the unknown.
But if it can happen, there is one road, and only one, that will lead to that accomplishment: the immediate, decisive, irrevocable separation of the proletarian, communistic elements of the movement from the petty bourgeois elements.
Why?
Because all the petit bourgeois, not accidentally but necessarily, turned toward chauvinism, toward a support of the bourgeoisie, toward dependence upon the bourgeoisie, toward a fear of trying to get along without the bourgeoisie, toward dependence upon the bourgeoisie, toward a fear of trying to get along without the bourgeoisie, etc.
How is it possible to "push" these petit bourgeois toward power, if this petit bourgeois element now could take power but does not want to?
Only by the separate and independent action of the proletarian, communistic party, only through the proletarian class struggle freed from the hesitancy and fears of the petite bourgeoisie, can we develop the necessary tactic. Only the unity of the proletariat, indeed, but a unity in action and not in words, is capable of "making it hot" for the petty bourgeois elements, so that under certain conditions they might be compelled to take over all power; and even then the possibility would not be eliminated that Guchkov and Milyukov—again under certain conditions—might strive for all power, or Cheidse, Tseretelli, Steklov, the Social-Revolutionists, who are all adherents of the petty bourgeois conception of "revolutionary defense."
He who immediately separates, and separates irrevocably, the proletarian elements in the Soviets (that is, the proletarian, communistic party) from the petty bourgeois elements, correctly expresses the interests of the movement in two possible events: in the event that Russia will yet go through a specific, independent "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," not subordinate to the bourgeoisie, or in the event that the petty bourgeois elements will not tear away from the bourgeoisie and will always (that is, until Socialism) vaccilate between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
He who is guided in his activity only by a simple formula, "the bourgeois-democratic revolution has not been completed," assumes by that very fact something like a guarantee that the petite bourgeoisie is surely capable of securing its independence from the bourgeoisie. By this, at the present moment, he surrenders helplessly to the mercy of the petite bourgeoisie.
By the way, it would not be out of place to remember that I especially emphasied in "Two Tactics" (July, 1905) two phases of the "formula" dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry:
"The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry has, as everything else in the world, a past and a future. Its past—autocracy, bondage, monarchy, privileges; its future—struggle against private property, struggle of the wage laborer, against his employer, struggle for Socialism."
The error of Comrade Kamennev is, that, even in 1917, he looks only at the past of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. But in fact its future has already begun, as the interests and politics of the worker have been sundered from those of his employer on such an important question as "national (or 'revolutionary') defense," and their attitude towards the imperialistic war.
And here I come to the second error in the criticism of Comrade Kamenev. He attacks my plan as being "based upon an immediate transformation of this (bourgeois-democratic) revolution into a Socialist Revolution."
It is not true. I not only do not count upon an "immediate tarnsformation of our revolution into a Socialist revolution," but directly warn against it, I directly state in No. 8 of my "theses":
"Not the introduction of Socialism, as our immediate problem."
Is it not clear that a man who counts upon the immediate transformation of our revolution into a Socialist revolution could not oppose an immediate introduction of Socialism?
Not only that. It is even impossible to introduce immediately a "communistic state" in Russia that is, a state organized on the type of the Paris Commune, since it is first necessary that the majority of the delegates in all (or in a majority) of the Soviets should clearly understand all the defects and the harm of the politics and tactics of the Social-Revolutionists, Cheidse, Steklov, and others. I state very precisely that I count, in this matter, only upon a "patient explanation" (is it essential to be patient in order to get a change which it is possible to realize "immediately"?)
Comrade Kamenev has been a little too "impatient" and hasty, and has repeated the bourgeois prejudices about the Paris Commune, that the Commune wanted "immediately" to introduce Socialism. It is not so. The Commune, unfortunately, was too slow with the introduction of Socialism. The actual content of the Commune, its importance and significance, is not where the bourgeois seeks, but in the creation of an original type of state. And such a state has already been born in Russia: the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates!
Comrade Kamenev did not go deep, into the fact, into the significance, of the existing Soviets, into their identity as a type and as a social-political institution with the state of the Commune; and, instead of studying the fact, he speaks of what I "count" upon as an immediate future. Unfortunately, this is a repetition of the usual bourgeois way of considering things. From the question, what are the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, whether they are a higher type of government than the parliamentary republic, whether they are more useful for the people, more democratic, more efficient in the struggle against famine, etc.,—from these fundamental aspects of the question, the attention is turned aside, to consideration of a hollow, quasi-scientific, pedantic question about "the consideration of an immediate transformation."
An empty, falsely presented question. I only "count" upon the fact that the workers, soldiers, peasants will be able to master the difficult practical questions (as the greater production. of bread, the better provisioning of the soldiers, etc.) much better than the bureaucrats and the police.
I am deeply convinced that the Soviets of Soldiers,' Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates will realize the independence of the mass of the people much more rapidly and much more adequately than a parliamentary republic. They will, in a better way, and more practically and correctly, decide what steps could be and should be taken towards Socialism. Control of the banks, centralization of all the banks into one, this is not Socialism yet, but a step towards Socialism. Such steps are made today by the junker and the bourgeois in Germany against the people. They will be accomplished much more thoroughly to-morrow in the interest of the people by the Soviets, if the Soviets assume all government power.
And what makes necessary these steps?
Hunger. Disorganization of economic life. The horrors of war. The agony of the wounds inflicted upon humanity by the war.
Comrade Kamenev concludes his article with a statement that "in a broad discussion he hopes to defend his point of view as the only possible one for revolutionary Socialism, inasmuch as Socialism aims to, and must, remain to the end a party of the revolutionary masses of the proletariat, and not become transformed into a group of propagandist-Communists."
It seems to me that in these words is contained a deeply erroneous estimate of the moment. Comrade Kamenev likens the "party of the masses" to a "group of propagandists." But the "masses" have just now yielded to the "hysteria" of "revolutionary defense," of co-operation with the bourgeois government. Wouldn't it be more becoming for internationalists to be able to resist, at such a moment, the "mass" hysteria than "want to be with the masses," that is, to yield to the general epidemic? Haven't we seen in all the belligerent European countries how the social-patriots and betrayers of Socialism justified themselves by emphasizing their desire to "remain with the masses"? Is it not necessary for a certain time to be able to remain in a minority against the "mass" ? Is not the task of the propagandist, just at this moment, a central point in the struggle to liberate the proletarian cause from the "mass" defensive-bourgeois hysteria? The fusion of the masses, proletarian and non-proletarian, without distinctions of class differences within the masses, is one of the conditions producing the "defensive" epidemic. To speak contemptuously of the "group of propagandists" of the proletarian cause is, as a matter of fact, very unbecoming.
II
'"Theses" on the Problems of the Proletariat
in The Revolution.
As I only arrived in Petrograd on the night of April 16, I could of course, on my own responsibility alone and without sufficient preparation render a report on April 17 on the problems of the revolutionary proletariat.
The only thing that I could do to explain my position was to prepare a written "theses." I read them, and gave the text to Comrade Tseretelli. I read them twice, very slowly: first at the meeting of the Bolsheviki, then at the joint meeting of Bolsheviki and Mensheviki.
I am publishing these personal "theses," provided with very short explanatory notes, which were developed in more detail in the report:
1.—In our relation to war, which on the part of Russia and with the new government of Lvov, Guchkov & Co. unquestionably remains a predatory imperialistic war in virtue of the capitalistic character of this government, not the smallest concessions to "revolutionary defense" are permissible.
The class conscious proletariat can give its consent to a revolutionary war, which really justifies revolutionary defense, only under conditions of (a) the transference of all power to the proletariat and its ally the poorest peasantry; (b) the repudiation of annexations in fact and not in words; (c) the complete break with the interests of capital.
In view of the undoubted integrity of the mass of adherents of "revolutionary defense," who recognize war only as a necessity and not for the sake of conquests, in view of their deception by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary to explain their mistake to them in detail, to explain the indissoluble connection between capital and the imperialistic war, to prove to them that it is impossible to end the war by a truly democratic peace, not a peace of violence, without the overthrow of capital.
The organization of an extensive propaganda of these ideas is necessary in the active army.
2.—The peculiarity of the present moment in Russia consists in the transition from the first stage of the Revolution, which gave power to the bourgeoisie because of the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, to the second stage, which must give power to the proletariat and poorest peasantry.
This transition is characterized by the maximum of "legality" (Russia now is the freest of all the belligerent nations of the world), by the absence of violence of the masses, and, finally, by the masses' trustful, unconscious attitude towards the government of capitalists, the worst enemies of peace and Socialism.
This peculiarity demands of us the ability to adapt ourselves to certain conditions of partisan work among the broad masses of the proletariat, who have only now awakened to political life.
3.—No support for the Provisional Government; explanation of the emptiness of its promises, especially concerning the repudiation of annexations. The revelation of the real character of this government, instead of the illusory "demand" that this government, a government of capitalists, should cease to be imperialistic.
4.—Recognition of the fact that in the majority of the Soviets of Workmen's Delegates our party is in the minority, and thus far in a small minority, against the bloc of all the petty bourgeois opportunistic elements, who have come under the influence of the bourgeoisie and who carry this influence into the ranks of the proletariat.
It should be explained to the masses that the Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers and Peasants constitute the only possible form of revolutionary government, and that therefore our problem, as long as this government is influenced by the bourgeoisie, is to adapt our propaganda, systematic, patient, persistent, to the practical needs of the masses, to explain their errors and our tactics.
As long as we are in the minority, we are carrying on work of criticism and explanation of errors; preaching, in the meantime, the necessity of a transference of the whole governmental power to the Soviets, in order that the masses should rid themselves of their errors by experience.
5.—Not a parliamentary republic—a return to it from the Soviets of Workmen's Delegates would be a step backwards—but a Republic of the Soviets of Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates, throughout the whole country.[2]
The removal of the police, army[3] and bureaucracy.
The salary of all government employees, who could be elected or recalled at any Time, not to be any higher than the average salary of a good worker.
6.—In the agrarian program, the transfer of the center of gravity to the Soviets of Farm-Laborers' Delegates.
Confiscation of all the land.
Nationalization of all the land in the country, control of it by the local Soviets of Peasants' Delegates.
Creation of a rural economy, under the control of the farm workers' delegates, out of every large estate (100 to 400 desiatyns, according to local conditions and by the decision of the local organizations).
7.—The immediate unification of all the banks into one national bank and the introduction of control over this bank by the Soviets of Workmen's Delegates.
8.—Not the "introduction" of Socialism as our immediate aim, but a transition only to the "control" of the production and distribution of products by the Soviets of Workmen's Delegates.
9.—Party problems:
a) An immediate convention of the party.
b) Consideration of the party program, mainly: (i) On Imperialism and the imperialistic war; (2) Our relation to government and our demand for a "government-Commune;" (3) The alteration of our minimum program.
c) Change of the name of the party.[4]
10.—Revival of the International. Initiating the creation of a revolutionary International. An International against the social-patriots and the "center."[5]
- ↑ In order that my words be not misinterpreted, I shall add—that I am absolutely in favor of the Peasants' and Workmen's Soviets immediately taking all the land, but that order and discipline should be strictly maintained by them; that sabotage and destruction of machines, buildings and cattle should be prevented: and that cultivation and the production of bread should not be stopped, but increased, because the soldiers need twice as much bread and the people must not starve.
- ↑ That is, of a government the type of which was the Paris Commune.
- ↑ That is, the replacement of a permanent army by the general armament of the people.
- ↑ Instead of "Social Democracy," the official leaders of which in the whole world have betrayed Socialism by going over to the bourgeoisie, we must call ourselves the Communist Party.
- ↑ The "centre" in the international Socialist movement means those elements, e. g., Kautsky & Co. in Germany, Longuet & Co. in France, Cheidse & Co. in Russia, Turati & Co. in Italy, Macdonald & Co. in England, etc.