1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Italy
ITALY (Italia), the name[1] applied both in ancient and in modern times to the great peninsula that projects from the mass of central Europe far to the south into the Mediterranean Sea, where the island of Sicily may be considered as a continuation of the continental promontory. The portion of the Mediterranean commonly termed the Tyrrhenian Sea forms its limit on the W. and S., and the Adriatic on the E.; while to the N., where it joins the main continent of Europe, it is separated from the adjacent regions by the mighty barrier of the Alps, which sweeps round in a vast semicircle from the head of the Adriatic to the shores of Nice and Monaco.
Topography.—The land thus circumscribed extends between the parallels of 46° 40′ and 36° 38′ N., and between 6° 30′ and 18° 30′ E. Its greatest length in a straight line along the mainland is from N.W. to S.E., in which direction it measures 708 m. in a direct line from the frontier near Courmayeur to Cape Sta Maria di Leuca, south of Otranto, but the great mountain peninsula of Calabria extends about two degrees farther south to Cape Spartivento in lat. 37° 55′. Its breadth is, owing to its configuration, very irregular. The northern portion, measured from the Alps at the Monte Viso to the mouth of the Po, has a breadth of about 270 m., while the maximum breadth, from the Rocca Chiardonnet near Susa to a peak in the valley of the Isonzo, is 354 m. But the peninsula of Italy, which forms the largest portion of the country, nowhere exceeds 150 m. in breadth, while it does not generally measure more than 100 m. across. Its southern extremity, Calabria, forms a complete peninsula, being united to the mass of Lucania or the Basilicata by an isthmus only 35 m. in width, while that between the gulfs of Sta Eufemia and Squillace, which connects the two portions of the province, does not exceed 20 m. The area of the kingdom of Italy, exclusive of the large islands, is computed at 91,277 sq. m. Though Boundaries. the Alps form throughout the northern boundary of Italy, the exact limits at the extremities of the Alpine chain are not clearly marked. Ancient geographers appear to have generally regarded the remarkable headland which descends from the Maritime Alps to the sea between Nice and Monaco as the limit of Italy in that direction, and in a purely geographical point of view it is probably the best point that could be selected. But Augustus, who was the first to give to Italy a definite political organization, carried the frontier to the river Varus or Var, a few miles west of Nice, and this river continued in modern times to be generally recognized as the boundary between France and Italy. But in 1860 the annexation of Nice and the adjoining territory to France brought the political frontier farther east, to a point between Mentone and Ventimiglia which constitutes no natural limit.
Towards the north-east, the point where the Julian Alps approach close to the seashore (just at the sources of the little stream known in ancient times as the Timavus) would seem to constitute the best natural limit. But by Augustus the frontier was carried farther east so as to include Tergeste (Trieste), and the little river Formio (Risano) was in the first instance chosen as the limit, but this was subsequently transferred to the river Arsia (the Arsa), which flows into the Gulf of Quarnero, so as to include almost all Istria; and the circumstance that the coast of Istria was throughout the middle ages held by the republic of Venice tended to perpetuate this arrangement, so that Istria was generally regarded as belonging to Italy, though certainly not forming any natural portion of that country. Present Italian aspirations are similarly directed.
The only other part of the northern frontier of Italy where the boundary is not clearly marked by nature is Tirol or the valley of the Adige. Here the main chain of the Alps (as marked by the watershed) recedes so far to the north that it has never constituted the frontier. In ancient times the upper valleys of the Adige and its tributaries were inhabited by Raetian tribes and included in the province of Raetia; and the line of demarcation between that province and Italy was purely arbitrary, as it remains to this day. Tridentum or Trent was in the time of Pliny included in the tenth region of Italy or Venetia, but he tells us that the inhabitants were a Raetian tribe. At the present day the frontier between Austria and the kingdom of Italy crosses the Adige about 30 m. below Trent—that city and its territory, which previous to the treaty of Lunéville in 1801 was governed by sovereign archbishops, subject only to the German emperors, being now included in the Austrian empire.
While the Alps thus constitute the northern boundary of Italy, its configuration and internal geography are determined almost entirely by the great chain of the Apennines, which branches off from the Maritime Alps between Nice and Genoa, and, after stretching in an unbroken line from the Gulf of Genoa to the Adriatic, turns more to the south, and is continued throughout Central and Southern Italy, of which it forms as it were the backbone, until it ends in the southernmost extremity of Calabria at Cape Spartivento. The great spur or promontory projecting towards the east to Brindisi and Otranto has no direct connexion with the central chain.
One chief result of the manner in which the Apennines traverse Italy from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic is the marked division between Northern Italy, including the region north of the Apennines and extending thence to the foot of the Alps, and the central and more southerly portions of the peninsula. No such line of separation exists farther south, and the terms Central and Southern Italy, though in general use among geographers and convenient for descriptive purposes, do not correspond to any natural divisions.
1. Northern Italy.—By far the larger portion of Northern Italy is occupied by the basin of the Po, which comprises the whole of the broad plain extending from the foot of the Apennines to that of the Alps, together with the valleys and slopes on both sides of it. From its source in Monte Viso to its outflow into the Adriatic—a distance of more than 220 m. in a direct line—the Po receives all the waters that flow from the Apennines northwards, and all those that descend from the Alps towards the south, Mincio (the outlet of the Lake of Garda) inclusive. The next river to the E. is the Adige, which, after pursuing a parallel course with the Po for a considerable distance, enters the Adriatic by a separate mouth. Farther to the N. and N.E. the various rivers of Venetia fall directly into the Gulf of Venice.
There is no other instance in Europe of a basin of similar extent equally clearly characterized—the perfectly level character of the plain being as striking as the boldness with which the lower slopes of the mountain ranges begin to rise on each side of it. This is most clearly marked on the side of the Apennines, where the great Aemilian Way, which has been the high road from the time of the Romans to our own, preserves an unbroken straight line from Rimini to Piacenza, a distance of more than 150 m., during which the underfalls of the mountains continually approach it on the left, without once crossing the line of road.
The geography of Northern Italy will be best described by following the course of the Po. That river has its origin as a mountain torrent descending from two little dark lakes on the north flank of Monte Viso, at a height of more than 6000 ft. above the sea; and after a course of less than 20 m. it enters the plain at Saluzzo, between which and Turin, a distance of only 30 m., it receives three considerable tributaries—the Chisone on its left bank, bringing down the waters from the valley of Fenestrelle, and the Varaita and Maira on the south, contributing those of two valleys of the Alps immediately south of that of the Po itself. A few miles below Valenza it is joined by the Tanaro, a large stream, which brings with it the united waters of the Stura, the Bormida and several minor rivers.
More important are the rivers that descend from the main chain of the Graian and Pennine Alps and join the Po on its left bank. Of these the Dora (called for distinction’s sake Dora Riparia), which unites with the greater river just below Turin, has its source in the Mont Genèvre, and flows past Susa at the foot of the Mont Cenis. Next comes the Stura, which rises in the glaciers of the Roche Melon; then the Orca, flowing through the Val di Locana; and then the Dora Baltea, one of the greatest of all the Alpine tributaries of the Po, which has its source in the glaciers of Mont Blanc, above Courmayeur, and thence descends through the Val d’Aosta for about 70 m. till it enters the plain at Ivrea, and, after flowing about 20 m. more, joins the Po a few miles below Chivasso. This great valley—one of the most considerable on the southern side of the Alps—has attracted special attention, in ancient as well as modern times, from its leading to two of the most frequented passes across the great mountain chain—the Great and the Little St Bernard—the former diverging at Aosta, and crossing the main ridges to the north into the valley of the Rhone, the other following a more westerly direction into Savoy. Below Aosta also the Dora Baltea receives several considerable tributaries, which descend from the glaciers between Mont Blanc and Monte Rosa.
About 25 m. below its confluence with the Dora, the Po receives the Sesia, also a large river, which has its source above Alagna at the southern foot of Monte Rosa, and after flowing by Varallo and Vercelli falls into the Po about 14 m. below the latter city. About 30 m. east of this confluence—in the course of which the Po makes a great bend south to Valenza, and then returns again to the northward—it is joined by the Ticino, a large and rapid river, which brings with it the outflow of Lago Maggiore and all the waters that flow into it. Of these the Ticino itself has its source about 10 m. above Airolo at the foot of the St Gotthard, and after flowing above 36 m. through the Val Leventina to Bellinzona (where it is joined by the Moësa bringing down the waters of the Val Misocco) enters the lake through a marshy plain at Magadino, about 10 m. distant. On the west side of the lake the Toccia or Tosa descends from the pass of the Gries nearly due south to Domodossola, where it receives the waters of the Doveria from the Simplon, and a few miles lower down those of the Val d’Anzasca from the foot of Monte Rosa, and 12 m. farther has its outlet into the lake between Baveno and Pallanza. The Lago Maggiore is also the receptacle of the waters of the Lago di Lugano on the east and the Lago d’Orta on the west.
The next great affluent of the Po, the Adda, forms the outflow of the Lake of Como, and has also its sources in the Alps, above Bormio, whence it flows through the broad and fertile valley of the Valtellina for more than 65 m. till it enters the lake near Colico. The Adda in this part of its course has a direction almost due east to west; but at the point where it reaches the lake, the Liro descends the valley of S. Giacomo, which runs nearly north and south from the pass of the Splügen, thus affording one of the most direct lines of communication across the Alps. The Adda flows out of the lake at its south-eastern extremity at Lecco, and has thence a course through the plain of above 70 m. till it enters the Po between Piacenza and Cremona. It flows by Lodi and Pizzighettone, and receives the waters of the Brembo, descending from the Val Brembana, and the Serio from the Val Seriana above Bergamo. The Oglio, a more considerable stream than either of the last two, rises in the Monte Tonale above Edolo, and descends through the Val Camonica to Lovere, where it expands into a large lake, called Iseo from the town of that name on its southern shore. Issuing thence at its south-west extremity, the Oglio has a long and winding course through the plain before it finally reaches the Po a few miles above Borgoforte. In this lower part it receives the smaller streams of the Mella, which flows by Brescia, and the Chiese, which proceeds from the small Lago d’Idro, between the Lago d’Iseo and that of Garda.
The last of the great tributaries of the Po is the Mincio, which flows from the Lago di Garda, and has a course of about 40 m. from Peschiera, where it issues from the lake at its south-eastern angle, till it joins the Po. About 12 m. above the confluence it passes under the walls of Mantua, and expands into a broad lake-like reach so as entirely to encircle that city. Notwithstanding its extent, the Lago di Garda is not fed by the snows of the high Alps, nor is the stream which enters it at its northern extremity (at Riva) commonly known as the Mincio, though forming the main source of that river, but is termed the Sarca; it rises at the foot of Monte Tonale.
The Adige, formed by the junction of two streams—the Etsch or Adige proper and the Eisak, both of which belong to Tirol rather than to Italy—descends as far as Verona, where it enters the great plain, with a course from north to south nearly parallel to the rivers last described, and would seem likely to discharge its waters into those of the Po, but below Legnago it turns eastward and runs parallel to the Po for about 40 m., entering the Adriatic by an independent mouth about 8 m. from the northern outlet of the greater stream. The waters of the two rivers have, however, been made to communicate by artificial cuts and canals in more than one place.
The Po itself, which is here a very large stream, with an average width of 400 to 600 yds., continues to flow with an undivided mass of waters as far as Sta Maria di Ariano, where it parts into two arms, known as the Po di Maestra and Po di Goro, and these again are subdivided into several other branches, forming a delta above 20 m. in width from north to south. The point of bifurcation, at present about 25 m. from the sea, was formerly much farther inland, more than 10 m. west of Ferrara, where a small arm of the river, still called the Po di Ferrara, branches from the main stream. Previous to the year 1154 this channel was the main stream, and the two small branches into which it subdivides, called the Po di Volano and Po di Primaro, were in early times the two main outlets of the river. The southernmost of these, the Po di Primaro, enters the Adriatic about 12 m. north of Ravenna, so that if these two arms be included, the delta of the Po extends about 36 m. from south to north. The whole course of the river, including its windings, is estimated at about 450 m.
Besides the delta of the Po and the large marshy tracts which it forms, there exist on both sides of it extensive lagoons of salt water, generally separated from the Adriatic by narrow strips of sand or embankments, partly natural and partly artificial, but having openings which admit the influx and efflux of the sea-water, and serve as ports for communication with the mainland. The best known and the most extensive of these lagoons is that in which Venice is situated, which extends from Torcello in the north to Chioggia and Brondolo in the south, a distance of above 40 m.; but they were formerly much more extensive, and afforded a continuous means of internal navigation, by what were called “the Seven Seas” (Septem Maria), from Ravenna to Altinum, a few miles north of Torcello. That city, like Ravenna, originally stood in the midst of a lagoon; and the coast east of it to near Monfalcone, where it meets the mountains, is occupied by similar expanses of water, which are, however, becoming gradually converted into dry land.
The tract adjoining this long line of lagoons is, like the basin of the Po, a broad expanse of perfectly level alluvial plain, extending from the Adige eastwards to the Carnic Alps, where they approach close to the Adriatic between Aquileia and Trieste, and northwards to the foot of the great chain, which here sweeps round in a semicircle from the neighbourhood of Vicenza to that of Aquileia. The space thus included was known in ancient times as Venetia, a name applied in the middle ages to the well-known city; the eastern portion of it became known in the middle ages as the Frioul or Friuli.
Returning to the south of the Po, the tributaries of that river on its right bank below the Tanaro are very inferior in volume and importance to those from the north. Flowing from the Ligurian Apennines, which never attain the limit of perpetual snow, they generally dwindle in summer into insignificant streams. Beginning from the Tanaro, the principal of them are—(1) the Scrivia, a small but rapid stream flowing from the Apennines at the back of Genoa; (2) the Trebbia, a much larger river, though of the same torrent-like character, which rises near Torriglia within 20 m. of Genoa, flows by Bobbio, and joins the Po a few miles above Piacenza; (3) the Nure, a few miles east of the preceding; (4) the Taro, a more considerable stream; (5) the Parma, flowing by the city of the same name; (6) the Enza; (7) the Secchia, which flows by Modena; (8) the Panaro, a few miles to the east of that city; (9) the Reno, which flows by Bologna, but instead of holding its course till it discharges its waters into the Po, as it did in Roman times, is turned aside by an artificial channel into the Po di Primaro. The other small streams east of this—of which the most considerable are the Solaro, the Santerno, flowing by Imola, the Lamone by Faenza, the Montone by Forlì, all in Roman times tributaries of the Po—have their outlet in like manner into the Po di Primaro, or by artificial mouths into the Adriatic between Ravenna and Rimini. The river Marecchia, which enters the sea immediately north of Rimini, may be considered as the natural limit of Northern Italy. It was adopted by Augustus as the boundary of Gallia Cispadana; the far-famed Rubicon was a trifling stream a few miles farther north, now called Fiumicino. The Savio is the only other stream of any importance which has always flowed directly into the Adriatic from this side of the Tuscan Apennines.
The narrow strip of coast-land between the Maritime Alps, the Apennines and the sea—called in ancient times Liguria, and now known as the Riviera of Genoa—is throughout its extent, from Nice to Genoa on the one side, and from Genoa to Spezia on the other, almost wholly mountainous. It is occupied by the branches and offshoots of the mountain ranges which separate it from the great plain to the north, and send down their lateral ridges close to the water’s edge, leaving only in places a few square miles of level plains at the mouths of the rivers and openings of the valleys. The district is by no means devoid of fertility, the steep slopes facing the south enjoying so fine a climate as to render them very favourable for the growth of fruit trees, especially the olive, which is cultivated in terraces to a considerable height up the face of the mountains, while the openings of the valleys are generally occupied by towns or villages, some of which have become favourite winter resorts.
From the proximity of the mountains to the sea none of the rivers in this part of Italy has a long course, and they are generally mere mountain torrents, rapid and swollen in winter and spring, and almost dry in summer. The largest and most important are those which descend from the Maritime Alps between Nice and Albenga. The most considerable of them are—the Roja, which rises in the Col di Tenda and descends to Ventimiglia; the Taggia, between San Remo and Oneglia; and the Centa, which enters the sea at Albenga. The Lavagna, which enters the sea at Chiavari, is the only stream of any importance between Genoa and the Gulf of Spezia. But immediately east of that inlet (a remarkable instance of a deep landlocked gulf with no river flowing into it) the Magra, which descends from Pontremoli down the valley known as the Lunigiana, is a large stream, and brings with it the waters of another considerable stream, the Vara. The Magra (Macra), in ancient times the boundary between Liguria and Etruria, may be considered as constituting on this side the limit of Northern Italy.
The Apennines (q.v.), as has been already mentioned, here traverse the whole breadth of Italy, cutting off the peninsula properly so termed from the broader mass of Northern Italy by a continuous barrier of considerable breadth, though of far inferior elevation to that of the Alps. The Ligurian Apennines may be considered as taking their rise in the neighbourhood of Savona, where a pass of very moderate elevation connects them with the Maritime Alps, of which they are in fact only a continuation. From the neighbourhood of Savona to that of Genoa they do not rise to more than 3000 to 4000 ft., and are traversed by passes of less than 2000 ft. As they extend towards the east they increase in elevation; the Monte Bue rises to 5915 ft., while the Monte Cimone, a little farther east, attains 7103 ft. This is the highest point in the northern Apennines, and belongs to a group of summits of nearly equal altitude; the range which is continued thence between Tuscany and what are now known as the Emilian provinces presents a continuous ridge from the mountains at the head of the Val di Mugello (due north of Florence) to the point where they are traversed by the celebrated Furlo Pass. The highest point in this part of the range is the Monte Falterona, above the sources of the Arno, which attains 5410 ft. Throughout this tract the Apennines are generally covered with extensive forests of chestnut, oak and beech; while their upper slopes afford admirable pasturage. Few towns of any importance are found either on their northern or southern declivity, and the former region especially, though occupying a tract of from 30 to 40 m. in width, between the crest of the Apennines and the plain of the Po, is one of the least known and at the same time least interesting portions of Italy.
2. Central Italy.—The geography of Central Italy is almost wholly determined by the Apennines, which traverse it in a direction from about north-north-east to south-south-west, almost precisely parallel to that of the coast of the Adriatic from Rimini to Pescara. The line of the highest summits and of the watershed ranges is about 30 to 40 m. from the Adriatic, while about double that distance separates it from the Tyrrhenian Sea on the west. In this part of the range almost all the highest points of the Apennines are found. Beginning from the group called the Alpi della Luna near the sources of the Tiber, which attain 4435 ft., they are continued by the Monte Nerone (5010 ft.), Monte Catria (5590), and Monte Maggio to the Monte Pennino near Nocera (5169 ft.), and thence to the Monte della Sibilla, at the source of the Nar or Nera, which attains 7663 ft. Proceeding thence southwards, we find in succession the Monte Vettore (8128 ft.), the Pizzo di Sevo (7945 ft.), and the two great mountain masses of the Monte Corno, commonly called the Gran Sasso d’Italia, the most lofty of all the Apennines, attaining to a height of 9560 ft., and the Monte della Maiella, its highest summit measuring 9170 ft. Farther south no very lofty summits are found till we come to the group of Monti del Matese, in Samnium (6660 ft.), which according to the division here adopted belongs to Southern Italy. Besides the lofty central masses enumerated there are two other lofty peaks, outliers from the main range, and separated from it by valleys of considerable extent. These are the Monte Terminillo, near Leonessa (7278 ft.), and the Monte Velino near the Lake Fucino, rising to 8192 ft., both of which are covered with snow from November till May. But the Apennines of Central Italy, instead of presenting, like the Alps and the northern Apennines, a definite central ridge, with transverse valleys leading down from it on both sides, in reality constitute a mountain mass of very considerable breadth, composed of a number of minor ranges and groups of mountains, which preserve a generally parallel direction, and are separated by upland valleys, some of them of considerable extent as well as considerable elevation above the sea. Such is the basin of Lake Fucino, situated in the centre of the mass, almost exactly midway between the two seas, at an elevation of 2180 ft. above them; while the upper valley of the Aterno, in which Aquila is situated, is 2380 ft. above the sea. Still more elevated is the valley of the Gizio (a tributary of the Aterno), of which Sulmona is the chief town. This communicates with the upper valley of the Sangro by a level plain called the Piano di Cinque Miglia, at an elevation of 4298 ft., regarded as the most wintry spot in Italy. Nor do the highest summits form a continuous ridge of great altitude for any considerable distance; they are rather a series of groups separated by tracts of very inferior elevation forming natural passes across the range, and broken in some places (as is the case in almost all limestone countries) by the waters from the upland valleys turning suddenly at right angles, and breaking through the mountain ranges which bound them. Thus the Gran Sasso and the Maiella are separated by the deep valley of the Aterno, while the Tronto breaks through the range between Monte Vettore and the Pizzo di Sevo. This constitution of the great mass of the central Apennines has in all ages exercised an important influence upon the character of this portion of Italy, which may be considered as divided by nature into two great regions, a cold and barren upland country, bordered on both sides by rich and fertile tracts, enjoying a warm but temperate climate.
The district west of the Apennines, a region of great beauty and fertility, though inferior in productiveness to Northern Italy, coincides in a general way with the countries familiar to all students of ancient history as Etruria and Latium. Until the union of Italy they were comprised in Tuscany and the southern Papal States. The northern part of Tuscany is indeed occupied to a considerable extent by the underfalls and offshoots of the Apennines, which, besides the slopes and spurs of the main range that constitutes its northern frontier towards the plain of the Po, throw off several outlying ranges or groups. Of these the most remarkable is the group between the valleys of the Serchio and the Magra, commonly known as the mountains of Carrara, from the celebrated marble quarries in the vicinity of that city. Two of the summits of this group, the Pizzo d’Uccello and the Pania della Croce, attain 6155 and 6100 ft. Another lateral range, the Prato Magno, which branches off from the central chain at the Monte Falterona, and separates the upper valley of the Arno from its second basin, rises to 5188 ft.; while a similar branch, called the Alpe di Catenaja, of inferior elevation, divides the upper course of the Arno from that of the Tiber.
The rest of this tract is for the most part a hilly, broken country, of moderate elevation, but Monte Amiata, near Radicofani, an isolated mass of volcanic origin, attains a height of 5650 ft. South of this the country between the frontier of Tuscany and the Tiber is in great part of volcanic origin, forming hills with distinct crater-shaped basins, in several instances occupied by small lakes (the Lake of Bolsena, Lake of Vico and Lake of Bracciano). This volcanic tract extends across the Campagna of Rome, till it rises again in the lofty group of the Alban hills, the highest summit of which, the Monte Cavo, is 3160 ft. above the sea. In this part the Apennines are separated from the sea, distant about 30 m. by the undulating volcanic plain of the Roman Campagna, from which the mountains rise in a wall-like barrier, of which the highest point, the Monte Gennaro, attains 4165 ft. South of Palestrina again, the main mass of the Apennines throws off another lateral mass, known in ancient times as the Volscian mountains (now called the Monti Lepini), separated from the central ranges by the broad valley of the Sacco, a tributary of the Liri (Liris) or Garigliano, and forming a large and rugged mountain mass, nearly 5000 ft. in height, which descends to the sea at Terracina, and between that point and the mouth of the Liri throws out several rugged mountain headlands, which may be considered as constituting the natural boundary between Latium and Campania, and consequently the natural limit of Central Italy. Besides these offshoots of the Apennines there are in this part of Central Italy several detached mountains, rising almost like islands on the seashore, of which the two most remarkable are the Monte Argentaro on the coast of Tuscany near Orbetello (2087 ft.) and the Monte Circello (1771 ft.) at the angle of the Pontine Marshes, by the whole breadth of which it is separated from the Volscian Apennines.
The two valleys of the Arno and the Tiber (Ital. Tevere) may be considered as furnishing the key to the geography of all this portion of Italy west of the Apennines. The Arno, which has its source in the Monte Falterona, one of the most elevated summits of the main chain of the Tuscan Apennines, flows nearly south till in the neighbourhood of Arezzo it turns abruptly north-west, and pursues that course as far as Pontassieve, where it again makes a sudden bend to the west, and pursues a westerly course thence to the sea, passing through Florence and Pisa. Its principal tributary is the Sieve, which joins it at Pontassieve, bringing down the waters of the Val di Mugello. The Elsa and the Era, which join it on its left bank, descending from the hills near Siena and Volterra, are inconsiderable streams; and the Serchio, which flows from the territory of Lucca and the Alpi Apuani, and formerly joined the Arno a few miles from its mouth, now enters the sea by a separate channel. The most considerable rivers of Tuscany south of the Arno are the Cecina, which flows through the plain below Volterra, and the Ombrone, which rises in the hills near Siena, and enters the sea about 12 m. below Grosseto.
The Tiber, a much more important river than the Arno, and the largest in Italy with the exception of the Po, rises in the Apennines, about 20 m. east of the source of the Arno, and flows nearly south by Borgo S. Sepolcro and Città di Castello, then between Perugia and Todi to Orte, just below which it receives the Nera. The Nera, which rises in the lofty group of the Monte della Sibilla, is a considerable stream, and brings with it the waters of the Velino (with its tributaries the Turano and the Salto), which joins it a few miles below its celebrated waterfall at Terni. The Teverone or Anio, which enters the Tiber a few miles above Rome, is an inferior stream to the Nera, but brings down a considerable body of water from the mountains above Subiaco. It is a singular fact in the geography of Central Italy that the valleys of the Tiber and Arno are in some measure connected by that of the Chiana, a level and marshy tract, the waters from which flow partly into the Arno and partly into the Tiber.
The eastern declivity of the central Apennines towards the Adriatic is far less interesting and varied than the western. The central range here approaches much nearer to the sea, and hence, with few exceptions, the rivers that flow from it have short courses and are of comparatively little importance. They may be enumerated, proceeding from Rimini southwards: (1) the Foglia; (2) the Metauro, of historical celebrity, and affording access to one of the most frequented passes of the Apennines; (3) the Esino; (4) the Potenza; (5) the Chienti; (6) the Aso; (7) the Tronto; (8) the Vomano; (9) the Aterno; (10) the Sangro; (11) the Trigno, which forms the boundary of the southernmost province of the Abruzzi, and may therefore be taken as the limit of Central Italy.
The whole of this portion of Central Italy is a hilly country, much broken and cut up by the torrents from the mountains, but fertile, especially in fruit-trees, olives and vines; and it has been, both in ancient and modern times, a populous district, containing many small towns though no great cities. Its chief disadvantage is the absence of ports, the coast preserving an almost unbroken straight line, with the single exception of Ancona, the only port worthy of the name on the eastern coast of Central Italy.
3. Southern Italy.—The great central mass of the Apennines, which has held its course throughout Central Italy, with a general direction from north-west to south-east, may be considered as continued in the same direction for about 100 m. farther, from the basin-shaped group of the Monti del Matese (which rises to 6660 ft.) to the neighbourhood of Potenza, in the heart of the province of Basilicata, corresponding nearly to the ancient Lucania. The whole of the district known in ancient times as Samnium (a part of which retains the name of Sannio, though officially designated the province of Campobasso) is occupied by an irregular mass of mountains, of much inferior height to those of Central Italy, and broken up into a number of groups, intersected by rivers, which have for the most part a very tortuous course. This mountainous tract, which has an average breadth of from 50 to 60 m., is bounded west by the plain of Campania, now called the Terra di Lavoro, and east by the much broader and more extensive tract of Apulia or Puglia, composed partly of level plains, but for the most part of undulating downs, contrasting strongly with the mountain ranges of the Apennines, which rise abruptly above them. The central mass of the mountains, however, throws out two outlying ranges, the one to the west, which separates the Bay of Naples from that of Salerno, and culminates in the Monte S. Angelo above Castellammare (4720 ft.), while the detached volcanic cone of Vesuvius (nearly 4000 ft.) is isolated from the neighbouring mountains by an intervening strip of plain. On the east side in like manner the Monte Gargano (3465 ft.), a detached limestone mass which projects in a bold spur-like promontory into the Adriatic, forming the only break in the otherwise uniform coast-line of Italy on that sea, though separated from the great body of the Apennines by a considerable interval of low country, may be considered as merely an outlier from the central mass.
From the neighbourhood of Potenza, the main ridge of the Apennines is continued by the Monti della Maddalena in a direction nearly due south, so that it approaches within a short distance of the Gulf of Policastro, whence it is carried on as far as the Monte Pollino, the last of the lofty summits of the Apennine chain, which exceeds 7000 ft. in height. The range is, however, continued through the province now called Calabria, to the southern extremity or “toe” of Italy, but presents in this part a very much altered character, the broken limestone range which is the true continuation of the chain as far as the neighbourhood of Nicastro and Catanzaro, and keeps close to the west coast, being flanked on the east by a great mass of granitic mountains, rising to about 6000 ft., and covered with vast forests, from which it derives the name of La Sila. A similar mass, separated from the preceding by a low neck of Tertiary hills, fills up the whole of the peninsular extremity of Italy from Squillace to Reggio. Its highest point is called Aspromonte (6420 ft.).
While the rugged and mountainous district of Calabria, extending nearly due south for a distance of more than 150 m., thus derives its character and configuration almost wholly from the range of the Apennines, the long spur-like promontory which projects towards the east to Brindisi and Otranto is merely a continuation of the low tract of Apulia, with a dry calcareous soil of Tertiary origin. The Monte Volture, which rises in the neighbourhood of Melfi and Venosa to 4357 ft., is of volcanic origin, and in great measure detached from the adjoining mass of the Apennines. Eastward from this the ranges of low bare hills called the Murgie of Gravina and Altamura gradually sink into the still more moderate level of those which constitute the peninsular tract between Brindisi and Taranto as far as the Cape of Sta Maria di Leuca, the south-east extremity of Italy. This projecting tract, which may be termed the “heel” or “spur” of Southern Italy, in conjunction with the great promontory of Calabria, forms the deep Gulf of Taranto, about 70 m. in width, and somewhat greater depth, which receives a number of streams from the central mass of the Apennines.
None of the rivers of Southern Italy is of any great importance. The Liri (Liris) or Garigliano, which has its source in the central Apennines above Sora, not far from Lake Fucino, and enters the Gulf of Gaeta about 10 m. east of the city of that name, brings down a considerable body of water; as does also the Volturno, which rises in the mountains between Castel di Sangro and Agnone, flows past Isernia, Venafro and Capua, and enters the sea about 15 m. from the mouth of the Garigliano. About 16 m. above Capua it receives the Calore, which flows by Benevento. The Silarus or Sele enters the Gulf of Salerno a few miles below the ruins of Paestum. Below this the watershed of the Apennines is too near to the sea on that side to allow the formation of any large streams. Hence the rivers that flow in the opposite direction into the Adriatic and the Gulf of Taranto have much longer courses, though all partake of the character of mountain torrents, rushing down with great violence in winter and after storms, but dwindling in the summer into scanty streams, which hold a winding and sluggish course through the great plains of Apulia. Proceeding south from the Trigno, already mentioned as constituting the limit of Central Italy, there are (1) the Biferno and (2) the Fortore, both rising in the mountains of Samnium, and flowing into the Adriatic west of Monte Gargano; (3) the Cervaro, south of the great promontory; and (4) the Ofanto, the Aufidus of Horace, whose description of it is characteristic of almost all the rivers of Southern Italy, of which it may be taken as the typical representative. It rises about 15 m. west of Conza, and only about 25 m. from the Gulf of Salerno, so that it is frequently (though erroneously) described as traversing the whole range of the Apennines. In its lower course it flows near Canosa and traverses the celebrated battlefield of Cannae. (5) The Bradano, which rises near Venosa, almost at the foot of Monte Volture, flows towards the south-east into the Gulf of Taranto, as do the Basento, the Agri and the Sinni, all of which descend from the central chain of the Apennines south of Potenza. The Crati, which flows from Cosenza northwards, and then turns abruptly eastward to enter the same gulf, is the only stream worthy of notice in the rugged peninsula of Calabria; while the arid limestone hills projecting eastwards to Capo di Leuca do not give rise to anything more than a mere streamlet, from the mouth of the Ofanto to the south-eastern extremity of Italy.
The only important lakes are those on or near the north frontier, formed by the expansion of the tributaries of the Po. They have been already noticed in connexion with the rivers by which they are formed, but may be again enumerated in order of succession. They are, proceeding from west to east, (1) the Lago Lakes. d’Orta, (2) the Lago Maggiore, (3) the Lago di Lugano, (4) the Lago di Como, (5) the Lago d’Iseo, (6) the Lago d’Idro, and (7) the Lago di Garda. Of these the last named is considerably the largest, covering an area of 143 sq. m. It is 3214 m. long by 10 broad; while the Lago Maggiore, notwithstanding its name, though considerably exceeding it in length (37 m.), falls materially below it in superficial extent.
They are all of great depth—the Lago Maggiore having an extreme 
different character is the Lago di Varese, between the Lago Maggiore and that of Lugano, which is a mere shallow expanse of water, surrounded by hills of very moderate elevation. Two other small lakes in the same neighbourhood, as well as those of Erba and Pusiano, between Como and Lecco, are of a similar character.
The lakes of Central Italy, which are comparatively of trifling dimensions, belong to a wholly different class. The most important of these, the Lacus Fucinus of the ancients, now called the Lago di Celano, situated almost exactly in the centre of the peninsula, occupies a basin of considerable extent, surrounded by mountains and without any natural outlet, at an elevation of more than 2000 ft. Its waters have been in great part carried off by an artificial channel, and more than half its surface laid bare. Next in size is the Lago Trasimeno, a broad expanse of shallow waters, about 30 m. in circumference, surrounded by low hills. The neighbouring lake of Chiusi is of similar character, but much smaller dimensions. All the other lakes of Central Italy, which are scattered through the volcanic districts west of the Apennines, are of an entirely different formation, and occupy deep cup-shaped hollows, which have undoubtedly at one time formed the craters of extinct volcanoes. Such is the Lago di Bolsena, near the city of the same name, which is an extensive sheet of water, as well as the much smaller Lago di Vico (the Ciminian lake of ancient writers) and the Lago di Bracciano, nearer Rome, while to the south of Rome the well known lakes of Albano and Nemi have a similar origin.
The only lake properly so called in southern Italy is the Lago del Matese, in the heart of the mountain group of the same name, of small extent. The so-called lakes on the coast of the Adriatic north and south of the promontory of Gargano are brackish lagoons communicating with the sea.
The three great islands of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica are closely connected with Italy, both by geographical position and community of language, but they are considered at length in separate articles. Of the smaller islands that lie near the coasts Islands. of Italy, the most considerable is that of Elba, off the west coast of central Italy, about 50 m. S. of Leghorn, and separated from the mainland at Piombino by a strait of only about 6 m. in width. North of this, and about midway between Corsica and Tuscany, is the small island of Capraia, steep and rocky, and only 412 m. long, but with a secure port; Gorgona, about 25 m. farther north, is still smaller, and is a mere rock, inhabited by a few fishermen. South of Elba are the equally insignificant islets of Pianosa and Montecristo, while the more considerable island of Giglio lies much nearer the mainland, immediately opposite the mountain promontory of Monte Argentaro, itself almost an island. The islands farther south in the Tyrrhenian Sea are of an entirely different character. Of these Ischia and Procida, close to the northern headland of the Bay of Naples, are of volcanic origin, as is the case also with the more distant group of the Ponza Islands. These are three in number—Ponza, Palmarola and Zannone; while Ventotene (also of volcanic formation) is about midway between Ponza and Ischia. The island of Capri, on the other hand, opposite the southern promontory of the Bay of Naples, is a precipitous limestone rock. The Aeolian or Lipari Islands, a remarkable volcanic group, belong rather to Sicily than to Italy, though Stromboli, the most easterly of them, is about equidistant from Sicily and from the mainland.
The Italian coast of the Adriatic presents a great contrast to its opposite shores, for while the coast of Dalmatia is bordered by a succession of islands, great and small, the long and uniform coast-line of Italy from Otranto to Rimini presents not a single adjacent island; and the small outlying group of the Tremiti Islands (north of the Monte Gargano and about 15 m. from the mainland) alone breaks the monotony of this part of the Adriatic.
Geology.—The geology of Italy is mainly dependent upon that of the Apennines (q.v.). On each side of that great chain are found extensive Tertiary deposits, sometimes, as in Tuscany, the district of Monferrat, &c., forming a broken, hilly country, at others spreading into broad plains or undulating downs, such as the Tavoliere of Puglia, and the tract that forms the spur of Italy from Bari to Otranto.
Besides these, and leaving out of account the islands, the Italian peninsula presents four distinct volcanic districts. In three of them the volcanoes are entirely extinct, while the fourth is still in great activity.
1. The Euganean hills form a small group extending for about 10 m. from the neighbourhood of Padua to Este, and separated from the lower offshoots of the Alps by a portion of the wide plain of Padua. Monte Venda, their highest peak, is 1890 ft. high.
2. The Roman district, the largest of the four, extends from the hills of Albano to the frontier of Tuscany, and from the lower slopes of the Apennines to the Tyrrhenian Sea. It may be divided into three groups: the Monti Albani, the second highest[2] of which, Monte Cavo (3115 ft.), is the ancient Mons Albanus, on the summit of which stood the temple of Jupiter Latialis, where the assemblies of the cities forming the Latin confederation were held; the Monti Cimini, which extend from the valley of the Tiber to the neighbourhood of Civita Vecchia, and attain at their culminating point an elevation of 3454 ft.; and the mountains of Radicofani and Monte Amiata, the latter of which is 5688 ft. high. The lakes of Bolsena (Vulsiniensis), of Bracciano (Sabatinus), of Vico (Ciminus), of Albano (Albanus), of Nemi (Nemorensis), and other smaller lakes belong to this district; while between its south-west extremity and Monte Circello the Pontine Marshes form a broad strip of alluvial soil infested by malaria.
3. The volcanic region of the Terra di Lavoro is separated by the Volscian mountains from the Roman district. It may be also divided into three groups. Of Roccamonfina, at the N.N.W. end of the Campanian Plain, the highest cone, called Montagna di Santa Croce, is 3291 ft. The Phlegraean Fields embrace all the country round Baiae and Pozzuoli and the adjoining islands. Monte Barbaro (Gaurus), north-east of the site of Cumae, Monte San Nicola (Epomeus), 2589 ft. in Ischia, and Camaldoli, 1488 ft., west of Naples, are the highest cones. The lakes Averno (Avernus), Lucrino (Lucrinus), Fusaro (Palus Acherusia), and Agnano are within this group, which has shown activity in historical times. A stream of lava issued in 1198 from the crater of the Solfatara, which still continues to exhale steam and noxious gases; the Lava dell’ Arso came out of the N.E. flank of Monte Epomeo in 1302; and Monte Nuovo, north-west of Pozzuoli (455 ft.), was thrown up in three days in September 1538. Since its first historical eruption in A.D. 79, Vesuvius or Somma, which forms the third group, has been in constant activity. The Punta del Nasone, the highest point of Somma, is 3714 ft. high, while the Punta del Palo, the highest point of the brim of the crater of Vesuvius, varies materially with successive eruptions from 3856 to 4275 ft.
4. The Apulian volcanic formation consists of the great mass of Monte Volture, which rises at the west end of the plains of Apulia, on the frontier of Basilicata, and is surrounded by the Apennines on its south-west and north-west sides. Its highest peak, the Pizzuto di Melfi, attains an elevation of 4365 ft. Within the widest crater there are the two small lakes of Monticchio and San Michele. In connexion with the volcanic districts we may mention Le Mofete, the pools of Ampsanctus, in a wooded valley S.E. of Frigento, in the province of Avellino, Campania (Virgil, Aeneid, vii. 563-571), The largest is not more than 160 ft. in circumference, and 7 ft. deep.
The whole of the great plain of Lombardy is covered by Pleistocene and recent deposits. It is a great depression—the continuation of the Adriatic Sea—filled up by deposits brought down by the rivers from the mountains. The depression was probably formed during the later stages of the growth of the Alps.
Climate and Vegetation.—The geographical position of Italy, extending from about 46° to 38° N., renders it one of the hottest countries in Europe. But the effect of its southern latitude is tempered by its peninsular character, bounded as it is on both sides by seas of considerable extent, as well as by the great range of the Alps with its snows and glaciers to the north. There are thus irregular variations of climate. Great differences also exist with regard to climate between northern and southern Italy, due in great part to other circumstances as well as to differences of latitude. Thus the great plain of northern Italy is chilled by the cold winds from the Alps, while the damp warm winds from the Mediterranean are to a great extent intercepted by the Ligurian Apennines. Hence this part of the country has a cold winter climate, so that while the mean summer temperature of Milan is higher than that of Sassari, and equal to that of Naples, and the extremes reached at Milan and Bologna are a good deal higher than those of Naples, the mean winter temperature of Turin is actually lower than that of Copenhagen. The lowest recorded winter temperature at Turin is 5° Fahr. Throughout the region north of the Apennines no plants will thrive which cannot stand occasional severe frosts in winter, so that not only oranges and lemons but even the olive tree cannot be grown, except in specially favoured situations. But the strip of coast between the Apennines and the sea, known as the Riviera of Genoa, is not only extremely favourable to the growth of olives, but produces oranges and lemons in abundance, while even the aloe, the cactus and the palm flourish in many places.
Central Italy also presents striking differences of climate and temperature according to the greater or less proximity to the mountains. Thus the greater part of Tuscany, and the provinces thence to Rome, enjoy a mild winter climate, and are well adapted to the growth of mulberries and olives as well as vines, but it is not till after passing Terracina, in proceeding along the western coast towards the south, that the vegetation of southern Italy develops in its full luxuriance. Even in the central parts of Tuscany, however, the climate is very much affected by the neighbouring mountains, and the increasing elevation of the Apennines as they proceed south produces a corresponding effect upon the temperature. But it is when we reach the central range of the Apennines that we find the coldest districts of Italy. In all the upland valleys of the Abruzzi snow begins to fall early in November, and heavy storms occur often as late as May; whole communities are shut out for months from any intercourse with their neighbours, and some villages are so long buried in snow that regular passages are made between the different houses for the sake of communication among the inhabitants. The district from the south-east of Lake Fucino to the Piano di Cinque Miglia, enclosing the upper basin of the Sangro and the small lake of Scanno, is the coldest and most bleak part of Italy south of the Alps. Heavy falls of snow in June are not uncommon, and only for a short time towards the end of July are the nights totally exempt from light frosts. Yet less than 40 m. E. of this district, and even more to the north, the olive, the fig-tree and the orange thrive luxuriantly on the shores of the Adriatic from Ortona to Vasto. In the same way, whilst in the plains and hills round Naples snow is rarely seen, and never remains long, and the thermometer seldom descends to the freezing-point, 20 m. E. from it in the fertile valley of Avellino, of no great elevation, but encircled by high mountains, light frosts are not uncommon as late as June; and 18 m. farther east, in the elevated region of San Angelo dei Lombardi and Bisaccia, the inhabitants are always warmly clad, and vines grow with difficulty and only in sheltered places. Still farther south-east, Potenza has almost the coldest climate in Italy, and certainly the lowest summer temperatures. But nowhere are these contrasts so striking as in Calabria. The shores, especially on the Tyrrhenian Sea, present almost a continued grove of olive, orange, lemon and citron trees, which attain a size unknown in the north of Italy. The sugar-cane flourishes, the cotton-plant ripens to perfection, date-trees are seen in the gardens, the rocks are clothed with the prickly-pear or Indian fig, the enclosures of the fields are formed by aloes and sometimes pomegranates, the liquorice-root grows wild, and the mastic, the myrtle and many varieties of oleander and cistus form the underwood of the natural forests of arbutus and evergreen oak. If we turn inland but 5 or 6 m. from the shore, and often even less, the scene changes. High districts covered with oaks and chestnuts succeed to this almost tropical vegetation; a little higher up and we reach the elevated regions of the Pollino and the Sila, covered with firs and pines, and affording rich pastures even in the midst of summer, when heavy dews and light frosts succeed each other in July and August, and snow begins to appear at the end of September or early in October. Along the shores of the Adriatic, which are exposed to the north-east winds, blowing coldly from over the Albanian mountains, delicate plants do not thrive so well in general as under the same latitude along the shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea.
Southern Italy indeed has in general a very different climate from the northern portion of the kingdom; and, though large tracts are still occupied by rugged mountains of sufficient elevation to retain the snow for a considerable part of the year, the districts adjoining the sea enjoy a climate similar to that of Greece and the southern provinces of Spain. Unfortunately several of these fertile tracts suffer severely from malaria (q.v.), and especially the great plain adjoining the Gulf of Tarentum, which in the early ages of history was surrounded by a girdle of Greek cities—some of which attained to almost unexampled prosperity—has for centuries past been given up to almost complete desolation.[3]
It is remarkable that, of the vegetable productions of Italy, many which are at the present day among the first to attract the attention of the visitor are of comparatively late introduction, and were unknown in ancient times. The olive indeed in all ages clothed the hills of a large part of the country; but the orange and lemon, are a late importation from the East, while the cactus or Indian fig and the aloe, both of them so conspicuous on the shores of southern Italy, as well as of the Riviera of Genoa, are of Mexican origin, and consequently could not have been introduced earlier than the 16th century. The same remark applies to the maize or Indian corn. Many botanists are even of opinion that the sweet chestnut, which now constitutes so large a part of the forests that clothe the sides both of the Alps and the Apennines, and in some districts supplies the chief food of the inhabitants, is not originally of Italian growth; it is certain that it had not attained in ancient times to anything like the extension and importance which it now possesses. The eucalyptus is of quite modern introduction; it has been extensively planted in malarious districts. The characteristic cypress, ilex and stone-pine, however, are native trees, the last-named flourishing especially near the coast. The proportion of evergreens is large, and has a marked effect on the landscape in winter.
Fauna.—The chamois, bouquetin and marmot are found only in the Alps, not at all in the Apennines. In the latter the bear was found in Roman times, and there are said to be still a few remaining. Wolves are more numerous, though only in the mountainous districts; the flocks are protected against them by large white sheepdogs, who have some wolf blood in them. Wild boars are also found in mountainous and forest districts. Foxes are common in the neighbourhood of Rome. The sea mammals include the common dolphin (Delphinus delphis). The birds are similar to those of central Europe; in the mountains vultures, eagles, buzzards, kites, falcons and hawks are found. Partridges, woodcock, snipe, &c., are among the game birds; but all kinds of small birds are also shot for food, and their number is thus kept down, while many members of the migratory species are caught by traps in the foothills on the south side of the Alps, especially near the Lake of Como, on their passage. Large numbers of quails are shot in the spring. Among reptiles, the various kinds of lizard are noticeable. There are several varieties of snakes, of which three species (all vipers) are poisonous. Of sea-fish there are many varieties, the tunny, the sardine and the anchovy being commercially the most important. Some of the other edible fish, such as the palombo, are not found in northern waters. Small cuttlefish are in common use as an article of diet. Tortoiseshell, an important article of commerce, is derived from the Thalassochelys caretta, a sea turtle. Of freshwater fish the trout of the mountain streams and the eels of the coast lagoons may be mentioned. The tarantula spider and the scorpion are found in the south of Italy. The aquarium of the zoological station at Naples contains the finest collection in the world of marine animals, showing the wonderful variety of the different species of fish, molluscs, crustacea, &c., found in the Mediterranean. (E. H. B.; T. As.)
Population.—The following table indicates the areas of the several provinces (sixty-nine in number), and the population of each according to the censuses of the 31st of December 1881 and the 9th of February 1901. (The larger divisions or compartments in which the provinces are grouped are not officially recognized.)
| Provinces and Compartments. | Area in sq. m. | Population. | |
| 1881. | 1901. | ||
| Alessandria | 1950 | 729,710 | 825,745 |
| Cuneo | 2882 | 635,400 | 670,504 |
| Novara | 2553 | 675,926 | 763,830 |
| Turin | 3955 | 1,029,214 | 1,147,414 |
| Piedmont | 11,340 | 3,070,250 | 3,407,493 |
| Genoa | 1582 | 760,122 | 931,156 |
| Porto Maurizio | 455 | 132,251 | 144,604 |
| Liguria | 2037 | 892,373 | 1,075,760 |
| Bergamo | 1098 | 390,775 | 467,549 |
| Brescia | 1845 | 471,568 | 541,765 |
| Como | 1091 | 515,050 | 594,304 |
| Cremona | 695 | 302,097 | 329,471 |
| Mantua | 912 | 295,728 | 315,448 |
| Milan | 1223 | 1,114,991 | 1,450,214 |
| Pavia | 1290 | 469,831 | 504,382 |
| Sondrio | 1232 | 120,534 | 130,966 |
| Lombardy | 9386 | 3,680,574 | 4,334,099 |
| Belluno | 1293 | 174,140 | 214,803 |
| Padua | 823 | 397,762 | 444,360 |
| Rovigo | 685 | 217,700 | 222,057 |
| Treviso | 960 | 375,704 | 416,945 |
| Udine | 2541 | 501,745 | 614,720 |
| Venice | 934 | 356,708 | 399,823 |
| Verona | 1188 | 394,065 | 427,018 |
| Vicenza | 1052 | 396,349 | 453,621 |
| Venetia | 9476 | 2,814,173 | 3,193,347 |
| Bologna | 1448 | 464,879 | 529,619 |
| Ferrara | 1012 | 230,807 | 270,558 |
| Forlì | 725 | 251,110 | 283,996 |
| Modena | 987 | 279,254 | 323,598 |
| Parma | 1250 | 267,306 | 303,694 |
| Piacenza | 954 | 226,758 | 250,491 |
| Ravenna | 715 | 218,359 | 234,656 |
| Reggio (Emilia) | 876 | 244,959 | 281,085 |
| Emilia | 7967 | 2,183,432 | 2,477,697 |
| Arezzo | 1273 | 238,744 | 275,588 |
| Florence | 2265 | 790,776 | 945,324 |
| Grosseto | 1738 | 114,295 | 137,795 |
| Leghorn | 133 | 121,612 | 121,137 |
| Lucca | 558 | 284,484 | 329,986 |
| Massa and Carrara | 687 | 169,469 | 202,749 |
| Pisa | 1179 | 283,563 | 319,854 |
| Siena | 1471 | 205,926 | 233,874 |
| Tuscany | 9304 | 2,208,869 | 2,566,307 |
| Ancona | 762 | 267,338 | 308,346 |
| Ascoli Piceno | 796 | 209,185 | 251,829 |
| Macerata | 1087 | 239,713 | 269,505 |
| Pesaro and Urbino | 1118 | 223,043 | 259,083 |
| Marches | 3763 | 939,279 | 1,088,763 |
| Perugia—Umbria | 3748 | 572,060 | 675,352 |
| Rome—Lazio | 4663 | 903,472 | 1,142,526 |
| Aquila degli Abruzzi (Abruzzo Ulteriore II.) | 2484 | 353,027 | 436,367 |
| Campobasso (Molise) | 1691 | 365,434 | 389,967 |
| Chieti (Abruzzo Citeriore) | 1138 | 343,948 | 387,604 |
| Teramo (Abruzzo Ulteriore I.) | 1067 | 254,806 | 312,188 |
| Abruzzi and Molise | 6380 | 1,317,215 | 1,526,135 |
| Avellino (Principato Ulteriore) | 1172 | 392,619 | 421,766 |
| Benevento | 818 | 238,425 | 265,460 |
| Caserta (Terra di Lavoro) | 2033 | 714,131 | 805,345 |
| Naples | 350 | 1,001,245 | 1,141,788 |
| Salerno (Principato Citeriore) | 1916 | 550,157 | 585,132 |
| Campania | 6289 | 2,896,577 | 3,219,491 |
| Bari delle Puglie (Terra di Bari) | 2065 | 679,499 | 837,683 |
| Foggia (Capitanata) | 2688 | 356,267 | 421,115 |
| Lecce (Terra di Otranto) | 2623 | 553,298 | 705,382 |
| Apulia | 7376 | 1,589,064 | 1,964,180 |
| Potenza (Basilicata) | 3845 | 524,504 | 491,558 |
| Catanzaro (Calabria Ulteriore II.) | 2030 | 433,975 | 498,791 |
| Cosenza (Calabria Citeriore) | 2568 | 451,185 | 503,329 |
| Reggio di Calabria (Calabria Ulteriore I.) | 1221 | 372,723 | 437,209 |
| Calabria | 5819 | 1,257,883 | 1,439,329 |
| Caltanisetta | 1263 | 266,379 | 329,449 |
| Catania | 1917 | 563,457 | 703,598 |
| Girgenti | 1172 | 312,487 | 380,666 |
| Messina | 1246 | 460,924 | 550,895 |
| Palermo | 1948 | 699,151 | 796,151 |
| Syracuse | 1442 | 341,526 | 433,796 |
| Trapani | 948 | 283,977 | 373,569 |
| Sicily | 9936 | 2,927,901 | 3,568,124 |
| Cagliari | 5204 | 420,635 | 486,767 |
| Sassari | 4090 | 261,367 | 309,026 |
| Sardinia | 9294 | 682,002 | 795,793 |
| Kingdom of Italy | 110,623 | 28,459,628 | 32,965,504 |
The number of foreigners in Italy in 1901 was 61,606, of whom 37,762 were domiciled within the kingdom.
The population given in the foregoing table is the resident or “legal” population, which is also given for the individual towns. This is 490,251 higher than the actual population, 32,475,253, ascertained by the census of the 10th of February 1901; the difference is due to temporary absences from their residences of certain individuals on military service, &c., who probably were counted twice, and also to the fact that 469,020 individuals were returned as absent from Italy, while only 61,606 foreigners were in Italy at the date of the census. The kingdom is divided into 69 provinces, 284 regions, of which 197 are classed as circondarii and 87 as districts (the latter belonging to the province of Mantua and the 8 provinces of Venetia), 1806 administrative divisions (mandamenti) and 8262 communes. These were the figures at the date of the census. In 1906 there were 1805 mandamenti and 8290 communes, and 4 boroughs in Sardinia not connected with communes. The mandamenti or administrative divisions no longer correspond to the judicial divisions (mandamenti giudiziarii) which in November 1891 were reduced from 1806 to 1535 by a law which provided that judicial reform should not modify existing administrative and electoral divisions. The principal elective local administrative bodies are the provincial and the communal councils. The franchise is somewhat wider than the parliamentary. Both bodies are elected for six years, one-half being renewed every three years. The provincial council elects a provincial commission and the communal council a municipal council from among its own members; these smaller bodies carry on the business of the larger while they are not sitting. The syndic of each commune is elected by ballot by the communal council from among its own members.
The actual (not the resident or “legal”) population of Italy since 1770 is approximately given in the following table (the first census of the kingdom as a whole was taken in 1871):—
| 1770 | 14,689,317 | 1861 | 25,016,801 |
| 1800 | 17,237,421 | 1871 | 26,801,154 |
| 1825 | 19,726,977 | 1881 | 28,459,628 |
| 1848 | 23,617,153 | 1901 | 32,475,253 |
The average density increased from 257.21 per sq. m. in 1881 to 293.28 in 1901. In Venetia, Emilia, the Marches, Umbria and Tuscany the proportion of concentrated population is only from 40 to 55%; in Piedmont, Liguria and Lombardy the proportion rises to from 70 to 76%; in southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia it attains a maximum of from 76 to 93%.
The population of towns over 100,000 is given in the following table according to the estimates for 1906. The population of the town itself is distinguished from that of its commune, which often includes a considerable portion of the surrounding country.
| Town. | Commune. | |
| Bologna | 105,153 | 160,423 |
| Catania | 135,548 | 159,210 |
| Florence | 201,183 | 226,559 |
| Genoa | 255,294 | 267,248 |
| Messina | 108,514 | 165,007 |
| Milan | 560,613 | .. |
| Naples | 491,614 | 585,289 |
| Palermo | 264,036 | 323,747 |
| Rome | 403,282 | 516,580 |
| Turin | 277,121 | 361,720 |
| Venice | 146,940 | 169,563 |
The population of the different parts of Italy differs in character and dialect; and there is little community of sentiment between them. The modes of life and standards of comfort and morality in north Italy and in Calabria are widely different; the former being far in front of the latter. Much, however, is effected towards unification, by compulsory military service, it being the principle that no man shall serve within the military district to which he belongs. In almost all parts the idea of personal loyalty (e.g. between master and servant) retains an almost feudal strength. The inhabitants of the north—the Piedmontese, Lombards and Genoese especially—have suffered less than those of the rest of the peninsula from foreign domination and from the admixture of inferior racial elements, and the cold winter climate prevents the heat of summer from being enervating. They, and also the inhabitants of central Italy, are more industrious than the inhabitants of the southern provinces, who have by no means recovered from centuries of misgovernment and oppression, and are naturally more hot-blooded and excitable, but less stable, capable of organization or trustworthy. The southerners are apathetic except when roused, and socialist doctrines find their chief adherents in the north. The Sicilians and Sardinians have something of Spanish dignity, but the former are one of the most mixed and the latter probably one of the purest races of the Italian kingdom. Physical characteristics differ widely; but as a whole the Italian is somewhat short of stature, with dark or black hair and eyes, often good looking. Both sexes reach maturity early. Mortality is decreasing, but if we may judge from the physical conditions of the recruits the physique of the nation shows little or no improvement. Much of this lack of progress is attributed to the heavy manual (especially agricultural) work undertaken by women and children. The women especially age rapidly, largely owing to this cause (E. Nathan, Vent’ anni di vita italiana attraverso all’ annuario, 169 sqq.).
Births, Marriages, Deaths.—Birth and marriage rates vary considerably, being highest in the centre and south (Umbria, the Marches, Apulia, Abruzzi and Molise, and Calabria) and lowest in the north (Piedmont, Liguria and Venetia), and in Sardinia. The death-rate is highest in Apulia, in the Abruzzi and Molise, and in Sardinia, and lowest in the north, especially in Venetia and Piedmont.
Taking the statistics for the whole kingdom, the annual marriage-rate for the years 1876–1880 was 7.53 per 1000; in 1881–1885 it rose to 8.06; in 1886–1890 it was 7.77; in 1891–1895 it was 7.41, and in 1896–1900 it had gone down to 7.14 (a figure largely produced by the abnormally low rate of 6.88 in 1898), and in 1902 was 7.23. Divorce is forbidden by the Roman Catholic Church, and only 839 judicial separations were obtained from the courts in 1902, more than half of the demands made having been abandoned. Of the whole population in 1901, 57.5% were unmarried, 36.0% married, and 6.5% widowers or widows. The illegitimate births show a decrease, having been 6.95 per 100 births in 1872 and 5.72 in 1902, with a rise, however, in the intermediate period as high as 7.76 in 1883. The birth-rate shows a corresponding decrease from 38.10 per 1000 in 1881 to 33.29 in 1902. The male births have since 1872 been about 3% (3.14 in 1872–1875 and 2.72 in 1896–1900) in excess of the female births, which is rather more than compensated for by the greater male mortality, the excess being 2.64 in 1872–1875 and having increased to 4.08 in 1896–1900. (The calculations are made in both cases on the total of births and deaths of both sexes.) The result is that, while in 1871 there was an excess of 143,370 males over females in the total population, in 1881 the excess was only 71,138, and in 1901 there were 169,684 more females than males. The death-rate (excluding still-born children) was, in 1872, 30.78 per 1000, and has since steadily decreased—less rapidly between 1886–1890 than during other years; in 1902 it was only 22.15 and in 1899 was as low as 21.89. The excess of births over deaths shows considerable variations—owing to a very low birth-rate, it was only 3.12 per 1000 in 1880, but has averaged 11.05 per 1000 from 1896 to 1900, reaching 11.98 in 1899 and 11.14 in 1902. For the four years 1899–1902 24.66% died under the age of one year, 9.41 between one and two years. The average expectation of life at birth for the same period was 52 years and 11 months, 62 years and 2 months at the age of three years, 52 years at the age of fifteen, 44 years at the age of twenty-four, 30 years at the age of forty; while the average period of life, which was 35 years 3 months per individual in 1882, was 43 years per individual in 1901. This shows a considerable improvement, largely, but not entirely, in the diminution of infant mortality; the expectation of life at birth in 1882, it is true, was only 33 years and 6 months, and at three years of age 56 years 1 month; but the increase, both in the expectation of life and in its average duration, goes all through the different ages.
Occupations.—In the census of 1901 the population over nine years of age (both male and female) was divided as follows as regards the main professions:—
| Total. | Males. | Females. | |
| Agricultural (including hunting and fishing) | 9,666,467 | 6,466,165 | 3,200,302 |
| Industrial | 4,505,736 | 3,017,393 | 1,488,343 |
| Commerce and transport (public and private services) | 1,003,888 | 885,070 | 118,818 |
| Domestic service, &c. | 574,855 | 171,875 | 402,980 |
| Professional classes, administration, &c. | 1,304,347 | 855,217 | 449,130 |
| Defence | 204,012 | 204,012 | . . |
| Religion | 129,893 | 89,329 | 40,564 |
Emigration.—The movement of emigration may be divided into two currents, temporary and permanent—the former going chiefly towards neighbouring European countries and to North Africa, and consisting of manual labourers, the latter towards trans-oceanic countries, principally Brazil, Argentina and the United States. These emigrants remain abroad for several years, even when they do not definitively establish themselves there. They are composed principally of peasants, unskilled workmen and other manual labourers. There was a tendency towards increased emigration during the last quarter of the 19th century. The principal causes are the growth of population, and the over-supply of and low rates of remuneration for manual labour in various Italian provinces. Emigration has, however, recently assumed such proportions as to lead to scarcity of labour and rise of wages in Italy itself. Italians form about half of the total emigrants to America.
| Year. | Temporary Emigration. | Permanent Emigration. | ||
| Total No. of Emigrants. | Per every 100,000 of Population. | Total No. of Emigrants. | Per every 100,000 of Population. | |
| 1881 | 94,225 | 333 | 41,607 | 147 |
| 1891 | 118,111 | 389 | 175,520 | 578 |
| 1901 | 281,668 | 865 | 251,577 | 772 |
The increased figures may, to a minor extent, be due to better registration, in consequence of the law of 1901.
From the next table will be seen the direction of emigration in the years specified:—
| 1900. | 1901. | 1902. | 1903. | 1904. | 1905. | |
| Europe | 181,047 | 244,298 | 236,066 | 215,943 | 209,942 | 266,982 |
| N. Africa | 5,417 | 9,499 | 11,771 | 9,452 | 14,709 | 11,910 |
| U.S. and Canada | 89,400 | 124,636 | 196,723 | 200,383 | 173,537 | 322,627 |
| Mexico (Central America) | 2,069 | 997 | 766 | 1,311 | 1,828 | 2,044 |
| South America | 74,168 | 152,543 | 85,097 | 78,699 | 74,209 | 111,943 |
| Asia and Oceania | 691 | 1,272 | 1,086 | 2,168 | 2,966 | 2,715 |
| Total | 352,792 | 533,245 | 531,509 | 507,956 | 477,191 | 718,221 |
The figures for 1905 show that the total of 718,221 emigrants was made up, as regards numbers, mainly by individuals from Venetia, Sicily, Campania, Piedmont, Calabria and the Abruzzi; while the percentage was highest in Calabria (4.44), the Abruzzi, Venetia, Basilicata, the Marches, Sicily (2.86), Campania, Piedmont (2.02). Tuscany gives 1.20, Latium 1.14%, Apulia only 1.02, while Sardinia with 0.34% occupies an exceptional position. The figure for Sicily, which was 106,000 in 1905, reached 127,000 in 1906 (3.5%), and of these about three-fourths would be adults; in the meantime, however, the population increases so fast that even in 1905 there was a net increase in Sicily of 20,000 souls; so that in three years 220,000 workers were replaced by 320,000 infants.
The phenomenon of emigration in Sicily cannot altogether be explained by low wages, which have risen, though prices have done the same. It has been defined as apparently “a kind of collective madness.”
Agriculture.—Accurate statistics with regard to the area occupied in different forms of cultivation are difficult to obtain, both on account of their varied and piecemeal character and from the lack of a complete cadastral survey. A complete survey was ordered by the law of the 1st of March 1886, but many years must elapse before its completion. The law, however, enabled provinces most heavily burdened by land tax to accelerate their portion of the survey, and to profit by the re-assessment of the tax on the new basis. An idea of the effects of the survey may be gathered from the fact that the assessments in the four provinces of Mantua, Ancona, Cremona and Milan, which formerly amounted to a total of £1,454,696, are now £2,788,080, an increase of 91%. Of the total area of Italy, 70,793,000 acres, 71% are classed as “productive.” The unproductive area comprises 16% of the total area (this includes 4% occupied by lagoons or marshes, and 1.75% of the total area susceptible of bonificazione or improvement by drainage. Between 1882 and 1902 over £4,000,000 was spent on this by the government). The uncultivated area is 13%. This includes 3.50% of the total susceptible of cultivation.
The cultivated area may be divided into five agrarian regions or zones, named after the variety of tree culture which flourishes in them. (1) Proceeding from south to north, the first zone is that of the agrumi (oranges, lemons and similar fruits). It comprises a great part of Sicily. In Sardinia it extends along the southern and western coasts. It predominates along the Ligurian Riviera from Bordighera to Spezia, and on the Adriatic, near San Benedetto del Tronto and Gargano, and, crossing the Italian shore of the Ionian Sea, prevails in some regions of Calabria, and terminates around the gulfs of Salerno, Sorrento and Naples. (2) The region of olives comprises the internal Sicilian valleys and part of the mountain slopes; in Sardinia, the valleys near the coast on the S.E., S.W. and N.W.; on the mainland it extends from Liguria and from the southern extremities of the Romagna to Cape Santa Maria di Leuca in Apulia, and to Cape Spartivento in Calabria. Some districts of the olive region are near the lakes of upper Italy and in Venetia, and the territories of Verona, Vicenza, Treviso and Friuli. (3) The vine region begins on the sunny slopes of the Alpine spurs and in those Alpine valleys open towards the south, extending over the plains of Lombardy and Emilia. In Sardinia it covers the mountain slopes to a considerable height, and in Sicily covers the sides of the Madonie range, reaching a level above 3000 ft. on the southern slope of Etna. The Calabrian Alps, the less rocky sides of the Apulian Murgie and the whole length of the Apennines are covered at different heights, according to their situation. The hills of Tuscany, and of Monferrato in Piedmont, produce the most celebrated Italian vintages. (4) The region of chestnuts extends from the valleys to the high plateaus of the Alps, along the northern slopes of the Apennines in Liguria, Modena, Tuscany, Romagna, Umbria, the Marches and along the southern Apennines to the Calabrian and Sicilian ranges, as well as to the mountains of Sardinia. (5) The wooded region covers the Alps and Apennines above the chestnut level. The woods consist chiefly of pine and hazel upon the Apennines, and upon the Calabrian, Sicilian and Sardinian mountains of oak, ilex, hornbeam and similar trees.
Between these regions of tree culture lie zones of different herbaceous culture, cereals, vegetables and textile plants. The style of cultivation varies according to the nature of the ground, terraces supported by stone walls being much used in mountainous districts. Cereal cultivation occupies the foremost place in area and quantity though it has been on the decline since 1903, still representing, however, an advance on previous years. Wheat is the most important crop and is widely distributed. In 1905 12,734,491 acres, or about 18% of the total area, produced 151,696,571 bushels of wheat, a yield of only 12 bushels per acre. The importation has, however, enormously increased since 1882—from 164,600 to 1,126,368 tons; while the extent of land devoted to corn cultivation has slightly decreased. Next in importance to wheat comes maize, occupying about 7% of the total area of the country, and cultivated almost everywhere as an alternative crop. The production of maize in 1905 reached about 96,250,000 bushels, a slight increase on the average. The production of maize is, however, insufficient, and 208,719 tons were imported in 1902—about double the amount imported in 1882.
Rice is cultivated in low-lying, moist lands, where spring and summer temperatures are high. The Po valley and the valleys of Emilia and the Romagna are best adapted for rice, but the area is diminishing on account of the competition of foreign rice and of the impoverishment of the soil by too intense cultivation. The area is about 0.5% of the total of Italy. The area under rye is about 0.5% of the total, of which about two-thirds lie in the Alpine and about one-third in the Apennine zone. The barley zone is geographically extensive but embraces not more than 1% of the total area, of which half is situated in Sardinia and Sicily. Oats, cultivated in the Roman and Tuscan maremma and in Apulia, are used almost exclusively for horses and cattle. The area of oats cultivation is 1.5% of the total area. The other cereals, millet and panico sorgo (Panicum italicum), have lost much of their importance in consequence of the introduction of maize and rice. Millet, however, is still cultivated in the north of Italy, and is used as bread for agricultural labourers, and as forage when mixed with buckwheat (Sorghum saccaratum). The manufacture of macaroni and similar foodstuff is a characteristic Italian industry. It is extensively distributed, but especially flourishes in the Neapolitan provinces. The exportation of “corn-flour pastes” sank, however, from 7100 tons to 350 between 1882 and 1902.
The cultivation of green forage is extensive and is divided into the categories of temporary and perennial. The temporary includes vetches, pulse, lupine, clover and trifolium; and the perennial, meadow-trefoil, lupinella, sulla (Hedysarum coronarium), lucerne and darnel. The natural grass meadows are extensive, and hay is grown all over the country, but especially in the Po valley. Pasture occupies about 30% of the total area of the country, of which Alpine pastures occupy 1.25%. Seed-bearing vegetables are comparatively scarce. The principal are: white beans, largely consumed by the working classes; lentils, much less cultivated than beans; and green peas, largely consumed in Italy, and exported as a spring vegetable. Chick-pease are extensively cultivated in the southern provinces. Horse beans are grown, especially in the south and in the larger islands; lupines are also grown for fodder.
Among tuberous vegetables the potato comes first. The area occupied is about 0.7% of the whole of the country. Turnips are grown principally in the central provinces as an alternative crop to wheat. They yield as much as 12 tons per acre. Beetroot (Beta vulgaris) is used as fodder, and yields about 10 tons per acre. Sugar beet is extensively grown to supply the sugar factories. In 1898–1899 there were only four sugar factories, with an output of 5972 tons; in 1905 there were thirty-three, with an output of 93,916 tons.
Market gardening is carried on both near towns and villages, where products find ready sale, and along the great railways, on account of transport facilities. Rome is an exception to the former rule and imports garden produce largely from the neighbourhood of Naples and from Sardinia.
Among the chief industrial plants is tobacco, which grows wherever suitable soil exists. Since tobacco is a government monopoly, its cultivation is subject to official concessions and prescriptions. Experiments hitherto made show that the cultivation of Oriental tobacco may profitably be extended in Italy. The yield for 1901 was 5528 tons, but a large increase took place subsequently, eleven million new plants having been added in southern Italy in 1905.
The chief textile plants are hemp, flax and cotton. Hemp is largely cultivated in the provinces of Turin, Ferrara, Bologna, Forlì, Ascoli Piceno and Caserta. Bologna hemp is specially valued. Flax covers about 160,000 acres, with a product, in fibre, amounting to about 20,000 tons. Cotton (Gossypium herbaceum), which at the beginning of the 19th century, at the time of the Continental blockade, and again during the American War of Secession, was largely cultivated, is now grown only in parts of Sicily and in a few southern provinces. Sumach, liquorice and madder are also grown in the south.
The vine is cultivated throughout the length and breadth of Italy, but while in some of the districts of the south and centre it occupies from 10 to 20% of the cultivated area, in some of the northern provinces, such as Sondrio, Belluno, Grosseto, &c., the average is only about 1 or 2%. The methods of cultivation are varied; but the planting of the vines by themselves in long rows of insignificant bushes is the exception. In Lombardy, Emilia, Romagna, Tuscany, the Marches, Umbria and the southern provinces, they are trained to trees which are either left in their natural state or subjected to pruning and pollarding. In Campania the vines are allowed to climb freely to the tops of the poplars. In the rest of Italy the elm and the maple are the trees mainly employed as supports. Artificial props of several kinds—wires, cane work, trellis work, &c.—are also in use in many districts (in the neighbourhood of Rome canes are almost exclusively employed), and in some the plant is permitted to trail along the ground. The vintage takes place, according to locality and climate, from the beginning of September to the beginning of November. The vine has been attacked by the Oidium Tuckeri, the Phylloxera vastatrix and the Peronospora viticola, which in rapid succession wrought great havoc in Italian vineyards. American vines, are, however, immune and have been largely adopted. The production of wine in the vintage of 1907, which was extraordinarily abundant all over the country, was estimated at 1232 million gallons (56 million hectolitres), the average for 1901–1903 being some 352 million gallons less; of this the probable home consumption was estimated at rather over half, while a considerable amount remained over from 1906. The exportation in 1902 only reached about 45 million gallons (and even that is double the average), while an equally abundant vintage in France and Spain rendered the exportation of the balance of 1907 impossible, and fiscal regulations rendered the distillation of the superfluous amount difficult. The quality, too, owing to bad weather at the time of vintage, was not good; Italian wine, indeed, never is sufficiently good to compete with the best wines of other countries, especially France (though there is more opening for Italian wines of the Bordeaux and Burgundy type); nor will many kinds of it stand keeping, partly owing to their natural qualities and partly to the insufficient care devoted to their preparation. There has been some improvement, however, while some of the heavier white wines, noticeably the Marsala of Sicily, have excellent keeping qualities. The area cultivated as vineyards has increased enormously, from about 4,940,000 acres to 9,880,000 acres, or about 14% of the total area of the country. Over-production seems thus to be a considerable danger, and improvement of quality is rather to be sought after. This has been encouraged by government prizes since 1904.
Next to cereals and the vine the most important object of cultivation is the olive. In Sicily and the provinces of Reggio, Catanzaro, Cosenza and Lecce this tree flourishes without shelter; as far north as Rome, Aquila and Teramo it requires only the slightest protection; in the rest of the peninsula it runs the risk of damage by frost every ten years or so. The proportion of ground under olives is from 20 to 36% at Porto Maurizio, and in Reggio, Lecce, Bari, Chieti and Leghorn it averages from 10 to 19%. Throughout Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia and the greater part of Emilia, the tree is of little importance. In the olive there is great variety of kinds, and the methods of cultivation differ greatly in different districts; in Bari, Chieti and Lecce, for instance, there are regular woods of nothing but olive-trees, while in middle Italy there are olive-orchards with the interspaces occupied by crops of various kinds. The Tuscan oils from Lucca, Calci and Buti are considered the best in the world; those of Bari, Umbria and western Liguria rank next. The wood of the olive is also used for the manufacture of small articles. The olive-growing area occupies about 3.5% of the total area of the country, and the crop in 1905 produced about 75,000,000 gallons of oil. The falling off of the crop, especially in 1899, was due to bad seasons and to insects, notably the Cycloconium oleoginum, and the Dacus oleae, or oil-fly, which have ravaged the olive-yards, and it is noticeable that lately good and bad seasons seem to alternate; between 1900 and 1905 the crops were alternately one half of, and equal to, that of the latter year. With the development of agricultural knowledge, notable improvements have been effected in the manufacture of oil. The steam mills give the best results. The export trade, however, is decreasing considerably, while the home consumption is increasing. In 1901, 1985 imperial tuns of oil were shipped from Gallipoli for abroad—two-thirds to the United Kingdom, one-third to Russia—and 666 to Italian ports; while in 1904 the figures were reversed, 1633 tuns going to Italian ports, and only 945 tuns to foreign ports. The other principal port of shipping is Gioia Tauro, 30 m. N.N.E. of Reggio Calabria. A certain amount of linseed-oil is made in Lombardy, Sicily, Apulia and Calabria; colza in Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia and Emilia; and castor-oil in Venetia and Sicily. The product is principally used for industrial purposes, and partly in the preparation of food, but the amount is decreasing.
The cultivation of oranges, lemons and their congeners (collectively designated in Italian by the term agrumi) is of comparatively modern date, the introduction of the Citrus Bigaradia being probably due to the Arabs. Sicily is the chief centre of cultivation—the area occupied by lemon and orange orchards in the province of Palermo alone having increased from 11,525 acres in 1854 to 54,340 in 1874. Reggio Calabria, Catanzaro, Cosenza, Lecce, Salerno, Naples and Caserta are the continental provinces which come next after Sicily. In Sardinia the cultivation is extensive, but receives little attention. Both crude and concentrated lime-juice is exported, and essential oils are extracted from the rind of the agrumi, more particularly from that of the lemon and the bergamot. In northern and central Italy, except in the province of Brescia, the agrumi are almost non-existent. The trees are planted on irrigated soil and the fruit gathered between November and August. Considerable trade is done in agro di limone or lemon extract, which forms the basis of citric acid. Extraction is extensively carried on in the provinces of Messina and Palermo.
Among other fruit trees, apple-trees have special importance. Almonds are widely cultivated in Sicily, Sardinia and the southern provinces; walnut trees throughout the peninsula, their wood being more important than their fruit; hazel nuts, figs, prickly pears (used in the south and the islands for hedges, their fruit being a minor consideration), peaches, pears, locust beans and pistachio nuts are among the other fruits. The mulberry-tree (Morus alba), whose leaves serve as food for silkworms, is cultivated in every region, considerable progress having been made in its cultivation and in the rearing of silkworms since 1850. Silkworm-rearing establishments of importance now exist in the Marches, Umbria, in the Abruzzi, Tuscany, Piedmont and Venetia. The chief silk-producing provinces are Lombardy, Venetia and Piedmont. During the period 1900–1904 the average annual production of silk cocoons was 53,500 tons, and of silk 5200 tons.
The great variety in physical and social conditions throughout the peninsula gives corresponding variety to the methods of agriculture. In the rotation of crops there is an amazing diversity—shifts of two years, three years, four years, six years, and in many cases whatever order strikes the fancy of the farmer. The fields of Tuscany for the most part bear wheat one year and maize the next, in perpetual interchanges, relieved to some extent by green crops. A similar method prevails in the Abruzzi, and in the provinces of Salerno, Benevento and Avellino. In Lombardy a six-year shift is common: either wheat, clover, maize, rice, rice, rice (the last year manured with lupines) or maize, wheat followed by clover, clover, clover ploughed in, and rice, rice and rice manured with lupines. The Emilian region is one where regular rotations are best observed—a common shift being grain, maize, clover, beans and vetches, &c., grain, which has the disadvantage of the grain crops succeeding each other. In the province of Naples, Caserta, &c., the method of fallows is widely adopted, the ground often being left in this state for fifteen or twenty years; and in some parts of Sicily there is a regular interchange of fallow and crop year by year. The following scheme indicates a common Sicilian method of a type which has many varieties: fallow, grain, grain, pasture, pasture—other two divisions of the area following the same order, but beginning respectively with the two years of grain and the two of pasture.
Woods and forests play an important part, especially in regard to the consistency of the soil and to the character of the watercourses. The chestnut is of great value for its wood and its fruit, an article of popular consumption. Good timber is furnished by the oak and beech, and pine and fir forests Woods and forests. of the Alps and Apennines. Notwithstanding the efforts of the government to unify and co-ordinate the forest laws previously existing in the various states, deforestation has continued in many regions. This has been due to speculation, to the unrestricted pasturage of goats, to the rights which many communes have over the forests, and to some extent to excessive taxation, which led the proprietors to cut and sell the trees and then abandon the ground to the Treasury. The results are—a lack of water-supply and of water-power, the streams becoming mere torrents for a short period and perfectly dry for the rest of the year; lack of a sufficient supply of timber; the denudation of the soil on the hills, and, where the valleys below have insufficient drainage, the formation of swamps. If the available water-power of Italy, already very considerable, be harnessed, converted into electric power (which is already being done in some districts), and further increased by reafforestation, the effect upon the industries of Italy will be incalculable, and the importation of coal will be very materially diminished. The area of forest is about 14.3% of the total, and of the chestnut-woods 1.5 more; and its products in 1886 were valued at £3,520,000 (not including chestnuts). A quantity of it is really brushwood, used for the manufacture of charcoal and for fuel, coal being little used except for manufacturing purposes. Forest nurseries have also been founded.
According to an approximate calculation the number of head of live stock in Italy in 1890 was 16,620,000, thus divided:—horses, 720,000; asses, 1,000,000; mules, 300,000; cattle, 5,000,000; sheep, 6,000,000; goats, 1,800,000; swine, 1,800,000.Live stock.
The breed of cattle most widely distributed is that known as the Podolian, usually with white or grey coat and enormous horns. Of the numerous sub-varieties, the finest is said to be that of the Val di Chiana, where the animals are stall-fed all the year round; next is ranked the so-called Valle Tiberina type. Wilder varieties roam in vast herds over the Tuscan and Roman maremmas, and the corresponding districts in Apulia and other regions. In the Alpine districts there is a stock distinct from the Podolian, generally called razza montanina. These animals are much smaller in stature and more regular in form than the Podolians; they are mainly kept for dairy purposes. Another stock, with no close allies nearer than the south of France, is found in the plain of Racconigi and Carmagnola; the mouse-coloured Swiss breed occurs in the neighbourhood of Milan: the Tirolese breed stretches south to Padua and Modena; and a red-coated breed named of Reggio or Friuli is familiar both in what were the duchies of Parma and Modena, and in the provinces of Udine and Treviso. In Sicily the so-called Modica race is of note; and in Sardinia there is a distinct stock which seldom exceeds the weight of 700 ℔. Buffaloes are kept in several districts, more particularly of southern Italy.
Enormous flocks are possessed by professional sheep-farmers, who pasture them in the mountains in the summer, and bring them down to the plains in the winter. At Saluzzo in Piedmont there is a stock with hanging ears, arched face and tall stature, kept for its dairy qualities; and in the Biellese the merino breed is maintained by some of the larger proprietors. In the upper valleys of the Alps there are many local varieties, one of which at Ossola is like the Scottish blackface. Liguria is not much adapted for sheep-farming on a large scale; but a number of small flocks come down to the plain of Tuscany in the winter. With the exception of a few sub-Alpine districts near Bergamo and Brescia, the great Lombard plain is decidedly unpastoral. The Bergamo sheep is the largest breed in the country; that of Cadore and Belluno approaches it in size. In the Venetian districts the farmers often have small stationary flocks. Throughout the Roman province, and Umbria, Apulia, the Abruzzi, Basilicata and Calabria, is found in its full development a remarkable system of pastoral migration with the change of seasons which has been in existence from the most ancient times, and has attracted attention as much by its picturesqueness as by its industrial importance (see Apulia). Merino sheep have been acclimatized in the Abruzzi, Capitanata and Basilicata. The number of sheep, however, is on the decrease. Similarly, the number of goats, which are reared only in hilly regions, is decreasing, especially on account of the existing forest laws, as they are the chief enemies of young plantations. Horse-breeding is on the increase. The state helps to improve the breeds by placing choice stallions at the disposal of private breeders at a low tariff. The exportation is, however, unimportant, while the importation is largely on the increase, 46,463 horses having been imported in 1902. Cattle-breeding varies with the different regions. In upper Italy cattle are principally reared in pens and stalls; in central Italy cattle are allowed to run half wild, the stall system being little practised; in the south and in the islands cattle are kept in the open air, few shelters being provided. The erection of shelters, however, is encouraged by the state. Swine are extensively reared in many provinces. Fowls are kept on all farms and, though methods are still antiquated, trade in fowls and eggs is rapidly increasing.
In 1905 Italy exported 32,786 and imported 17,766 head of cattle; exported 33,574 and imported 6551 sheep; exported 95,995 and imported 1604 swine. The former two show a very large decrease and the latter a large increase on the export figures for 1882. The export of agricultural products shows a large increase.
The north of Italy has long been known for its great dairy districts. Parmesan cheese, otherwise called Lodigiano (from Lodi) or grana, was presented to King Louis XII. as early as 1509. Parmesan is not confined to the province from which it derives its name; it is manufactured in all that part of Emilia in the neighbourhood of the Po, and in the provinces of Brescia, Bergamo, Pavia, Novara and Alessandria. Gorgonzola, which takes its name from a town in the province, has become general throughout the whole of Lombardy, in the eastern parts of the “ancient provinces,” and in the province of Cuneo. The cheese known as the cacio-cavallo is produced in regions extending from 37° to 43° N. lat. Gruyère, extensively manufactured in Switzerland and France, is also produced in Italy in the Alpine regions and in Sicily. With the exception of Parmesan, Gorgonzola, La Fontina and Gruyère, most of the Italian cheese is consumed in the locality of its production. Co-operative dairy farms are numerous in north Italy, and though only about half as many as in 1889 (114 in 1902) are better organized. Modern methods have been introduced.
The drainage of marshes and marshy lands has considerably extended. A law passed on the 22nd of March 1900 gave a special impulse to this form of enterprise by fixing the ratio of expenditure incumbent respectively upon the State, the provinces, the communes, and the owners or other private Drainage, &c. individuals directly interested.
The Italian Federation of Agrarian Unions has greatly contributed to agricultural progress. Government travelling teachers of agriculture, and fixed schools of viticulture, also do good work. Some unions annually purchase large quantities of merchandise for their members, especially chemical Agrarian economics. manures. The importation of machinery amounted to over 5000 tons in 1901.
Income from land has diminished on the whole. The chief diminution has taken place in the south in regard to oranges and lemons, cereals and (for some provinces) vines. Since 1895, however, the heavy import corn duty has caused a slight rise in the income from corn lands. The principal reasons for the general decrease are the fall in prices through foreign competition and the closing of certain markets, the diseases of plants and the increased outlay required to combat them, and the growth of State and local taxation. One of the great evils of Italian agricultural taxation is its lack of elasticity and of adaptation to local conditions. Taxes are not sufficiently proportioned to what the land may reasonably be expected to produce, nor sufficient allowance made for the exceptional conditions of a southern climate, in which a few hours’ bad weather may destroy a whole crop. The Italian agriculturist has come to look (and often in vain) for action on a large scale from the state, for irrigation, drainage of uncultivated low-lying land, which may be made fertile, river regulation, &c.; while to the small proprietor the state often appears only as a hard and inconsiderate tax-gatherer.
The relations between owners and tillers of the soil are still regulated by the ancient forms of agrarian contract, which have remained almost untouched by social and political changes. The possibility of reforming these contracts in some parts of the kingdom has been studied, in the hope of bringing them into closer harmony with the needs of rational cultivation and the exigencies of social justice.
Peasant proprietorship is most common in Lombardy and Piedmont, but it is also found elsewhere. Large farms are found in certain of the more open districts; but in Italy generally, and especially in Sardinia, the land is very much subdivided. The following forms of contract are most usual in the several regions: In Piedmont the mezzadria (métayage), the terzieria, the colonia parziaria, the boaria, the schiavenza and the affitto, or lease, are most usual. Under mezzadria the contract generally lasts three years. Products are usually divided in equal proportions between the owner and the tiller. The owner pays the taxes, defrays the cost of preparing the ground, and provides the necessary implements. Stock usually belongs to the owner, and, even if kept on the half-and-half system, is usually bought by him. The peasant, or mezzadro, provides labour. Under terzieria the owner furnishes stock, implements and seed, and the tiller retains only one-third of the principal products. In the colonia parziaria the peasant executes all the agricultural work, in return for which he is housed rent-free, and receives one-sixth of the corn, one-third of the maize and has a small money wage. This contract is usually renewed from year to year. The boaria is widely diffused in its two forms of cascina fatta and paghe. In the former case a peasant family undertakes all the necessary work in return for payment in money or kind, which varies according to the crop; in the latter the money wages and the payment in kind are fixed beforehand. Schiavenza, either simple or with a share in the crops, is a form of contract similar to the boaria, but applied principally to large holdings. The wages are lower than under the boaria. In the affitto, or lease, the proprietor furnishes seed and the implements. Rent varies according to the quality of the soil.
In Lombardy, besides the mezzadria, the lease is common, but the terzieria is rare. The lessee, or farmer, tills the soil at his own risk; usually he provides live stock, implements and capital, and has no right to compensation for ordinary improvements, nor for extraordinary improvements effected without the landlord’s consent. He is obliged to give a guarantee for the fulfilment of his engagements. In some places he pays an annual tribute in grapes, corn and other produce. In some of the Lombard mezzadria contracts taxes are paid by the cultivator.
In Venetia it is more common than elsewhere in Italy for owners to till their own soil. The prevalent forms of contract are the mezzadria and the lease. In Liguria, also, mezzadria and lease are the chief forms of contract.
In Emilia both mezzadria and lease tenure are widely diffused in the provinces of Ferrara, Reggio and Parma; but other special forms of contract exist, known as the famiglio da spesa, boaria, braccianti obbligati and braccianti disobbligati. In the famiglio da spesa the tiller receives a small wage and a proportion of certain products. The boaria is of two kinds. If the tiller receives as much as 45 lire per month, supplemented by other wages in kind, it is said to be boaria a salario; if the principal part of his remuneration is in kind, his contract is called boaria a spesa.
In the Marches, Umbria and Tuscany, mezzadria prevails in its purest form. Profits and losses, both in regard to produce and stock, are equally divided. In some places, however, the landlord takes two-thirds of the olives and the whole of the grapes and the mulberry leaves. Leasehold exists in the province of Grosseto alone. In Latium leasehold and farming by landlords prevail, but cases of mezzadria and of “improvement farms” exist. In the agro Romano, or zone immediately around Rome, land is as a rule left for pasturage. It needs, therefore, merely supervision by guardians and mounted overseers, or butteri, who are housed and receive wages. Large landlords are usually represented by ministri, or factors, who direct agricultural operations and manage the estates, but the estate is often let to a middleman, or mercante di campagna. Wherever corn is cultivated, leasehold predominates. Much of the work is done by companies of peasants, who come down from the mountainous districts when required, permanent residence not being possible owing to the malaria. Near Velletri and Frosinone “improvement farms” prevail. A piece of uncultivated land is made over to a peasant for from 20 to 29 years. Vines and olives are usually planted, the landlord paying the taxes and receiving one-third of the produce. At the end of the contract the landlord either cultivates his land himself or leases it, repaying to the improver part of the expenditure incurred by him. This repayment sometimes consists of half the estimated value of the standing crops.
In the Abruzzi and in Apulia leasehold is predominant. Usually leases last from three to six years. In the provinces of Foggia and Lecce long leases (up to twenty-nine years) are granted, but in them it is explicitly declared that they do not imply enfiteusi (perpetual leasehold), nor any other form of contract equivalent to co-proprietorship. Mezzadria is rarely resorted to. On some small holdings, however, it exists with contracts lasting from two to six years. Special contracts, known as colonie immovibili and colonie temporanee are applied to the latifondi or huge estates, the owners of which receive half the produce, except that of the vines, olive-trees and woods, which he leases separately. “Improvement contracts” also exist. They consist of long leases, under which the landlord shares the costs of improvements and builds farm-houses; also leases of orange and lemon gardens, two-thirds of the produce of which go to the landlord, while the farmer contributes half the cost of farming besides the labour. Leasehold, varying from four to six years for arable land and from six to eighteen years for forest-land, prevails also in Campania, Basilicata and Calabria. The estaglio, or rent, is often paid in kind, and is equivalent to half the produce of good land and one-third of the produce of bad land. “Improvement contracts” are granted for uncultivated bush districts, where one fourth of the produce goes to the landlord, and for plantations of fig-trees, olive-trees and vines, half of the produce of which belongs to the landlord, who at the end of ten years reimburses the tenant for a part of the improvements effected. Other forms of contract are the piccola mezzadria, or sub-letting by tenants to under-tenants, on the half-and-half system; enfiteusi, or perpetual leases at low rents—a form which has almost died out; and mezzadria (in the provinces of Caserta and Benevento).
In Sicily leasehold prevails under special conditions. In pure leasehold the landlord demands at least six months’ rent as guarantee, and the forfeiture of any fortuitous advantages. Under the gabella lease the contract lasts twenty-nine years, the lessee being obliged to make improvements, but being sometimes exempted from rent during the first years. Inquilinaggio is a form of lease by which the landlord, and sometimes the tenant, makes over to tenant or sub-tenant the sowing of corn. There are various categories of inquilinaggio, according as rent is paid in money or in kind. Under mezzadria or metateria the landlord divides the produce with the farmer in various proportions. The farmer provides all labour. Latifondi farms are very numerous in Sicily. The landlord lets his land to two or more persons jointly, who undertake to restore it to him in good condition with one-third of it “interrozzito,” that is, fallow, so as to be cultivated the following year according to triennial rotation. These lessees are usually speculators, who divide and sub-let the estate. The sub-tenants in their turn let a part of their land to peasants in mezzadria, thus creating a system disastrous both for agriculture and the peasants. At harvest-time the produce is placed in the barns of the lessor, who first deducts 25% as premium, then 16% for battiteria (the difference between corn before and after winnowing), then deducts a proportion for rent and subsidies, so that the portion retained by the actual tiller of the soil is extremely meagre. In bad years the tiller, moreover, gives up seed corn before beginning harvest.
In Sardinia landlord-farming and leasehold prevail. In the few cases of mezzadria the Tuscan system is followed.
Mines.—The number of mines increased from 589 in 1881 to 1580 in 1902. The output in 1881 was worth about £2,800,000, but by 1895 had decreased to £1,800,000, chiefly on account of the fall in the price of sulphur. It afterwards rose, and was worth more than £3,640,000 in 1899, falling again to £3,118,600 in 1902 owing to severe American competition in sulphur (see Sicily). The chief minerals are sulphur, in the production of which Italy holds one of the first places, iron, zinc, lead; these, and, to a smaller extent, copper of an inferior quality, manganese and antimony, are successfully mined. The bulk of the sulphur mines are in Sicily, while the majority of the lead and zinc mines are in Sardinia; much of the lead smelting is done at Pertusola, near Genoa, the company formed for this purpose having acquired many of the Sardinian mines. Iron is mainly mined in Elba. Quicksilver and tin are found (the latter in small quantities) in Tuscany. Boracic acid is chiefly found near Volterra, where there is also a little rock salt, but the main supply is obtained by evaporation. The output of stone from quarries is greatly diminished (from 12,500,000 tons, worth £1,920,000, in 1890, to 8,000,000 tons, worth £1,400,000, in 1899), a circumstance probably attributable to the slackening of building enterprise in many cities, and to the decrease in the demand for stone for railway, maritime and river embankment works. The value of the output had, however, by 1902 risen to £1,600,000, representing a tonnage of about 10,000,000. There is good travertine below Tivoli and elsewhere in Italy; the finest granite is found at Baveno. Lava is much used for paving-stones in the neighbourhood of volcanic districts, where pozzolana (for cement) and pumice stone are also important. Much of Italy contains Pliocene clay, which is good for pottery and brickmaking. Mineral springs are very numerous, and of great variety.
Fisheries.—The number of boats and smacks engaged in the fisheries has considerably increased. In 1881 the total number was 15,914, with a tonnage of 49,103. In 1902 there were 23,098 boats, manned by 101,720 men, and the total catch was valued at just over half a million sterling—according to the government figures, which are certainly below the truth. The value has, however, undoubtedly diminished, though the number of boats and crews increases. Most of the fishing boats, properly so called, start from the Adriatic coast, the coral boats from the western Mediterranean coast, and the sponge boats from the western Mediterranean and Sicilian coasts. Fishing and trawling are carried on chiefly off the Italian (especially Ligurian), Austrian and Tunisian coasts; coral is found principally near Sardinia and Sicily, and sponges almost exclusively off Sicily and Tunisia in the neighbourhood of Sfax. For sponge fishing no accurate statistics are available before 1896; in that year 75 tons of sponges were secured, but there has been considerable diminution since, only 31 tons being obtained in 1902. A considerable proportion was obtained by foreign boats. The island of Lampedusa may be considered its centre. Coral fishing, which fell off between 1889 and 1892 on account of the temporary closing of the Sciacca coral reefs has greatly decreased since 1884, when the fisheries produced 643 tons, whereas in 1902 they only produced 225 tons. The value of the product has, however, proportionately increased, so that the sum realized was little less, while less than half the number of men was employed. Sardinian coral commands from £3 to £4 per kilogramme (2.204 ℔), and is much more valuable than the Sicilian coral. The Sciacca reefs were again closed for three winters by a decree of 1904. The fishing is largely carried on by boats from Torre del Greco, in the Gulf of Naples, where the best coral beds are now exhausted. In 1879 4000 men were employed; in 1902 only just over 1000. In 1902 there were 48 tunny fisheries, employing 3006 men, and 5116 tons of fish worth £80,000 were caught. The main fisheries are in Sardinia, Sicily and Elba. Anchovy and sardine fishing (the products of which are reckoned among the general total) are also of considerable importance, especially along the Ligurian and Tuscan coasts. The lagoon fisheries are also of great importance, more especially those of Comacchio, the lagoon of Orbetello and the Mare Piccolo at Taranto &c. The deep-sea fishing boats in 1902 numbered 1368, with a total tonnage of 16,149; 100 of these were coral-fishing boats and 111 sponge-fishing boats.
Industrial Progress.—The industrial progress of Italy has been great since 1880. Many articles formerly imported are now made at home, and some Italian manufactures have begun to compete in foreign markets. Italy has only unimportant lignite and anthracite mines, but water power is abundant and has been largely applied to industry, especially in generating electricity. The electric power required for the tramways and the illumination of Rome is entirely supplied by turbines situated at Tivoli, and this is the case elsewhere, and the harnessing of this water-power is capable of very considerable extension. A sign of industrial development is to be found in the growing number of manufacturing companies, both Italian and foreign.
The chief development has taken place in mechanical industries, though it has also been marked in metallurgy. Sulphur mining supplies large industries of sulphur-refining and grinding, in spite of American competition. Very little pig iron is made, most of the iron ore being exported, and iron Mechanical industries. manufactured consists of old iron resmelted. For steel-making foreign pig iron is chiefly used. The manufacture of steel rails, carried on first at Terni and afterwards at Savona, began in Italy in 1886. Tin has been manufactured since 1892. Lead, antimony, mercury and copper are also produced. The total salt production in 1902 was 458,497 tons, of which 248,215 were produced in the government salt factories and the rest in the free salt-works of Sicily. Great progress has been made in the manufacture of machinery; locomotives, railway carriages, electric tram-cars, &c., and machinery of all kinds, are now largely made in Italy itself, especially in the north and in the neighbourhood of Naples. At Turin the manufacture of motor-cars has attained great importance and the F.I.A.T. (Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino) factory employs 2000 workmen, while eight others employ 2780 amongst them.
The textile industries, some of which are of ancient date, are among those that have most rapidly developed. Handlooms and small spinning establishments have, in the silk industry, given place to large establishments with steam looms. The production of raw silk at least tripled itself between 1875 and 1900, and the value Textiles. of the silks woven in Italy, estimated in 1890 to be £2,200,000, is now, on account of the development of the export trade, calculated to be almost £4,000,000. Lombardy (especially Como, Milan and Bergamo), Piedmont and Venetia are the chief silk-producing regions. There are several public assay offices in Italy for silk; the first in the world was established in Turin in 1750. The cotton industry has also rapidly developed. Home products not only supply the Italian market in increasing degree, but find their way into foreign markets. While importation of raw cotton increases importations of cotton thread and of cotton stuffs have rapidly decreased. The value of the annual produce of the various branches of the cotton industry, which in 1885 was calculated to be £7,200,000, was in 1900, notwithstanding the fall in prices, about £12,000,000. The industry is chiefly developed in Lombardy, Piedmont and Liguria; to some extent also in Campania, Venetia and Tuscany, and to a less extent in Lazio (Rome), Apulia, Emilia, the Marches, Umbria, the Abruzzi and Sicily. A government weaving school was established in Naples in 1906. As in the case of cotton, Italian woollen fabrics are conquering the home market in increasing degree. The industry centres chiefly in Piedmont (province of Novara), Venetia (province of Vicenza), Tuscany (Florence), Lombardy (Brescia), Campania (Caserta), Genoa, Umbria, the Marches and Rome. To some extent the industry also exists in Emilia, Calabria, Basilicata, the Abruzzi, Sardinia and Sicily. It has, however, a comparatively small export trade.
The other textile industries (flax, jute, &c.) have made notable progress. The jute industry is concentrated in a few large factories, which from 1887 onwards have more than supplied the home market, and have begun considerably to export.
Chemical industries show an output worth £2,640,000 in 1902 as against £1,040,000 in 1893. The chief products are sulphuric acid; sulphate of copper, employed chiefly as a preventive of certain maladies of the vine; carbonate of lead, hyperphosphates and chemical manures; calcium carbide; explosive Chemicals. powder; dynamite and other explosives. Pharmaceutical industries, as distinguished from those above mentioned, have kept pace with the general development of Italian activity. The principal product is quinine, the manufacture of which has acquired great importance, owing to its use as a specific against malaria. Milan and Genoa are the principal centres, and also the government military pharmaceutical factory at Turin. Other industries of a semi-chemical character are candle-, soap-, glue-, and perfume-making, and the preparation of india-rubber. The last named has succeeded, by means of the large establishments at Milan in supplying not only the whole Italian market but an export trade.
The match-making industry is subject to special fiscal conditions. In 1902–1903 there were 219 match factories scattered throughout Italy, but especially in Piedmont, Lombardy and Venetia. The number has been reduced to less than half since 1897 by the suppression of smaller factories, while the production has increased from 47,690 millions to 59,741 millions.
The beetroot-sugar industry has attained considerable proportions in Umbria, the Marches, Lazio, Venetia and Piedmont since 1890. In 1898–1899, 5972 tons were produced, while in 1905 the figure had risen to 93,916. The rise of the industry has been favoured by protective tariffs and by a system of excise which allows a considerable premium to manufacturers.
Alcohol has undergone various oscillations, according to the legislation governing distilleries. In 1871 only 20 hectolitres were produced, but in 1881 the output was 318,000 hectolitres, the maximum hitherto attained. Since then special laws have hampered development, some provinces, as for instance Sardinia, being allowed to manufacture for their own consumption but not for export. In other parts the industry is subjected to an almost prohibitive excise-duty. The average production is about 180,000 hectolitres per annum. The greatest quantity is produced in Lombardy, Piedmont, Venetia and Tuscany. The quantity of beer is about the same, the greater part of the beer drunk being imported from Germany, while the production of artificial mineral waters has somewhat decreased. There is a considerable trade (not very large for export, however) in natural mineral waters, which are often excellent.
Paper-making is highly developed in the provinces of Novara, Caserta, Milan, Vicenza, Turin, Como, Lucca, Ancona, Genoa, Brescia, Cuneo, Macerata and Salerno. The hand-made paper of Fabriano is especially good.
Furniture-making in different styles is carried on all over Italy, especially as a result of the establishment of industrial schools. Each region produces a special type, Venetia turning out imitations of 16th- and 17th-century styles, Tuscany the 15th-century or cinquecento style, and the Neapolitan provinces the Pompeian style. Furniture and cabinet-making in great factories are carried on particularly in Lombardy and Piedmont. Bent-wood factories have been established in Venetia and Liguria.
A characteristic Italian industry is that of straw-plaiting for hat-making, which is carried on principally in Tuscany, in the district of Fermo, in the Alpine villages of the province of Vicenza, and in some communes of the province of Messina. The plaiting is done by country women, while the hats are made up in factories. Both plaits and hats are largely exported.
Tobacco is entirely a government monopoly; the total amount manufactured in 1902–1903 was 16,599 tons—a fairly constant figure.
The finest glass is made in Tuscany and Venetia; Venetian glass is often coloured and of artistic form.
In the various ceramic arts Italy was once unrivalled, but the ancient tradition for a long time lost its primeval impulse. The works at Vinovo, which had fame in the 18th century, came to an untimely end in 1820; those of Castelli (in the Abruzzi), which have been revived, were supplanted by Charles III.’s Artistic industries. establishment at Capodimonte, 1750, which after producing articles of surprising execution was closed before the end of the century. The first place now belongs to the Della Doccia works at Florence. Founded in 1735 by the marquis Carlo Ginori, they maintained a reputation of the very highest kind down to about 1860; but since then they have not kept pace with their younger rivals in other lands. They still, however, are commercially successful. Other cities where the ceramic industries keep their ground are Pesaro, Gubbio, Faenza (whose name long ago became the distinctive term for the finer kind of potter’s work in France, faïence), Savona and Albissola, Turin, Mondovi, Cuneo, Castellamonte, Milan, Brescia, Sassuolo, Imola, Rimini, Perugia, Castelli, &c. In all these the older styles, by which these places became famous in the 16th–18th centuries, have been revived. It is estimated that the total production of the finer wares amounts on the average to £400,000 per annum. The ruder branches of the art—the making of tiles and common wares—are pretty generally diffused.
The jeweller’s art received large encouragement in a country which had so many independent courts; but nowhere has it attained a fuller development than at Rome. A vast variety of trinkets—in coral, glass, lava, &c.—is exported from Italy, or carried away by the annual host of tourists. The copying of the paintings of the old masters is becoming an art industry of no small mercantile importance in some of the larger cities.
The production of mosaics is an industry still carried on with much success in Italy, which indeed ranks exceedingly high in the department. The great works of the Vatican are especially famous (more than 17,000 distinct tints are employed in their productions), and there are many other establishments in Rome. The Florentine mosaics are perhaps better known abroad; they are composed of larger pieces than the Roman. Those of the Venetian artists are remarkable for the boldness of their colouring. There is a tendency towards the fostering of feminine home industries—lace-making, linen-weaving, &c.
Condition of the Working Classes.—The condition of the numerous agricultural labourers (who constitute one-third of the population) is, except in some regions, hard, and in places absolutely miserable. Much light was thrown upon their position by the agricultural inquiry (inchiesta agraria) completed in 1884. The large numbers of emigrants, who are drawn chiefly from the rural classes, furnish another proof of poverty. The terms of agrarian contracts and leases (except in districts where mezzadria prevails in its essential form), are in many regions disadvantageous to the labourers, who suffer from the obligation to provide guarantees for payment of rent, for repayment of seed corn and for the division of products.
It was only at the close of the 19th century that the true cause of malaria—the conveyance of the infection by the bite of the Anopheles claviger—was discovered. This mosquito does not as a rule enter the large towns; but low-lying coast districts and ill-drained plains are especially subject to it. Much Malaria. has been done in keeping out the insects by fine wire netting placed on the windows and the doors of houses, especially in the railwaymen’s cottages. In 1902 the state took up the sale of quinine at a low price, manufacturing it at the central military pharmaceutical laboratory at Turin. Statistics show the difference produced by this measure.
| Financial Year. | Pounds of quinine sold. | Deaths by Malaria. |
| 1901–1902 | . . | 13,358 |
| 1902–1903 | 4,932 | 9,908 |
| 1903–1904 | 15,915 | 8,513 |
| 1904–1905 | 30,956 | 8,501 |
| 1905–1906 | 41,166 | 7,838 |
| 1906–1907 | 45,591 | 4,875 |
The profit made by the state, which is entirely devoted to a special fund for means against malaria, amounted in these five years to £41,759. It has been established that two 3-grain pastilles a day are a sufficient prophylactic; and the proprietors of malarious estates and contractors for public works in malarious districts are bound by law to provide sufficient quinine for their workmen, death for want of this precaution coming under the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act. Much has also been, though much remains to be, done in the way of bonificamento, i.e. proper drainage and improvement of the (generally fertile) low-lying and hitherto malarious plains.
In Venetia the lives of the small proprietors and of the salaried peasants are often extremely miserable. There and in Lombardy the disease known as pellagra is most widely diffused. The disease is due to poisoning by micro-organisms produced by deteriorated maize, and can be combated by care in ripening, drying and storing the maize. The most recent statistics show the disease to be diminishing. Whereas in 1881 there were 104,067 (16.29 per 1000) peasants afflicted by the disease, in 1899 there were only 72,603 (10.30 per 1000) peasants, with a maximum of 39,882 (34.32 per 1000) peasants in Venetia, and 19,557 (12.90 per 1000) peasants in Lombardy. The decrease of the disease is a direct result of the efforts made to combat it, in the form of special hospitals or pellagrosari, economic kitchens, rural bakeries and maize-drying establishments. A bill for the better prevention of pellagra was introduced in the spring of 1902. The deaths from it dropped in that year to 2376, from 3054 in the previous year and 3788 in 1900.
In Liguria, on account of the comparative rarity of large estates, agricultural labourers are in a better condition. Men earn between 1s. 3d. and 2s. 1d. a day, and women from 5d. to 8d. In Emilia the day labourers, known as disobbligati, earn, on the contrary, low wages, out of which they have to provide for shelter and to lay by something against unemployment. Their condition is miserable. In Tuscany, however, the prevalence of mezzadria, properly so called, has raised the labourers’ position. Yet in some Tuscan provinces, as, for instance, that of Grosseto, where malaria rages, labourers are organized in gangs under “corporals,” who undertake harvest work. They are poverty-stricken, and easily fall victims to fever. In the Abruzzi and in Apulia both regular and irregular workmen are engaged by the year. The curatori or curatoli (factors) receive £40 a year, with a slight interest in the profits; the stockmen hardly earn in money and kind £13; the muleteers and under-workmen get between £5 to £8, plus firewood, bread and oil; irregular workmen have even lower wages, with a daily distribution of bread, salt and oil. In Campania and Calabria the curatoli and massari earn, in money and kind, about £12 a year; cowmen, shepherds and muleteers about £10; irregular workmen are paid from 812d. to 1s. 8d. per day, but only find employment, on an average, 230 days in the year. The condition of Sicilian labourers is also miserable. The huge extent of the latifondi, or large estates, often results in their being left in the hands of speculators, who exploit both workmen and farmers with such usury that the latter are often compelled, at the end of a scanty year, to hand over their crops to the usurers before harvest. In Sardinia wage-earners are paid 10d. a day, with free shelter and an allotment for private cultivation. Irregular adult workmen earn between 10d. and 1s. 3d., and boys from 6d. to 10d. a day. Woodcutters and vine-waterers, however, sometimes earn as much as 3s. a day.
The peasants somewhat rarely use animal food—this is most largely used in Sardinia and least in Sicily—bread and polenta or macaroni and vegetables being the staple diet. Wine is the prevailing drink.
The condition of the workmen employed in manufactures has improved during recent years. Wages are higher, the cost of the prime necessaries of life is, as a rule, lower, though taxation on some of them is still enormous; so that the remuneration of work has improved. Taking into account the variations in wages and in the price of wheat, it may be calculated that the number of hours of work requisite to earn a sum equal to the price of a cwt. of wheat fell from 183 in 1871 to 73 in 1894. In 1898 it was 105, on account of the rise in the price of wheat, and since then up till 1902 it oscillated between 105 and 95.
Wages have risen from 22.6 centimes per hour (on an average) to 26.3 centimes, but not in all industries. In the mining and woollen industries they have fallen, but have increased in mechanical, chemical, silk and cotton industries. Wages vary greatly in different parts of Italy, according to the cost of the necessaries of life, the degree of development of working-class needs and the state of working-class organization, which in some places has succeeded in increasing the rates of pay. Women are, as a rule, paid less than men, and though their wages have also increased, the rise has been slighter than in the case of men. In some trades, for instance the silk trade, women earn little more than 10d. a day, and, for some classes of work, as little as 7d. and 412d. The general improvement in sanitation has led to a corresponding improvement in the condition of the working classes, though much still remains to be done, especially in the south. On the other hand, it is generally the case that even in the most unpromising inn the bedding is clean.
The number of industrial strikes has risen from year to year, although, on account of the large number of persons involved in some of them, the rise in the number of strikers has not always corresponded to the number of strikes. During the years 1900 and 1901 strikes were increasingly numerous, chiefly Strikes. on account of the growth of Socialist and working-class organizations.
The greatest proportion of strikes takes place in northern Italy, especially Lombardy and Piedmont, where manufacturing industries are most developed. Textile, building and mining industries show the highest percentage of strikes, since they give employment to large numbers of men concentrated in single localities. Agricultural strikes, though less frequent than those in manufacturing industries, have special importance in Italy. They are most common in the north and centre, a circumstance which shows them to be promoted less by the more backward and more ignorant peasants than by the better-educated labourers of Lombardy and Emilia, among whom Socialist organizations are widespread. Since 1901 there have been, more than once, general strikes at Milan and elsewhere, and one in the autumn of 1905 caused great inconvenience throughout the country, and led to no effective result.
Although in some industrial centres the working-class movement has assumed an importance equal to that of other countries, there is no general working-class organization comparable to the English trade unions. Mutual benefit and co-operative societies serve the purpose of working-class defence or offence against the employers. In 1893, after many vicissitudes, the Italian Socialist Labour Party was founded, and has now become the Italian Socialist Party, in which the majority of Italian workmen enrol themselves. Printers and hat-makers, however, possess trade societies. In 1899 an agitation began for the organization of “Chambers of Labour,” intended to look after the technical education of workmen and to form commissions of arbitration in case of strikes. They act also as employment bureaux, and are often centres of political propaganda. At present such “chambers” exist in many Italian cities, while “leagues of improvement,” or of “resistance,” are rapidly spreading in the country districts. In many cases the action of these organizations has proved, at least temporarily, advantageous to the working classes.
Labour legislation is backward in Italy, on account of the late development of manufacturing industry and of working-class organization. On the 17th of April 1898 a species of Employers’ Liability Act compelled employers of more than five workmen in certain industries to insure their employees against accidents. On the 17th of July 1898 a national fund for the insurance of workmen against illness and old age was founded by law on the principle of optional registration. In addition to an initial endowment by the state, part of the annual income of the fund is furnished in various forms by the state (principally by making over a proportion of the profits of the Post Office Savings Bank), and part by the premiums of the workmen. The minimum annual premium is six lire for an annuity of one lira per day at the age of sixty, and insurance against sickness. The low level of wages in many trades and the jealousies of the “Chambers of Labour” and other working-class organizations impede rapid development.
A law came into operation in February 1908, according to which a weekly day of rest (with few exceptions) was established on Sunday in every case in which it was possible, and otherwise upon some other day of the week.
The French institution of Prudhommes was introduced into Italy in 1893, under the name of Collegi di Probiviri. The institution has not attained great vogue. Most of the colleges deal with matters affecting textile and mechanical industries. Each “college” is founded by royal decree, and consists of a president, with not fewer than ten and not more than twenty members. A conciliation bureau and a jury are elected to deal with disputes concerning wages, hours of work, labour contracts, &c., and have power to settle the disputes, without appeal, whenever the amounts involved do not exceed £8.
Provident institutions have considerably developed in Italy under the forms of savings banks, assurance companies and mutual benefit societies. Besides the Post Office Savings Bank and the ordinary savings banks, many co-operative credit societies and ordinary credit banks Provident Institutions. receive deposits of savings.
The greatest number of savings banks exists in Lombardy; Piedmont and Venetia come next. Campania holds the first place in the south, most of the savings of that region being deposited in the provident institutions of Naples. In Liguria and Sardinia the habit of thrift is less developed. Assurance societies in Italy are subject to the general dispositions of the commercial code regarding commercial companies. Mutual benefit societies have increased rapidly, both because their advantages have been appreciated, and because, until recently, the state had taken no steps directly to insure workmen against illness. The present Italian mutual benefit societies resemble the ancient beneficent corporations, of which in some respects they may be considered a continuation. The societies require government recognition if they wish to enjoy legal rights. The state (law of the 15th of April 1896) imposed this condition in order to determine exactly the aims of the societies, and, while allowing them to give help to their sick, old or feeble members, or aid the families of deceased members, to forbid them to pay old-age pensions, lest they assumed burdens beyond their financial strength. Nevertheless, the majority of societies have not sought recognition, being suspicious of fiscal state intervention.
Co-operation, for the various purposes of credit, distribution, production and labour, has attained great development in Italy. Credit co-operation is represented by a special type of association known as People’s Banks (Banche Popolari). They are not, as a rule, supported by Co-operation. workmen or peasants, but rather by small tradespeople, manufacturers and farmers. They perform a useful function in protecting their clients from the cruel usury which prevails, especially in the south. A recent form of co-operative credit banks are the Casse Rurali or rural banks, on the Raffeisen system, which lend money to peasants and small proprietors out of capital obtained on credit or by gift. These loans are made on personal security, but the members of the bank do not contribute any quota of the capital, though their liability is unlimited in case of loss. They are especially widespread in Lombardy and Venetia.
Distributive co-operation is confined almost entirely to Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Venetia, Emilia and Tuscany, and is practically unknown in Basilicata, the Abruzzi and Sardinia.
Co-operative dairies are numerous. They have, however, much decreased in number since 1889. More numerous are the agricultural and viticultural co-operative societies, which have largely increased in number. They are to be found mainly in the fertile plains of north Italy, where they enjoy considerable success, removing the cause of labour troubles and strikes, and providing for cultivation on a sufficiently large scale. The richest, however, of the co-operative societies, though few in number, are those for the production of electricity, for textile industries and for ceramic and glass manufactures.
Co-operation in general is most widely diffused, in proportion to population, in central Italy; less so in northern Italy, and much less so in the south and the islands. It thus appears that co-operation flourishes most in the districts in which the mezzadria system has been prevalent.
Railways.—The first railway in Italy, a line 16 m. long from Naples to Castellammare, was opened in 1840. By 1881 there were some 5500 m. open, in 1891 some 8000 m., while in 1901 the total length was 9317 m. In July 1905 all the principal lines, which had been constructed by the state, but had been since 1885 let out to three companies (Mediterranean, Adriatic, Sicilian), were taken over by the state; their length amounted in 1901 to 6147 m., and in 1907 to 8422 m. The minor lines (many of them narrow gauge) remain in the hands of private companies. The total length, including the Sardinian railways, was 10,368 m. in 1907. The state, in taking over the railways, did not exercise sufficient care to see that the lines and the rolling stock were kept up to a proper state of efficiency and adequacy for the work they had to perform; while the step itself was taken somewhat hastily. The result was that for the first two years of state administration the service was distinctly bad, and the lack of goods trucks at the ports was especially felt. A capital expenditure of £4,000,000 annually was decided on to bring the lines up to the necessary state of efficiency to be able to cope with the rapidly increasing traffic. It was estimated in 1906 that this would have to be maintained for a period of ten years, with a further total expenditure of £14,000,000 on new lines.
Comparing the state of things in 1901 with that of 1881, for the whole country, we find the passenger and goods traffic almost doubled (except the cattle traffic), the capital expenditure almost doubled, the working expenses per mile almost imperceptibly increased, and the gross receipts per mile slightly lower. The personnel had increased from 70,568 to 108,690. The construction of numerous unremunerative lines, and the free granting of concessions to government and other employees (and also of cheap tickets on special occasions for congresses, &c., in various towns, without strict inquiry into the qualifications of the claimants) will account for the failure to realize a higher profit. The fares (in slow trains, with the addition of 10% for expenses) are: 1st class, 1.85d.; 2nd, 1.3d.; 3rd, 0.725d. per mile. There are, however, considerable reductions for distances over 93 m., on a scale increasing in proportion to the distance.
The taking over of the main lines by the state has of course produced a considerable change in the financial situation of the railways. The state incurred in this connexion a liability of some £20,000,000, of which about £16,000,000 represented the rolling stock. The state has considerably improved the engines and passenger carriages. The capital value of the whole of the lines, rolling stock, &c., for 1908–1909 was calculated approximately at £244,161,400, and the profits at £5,295,019, or 2.2%.
Milan is the most important railway centre in the country, and is followed by Turin, Genoa, Verona, Bologna, Rome, Naples. Lombardy and Piedmont are much better provided with railways in proportion to their area than any other parts of Italy; next come Venetia, Emilia and the immediate environs of Naples.
The northern frontier is crossed by the railway from Turin to Ventimiglia by the Col di Tenda, the Mont Cenis line from Turin to Modane (the tunnel is 7 m. in length), the Simplon line (tunnel 11 m. in length) from Domodossola to Brigue, the St Gotthard from Milan to Chiasso (the tunnel is entirely in Swiss territory), the Brenner from Verona to Trent, the line from Udine to Tarvis and the line from Venice to Triest by the Adriatic coast. Besides these international lines the most important are those from Milan to Turin (via Vercelli and via Alessandria), to Genoa via Tortona, to Bologna via Parma and Modena, to Verona, and the shorter lines to the district of the lakes of Lombardy; from Turin to Genoa via Savona and via Alessandria; from Genoa to Savona and Ventimiglia along the Riviera, and along the south-west coast of Italy, via Sarzana (whence a line runs to Parma) to Pisa (whence lines run to Pistoia and Florence) and Rome; from Verona to Modena, and to Venice via Padua; from Bologna to Padua, to Rimini (and thence along the north-east coast via Ancona, Castellammare Adriatico and Foggia to Brindisi and Otranto), and to Florence and Rome; from Rome to Ancona, to Castellammare Adriatico and to Naples; from Naples to Foggia, via Metaponto (with a junction for Reggio di Calabria), to Brindisi and to Reggio di Calabria. (For the Sicilian and Sardinian lines, see Sicily and Sardinia.) The speed of the trains is not high, nor are the runs without stoppage long as a rule. One of the fastest runs is from Rome to Orte, 52.40 m. in 69 min., or 45.40 m. per hour, but this is a double line with little traffic. The low speed reduces the potentiality of the lines. The insufficiency of rolling stock, and especially of goods wagons, is mainly caused by delays in “handling” traffic consequent on this or other causes, among which may be mentioned the great length of the single lines south of Rome. It is thus a matter of difficulty to provide trucks for a sudden emergency, e.g. the vintage season; and in 1905–1907 complaints were many, while the seaports were continually short of trucks. This led to deficiencies in the supply of coal to the manufacturing centres, and to some diversion elsewhere of shipping.
Steam and Electric Tramways.—Tramways with mechanical traction have developed rapidly. Between 1875, when the first line was opened, and 1901, the length of the lines grew to 1890 m. of steam and 270 m. of electric tramways. These lines exist principally in Lombardy (especially in the province of Milan), in Piedmont, especially in the province of Turin, and in other regions of northern and central Italy. In the south they are rare, on account partly of the mountainous character of the country, and partly of the scarcity of traffic. All the important towns of Italy are provided with internal electric tramways, mostly with overhead wires.
Carriage-roads have been greatly extended in modern times, although their ratio to area varies in different localities. In north Italy there are 1480 yds. of road per sq. m.; in central Italy 993; in southern Italy 405; in Sardinia 596, and in Sicily only 244. They are as a rule well kept up in north and central Italy, less so in the south, where, especially in Calabria, many villages are inaccessible by road and have only footpaths leading to them. By the act of 1903 the state contributes half and the province a quarter of the cost of roads connecting communes with the nearest railway stations or landing places.
Inland Navigation.—Navigable canals had in 1886 a total length of about 655 m.; they are principally situated in Piedmont, Lombardy and Venetia, and are thus practically confined to the Po basin. Canals lead from Milan to the Ticino, Adda and Po. The Po is itself navigable from Turin downwards, but through its delta it is so sandy that canals are preferred, the Po di Volano and the Po di Primaro on the right, and the Canale Bianco on the left. The total length of navigable rivers is 967 m.
Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones.—The number of post offices (including collettorie, or collecting offices, which are rapidly being eliminated) increased from 2200 in 1862 to 4823 in 1881, 6700 in 1891 and 8817 in 1904. In spite of a large increase in the number of letters and post cards (i.e. nearly 10 per inhabitant per annum in 1904, as against 5.65 in 1888) the average is considerably below that of most other European countries. The number of state telegraph offices was 4603, of other offices (railway and tramway stations, which accept private telegrams for transmission) 1930. The telephone system is considerably developed; in 1904, 92 urban and 66 inter-urban systems existed. They were installed by private companies, but have been taken over by the state. International communication between Rome and Paris, and Italy and Switzerland also exists. The parcel post and money order services have largely increased since 1887–1888, the number of parcels having almost doubled (those for abroad are more than trebled), while the number of money orders issued is trebled and their value doubled (about £40,000,000). The value of the foreign orders paid in Italy increased from £1,280,000 to £2,356,000—owing to the increase of emigration and of the savings sent home by emigrants.
At the end of 1907 Italy was among the few countries that had not adopted the reduction of postage sanctioned at the Postal Union congress, held in Rome in 1906, by which the rates became 212d. for the first oz., and 112d. per oz. afterwards. The internal rate is 15c. (112d.) per 12 oz.; post-cards 10c. (1d.), reply 15c. On the other hand, letters within the postal district are only 5c. (12d.) per 12 oz. Printed matter is 2c. (15d.) per 50 grammes (123 oz.). The regulations provide that if there is a greater weight of correspondence (including book-packets) than 114 ℔ for any individual by any one delivery, notice shall be given him that it is lying at the post office, he being then obliged to arrange for fetching it. Letters insured for a fixed sum are not delivered under any circumstances.
Money order cards are very convenient and cheap (up to 10 lire [8s.] for 10c. [1d.]), as they need not be enclosed in a letter, while a short private message can be written on them. Owing to the comparatively small amount of letters, it is found possible to have a travelling post office on all principal trains (while almost every train has a travelling sorter, for whom a compartment is reserved) without a late fee being exacted in either case. In the principal towns letters may be posted in special boxes at the head office just before the departure of any given mail train, and are conveyed direct to the travelling post office. Another convenient arrangement is the provision of letter-boxes on electric tramcars in some cities.
Mercantile Marine.—Between the years 1881 and 1905 the number of ships entered and cleared at Italian ports decreased slightly (219,598 in 1881 and 208,737 in 1905), while their aggregate tonnage increased (32,070,704 in 1881 and 80,782,030 in 1905). In the movement of shipping, trade with foreign countries prevails (especially as regards arrivals) over trade between Italian ports. Most of the merchandise and passengers bound for and hailing from foreign ports sail under foreign flags. Similarly, foreign vessels prevail over Italian vessels in regard to goods embarked. European countries absorb the greater part of Italian sea-borne trade, whereas most of the passenger traffic goes to North and South America. The substitution of steamships for sailing vessels has brought about a diminution in the number of vessels belonging to the Italian mercantile marine, whether employed in the coasting trade, the fisheries or in traffic on the high seas. Thus:—
| Year. | Total No. of Ships. | Steamships. | Sailing Vessels. | ||
| Number. | Tonnage (Net.) | Number. | Tonnage (Net.) | ||
| 1881 | 7815 | 176 | 93,698 | 7,639 | 895,359 |
| 1905 | 5596 | 513 | 462,259 | 5,083 | 570,355 |
Among the steamers the increase has chiefly taken place in vessels of more than 1000 tons displacement, but the number of large sailing vessels has also increased. The most important Italian ports are (in order): Genoa, Naples, Palermo, Leghorn, Messina, Venice, Catania.
Foreign Trade.—Italian trade with foreign countries (imports and exports) during the quinquennium 1872–1876 averaged £94,000,000 a year; in the quinquennium 1893–1897 it fell to £88,960,000 a year. In 1898, however, the total rose to £104,680,000, but the increase was principally due to the extra importation of corn in that year. In 1899 it was nearly £120,000,000. Since 1899 there has been a steady increase both in imports and exports. Thus:—
| Year. | Trade with Foreign Countries in £1000 (exclusive of Precious Metals).* | |||
| Totals. | Imports. | Exports. | Excess of Imports over Exports. | |
| 1871 | 81,966 | 38,548 | 43,418 | −4,870 |
| 1881 | 96,208 | 49,587 | 46,621 | 2,966 |
| 1891 | 80,135 | 45,063 | 35,072 | 9,991 |
| 1900 | 121,538 | 68,009 | 53,529 | 14,480 |
| 1904 | 140,437 | 76,549 | 63,888 | 12,661 |
The great extension of Italian coast-line is thought by some to be not really a source of strength to the Italian mercantile marine, as few of the ports have a large enough hinterland to provide them with traffic, and in this hinterland (except in the basin of the Po) there are no canals or navigable rivers. Another source of weakness is the fact that Italy is a country of transit and the Italian mercantile marine has to enter into competition with the ships of other countries, which call there in passing. A third difficulty is the comparatively small tonnage and volume of Italian exports relatively to the imports, the former in 1907 being about one-fourth of the latter, and greatly out of proportion to the relative value; while a fourth is the lack of facilities for handling goods, especially in the smaller ports.
The total imports for the first six months of 1907 amounted to £57,840,000, an increase of £7,520,000 as compared with the corresponding period of 1906. The exports for the corresponding period amounted to £35,840,000, a diminution of £1,520,000 as compared with the corresponding period of 1906. The diminution was due to a smaller exportation of raw silk and oil. The countries with which this trade is mainly carried on are: (imports) United Kingdom, Germany, United States, France, Russia and India; (exports) Switzerland, United States, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Argentina.
The most important imports are minerals, including coal and metals (both in pig and wrought); silks, raw, spun and woven; stone, potter's earths, earthenware and glass; corn, flour and farinaceous products; cotton, raw, spun and woven; and live stock. The principal exports are silk and cotton tissues, live stock, wines, spirits and oils; corn, flour, macaroni and similar products; and minerals, chiefly sulphur. Before the tariff reform of 1887 manufactured articles, alimentary products and raw materials for manufacture held the principal places in the imports. In the exports, alimentary products came first, while raw materials for manufacture and manufactured articles were of little account. The transformation of Italy from a purely agricultural into a largely industrial country is shown by the circumstance that trade in raw stuffs, semi-manufactured and manufactured materials, now preponderates over that in alimentary products and wholly-manufactured articles, both the importation of raw materials and the exportation of manufactured articles having increased. The balance of Italian trade has undergone frequent fluctuations. The large predominance of imports over exports after 1884 was a result of the falling off of the export trade in live stock, olive oil and wine, on account of the closing of the French market, while the importation of corn from Russia and the Balkan States increased considerably. In 1894 the excess of imports over exports fell to £2,720,000, but by 1898 it had grown to £8,391,000, in consequence chiefly of the increased importation of coal, raw cotton and cotton thread, pig and cast iron, old iron, grease and oil-seeds for use in Italian industries. In 1899 the excess of imports over exports fell to £3,006,000; but since then it has never been less than £12,000,000.
Education.—Public instruction in Italy is regulated by the state, which maintains public schools of every grade, and requires that other public schools shall conform to the rules of the state schools. No private person may open a school without state authorization. Schools may be classed thus:—
1. Elementary, of two grades, of the lower of which there must legally be at least one for boys and one for girls in each commune; while the upper grade elementary school is required in communes having normal and secondary schools or over 4000 inhabitants. In both the instruction is free. They are maintained by the communes, sometimes with state help. The age limit is six to nine years for the lower grade, and up to twelve for the higher grade, attendance being obligatory at the latter also where it exists. 2. Secondary instruction (i.) classical in the ginnasi and licei, the latter leading to the universities; (ii.) technical. 3. Higher education—universities, higher institutes and special schools.
Of the secondary and higher educatory methods, in the normal schools and licei the state provides for the payment of the staff and for scientific material, and often largely supports the ginnasi and technical schools, which should by law be supported by the communes. The universities are maintained by the state and by their own ancient resources; while the higher special schools are maintained conjointly by the state, the province, the commune and (sometimes) the local chamber of commerce.
The number of persons unable to read and write has gradually decreased, both absolutely and in proportion to the number of inhabitants. The census of 1871 gave 73% of illiterates, that of 1881, 67%, and that of 1901, 56%, i.e. 51.8 for males and 60.8 for females. In Piedmont there were 17.7% of illiterates above six years (the lowest) and in Calabria 78.7% (the highest), the figures for the whole country being 48.5. As might be expected, progress has been most rapid wherever education, at the moment of national unification, was most widely diffused. For instance, the number of bridegrooms unable to write their names in 1872 was in the province of Turin 26%, and in the Calabrian province of Cosenza 90%; in 1899 the percentage in the province of Turin had fallen to 5%, while in that of Cosenza it was still 76%. Infant asylums (where the first rudiments of instruction are imparted to children between two and a half and six years of age) and elementary schools have increased in number. There has been a corresponding increase in the number of scholars. Thus:—
| Year. | Infant Asylums (Public and Private). | Daily Elementary Schools (Public and Private). | ||
| Number of Asylums | Number of Scholars. | Number of Schoolrooms. | Number of Scholars. | |
| 1885–86 | 2083 | 240,365 | 53,628 | 2,252,898 |
| 1890–91 | 2296 | 278,204 | 57,077 | 2,418,692 |
| 1901–02 | 3314 | 355,594 | 61,777 | 2,733,349 |
The teachers in 1901–1902 numbered 65,739 (exclusive of 576 non-teaching directors and 322 teachers of special subjects) or about 41.5 scholars per teacher.
The rate of increase in the public state-supported schools has been much greater than in the private schools. School buildings have been improved and the qualifications of teachers raised. Nevertheless, many schools are still defective, both from a hygienic and a teaching point of view; while the economic position of the elementary teachers, who in Italy depend upon the communal administrations and not upon the state, is still in many parts of the country extremely low.
The law of 1877 rendering education compulsory for children between six and nine years of age has been the principal cause of the spread of elementary education. The law is, however, imperfectly enforced for financial reasons. In 1901–1902 only 65% out of the whole number of children between six and nine years of age were registered in the lower standards of the elementary and private schools. The evening schools have to some extent helped to spread education. Their number and that of their scholars have, however, decreased since the withdrawal of state subsidies. In 1871–1872 there were 375,947 scholars at the evening schools and 154,585 at the holiday schools, while in 1900–1901 these numbers had fallen to 94,510 and 35,460 respectively. These are, however, the only institutions in which a decrease is shown, and by the law of 1906 5000 of these institutions are to be provided in the communes where the proportion of illiterates is highest. In 1895 they numbered 4245, with 138,181 scholars. Regimental schools impart elementary education to illiterate soldiers. Whereas the levy of 1894 showed 40% of the recruits to be completely illiterate, only 27% were illiterate when the levy was discharged in 1897. Private institutions and working-class associations have striven to improve the intellectual conditions of the working classes. Popular universities have lately attained considerable development. The number of institutes devoted to secondary education remained almost unchanged between 1880–1881 and 1895–1896. In some places the number has even been diminished by the suppression of private educational institutes. But the number of scholars has considerably increased, and shows a ratio superior to the general increase of the population. The greatest increase has taken place in technical education, where it has been much more rapid than in classical education. There are three higher commercial schools, with academic rank, at Venice, Genoa and Bari, and eleven secondary commercial schools; and technical and commercial schools for women at Florence and Milan. The number of agricultural schools has also grown, although the total is relatively small when compared with population. The attendance at the various classes of secondary schools in 1882 and 1902 is shown by the following table:—
| 1882. | 1902. | No. of Schools. | |
| Ginnasi— | |||
| Government | 13,875 | 24,081 | 192 |
| On an equal footing with government schools | 6,417 | 7,208 | 76 |
| Not on such a footing | 22,609 | 24,850* | 442 |
| Total | 42,811 | 56,139 | 710 |
| Technical schools— | |||
| Government | 7,510 | 30,411 | 188 |
| On an equal footing | 8,653 | 12,055 | 101 |
| Not on such a footing | 8,670 | 3,623* | 106* |
| Total | 24,833 | 46,089 | 395 |
| Licei— | |||
| Government | 6,623 | 10,983 | 121 |
| On an equal footing | 1,167 | 1,955 | 33 |
| Not on such a footing | 4,600 | 4,962* | 187 |
| Total | 12,390 | 17,900 | 341 |
| Technical institutes— | |||
| Government | 5,555 | 9,654 | 54 |
| On an equal footing | 1,684 | 1,898 | 18 |
| Not on such a footing | 619 | 378* | 7 |
| Total | 7,858 | 11,930 | 79 |
| Nautical institutes— | |||
| Government | 758 | 1,878 | 18 |
| On an equal footing | 69 | 38 | 1 |
| Not on such a footing | 13 | 29* | 1 |
| Total | 816 | 1,945 | 20 |
* 1896.
The schools which do not obtain equality with government schools are either some of those conducted by religious orders, or else those in which a sufficient standard is not reached. The total number of such schools was, in 1896, 742 with 33,813 pupils.
The pupils of the secondary schools reach a maximum of 6.60 per 1000 in Liguria and 5.92 in Latium, and a minimum of 2.30 in the Abruzzi, 2.27 in Calabria and 1.65 in Basilicata.
For the boarding schools, or convitti, there are only incomplete reports except for the institutions directly dependent on the ministry of public instruction, which are comparatively few. The rest are largely directed by religious institutions. In 1895–1896 there were 919 convitti for boys, with 59,066 pupils, of which 40, with 3814 pupils, were dependent on the ministry (in 1901–1902 there were 43 of these with 4036 pupils); and 1456 for girls, with 49,367 pupils, of which only 8, with about 600 pupils, were dependent on the ministry.
The scuole normali or training schools (117 in number, of which 75 were government institutions) for teachers had 1329 male students in 1901–1902, showing hardly any increase, while the female students increased from 8005 in 1882–1883 to 22,316 in 1895–1896, but decreased to 19,044 in 1901–1902, owing to the admission of women to telegraph and telephone work. The female secondary schools in 1881–1882 numbered 77, of which 7 were government institutions, with 3569 pupils; in 1901–1902 there were 233 schools (9 governmental) with 9347 pupils.
The total attendance of students in the various faculties at the different universities and higher institutes is as follows:—
| 1882. | 1902. | |
| Law | 4,801 | 8,385 |
| Philosophy and letters | 419 | 1,703 |
| Medicine and surgery | 4,428 | 9,055 |
| Professional diploma, pharmacy | 798 | 3,290 |
| Mathematics and natural science | 1,364 | 3,500 |
| Engineering | 982 | 1,293 |
| Agriculture | 145 | 507 |
| Commerce | 128 | 167 |
| Total | 13,065 | 27,900 |
Thus a large all-round increase in secondary and higher education is shown—satisfactory in many respects, but showing that more young men devote themselves to the learned professions (especially to the law) than the economic condition of the country will justify. There are 21 universities—Bologna, Cagliari, Camerino, Catania, Ferrara, Genoa, Macerata, Messina, Modena, Naples, Padua, Palermo, Parma, Pavia, Perugia, Pisa, Rome, Sassari, Siena, Turin, Urbino, of which Camerino, Ferrara, Perugia and Urbino are not state institutions; university courses are also given at Aquila, Bari and Catanzaro. Of these the most frequented in 1904–1905 were: Naples (4745), Turin (3451), Rome (2630), Bologna (1711), Pavia (1559), Padua (1364), Genoa (1276), and the least frequented, Cagliari (254), Siena (235) and Sassari (200). The professors are ordinary and extraordinary, and free professors (liberi docenti), corresponding to the German Privatdozenten, are also allowed to be attached to the universities.
The institutions which co-operate with the universities are the special schools for engineers at Turin, Naples, Rome and Bologna (and others attached to some of the universities), the higher technical institute at Milan, the higher veterinary schools of Milan, Naples and Turin, the institute for higher studies at Florence (Istituto di studi superiori, pratici e di perfezionamento), the literary and scientific academy of Milan, the higher institutes for the training of female teachers at Florence and Rome, the Institute of Social Studies at Florence, the higher commercial schools at Venice, Bari and Genoa, the commercial university founded by L. Bocconi at Milan in 1902, the higher naval school at Genoa, the higher schools of agriculture at Milan and Portici, the experimental institute at Perugia, the school of forestry at Vallambrosa, the industrial museum at Turin. The special secondary institutions, distinct from those already reckoned under the universities and allied schools, include an Oriental institute at Naples with 243 pupils; 34 schools of agriculture with (1904–1905) 1925 students; 2 schools of mining (at Caltanisetta and Iglesias) with (1904–1905) 83 students; 308 industrial and commercial schools with (1903–1904) 46,411 students; 174 schools of design and moulding with (1898) 12,556 students; 13 government fine art institutes (1904–1905) with 2778 students and 13 non-government with 1662 students; 5 government institutes of music with 1026 students, and 51 non-government with 4109 pupils (1904–1905). Almost all of these show a considerable increase.
Libraries are numerous in Italy, those even of small cities being often rich in manuscripts and valuable works. Statistics collected in 1893–1894 and 1896 revealed the existence of 1831 libraries, either private (but open to the public) or completely public. The public libraries have been enormously increased since 1870 by the incorporation of the treasures of suppressed monastic institutions. The richest in manuscripts is that of the Vatican, especially since the purchase of the Barberini Library in 1902; it now contains over 34,000 MSS. The Vatican archives are also of great importance. Most large towns contain important state or communal archives, in which a considerable amount of research is being done by local investigators; the various societies for local history (Società di Storia Patria) do very good work and issue valuable publications; the treasures which the archives contain are by no means exhausted. Libraries and archives are under the superintendence of the Ministry of Public Instruction. A separate department of this ministry under a director-general has the charge of antiquities and fine arts, making archaeological excavations and supervising those undertaken by private persons (permission to foreigners, even to foreign schools, to excavate in Italy is rarely granted), and maintaining the numerous state museums and picture galleries. The exportation of works of art and antiquities from Italy without leave of the ministry is forbidden (though it has in the past been sometimes evaded). An inventory of those subjects, the exportation of which can in no case be permitted, has been prepared; and the ministry has at its disposal a fund of £200,000 for the purchase of important works of art of all kinds.
Charities.—In Italy there is no legal right in the poor to be supported by the parish or commune, nor any obligation on the commune to relieve the poor—except in the case of forsaken children and the sick poor. Public charity is exercised through the permanent charitable foundations (opere pie), which are, however, very unequally distributed in the different provinces. The districts of Italy which show between 1881 and 1903 the greatest increase of new institutions, or of gifts to old ones, are Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria, while Sardinia, Calabria and Basilicata stand lowest, Latium standing comparatively low.
The patrimony of Italian charitable institutions is considerable and is constantly increasing. In 1880 the number of charitable institutions (exclusive of public pawnshops, or Monti di Pietà, and other institutions which combine operations of credit with charity) was approximately 22,000, with an aggregate patrimony of nearly £80,000,000. The revenue was about £3,600,000; after deduction of taxes, interest on debts, expenses of management, &c., £2,080,000. Adding to this £1,240,000 of communal and provincial subsidies, the product of the labour of inmates, temporary subscriptions, &c., the net revenue available for charity was, during 1880, £3,860,000. Of this sum £260,000 was spent for religious purposes. Between 1881 and 1905 the bequests to existing institutions and sums left for the endowment of new institutions amounted to about £16,604,600.
Charitable institutions take, as a rule, the two forms of outdoor and indoor relief and attendance. The indoor institutions are the more important in regard to endowment, and consist of hospitals for the infirm (a number of these are situated at the seaside); of hospitals for chronic and incurable diseases; of orphan asylums; of poorhouses and shelters for beggars; of infant asylums or institutes for the first education of children under six years of age; of lunatic asylums; of homes for the deaf and dumb; and of institutes for the blind. The outdoor charitable institutions include those which distribute help in money or food; those which supply medicine and medical help; those which aid mothers unable to rear their own children; those which subsidize orphans and foundlings; those which subsidize educational institutes; and those which supply marriage portions. Between 1881 and 1898 the chief increases took place in the endowments of hospitals; orphan asylums; infant asylums; poorhouses; almshouses; voluntary workhouses; and institutes for the blind. The least creditably administered of these are the asylums for abandoned infants; in 1887, of a total of 23,913, 53.77% died; while during the years 1893–1896 (no later statistics are available) of 117,970 51.72% died. The average mortality under one year for the whole of Italy in 1893–1896 was only 16.66%.
Italian charity legislation was reformed by the laws of 1862 and 1890, which attempted to provide efficacious protection for endowments, and to ensure the application of the income to the purposes for which it was intended. The law considers as “charitable institutions” (opere pie) all poorhouses, almshouses and institutes which partly or wholly give help to able-bodied or infirm paupers, or seek to improve their moral and economic condition; and also the Congregazioni di carità (municipal charity boards existing in every commune, and composed of members elected by the municipal council), which administer funds destined for the poor in general. All charitable institutions were under the protection of provincial administrative junta, existing in every province, and empowered to control the management of charitable endowments. The supreme control was vested in the minister of the Interior. The law of 1890 also empowers every citizen to appeal to the tribunals on behalf of the poor, for whose benefit a given charitable institution may have been intended. A more recent law provides for the formation of a central body, with provincial commissions under it. Its effect, however, has been comparatively small.
Public pawnshops or Monti di pietà numbered 555 in 1896, with a net patrimony of £2,879,625. In that year their income, including revenue from capital, was £416,385, and their expenditure £300,232. The amount lent on security was £4,153,229.
The Monti frumentarii or co-operative corn deposits, which lend seed corn to farmers, and are repaid after harvest with interest in kind, numbered 1615 in 1894, and possessed a patrimony of £240,000.
In addition to the regular charitable institutions, the communal and provincial authorities exercise charity, the former (in 1899) to the extent of £1,827,166 and the latter to the extent of £919,832 per annum. Part of these sums is given to hospitals, and part spent directly by the communal and provincial authorities. Of the sum spent by the communes, about 12 goes for the sanitary service (doctors, midwives, vaccination), 18 for the maintenance of foundlings, 110 for the support of the sick in hospitals, and 122 for sheltering the aged and needy. Of the sum spent by the provincial authorities, over half goes to lunatic asylums and over a quarter to the maintenance of foundling hospitals.
Religion.—The great majority of Italians—97.12%—are Roman Catholics. Besides the ordinary Latin rite, several others are recognized. The Armenians of Venice maintain their traditional characteristics. The Albanians of the southern provinces still employ the Greek rite and the Greek language in their public worship, and their priests, like those of the Greek Church, are allowed to marry. Certain peculiarities introduced by St Ambrose distinguish the ritual of Milan from that of the general church. Up to 1871 the island of Sicily was, according to the bull of Urban II., ecclesiastically dependent on the king, and exempt from the canonical power of the pope.
Though the territorial authority of the papal see was practically abolished in 1870, the fact that Rome is the seat of the administrative centre of the vast organization of the church is not without significance to the nation. In the same city in which the administrative functions of the body polit there still exists the court of the spiritual potentate which in 1879 consisted of 1821 persons. Protestants number some 65,000, of whom half are Italian and half foreign. Of the former 22,500 are Waldensians. The number of Jews was returned as 36,000, but is certainly higher. There are, besides, in Italy some 2500 members of the Greek Orthodox Church. There were in 1901 20,707 parishes in Italy, 68,444 secular clergy and 48,043 regulars (monks, lay brothers and nuns). The size of parishes varies from province to province, Sicily having larger parishes in virtue of the old Sicilian church laws, and Naples, and some parts of central Italy, having the smallest. The Italian parishes had in 1901 a total gross revenue, including assignments from the public worship endowment fund, of £1,280,000 or an average of £63 per parish; 51% of this gross sum consists of revenue from glebe lands.
The kingdom is divided into 264 sees and ten abbeys, or prelatures nullius dioceseos. The dioceses are as follows:—
A. 6 suburbicarian sees—Ostia and Velletri, Porto and Sta Rufina, Albano, Frascati, Palestrina, Sabina—all held by cardinal bishops.
B. 74 sees immediately subject to the Holy See, of which 12 are archiepiscopal and 61 episcopal.
C. 37 ecclesiastical provinces, each under a metropolitan, composed of 148 suffragan dioceses. Their position is indicated in the following table:—
| Metropolitans. | Suffragans. |
| Acerenza-Matera | Anglona-Tursi, Tricarico, Venosa. |
| Bari | Conversano, Ruvo-Bitonto. |
| Benevento | S. Agata de’ Goti, Alife, Ariano, Ascoli Satriano Cerignola, Avellino, Bojano, Bovino, Larino, Lucera, S. Severo, Telese (Cerreto), Termoli. |
| Bologna | Faenza, Imola. |
| Brindisi and Ostuni | No suffragan. |
| Cagliari | Galtelli-Nuoro, Iglesias, Ogliastra. |
| Capua | Caiazzo, Calvi-Teano, Caserta, Isernia-Venafro, Sessa. |
| Chieti and Vasto | No suffragan. |
| Conza and Campagna | S. Angelo de’ Lombardi-Bisaccia, Lacedonia, Muro Lucano. |
| Fermo | Macerata-Tolentino, Montalto, Ripatransone, S. Severino. |
| Florence | Borgo S. Sepolcro, Colle di Val d’Elsa, Fiesole, S. Miniato, Modigliana, Pistoia-Prato. |
| Genoa | Albenga, Bobbio, Chiavari, Savona-Noli, Tortona, Ventimiglia. |
| Lanciano and Ortona | No suffragan. |
| Manfredonia and Viesti | No suffragan. |
| Messina | Lipari, Nicosia, Patti. |
| Milan | Bergamo, Brescia, Como, Crema, Cremona, Lodi, Mantua, Pavia. |
| Modena | Carpi, Guastalla, Massa-Carrara, Reggio. |
| Monreale | Caltanisetta, Girgenti. |
| Naples | Acerra, Ischia, Nola, Pozzuoli. |
| Oristano | Ales-Terralba. |
| Otranto | Gallipoli, Lecce, Ugento. |
| Palermo | Cefalù, Mazzara, Trapani. |
| Pisa | Leghorn, Pescia, Pontremoli, Volterra. |
| Ravenna | Bertinoro, Cervia, Cesena, Comacchio, Forlì, Rimini, Sarsina. |
| Reggio Calabria | Bova, Cassano, Catanzaro, Cotrone, Gerace, Nicastro, Oppido, Nicotera-Tropea, Squillace. |
| Salerno | Acerno, Capaccio-Vallo, Diano, Marsico-Nuovo and Potenza, Nocera dei Pagani, Nusco, Policastro. |
| Sassari | Alghero, Ampurias and Tempio, Bisarhio, Bosa. |
| S. Severino | Cariati. |
| Siena | Chiusi-Pienza, Grosseto, Massa Marittima, Sovana-Pitigliano. |
| Syracuse | Caltagirone, Noto, Piazza-Armerina. |
| Sorrento | Castellammare. |
| Taranto | Castellaneta, Oria. |
| Trani-Nazareth-Barletta, Bisceglie | Andria. |
| Turin | Acqui, Alba, Aosta, Asti, Cuneo, Fossano, Ivrea, Mondovi, Pinerolo, Saluzzo, Susa. |
| Urbino | S. Angelo in Vado-Urbania, Cagli-Pergola, Fossombrone, Montefeltro, Pesaro, Sinigaglia. |
| Venice (patriarch) | Adria, Belluno-Feltre, Ceneda (Vittorio), Chioggia, Concordia-Portogruaro, Padua, Treviso, Verona, Vicenza. |
| Vercelli | Alessandria della Paglia, Biella, Casale, Monferrato, Novara, Vigevano. |
Twelve archbishops and sixty-one bishops are independent of all metropolitan supervision, and hold directly of the Holy See. The archbishops are those of Amalfi, Aquila, Camerino and Treia, Catania, Cosenza, Ferrara, Gaeta, Lucca, Perugia, Rossano, Spoleto, and Udine, and the bishops those of Acireale, Acquapendente, Alatri, Amelia, Anagni, Ancona-Umana, Aquino-Sora-Pontecorvo, Arezzo, Ascoli, Assisi, Aversa, Bagnorea, Borgo San Donnino, Cava-Sarno, Città di Castello, Città della Pieve, Cività Castellana-Orte-Gallese, Corneto-Civita Vecchia, Cortona, Fabriano-Matelica, Fano, Ferentino, Foggia, Foligno, Gravina-Montepeloso, Gubbio, Jesi, Luni-Sarzana and Bragnato, S. Marco-Bisignano, Marsi (Pescina), Melfi-Rapolla, Mileto, Molfetta-Terlizzi-Giovennazzo, Monopoli, Montalcino, Montefiascone, Montepulciano, Nardo, Narni, Nocera in Umbria, Norcia, Orvieto, Osimo-Cingoli, Parma, Penne-Atri, Piacenza, Poggio Mirteto, Recanati-Loreto, Rieti, Segni, Sutri-Nepi, Teramo, Terni, Terracina-Piperno-Sezze, Tivoli, Todi, Trivento, Troia, Valva-Sulmona, Veroli, Viterbo-Toscanella. Excluding the diocese of Rome and suburbicarian sees, each see has an average area of 430 sq. m. and a population of 121,285 souls. The largest sees exist in Venetia and Lombardy, and the smallest in the provinces of Naples, Leghorn, Forlì, Ancona, Pesaro, Urbino, Caserta, Avellino and Ascoli. The Italian sees (exclusive of Rome and of the suburbicarian sees) have a total annual revenue of £206,000 equal to an average of £800 per see. The richest is that of Girgenti, with £6304, and the poorest that of Porto Maurizio, with only £246. In each diocese is a seminary or diocesan school.
In 1855 an act was passed in the Sardinian states for the disestablishment of all houses of the religious orders not engaged in preaching, teaching or the care of the sick, of all chapters of collegiate churches not having a cure of souls or existing in towns of less than 20,000 inhabitants, and of all private Religious Foundations. benefices for which no service was paid by the holders. The property and money thus obtained were used to form an ecclesiastical fund (Cassa Ecclesiastica) distinct from the finances of the state. This act resulted in the suppression of 274 monasteries with 3733 friars, of 61 nunneries with 1756 nuns and of 2722 chapters and benefices. In 1860 and 1861 the royal commissioners (even before the constitution of the new kingdom of Italy had been formally declared) issued decrees by which there were abolished—(1) in Umbria, 197 monasteries and 102 convents with 1809 male and 2393 female associates, and 836 chapters or benefices; (2) in the Marches, 292 monasteries and 127 convents with 2950 male and 2728 female associates; (3) in the Neapolitan provinces, 747 monasteries and 275 convents with 8787 male and 7493 female associates. There were thus disestablished in seven or eight years 2075 houses of the regular clergy occupied by 31,649 persons; and the confiscated property yielded a revenue of £398,298. And at the same time there had been suppressed 11,889 chapters and benefices of the secular clergy, which yielded an annual income of £199,149. The value of the capital thus potentially freed was estimated at £12,000,000; though hitherto the ecclesiastical possessions in Lombardy, Emilia, Tuscany and Sicily had been untouched. As yet the Cassa Ecclesiastica had no right to dispose of the property thus entrusted to it; but in 1862 an act was passed by which it transferred all its real property to the national domain, and was credited with a corresponding amount by the exchequer. The property could now be disposed of like the other property of the domain; and except in Sicily, where the system of emphyteusis was adopted, the church lands began to be sold by auction. To encourage the poorer classes of the people to become landholders, it was decided that the lots offered for sale should be small, and that the purchaser should be allowed to pay by five or ten yearly instalments. By a new act in 1866 the process of secularization was extended to the whole kingdom. All the members of the suppressed communities received full exercise of all the ordinary political and civil rights of laymen; and annuities were granted to all those who had taken permanent religious vows prior to the 18th of January 1864. To priests and choristers, for example, of the proprietary or endowed orders were assigned £24 per annum if they were upwards of sixty years of age, £16 if upwards of 40, and £14, 8s. if younger. The Cassa Ecclesiastica was abolished, and in its stead was instituted a Fondo pel Culto, or public worship fund. From the general confiscation were exempted the buildings actually used for public worship, as episcopal residences or seminaries, &c., or which had been appropriated to the use of schools, poorhouses, hospitals, &c.; as well as the buildings, appurtenances, and movable property of the abbeys of Monte Casino, Della Cava dei Tirreni, San Martino della Scala, Monreale, Certosa near Pavia, and other establishments of the same kind of importance as architectural or historical monuments. An annuity equal to the ascertained revenue of the suppressed institutions was placed to the credit of the fund in the government 5% consols. A fourth of this sum was to be handed to the communes to be employed on works of beneficence or education as soon as a surplus was obtained from that part of the annuity assigned for the payment of monastic pensions; and in Sicily, 209 communes entered on their privileges as soon as the patrimony was liquidated. Another act in 1867 decreed the suppression of certain foundations which had escaped the action of previous measures, put an extraordinary tax of 30% on the whole of the patrimony of the church, and granted the government the right of issuing 5% bonds sufficient to bring into the treasury £16,000,000, which were to be accepted at their nominal value as purchase money for the alienated property. The public worship endowment fund has relieved the state exchequer of the cost of public worship; has gradually furnished to the poorer parish priests an addition to their stipends, raising them to £32 per annum, with the prospect of further raising them to £40; and has contributed to the outlay incurred by the communes for religious purposes. The monastic buildings required for public purposes have been made over to the communal and provincial authorities, while the same authorities have been entrusted with the administration of the ecclesiastical revenues previously set apart for charity and education, and objects of art and historical interest have been consigned to public libraries and museums. By these laws the reception of novices was forbidden in the existing conventual establishments the extinction of which had been decreed, and all new foundations were forbidden, except those engaged in instruction and the care of the sick. But the laws have not been rigorously enforced of late years; and the ecclesiastical possessions seized by the state were thrown on the market simultaneously, and so realized very low prices, being often bought up by wealthy religious institutions. The large number of these institutions was increased when these bodies were expelled from France.
On the 30th of June 1903 the patrimony of the endowment fund amounted to £17,339,040, of which only £264,289 were represented by buildings still occupied by monks or nuns. The rest was made up of capital and interest. The liabilities of the fund (capitalized) amounted to £10,668,105, of which monastic pensions represented a rapidly diminishing sum of £2,564,930. The chief items of annual expenditure drawn from the fund are the supplementary stipends to priests and the pensions to members of suppressed religious houses. The number of persons in receipt of monastic pensions on the 30th of June 1899 was 13,255; but while this item of expenditure will disappear by the deaths of those entitled to pensions, the supplementary stipends and contributions are gradually increasing. The following table shows the course of the two main categories of the fund from 1876 to 1902–1903:—
| 1876. | 1885–1886. | 1898–1899. | 1902–1903. | |
| Monastic pensions, liquidation of religious property and provision of shelter for nuns . . . | £749,172 | £491,339 | £220,479 | £165,144 |
| Supplementary stipends to bishops and parochial clergy, assignments to Sardinian clergy and expenditure for education and charitable purposes . | 142,912 | 128,521 | 210,020 | 347,940 |
Roman Charitable and Religious Fund.—The law of the 19th of June 1873 contained special provisions, in conformity with the character of Rome as the seat of the papacy, and with the situation created by the Law of Guarantees. According to the census of 1871 there were in the city and province of Rome 474 monastic establishments (311 for monks, 163 for nuns), occupied by 4326 monks and 3825 nuns, and possessing a gross revenue of 4,780,891 lire. Of these, 126 monasteries and 90 convents were situated in the city, 51 monasteries and 22 convents in the “suburbicariates.” The law of 1873 created a special charitable and religious fund of the city, while it left untouched 23 monasteries and 49 convents which had either the character of private institutions or were supported by foreign funds. New parishes were created, old parishes were improved, the property of the suppressed religious corporations was assigned to charitable and educational institutions and to hospitals, while property having no special application was used to form a charitable and religious fund. On the 30th of June 1903 the balance-sheet of this fund showed a credit amounting to £1,796,120 and a debit of £460,819. Expenditure for the year 1902–1903 was £889,858 and revenue £818,674.
Constitution and Government.—The Vatican palace itself (with St Peter’s), the Lateran palace, and the papal villa at Castel Gandolfo have secured to them the privilege of extraterritoriality by the law of 1871. The small republic of San Marino is the only other enclave in Italian territory. Italy is a constitutional monarchy, in which the executive power belongs exclusively to the sovereign, while the legislative power is shared by him with the parliament. He holds supreme command by land and sea, appoints ministers and officials, promulgates the laws, coins money, bestows honours, has the right of pardoning, and summons and dissolves the parliament. Treaties with foreign powers, however, must have the consent of parliament. The sovereign is irresponsible, the ministers, the signature of one of whom is required to give validity to royal decrees, being responsible. Parliament consists of two chambers, the senate and the Chamber of Deputies, which are nominally on an equal footing, though practically the elective chamber is the more important. The senate consists of princes of the blood who have attained their majority, and of an unlimited number of senators above forty years of age, who are qualified under any one of twenty-one specified categories—by having either held high office, or attained celebrity in science, literature, &c. In 1908 there were 318 senators exclusive of five members of the royal family. Nomination is by the king for life. Besides its legislative functions, the senate is the highest court of justice in the case of political offences or the impeachment of ministers. The deputies to the lower house are 508 in number, i.e. one to every 64,893 of the population, and all the constituencies are single-member constituencies. The party system is not really strong. The suffrage is extended to all citizens over twenty-one years of age who can read and write and have either attained a certain standard of elementary education or are qualified by paying a rent which varies from £6 in communes of 2500 inhabitants to £16 in communes of 150,000 inhabitants, or, if peasant farmers, 16s. of rent; or by being sharers in the profits of farms on which not less than £3, 4s. of direct (including provincial) taxation is paid; or by paying not less than £16 in direct (including provincial) taxation. Others, e.g. members of the professional classes, are qualified to vote by their position. The number of electors (2,541,327) at the general election in 1904 was 29% of the male population over twenty-one years of age, and 7.6% of the total population—exclusive of those temporarily disfranchised on account of military service; and of these 62.7% voted. No candidate can be returned unless he obtains more than half the votes given and more than one-sixth of the total number on the register; otherwise a second ballot must be held. Nor can he be returned under the age of thirty, and he must be qualified as an elector. All salaried government officials (except ministers, under-secretaries of state and other high functionaries, and officers in the army or navy), and ecclesiastics, are disqualified for election. Senators and deputies receive no salary but have free passes on railways throughout Italy and on certain lines of steamers. Parliaments are quinquennial, but the king may dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at any time, being bound, however, to convoke a new chamber within four months. The executive must call parliament together annually. Each of the chambers has the right of introducing new bills, as has also the government; but all money bills must originate in the Chamber of Deputies. The consent of both chambers and the assent of the king is necessary to their being passed. Ministers may attend the debates of either house but can only vote in that of which they are members. The sittings of both houses are public, and an absolute majority of the members must be present to make a sitting valid. The ministers are eleven in number and have salaries of about £1000 each; the presidency of the council of ministers (created in 1889) may be held by itself or (as is usual) in conjunction with any other portfolio. The ministries are: interior (under whom are the prefects of the several provinces), foreign affairs, treasury (separated from finance in 1889), finance, public works, justice and ecclesiastical affairs, war, marine, public instruction, commerce, industry and agriculture, posts and telegraphs (separated from public works in 1889). Each minister is aided by an under-secretary of state at a salary of £500. There is a council of state with advisory functions, which can also decide certain questions of administration, especially applications from local authorities and conflicts between ministries, and a court of accounts, which has the right of examining all details of state expenditure. In every country the bureaucracy is abused, with more or less reason, for unprogressiveness, timidity and “red-tape,” and Italy is no exception to the rule. The officials are not well paid, and are certainly numerous; while the manifold checks and counterchecks have by no means always been sufficient to prevent dishonesty.
Titles of Honour.—The former existence of so many separate sovereignties and “fountains of honour” gave rise to a great many hereditary titles of nobility. Besides many hundreds of princes, dukes, marquesses, counts, barons and viscounts, there are a large number of persons of “patrician” rank, persons with a right to the designation nobile or signori, and certain hereditary knights or cavalieri. In the “Golden Book of the Capitol” (Libro d’Oro del Campidoglio) are inscribed 321 patrician families, and of these 28 have the title of prince and 8 that of duke, while the others are marquesses, counts or simply patricians. For the Italian orders of knighthood see Knighthood and Chivalry: Orders of Knighthood. The king’s uncle is duke of Aosta, his son is prince of Piedmont and his cousin is duke of Genoa.
Justice.—The judiciary system of Italy is mainly framed on the French model. Italy has courts of cassation at Rome, Naples, Palermo, Turin, Florence, 20 appeal court districts, 162 tribunal districts and 1535 mandamenti, each with its own magistracy (pretura). In 13 of the principal towns there are also pretori who have exclusively penal jurisdiction. For minor civil cases involving sums up to 100 lire (£4), giudici conciliatori have also jurisdiction, while they may act as arbitrators up to any amount by request. The Roman court of cassation is the highest, and in both penal and civil matters has a right to decide questions of law and disputes between the lower judicial authorities, and is the only one which has jurisdiction in penal cases, while sharing with the others the right to revise civil cases.
The pretori have penal jurisdiction concerning all misdemeanours (contravvenzioni) or offences (delitti) punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three months or by fine not exceeding 1000 lire (£40). The penal tribunals have jurisdiction in cases involving imprisonment up to ten years, or a fine exceeding £40, while the assize courts, with a jury, deal with offences involving imprisonment for life or over ten years, and have exclusive jurisdiction (except that the senate is on occasion a high court of justice) over all political offences. Appeal may be made from the sentences of the pretori to the tribunals, and from the tribunals to the courts of appeal; from the assize courts there is no appeal except on a point of form, which appeal goes to the court of cassation at Rome. This court has the supreme power in all questions of legality of a sentence, jurisdiction or competency.
The penal code was unified and reformed in 1890. A reform of late years is the condanna condizionale, equivalent to the English “being bound over to appear for judgment if called upon,” applied in 94,489 cases in 1907. In civil matters there is appeal from the giudice conciliatore to the pretore (who has jurisdiction up to a sum of 1500 lire = £60) from the pretore to the civil tribunal, from the civil tribunal to the court of appeal, and from the court of appeal to the court of cassation.
The judges of all kinds are very poorly paid. Even the first president of the Rome court of cassation only receives £600 a year.
The statistics of civil proceedings vary considerably from province to province. Lombardy, with 25 lawsuits per 1000 inhabitants, holds the lowest place; Emilia comes next with 31 per 1000; Tuscany has 39; Venetia, 42; Calabria, 144; Rome, 146; Apulia, 153; and Sardinia, 360 per 1000. The high average in Sardinia is chiefly due to cases within the competence of the conciliation offices. The number of penal proceedings, especially those within the competence of praetors, has also increased, chiefly on account of the frequency of minor contraventions of the law referred to in the section Crime. The ratio of criminal proceedings to population is, as a rule, much higher in the south than in the north.
A royal decree, dated February 1891, established three classes of prisons: judiciary prisons, for persons awaiting examination or persons sentenced to arrest, detention or seclusion for less than six months; penitentiaries of various kinds (ergastoli, case di reclusione, detenzione or custodia), for criminals condemned to long terms of imprisonment; and reformatories, for criminals under age and vagabonds. Capital punishment was abolished in 1877, penal servitude for life being substituted. This generally involves solitary confinement of the most rigorous nature, and, as little is done to occupy the mind, the criminal not infrequently becomes insane. Certain types of dangerous individuals are relegated after serving a sentence in the ordinary convict prisons, and by administrative, not by judicial process, to special penal colonies known as domicilii coatti or “forced residences.” These establishments are, however, unsatisfactory, being mostly situated on small islands, where it is often difficult to find work for the coatti, who are free by day, being only confined at night. They receive a small and hardly sufficient, allowance for food of 50 centesimi a day, which they are at liberty to supplement by work if they can find it or care to do it.
Notwithstanding the construction of new prisons and the transformation of old ones, the number of cells for solitary confinement is still insufficient for a complete application of the penal system established by the code of 1890, and the moral effect of the association of the prisoners is not good, though the system of solitary confinement as practised in Italy is little better. The total number of prisoners, including minors and inhabitants of enforced residences, which from 76,066 (2.84 per 1000 inhabitants) on the 31st of December 1871 rose to a maximum of 80,792 on the 31st of December 1879 (2.87 per 1000), decreased to a minimum of 60,621 in 1896 (1.94 per 1000), and on the 31st of December 1898 rose again to 75,470 (2.38 per 1000), of whom 7038, less than one-tenth, were women. The lowness of the figures regarding women is to be noticed throughout. On the 31st of December 1903 it had decreased to 65,819, of which 6044 were women. Of these, 31,219 were in lockups, 25,145 in penal establishments, 1837 minors in government, and 4547 in private reformatories, and 3071 (males) were inmates of forced residences.
Crime.—Statistics of offences, including contravvenzioni or breaches of by-laws and regulations, exhibit a considerable increase per 100,000 inhabitants since 1887, and only a slight diminution on the figures of 1897. The figure was 1783.45 per 100,000 in 1887, 2164.46 in 1892, 2546.49 in 1897, 2497.90 in 1902. The increase is partly covered by contravvenzioni, but almost every class of penal offence shows a rise except homicide, and even in that the diminution is slow, 5418 in 1880, 3966 in 1887, 4408 in 1892, 4005 in 1897, 3202 in 1902; and Italy remains, owing to the frequent use of the knife, the European country in which it is most frequent. Libels, insults, &c., resistance to public authority, offences against good customs, thefts and frauds, have increased; assaults are nearly stationary. There is also an increase in juvenile delinquency. From 1890 to 1900 the actual number rose by one-third (from 30,108 to 43,684), the proportion to the rest of those sentenced from one-fifth to one-fourth; while in 1905 the actual number rose to 67,944, being a considerable proportionate rise also. In Naples, the Camorra and in Sicily, the Mafia are secret societies whose power of resistance to authority is still not inconsiderable.
Procedure, both civil and criminal, is somewhat slow, and the preliminary proceedings before the juge d’instruction occupy much time; and recent murder trials, by the large number of witnesses called (including experts) and the lengthy speeches of counsel, have been dragged out to an unconscionable length. In this, as in the intervention of the presiding judge, the French system has been adopted; and it is said (e.g. by Nathan, Vent’ anni di vita italiana, p. 241) that the efforts of the juge d’instruction are, as a rule, in fact, though not in law, largely directed to prove that the accused is guilty. In 1902 of 884,612 persons accused of penal offences, 13.12% were acquitted during the period of the instruction, 30.31 by the courts, 46.32 condemned and the rest acquitted in some other way. This shows that charges, often involving preliminary imprisonment, are brought against an excessive proportion of persons who either are not or cannot be proved to be guilty. The courts of appeal and cassation, too, often have more than they can do; in the year 1907 the court of cassation at Rome decided 948 appeals on points of law in civil cases, while no fewer than 460 remained to be decided.
As in most civilized countries, the number of suicides in Italy has increased from year to year.
The Italian suicide rate of 63.6 per 1,000,000 is, however, lower than those of Denmark, Switzerland, Germany and France, while it approximates to that of England. The Italian rate is highest in the more enlightened and industrial north, and lowest in the south. Emilia gives a maximum rate of 10.48 per 100,000, while that of Liguria and Lazio is little lower. The minimum of 1.27 is found in the Basilicata, though Calabria gives only 2.13. About 20% of the total are women, and there is an increase of nearly 3% since 1882 in the proportion of suicides under twenty years of age.
Army.—The Italian army grew out of the old Piedmontese army with which in the main the unification of Italy was brought about. This unification meant for the army the absorption of contingents from all parts of Italy and presenting serious differences in physical and moral aptitudes, political opinions and education. Moreover the strategic geography of the country required the greater part of the army to be stationed permanently within reach of the north-eastern and north-western frontiers. These conditions made a territorial system of recruiting or organization, as understood in Germany, practically impossible. To secure fairly uniform efficiency in the various corps, and also as a means of unifying Italy, Piedmontese, Umbrians and Neapolitans are mixed in the same corps and sleep in the same barrack room. But on leaving the colours the men disperse to their homes, and thus a regiment has, on mobilization, to draw largely on the nearest reservists, irrespective of the corps to which they belong. The remedy for this condition of affairs is sought in a most elaborate and artificial system of transferring officers and men from one unit to another at stated intervals in peace-time, but this is no more than a palliative, and there are other difficulties of almost equal importance to be surmounted. Thus in Italy the universal service system, though probably the best organization both for the army and the nation, works with a maximum of friction. “Army Reform,” therefore, has been very much in the forefront of late years owing to the estrangement of Austria (which power can mobilize much more rapidly), but financial difficulties have hitherto stood in the way of any radical and far-reaching reforms, and even the proposals of the Commission of 1907, referred to below, have only been partially accepted.
The law of 1875 therefore still regulates the principles of military service in Italy, though an important modification was made in 1907–1908. By this law, every man liable and accepted for service served for eight or nine years on the Active Army and its Reserve (of which three to five were spent with the colours), four or five in the Mobile Militia, and the rest of the service period of nineteen years in the Territorial Militia. Under present regulations the term of liability is divided into nine years in the Active Army and Reserve (three or two years with the colours) four in the Mobile Militia and six in the Territorial Militia. But these figures do not represent the actual service of every able-bodied Italian. Like almost all “Universal Service” countries, Italy only drafts a small proportion of the available recruits into the army.
The following table shows the operation of the law of 1875, with the figures of 1871 for comparison:—
| 30th Sept. | 30th June. | |||
| 1871. | 1881. | 1891. | 1901. | |
| Officers* | 14,070 | 22,482 | 36,739 | 36,718 |
| Men | 521,969 | 1,833,554 | 2,821,367 | 3,330,202 |
| Acting Army & Reserve | 536,039 | 731,149 | 843,160 | 734,401 |
| Mobile Militia | .. | 294,714 | 445,315 | 320,170 |
| Territorial Militia | .. | 823,970 | 1,553,784 | 2,275,631 |
*Including officers on special service or in the reserve.
Thus, on the 30th of September 1871 the various categories of the army included only 2% of the population, but on the 30th of June 1898 they included 10%. But in 1901 the strength of the active army and reserve shows a marked diminution, which became accentuated in the year following. The table below indicates that up to 1907 the army, though always below its nominal strength, never absorbed more than a quarter of the available contingent.
| 1902. | 1903. | 1904. | 1906. | |
| Liable | 441,171 | 453,640 | 469,860 | 475,737 |
| Physically unfit | 91,176 | 98,065 | 119,070 | 122,559 |
| Struck off | 12,270 | 13,189 | 13,130 | 18,222 |
| Failed to appear | 33,634 | 34,711 | 39,219 | 40,226 |
| Put back for re-examination | 108,835 | 108,618 | 107,173 | 122,205 |
| Assigned to Territorial Militia and excused peace service | 92,952 | 96,916 | 94,136 | 87,032 |
| Assigned to active army | 102,204 | 102,141 | 97,132 | 87,493 |
| Joined active army | 88,666 | 86,448 | 81,581 | 66,836 |
The serious condition of recruiting was quickly noticed, and the tabulation of each year’s results was followed by a new draft law, but no solution was achieved until a special commission assembled. The inquiries made by this body revealed an unsatisfactory condition in the national defences, traceable in the main to financial exigencies, and as regards recruiting a new law was brought into force in 1907–1908.
One specially difficult point concerned the effectives of the peace-strength army. Hitherto the actual time of training had been less than the nominal. The recruits due to join in November were not incorporated till the following March, and thus in the winter months Italy was defenceless. The army is always maintained at a low peace effective (about one-quarter of war establishment) and even this was reduced, by the absence of the recruits, until there were often only 15 rank and file with a company, whose war strength is about 230. Even in the summer and autumn a large proportion of the army consisted of men with but a few months’ service—a highly dangerous state of things considering the peculiar mobilization conditions of the country. Further—and this case no legislation can cover—the contingent, and (what is more serious) the reserves, are being steadily weakened by emigration. The increase in the numbers rejected as unfit is accounted for by the fact that if only a small proportion of the contingent can be taken for service, the medical standard of acceptance is high.
The new recruiting scheme of 1907 re–established three categories of recruits,[4] the 2nd category corresponding practically to the German Ersatz-Reserve. The men classed in it have to train for six months, and they are called up in the late summer to bridge the gap above mentioned. The new terms of service for the other categories have been already stated. In consequence, in 1908, of 490,000 liable, some 110,000 actually joined for full training and 24,000 of the new 2nd category for short training, which contrasts very forcibly with the feeble embodiments of 1906 and 1907. These changes threw a considerable strain on the finances, but the imminence of the danger caused their acceptance.
The peace strength under the new scheme is nominally 300,000, but actually (average throughout the year) about 240,000. The army is organized in 12 army corps (each of 2 divisions), 6 of which are quartered on the plain of Lombardy and Venetia and on the frontiers, and 2 more in northern Central Italy. Their headquarters are: I. Turin, II. Alessandria, III. Milan, IV. Genoa, V. Verona, VI. Bologna, VII. Ancona, VIII. Florence, IX. Rome, X. Naples, XI. Bari, XII. Palermo, Sardinian division Cagliari. In addition there are 22 “Alpini” battalions and 15 mountain batteries stationed on the Alpine frontiers.
The war strength was estimated in 1901 as, Active Army (incl. Reserve) 750,000, Mobile Militia 320,000, Territorial Militia 2,300,000 (more than half of the last-named untrained). These figures are, with a fractional increase in the Regular Army, applicable to-day. When the 1907 scheme takes full effect, however, the Active Army and the Mobile Militia will each be augmented by about one-third. In 1915 the field army should, including officers and permanent cadres, be about 1,012,000 strong. The Mobile Militia will not, however, at that date have felt the effects of the scheme, and the Territorial Militia (setting the drain of emigration against the increased population) will probably remain at about the same figure as in 1901.
The army consists of 96 three-battalion regiments of infantry of the line and 12 of bersaglieri (riflemen), each of the latter having a cyclist company (Bersaglieri cyclist battalions are being (1909) provisionally formed); 26 regiments of cavalry, of which 10 are lancers, each of 6 squadrons; 24 regiments of artillery, each of 8 batteries;[5] 1 regiment of horse artillery of 6 batteries; 1 of mountain artillery of 12 batteries, and 3 independent mountain batteries. The armament of the infantry is the Männlicher-Carcano magazine rifle of 1891. The field and horse artillery was in 1909 in process of rearmament with a Krupp quick-firer. The garrison artillery consists of 3 coast and 3 fortress regiments, with a total of 72 companies. There are 4 regiments (11 battalions) of engineers. The carabinieri or gendarmerie, some 26,500 in number, are part of the standing army; they are recruited from selected volunteers from the army. In 1902 the special corps in Eritrea numbered about 4700 of all ranks, including nearly 4000 natives.
Ordinary and extraordinary military expenditure for the financial year 1898–1899 amounted to nearly £10,000,000, an increase of £4,000,000 as compared with 1871. The Italian Chamber decided that from the 1st of July 1901 until the 30th of June 1907 Italian military expenditure proper should not exceed the maximum of £9,560,000 per annum fixed by the Army Bill of May 1897, and that military pensions should not exceed £1,440,000. Italian military expenditure was thus until 1907 £11,000,000 per annum. In 1908 the ordinary and extraordinary expenditure was £10,000,000. The demands of the Commission were only partly complied with, but a large special grant was voted amounting to at least £1,000,000 per annum for the next seven years. The amount spent is slight compared with the military expenditure of other countries.
The Alpine frontier is fortified strongly, although the condition of the works was in many cases considered unsatisfactory by the 1907 Commission. The fortresses in the basin of the Po chiefly belong to the era of divided Italy and are now out of date; the chief coast fortresses are Vado, Genoa, Spezia, Monte Argentaro, Gaeta, Straits of Messina, Taranto, Maddalena. Rome is protected by a circle of forts from a coup de main from the sea, the coast, only 12 m. off, being flat and deserted.
Navy.—For purposes of naval organization the Italian coast is divided into three maritime departments, with headquarters at Spezia, Naples and Venice; and into two comandi militari, with headquarters at Taranto and at the island of Maddalena. The personnel of the navy consists of the following corps: (1) General staff; (2) naval engineers, chiefly employed in building and repairing war vessels; (3) sanitary corps; (4) commissariat corps, for supplies and account-keeping; (5) crews.
The matériel of the Italian navy has been completely transformed, especially in virtue of the bill of the 31st of March 1875. Old types of vessels have been sold or demolished, and replaced by newer types.
In March 1907 the Italian navy contained, excluding ships of no fighting value:—
| Effective. | Completing. | Projected. | |
| Modern battleships | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Old battleships | 10 | .. | .. |
| Armoured cruisers | 6 | 2 | .. |
| Protected cruisers | 14 | .. | .. |
| Torpedo gunboats | 13 | .. | .. |
| Destroyers | 13 | 4 | 10 |
| Modern torpedo boats | 34 | .. | 15 |
| Submarines | 1 | 4 | 2 |
The four modern ships—the “Vittorio Emanuele” class, laid down in 1897—have a tonnage of 12,625, two 12-in. and twelve 8-in. guns, an I.H.P. of 19,000, and a designed speed of 22 knots, being intended to avoid any battleship and to carry enough guns to destroy any cruiser.
The personnel on active service consisted of 1799 officers and 25,000 men, the former being doubled and the latter trebled since 1882.
Naval expenditure has enormously increased since 1871, the total for 1871 having been about £900,000, and the total for 1905–1906 over £5,100,000. Violent fluctuations have, however, taken place from year to year, according to the state of Italian finances. To permit the steady execution of a normal programme of shipbuilding, the Italian Chamber, in May 1901, adopted a resolution limiting naval expenditure, inclusive of naval pensions and of premiums on mercantile shipbuilding, to the sum of £4,840,000 for the following six years, i.e. from 1st July 1901 until 30th June 1907. This sum consists of £4,240,000 of naval expenditure proper, £220,000 for naval pensions and £380,000 for premiums upon mercantile shipbuilding. During the financial year ending on the 30th of June 1901 these figures were slightly exceeded.
Finance.—The volume of the Italian budget has considerably increased as regards both income and expenditure. The income of £60,741,418 in 1881 rose in 1899–1900 to £69,917,126; while the expenditure increased from £58,705,929 in 1881 to £69,708,706 in 1899–1900, an increase of £9,175,708 in income and £11,002,777 in expenditure, while there has been a still further increase since, the figures for 1905–1906 showing (excluding items which figure on both sides of the account) an increase of £8,766,995 in income and £5,434,560 in expenditure over 1899–1900. These figures include not only the categories of “income and expenditure” proper, but also those known as “movement of capital,” “railway constructions” and “partite di giro” which do not constitute real income and expenditure.[6] Considering only income and expenditure proper, the approximate totals are:—
| Financial Year. | Revenue. | Expenditure. | Surpluses or Deficits. |
| 1882 | £52,064,800 | £51,904,800 | £+ 160,000 |
| 1885–1886 | 56,364,000 | 57,304,400 | − 940,000 |
| 1890–1891 | 61,600,000 | 64,601,600 | −3,001,600 |
| 1895–1896 | 65,344,000 | 67,962,800 | −2,618,800 |
| 1898–1899 | 66,352,800 | 65,046,400 | +1,306,400 |
| 1899–1900 | 66,860,800 | 65,323,600 | +1,537,200 |
| 1900–1901 | 68,829,200 | 66,094,400 | +2,734,800 |
| 1905–1906 | 77,684,100 | 75,143,300 | +2,540,900 |
The financial year 1862 closed with a deficit of more than £16,000,000, which increased in 1866 to £28,840,000 on account of the preparations for the war against Austria. Excepting the increases of deficit in 1868 and 1870, the annual deficits tended thenceforward to decrease, until in 1875 equilibrium between expenditure and revenue was attained, and was maintained until 1881. Advantage was taken of the equilibrium to abolish certain imposts, amongst them the grist tax, which prior to its gradual repeal produced more than £3,200,000 a year. From 1885–1886 onwards, outlay on public works, military and colonial expenditure, and especially the commercial and financial crises, contributed to produce annual deficits; but owing to drastic reforms introduced in 1894–1895 and to careful management the year 1898–1899 marked a return of surpluses (nearly £1,306,400).
The revenue in the Italian financial year 1905–1906 (July 1, 1905 to June 30, 1906) was £102,486,108, and the expenditure £99,945,253, or, subtracting the partite di giro, £99,684,121 and £97,143,266, leaving a surplus of £2,540,855.[7] The surplus was made up by contributions from every branch of the effective revenue, except the “contributions and repayments from local authorities.” The railways showed an increase of £351,685; registration transfer and succession, £295,560; direct taxation, £42,136 (mainly from income tax, which more than made up for the remission of the house tax in the districts of Calabria visited by the earthquake of 1906); customs and excise, £1,036,742; government monopolies, £291,027; posts, £41,310; telegraphs, £23,364; telephones, £65,771. Of the surplus £1,000,000 was allocated to the improvement of posts, telegraphs and telephones; £1,000,000 to public works (£720,000 for harbour improvement and £280,000 for internal navigation); £200,000 to the navy (£132,000 for a second dry dock at Taranto and £68,000 for coal purchase); and £200,000 as a nucleus of a fund for the purchase of valuable works of art which are in danger of exportation.
The state therefore draws its principal revenues from the imposts, the taxes and the monopolies. According to the Italian tributary system, “imposts,” properly so called are those upon land, buildings and personal estate. The impost upon land is based upon the cadastral survey independently of the vicissitudes of Taxation. harvests. In 1869 the main quota to the impost was increased by one-tenth, in addition to the extra two-tenths previously imposed in 1866. Subsequently, it was decided to repeal these additional tenths, the first being abolished in 1886 and the rest in 1887. On account of the inequalities still existing in the cadastral survey, in spite of the law of 1886 (see Agriculture, above), great differences are found in the land tax assessments in various parts of Italy. Land is not so heavily burdened by the government quota as by the additional centimes imposed by the provincial and communal authorities. On an average Italian landowners pay nearly 25% of their revenues from land in government and local land tax. The buildings impost has been assessed since 1866 upon the basis of 12.50% of “taxable revenue.” Taxable revenue corresponds to two-thirds of actual income from factories and to three-fourths of actual income from houses; it is ascertained by the agents of the financial administration. In 1869, however, a third additional tenth was added to the previously existing additional two-tenths, and, unlike the tenths of the land tax, they have not been abolished. At present the main quota with the additional three-tenths amounts to 16.25% of taxable income. The imposts on incomes from personal estate (ricchezza mobile) were introduced in 1866; it applies to incomes derived from investments, industry or personal enterprise, but not to landed revenues. It is proportional, and is collected by deduction from salaries and pensions paid to servants of the state, where it is assessed on three-eighths of the income, and from interest on consolidated stock, where it is assessed on the whole amount; and by register in the cases of private individuals, who pay on three-fourths of their income, professional men, capitalists or manufacturers, who pay on one-half or nine-twentieths of their income. From 1871 to 1894 it was assessed at 13.20% of taxable income, this quota being formed of 12% main quota and 1.20% as an additional tenth. In 1894 the quota, including the additional tenth, was raised to the uniform level of 20%. One-tenth of the tax is paid to the communes as compensation for revenues made over to the state.
Taxes proper are divided into (a) taxes on business transactions and (b) taxes on articles of consumption. The former apply principally to successions, stamps, registrations, mortgages, &c.; the latter to distilleries, breweries, explosives, native sugar and matches, though the customs revenue and octrois upon articles of general consumption, such as corn, wine, spirits, meat, flour, petroleum, butter, tea, coffee and sugar, may be considered as belonging to this class. The monopolies are those of salt, tobacco and the lottery.
Since 1880, while income from the salt and lotto monopolies has remained almost stationary, and that from land tax and octroi has diminished, revenue derived from all other sources has notably increased, especially that from the income tax on personal estate, and the customs, the yield from which has been nearly doubled.
It will be seen that the revenue is swollen by a large number of taxes which can only be justified by necessity; the reduction and, still more, the readjustment of taxation (which now largely falls on articles of primary necessity) is urgently needed. The government in presenting the estimates for 1907–1908 proposed to set aside a sum of nearly £800,000 every year for this express purpose. It must be remembered that the sums realized by the octroi go in the main to the various communes. It is only in Rome and Naples that the octroi is collected directly by the government, which pays over a certain proportion to the respective communes.
The external taxation is not only strongly protectionist, but is applied to goods which cannot be made in Italy; hardly anything comes in duty free, even such articles as second-hand furniture paying duty, unless within six months of the date at which the importer has declared domicile in Italy. The application, too, is somewhat rigorous, e.g. the tax on electric light is applied to foreign ships generating their own electricity while lying in Italian ports.
The annual consumption per inhabitant of certain kinds of food and drink has considerably increased, e.g. grain from 270 ℔ per head in 1884–1885 to 321 ℔ in 1901–1902 (maize remains almost stationary at 158 ℔); wine from 73 to 125 litres per head; oil from 12 to 13 ℔ per head (sugar is almost stationary at 714 ℔ per head, and coffee at about 1 ℔); salt from 14 to 16 ℔ per head. Tobacco slightly diminished in weight at a little over 1 ℔ per head, while the gross receipts are considerably increased—by over 214 millions sterling since 1884–1885—showing that the quality consumed is much better. The annual expenditure on tobacco was 5s. per inhabitant in 1902–1903, and is increasing.
The annual surpluses are largely accounted for by the heavy taxation on almost everything imported into the country,[8] and by the monopolies on tobacco and on salt; and are as a rule spent, and well spent, in other ways. Thus, that of 1907–1908 was devoted mainly to raising the salaries of government officials and university professors; even then the maximum for both (in the former class, for an under-secretary of state) was only £500 per annum. The case is frequent, too, in which a project is sanctioned by law, but is then not carried into execution, or only partly so, owing to the lack of funds. Additional stamp duties and taxes were imposed in 1909 to meet the expenditure necessitated by the disastrous earthquake at the end of 1908.
The way in which the taxes press on the poor may be shown by the number of small proprietors sold up owing to inability to pay the land and other taxes. In 1882 the number of landed proprietors was 14.52% of the population, in 1902 only 12.66, with an actual diminution of some 30,000. Had the percentage of 1882 been kept up there would have been in 1902 600,000 more proprietors than there were. Between 1884 and 1902 no fewer than 220,616 sales were effected for failure to pay taxes, while, from 1886 to 1902, 79,208 expropriations were effected for other debts not due to the state. In 1884 there were 20,422 sales, of which 35.28% were for debts of 4s. or less, and 51.95 for debts between 4s. and £2; in 1902 there were 4857 sales, but only 11.01% for debts under 4s. (the treasury having given up proceeding in cases where the property is a tiny piece of ground, sometimes hardly capable of cultivation), and 55.69% for debts between 4s. and £2. The expropriations deal as a rule with properties of higher value; of these there were 3217 in 1886, 5993 in 1892 (a period of agricultural depression), 3910 in 1902. About 22% of them are for debts under £40, about 49% from £40 to £200, about 26% from £200 to £2000.
Of the expenditure a large amount is absorbed by interest on debt. Debt has continually increased with the development of the state. The sum paid in interest on debt amounted to £17,640,000 in 1871, £19,440,000 in 1881, £25,600,000 in 1891–1892 and £27,560,000 in 1899–1900; but had been reduced to Expenditure. £23,100,409 by the 30th of June 1906. The public debt at that date was composed as follows:—
| Part I.—Funded Debt. | |
| Grand Livre— | Amount. |
| Consolidated 5% | £316,141,802 |
| ” 3% | 6,404,335 |
| ” 412% net | 28,872,511 |
| ” 4% net | 7,875,592 |
| ” 312% net | 37,689,880 |
| Total | £396,984,120 |
| Debts to be transferred to the Grand Livre | 60,868 |
| Perpetual annuity to the Holy See | 2,580,000 |
| Perpetual debts (Modena, Sicily, Naples) | 2,591,807 |
| Total | £402,216,795 |
| Part II.—Unfunded Debt. | |
| Debts separately inscribed in the Grand Livre | 10,042,027 |
| Various railway obligations, redeemable, &c. | 56,375,351 |
| Sicilian indemnities | 195,348 |
| Capital value of annual payment to South Austrian Company | 37,102,908 |
| Long date Treasury warrants, law of July 7, 1901 | 1,416,200 |
| Railway certificates (3.65% net), Art. 6 of law, June 25, 1905, No. 261 | 14,220,000 |
| Total | £119,351,834 |
| Part I. | £402,216,795 |
| Grand Total | £521,568,629 |
The debt per head of population was, in 1905, £14, 16s. 3d., and the interest 13s. 5d.
In July 1906 the 5% gross (4% net), and 4% net rente were successfully converted into 334% stock (to be reduced to 312% after five years), to a total amount of £324,017,393. The demands for reimbursement at par represented a sum of only £187,588 and the market value of the stock was hardly affected; while the saving to the Treasury was to be £800,000 per annum for the first five years and about double the amount afterwards.
Currency.—The lira (plural lire) of 100 centesimi (centimes) is equal in value to the French franc. The total coinage (exclusive of Eritrean currency) from the 1st of January 1862 to the end of 1907 was 1,104,667,116 lire (exclusive of recoinage), divided as follows: gold, 427,516,970 lire; silver, 570,097,025 lire; nickel, 23,417,000 lire; bronze, 83,636,121 lire. The forced paper currency, instituted in 1866, was abolished in 1881, in which year were dissolved the Union of Banks of Issue created in 1874 to furnish to the state treasury a milliard of lire in notes, guaranteed collectively by the banks. Part of the Union notes were redeemed, part replaced by 10 lire and 5 lire state notes, payable at sight in metallic legal tender by certain state banks. Nevertheless the law of 1881 did not succeed in maintaining the value of the state notes at a par with the metallic currency, and from 1885 onwards there reappeared a gold premium, which during 1899 and 1900 remained at about 7%, but subsequently fell to about 3% and has since 1902 practically disappeared. The paper circulation to the debit of the state and the paper currency issued by the authorized state banks is shown below:—
| Date. | Direct Liability of State. | Notes issued by State Banks. | Aggregate Paper Currency. | ||
| State Notes. | Bons de Caisse.* | ||||
| Lire. | Lire. | Lire. | Lire. | ||
| 31st December | 1881 | 940,000,000 | .. | 735,579,197 | 1,675,579,197 |
| ” | 1886 | 446,665,535 | .. | 1,031,869,712 | 1,478,535,247 |
| ” | 1891 | 341,949,237 | .. | 1,121,601,079 | 1,463,550,316 |
| ” | 1896 | 400,000,000 | 110,000,000 | 1,069,233,376 | 1,579,233,376 |
| ” | 1899 | 451,431,780 | 42,138,152 | 1,180,110,330 | 1,673,680,262 |
| ” | 1905 | 441,304,780 | 1,874,184 | 1,406,474,800 | 1,848,657,764 |
* These ceased to have legal currency at the end of 1901; they were notes of 1 and 2 lire.
Banks.—Until 1893 the juridical status of the Banks of Issue was
regulated by the laws of the 30th of April 1874 on paper currency and
of the 7th of April 1881 on the abolition of forced currency. At that
time four limited companies were authorized to issue bank notes,
namely, the National Bank, the National Bank of Tuscany, the
Roman Bank and the Tuscan Credit Bank; and two banking
corporations, the Bank of Naples and the Bank of Sicily. In 1893
the Roman Bank was put into liquidation, and the other three
limited companies were fused, so as to create the Bank of Italy, the
privilege of issuing bank notes being thenceforward confined to the
Bank of Italy, the Bank of Naples and the Bank of Sicily. The gold
reserve in the possession of the Banca d’Italia on September 30th
1907 amounted to £32,240,984, and the silver reserve to £4,767,861;
the foreign treasury bonds, &c. amounted to £3,324,074, making
the total reserve £40,332,919; while the circulation amounted to
£54,612,234. The figures were on the 31st of December 1906:
| Paper Circulation. | Reserve. | |
| Banca d’Italia | £47,504,352 | £36,979,235 |
| Banca di Napoli | 13,893,152 | 9,756,284 |
| Banca di Sicilia | 2,813,692 | 2,060,481 |
| Total | £64,211,196 | £48,796,000 |
This is considerably in excess of the circulation, £40,404,000, fixed by royal decree of 1900; but the issue of additional notes was allowed, provided they were entirely covered by a metallic reserve, whereas up to the fixed limit a 40% reserve only was necessary. These notes are of 50, 100, 500 and 1000 lire; while the state issues notes for 5, 10 and 25 lire, the currency of these at the end of October 1906 being £17,546,967; with a total guarantee of £15,636,000 held against them. They were in January 1908 equal in value to the metallic currency of gold and silver.
The price of Italian consolidated 5% (gross, 4% net, allowing for the 20% income tax) stock, which is the security most largely negotiated abroad, and used in settling differences between large financial institutions, has steadily risen during recent years. After being depressed between 1885 and 1894, the prices in Italy and abroad reached, in 1899, on the Rome Stock Exchange, the average of 100.83 and of 94.8 on the Paris Bourse. By the end of 1901 the price of Italian stock on the Paris Bourse had, however, risen to par or thereabouts. The average price of Italian 4% in 1905 was 105.29; since the conversion to 334% net (to be further reduced to 312 in five more years), the price has been about 103.5. Rates of exchange, or, in other words the gold premium, favoured Italy during the years immediately following the abolition of the forced currency in 1881. In 1885, however, rates tended to rise, and though they fell in 1886 they subsequently increased to such an extent as to reach 110% at the end of August 1894. For the next four years they continued low, but rose again in 1898 and 1899. In 1900 the maximum rate was 107.32, and the minimum 105.40, but in 1901 rates fell considerably, and were at par in 1902–1909.
There are in Italy six clearing houses, namely, the ancient one at Leghorn, and those of Genoa, Milan, Rome, Florence and Turin, founded since 1882.
The number of ordinary banks, which diminished between 1889 and 1894, increased in the following years, and was 158 in 1898. At the same time the capital employed in banking decreased by nearly one-half, namely, from about £12,360,000 in 1880 to about £6,520,000 in 1898. This decrease was due to the liquidation of a number of large and small banks, amongst others the Bank of Genoa, the General Bank, and the Società di Credito Mobiliare Italiano of Rome, and the Genoa Discount Bank—establishments which alone represented £4,840,000 of paid-up capital. Ordinary credit operations are also carried on by the co-operative credit societies, of which there are some 700.
Certain banks make a special business of lending money to owners
of land or buildings (credito fondiario). Loans are repayable by
instalments, and are guaranteed by first mortgages not
greater in amount than half the value of the hypothecated
property. The banks may buy up mortgages and advance
Agrarian
Credit
Banks.
money on current account on the security of land or
buildings. The development of the large cities has induced these
banks to turn their attention rather to building enterprise than to
mortgages on rural property. The value of their land certificates
or cartelle fondiarie (representing capital in circulation) rose from
£10,420,000 in 1881 to £15,560,000 in 1886, and to £30,720,000
in 1891, but fell to £29,320,000 in 1896, to £27,360,000 in 1898,
and to £24,360,000 in 1907; the amount of money lent increased
from £10,440,000 in 1881 to £15,600,000 in 1886, and £30,800,000 in
1891, but fell to £29,320,000 in 1896, to £27,360,000 in 1899, and
to £21,720,000 in 1907. The diminution was due to the law of the
10th of April 1893 upon the banks of issue, by which they were
obliged to liquidate the loan and mortgage business they had previously
carried on.
Various laws have been passed to facilitate agrarian credit. The law of the 23rd of January 1887 (still in force) extended the dispositions of the Civil Code with regard to “privileges,”[9] and established special “privileges” in regard to harvested produce, produce stored in barns and farm buildings, and in regard to agricultural implements. Loans on mortgage may also be granted to landowners and agricultural unions, with a view to the introduction of agricultural improvements. These loans are regulated by special disposition, and are guaranteed by a share of the increased value of the land after the improvements have been carried out. Agrarian credit banks may, with the permission of the government, issue cartelle agrarie, or agrarian bonds, repayable by instalments and bearing interest.
Internal Administration.—It was not till 1865 that the administrative unity of Italy was realized. Up to that year some of the regions of the kingdom, such as Tuscany, continued to have a kind of autonomy; but by the laws of the 20th of March the whole country was divided into 69 provinces and 8545 communes. The extent to which communal independence had been maintained in Italy through all the centuries of its political disintegration was strongly in its favour. The syndic (sindaco) or chief magistrate of the commune was appointed by the king for three years, and he was assisted by a “municipal junta.”
Local government was modified by the law of the 10th of February 1889 and by posterior enactments. The syndics (or mayors) are now elected by a secret ballot of the communal council, though they are still government officials. In the provincial administrations the functions of the prefects have been curtailed. Each province has a prefect, responsible to and appointed by the Ministry of the Interior, while each of the regions (called variously circondarii and distretti) has its sub-prefect. Whereas the prefect was formerly ex-officio president of the provincial deputation or executive committee of the provincial council, his duties under the present law are reduced to mere participation in the management of provincial affairs, the president of the provincial deputation being chosen among and elected by the members of the deputation. The most important change introduced by the new law has been the creation in every province of a provincial administrative junta entrusted with the supervision of communal administrations, a function previously discharged by the provincial deputation. Each provincial administrative junta is composed, in part, of government nominees, and in larger part of elective elements, elected by the provincial council for four years, half of whom require to be elected every two years. The acts of communal administration requiring the sanction of the provincial administrative junta are chiefly financial. Both communal councils and prefects may appeal to the government against the decision of the provincial administrative juntas, the government being guided by the opinion of the Council of State. Besides possessing competence in regard to local government elections, which previously came within the jurisdiction of the provincial deputations, the provincial administrative juntas discharge magisterial functions in administrative affairs, and deal with appeals presented by private persons against acts of the communal and provincial administrations. The juntas are in this respect organs of the administrative jurisprudence created in Italy by the law of the 1st of May 1890, in order to provide juridical protection for those rights and interests outside the competence of the ordinary tribunals. The provincial council only meets once a year in ordinary session.
The former qualifications for electorship in local government elections have been modified, and it is now sufficient to pay five lire annually in direct taxes, five lire of certain communal taxes, or a certain rental (which varies according to the population of a commune), instead of being obliged to pay, as previously, at least five lire annually of direct taxes to the state. In consequence of this change the number of local electors increased by more than one-third between 1887–1889; it decreased, however, as a result of an extraordinary revision of the registers in 1894. The period for which both communal and provincial councils are elected is six years, one-half being renewed every three years.
The ratio of local electors to population is in Piedmont 79%, but in Sicily less than 45%. The ratio of voters to qualified electors tends to increase; it is highest in Campania, Basilicata and in the south generally; the lowest percentages are given by Emilia and Liguria.
Local finance is regulated by the communal and provincial law of May 1898, which instituted provincial administrative juntas, empowered to examine and sanction the acts of the communal financial administrations. The sanction of the provincial administrative junta is necessary for sales or Local finance. purchases of property, alterations of rates (although in case of increase the junta can only act upon request of ratepayers paying an aggregate of one-twentieth of the local direct taxation), and expenditure affecting the communal budget for more than five years. The provincial administrative junta is, moreover, empowered to order “obligatory” expenditure, such as the upkeep of roads, sanitary works, lighting, police (i.e. the so-called “guardie di pubblica sicurezza,” the “carabinieri” being really a military force; only the largest towns maintain a municipal police force), charities, education, &c., in case such expenditure is neglected by the communal authorities. The cost of fire brigades, infant asylums, evening and holiday schools, is classed as “optional” expenditure. Communal revenues are drawn from the proceeds of communal property, interest upon capital, taxes and local dues. The most important of the local dues is the gate tax, or dazio di consumo, which may be either a surtax upon commodities (such as alcoholic drinks or meat), having already paid customs duty at the frontier, in which case the local surtax may not exceed 50% of the frontier duty, or an exclusively communal duty limited to 10% on flour, bread and farinaceous products,[10] and to 20% upon other commodities. The taxes thus vary considerably in different towns.
In addition, the communes have a right to levy a surtax not exceeding 50% of the quota levied by the state upon lands and buildings; a family tax, or fuocatico, upon the total incomes of families, which, for fiscal purposes, are divided into various categories; a tax based upon the rent-value of houses, and other taxes upon cattle, horses, dogs, carriages and servants; also on licences for shopkeepers, hotel and restaurant keepers, &c.; on the slaughter of animals, stamp duties, one-half of the tax on bicycles, &c. Occasional sources of interest are found in the sale of communal property, the realization of communal credits, and the contraction of debt.
The provincial administrations are entrusted with the management of the affairs of the provinces in general, as distinguished from those of the communes. Their expenditure is likewise classed as “obligatory” and “optional.” The former category comprises the maintenance of provincial roads, bridges and watercourse embankments; secondary education, whenever this is not provided for by private institutions or by the state (elementary education being maintained by the communes), and the maintenance of foundlings and pauper lunatics. “Optional” expenditure includes the cost of services of general public interest, though not strictly indispensable. Provincial revenues are drawn from provincial property, school taxes, tolls and surtaxes on land and buildings. The provincial surtaxes may not exceed 50% of the quotas levied by the state. In 1897 the total provincial revenue was £3,732,253, of which £3,460,000 was obtained from the surtax upon lands and buildings. Expenditure amounted to £3,768,888, of which the principal items were £760,000 for roads and bridges, £520,000 for lunatic asylums, £240,000 for foundling hospitals, £320,000 for interest on debt and £200,000 for police. Like communal revenue, provincial revenue has considerably increased since 1880, principally on account of the increase in the land and building surtax.
The Italian local authorities, communes and provinces alike, have considerably increased their indebtedness since 1882. The ratio of communal and provincial debt per inhabitant has grown from 30.79 lire (£1, 4s. 712d.) to 43.70 lire (£1, 14s. 11d.), an increase due in great part to the need for improved buildings, hygienic reforms and education, but also attributable in part to the manner in which the finances of many communes are administered. The total was in 1900, £49,496,193 for the communes and £6,908,022 for the provinces. The former total is more than double and the latter more than treble the sum in 1873, while there is an increase of 62% in the former and 26% in the latter over the totals for 1882.
See Annuario statistico italiano (not, however, issued regularly each year) for general statistics; and other official publications; W. Deecke, Italy; a Popular Account of the Country, its People and its Institutions (translated by H. A. Nesbitt, London, 1904); B. King and T. Okey, Italy to-day (London, 1901); E. Nathan, Vent’ Anni di vita italiana attraverso all’ Annuario (Rome, 1906); G. Strafforello, Geografia dell’ Italia (Turin, 1890–1902). (T. As.)
History
The difficulty of Italian history lies in the fact that until modern times the Italians have had no political unity, no independence, no organized existence as a nation. Split up into numerous and mutually hostile communities, they never, through the fourteen centuries which have elapsed since the end of the old Western empire, shook off the yoke of foreigners completely; they never until lately learned to merge their local and conflicting interests in the common good of undivided Italy. Their history is therefore not the history of a single people, centralizing and absorbing its constituent elements by a process of continued evolution, but of a group of cognate populations, exemplifying divers types of constitutional developments.
The early history of Italy will be found under Rome and allied headings. The following account is therefore mainly concerned with the periods succeeding A.D. 476, when Romulus Augustulus was deposed by Odoacer. Prefixed to this are two sections dealing respectively with (A) the ethnographical and philological divisions of ancient Italy, and (B) the unification of the country under Augustus, the growth of the road system and so forth. The subsequent history is divided into five periods: (C) From 476 to 1796; (D) From 1796 to 1814; (E) From 1815 to 1870; (F) From 1870 to 1902; (G) From 1902 to 1910.
A. Ancient Languages and Peoples
The ethnography of ancient Italy is a very complicated and difficult subject, and notwithstanding the researches of modern scholars is still involved in some obscurity. The great beauty and fertility of the country, as well as the charm of its climate, undoubtedly attracted, even in early ages, successive swarms of invaders from the north, who sometimes drove out the previous occupants of the most favoured districts, at others reduced them to a state of serfdom, or settled down in the midst of them, until the two races gradually coalesced. Ancient writers are agreed as to the composite character of the population of Italy, and the diversity of races that were found within the limits of the peninsula. But unfortunately the traditions they have transmitted to us are often various and conflicting, while the only safe test of the affinities of nations, derived from the comparison of their languages, is to a great extent inapplicable, from the fact that the idioms that prevailed in Italy in and before the 5th century B.C. are preserved, if at all, only in a few scanty and fragmentary inscriptions, though from that date onwards we have now a very fair record of many of them (see, e.g. Latin Language, Osca Lingua, Iguvium, Volsci, Etruria: section Language, and below). These materials, imperfect as they are, when combined with the notices derived from ancient writers and the evidence of archaeological excavations, may be considered as having furnished some results of reasonable certainty.
It must be observed that the name “Italians” was at one time confined to the Oenotrians; indeed, according to Antiochus of Syracuse (apud Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. ii. 1), the name of Italy was first still more limited, being applied only to the southern portion of the Bruttium peninsula (now known as Calabria). But in the time of that historian, as well as of Thucydides, the names of Oenotria and Italia, which appear to have been at that period regarded as synonymous, had been extended to include the shore of the Tarentine Gulf as far as Metapontum and from thence across to the gulfs of Laus and Posidonia on the Tyrrhenian Sea. It thus still comprised only the two provinces subsequently known as Lucania and Bruttium (see references s.v. “Italia” in R. S. Conway’s Italic Dialects, p. 5). The name seems to be a Graecized form of an Italic Vitelia, from the stem vitlo-, “calf” (Lat. vitulus, Gr. ἰταλός), and perhaps to have meant “calf-land,” “grazing-land”; but the origin is more certain than the meaning; the calf may be one of the many animals connected with Italian tribes (see Hirpini, Samnites).
Taking the term Italy to comprise the whole peninsula with the northern region as far as the Alps, we must first distinguish the tribe or tribes which spoke Indo-European languages from those who did not. To the latter category it is now possible to refer with certainty only the Etruscans (for the chronology and limits of their occupation of Italian soil see Etruria: section Language). Of all the other tribes that inhabited Italy down to the classical period, of whose speech there is any record (whether explicit or in the form of names and glosses), it is impossible to maintain that any one does not belong to the Indo-European group. Putting aside the Etruscan, and also the different Greek dialects of the Greek colonies, like Cumae, Neapolis, Tarentum, and proceeding from the south to the north, the different languages or dialects, of whose separate existence at some time between, say, 600 and 200 B.C., we can be sure, may be enumerated as follows: (1) Sicel, (2) South Oscan and Oscan, (3) Messapian, (4) North Oscan, (5) Volscian, (6) East Italic or “Sabellic,” (7) Latinian, (8) Sabine, (9) Iguvine or “Umbrian,” (10) Gallic, (11) Ligurian and (12) Venetic.
Between several of these dialects it is probable that closer affinities exist. (1) It is probable, though not very clearly demonstrated, that Venetic, East Italic and Messapian are connected together and with the ancient dialects spoken in Illyria (q.v.), so that these might be provisionally entitled the Adriatic group, to which the language spoken by the Eteocretes of the city of Praesos in Crete down to the 4th century B.C. was perhaps akin. (2) Too little is known of the Sicel language to make clear more than its Indo-European character. But it must be reckoned among the languages of Italy because of the well-supported tradition of the early existence of the Sicels in Latium (see Siculi). Their possible place in the earlier stratum of Indo-European population is discussed under Sabini. How far also the language or languages spoken in Bruttium and at certain points of Lucania, such as Anxia, differed from the Oscan of Samnium and Campania there is not enough evidence to show (see Bruttii). (3) It is doubtful whether there are any actual inscriptions which can be referred with certainty to the language of the Ligures, but some other evidence seems to link them with the -CO- peoples, whose early distribution is discussed under Volsci and Liguria. (4) It is difficult to point to any definite evidence by which we may determine the dates of the earliest appearance of Gallic tribes in the north of Italy. No satisfactory collection has been made of the Celtic inscriptions of Cisalpine Gaul, though many are scattered about in different museums. For our present purpose it is important to note that the archaeological stratification in deposits like those of Bologna shows that the Gallic period supervened upon the Etruscan. Until a scientific collection of the local and personal names of this district has been made, and until the archaeological evidence is clearly interpreted, it is impossible to go beyond the region of conjecture as to the tribe or tribes occupying the valley of the Po before the two invasions. It is clear, however, that the Celtic and Etruscan elements together occupied the greater part of the district between the Apennines and the Alps down to its Romanization, which took place gradually in the course of the 2nd century B.C. Their linguistic neighbours were Ligurian in the south and south-west, and the Veneti on the east.
We know from the Roman historians that a large force of Gauls came as far south as Rome in the year 390 B.C., and that some part of this horde settled in what was henceforward known as the Ager Gallicus, the easternmost strip of coast in what was later known as Umbria, including the towns of Caesēna, Ravenna and Arīminum. A bilingual inscription (Gallic and Latin) of the 2nd century B.C. was found as far south as Tuder, the modern Todi (Italic Dialects, ii. 528; Stokes, Bezzenberger’s Beiträge, 11, p. 113).
(5) Turning now to the languages which constitute the Italic group in the narrower sense, (a) Oscan; (b) the dialect of Velitrae, commonly called Volscian; (c) Latinian (i.e. Latin and its nearest congeners, like Faliscan); and (d) Umbrian (or, as it may more safely be called, Iguvine), two principles of classification offer themselves, of which the first is purely linguistic, the second linguistic and topographical. Writers on the ethnology of Italy have been hitherto content with the first, namely, the broad distinction between the dialects which preserved the Indo-European velars (especially the breathed plosive q) as velars or back-palatals (gutturals), with or without the addition of a w-sound, and the dialects which converted the velars wholly into labials, for example, Latinian quis contrasted with Oscan, Volscian and Umbrian pis (see further Latin Language).
This distinction, however, takes us but a little way towards an historical grouping of the tribes, since the only Latinian dialects of which, besides Latin, we have inscriptions are Faliscan and Marsian (see Falisci, Marsi); although the place-names of the Aequi (q.v.) suggest that they belong to the same group in this respect. Except, therefore, for a very small and apparently isolated area in the north of Latium and south of Etruria, all the tribes of Italy, though their idioms differed in certain particulars, are left undiscriminated. This presents a strong contrast to the evidence of tradition, which asserts very strongly (1) the identity of the Sabines and Samnites; (2) the conquest of an earlier population by this tribe; and which affords (3) clear evidence of the identity of the Sabines with the ruling class, i.e. the patricians, at Rome itself (see Sabini; and Rome: Early History and Ethnology).
Some clue to this enigma may perhaps be found in the second principle of classification proposed by the present writer at the Congresso Internationale di Scienze Storiche at Rome (Atti del Congresso, ii) in 1903. It was on that occasion pointed out that the ethnica or tribal and oppidan names of communities belonging to the Sabine stock were marked by the use of the suffix -NO- as in Sabini; and that there was some linguistic evidence that this stratum of population overcame an earlier population, which used, generally, ethnica in -CO- or -TI- (as in Marruci, Ardeates, transformed later into Marrucini, Ardeatini).
The validity of this distinction and its results are discussed under Sabini and Volsci, but it is well to state here its chief consequences.
1. Latin will be counted the language of the earlier plebeian stratum of the population of Rome and Latium, probably once spread over a large area of the peninsula, and akin in some degree to the language or languages spoken in north Italy before either the Etruscan or the Gallic invasions began.
2. It would follow, on the other hand, that what is called Oscan represented the language of the invading Sabines (more correctly Safines), whose racial affinities would seem to be of a distinctly more northern cast, and to mark them, like the Dorians or Achaeans in Greece, as an early wave of the invaders who more than once in later history have vitally influenced the fortunes of the tempting southern land into which they forced their way.
3. What is called Volscian, known only from the important inscription of the town of Velitrae, and what is called Umbrian, known from the famous Iguvine Tables with a few other records, would be regarded as Safine dialects, spoken by Safine communities who had become more or less isolated in the midst of the earlier and possibly partly Etruscanized populations, the result being that as early as the 4th century B.C. their language had suffered corruptions which it escaped both in the Samnite mountains and in the independent and self-contained community of Rome.
For fuller details the reader must be referred to the separate articles already mentioned, and to Iguvium, Picenum, Osca Lingua, Marsi, Aequi, Siculi and Liguria. Such archaeological evidence as can be connected with the linguistic data will there be discussed. (R. S. C.)
B. Consolidation of Italy
We have seen that the name of Italy was originally applied only to the southernmost part of the peninsula, and was only gradually extended so as to comprise the central regions, such as Latium and Campania, which were designated by writers as late as Thucydides and Aristotle as in Opicia. The progress of this change cannot be followed in detail, but there can be little doubt that the extension of the Roman arms, and the gradual union of the nations of the peninsula under one dominant power, would contribute to the introduction, or rather would make the necessity felt, for the use of one general appellation. At first, indeed, the term was apparently confined to the regions of the central and southern districts, exclusive of Cisalpine Gaul and the whole tract north of the Apennines, and this continued to be the official or definite signification of the name down to the end of the republic. But the natural limits of Italy are so clearly marked that the name came to be generally employed as a geographical term at a much earlier period. Thus we already find Polybius repeatedly applying it in this wider signification to the whole country, as far as the foot of the Alps; and it is evident from many passages in the Latin writers that this was the familiar use of the term in the days of Cicero and Caesar. The official distinction was, however, still retained. Cisalpine Gaul, including the whole of northern Italy, still constituted a “province,” an appellation never applied to Italy itself. As such it was assigned to Julius Caesar, together with Transalpine Gaul, and it was not till he crossed the Rubicon that he entered Italy in the strict sense of the term.
Augustus was the first who gave a definite administrative organization to Italy as a whole, and at the same time gave official sanction to that wider acceptation of the name which had already established itself in familiar usage, and which has continued to prevail ever since.
The division of Italy into eleven regions, instituted by Augustus for administrative purposes, which continued in official use till the reign of Constantine, was based mainly on the territorial divisions previously existing, and preserved with few exceptions the ancient limits.
The first region comprised Latium (in the more extended sense of the term, as including the land of the Volsci, Hernici and Aurunci), together with Campania and the district of the Picentini. It thus extended from the mouth of the Tiber to that of the Silarus (see Latium).
The second region included Apulia and Calabria (the name by which the Romans usually designated the district known to the Greeks as Messapia or Iapygia), together with the land of the Hirpini, which had usually been considered as a part of Samnium.
The third region contained Lucania and Bruttium; it was bounded on the west coast by the Silarus, on the east by the Bradanus.
The fourth region comprised all the Samnites (except the Hirpini), together with the Sabines and the cognate tribes of the Frentani, Marrucini, Marsi, Peligni, Vestini and Aequiculi. It was separated from Apulia on the south by the river Tifernus, and from Picenum on the north by the Matrinus.
The fifth region was composed solely of Picenum, extending along the coast of the Adriatic from the mouth of the Matrinus to that of the Aesis, beyond Ancona.
The sixth region was formed by Umbria, in the more extended sense of the term, as including the Ager Gallicus, along the coast of the Adriatic from the Aesis to the Ariminus, and separated from Etruria on the west by the Tiber.
The seventh region consisted of Etruria, which preserved its ancient limits, extending from the Tiber to the Tyrrhenian Sea, and separated from Liguria on the north by the river Macra.
The eighth region, termed Gallia Cispadana, comprised the southern portion of Cisalpine Gaul, and was bounded on the north (as its name implied) by the river Padus or Po, from above Placentia to its mouth. It was separated from Etruria and
Umbria by the main chain of the Apennines; and the river 
Ariminus was substituted for the far-famed Rubicon as its limit on the Adriatic.
The ninth region comprised Liguria, extending along the sea-coast from the Varus to the Macra, and inland as far as the river Padus, which constituted its northern boundary from its source in Mount Vesulus to its confluence with the Trebia just above Placentia.
The tenth region included Venetia from the Padus and Adriatic to the Alps, to which was annexed the neighbouring peninsula of Istria, and to the west the territory of the Cenomani, a Gaulish tribe, extending from the Athesis to the Addua, which had previously been regarded as a part of Gallia Cisalpina.
The eleventh region, known as Gallia Transpadana, included all the rest of Cisalpine Gaul from the Padus on the south and the Addua on the east to the foot of the Alps.
The arrangements thus established by Augustus continued almost unchanged till the time of Constantine, and formed the basis of all subsequent administrative divisions until the fall of the Western empire.
The mainstay of the Roman military control of Italy first, and of the whole empire afterwards, was the splendid system of roads. As the supremacy of Rome extended itself over Italy, the Roman road system grew step by step, each fresh conquest being marked by the pushing forward of Roads. roads through the heart of the newly-won territory, and the establishment of fortresses in connexion with them. It was in Italy that the military value of a network of roads was first appreciated by the Romans, and the lesson stood them in good stead in the provinces. And it was for military reasons that from mere cart-tracks they were developed into permanent highways (T. Ashby, in Papers of the British School at Rome, i. 129). From Rome itself roads radiated in all directions. Communications with the south-east were mainly provided by the Via Appia (the “queen of Roman roads,” as Statius called it) and the Via Latina, which met close to Casilinum, at the crossing of the Volturnus, 3 m. N.W. of Capua, the second city in Italy in the 3rd century B.C., and the centre of the road system of Campania. Here the Via Appia turned eastward towards Beneventum, while the Via Popilia continued in a south-easterly direction through the Campanian plain and thence southwards through the mountains of Lucania and Bruttii as far as Rhegium. Coast roads of minor importance as means of through communication also existed on both sides of the “toe” of the boot. Other roads ran south from Capua to Cumae, Puteoli (the most important harbour of Campania), and Neapolis, which could also be reached by a coast road from Minturnae on the Via Appia. From Beneventum, another important road centre, the Via Appia itself ran south-east through the mountains past Venusia to Tarentum on the south-west coast of the “heel,” and thence across Calabria to Brundusium, while Trajan’s correction of it, following an older mule-track, ran north-east through the mountains and then through the lower ground of Apulia, reaching the coast at Barium. Both met at Brundusium, the principal port for the East. From Aequum Tuticum, on the Via Traiana, the Via Herculia ran to the south-east, crossing the older Via Appia, then south to Potentia and so on to join the Via Popilia in the centre of Lucania.
The only highroad of importance which left Rome and ran eastwards, the Via Valeria, was not completed as far as the Adriatic before the time of Claudius; but on the north and north-west started the main highways which communicated with central and northern Italy, and with all that part of the Roman empire which was accessible by land. The Via Salaria, a very ancient road, with its branch, the Via Caecilia, ran north-eastwards to the Adriatic coast and so also did the Via Flaminia, which reached the coast at Fanum Fortunae, and thence followed it to Ariminum. The road along the east coast from Fanum Fortunae down to Barium, which connected the terminations of the Via Salaria and Via Valeria, and of other roads farther south crossing from Campania, had no special name in ancient times, as far as we know. The Via Flaminia was the earliest and most important road to the north; and it was soon extended (in 187 B.C.) by the Via Aemilia running through Bononia as far as Placentia, in an almost absolutely straight line between the plain of the Po and the foot of the Apennines. In the same year a road was constructed over the Apennines from Bononia to Arretium, but it is difficult to suppose that it was not until later that the Via Cassia was made, giving a direct communication between Arretium and Rome. The Via Clodia was an alternative route to the Cassia for the first portion out of Rome, a branch having been built at the same time from Florentia to Lucca and Luna. Along the west coast the Via Aurelia ran up to Pisa and was continued by another Via Aemilia to Genoa. Thence the Via Postumia led to Dertona, Placentia and Cremona, while the Via Aemilia and the Via Julia Augusta continued along the coast into Gallia Narbonensis.
The road system of Cisalpine Gaul was mainly conditioned by the rivers which had to be crossed, and the Alpine passes which had to be approached.
Cremona, on the north bank of the Po, was an important meeting point of roads and Postilia (Ostiglia) another; so also was Patavium, farther east, and Altinum and Aquileia farther east still. Roads, indeed, were almost as plentiful as railways at the present day in the basin of the Po.
As to the roads leading out of Italy, from Aquileia roads diverged northward into Raetia, eastward to Noricum and Pannonia, and southwards to the Istrian and Dalmatian coasts. Farther west came the roads over the higher Alpine passes—the Brenner from Verona, the Septimer and the Splügen from Clavenna (Chiavenna), the Great and the Little St Bernard from Augusta Praetoria (Aosta), and the Mont Genèvre from Augusta Taurinorum (Turin).
Westward two short but important roads led on each side of the Tiber to the great harbour at its mouth; while the coast of Latium was supplied with a coast road by Septimius Severus. To the south-west the roads were short and of little importance.
On ancient Italian geography in general see articles in Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyclopädie (1899, sqq.); Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum (Berlin, 1862 sqq.); G. Strafforello, Geografia dell’ Italia (Turin, 1890–1892); H. Nissen, Italische Landeskunde (Berlin, 1883–1902); also references in articles Rome, Latium, &c. (T. As.)
C. From 476 to 1796
The year 476 opened a new age for the Italian people. Odoacer, a chief of the Herulians, deposed Romulus, the last Augustus of the West, and placed the peninsula beneath the titular sway of the Byzantine emperors. At Pavia the barbarian conquerors of Italy proclaimed him king, and he received from Zeno the dignity of Roman patrician. Thus began that system of mixed government, Teutonic and Roman, which, in the absence of a national monarch, impressed the institutions of new Italy from the earliest date with dualism. The same revolution vested supreme authority in a non-resident and inefficient autocrat, whose title gave him the right to interfere in Italian affairs, but who lacked the power and will to rule the people for his own or their advantage. Odoacer inaugurated that long series of foreign rulers—Greeks, Franks, Germans, Spaniards and Austrians—who have successively contributed to the misgovernment of Italy from distant seats of empire.
I. Gothic and Lombard Kingdoms.—In 488 Theodoric, king of the East Goths, received commission from the Greek emperor, Zeno, to undertake the affairs of Italy. He defeated Odoacer, drove him to Ravenna, besieged him there, and in 493 completed the conquest of the country by murdering the Herulian chief with his own hand. Theodoric respected the Roman institutions which he found in Italy, held the Eternal City sacred, and governed by ministers chosen from the Roman population. He settled at Ravenna, which had been the capital of Italy since the days of Honorius, and which still testifies by its monuments to the Gothic chieftain’s Romanizing policy. Those who believe that the Italians would have gained strength by unification in a single monarchy must regret that this Gothic kingdom lacked the elements of stability. The Goths, except in the valley of the Po, resembled an army of occupation rather than a people numerous enough to blend with the Italic stock. Though their rule was favourable to the Romans, they were Arians; and religious differences, combined with the pride and jealousies of a nation accustomed to imperial honours, rendered the inhabitants of Italy eager to throw off their yoke. When, therefore, Justinian undertook the reconquest of Italy, his generals, Belisarius and Narses, were supported by the south. The struggle of the Greeks and the Goths was carried on for fourteen years, between 539 and 553, when Teias, the last Gothic king, was finally defeated in a bloody battle near Vesuvius. At its close the provinces of Italy were placed beneath Greek dukes, controlled by a governor-general, entitled exarch, who ruled in the Byzantine emperor’s name at Ravenna.
This new settlement lasted but a few years. Narses had employed Lombard auxiliaries in his campaigns against the Goths; and when he was recalled by an insulting message from the empress in 565, he is said to have invited this fiercest and rudest of the Teutonic clans The Lombards. to seize the spoils of Italy. Be this as it may, the Lombards, their ranks swelled by the Gepidae, whom they had lately conquered, and by the wrecks of other barbarian tribes, passed southward under their king Alboin in 568. The Herulian invaders had been but a band of adventurers; the Goths were an army; the Lombards, far more formidable, were a nation in movement. Pavia offered stubborn resistance; but after a three years’ siege it was taken, and Alboin made it the capital of his new kingdom.
In order to understand the future history of Italy, it is necessary to form a clear conception of the method pursued by the Lombards in their conquest. Penetrating the peninsula, and advancing like a glacier or half-liquid stream of mud, they occupied the valley of the Po, and moved slowly downward through the centre of the country. Numerous as they were compared with their Gothic predecessors, they had not strength or multitude enough to occupy the whole peninsula. Venice, which since the days of Attila had offered an asylum to Roman refugees from the northern cities, was left untouched. So was Genoa with its Riviera. Ravenna, entrenched within her lagoons, remained a Greek city. Rome, protected by invincible prestige, escaped. The sea-coast cities of the south, and the islands, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, preserved their independence. Thus the Lombards neither occupied the extremities nor subjugated the brain-centre of the country. The strength of Alboin’s kingdom was in the north; his capital, Pavia. As his people pressed southward, they omitted to possess themselves of the coasts; and what was worse for the future of these conquerors, the original impetus of the invasion was checked by the untimely murder of Alboin in 573. After this event, the semi-independent chiefs of the Lombard tribe, who borrowed the title of dukes from their Roman predecessors, seem to have been contented with consolidating their power in the districts each had occupied. The duchies of Spoleto in the centre, and of Benevento in the south, inserted wedge-like into the middle of the peninsula, and enclosing independent Rome, were but loosely united to the kingdom at Pavia. Italy was broken up into districts, each offering points for attack from without, and fostering the seeds of internal revolution. Three separate capitals must be discriminated—Pavia, the seat of the new Lombard kingdom; Ravenna, the garrison city of the Byzantine emperor; and Rome, the rallying point of the old nation, where the successor of St Peter was already beginning to assume that national protectorate which proved so influential in the future.
It is not necessary to write the history of the Lombard kingdom in detail. Suffice it to say that the rule of the Lombards proved at first far more oppressive to the native population, and was less intelligent of their old customs, than that of the Goths had been. Wherever the Lombards had the upper hand, they placed the country under military rule, resembling in its general character what we now know as the feudal system. Though there is reason to suppose that the Roman laws were still administered within the cities, yet the Lombard code was that of the kingdom; and the Lombards being Arians, they added the oppression of religious intolerance to that of martial despotism and barbarous cupidity. The Italians were reduced to the last extremity when Gregory the Great (590–604), having strengthened his position by diplomatic relations with the duchy of Spoleto, and brought about the conversion of the Lombards to orthodoxy, raised the cause of the remaining Roman population throughout Italy. The fruit of his policy, which made of Rome a counterpoise against the effete empire of the Greeks upon the one hand and against the pressure of the feudal kingdom on the other, was seen in the succeeding century. When Leo the Isaurian published his decrees against the worship of images in 726, Gregory II. allied himself with Liudprand, the Lombard king, threw off allegiance to Byzantium, and established the autonomy of Rome. This pope initiated the dangerous policy of playing one hostile force off against another with a view to securing independence. He used the Lombards in his struggle with the Greeks, leaving to his successors the duty of checking these unnatural allies. This was accomplished by calling the Franks in against the Lombards. Liudprand pressed hard, not only upon the Greek dominions of the exarchate, but also upon Rome. His successors, Rachis and Aistolf, attempted to follow the same game of conquest. But the popes, Gregory III., Zachary and Stephen II., determining at any cost to espouse the national cause and to aggrandize their own office, continued to rely upon the Franks. Pippin twice crossed the Alps, and forced Aistolf to relinquish his acquisitions, including Ravenna, Pentapolis, the coast towns of Romagna and some cities in the duchy of Spoleto. These he handed over to the pope of Rome. This donation of Pippin in 756 confirmed the papal see in the protectorate of the Italic party, and conferred upon it sovereign rights. The virtual outcome of the contest carried on by Rome since the year 726 with Byzantium and Pavia was to place the popes in the position held by the Greek exarch, and to confirm the limitation of the Lombard kingdom. We must, however, be cautious to remember that the south of Italy was comparatively unaffected. The dukes of the Greek empire and the Lombard dukes of Benevento, together with a few autonomous commercial cities, still divided Italy below the Campagna of Rome (see Lombards).
II. Frankish Emperors.—The Franko-Papal alliance, which conferred a crown on Pippin and sovereign rights upon the see of Rome, held within itself that ideal of mutually supporting papacy and empire which exercised so powerful an influence in medieval history. When Charles the Great and the Carolingians. Charles the Great (Charlemagne) deposed his father-in-law Desiderius, the last Lombard king, in 774, and when he received the circlet of the empire from Leo III. at Rome in 800, he did but complete and ratify the compact offered to his grandfather, Charles Martel, by Gregory III. The relations between the new emperor and the pope were ill defined; and this proved the source of infinite disasters to Italy and Europe in the sequel. But for the moment each seemed necessary to the other; and that sufficed. Charles took possession of the kingdom of Italy, as limited by Pippin’s settlement. The pope was confirmed in his rectorship of the cities ceded by Aistolf, with the further understanding, tacit rather than expressed, that, even as he had wrung these provinces for the Italic people from both Greeks and Lombards, so in the future he might claim the protectorate of such portions of Italy, external to the kingdom, as he should be able to acquire. This, at any rate, seems to be the meaning of that obscure re-settlement of the peninsula which Charles effected. The kingdom of Italy, transmitted on his death by Charles the Great, and afterwards confirmed to his grandson Lothar by the peace of Verdun in 843, stretched from the Alps to Terracina. The duchy of Benevento remained tributary, but independent. The cities of Gaeta and Naples, Sicily and the so-called Theme of Lombardy in South Apulia and Calabria, still recognized the Byzantine emperor. Venice stood aloof, professing a nominal allegiance to the East. The parcels into which the Lombards had divided the peninsula remained thus virtually unaltered, except for the new authority acquired by the see of Rome.
Internally Charles left the affairs of the Italian kingdom much as he found them, except that he appears to have pursued the policy of breaking up the larger fiefs of the Lombards, substituting counts for their dukes, and adding to the privileges of the bishops. We may reckon these measures among the earliest advantages extended to the cities, which still contained the bulk of the old Roman population, and which were destined to intervene with decisive effect two centuries later in Italian history. It should also here be noticed that the changes introduced into the holding of the fiefs, whether by altering their boundaries or substituting Frankish for Lombard vassals, were chief among the causes why the feudal system took no permanent hold in Italy. Feudalism was not at any time a national institution. The hierarchy of dukes and marquises and counts consisted of foreign soldiers imposed on the indigenous inhabitants; and the rapid succession of conquerors, Lombards, Franks and Germans following each other at no long interval, and each endeavouring to weaken the remaining strength of his predecessor, prevented this alien hierarchy from acquiring fixity by permanence of tenure. Among the many miseries inflicted upon Italy by the frequent changes of her northern rulers, this at least may be reckoned a blessing.
The Italians acknowledged eight kings of the house of Charles the Great, ending in Charles the Fat, who was deposed in 888. After them followed ten sovereigns, some of whom have been misnamed Italians by writers too eager to catch at any resemblance of national glory for a Frankish and Italian kings. people passive in the hands of foreign masters. The truth is that no period in Italian history was less really glorious than that which came to a close in 961 by Berengar II.’s cession of his rights to Otto the Great. It was a period marked in the first place by the conquests of the Saracens, who began to occupy Sicily early in the 9th century, overran Calabria and Apulia, took Bari and threatened Rome. In the second place it was marked by a restoration of the Greeks to power. In 890 they established themselves again at Bari, and ruled the Theme of Lombardy by means of an officer entitled Catapan. In the third place it was marked by a decline of good government in Rome. Early in the 10th century the papacy fell into the hands of a noble family, known eventually as the counts of Tusculum, who almost succeeded in rendering the office hereditary, and in uniting the civil and ecclesiastical functions of the city under a single member of their house. It is not necessary to relate the scandals of Marozia’s and Theodora’s female reign, the infamies of John XII. or the intrigues which tended to convert Rome into a duchy. The most important fact for the historian of Italy to notice is that during this time the popes abandoned, not only their high duties as chiefs of Christendom, but also their protectorate of Italian liberties. A fourth humiliating episode in this period was the invasion of the Magyar barbarians, who overran the north of Italy, and reduced its fairest provinces to the condition of a wilderness. Anarchy and misery are indeed the main features of that long space of time which elapsed between the death of Charles the Great and the descent of Otto. Through the almost impenetrable darkness and confusion we only discern this much, that Italy was powerless to constitute herself a nation.
The discords which followed on the break-up of the Carolingian power, and the weakness of the so-called Italian emperors, who were unable to control the feudatories (marquises of Ivrea and Tuscany, dukes of Friuli and Spoleto), from whose ranks they sprang, exposed Italy to ever-increasing misrule. The country by this time had become thickly covered over with castles, the seats of greater or lesser nobles, all of whom were eager to detach themselves from strict allegiance to the “Regno.” The cities, exposed to pillage by Huns in the north and Saracens in the south, and ravaged on the coast by Norse pirates, asserted their right to enclose themselves with walls, and taught their burghers the use of arms. Within the circuit of their ramparts, the bishops already began to exercise authority in rivalry with the counts, to whom, since the days of Theodoric, had been entrusted the government of the Italian burghs. Agreeably to feudal customs, these nobles, as they grew in power, retired from the town, and built themselves fortresses on points of vantage in the neighbourhood. Thus the titular king of Italy found himself simultaneously at war with those great vassals who had chosen him from their own class, with the turbulent factions of the Roman aristocracy, with unruly bishops in the growing cities and with the multitude of minor counts and barons who occupied the open lands, and who changed sides according to the interests of the moment. The last king of the quasi-Italian succession, Berengar II., marquis of Ivrea (951–961), made a vigorous effort to restore the authority of the regno; and had he succeeded, it is not impossible that now at the last moment Italy might have become an independent nation. But this attempt at unification was reckoned to Berengar for a crime. He only won the hatred of all classes, and was represented by the obscure annalists of that period as an oppressor of the church and a remorseless tyrant. In Italy, divided between feudal nobles and almost hereditary ecclesiastics, of foreign blood and alien sympathies, there was no national feeling. Berengar stood alone against a multitude, unanimous in their intolerance of discipline. His predecessor in the kingdom, Lothar, had left a young and beautiful widow, Adelheid. Berengar imprisoned her upon the Lake of Como, and threatened her with a forced marriage to his son Adalbert. She escaped to the castle of Canossa, where the great count of Tuscany espoused her cause, and appealed in her behalf to Otto the Saxon. The king of Germany descended into Italy, and took Adelheid in marriage. After this episode Berengar was more discredited and impotent than ever. In the extremity of his fortunes he had recourse himself to Otto, making a formal cession of the Italian kingdom, in his own name and that of his son Adalbert, to the Saxon as his overlord. By this slender tie the crown of Italy was joined to that of Germany; and the formal right of the elected king of Germany to be considered king of Italy and emperor may be held to have accrued from this epoch.
III. The German Emperors.—Berengar gained nothing by his act of obedience to Otto. The great Italian nobles, in their turn, appealed to Germany. Otto entered Lombardy in 961, deposed Berengar, assumed the crown in San Ambrogio at Milan, and in 962 was proclaimed Saxon and Franconian emperors. emperor by John XII. at Rome. Henceforward Italy changed masters according as one or other of the German families assumed supremacy beyond the Alps. It is one of the strongest instances furnished by history of the fascination exercised by an idea that the Italians themselves should have grown to glory in this dependence of their nation upon Caesars who had nothing but a name in common with the Roman Imperator of the past.
The first thing we have to notice in this revolution which placed Otto the Great upon the imperial throne is that the Italian kingdom, founded by the Lombards, recognized by the Franks and recently claimed by eminent Italian feudatories, virtually ceased to exist. It was merged in the German kingdom; and, since for the German princes Germany was of necessity their first care, Italy from this time forward began to be left more and more to herself. The central authority of Pavia had always been weak; the regno had proved insufficient to combine the nation. But now even that shadow of union disappeared, and the Italians were abandoned to the slowly working influences which tended to divide them into separate states. The most brilliant period of their chequered history, the period which includes the rise of communes, the exchange of municipal liberty for despotism and the gradual discrimination of the five great powers (Milan, Venice, Florence, the Papacy and the kingdom of Naples), now begins. Among the centrifugal forces which determined the future of the Italian race must be reckoned, first and foremost, the new spirit of municipal independence. We have seen how the cities enclosed themselves with walls, and how the bishops defined their authority against that of the counts. Otto encouraged this revolution by placing the enclosures of the chief burghs beyond the jurisdiction of the counts. Within those precincts the bishops and the citizens were independent of all feudal masters but the emperor. He further broke the power of the great vassals by redivisions of their feuds, and by the creation of new marches which he assigned to his German followers. In this way, owing to the dislocation of the ancient aristocracy, to the enlarged jurisdiction of a power so democratic as the episcopate, and to the increased privileges of the burghs, feudalism received a powerful check in Italy. The Italian people, that people which gave to the world the commerce and the arts of Florence, was not indeed as yet apparent. But the conditions under which it could arise, casting from itself all foreign and feudal trammels, recognizing its true past in ancient Rome, and reconstructing a civility out of the ruins of those glorious memories, were now at last granted. The nobles from this time forward retired into the country and the mountains, fortified themselves in strong places outside the cities, and gave their best attention to fostering the rural population. Within the cities and upon the open lands the Italians, in this and the next century, doubled, trebled and quadrupled their numbers. A race was formed strong enough to keep the empire itself in check, strong enough, except for its own internecine contests, to have formed a nation equal to its happier neighbours.
The recent scandals of the papacy induced Otto to deprive the Romans of their right to elect popes. But when he died in 973, his son Otto II. (married to Theophano of the imperial Byzantine house) and his grandson, Otto III., who descended into Italy in 996, found that the affairs of Rome and of the southern provinces were more than even their imperial powers could cope with. The faction of the counts of Tusculum raised its head from time to time in the Eternal City, and Rome still claimed to be a commonwealth. Otto III.’s untimely death in 1002 introduced new discords. Rome fell once more into the hands of her nobles. The Lombards chose Ardoin, marquis of Ivrea, for king, and Pavia supported his claims against those of Henry of Bavaria, who had been elected in Germany. Milan sided with Henry; and this is perhaps the first eminent instance of cities being reckoned powerful allies in the Italian disputes of sovereigns. It is also the first instance of that bitter feud between the two great capitals of Lombardy, a feud rooted in ancient antipathies between the Roman population of Mediolanum and the Lombard garrison of Alboin’s successors, which proved so disastrous to the national cause. Ardoin retired to a monastery, where he died in 1015. Henry nearly destroyed Pavia, was crowned in Rome and died in 1024. After this event Heribert, the archbishop of Milan, invited Conrad, the Franconian king of Germany, into Italy, and crowned him with the iron crown of the kingdom.
The intervention of this man, Heribert, compels us to turn a closer glance upon the cities of North Italy. It is here, at the present epoch and for the next two centuries, that the pith and nerve of the Italian nation must be sought; and among the burghs of Lombardy, Milan, the eldest Heribert and the Lombard burghs. daughter of ancient Rome, assumes the lead. In Milan we hear for the first time the word Comune. In Milan the citizens first form themselves into a Parlamento. In Milan the archbishop organizes the hitherto voiceless, defenceless population into a community capable of expressing its needs, and an army ready to maintain its rights. To Heribert is attributed the invention of the Carroccio, which played so singular and important a part in the warfare of Italian cities. A huge car drawn by oxen, bearing the standard of the burgh, and carrying an altar with the host, this carroccio, like the ark of the Israelites, formed a rallying point in battle, and reminded the armed artisans that they had a city and a church to fight for. That Heribert’s device proved effectual in raising the spirit of his burghers, and consolidating them into a formidable band of warriors, is shown by the fact that it was speedily adopted in all the free cities. It must not, however, be supposed that at this epoch the liberties of the burghs were fully developed. The mass of the people remained unrepresented in the government; and even if the consuls existed in the days of Heribert, they were but humble legal officers, transacting business for their constituents in the courts of the bishop and his viscount. It still needed nearly a century of struggle to render the burghers independent of lordship, with a fully organized commune, self-governed in its several assemblies. While making these reservations, it is at the same time right to observe that certain Italian communities were more advanced upon the path of independence than others. This is specially the case with the maritime ports. Not to mention Venice, which has not yet entered the Italian community, and remains a Greek free city, Genoa and Pisa were rapidly rising into ill-defined autonomy. Their command of fleets gave them incontestable advantages, as when, for instance, Otto II. employed the Pisans in 980 against the Greeks in Lower Italy, and the Pisans and Genoese together attacked the Saracens of Sardinia in 1017. Still, speaking generally, the age of independence for the burghs had only begun when Heribert from Milan undertook the earliest organization of a force that was to become paramount in peace and war.
Next to Milan, and from the point of view of general politics even more than Milan, Rome now claims attention. The destinies of Italy depended upon the character which the see of St Peter should assume. Even the liberties of her republics in the north hung on the issue of a contest which Rome. in the 11th and 12th centuries shook Europe to its farthest boundaries. So fatally were the internal affairs of that magnificent but unhappy country bound up with concerns which brought the forces of the civilized world into play. Her ancient prestige, her geographical position and the intellectual primacy of her most noble children rendered Italy the battleground of principles that set all Christendom in motion, and by the clash of which she found herself for ever afterwards divided. During the reign of Conrad II., the party of the counts of Tusculum revived in Rome; and Crescentius, claiming the title of consul in the imperial city, sought once more to control the election of the popes. When Henry III., the son of Conrad, entered Italy in 1046, he found three popes in Rome. These he abolished, and, taking the appointment into his own hands, gave German bishops to the see. The policy thus initiated upon the precedent laid down by Otto the Great was a remedy for pressing evils. It saved Rome from becoming a duchy in the hands of the Tusculum house. But it neither raised the prestige of the papacy, nor could it satisfy the Italians, who rightly regarded the Roman see as theirs. These German popes were short-lived and inefficient. Their appointment, according to notions which defined themselves within the church at this epoch, was simoniacal; and during the long minority of Henry IV., who succeeded his father in 1056, the terrible Tuscan monk, Hildebrand of Soana, forged weapons which he used with deadly effect against the presumption of the empire. The condition of the church seemed desperate, unless it could be purged of crying scandals—of the subjection of the papacy to the great Roman nobles, of its subordination to the German emperor and of its internal demoralization. It was Hildebrand’s policy throughout three papacies, during which he controlled the counsels of the Vatican, and before he himself assumed the tiara, to prepare the mind of Italy and Europe for a mighty change. His programme included these three points: (1) the celibacy of the clergy; (2) the abolition of ecclesiastical appointments made by the secular authority; (3) the vesting of the papal election in the hands of the Roman clergy and people, presided over by the curia of cardinals. How Hildebrand paved the way for these reforms during the pontificates of Nicholas II. and Alexander II., how he succeeded in raising the papal office from the depths of degradation and subjection to illimitable sway over the minds of men in Europe, and how his warfare with the empire established on a solid basis the still doubtful independence of the Italian burghs, renewing the long neglected protectorate of the Italian race, and bequeathing to his successors a national policy which had been forgotten by the popes since his great predecessor Gregory II., forms a chapter in European history which must now be interrupted. We have to follow the fortunes of unexpected allies, upon whom in no small measure his success depended.
In order to maintain some thread of continuity through the
perplexed and tangled vicissitudes of the Italian race, it has been
necessary to disregard those provinces which did not
immediately contribute to the formation of its history.
For this reason we have left the whole of the south up
Norman conquest
of the Two Sicilies.
to the present point unnoticed. Sicily in the hands of
the Mussulmans, the Theme of Lombardy abandoned to
the weak suzerainty of the Greek catapans, the Lombard duchy
of Benevento slowly falling to pieces and the maritime republics
of Naples, Gaeta and Amalfi extending their influence by commerce
in the Mediterranean, were in effect detached from the
Italian regno, beyond the jurisidiction of Rome, included in no
parcel of Italy proper. But now the moment had arrived when
this vast group of provinces, forming the future kingdom of the
Two Sicilies, was about to enter definitely and decisively within
the bounds of the Italian community. Some Norman adventurers,
on pilgrimage to St Michael’s shrine on Monte Gargano, lent
their swords in 1017 to the Lombard cities of Apulia against the
Greeks. Twelve years later we find the Normans settled at
Aversa under their Count Rainulf. From this station as a centre
the little band of adventurers, playing the Greeks off against the
Lombards, and the Lombards against the Greeks, spread their
power in all directions, until they made themselves the most considerable
force in southern Italy. William of Hauteville was
proclaimed count of Apulia. His half-brother, Robert Wiskard
or Guiscard, after defeating the papal troops at Civitella in 1053,
received from Leo IX. the investiture of all present and future
conquests in Apulia, Calabria and Sicily, which he agreed to hold
as fiefs of the Holy See. Nicholas II. ratified this grant, and confirmed
the title of count. Having consolidated their possessions
on the mainland, the Normans, under Robert Guiscard’s brother,
the great Count Roger, undertook the conquest of Sicily in 1060.
After a prolonged struggle of thirty years, they wrested the
whole island from the Saracens; and Roger, dying in 1101,
bequeathed to his son Roger a kingdom in Calabria and Sicily
second to none in Europe for wealth and magnificence. This,
while the elder branch of the Hauteville family still held the title
and domains of the Apulian duchy; but in 1127, upon the death
of his cousin Duke William, Roger united the whole of the future
realm. In 1130 he assumed the style of king of Sicily, inscribing
upon his sword the famous hexameter—
This Norman conquest of the two Sicilies forms the most romantic episode in medieval Italian history. By the consolidation of Apulia, Calabria and Sicily into a powerful kingdom, by checking the growth of the maritime republics and by recognizing the over-lordship of the papal see, the house of Hauteville influenced the destinies of Italy with more effect than any of the princes who had previously dealt with any portion of the peninsula. Their kingdom, though Naples was from time to time separated from Sicily, never quite lost the cohesion they had given it; and all the disturbances of equilibrium in Italy were due in after days to papal manipulation of the rights acquired by Robert Guiscard’s act of homage. The southern regno, in the hands of the popes, proved an insurmountable obstacle to the unification of Italy, led to French interference in Italian affairs, introduced the Spaniard and maintained in those rich southern provinces the reality of feudal sovereignty long after this alien element had been eliminated from the rest of Italy (see Normans; Sicily: History).
For the sake of clearness, we have anticipated the course of events by nearly a century. We must now return to the date of Hildebrand’s elevation to the papacy in 1073, when he chose the memorable name of Gregory VII. In the next year after his election Hildebrand convened War of investitures. a council, and passed measures enforcing the celibacy of the clergy. In 1075 he caused the investiture of ecclesiastical dignitaries by secular potentates of any degree to be condemned. These two reforms, striking at the most cherished privileges and most deeply-rooted self-indulgences of the aristocratic caste in Europe, inflamed the bitterest hostility. Henry IV., king of Germany, but not crowned emperor, convened a diet in the following year at Worms, where Gregory was deposed and excommunicated. The pope followed with a counter excommunication, far more formidable, releasing the king’s subjects from their oaths of allegiance. War was thus declared between the two chiefs of western Christendom, that war of investitures which out-lasted the lives of both Gregory and Henry, and was not terminated till the year 1122. The dramatic episodes of this struggle are too well known to be enlarged upon. In his single-handed duel with the strength of Germany, Gregory received material assistance from the Countess Matilda of Tuscany. She was the last heiress of the great house of Canossa, whose fiefs stretched from Mantua across Lombardy, passed the Apennines, included the Tuscan plains, and embraced a portion of the duchy of Spoleto. It was in her castle of Canossa that Henry IV. performed his three days’ penance in the winter of 1077; and there she made the cession of her vast domains to the church. That cession, renewed after the death of Gregory to his successors, conferred upon the popes indefinite rights, of which they afterwards availed themselves in the consolidation of their temporal power. Matilda died in the year 1115. Gregory had passed before her from the scene of his contest, an exile at Salerno, whither Robert Guiscard carried him in 1084 from the anarchy of rebellious Rome. With unbroken spirit, though the objects of his life were unattained, though Italy and Europe had been thrown into confusion, and the issue of the conflict was still doubtful, Gregory expired in 1085 with these words on his lips: “I loved justice, I hated iniquity, therefore in banishment I die.”
The greatest of the popes thus breathed his last; but the new spirit he had communicated to the papacy was not destined to expire with him. Gregory’s immediate successors, Victor III., Urban II. and Paschal II., carried on his struggle with Henry IV. and his imperial antipopes, encouraging the emperor’s son to rebel against him, and stirring up Europe for the first crusade. When Henry IV. died, his own son’s prisoner, in 1106, Henry V. crossed the Alps, entered Rome, wrung the imperial coronation from Paschal II. and compelled the pope to grant his claims on the investitures. Scarcely had he returned to Germany when the Lateran disavowed all that the pope had done, on the score that it had been extorted by force. France sided with the church. Germany rejected the bull of investiture. A new descent into Italy, a new seizure of Rome, proved of no avail. The emperor’s real weakness was in Germany, where his subjects openly expressed their discontent. He at last abandoned the contest which had distracted Europe. By the concordat of Worms, 1122, the emperor surrendered the right of investiture by ring and staff, and granted the right of election to the clergy. The popes were henceforth to be chosen by the cardinals, the bishops by the chapters subject to the pope’s approval. On the other hand the pope ceded to the emperor the right of investiture by the sceptre. But the main issue of the struggle was not in these details of ecclesiastical government; principles had been at stake far deeper and more widely reaching. The respective relations of pope and emperor, ill-defined in the compact between Charles the Great and Leo III., were brought in question, and the two chief potentates of Christendom, no longer tacitly concordant, stood against each other in irreconcilable rivalry. Upon this point, though the battle seemed to be a drawn one, the popes were really victors. They remained independent of the emperor, but the emperor had still to seek the crown at their hands. The pretensions of Otto the Great and Henry III. to make popes were gone for ever (see Papacy; Investiture).
IV. Age of the Communes.—The final gainers, however, by the
war of investitures were the Italians. In the first place, from
this time forward, owing to the election of popes by
the Roman curia, the Holy See remained in the hands
of Italians; and this, though it was by no means an
Rise of
free cities.
unmixed good, was a great glory to the nation. In the
next place, the antagonism of the popes to the emperors, which
became hereditary in the Holy College, forced the former to
assume the protectorate of the national cause. But by far the
greatest profit the Italians reaped was the emancipation of their
burghs. During the forty-seven years’ war, when pope and
emperor were respectively bidding for their alliance, and offering
concessions to secure their support, the communes grew in
self-reliance, strength and liberty. As the bishops had helped
to free them from subservience to their feudal masters, so the
war of investitures relieved them of dependence on their bishops.
The age of real autonomy, signalized by the supremacy of consuls
in the cities, had arrived.
In the republics, as we begin to know them after the war of investitures, government was carried on by officers called consuls, varying in number according to custom and according to the division of the town into districts. These magistrates, as we have already seen, were originally appointed to control and protect the humbler classes. But, in proportion as the people gained more power in the field the consuls rose into importance, superseded the bishops and began to represent the city in transactions with its neighbours. Popes and emperors who needed the assistance of a city, had to seek it from the consuls, and thus these officers gradually converted an obscure and indefinite authority into what resembles the presidency of a commonwealth. They were supported by a deliberative assembly, called credenza, chosen from the more distinguished citizens. In addition to this privy council, we find a gran consiglio, consisting of the burghers who had established the right to interfere immediately in public affairs, and a still larger assembly called parlamento, which included the whole adult population. Though the institutions of the communes varied in different localities, this is the type to which they all approximated. It will be perceived that the type was rather oligarchical than strictly democratic. Between the parlamento and the consuls with their privy council, or credenza, was interposed the gran consiglio of privileged burghers. These formed the aristocracy of the town, who by their wealth and birth held its affairs within their custody. There is good reason to believe that, when the term popolo occurs, it refers to this body and not to the whole mass of the population. The comune included the entire city—bishop, consuls, oligarchy, councils, handicraftsmen, proletariate. The popolo was the governing or upper class. It was almost inevitable in the transition from feudalism to democracy that this intermediate ground should be traversed; and the peculiar Italian phrases, primo popolo, secondo popolo, terzo popolo, and so forth, indicate successive changes, whereby the oligarchy passed from one stage to another in its progress toward absorption in democracy or tyranny.
Under their consuls the Italian burghs rose to a great height of prosperity and splendour. Pisa built her Duomo. Milan undertook the irrigation works which enriched the soil of Lombardy for ever. Massive walls, substantial edifices, commodious seaports, good roads, were the benefits conferred by this new government on Italy. It is also to be noticed that the people now began to be conscious of their past. They recognized the fact that their blood was Latin as distinguished from Teutonic, and that they must look to ancient Rome for those memories which constitute a people’s nationality. At this epoch the study of Roman law received a new impulse, and this is the real meaning of the legend that Pisa, glorious through her consuls, brought the pandects in a single codex from Amalfi. The very name consul, no less than the Romanizing character of the best architecture of the time, points to the same revival of antiquity.
The rise of the Lombard communes produced a sympathetic
revolution in Rome, which deserves to be mentioned in this place.
A monk, named Arnold of Brescia, animated with the
spirit of the Milanese, stirred up the Romans to shake
off the temporal sway of their bishop. He attempted,
Republic
in Rome.
in fact, upon a grand scale what was being slowly and quietly
effected in the northern cities. Rome, ever mindful of her
unique past, listened to Arnold’s preaching. A senate was
established, and the republic was proclaimed. The title of
patrician was revived and offered to Conrad, king of Italy, but
not crowned emperor. Conrad refused it, and the Romans
conferred it upon one of their own nobles. Though these institutions
borrowed high-sounding titles from antiquity, they were
in reality imitations of the Lombard civic system. The patrician
stood for the consuls. The senate, composed of nobles, represented
the credenza and the gran consiglio. The pope was
unable to check this revolution, which is now chiefly interesting
as further proof of the insurgence of the Latin as against the
feudal elements in Italy at this period (see Rome: History).
Though the communes gained so much by the war of investitures, the division of the country between the pope’s and emperor’s parties was no small price to pay for independence. It inflicted upon Italy the ineradicable curse of party-warfare, setting city against city, house Municipal wars. against house, and rendering concordant action for a national end impossible. No sooner had the compromise of the investitures been concluded than it was manifest that the burghers of the new enfranchised communes were resolved to turn their arms against each other. We seek in vain an obvious motive for each separate quarrel. All we know for certain is that, at this epoch, Rome attempts to ruin Tivoli, and Venice Pisa; Milan fights with Cremona, Cremona with Crema, Pavia with Verona, Verona with Padua, Piacenza with Parma, Modena and Reggio with Bologna, Bologna and Faenza with Ravenna and Imola, Florence and Pisa with Lucca and Siena, and so on through the whole list of cities. The nearer the neighbours, the more rancorous and internecine is the strife; and, as in all cases where animosity is deadly and no grave local causes of dispute are apparent, we are bound to conclude that some deeply-seated permanent uneasiness goaded these fast growing communities into rivalry. Italy was, in fact, too small for her children. As the towns expanded, they perceived that they must mutually exclude each other. They fought for bare existence, for primacy in commerce, for the command of seaports, for the keys of mountain passes, for rivers, roads and all the avenues of wealth and plenty. The pope’s cause and the emperor’s cause were of comparatively little moment to Italian burghers; and the names of Guelph and Ghibelline, which before long began to be heard in every street, on every market-place, had no meaning for them. These watchwords are said to have arisen in Germany during the disputed succession of the empire between 1135 and 1152, when the Welfs of Bavaria opposed the Swabian princes of Waiblingen origin. But in Italy, although they were severally identified with the papal and imperial parties, they really served as symbols for jealousies which altered in complexion from time to time and place to place, expressing more than antagonistic political principles, and involving differences vital enough to split the social fabric to its foundation.
Under the imperial rule of Lothar the Saxon (1125–1137) and
Conrad the Swabian (1138–1152), these civil wars increased
in violence owing to the absence of authority. Neither
Lothar nor Conrad was strong at home; the former
had no influence in Italy, and the latter never entered
Swabian emperors.
Frederick Barbarossa and the Lombard cities.
Italy at all. But when Conrad died, the electors chose his
nephew Frederick, surnamed Barbarossa, who united the rival
honours of Welf and Waiblingen, to succeed him; and it was
soon obvious that the empire had a master powerful
of brain and firm of will. Frederick immediately
determined to reassert the imperial rights in his
southern provinces, and to check the warfare of the
burghs. When he first crossed the Alps in 1154,
Lombardy was, roughly speaking, divided between two parties,
the one headed by Pavia professing loyalty to the empire,
the other headed by Milan ready to oppose its claims. The
municipal animosities of the last quarter of a century gave
substance to these factions; yet neither the imperial nor the
anti-imperial party had any real community of interest with
Frederick. He came to supersede self-government by consuls,
to deprive the cities of the privilege of making war on their own
account and to extort his regalian rights of forage, food and
lodging for his armies. It was only the habit of inter-urban
jealousy which prevented the communes from at once combining
to resist demands which threatened their liberty of action, and
would leave them passive at the pleasure of a foreign master.
The diet was opened at Roncaglia near Piacenza, where Frederick
listened to the complaints of Como and Lodi against Milan, of
Pavia against Tortona and of the marquis of Montferrat against
Asti and Chieri. The plaintiffs in each case were imperialists;
and Frederick’s first action was to redress their supposed grievances.
He laid waste Chieri, Asti and Tortona, then took the
Lombard crown at Pavia, and, reserving Milan for a future day,
passed southward to Rome. Outside the gates of Rome he was
met by a deputation from the senate he had come to supersede,
who addressed him in words memorable for expressing the
republican spirit of new Italy face to face with autocratic
feudalism: “Thou wast a stranger, I have made thee a citizen”;
it is Rome who speaks: “Thou earnest as an alien from beyond
the Alps, I have conferred on thee the principality.” Moved
only to scorn and indignation by the rhetoric of these presumptuous
enthusiasts, Frederick marched into the Leonine city, and
took the imperial crown from the hands of Adrian IV. In return
for this compliance, the emperor delivered over to the pope his
troublesome rival Arnold of Brescia, who was burned alive by
Nicholas Breakspear, the only English successor of St Peter.
The gates of Rome itself were shut against Frederick; and even
on this first occasion his good understanding with Adrian began
to suffer. The points of dispute between them related mainly
to Matilda’s bequest, and to the kingdom of Sicily, which the
pope had rendered independent of the empire by renewing its
investiture in the name of the Holy See. In truth, the papacy
and the empire had become irreconcilable. Each claimed
illimitable authority, and neither was content to abide within
such limits as would have secured a mutual tolerance. Having
obtained his coronation, Frederick withdrew to Germany, while
Milan prepared herself against the storm which threatened.
In the ensuing struggle with the empire, that great city rose to
the altitude of patriotic heroism. By their sufferings no less
than by their deeds of daring, her citizens showed themselves to
be sublime, devoted and disinterested, winning the purest
laurels which give lustre to Italian story. Almost in Frederick’s
presence, they rebuilt Tortona, punished Pavia, Lodi, Cremona
and the marquis of Montferrat. Then they fortified the Adda
and Ticino, and waited for the emperor’s next descent. He
came in 1158 with a large army, overran Lombardy, raised his
imperial allies, and sat down before the walls of Milan. Famine
forced the burghers to partial obedience, and Frederick held a
victorious diet at Roncaglia. Here the jurists of Bologna
appeared, armed with their new lore of Roman law, and expounded
Justinian’s code in the interests of the German empire.
It was now seen how the absolutist doctrines of autocracy
developed in Justinian’s age at Byzantium would bear fruits in
the development of an imperial idea, which was destined to be
the fatal mirage of medieval Italy. Frederick placed judges of
his own appointment, with the title of podestà, in all the Lombard
communes; and this stretch of his authority, while it exacerbated
his foes, forced even his friends to join their ranks against
him. The war, meanwhile, dragged on. Crema yielded after an
heroic siege in 1160, and was abandoned to the cruelty of its
fierce rival Cremona. Milan was invested in 1161, starved into
capitulation after nine months’ resistance, and given up to total
destruction by the Italian imperialists of Frederick’s army,
so stained and tarnished with the vindictive passions of municipal
rivalry was even this, the one great glorious strife of Italian
annals. Having ruined his rebellious city, but not tamed her
spirit, Frederick withdrew across the Alps. But, in the interval
between his second and third visit, a league was formed against
him in north-eastern Lombardy. Verona, Vicenza, Padua,
Treviso, Venice entered into a compact to defend their liberties;
and when he came again in 1163 with a brilliant staff of German
knights, the imperial cities refused to join his standards. This
was the first and ominous sign of a coming change.
Meanwhile the election of Alexander III. to the papacy in 1159 added a powerful ally to the republican party. Opposed by an anti-pope whom the emperor favoured, Alexander found it was his truest policy to rely for support upon the anti-imperialist communes. They in return gladly accepted a champion who lent them the prestige and influence of the church. When Frederick once more crossed the Alps in 1166, he advanced on Rome, and besieged Alexander in the Coliseum. But the affairs of Lombardy left him no leisure to persecute a recalcitrant pontiff. In April 1167 a new league was formed between Cremona, Bergamo, Brescia, Mantua and Ferrara. In December of the same year this league allied itself with the elder Veronese league, and received the addition of Milan, Lodi, Piacenza, Parma, Modena and Bologna. The famous league of Lombard cities, styled Concordia in its acts of settlement, was now established. Novara, Vercelli, Asti and Tortona swelled its Lombard League. ranks; only Pavia and Montferrat remained imperialist between the Alps and Apennines. Frederick fled for his life by the Mont Cenis, and in 1168 the town of Alessandria was erected to keep Pavia and the marquisate in check. In the emperor’s absence, Ravenna, Rimini, Imola and Forli joined the league, which now called itself the “Society of Venice, Lombardy, the March, Romagna and Alessandria.” For the fifth time, in 1174, Frederick entered his rebellious dominions. The fortress town of Alessandria stopped his progress with those mud walls contemptuously named “of straw,” while the forces of the league assembled at Modena and obliged him to raise the siege. In the spring of 1176 Frederick threatened Milan. His army found itself a little to the north of the town near the village of Legnano, when the troops of the city, assisted only by a few allies from Piacenza, Verona, Brescia, Novara and Vercelli, met and overwhelmed it. The victory was complete. Frederick escaped alone to Pavia, whence he opened negotiations with Alexander. In consequence of these transactions, he was suffered to betake himself unharmed to Venice. Here, as upon neutral ground, the emperor met the pope, and a truce for six years was concluded with the Lombard burghs. Looking back from the vantage-ground of history upon the issue of this long struggle, we are struck with the small results which satisfied the Lombard communes. They had humbled and utterly defeated their foreign lord. They had proved their strength in combination. Yet neither the acts by which their league was ratified nor the terms negotiated for them by their patron Alexander evince the smallest desire of what we now understand as national independence. The name of Italy is never mentioned. The supremacy of the emperor is not called in question. The conception of a permanent confederation, bound together in offensive and defensive alliance for common objects, has not occurred to these hard fighters and stubborn asserters of their civic privileges. All they claim is municipal autonomy; the right to manage their own affairs within the city walls, to fight their battles as they choose, and to follow their several ends unchecked. It is vain to lament that, when they might have now established Italian independence upon a secure basis, they chose local and municipal privileges. Their mutual jealousies, combined with the prestige of the empire, and possibly with the selfishness of the pope, who had secured his own position, and was not likely to foster a national spirit that would have threatened the ecclesiastical supremacy, deprived the Italians of the only great opportunity they ever had of forming themselves into a powerful nation.
When the truce expired in 1183, a permanent peace was ratified at Constance. The intervening years had been spent by the Lombards, not in consolidating their union, but in attempting to secure special privileges for their several cities. Alessandria della Paglia, glorious by Peace of Constance. her resistance to the emperor in 1174, had even changed her name to Cesarea! The signatories of the peace of Constance were divided between leaguers and imperialists. On the one side we find Vercelli, Novara, Milan, Lodi, Bergamo, Brescia, Mantua, Verona, Vicenza, Padua, Treviso, Bologna, Faenza, Modena, Reggio, Parma, Piacenza; on the other, Pavia, Genoa, Alba, Cremona, Como, Tortona, Asti, Cesarea. Venice, who had not yet entered the Italian community, is conspicuous by her absence. According to the terms of this treaty, the communes were confirmed in their right of self-government by consuls, and their right of warfare. The emperor retained the supreme courts of appeal within the cities, and his claim for sustenance at their expense when he came into Italy.
The privileges confirmed to the Lombard cities by the peace of Constance were extended to Tuscany, where Florence, having ruined Fiesole, had begun her career of freedom and prosperity. The next great chapter in the history of Italian evolution is the war of the burghs against the War of cities against nobles. nobles. The consular cities were everywhere surrounded by castles; and, though the feudal lords had been weakened by the events of the preceding centuries, they continued to be formidable enemies. It was, for instance, necessary to the well-being of the towns that they should possess territory round their walls, and this had to be wrested from the nobles. We cannot linger over the details of this warfare. It must suffice to say that, partly by mortgaging their property to rich burghers, partly by entering the service of the cities as condottieri (mercenary leaders), partly by espousing the cause of one town against another, and partly by forced submission after the siege of their strong places, the counts were gradually brought into connexion of dependence on the communes. These, in their turn, forced the nobles to leave their castles, and to reside for at least a portion of each year within the walls. By these measures the counts became citizens, the rural population ceased to rank as serfs, and the Italo-Roman population of the towns absorbed into itself the remnants of Franks, Germans and other foreign stocks. It would be impossible to exaggerate the importance of this revolution, which ended by destroying the last vestige of feudality, and prepared that common Italian people which afterwards distinguished itself by the creation of European culture. But, like all the vicissitudes, of the Italian race, while it was a decided step forward in one direction, it introduced a new source of discord. The associated nobles proved ill neighbours to the peaceable citizens. They fortified their houses, retained their military habits, defied the consuls, and carried on feuds in the streets and squares. The war against the castles became a war against the palaces; and the system of government by consuls proved inefficient to control the clashing elements within the state. This led to the establishment of podestàs, who represented a compromise between two radically hostile parties in the city, and whose business it was to arbitrate and keep the peace between them. Invariably a foreigner, elected for a year with power of life and death and control of the armed force, but subject to a strict account at the expiration of his office, the podestà might be compared to a dictator invested with limited authority. His title was derived from that of Frederick Barbarossa’s judges; but he had no dependence on the empire. The citizens chose him, and voluntarily submitted to his rule. The podestà marks an essentially transitional state in civic government, and his intervention paved the way for despotism.
The thirty years which elapsed between Frederick Barbarossa’s death in 1190 and the coronation of his grandson Frederick II. in 1220 form one of the most momentous epochs in Italian history. Barbarossa, perceiving the advantage that would accrue to his house if he could join the Innocent III. crown of Sicily to that of Germany, and thus deprive the popes of their allies in Lower Italy, procured the marriage of his son Henry VI. to Constance, daughter of King Roger, and heiress of the Hauteville dynasty. When William II., the last monarch of the Norman race, died, Henry VI. claimed that kingdom in his wife’s right, and was recognized in 1194. Three years afterwards he died, leaving a son, Frederick, to the care of Constance, who in her turn died in 1198, bequeathing the young prince, already crowned king of Germany, to the guardianship of Innocent III. It was bold policy to confide Frederick to his greatest enemy and rival; but the pope honourably discharged his duty, until his ward outgrew the years of tutelage, and became a fair mark for ecclesiastical hostility. Frederick’s long minority was occupied by Innocent’s pontificate. Among the principal events of that reign must be reckoned the foundation of the two orders, Franciscan and Dominican, who were destined to form a militia for the holy see in conflict with the empire and the heretics of Lombardy. A second great event was the fourth crusade, undertaken in 1198, which established the naval and commercial supremacy of the Italians in the Mediterranean. The Venetians, who contracted for the transport of the crusaders, and whose blind doge Dandolo was first to land in Constantinople, received one-half and one-fourth of the divided Greek empire for their spoils. The Venetian ascendancy in the Levant dates from this epoch; for, though the republic had no power to occupy all the domains ceded to it, Candia was taken, together with several small islands and stations on the mainland. The formation of a Latin empire in the East increased the pope’s prestige; while at home it was his policy to organize Countess Matilda’s heritage by the formation of Guelph leagues, over which he presided. This is the meaning of the three leagues, in the March, in the duchy of Spoleto and in Tuscany, which now combined the chief cities of the papal territory into allies of the holy see. From the Tuscan league Pisa, consistently Ghibelline, stood aloof. Rome itself again at this epoch established a republic, with which Innocent would not or could not interfere. The thirteen districts in their council nominated four caporioni, who acted in concert with a senator, appointed, like the podestà of other cities, for supreme judicial functions. Meanwhile the Guelph and Ghibelline factions were beginning to divide Italy into minute parcels. Not only did commune range itself against commune under the two rival flags, but party rose up against party within the city walls. The introduction of the factions into Florence in 1215, owing to a private quarrel between the Buondelmonti, Amidei and Donati, is a celebrated instance of what was happening in every burgh.
Frederick II. was left without a rival for the imperial throne in 1218 by the death of Otto IV., and on the 22nd of November 1220, Honorius III., Innocent’s successor, crowned him in Rome. It was impossible for any section of the Italians to mistake the gravity of his access to power. Frederick II. Emperor. In his single person he combined the prestige of empire with the crowns of Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Germany and Burgundy; and in 1225, by marriage with Yolande de Brienne, he added that of Jerusalem. There was no prince greater or more formidable in the habitable globe. The communes, no less than the popes, felt that they must prepare themselves for contest to the death with a power which threatened their existence. Already in 1218, the Guelphs of Lombardy had resuscitated their old league, and had been defeated by the Ghibellines in a battle near Ghibello. Italy seemed to lie prostrate before the emperor, who commanded her for the first time from the south as well as from the north. In 1227 Frederick, who had promised to lead a crusade, was excommunicated by Gregory IX. because he was obliged by illness to defer his undertaking; and thus the spiritual power declared war upon its rival. The Guelph towns of Lombardy again raised their levies. Frederick enlisted his Saracen troops at Nocera and Luceria, and appointed the terrible Ezzelino da Romano his vicar in the Marches of Verona to quell their insurrection. It was 1236, however, before he was able to take the field himself against the Lombards. Having established Ezzelino in Verona, Vicenza and Padua, he defeated the Milanese and their allies at Cortenuova in 1237, and sent their carroccio as a trophy of his victory to Rome. Gregory IX. feared lest the Guelph party would be ruined by this check. He therefore made alliance with Venice and Genoa, fulminated a new excommunication against Frederick, and convoked a council at Rome to ratify his ban in 1241. The Genoese undertook to bring the French bishops to this council. Their fleet was attacked at Meloria by the Pisans, and utterly defeated. The French prelates went in silver chains to prison in the Ghibelline capital of Tuscany. So far Frederick had been successful at all points. In 1243 a new pope, Innocent IV., was elected, who prosecuted the war with still bitterer spirit. Forced to fly to France, he there, at Lyons, in 1245, convened a council, which enforced his condemnation of the emperor. Frederick’s subjects were freed from their allegiance, and he was declared dethroned and deprived of all rights. Five times king and emperor as he was, Frederick, placed under the ban of the church, led henceforth a doomed existence. The mendicant monks stirred up the populace to acts of fanatical enmity. To plot against him, to attempt his life by poison or the sword, was accounted virtuous. His secretary, Piero delle Vigne, was wrongly suspected of conspiring. The crimes of his vicar Ezzelino, who laid whole provinces waste and murdered men by thousands in his Paduan prisons, increased the horror with which he was regarded. Parma revolted from him, and he spent months in 1247–1248 vainly trying to reduce this one time faithful city. The only gleam of success which shone on his ill fortune was the revolution which placed Florence in the hands of the Ghibellines in 1248. Next year Bologna rose against him, defeated his troops and took his son Enzio, king of Sardinia, prisoner at Fossalta. Hunted to the ground and broken-hearted, Frederick expired at the end of 1250 in his Apulian castle of Fiorentino. It is difficult to judge his career with fairness. The only prince who could, with any probability of success, have established the German rule in Italy, his ruin proved the impossibility of that long-cherished scheme. The nation had outgrown dependence upon foreigners, and after his death no German emperor interfered with anything but miserable failure in Italian affairs. Yet from many points of view it might be regretted that Frederick was not suffered to rule Italy. By birth and breeding an Italian, highly gifted and widely cultivated, liberal in his opinions, a patron of literature, a founder of universities, he anticipated the spirit of the Renaissance. At his court Italian started into being as a language. His laws were wise. He was capable of giving to Italy a large and noble culture. But the commanding greatness of his position proved his ruin. Emperor and king of Sicily, he was the natural enemy of popes, who could not tolerate so overwhelming a rival.
After Frederick’s death, the popes carried on their war for eighteen years against his descendants. The cause of his son Conrad was sustained in Lower Italy by Manfred, one of Frederick’s many natural children; and, when Conrad died in 1254, Manfred still acted as vicegerent Papal war against Frederick’s successors. for the Swabians, who were now represented by a boy Conradin. Innocent IV. and Alexander IV. continued to make head against the Ghibelline party. The most dramatic incident in this struggle was the crusade preached against Ezzelino. This tyrant had made himself justly odious; and when he was hunted to death in 1259, the triumph was less for the Guelph cause than for humanity outraged by the iniquities of such a monster. The battle between Guelph and Ghibelline raged with unintermitting fury. While the former faction gained in Lombardy by the massacre of Ezzelino, the latter revived in Tuscany after the battle of Montaperti, which in 1260 placed Florence at the discretion of the Ghibellines. Manfred, now called king of Sicily, headed the Ghibellines, and there was no strong counterpoise against him. In this necessity Urban IV. and Clement IV. invited Charles of Anjou to enter Italy and take the Guelph command. They made him senator of Rome and vicar of Tuscany, and promised him the investiture of the regno provided he stipulated that it should not be held in combination with the empire. Charles accepted these terms, and was welcomed by the Guelph party as their chief throughout Italy. He defeated Manfred in a battle at Grandella near Benevento in 1266. Manfred was killed; and, when Conradin, a lad of sixteen, descended from Germany to make good his claims to the kingdom, he too was defeated at Tagliacozzo in 1267. Less lucky than his uncle, Conradin escaped with his life, to die upon a scaffold at Naples. His glove was carried to his cousin Constance, wife of Peter of Aragon, the last of the great Norman-Swabian family. Enzio died in his prison four years later. The popes had been successful; but they had purchased their bloody victory at a great cost. This first invitation to French princes brought with it incalculable evils.
Charles of Anjou, supported by Rome, and recognized as chief in Tuscany, was by far the most formidable of the Italian potentates. In his turn he now excited the jealousy of the popes, who began, though cautiously, to cast their weight into the Ghibelline scale. Gregory initiated the policy of establishing Civil War of Guelphs and Ghibellines. an equilibrium between the parties, which was carried out by his successor Nicholas III. Charles was forced to resign the senatorship of Rome and the signoria of Lombardy and Tuscany. In 1282 he received a more decided check, when Sicily rose against him in the famous rebellion of the Vespers. He lost the island, which gave itself to Aragon; and thus the kingdom of Sicily was severed from that of Naples, the dynasty in the one being Spanish and Ghibelline, in the other French and Guelph. Meanwhile a new emperor had been elected, the prudent Rudolf of Habsburg, who abstained from interference with Italy, and who confirmed the territorial pretensions of the popes by solemn charter in 1278. Henceforth Emilia, Romagna, the March of Ancona, the patrimony of St Peter and the Campagna of Rome held of the Holy See, and not of the empire. The imperial chancery, without inquiring closely into the deeds furnished by the papal curia, made a deed of gift, which placed the pope in the position of a temporal sovereign. While Nicholas III. thus bettered the position of the church in Italy, the Guelph party grew stronger than ever, through the crushing defeat of the Pisans by the Genoese at Meloria in 1284. Pisa, who had ruined Amalfi, was now ruined by Genoa. She never held her head so high again after this victory, which sent her best and bravest citizens to die in the Ligurian dungeons. The Mediterranean was left to be fought for by Genoa and Venice, while Guelph Florence grew still more powerful in Tuscany. Not long after the battle of Meloria Charles of Anjou died, and was succeeded by his son Charles II. of Naples, who played no prominent part in Italian affairs. The Guelph party was held together with a less tight hand even in cities so consistent as Florence. Here in the year 1300 new factions, subdividing the old Guelphs and Ghibellines under the names of Neri and Bianchi, had acquired such force that Boniface VIII., a violently Guelph pope, called in Charles of Valois to pacify the republic and undertake the charge of Italian affairs. Boniface was a passionate and unwise man. After quarrelling with the French king, Philip le Bel, he fell into the hands of the Colonna family at Anagni, and died, either of the violence he there received or of mortification, in October 1303.
After the short papacy of Benedict XI. a Frenchman, Clement V., was elected, and the seat of the papacy was transferred to Avignon. Thus began that Babylonian exile of the popes which placed them in subjection to the French crown and ruined their prestige in Italy. Lasting Translation of the Papacy to Avignon. seventy years, and joining on to the sixty years of the Great Schism, this enfeeblement of the papal authority, coinciding as it did with the practical elimination of the empire from Italian affairs, gave a long period of comparative independence to the nation. Nor must it be forgotten that this exile was due to the policy which induced the pontiffs, in their detestation of Ghibellinism, to rely successively upon the houses of Anjou and of Valois. This policy it was which justified Dante’s fierce epigram—the puttaneggiar co regi.
The period we have briefly traversed was immortalized by Dante in an epic which from one point of view might be called the poem of the Guelphs and Ghibellines. From the foregoing bare narration of events it is impossible to estimate the importance of these parties, or to understand their bearing on subsequent Italian history. We are therefore forced to pause awhile, and probe beneath the surface. The civil wars may be regarded as a continuation of the previous municipal struggle, intensified by recent hostilities between the burghers and the nobles. The quarrels of the church and empire lend pretexts and furnish war-cries; but the real question at issue is not the supremacy of pope or emperor. The conflict is a social one, between civic and feudal institutions, between commercial and military interests, between progress and conservatism. Guelph democracy and industry idealize the pope. The banner of the church waves above the camp of those who aim at positive prosperity and republican equality. Ghibelline aristocracy and immobility idealize the emperor. The prestige of the empire, based upon Roman law and feudal tradition, attracts imaginative patriots and systematic thinkers. The two ideals are counterposed and mutually exclusive. No city calls itself either Guelph or Ghibelline till it has expelled one-half of its inhabitants; for each party is resolved to constitute the state according to its own conception, and the affirmation of the one programme is the negation of the other. The Ghibelline honestly believes that the Guelphs will reduce society to chaos. The Guelph is persuaded that the Ghibellines will annihilate freedom and strangle commerce. The struggle is waged by two sets of men who equally love their city, but who would fain rule it upon diametrically opposite principles, and who fight to the death for its possession. This contradiction enters into the minutest details of life—armorial bearings, clothes, habits at table, symbolize and accentuate the difference. Meanwhile each party forms its own organization of chiefs, finance-officers and registrars at home, and sends ambassadors to foreign cities of the same complexion. A network of party policy embraces and dominates the burghs of Italy, bringing the most distant centres into relation, and by the very division of the country augmenting the sense of nationality. The Italians learn through their discords at this epoch that they form one community. The victory in the conflict practically falls to the hitherto unenfranchised plebeians. The elder noble families die out or lose their preponderance. In some cities, as notably in Florence after the date 1292, it becomes criminal to be scioperato, or unemployed in industry. New houses rise into importance; a new commercial aristocracy is formed. Burghers of all denominations are enrolled in one or other of the arts or gilds, and these trading companies furnish the material from which the government or signoria of the city is composed. Plebeian handicrafts assert their right to be represented on an equality with learned professions and wealthy corporations. The ancient classes are confounded and obliterated in a population more homogeneous, more adapted for democracy and despotism.
In addition to the parliament and the councils which have been already enumerated, we now find a council of the party established within the city. This body tends to become a little state within the state, and, by controlling the victorious majority, disposes of the New constitution of the free cities. government as it thinks best. The consuls are merged in ancients or priors, chosen from the arts. A new magistrate, the gonfalonier of justice, appears in some of the Guelph cities, with the special duty of keeping the insolence of the nobility in check. Meanwhile the podestà still subsists; but he is no longer equal to the task of maintaining an equilibrium of forces. He sinks more and more into a judge, loses more and more the character of dictator. His ancient place is now occupied by a new functionary, no longer acting as arbiter, but concentrating the forces of the triumphant party. The captain of the people, acting as head of the ascendant Guelphs or Ghibellines, undertakes the responsibility of proscriptions, decides on questions of policy, forms alliances, declares war. Like all officers created to meet an emergency, the limitations to his power are ill-defined, and he is often little better than an autocrat.
V. Age of the Despots.—Thus the Italians, during the heat of the civil wars, were ostensibly divided between partisans of the empire and partisans of the church. After the death of Frederick II. their affairs were managed by Manfred and by Charles of Anjou, the supreme captains of Origin of Tyrannies. the parties, under whose orders acted the captains of the people in each city. The contest being carried on by warfare, it followed that these captains in the burghs were chosen on account of military skill; and, since the nobles were men of arms by profession, members of ancient houses took the lead again in towns where they had been absorbed into the bourgeoisie. In this way, after the downfall of the Ezzelini of Romano, the Della Scala dynasty arose in Verona, and the Carraresi in Padua. The Estensi made themselves lords of Ferrara; the Torriani headed the Guelphs of Milan. At Ravenna we find the Polenta family, at Rimini the Malatestas, at Parma the Rossi, at Piacenza the Scotti, at Faenza the Manfredi. There is not a burgh of northern Italy but can trace the rise of a dynastic house to the vicissitudes of this period. In Tuscany, where the Guelph party was very strongly organized, and the commercial constitution of Florence kept the nobility in check, the communes remained as yet free from hereditary masters. Yet generals from time to time arose, the Conte Ugolino della Gheradesca at Pisa, Uguccione della Faggiuola at Lucca, the Conte Guido di Montefeltro at Florence, who threatened the liberties of Tuscan cities with military despotism.
Left to themselves by absentee emperors and exiled popes, the Italians pursued their own course of development unchecked. After the commencement of the 14th century, the civil wars decreased in fury, and at the same time it was perceived that their effect had been to confirm tyrants in their grasp upon free cities. Growing up out of the captain of the people or signore of the commune, the tyrant annihilated both parties for his own profit and for the peace of the state. He used the dictatorial powers with which he was invested to place himself above the law, resuming in his person the state-machinery which had preceded him. In him, for the first time, the city attained self-consciousness; the blindly working forces of previous revolutions were combined in the will of a ruler. The tyrant’s general policy was to favour the multitude at the expense of his own caste. He won favour by these means, and completed the levelling down of classes, which had been proceeding ever since the emergence of the communes.
In 1309 Robert, grandson of Charles, the first Angevine sovereign, succeeded to the throne of Naples, and became the leader of the Guelphs in Italy. In the next year Henry VII. of Luxembourg crossed the Alps soon after his election to the empire, and raised the hopes of the Decline of civil wars. Advent of the bourgeoisie. Ghibellines. Dante from his mountain solitudes passionately called upon him to play the part of a Messiah. But it was now impossible for any German to control the “Garden of the Empire.” Italy had entered on a new phase of her existence, and the great poet’s De monarchia represented a dream of the past which could not be realized. Henry established imperial vicars in the Lombard towns, confirming the tyrants, but gaining nothing for the empire in exchange for the titles he conferred. After receiving the crown in Rome, he died at Buonconvento, a little walled town south of Siena, on his backward journey in 1313. The profits of his inroad were reaped by despots, who used the Ghibelline prestige for the consolidation of their own power. It is from this epoch that the supremacy of the Visconti, hitherto the unsuccessful rivals of the Guelphic Torriani for the signory of Milan, dates. The Scaligers in Verona and the Carraresi in Padua were strengthened; and in Tuscany Castruccio Castracane, Uguccione’s successor at Lucca, became formidable. In 1325 he defeated the Florentines at Alto Pascio, and carried home their carroccio as a trophy of his victory over the Guelphs. Louis of Bavaria, the next emperor, made a similar excursion in the year 1327, with even greater loss of imperial prestige. He deposed Galeazzo Visconti on his downward journey, and offered Milan for a sum of money to his son Azzo upon his return. Castruccio Castracane was nominated by him duke of Lucca; and this is the first instance of a dynastic title conferred upon an Italian adventurer by the emperor. Castruccio dominated Tuscany, where the Guelph cause, in the weakness of King Robert, languished. But the adventurer’s death in 1328 saved the stronghold of republican institutions, and Florence breathed freely for a while again. Can Grande della Scala’s death in the next year inflicted on the Lombard Ghibellines a loss hardly inferior to that of Castruccio’s on their Tuscan allies. Equally contemptible in its political results and void of historical interest was the brief visit of John of Bohemia, son of Henry VII., whom the Ghibellines next invited to assume their leadership. He sold a few privileges, conferred a few titles, and recrossed the Alps in 1333. It is clear that at this time the fury of the civil wars was spent. In spite of repeated efforts on the part of the Ghibellines, in spite of King Robert’s supine incapacity, the imperialists gained no permanent advantage. The Italians were tired of fighting, and the leaders of both factions looked exclusively to their own interests. Each city which had been the cradle of freedom thankfully accepted a master, to quench the conflagration of party strife, encourage trade, and make the handicraftsmen comfortable. Even the Florentines in 1342 submitted for a few months to the despotism of the duke of Athens. They conferred the signory upon him for life; and, had he not mismanaged matters, he might have held the city in his grasp. Italy was settling down and turning her attention to home comforts, arts and literature. Boccaccio, the contented bourgeois, succeeded to Dante, the fierce aristocrat.
The most marked proof of the change which came over Italy towards the middle of the 14th century is furnished by the companies of adventure. It was with their own militia that the burghers won freedom in the war of independence, subdued the nobles, and fought the battles of the parties. But from this time forward they laid down their arms, and played the game of warfare by the aid of mercenaries. Ecclesiastical overlords, interfering from a distance in Italian politics; prosperous republics, with plenty of money to spend but no leisure or inclination for camp-life; cautious tyrants, glad of every pretext to emasculate their subjects, and courting popularity by exchanging conscription for taxation—all combined to favour the new system. Mercenary troops are said to have been first levied from disbanded Germans, together with Breton and English adventurers, whom the Visconti and Castruccio took into their pay. They soon appeared under their own captains, who hired them out to the highest bidder, or marched them on marauding expeditions up and down the less protected districts. The names of some of these earliest captains of adventure, Fra Moriale, Count Lando and Duke Werner, who styled himself the “Enemy of God and Mercy,” have been preserved to us. As the companies grew in size and improved their discipline, it was seen by the Italian nobles that this kind of service offered a good career for men of spirit, who had learned the use of arms. To leave so powerful and profitable a calling in the hands of foreigners seemed both dangerous and uneconomical. Therefore, after the middle of the century, this profession fell into the hands of natives. The first Italian who formed an exclusively Italian company was Alberico da Barbiano, a nobleman of Romagna, and founder of the Milanese house of Belgiojoso. In his school the great condottieri Braccio da Montone and Sforza Attendolo were formed; and henceforth the battles of Italy were fought by Italian generals commanding native troops. This was better in some respects than if the mercenaries had been foreigners. Yet it must not be forgotten that the new companies of adventure, who decided Italian affairs for the next century, were in no sense patriotic. They sold themselves for money, irrespective of the cause which they upheld; and, while changing masters, they had no care for any interests but their own. The name condottiero, derived from condotta, a paid contract to supply so many fighting men in serviceable order, sufficiently indicates the nature of the business. In the hands of able captains, like Francesco Sforza or Piccinino, these mercenary troops became moving despotisms, draining the country of its wealth, and always eager to fasten and found tyrannies upon the provinces they had been summoned to defend. Their generals substituted heavy-armed cavalry for the old militia, and introduced systems of campaigning which reduced the art of war to a game of skill. Battles became all but bloodless; diplomacy and tactics superseded feats of arms and hard blows in pitched fields. In this way the Italians lost their military vigour, and wars were waged by despots from their cabinets, who pulled the strings of puppet captains in their pay. Nor were the people only enfeebled for resistance to a real foe; the whole political spirit of the race was demoralized. The purely selfish bond between condottieri and their employers, whether princes or republics, involved intrigues and treachery, checks and counterchecks, secret terror on the one hand and treasonable practice on the other, which ended by making statecraft in Italy synonymous with perfidy.
It must further be noticed that the rise of mercenaries was synchronous with a change in the nature of Italian despotism. The tyrants, as we have already seen, established themselves as captains of the people, vicars of the empire, vicars for the church, leaders of the Guelph and Ghibelline parties. They were Change in type of despotism. accepted by a population eager for repose, who had merged old class distinctions in the conflicts of preceding centuries. They rested in large measure on the favour of the multitude, and pursued a policy of sacrificing to their interests the nobles. It was natural that these self-made princes should seek to secure the peace which they had promised in their cities, by freeing the people from military service and disarming the aristocracy. As their tenure of power grew firmer, they advanced dynastic claims, assumed titles, and took the style of petty sovereigns. Their government became paternal; and, though there was no limit to their cruelty when stung by terror, they used the purse rather than the sword, bribery at home and treasonable intrigue abroad in preference to coercive measures or open war. Thus was elaborated the type of despot which attained completeness in Gian Galeazzo Visconti and Lorenzo de’ Medici. No longer a tyrant of Ezzelino’s stamp, he reigned by intelligence and terrorism masked beneath a smile. He substituted cunning and corruption for violence. The lesser people tolerated him because he extended the power of their city and made it beautiful with public buildings. The bourgeoisie, protected in their trade, found it convenient to support him. The nobles, turned into courtiers, placemen, diplomatists and men of affairs, ended by preferring his authority to the alternative of democratic institutions. A lethargy of well-being, broken only by the pinch of taxation for war-costs, or by outbursts of frantic ferocity and lust in the less calculating tyrants, descended on the population of cities which had boasted of their freedom. Only Florence and Venice, at the close of the period upon which we are now entering, maintained their republican independence. And Venice was ruled by a close oligarchy; Florence was passing from the hands of her oligarchs into the power of the Medicean merchants.
Between the year 1305, when Clement V. settled at Avignon, and the year 1447, when Nicholas V. re-established the papacy upon a solid basis at Rome, the Italians approximated more nearly to self-government than at any other epoch of their history. The conditions which have Discrimination of the five great powers. been described, of despotism, mercenary warfare and bourgeois prosperity, determined the character of this epoch, which was also the period when the great achievements of the Renaissance were prepared. At the end of this century and a half, five principal powers divided the peninsula; and their confederated action during the next forty-five years (1447–1492) secured for Italy a season of peace and brilliant prosperity. These five powers were the kingdom of Naples, the duchy of Milan, the republic of Florence, the republic of Venice and the papacy. The subsequent events of Italian history will be rendered most intelligible if at this point we trace the development of these five constituents of Italian greatness separately.
When Robert of Anjou died in 1343, he was succeeded by his grand-daughter Joan, the childless wife of four successive husbands, Andrew of Hungary, Louis of Taranto, James of Aragon and Otto of Brunswick. Charles of Durazzo, the last male scion of the Angevine house in The Two Sicilies. Lower Italy, murdered Joan in 1382, and held the kingdom for five years. Dying in 1387, he transmitted Naples to his son Ladislaus, who had no children, and was followed in 1414 by his sister Joan II. She too, though twice married, died without issue, having at one time adopted Louis III. of Provence and his brother René, at another Alfonso V. of Aragon, who inherited the crown of Sicily. After her death in February 1435 the kingdom was fought for between René of Anjou and Alfonso, surnamed the Magnanimous. René found supporters among the Italian princes, especially the Milanese Visconti, who helped him to assert his claims with arms. During the war of succession which ensued, Alfonso was taken prisoner by the Genoese fleet in August 1435, and was sent a prisoner to Filippo Maria at Milan. Here he pleaded his own cause so powerfully, and proved so incontestably the advantage which might ensue to the Visconti from his alliance, if he held the regno, that he obtained his release and recognition as king. From the end of the year 1435 Alfonso reigned alone and undisturbed in Lower Italy, combining for the first time since the year 1282 the crowns of Sicily and Naples. The former he held by inheritance, together with that of Aragon. The latter he considered to be his by conquest. Therefore, when he died in 1458, he bequeathed Naples to his natural son Ferdinand, while Sicily and Aragon passed together to his brother John, and so on to Ferdinand the Catholic. The twenty-three years of Alfonso’s reign were the most prosperous and splendid period of South Italian history. He became an Italian in taste and sympathy, entering with enthusiasm into the humanistic ardour of the earlier Renaissance, encouraging men of letters at his court, administering his kingdom on the principles of an enlightened despotism, and lending his authority to establish that equilibrium in the peninsula upon which the politicians of his age believed, not without reason, that Italian independence might be secured.
The last member of the Visconti family of whom we had occasion to speak was Azzo, who bought the city in 1328 from Louis of Bavaria. His uncle Lucchino succeeded, but was murdered in 1349 by a wife against whose life he had been plotting. Lucchino’s brother John, archbishop Duchy of Milan. of Milan, now assumed the lordship of the city, and extended the power of the Visconti over Genoa and the whole of north Italy, with the exception of Piedmont, Verona, Mantua, Ferrara and Venice. The greatness of the family dates from the reign of this masterful prelate. He died in 1354, and his heritage was divided between three members of his house, Matteo, Bernabò and Galeazzo. In the next year Matteo, being judged incompetent to rule, was assassinated by order of his brothers, who made an equal partition of their subject cities—Bernabò residing in Milan, Galeazzo in Pavia. Galeazzo was the wealthiest and most magnificent Italian of his epoch. He married his daughter Violante to our duke of Clarence, and his son Gian Galeazzo to a daughter of King John of France. When he died in 1378, this son resolved to reunite the domains of the Visconti; and, with this object in view, he plotted and executed the murder of his uncle Bernabò. Gian Galeazzo thus became by one stroke the most formidable of Italian despots. Immured in his castle at Pavia, accumulating wealth by systematic taxation and methodical economy, he organized the mercenary troops who eagerly took service under so good a paymaster; and, by directing their operations from his cabinet, he threatened the whole of Italy with conquest. The last scions of the Della Scala family still reigned in Verona, the last Carraresi in Padua; the Estensi were powerful in Ferrara, the Gonzaghi in Mantua. Gian Galeazzo, partly by force and partly by intrigue, discredited these minor despots, pushed his dominion to the very verge of Venice, and, having subjected Lombardy to his sway, proceeded to attack Tuscany. Pisa and Perugia were threatened with extinction, and Florence dreaded the advance of the Visconti arms, when the plague suddenly cut short his career of treachery and conquest in the year 1402. Seven years before his death Gian Galeazzo bought the title of duke of Milan and count of Pavia from the emperor Wenceslaus, and there is no doubt that he was aiming at the sovereignty of Italy. But no sooner was he dead than the essential weakness of an artificial state, built up by cunning and perfidious policy, with the aid of bought troops, dignified by no dynastic title, and consolidated by no sense of loyalty, became apparent. Gian Galeazzo’s duchy was a masterpiece of mechanical contrivance, the creation of a scheming intellect and lawless will. When the mind which had planned it was withdrawn, it fell to pieces, and the very hands which had been used to build it helped to scatter its fragments. The Visconti’s own generals, Facino Cane, Pandolfo Malatesta, Jacopo dal Verme, Gabrino Fondulo, Ottobon Terzo, seized upon the tyranny of several Lombard cities. In others the petty tyrants whom the Visconti had uprooted reappeared. The Estensi recovered their grasp upon Ferrara, and the Gonzaghi upon Mantua. Venice strengthened herself between the Adriatic and the Alps. Florence reassumed her Tuscan hegemony. Other communes which still preserved the shadow of independence, like Perugia and Bologna, began once more to dream of republican freedom under their own leading families. Meanwhile Gian Galeazzo had left two sons, Giovanni Maria and Filippo Maria. Giovanni, a monster of cruelty and lust, was assassinated by some Milanese nobles in 1412; and now Filippo set about rebuilding his father’s duchy. Herein he was aided by the troops of Facino Cane, who, dying opportunely at this period, left considerable wealth, a well-trained band of mercenaries, and a widow, Beatrice di Tenda. Filippo married and then beheaded Beatrice after a mock trial for adultery, having used her money and her influence in reuniting several subject cities to the crown of Milan. He subsequently spent a long, suspicious, secret and incomprehensible career in the attempt to piece together Gian Galeazzo’s Lombard state, and to carry out his schemes of Italian conquest. In this endeavour he met with vigorous opponents. Venice and Florence, strong in the strength of their resentful oligarchies, offered a determined resistance; nor was Filippo equal in ability to his father. His infernal cunning often defeated its own aims, checkmating him at the point of achievement by suggestions of duplicity or terror. In the course of Filippo’s wars with Florence and Venice, the greatest generals of this age were formed—Francesco Carmagnola, who was beheaded between the columns at Venice in 1432; Niccolò Piccinino, who died at Milan in 1444; and Francesco Sforza, who survived to seize his master’s heritage in 1450. Son of Attendolo Sforza, this Francesco received the hand of Filippo’s natural daughter, Bianca, as a reward for past service and a pledge of future support. When the Visconti dynasty ended by the duke’s death in 1447, he pretended to espouse the cause of the Milanese republic, which was then re-established; but he played his cards so subtly as to make himself, by the help of Cosimo de’ Medici in Florence, duke de facto if not de jure. Francesco Sforza was the only condottiero among many aspiring to be tyrants who planted themselves firmly on a throne of first-rate importance. Once seated in the duchy of Milan, he displayed rare qualities as a ruler; for he not only entered into the spirit of the age, which required humanity and culture from a despot, but he also knew how to curb his desire for territory. The conception of confederated Italy found in him a vigorous supporter. Thus the limitation of the Milanese duchy under Filippo Maria Visconti, and its consolidation under Francesco Sforza, were equally effectual in preparing the balance of power to which Italian politics now tended.
This balance could not have been established without the concurrent aid of Florence. After the expulsion of the duke of Athens in 1343, and the great plague of 1348, the Florentine proletariate rose up against the merchant princes. This insurgence of the artisans, in a republic which had been remodelled upon economical principles by Giano della Bella’s constitution of 1292, reached a climax in 1378, when the Ciompi rebellion placed the city for a few years in the hands of the Lesser Arts. The revolution was but temporary, and was rather a symptom of democratic tendencies in the state than the sign of any capacity for government on the part of the working classes. The necessities of war and foreign affairs soon placed Florence in the power of an oligarchy headed by the great Albizzi family. They fought the battles of the republic with success against the Visconti, and widely extended the Florentine domain over the Tuscan cities. During their season of ascendancy Pisa was enslaved, and Florence gained the access to the sea. But throughout this period a powerful opposition was gathering strength. It was led by the Medici, who sided with the common people, and increased their political importance by the accumulation and wise employment of vast commercial wealth. In 1433 the Albizzi and the Medici came to open strife. Cosimo de’ Medici, the chief of the opposition, was exiled to Venice. In the next year he returned, assumed the presidency of the democratic party, and by a system of corruption and popularity-hunting, combined with the patronage of arts and letters, established himself as the real but unacknowledged dictator of the commonwealth. Cosimo abandoned the policy of his predecessors. Instead of opposing Francesco Sforza in Milan, he lent him his prestige and influence, foreseeing that the dynastic future of his own family and the
pacification of Italy might be secured by a balance of power in 
which Florence should rank on equal terms with Milan and Naples.
The republic of Venice differed essentially from any other state in Italy; and her history was so separate that, up to this point, it would have been needless to interrupt the narrative by tracing it. Venice, however, in the 14th century took her place at last as an Italian power on an equality Venice. at least with the very greatest. The constitution of the commonwealth had slowly matured itself through a series of revolutions, which confirmed and defined a type of singular stability. During the earlier days of the republic the doge had been a prince elected by the people, and answerable only to the popular assemblies. In 1032 he was obliged to act in concert with a senate, called pregadi; and in 1172 the grand council, which became the real sovereign of the state, was formed. The several steps whereby the members of the grand council succeeded in eliminating the people from a share in the government, and reducing the doge to the position of their ornamental representative, cannot here be described. It must suffice to say that these changes culminated in 1297, when an act was passed for closing the grand council, or in other words for confining it to a fixed number of privileged families, in whom the government was henceforth vested by hereditary right. This ratification of the oligarchical principle, together with the establishment in 1311 of the Council of Ten, completed that famous constitution which endured till the extinction of the republic in 1797. Meanwhile, throughout the middle ages, it had been the policy of Venice to refrain from conquests on the Italian mainland, and to confine her energies to commerce in the East. The first entry of any moment made by the Venetians into strictly Italian affairs was in 1336, when the republics of Florence and St Mark allied themselves against Mastino della Scala, and the latter took possession of Treviso. After this, for thirty years, between 1352 and 1381, Venice and Genoa contested the supremacy of the Mediterranean. Pisa’s maritime power having been extinguished in the battle of Meloria (1284), the two surviving republics had no rivals. They fought their duel out upon the Bosporus, off Sardinia, and in the Morea, with various success. From the first great encounter, in 1355, Venice retired well-nigh exhausted, and Genoa was so crippled that she placed herself under the protection of the Visconti. The second and decisive battle was fought upon the Adriatic. The Genoese fleet under Luciano Doria defeated the Venetians off Pola in 1379, and sailed without opposition to Chioggia, which was stormed and taken. Thus the Venetians found themselves blockaded in their own lagoons. Meanwhile a fleet was raised for their relief by Carlo Zeno in the Levant, and the admiral Vittore Pisani, who had been imprisoned after the defeat at Pola, was released to lead their forlorn hope from the city side. The Genoese in their turn were now blockaded in Chioggia, and forced by famine to surrender. The losses of men and money which the war of Chioggia, as it was called, entailed, though they did not immediately depress the spirit of the Genoese republic, signed her naval ruin. During this second struggle to the death with Genoa, the Venetians had been also at strife with the Carraresi of Padua and the Scaligers of Verona. In 1406, after the extinction of these princely houses they added Verona, Vicenza and Padua to the territories they claimed on terra firma. Their career of conquest, and their new policy of forming Italian alliances and entering into the management of Italian affairs were confirmed by the long dogeship of Francesco Foscari (1423–1457), who must rank with Alfonso, Cosimo de’ Medici, Francesco Sforza and Nicholas V., as a joint-founder of confederated Italy. When Constantinople fell in 1453, the old ties between Venice and the Eastern empire were broken, and she now entered on a wholly new phase of her history. Ranking as one of the five Italian powers, she was also destined to defend Western Christendom against the encroachments of the Turk in Europe. (See Venice: History.)
By their settlement in Avignon, the popes relinquished their protectorate of Italian liberties, and lost their position as Italian potentates. Rienzi’s revolution in Rome (1347–1354), and his establishment of a republic upon a fantastic basis, half classical, half feudal, proved the temper of the times; while the rise of The Papacy. dynastic families in the cities of the church, claiming the title of papal vicars, but acting in their own interests, weakened the authority of the Holy See. The predatory expeditions of Bertrand du Poiet and Robert of Geneva were as ineffective as the descents of the emperors; and, though the cardinal Albornoz conquered Romagna and the March in 1364, the legates who resided in those districts were not long able to hold them against their despots. At last Gregory XI. returned to Rome; and Urban VI., elected in 1378, put a final end to the Avignonian exile. Still the Great Schism, which now distracted Western Christendom, so enfeebled the papacy, and kept the Roman pontiffs so engaged in ecclesiastical disputes, that they had neither power nor leisure to occupy themselves seriously with their temporal affairs. The threatening presence of the two princely houses of Orsini and Colonna, alike dangerous as friends or foes, rendered Rome an unsafe residence. Even when the schism was nominally terminated in 1415 by the council of Constance, the next two popes held but a precarious grasp upon their Italian domains. Martin V. (1417–1431) resided principally at Florence. Eugenius IV. (1431–1447) followed his example. And what Martin managed to regain Eugenius lost. At the same time, the change which had now come over Italian politics, the desire on all sides for a settlement, and the growing conviction that a federation was necessary, proved advantageous to the popes as sovereigns. They gradually entered into the spirit of their age, assumed the style of despots and made use of the humanistic movement, then at its height, to place themselves in a new relation to Italy. The election of Nicholas V. in 1447 determined this revolution in the papacy, and opened a period of temporal splendour, which ended with the establishment of the popes as sovereigns. Thomas of Sarzana was a distinguished humanist. Humbly born, he had been tutor in the house of the Albizzi, and afterwards librarian of the Medici at Florence, where he imbibed the politics together with the culture of the Renaissance. Soon after assuming the tiara, he found himself without a rival in the church; for the schism ended by Felix V.’s resignation in 1449. Nicholas fixed his residence in Rome, which he began to rebuild and to fortify, determining to render the Eternal City once more a capital worthy of its high place in Europe. The Romans were flattered; and, though his reign was disturbed by republican conspiracy, Nicholas V. was able before his death in 1455 to secure the modern status of the pontiff as a splendid patron and a wealthy temporal potentate.
Italy was now for a brief space independent. The humanistic movement had created a common culture, a common language and sense of common nationality. The five great powers, with their satellites—dukes of Savoy and Urbino, marquesses of Ferrara and Mantua, republics Confederated Italy. of Bologna, Perugia, Siena—were constituted. All political institutions tended toward despotism. The Medici became yearly more indispensable to Florence, the Bentivogli more autocratic in Bologna, the Baglioni in Perugia; and even Siena was ruled by the Petrucci. But this despotism was of a mild type. The princes were Italians; they shared the common enthusiasms of the nation for art, learning, literature and science; they studied how to mask their tyranny with arts agreeable to the multitude. When Italy had reached this point, Constantinople was taken by the Turks. On all sides it was felt that the Italian alliance must be tightened; and one of the last, best acts of Nicholas V.’s pontificate was the appeal in 1453 to the five great powers in federation. As regards their common opposition to the Turk, this appeal led to nothing; but it marked the growth of a new Italian consciousness.
Between 1453 and 1492 Italy continued to be prosperous and tranquil. Nearly all wars during this period were undertaken either to check the growing power of Venice or to further the ambition of the papacy. Having become despots, the popes sought to establish their relatives in principalities. The word nepotism acquired new significance in the reigns of Sixtus IV. and Innocent VIII. Though the country was convulsed by no great struggle, these forty years witnessed a truly appalling increase of political crime. To be a prince was tantamount to being the mark of secret conspiracy and assassination. Among the most noteworthy examples of such attempts may be mentioned the revolt of the barons against Ferdinand I. of Naples (1464), the murder of Galeazzo Maria Sforza at Milan (1476) and the plot of the Pazzi to destroy the Medici (1478). After Cosimo de’ Medici’s death in 1464, the presidency of the Florentine republic passed to his son Piero, who left it in 1469 to his sons Lorenzo and Giuliano. These youths assumed the style of princes, and it was against their lives that the Pazzi, with the sanction of Sixtus IV., aimed their blow. Giuliano was murdered, Lorenzo escaped, to tighten his grasp upon the city, which now loved him and was proud of him. During the following fourteen years of his brilliant career he made himself absolute master of Florence, and so modified her institutions that the Medici were henceforth necessary to the state. Apprehending the importance of Italian federation, Lorenzo, by his personal tact and prudent leadership of the republic, secured peace and a common intelligence between the five powers. His own family was fortified by the marriage of his daughter to a son of Innocent VIII., which procured his son Giovanni’s elevation to the cardinalate, and involved two Medicean papacies and the future dependence of Florence upon Rome.
VI. Age of Invasions.—The year 1492 opened a new age for Italy. In this year Lorenzo died, and was succeeded by his son, the vain and weak Piero; France passed beneath the personal control of the inexperienced Charles VIII.; the fall of Granada freed Spain from her Invasion of Charles VIII. embarrassments; Columbus discovered America, destroying the commercial supremacy of Venice; last, but not least, Roderigo Borgia assumed the tiara with the famous title of Alexander VI. In this year the short-lived federation of the five powers was shaken, and Italy was once more drawn into the vortex of European affairs. The events which led to this disaster may be briefly told. After Galeazzo Maria’s assassination, his crown passed to a boy, Gian Galeazzo, who was in due course married to a grand-daughter of Ferdinand I. of Naples. But the government of Milan remained in the hands of this youth’s uncle, Lodovico, surnamed Il Moro. Lodovico resolved to become duke of Milan. The king of Naples was his natural enemy, and he had cause to suspect that Piero de’ Medici might abandon his alliance. Feeling himself alone, with no right to the title he was bent on seizing, he had recourse to Charles VIII. of France, whom he urged to make good his claim to the kingdom of Naples. This claim, it may be said in passing, rested on the will of King René of Anjou. After some hesitation, Charles agreed to invade Italy. He crossed the Alps in 1495, passed through Lombardy, entered Tuscany, freed Pisa from the yoke of Florence, witnessed the expulsion of the Medici, marched to Naples and was crowned there—all this without striking a blow. Meanwhile Lodovico procured his nephew’s death, and raised a league against the French in Lombardy. Charles hurried back from Naples, and narrowly escaped destruction at Fornovo in the passes of the Apennines. He made good his retreat, however, and returned to France in 1495. Little remained to him of his light acquisitions; but he had convulsed Italy by this invasion, destroyed her equilibrium, exposed her military weakness and political disunion, and revealed her wealth to greedy and more powerful nations.
The princes of the house of Aragon, now represented by Frederick, a son of Ferdinand I., returned to Naples. Florence made herself a republic, adopting a form of constitution analogous to that of Venice. At this crisis she was ruled by the monk Girolamo Savonarola, who inspired Louis XII. the people with a thirst for freedom, preached the necessity of reformation, and placed himself in direct antagonism to Rome. After a short but eventful career, the influence of which was long effective, he lost his hold upon the citizens. Alexander VI. procured a mock trial, and his enemies burned him upon the Piazza in 1498. In this year Louis XII. succeeded Charles VIII. upon the throne of France. As duke of Orleans he had certain claims to Milan through his grandmother Valentina, daughter of Gian Galeazzo, the first duke. They were not valid, for the investiture of the duchy had been granted only to male heirs. But they served as a sufficient pretext, and in 1499 Louis entered and subdued the Milanese. Lodovico escaped to Germany, returned the next year, was betrayed by his Swiss mercenaries and sent to die at Loches in France. In 1500 Louis made the blunder of calling Ferdinand the Catholic to help him in the conquest of Naples. By a treaty signed at Granada, the French and Spanish kings were to divide the spoil. The conquest was easy; but, when it came to a partition, Ferdinand played his ally false. He made himself supreme over the Two Sicilies, which he now reunited under a single crown. Three years later, unlessoned by this experience, Louis signed the treaty of Blois (1504), whereby he invited the emperor Maximilian to aid him in the subjugation of Venice. No policy could have been less far-sighted; for Charles V., joint heir to Austria, Burgundy, Castile and Aragon, the future overwhelming rival of France, was already born.
The stage was now prepared, and all the actors who were destined to accomplish the ruin of Italy trod it with their armies. Spain, France, Germany, with their Swiss auxiliaries, had been summoned upon various pretexts to partake her provinces. Then, too late, patriots like Machiavelli perceived the suicidal self-indulgence of the past, which, by substituting mercenary troops for national militias, left the Italians at the absolute discretion of their neighbours. Whatever parts the Italians themselves played in the succeeding quarter of a century, the game was in the hands of French, Spanish and German invaders. Meanwhile, no scheme for combination against common foes arose in the peninsula. Each petty potentate strove for his own private advantage in the confusion; and at this epoch the chief gains accrued to the papacy. Aided by his terrible son, Cesare Borgia, Alexander VI. chastised the Roman nobles, subdued Romagna and the March, threatened Tuscany, and seemed to be upon the point of creating a Central Italian state in favour of his progeny, when he died suddenly in 1503. His conquests reverted to the Holy See. Julius II., his bitterest enemy and powerful successor, continued Alexander’s policy, but no longer in the interest of his own relatives. It became the nobler ambition of Julius to aggrandize the church, and to reassume the protectorate of the Italian people. With this object, he secured Emilia, carried his victorious arms against Ferrara, and curbed the tyranny of the Baglioni in Perugia. Julius II. played a perilous game; but the stakes were high, and he fancied himself strong enough to guide the tempest he evoked. Quarrelling with the Venetians in 1508, he combined the forces of all Europe by the league of Cambray against them; and, when he had succeeded in his first purpose of humbling them even to the dust, he turned round in 1510, uttered his famous resolve to expel the barbarians from Italy, and pitted the Spaniards against the French. It was with the Swiss that he hoped to effect this revolution; but the Swiss, now interfering for the first time as principals in Italian affairs, were incapable of more than adding to the already maddening distractions of the people. Formed for mercenary warfare, they proved a perilous instrument in the hands of those who used them, and were hardly less injurious to their friends than to their foes. In 1512 the battle of Ravenna between the French troops and the allies of Julius—Spaniards, Venetians and Swiss—was fought. Gaston de Foix bought a doubtful victory dearly with his death; and the allies, though beaten on the banks of the Ronco, immediately afterwards expelled the French from Lombardy. Yet Julius II. had failed, as might have been foreseen. He only exchanged one set of foreign masters for another, and taught a new barbarian race how pleasant were the plains of Italy. As a consequence of the battle of Ravenna, the Medici returned in 1512 to Florence.
When Leo X. was elected in 1513, Rome and Florence rejoiced; but Italy had no repose. Louis XII. had lost the game, and the Spaniards were triumphant. But new actors appeared upon the scene, and the same old struggle was resumed with fiercer energy. By the victory of Marignano in 1515 Francis I., having now succeeded to the throne of France, regained the Milanese, and broke the power of the Swiss, who held it for Massimiliano Sforza, the titular duke. Leo for a while relied on Francis; for the vast power of Charles V., who succeeded to the empire in 1519, as in 1516 he had succeeded to the crowns of Spain and Lower Italy, threatened the whole of Europe. It was Leo’s nature, however, to be inconstant. In 1521 he changed sides, allied himself to Charles, and died after hearing that the imperial troops had again expelled the French from Milan. During the next four years the Franco-Spanish war dragged on in Lombardy until the decisive battle of Pavia in 1525, when Francis was taken prisoner, and Italy lay open to the Spanish armies. Meanwhile Leo X. had been followed by Adrian VI., and Adrian by Clement VII., of the house of Medici, who had long ruled Florence. In the reign of this pope Francis was released from his prison in Madrid (1526), and Clement hoped that he might still be used in the Italian interest as a counterpoise to Charles. It is impossible in this place to follow the tangled intrigues of that period. The year 1527 was signalized by the famous sack of Rome. An army of mixed German and Spanish troops, pretending to act for the emperor, but which may rather be regarded as a vast marauding party, entered Italy under their leader Frundsberg. After his death, the Constable de Bourbon took command of them; they marched slowly down, aided by the marquis of Ferrara, and unopposed by the duke of Urbino, reached Rome, and took it by assault. The constable was killed in the first onslaught; Clement was imprisoned in the castle of St Angelo; Rome was abandoned to the rage of 30,000 ruffians. As an immediate result of this catastrophe, Florence shook off the Medici, and established a republic. But Clement, having made peace with the emperor, turned the remnants of the army which had sacked Rome against his native city. After a desperate resistance, Florence fell in 1530. Alessandro de’ Medici was placed there with the title of duke of Cività di Penna; and, on his murder in 1537, Cosimo de’ Medici, of the younger branch of the ruling house, was made duke. Acting as lieutenant for the Spaniards, he subsequently (1555) subdued Siena, and bequeathed to his descendants the grand-duchy of Tuscany.
VII. Spanish-Austrian Ascendancy.—It was high time, after the sack of Rome in 1527, that Charles V. should undertake Italian affairs. The country was exposed to anarchy, of which this had been the last and most disgraceful example. The Turks were threatening western Settlement of Italy by Spain. Europe, and Luther was inflaming Germany. By the treaty of Barcelona in 1529 the pope and emperor made terms. By that of Cambray in the same year France relinquished Italy to Spain. Charles then entered the port of Genoa, and on the 5th of November met Clement VII. at Bologna. He there received the imperial crown, and summoned the Italian princes for a settlement of all disputed claims. Francesco Sforza, the last and childless heir of the ducal house, was left in Milan till his death, which happened in 1535. The republic of Venice was respected in her liberties and Lombard territories. The Este family received a confirmation of their duchy of Modena and Reggio, and were invested in their fief of Ferrara by the pope. The marquessate of Mantua was made a duchy; and Florence was secured, as we have seen, to the Medici. The great gainer by this settlement was the papacy, which held the most substantial Italian province, together with a prestige that raised it far above all rivalry. The rest of Italy, however parcelled, henceforth became but a dependence upon Spain. Charles V., it must be remembered, achieved his conquest and confirmed his authority far less as emperor than as the heir of Castile and Aragon. A Spanish viceroy in Milan and another in Naples, supported by Rome and by the minor princes who followed the policy dictated to them from Madrid, were sufficient to preserve the whole peninsula in a state of somnolent inglorious servitude.
From 1530 until 1796, that is, for a period of nearly three centuries, the Italians had no history of their own. Their annals are filled with records of dynastic changes and redistributions of territory, consequent upon treaties signed by foreign powers, in the settlement of quarrels which no wise concerned the people. Italy only too often became the theatre of desolating and distracting wars. But these wars were fought for the most part by alien armies; the points at issue were decided beyond the Alps; the gains accrued to royal families whose names were unpronounceable by southern tongues. The affairs of Europe during the years when Habsburg and Bourbon fought their domestic battles with the blood of noble races may teach grave lessons to all thoughtful men of our days, but none bitterer, none fraught with more insulting recollections, than to the Italian people, who were haggled over like dumb driven cattle in the mart of chaffering kings. We cannot wholly acquit the Italians of their share of blame. When they might have won national independence, after their warfare with the Swabian emperors, they let the golden opportunity slip. Pampered with commercial prosperity, eaten to the core with inter-urban rivalries, they submitted to despots, renounced the use of arms, and offered themselves in the hour of need, defenceless and disunited to the shock of puissant nations. That they had created modern civilization for Europe availed them nothing. Italy, intellectually first among the peoples, was now politically and practically last; and nothing to her historian is more heart-rending than to watch the gradual extinction of her spirit in this age of slavery.
In 1534 Alessandro Farnese, who owed his elevation to his sister Giulia, one of Alexander VI.’s mistresses, took the tiara with the title of Paul III. It was his ambition to create a duchy for his family; and with this object he gave Parma and Piacenza to his son Pier Luigi. After Pontificate of Paul III. much wrangling between the French and Spanish parties, the duchy was confirmed in 1586 to Ottaviano Farnese and his son Alessandro, better known as Philip II.’s general, the prince of Parma. Alessandro’s descendants reigned in Parma and Piacenza till the year 1731. Paul III.’s pontificate was further marked by important changes in the church, all of which confirmed the spiritual autocracy of Rome. In 1540 this pope approved of Loyola’s foundation, and secured the powerful militia of the Jesuit order. The Inquisition was established with almost unlimited powers in Italy, and the press was placed under its jurisdiction. Thus free thought received a check, by which not only ecclesiastical but political tyrants knew how to profit. Henceforth it was impossible to publish or to utter a word which might offend the despots of church or state; and the Italians had to amuse their leisure with the polite triflings of academics. In 1545 a council was opened at Trent for the reformation of church discipline and the promulgation of orthodox doctrine. The decrees of this council defined Roman Catholicism against the Reformation; and, while failing to regenerate morality, they enforced a hypocritical observance of public decency. Italy to outer view put forth blossoms of hectic and hysterical piety, though at the core her clergy and her aristocracy were more corrupt than ever.
In 1556 Philip II., by the abdication of his father Charles V., became king of Spain. He already wore the crown of the Two Sicilies, and ruled the duchy of Milan. In the next year Ferdinand, brother of Charles, was elected emperor. The French, meanwhile, had not entirely Reign of Philip II. abandoned their claims on Italy. Gian Pietro Caraffa, who was made pope in 1555 with the name of Paul IV., endeavoured to revive the ancient papal policy of leaning upon France. He encouraged the duke of Guise to undertake the conquest of Naples, as Charles of Anjou had been summoned by his predecessors. But such schemes were now obsolete and anachronistic. They led to a languid lingering Italian campaign, which was settled far beyond the Alps by Philip’s victories over the French at St Quentin and Gravelines. The peace of Câteau Cambresis, signed in 1559, left the Spanish monarch undisputed lord of Italy. Of free commonwealths there now survived only Venice, which, together with Spain, achieved for Europe the victory of Lepanto in 1573; Genoa, which, after the ineffectual Fieschi revolution in 1547, abode beneath the rule of the great Doria family, and held a feeble sway in Corsica; and the two insignificant republics of Lucca and San Marino.
The future hope of Italy, however, was growing in a remote and hitherto neglected corner. Emmanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy, represented the oldest and not the least illustrious reigning house in Europe, and his descendants were destined to achieve for Italy the independence which no other power or prince had given her since the fall of ancient Rome. (See Savoy, House of.)
When Emmanuel Philibert succeeded to his father Charles III. in 1553, he was a duke without a duchy. But the princes of the house of Savoy were a race of warriors; and what Emmanuel Philibert lost as sovereign he regained as captain of adventure in the service of his cousin Philip II. The treaty of Câteau Cambresis in 1559, and the evacuation of the Piedmontese cities held by French and Spanish troops in 1574, restored his state. By removing the capital from Chambéry to Turin, he completed the transformation of the dukes of Savoy from Burgundian into Italian sovereigns. They still owned Savoy beyond the Alps, the plains of Bresse, and the maritime province of Nice.
Emmanuel Philibert was succeeded by his son Charles Emmanuel I., who married Catherine, a daughter of Philip II. He seized the first opportunity of annexing Saluzzo, which had been lost to Savoy in the last two reigns, and renewed the disastrous policy of his grandfather Charles III. by invading Geneva and threatening Provence. Henry IV. of France forced him in 1601 to relinquish Bresse and his Burgundian possessions. In return he was allowed to keep Saluzzo. All hopes of conquest on the transalpine side were now quenched; but the keys of Italy had been given to the dukes of Savoy; and their attention was still further concentrated upon Lombard conquests. Charles Emmanuel now attempted the acquisition of Montferrat, which was soon to become vacant by the death of Francesco Gonzaga, who held it together with Mantua. In order to secure this territory, he went to war with Philip III. of Spain, and allied himself with Venice and the Grisons to expel the Spaniards from the Valtelline. When the male line of the Gonzaga family expired in 1627, Charles, duke of Nevers, claimed Mantua and Montferrat in right of his wife, the only daughter of the last duke. Charles Emmanuel was now checkmated by France, as he had formerly been by Spain. The total gains of all his strenuous endeavours amounted to the acquisition of a few places on the borders of Montferrat.
Not only the Gonzagas, but several other ancient ducal
families, died out about the date which we have reached. The
legitimate line of the Estensi ended in 1597 by the
death of Alfonso II., the last duke of Ferrara. He
left his domains to a natural relative, Cesare d’Este,
Extinction
of old ducal families.
who would in earlier days have inherited without
dispute, for bastardy had been no bar on more than one occasion
in the Este pedigree. Urban VIII., however, put in a claim to
Ferrara, which, it will be remembered, had been recognized a
papal fief in 1530. Cesare d’Este had to content himself with
Modena and Reggio, where his descendants reigned as dukes
till 1794. Under the same pontiff, the Holy See absorbed the
duchy of Urbino on the death of Francesco Maria II., the last
representative of Montefeltro and Della Rovere. The popes
were now masters of a fine and compact territory, embracing
no inconsiderable portion of Countess Matilda’s legacy, in
addition to Pippin’s donation, and the patrimony of St Peter.
Meanwhile Spanish fanaticism, the suppression of the Huguenots
in France and the Catholic policy of Austria combined to
strengthen their authority as pontiffs. Urban’s predecessor,
Paul V., advanced so far as to extend his spiritual jurisdiction
over Venice, which, up to the date of his election (1605), had
resisted all encroachments of the Holy See. Venice offered the
single instance in Italy of a national church. The republic
managed the tithes, and the clergy acknowledged no chief above
their own patriarch. Paul V. now forced the Venetians to
admit his ecclesiastical supremacy; but they refused to readmit
the Jesuits, who had been expelled in 1606. This, if we do not
count the proclamation of James I. of England (1604), was the
earliest instance of the order’s banishment from a state where
it had proved disloyal to the commonwealth.
Venice rapidly declined throughout the 17th century. The loss of trade consequent upon the closing of Egypt and the Levant, together with the discovery of America and the sea-route to the Indies, had dried up her chief source of wealth. Prolonged warfare with the Ottomans, Decline of Venice and Spain. who forced her to abandon Candia in 1669, as they had robbed her of Cyprus in 1570, still further crippled her resources. Yet she kept the Adriatic free of pirates, notably by suppressing the sea-robbers called Uscocchi (1601–1617), maintained herself in the Ionian Islands, and in 1684 added one more to the series of victorious episodes which render her annals so romantic. In that year Francesco Morosini, upon whose tomb we still may read the title Peloponnesiacus, wrested the whole of the Morea from the Turks. But after his death in 1715 the republic relaxed her hold upon his conquests. The Venetian nobles abandoned themselves to indolence and vice. Many of them fell into the slough of pauperism, and were saved from starvation by public doles. Though the signory still made a brave show upon occasions of parade, it was clear that the state was rotten to the core, and sinking into the decrepitude of dotage. The Spanish monarchy at the same epoch dwindled with apparently less reason. Philip’s Austrian successors reduced it to the rank of a secondary European power. This decline of vigour was felt, with the customary effects of discord and bad government, in Lower Italy. The revolt of Masaniello in Naples (1647), followed by rebellions at Palermo and Messina, which placed Sicily for a while in the hands of Louis XIV. (1676–1678) were symptoms of progressive anarchy. The population, ground down by preposterous taxes, ill-used as only the subjects of Spaniards, Turks or Bourbons are handled, rose in blind exasperation against their oppressors. It is impossible to attach political importance to these revolutions; nor did they bring the people any appreciable good. The destinies of Italy were decided in the cabinets and on the battlefields of northern Europe. A Bourbon at Versailles, a Habsburg at Vienna, or a thick-lipped Lorrainer, with a stroke of his pen, wrote off province against province, regarding not the populations who had bled for him or thrown themselves upon his mercy.
This inglorious and passive chapter of Italian history is continued to the date of the French Revolution with the records of three dynastic wars, the war of the Spanish succession, the war of the Polish succession, the war of the Austrian succession, followed by three European treaties, Wars of Succession. which brought them respectively to diplomatic terminations. Italy, handled and rehandled, settled and resettled, upon each of these occasions, changed masters without caring or knowing what befell the principals in any one of the disputes. Humiliating to human nature in general as are the annals of the 18th-century campaigns in Europe, there is no point of view from which they appear in a light so tragi-comic as from that afforded by Italian history. The system of setting nations by the ears with the view of settling the quarrels of a few reigning houses was reduced to absurdity when the people, as in these cases, came to be partitioned and exchanged without the assertion or negation of a single principle affecting their interests or rousing their emotions.
In 1700 Charles II. died, and with him ended the Austrian family in Spain. Louis XIV. claimed the throne for Philip, duke of Anjou. Charles, archduke of Austria, opposed him. The dispute was fought out in Flanders; but Lombardy felt the shock, as usual, of the French and Spanish Succession. Austrian dynasties. The French armies were more than once defeated by Prince Eugene of Savoy, who drove them out of Italy in 1707. Therefore, in the peace of Utrecht (1713), the services of the house of Savoy had to be duly recognized. Victor Amadeus II. received Sicily with the title of king. Montferrat and Alessandria were added to his northern provinces, and his state was recognized as independent. Charles of Austria, now emperor, took Milan, Mantua, Naples and Sardinia for his portion of the Italian spoil. Philip founded the Bourbon line of Spanish kings, renouncing in Italy all that his Habsburg predecessors had gained. Discontented with this diminution of the Spanish heritage, Philip V. married Elisabetta Farnese, heiress to the last duke of Parma, in 1714. He hoped to secure this duchy for his son, Don Carlos; and Elisabetta further brought with her a claim to the grand-duchy of Tuscany, which would soon become vacant by the death of Gian Gastone de’ Medici. After this marriage Philip broke the peace of Europe by invading Sardinia. The Quadruple Alliance was formed, and the new king of Sicily was punished for his supposed adherence to Philip V. by the forced exchange of Sicily for the island of Sardinia. It was thus that in 1720 the house of Savoy assumed the regal title which it bore until the declaration of the Italian kingdom in the last century. Victor Amadeus II.’s reign was of great importance in the history of his state. Though a despot, as all monarchs were obliged to be at that date, he reigned with prudence, probity and zeal for the welfare of his subjects. He took public education out of the hands of the Jesuits, which, for the future development of manliness in his dominions, was a measure of incalculable value. The duchy of Savoy in his days became a kingdom, and Sardinia, though it seemed a poor exchange for Sicily, was a far less perilous possession than the larger and wealthier island would have been. In 1730 Victor Amadeus abdicated in favour of his son Charles Emmanuel III. Repenting of this step, he subsequently attempted to regain Turin, but was imprisoned in the castle of Rivoli, where he ended his days in 1732.
The War of the Polish Succession which now disturbed Europe is only important in Italian history because the treaty of Vienna in 1738 settled the disputed affairs of the duchies of Parma and Tuscany. The duke Antonio Farnese died in 1731; the grand-duke Gian Gastone de’ Polish Succession. Medici died in 1737. In the duchy of Parma Don Carlos had already been proclaimed. But he was now transferred to the Two Sicilies, while Francis of Lorraine, the husband of Maria Theresa, took Tuscany and Parma. Milan and Mantua remained in the hands of the Austrians. On this occasion Charles Emmanuel acquired Tortona and Novara.
Worse complications ensued for the Italians when the emperor Charles VI., father of Maria Theresa, died in 1740. The three branches of the Bourbon house, ruling in France, Spain and the Sicilies, joined with Prussia, Bavaria and the kingdom of Sardinia to despoil Maria Theresa Austrian Succession. of her heritage. Lombardy was made the seat of war; and here the king of Sardinia acted as in some sense the arbiter of the situation. After war broke out, he changed sides and supported the Habsburg-Lorraine party. At first, in 1745, the Sardinians were defeated by the French and Spanish troops. But Francis of Lorraine, elected emperor in that year, sent an army to the king’s support, which in 1746 obtained a signal victory over the Bourbons at Piacenza. Charles Emmanuel now threatened Genoa. The Austrian soldiers already held the town. But the citizens expelled them, and the republic kept her independence. In 1748 the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which put an end to the War of the Austrian Succession, once more redivided Italy. Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla were formed into a duchy for Don Philip, brother of Charles III. of the Two Sicilies, and son of Philip V. of Spain. Charles III. was confirmed in his kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The Austrians kept Milan and Tuscany. The duchy of Modena was placed under the protection of the French. So was Genoa, which in 1755, after Paoli’s insurrection against the misgovernment of the republic, ceded her old domain of Corsica to France.
From the date of this settlement until 1792, Italy enjoyed a period of repose and internal amelioration under her numerous paternal despots. It became the fashion during these forty-four years of peace to encourage the industrial population and to experimentalize in economical reforms. Forty-four years’ peace. The Austrian government in Lombardy under Maria Theresa was characterized by improved agriculture, regular administration, order, reformed taxation and increased education. A considerable amount of local autonomy was allowed, and dependence on Vienna was very slight and not irksome. The nobles and the clergy were rich and influential, but kept in order by the civil power. There was no feeling of nationality, but the people were prosperous, enjoyed profound peace and were placidly content with the existing order of things. On the death of Maria Theresa in 1780, the emperor Joseph II. instituted much wider reforms. Feudal privileges were done away with, clerical influence diminished and many monasteries and convents suppressed, the criminal law rendered more humane and torture abolished largely as a result of G. Beccaria’s famous pamphlet Dei delitti e delle pene. At the same time Joseph’s administration was more arbitrary, and local autonomy was to some extent curtailed. His anti-clerical laws produced some ill-feeling among the more devout part of the population. On the whole the Austrian rule in pre-revolutionary days was beneficial and far from oppressive, and helped Lombardy to recover from the ill-effects of the Spanish domination. It did little for the moral education of the people, but the same criticism applies more or less to all the European governments of the day. The emperor Francis I. ruled the grand-duchy of Tuscany by lieutenants until his death in 1765, when it was given, as an independent state, to his second son, Peter Leopold. The reign of this duke was long remembered as a period of internal prosperity, wise legislation and important public enterprise. Leopold, among other useful works, drained the Val di Chiana, and restored those fertile upland plains to agriculture. In 1790 he succeeded to the empire, and left Tuscany to his son Ferdinand. The kingdom of Sardinia was administered upon similar principles, but with less of geniality. Charles Emmanuel made his will law, and erased the remnants of free institutions from his state. At the same time he wisely followed his father’s policy with regard to education and the church. This is perhaps the best that can be said of a king who incarnated the stolid absolutism of the period. From this date, however, we are able to trace the revival of independent thought among the Italians. The European ferment of ideas which preceded the French Revolution expressed itself in men like Alfieri, the fierce denouncer of tyrants, Beccaria, the philosopher of criminal jurisprudence, Volta, the physicist, and numerous political economists of Tuscany. Moved partly by external influences and partly by a slow internal reawakening, the people was preparing for the efforts of the 19th century. The papacy, during this period, had to reconsider the question of the Jesuits, who made themselves universally odious, not only in Italy, but also in France and Spain. In the pontificate of Clement XIII. they ruled the Vatican, and almost succeeded in embroiling the pope with the concerted Bourbon potentates of Europe. His successor, Clement XIV. suppressed the order altogether by a brief of 1773. (J. A. S.)
D. Italy in the Napoleonic Period, 1796–1814
The campaign of 1796 which led to the awakening of the Italian people to a new consciousness of unity and strength is detailed in the article Napoleonic Campaigns. Here we can attempt only a general survey of the events, political, civic and social, which heralded the Risorgimento in its first phase. It is desirable in the first place to realize the condition of Italy at the time when the irruption of the French and the expulsion of the Austrians opened up a new political vista for that oppressed and divided people.
For many generations Italy had been bandied to and fro
between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons. The decline of
French influence at the close of the reign of Louis XIV.
left the Habsburgs and the Spanish Bourbons without
serious rivals. The former possessed the rich duchies
Influence of the French Revolution.
of Milan (including Mantua) and Tuscany; while
through a marriage alliance with the house of Este
of Modena (the Archduke Ferdinand had married the heiress
of Modena) its influence over that duchy was supreme.
It also had a few fiefs in Piedmont and in Genoese
territory. By marrying her daughter, Maria Amelia, to the
young duke of Parma, and another daughter, Maria Carolina,
to Ferdinand of Naples, Maria Theresa consolidated Habsburg
influence in the north and south of the peninsula. The Spanish
Bourbons held Naples and Sicily, as well as the duchy of Parma.
Of the nominally independent states the chief were the kingdom
of Sardinia, ruled over by the house of Savoy, and comprising
Piedmont, the isle of Sardinia and nominally Savoy and Nice,
though the two provinces last named had virtually been lost
to the monarchy since the campaign of 1793. Equally extensive,
but less important in the political sphere, were the Papal States
and Venetia, the former torpid under the obscurantist rule
of pope and cardinals, the latter enervated by luxury and the
policy of unmanly complaisance long pursued by doge and
council. The ancient rival of Venice, Genoa, was likewise far
gone in decline. The small states, Lucca and San Marino,
completed the map of Italy. The worst governed part of the
peninsula was the south, where feudalism lay heavily on the
cultivators and corruption pervaded all ranks. Milan and
Piedmont were comparatively well governed; but repugnance
to Austrian rule in the former case, and the contagion of French
Jacobinical opinions in the latter, brought those populations into
increasing hostility to the rulers. The democratic propaganda,
which was permeating all the large towns of the peninsula, then
led to the formation of numerous and powerful clubs and secret
societies; and the throne of Victor Amadeus III., of the house
of Savoy, soon began to totter under the blows delivered by the
French troops at the mountain barriers of his kingdom and under
the insidious assaults of the friends of liberty at Turin. Plotting
was rife at Milan, as also at Bologna, where the memory of old
liberties predisposed men to cast off clerical rule and led to the
first rising on behalf of Italian liberty in the year 1794. At
Palermo the Sicilians struggled hard to establish a republic
Bonaparte
in Italy.
in place of the odious government of an alien dynasty.
The anathemas of the pope, the bravery of Piedmontese
and Austrians, and the subsidies of Great Britain
failed to keep the league of Italian princes against
France intact. The grand-duke of Tuscany was the first of the
European sovereigns who made peace with, and recognized
the French republic, early in 1795. The first fortnight of
Napoleon’s campaign of 1796 detached Sardinia from alliance
with Austria and England. The enthusiasm of the Italians
for the young Corsican “liberator” greatly helped his progress.
Two months later Ferdinand of Naples sought for an armistice,
the central duchies were easily overrun, and, early in 1797,
Pope Pius VI. was fain to sign terms of peace with Bonaparte
at Tolentino, practically ceding the northern part of his states,
known as the Legations. The surrender of the last Habsburg
stronghold, Mantua, on the 2nd of February 1797 left the field
clear for the erection of new political institutions.
Already the men of Reggio, Modena and Bologna had declared for a democratic policy, in which feudalism and clerical rule should have no place, and in which manhood suffrage, together with other rights promised by Bonaparte to the men of Milan in May 1796, should form the basis The Cispadane Republic. of a new order of things. In taking this step the Modenese and Romagnols had the encouragement of Bonaparte, despite the orders which the French directory sent to him in a contrary sense. The result was the formation of an assembly at Modena which abolished feudal dues and customs, declared for manhood suffrage and established the Cispadane Republic (October 1796).
The close of Bonaparte’s victorious campaign against the Archduke Charles in 1797 enabled him to mature those designs respecting Venice which are detailed in the article Napoleon. On a far higher level was his conduct towards the Milanese. While the French directory saw in that province little more than a district which might be plundered and bargained for, Bonaparte, though by no means remiss in the exaction of gold and of artistic treasures, was laying the foundation of a friendly republic. During his sojourn at the castle of Montebello or Mombello, near Milan, he commissioned several of the leading men of northern Italy to draw up a project of constitution and list of reforms for that province. Meanwhile he took care to curb the excesses of the Italian Jacobins and to encourage the Moderates, who were favourable to the French connexion as promising a guarantee against Austrian domination and internal anarchy. He summed up his conduct in the letter of the 8th of May 1797 to the French directory, “I cool the hot The Cisalpine Republic. heads here and warm the cool ones.” The Transpadane Republic, or, as it was soon called, the Cisalpine Republic, began its organized life on the 9th of July 1797, with a brilliant festival at Milan. The constitution was modelled on that of the French directory, and, lest there should be a majority of clerical or Jacobinical deputies, the French Republic through its general, Bonaparte, nominated and appointed the first deputies and administrators of the new government. In the same month it was joined by the Cispadane Republic; and the terms of the treaty of Campo Formio (October 17, 1797), while fatal to the political life of Venice, awarded to this now considerable state the Venetian territories west of the river Adige. A month later, under the pretence of stilling the civil strifes in the Valtelline, Bonaparte absorbed that Swiss district in the Cisalpine Republic, which thus included all the lands between Como and Verona on the north, and Rimini on the south.
Early in the year 1798 the Austrians, in pursuance of the scheme of partition agreed on at Campo Formio, entered Venice and brought to an end its era of independence which had lasted some 1100 years. Venice with its mainland territories east of the Adige, inclusive of Istria and End of the Venetian Republic. Dalmatia, went to the Habsburgs, while the Venetian isles of the Adriatic (the Ionian Isles) and the Venetian fleet went to strengthen France for that eastern expedition on which Bonaparte had already set his heart. Venice not only paid the costs of the war to the two chief belligerents, but her naval resources also helped to launch the young general on his career of eastern adventure. Her former rival, Genoa, had also been compelled, in June 1797, to bow before the young conqueror, and had undergone at his hands a remodelling on the lines already followed at Milan. The new Genoese republic, French in all but name, was renamed the Ligurian Republic.
Before he set sail for Egypt, the French had taken possession of Rome. Already masters of the papal fortress of Ancona, they began openly to challenge the pope’s authority at the Eternal City itself. Joseph Bonaparte, then French envoy to the Vatican, encouraged democratic French occupation of Rome. manifestations; and one of them, at the close of 1797, led to a scuffle in which a French general, Duphot, was killed. The French directory at once ordered its general, Berthier, to march to Rome: the Roman democrats proclaimed a republic on the 15th of February 1798, and on their invitation Berthier and his troops marched in. The pope, Pius VI., was forthwith haled away to Siena and a year later to Valence in the south of France, where he died. Thus fell the temporal power. The “liberators” of Rome thereupon proceeded to plunder the city in a way which brought shame on their cause and disgrace (perhaps not wholly deserved) on the general left in command, Masséna.
These events brought revolution to the gates of the kingdom
of Naples, the worst-governed part of Italy, where the boorish
king, Ferdinand IV. (il rè lazzarone, he was termed),
and his whimsical consort, Maria Carolina, scarcely
held in check the discontent of their own subjects. A British
Naples.
fleet under Nelson, sent into the Mediterranean in May 1798
primarily for their defence, checkmated the designs of Bonaparte
in Egypt, and then, returning to Naples, encouraged that court
to adopt a spirited policy. It is now known that the influence
of Nelson and of the British ambassador, Sir William Hamilton,
and Lady Hamilton precipitated the rupture between Naples
and France. The results were disastrous. The Neapolitan
troops at first occupied Rome, but, being badly handled by
their leader, the Austrian general, Mack, they were soon scattered
in flight; and the Republican troops under General
The Partheno-
paean Republic.
Championnet, after crushing the stubborn resistance
of the lazzaroni, made their way into Naples and
proclaimed the Parthenopaean Republic (January 23,
1799). The Neapolitan Democrats chose five of their leading
men to be directors, and tithes and feudal dues and customs
were abolished. Much good work was done by the Republicans
during their brief tenure of power, but it soon came to an end owing
to the course of events which favoured a reaction against France.
The directors of Paris, not content with overrunning and plundering
Switzerland, had outraged German sentiment in many ways.
Further, at the close of 1798 they virtually compelled the young
king of Sardinia, Charles Emmanuel IV., to abdicate at Turin.
He retired to the island of Sardinia, while the French despoiled
Piedmont, thereby adding fuel to the resentment rapidly growing
against them in every part of Europe.
The outcome of it all was the War of the Second Coalition,
in which Russia, Austria, Great Britain, Naples and some
secondary states of Germany took part. The incursion
of an Austro-Russian army, led by that strange but
magnetic being, Suvarov, decided the campaign in
Suvarov
in Italy.
northern Italy. The French, poorly handled by Schérer and
Sérurier, were everywhere beaten, especially at Magnano (April
5) and Cassano (April 27). Milan and Turin fell before the
allies, and Moreau, who took over the command, had much
difficulty in making his way to the Genoese coast-line. There
he awaited the arrival of Macdonald with the army of Naples.
That general, Championnet’s successor, had been compelled by
these reverses and by the threatening pressure of Nelson’s fleet
to evacuate Naples and central Italy. In many parts the
peasants and townsfolk, enraged by the licence of the French,
hung on his flank and rear. The republics set up by the French
at Naples, Rome and Milan collapsed as soon as the French
troops retired; and a reaction in favour of clerical and Austrian
influence set in with great violence. For the events which then
occurred at Naples, so compromising to the reputation of Nelson,
see Nelson and Naples. Sir William Hamilton was subsequently
recalled in a manner closely resembling a disgrace, and
his place was taken by Paget, who behaved with more dignity
and tact.
Meanwhile Macdonald, after struggling through central Italy, had defeated an Austrian force at Modena (June 12, 1799), but Suvarov was able by swift movements utterly to overthrow him at the Trebbia (June 17–19). The wreck of his force drifted away helplessly towards Genoa. A month later the ambitious young general, Joubert, who took over Moreau’s command and rallied part of Macdonald’s following, was utterly routed by the Austro-Russian army at Novi (August 15) with the loss of 12,000 men. Joubert perished in the battle. The growing friction between Austria and Russia led to the transference of Suvarov and his Russians to Switzerland, with results which were to be fatal to the allies in that quarter. But in Italy the Austrian successes continued. Melas defeated Championnet near Coni on the 4th of November; and a little later the French garrisons at Ancona and Coni surrendered. The tricolour, which floated triumphantly over all the strongholds of Italy early in the year, at its close waved only over Genoa, where Masséna prepared for a stubborn defence. Nice and Savoy also seemed at the mercy of the invaders. Everywhere the old order of things was restored. The death of the aged Pope Pius VI. at Valence (August 29, 1799) deprived the French of whatever advantage they had hoped to gain by dragging him into exile; on the 24th of March 1800 the conclave, assembled for greater security on the island of San Giorgio at Venice, elected a new pontiff, Pius VII.
Such was the position of affairs when Bonaparte returned
from Egypt and landed at Fréjus. The contrast presented by
his triumphs, whether real or imaginary, to the reverses
sustained by the armies of the French directory, was
fatal to that body and to popular institutions in France.
Campaign
of Marengo.
After the coup d’état of Brumaire (November 1799) he,
as First Consul, began to organize an expedition against the
Austrians (Russia having now retired from the coalition), in
northern Italy. The campaign culminating at Marengo was
the result. By that triumph (due to Desaix and Kellermann
rather than directly to him), Bonaparte consolidated his own
position in France and again laid Italy at his feet. The Austrian
general, Melas, signed an armistice whereby he was to retire
with his army beyond the river Mincio. Ten days earlier,
namely on the 4th of June, Masséna had been compelled by
hunger to capitulate at Genoa; but the success at Marengo,
followed up by that of Macdonald in north Italy, and Moreau
at Hohenlinden (December 2, 1800), brought the emperor
Treaty of Lunéville.
Francis to sue for peace which was finally concluded
at Lunéville on the 9th of February 1801. The
Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics (reconstituted soon
after Marengo) were recognized by Austria on condition that they
were independent of France. The rule of Pius VII. over the
Papal States was admitted; and Italian affairs were arranged
much as they were at Campo Formio: Modena and Tuscany
now reverted to French control, their former rulers being promised
compensation in Germany. Naples, easily worsted by the French,
under Miollis, left the British alliance, and made peace by the
treaty of Florence (March 1801), agreeing to withdraw her
troops from the Papal States, to cede Piombino and the Presidii
(in Tuscany) to France and to close her ports to British ships and
commerce. King Ferdinand also had to accept a French garrison
at Taranto, and other points in the south.
Other changes took place in that year, all of them in favour of France. By complex and secret bargaining with the court of Madrid, Bonaparte procured the cession to France of Louisiana, in North America, and Parma; while the duke of Parma (husband of an infanta of Spain) Napoleon’s reorganization of Italy. was promoted by him to the duchy of Tuscany, now renamed the kingdom of Etruria. Piedmont was declared to be a military division at the disposal of France (April 21, 1801); and on the 21st of September 1802, Bonaparte, then First Consul for life, issued a decree for its definitive incorporation in the French Republic. About that time, too, Elba fell into the hands of Napoleon. Piedmont was organized in six departments on the model of those of France, and a number of French veterans were settled by Napoleon in and near the fortress of Alessandria. Besides copying the Roman habit of planting military colonies, the First Consul imitated the old conquerors of the world by extending and completing the road-system of his outlying districts, especially at those important passes, the Mont Cenis and Simplon. He greatly improved the rough track over the Simplon Pass, so that, when finished in 1807, it was practicable for artillery. Milan was the terminus of the road, and the construction of the Foro Buonaparte and the completion of the cathedral added dignity to the Lombard capital. The Corniche road was improved; and public works in various parts of Piedmont, and the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics attested the foresight and wisdom of the great organizer of industry and quickener of human energies. The universities of Pavia and Bologna were reopened and made great progress in this time of peace and growing prosperity. Somewhat later the Pavia canal was begun in order to connect Lake Como with the Adriatic for barge-traffic.
The personal nature of the tie binding Italy to France was illustrated by a curious incident of the winter of 1802–1803. Bonaparte, now First Consul for life, felt strong enough to impose his will on the Cisalpine Republic and to set at defiance one of the stipulations of the treaty of Lunéville. On the pretext of consolidating that republic, he invited 450 of its leading men to come to Lyons to a consulta. In reality he and his agents had already provided for the passing of proposals which were agreeable to him. The deputies having been dazzled by fêtes and reviews, Talleyrand and Marescalchi, ministers of foreign affairs at Paris and Milan, plied them with hints as to the course to be followed by the consulta; and, despite the rage of the more democratic of their number, everything corresponded to the wishes of the First Consul. It remained to find a chief. Very many were in favour of Count Melzi, a Lombard noble, who had been chief of the executive at Milan; but again Talleyrand and French agents set to work on behalf of their master, with the result that he was elected president for ten years. He accepted that office because, as he frankly informed the deputies, he had found no one who “for his services rendered to his country, his authority with the people and his separation from party has deserved such an office.” Melzi was elected vice-president with merely honorary functions. The constitution comprised a consulta charged with executive duties, a legislative body of 150 members and a court charged with the maintenance of the fundamental laws. These three bodies were to be chosen by three electoral colleges consisting of (a) landed proprietors, (b) learned men and clerics, (c) merchants and traders, holding their sessions biennially at Milan, Bologna and Brescia respectively. In practice the consulta could override the legislature; and, as the consulta was little more than the organ of the president, the whole constitution may be pronounced as autocratic as that of France after the changes brought about by Bonaparte in August 1802. Finally we must note that the Cisalpine now took the name of the Italian Republic, and that by a concordat with the pope, Bonaparte regulated its relations to the Holy See in a manner analogous to that adopted in the famous French concordat promulgated at Easter 1802 (see Concordat). It remains to add that the Ligurian Republic and that of Lucca remodelled their constitutions in a way somewhat similar to that of the Cisalpine.
Bonaparte’s ascendancy did not pass unchallenged. Many of
the Italians retained their enthusiasm for democracy and national
independence. In 1803 movements in these directions
took place at Rimini, Brescia and Bologna; but they
were sharply repressed, and most Italians came to
Kingdom
of Italy.
acquiesce in the Napoleonic supremacy as inevitable and indeed
beneficial. The complete disregard shown by Napoleon for one
of the chief conditions of the treaty of Lunéville (February
1801)—that stipulating for the independence of the Ligurian
and Cisalpine Republics—became more and more apparent
every year. Alike in political and commercial affairs they were
for all practical purposes dependencies of France. Finally,
after the proclamation of the French empire (May 18, 1804)
Napoleon proposed to place his brother Joseph over the Italian
state, which now took the title of kingdom of Italy. On Joseph
declining, Napoleon finally decided to accept the crown which
Melzi, Marescalchi, Serbelloni and others begged him to assume.
Accordingly, on the 26th of May 1805, in the cathedral at Milan,
he crowned himself with the iron crown of the old Lombard
kings, using the traditional formula, “God gave it me: let him
beware who touches it.” On the 7th of June he appointed his
step-son, Eugène Beauharnais, to be viceroy. Eugène soon found
that his chief duty was to enforce the will of Napoleon. The
legislature at Milan having ventured to alter some details of
taxation, Eugène received the following rule of conduct from his
step-father: “Your system of government is simple: the
emperor wills it to be thus.” Republicanism was now everywhere
discouraged. The little republic of Lucca, along with
Piombino, was now awarded as a principality by the emperor
to Elisa Bonaparte and her husband, Bacciocchi.
In June 1805 there came a last and intolerable affront to the emperors of Austria and Russia, who at that very time were seeking to put bounds to Napoleon’s ambition and to redress the balance of power. The French emperor, at the supposed request of the doge of Genoa, declared the Ligurian Republic to be an integral part of the French empire. This defiance to the sovereigns of Russia and Austria rekindled the flames of war. The third coalition was formed between Great Britain, Russia and Austria, Naples soon joining its ranks.
For the chief events of the ensuing campaigns see Napoleonic
Campaigns. While Masséna pursued the Austrians into their
own lands at the close of 1805, Italian forces under Eugène
and Gouvion St Cyr (q.v.) held their ground against allied forces
landed at Naples. After Austerlitz (December 2, 1805)
Austria made peace by the treaty of Pressburg, ceding to the
kingdom of Italy her part of Venetia along with the provinces
of Istria and Dalmatia. Napoleon then turned fiercely against
Maria Carolina of Naples upbraiding her with her “perfidy.”
He sent Joseph Bonaparte and Masséna southwards with a
strong column, compelled the Anglo-Russian forces to evacuate
Naples, and occupied the south of the peninsula with little
opposition except at the fortress of Gaeta. The Bourbon court
sailed away to Palermo, where it remained for eight years
under the protection afforded by the British fleet and a
Joseph Bonaparte
in Naples.
British army of occupation. On the 15th of February
1806 Joseph Bonaparte entered Naples in triumph, his
troops capturing there two hundred pieces of cannon.
Gaeta, however, held out stoutly against the French.
Sir Sidney Smith with a British squadron captured Capri
(February 1806), and the peasants of the Abruzzi and Calabria
soon began to give trouble. Worst of all was the arrival of a
small British force in Calabria under Sir John Stuart, which
beat off with heavy loss an attack imprudently delivered by
General Réynier on level ground near the village of Maida
(July 4). The steady volleys of Kempt’s light infantry
were fatal to the French, who fell back in disorder under a
bayonet charge of the victors, with the loss of some 2700 men.
Calabria now rose in revolt against King Joseph, and the peasants
dealt out savage reprisals to the French troops. On the 18th
of July, however, Gaeta surrendered to Masséna, and that
marshal, now moving rapidly southwards, extricated Réynier,
crushed the Bourbon rising in Calabria with great barbarity,
and compelled the British force to re-embark for Sicily. At
Palermo Queen Maria Carolina continued to make vehement
but futile efforts for the overthrow of King Joseph.
It is more important to observe that under Joseph and his ministers or advisers, including the Frenchmen Roederer, Dumas, Miot de Melito and the Corsican Saliceti, great progress was made in abolishing feudal laws and customs, in reforming the judicial procedure and criminal laws on the model of the Code Napoléon, and in attempting the beginnings of elementary education. More questionable was Joseph’s policy in closing and confiscating the property of 213 of the richer monasteries of the land. The monks were pensioned off, but though the confiscated property helped to fill the empty coffers of the state, the measure aroused widespread alarm and resentment among that superstitious people.
The peace of Tilsit (July 7, 1807) enabled Napoleon to press on his projects for securing the command of the Mediterranean, thenceforth a fundamental axiom of his policy. Consequently, in the autumn of 1807 he urged on Joseph the adoption of vigorous measures for the capture of Sicily. Already, in the negotiations with England during the summer of 1806, the emperor had shown his sense of the extreme importance of gaining possession of that island, which indeed caused the breakdown of the peace proposals then being considered; and now he ordered French squadrons into the Mediterranean in order to secure Corfu and Sicily. His plans respecting Corfu succeeded. That island and some of the adjacent isles fell into the hands of the French (some of them were captured by British troops in 1809–10); but Sicily remained unassailable. Capri, however, fell to the French on the 18th of October 1808, shortly after the arrival at Naples of the new king, Murat.
This ambitious marshal, brother-in-law of Napoleon, foiled in his hope of gaining the crown of Spain, received that of Naples in the summer of 1808, Joseph Bonaparte being moved from Naples to Madrid. This arrangement pleased neither of the relatives of the emperor; but his will Murat, King of Naples. now was law on the continent. Joseph left Naples on the 23rd of May 1808; but it was not until the 6th of September that Joachim Murat made his entry. A fortnight later his consort Caroline arrived, and soon showed a vigour and restlessness of spirit which frequently clashed with the dictates of her brother, the emperor and the showy, unsteady policy of her consort. The Spanish national rising of 1808 and thereafter the Peninsular War diverted Napoleon’s attention from the affairs of south Italy. In June 1809, during his campaign against Austria, Sir John Stuart with an Anglo-Sicilian force sailed northwards, captured Ischia and threw Murat into great alarm; but on the news of the Austrian defeat at Wagram, Stuart sailed back again.
It is now time to turn to the affairs of central Italy. Early in 1808 Napoleon proceeded with plans which he had secretly concerted after the treaty of Tilsit for transferring the infanta of Spain who, after the death of her consort, reigned at Florence on behalf of her young son, Charles Louis, from her kingdom of Central Italy. Etruria to the little principality of Entre Douro e Minho which he proposed to carve out from the north of Portugal. Etruria reverted to the French empire, but the Spanish princess and her son did not receive the promised indemnity. Elisa Bonaparte and her husband, Bacciocchi, rulers of Lucca and Piombino, became the heads of the administration in Tuscany, Elisa showing decided governing capacity.
The last part of the peninsula to undergo the Gallicizing influence was the papal dominion. For some time past the relations between Napoleon and the pope, Pius VII., had been severely strained, chiefly because the emperor insisted on controlling the church, both in France and in the Napoleon and the Papacy. kingdom of Italy, in a way inconsistent with the traditions of the Vatican, but also because the pontiff refused to grant the divorce between Jerome Bonaparte and the former Miss Patterson on which Napoleon early in the year 1806 laid so much stress. These and other disputes led the emperor, as successor of Charlemagne, to treat the pope in a very highhanded way. “Your Holiness (he wrote) is sovereign of Rome, but I am its emperor”; and he threatened to annul the presumed “donation” of Rome by Charlemagne, unless the pope yielded implicit obedience to him in all temporal affairs. He further exploited the Charlemagne tradition for the benefit of the continental system, that great engine of commercial war by which he hoped to assure the ruin of England. This aim prompted the annexation of Tuscany, and his intervention in the affairs of the Papal States. To this the pope assented under pressure from Napoleon; but the latter soon found other pretexts for intervention, and in February 1808 a French column under Miollis occupied Rome, and deposed the papal authorities. Against this violence Pius VII. protested in vain. Napoleon sought to push matters to an extreme, and on the 2nd of April Annexation of the Papal States. he adopted the rigorous measure of annexing to the kingdom of Italy the papal provinces of Ancona, Urbino, Macerata and Camerina. This measure, which seemed to the pious an act of sacrilege, and to Italian patriots an outrage on the only independent sovereign of the peninsula, sufficed for the present. The outbreak of war in Spain, followed by the rupture with Austria in the spring of 1809, distracted the attention of the emperor. But after the occupation of Vienna the conqueror dated from that capital on the 17th of May 1809 a decree virtually annexing Rome and the Patrimonium Petri to the French empire. Here again he cited the action of Charlemagne, his “august predecessor,” who had merely given “certain domains to the bishops of Rome as fiefs, though Rome did not thereby cease to be part of his empire.”
In reply the pope prepared a bull of excommunication against those who should infringe the prerogatives of the Holy See in this matter. Thereupon the French general, Miollis, who still occupied Rome, caused the pope to be arrested and carried him away northwards into Tuscany, thence to Savona; finally he was taken, at Napoleon’s orders, to Fontainebleau. Thus, a second time, fell the temporal power of the papacy. By an imperial decree of the 17th of February 1810, Rome and the neighbouring districts, including Spoleto, became part of the French empire. Rome thenceforth figured as its second city, and entered upon a new life under the administration of French officials. The Roman territory was divided into two departments—the Tiber and Trasimenus; the Code Napoléon was introduced, public works were set on foot and great advance was made in the material sphere. Nevertheless the harshness with which the emperor treated the Roman clergy and suppressed the monasteries caused deep resentment to the orthodox.
There is no need to detail the fortunes of the Napoleonic states in Italy. One and all they underwent the influences emanating from Paris; and in respect to civil administration, law, judicial procedure, education and public works, they all experienced great benefits, the results of which Character of Napoleon’s rule. never wholly disappeared. On the other hand, they suffered from the rigorous measures of the continental system, which seriously crippled trade at the ports and were not compensated by the increased facilities for trade with France which Napoleon opened up. The drain of men to supply his armies in Germany, Spain and Russia was also a serious loss. A powerful Italian corps marched under Eugène Beauharnais to Moscow, and distinguished itself at Malo-Jaroslavitz, as also during the horrors of the retreat in the closing weeks of 1812. It is said that out of 27,000 Italians who entered Russia with Eugène, only 333 saw their country again. That campaign marked the beginning of the end for the Napoleonic domination in Italy as elsewhere. Collapse of Napoleon’s rule. Murat, left in command of the Grand Army at Vilna, abandoned his charge and in the next year made overtures to the allies who coalesced against Napoleon. For his vacillations at this time and his final fate, see Murat. Here it must suffice to say that the uncertainty caused by his policy in 1813–1814 had no small share in embarrassing Napoleon and in precipitating the downfall of his power in Italy. Eugène Beauharnais, viceroy of the kingdom of Italy, showed both constancy and courage; but after the battle of Leipzig (October 16–19, 1813) his power crumbled away under the assaults of the now victorious Austrians. By an arrangement with Bavaria, they were able to march through Tirol and down the valley of the Adige in force, and overpowered the troops of Eugène whose position was fatally compromised by the defection of Murat and the dissensions among the Italians. Very many of them, distrusting both of these kings, sought to act independently in favour of an Italian republic. Lord William Bentinck with an Anglo-Sicilian force landed at Leghorn on the 8th of March 1814, and issued a proclamation to the Italians bidding them rise against Napoleon in the interests of their own freedom. A little later he gained possession of Genoa. Amidst these schisms the defence of Italy collapsed. On the 16th of April 1814 Eugène, on hearing of Napoleon’s overthrow at Paris, signed an armistice at Mantua by which he was enabled to send away the French troops beyond the Alps and entrust himself to the consideration of the allies. The Austrians, under General Bellegarde, entered Milan without resistance; and this event precluded the restoration of the old political order.
The arrangements made by the allies in accordance with the treaty of Paris (June 12, 1814) and the Final Act of the congress of Vienna (June 9, 1815), imposed on Italy boundaries which, roughly speaking, corresponded to those of the pre-Napoleonic era. To the kingdom of Sardinia, now reconstituted under Victor Emmanuel I., France ceded its old provinces, Savoy and Nice; and the allies, especially Great Britain and Austria, insisted on the addition to that monarchy of the territories of the former republic of Genoa, in respect of which the king took the title of duke of Genoa, in order to strengthen it for the duty of acting as a buffer state between France and the smaller states of central Italy. Austria recovered the Milanese, and all the possessions of the old Venetian Republic on the mainland, including Istria and Dalmatia. The Ionian Islands, formerly belonging to Venice, were, by a treaty signed at Paris on the 5th of November 1815, placed under the protection of Great Britain. By an instrument signed on the 24th of April 1815, the Austrian territories in north Italy were erected into the kingdom of Lombardo-Venetia, which, though an integral part of the Austrian empire, was to enjoy a separate administration, the symbol of its separate individuality being the coronation of the emperors with the ancient iron crown of Lombardy (“Proclamation de l’empereur d’Autriche, &c.,” April 7, 1815, State Papers, ii. 906). Francis IV., son of the archduke Ferdinand of Austria and Maria Beatrice, daughter of Ercole Rinaldo, the last of the Estensi, was reinstated as duke of Modena. Parma and Piacenza were assigned to Marie Louise, daughter of the Austrian emperor and wife of Napoleon, on behalf of her son, the little Napoleon, but by subsequent arrangements (1816–1817) the duchy was to revert at her death to the Bourbons of Parma, then reigning at Lucca. Tuscany was restored to the grand-duke Ferdinand III. of Habsburg-Lorraine. The duchy of Lucca was given to Marie Louise of Bourbon-Parma, who, at the death of Marie Louise of Austria, would return to Parma, when Lucca would be handed over to Tuscany. The pope, Pius VII., who had long been kept under restraint by Napoleon at Fontainebleau, returned to Rome in May 1814, and was recognized by the congress of Vienna (not without some demur on the part of Austria) as the sovereign of all the former possessions of the Holy See. Ferdinand IV. of Naples, not long after the death of his consort, Maria Carolina, in Austria, returned from Sicily to take possession of his dominions on the mainland. He received them back in their entirety at the hands of the powers, who recognized his new title of Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies. The rash attempt of Murat in the autumn of 1815, which led to his death at Pizzo in Calabria, enabled the Bourbon dynasty to crush malcontents with all the greater severity. The reaction, which was dull and heavy in the dominions of the pope and of Victor Emmanuel, systematically harsh in the Austrian states of the north, and comparatively mild in Parma and Tuscany, excited the greatest loathing in southern Italy and Sicily, because there it was directed by a dynasty which had aroused feelings of hatred mingled with contempt.
There were special reasons why Sicily should harbour these feelings against the Bourbons. During eight years (1806–1814) the chief places of the island had been garrisoned by British troops; and the commander of the force which upheld the tottering rule of Ferdinand at Palermo naturally had great authority. The British government, which awarded a large annual subsidy to the king and queen at Palermo, claimed to have some control over the administration. Lord William Bentinck finally took over large administrative powers, seeing that Ferdinand, owing to his dulness, and Maria Carolina, owing to her very suspicious intrigues with Napoleon, could never be trusted. The contest between the royal power and that of the Sicilian estates threatened to bring matters to a deadlock, until in 1812, under the impulse of Lord William Bentinck, a constitution modelled largely on that of England was passed by the estates. After the retirement of the British troops in 1814 the constitution lapsed, and the royal authority became once more absolute. But the memory of the benefits conferred by “the English constitution” remained fresh and green amidst the arid waste of repression which followed. It lived on as one of the impalpable but powerful influences which spurred on the Sicilians and the democrats of Naples to the efforts which they put forth in 1821, 1830, 1848 and 1860.
This result, accruing from British intervention, was in some respects similar to that exerted by Napoleon on the Italians of the mainland. The brutalities of Austria’s white coats in the north, the unintelligent repression then characteristic of the house of Savoy, the petty spite of the duke of Modena, the medieval obscurantism of pope and cardinals in the middle of the peninsula and the clownish excesses of Ferdinand in the south, could not blot out from the minds of the Italians the recollection of the benefits derived from the just laws, vigorous administration and enlightened aims of the great emperor. The hard but salutary training which they had undergone at his hands had taught them that they were the equals of the northern races both in the council chamber and on the field of battle. It had further revealed to them that truth, which once grasped can never be forgotten, that, despite differences of climate, character and speech, they were in all essentials a nation. (J. Hl. R.)
E. The Risorgimento, 1815–1870
As the result of the Vienna treaties, Austria became the real mistress of Italy. Not only did she govern Lombardy and Venetia directly, but Austrian princes ruled in Modena, Parma and Tuscany; Piacenza, Ferrara and Comacchio had Austrian garrisons; Prince Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, believed that he could always secure the election of an Austrophil pope, and Ferdinand of Naples, reinstated by an Austrian army, had bound himself, by a secret article of the treaty of June 12, 1815, not to introduce methods of government incompatible with those adopted in Austria’s Italian possessions. Austria also concluded offensive and defensive alliances with Sardinia, Tuscany and Naples; and Metternich’s ambition was to make Austrian predominance over Italy still more absolute, by placing an Austrian archduke on the Sardinian throne.
Victor Emmanuel I., the king of Sardinia, was the only native ruler in the peninsula, and the Savoy dynasty was popular with all classes. But although welcomed with enthusiasm on his return to Turin, he introduced a system of reaction which, if less brutal, was no less uncompromising Reaction in the Italian States. than that of Austrian archdukes or Bourbon princes. His object was to restore his dominions to the conditions preceding the French occupation. The French system of taxation was maintained because it brought in ampler revenues; but feudalism, the antiquated legislation and bureaucracy were revived, and all the officers and officials still living who had served the state before the Revolution, many of them now in their dotage, were restored to their posts; only nobles were eligible for the higher government appointments; all who had served under the French administration were dismissed or reduced in rank, and in the army beardless scions of the aristocracy were placed over the heads of war-worn veterans who had commanded regiments in Spain and Russia. The influence of a bigoted priesthood was re-established, and “every form of intellectual and moral torment, everything save actual persecution and physical torture that could be inflicted on the ‘impure’ was inflicted” (Cesare Balbo’s Autobiography). All this soon provoked discontent among the educated classes. In Genoa the government was particularly unpopular, for the Genoese resented being handed over to their old enemy Piedmont like a flock of sheep. Nevertheless the king strongly disliked the Austrians, and would willingly have seen them driven from Italy.
In Lombardy French rule had ended by making itself unpopular,
and even before the fall of Napoleon a national party,
called the Italici puri, had begun to advocate the
independence of Lombardy, or even its union with
Sardinia. At first a part of the population were
Austrian
rule in Italy.
content with Austrian rule, which provided an honest
and efficient administration; but the rigid system of centralization
which, while allowing the semblance of local autonomy,
sent every minute question for settlement to Vienna; the
severe police methods; the bureaucracy, in which the best
appointments were usually conferred on Germans or Slavs
wholly dependent on Vienna, proved galling to the people, and
in view of the growing disaffection the country was turned
into a vast armed camp. In Modena Duke Francis proved
a cruel tyrant. In Parma, on the other hand, there was
very little oppression, the French codes were retained, and
the council of state was consulted on all legislative matters.
Lucca too enjoyed good government, and the peasantry were
well cared for and prosperous. In Tuscany the rule of Ferdinand
and of his minister Fossombroni was mild and benevolent,
but enervating and demoralizing. The Papal States were
ruled by a unique system of theocracy, for not only the head of
the state but all the more important officials were ecclesiastics,
assisted by the Inquisition, the Index and all the paraphernalia
Reaction
in Rome.
of medieval church government. The administration
was inefficient and corrupt, the censorship uncompromising,
the police ferocious and oppressive, although
quite unable to cope with the prevalent anarchy and brigandage;
the antiquated pontifical statutes took the place of the French
laws, and every vestige of the vigorous old communal independence
was swept away. In Naples King Ferdinand retained
some of the laws and institutions of Murat’s régime, and many
Naples.
of the functionaries of the former government entered
his service; but he revived the Bourbon tradition,
the odious police system and the censorship; and a degrading
religious bigotry, to which the masses were all too much inclined,
became the basis of government and social life. The upper
classes were still to a large extent inoculated with French ideas,
but the common people were either devoted to the dynasty or
indifferent. In Sicily, which for centuries had enjoyed a feudal
constitution modernized and Anglicized under British auspices
in 1812, and where anti-Neapolitan feeling was strong, autonomy
was suppressed, the constitution abolished in 1816, and the
island, as a reward for its fidelity to the dynasty, converted into
a Neapolitan province governed by Neapolitan bureaucrats.
To the mass of the people the restoration of the old governments undoubtedly brought a sense of relief, for the terrible drain in men and money caused by Napoleon’s wars had caused much discontent, whereas now there was a prospect of peace and rest. But the restored governments in their terror of revolution would not realize that the late régime had wafted a breath of new life over the country and left ineffaceable traces in the way of improved laws, efficient administration, good roads and the sweeping away of old abuses; while the new-born idea of Italian unity, strengthened by a national pride revived on many a stricken field from Madrid to Moscow, was a force to be reckoned with. The oppression and follies of the restored governments made men forget the evils of French rule and remember only its good side. The masses were still more or less indifferent, but among the nobility and the educated middle Secret societies. The Carbonari.classes, cut off from all part in free political life, there was developed either the spirit of despair at Italy’s moral degradation, as expressed in the writings of Foscolo and Leopardi, or a passion of hatred and revolt, which found its manifestation, in spite of severe laws, in the development of secret societies. The most important of these were the Carbonari lodges, whose objects were the expulsion of the foreigner and the achievement of constitutional freedom (see Carbonari).
When Ferdinand returned to Naples in 1815 he found the kingdom, and especially the army, honeycombed with Carbonarism, to which many noblemen and officers were affiliated; and although the police instituted prosecutions and organized the Revolution in Naples, 1820.counter-movement of the Calderai, who may be compared to the “Black Hundreds” of modern Russia, the revolutionary spirit continued to grow, but it was not at first anti-dynastic. The granting of the Spanish constitution of 1820 proved the signal for the beginning of the Italian liberationist movement; a military mutiny led by two officers, Silvati and Morelli, and the priest Menichini, broke out at Monteforte, to the cry of “God, the King, and the Constitution!” The troops sent against them commanded by General Guglielmo Pepe, himself a Carbonaro, hesitated to act, and the king, finding that he could not count on the army, granted the constitution (July 13, 1820), and appointed his son Francis regent. The events that followed are described in the article on the history of Naples (q.v.). Not only did the constitution, which was modelled on the impossible Spanish constitution of 1812, prove unworkable, but the powers of the Grand Alliance, whose main object was to keep the peace of Europe, felt themselves bound to interfere to prevent the evil precedent of a successful military revolution. The diplomatic developments that led to the intervention of Austria are sketched elsewhere (see Europe: History); in general the result of the deliberations of the congresses of Troppau and Laibach was to establish, not the general right of intervention claimed in the Troppau Protocol, but the special right of Austria to safeguard her interests in Italy. The defeat of General Pepe by the Austrians at Rieti (March 7, 1821) and the re-establishment of King Ferdinand’s autocratic power under the protection of Austrian bayonets were the effective assertion of this principle.
The movement in Naples had been purely local, for the Neapolitan Carbonari had at that time no thought save of Naples; it was, moreover, a movement of the middle and upper classes in which the masses took little interest. Immediately after Military revolt in Piedmont.the battle of Rieti a Carbonarist mutiny broke out in Piedmont independently of events in the south. Both King Victor Emmanuel and his brother Charles Felix had no sons, and the heir presumptive to the throne was Prince Charles Albert, of the Carignano branch of the house of Savoy. Charles Albert felt a certain interest in Liberal ideas and was always surrounded by young nobles of Carbonarist and anti-Austrian tendencies, and was therefore regarded with suspicion by his royal relatives. Metternich, too, had an instinctive dislike for him, and proposed to exclude him from the succession by marrying one of the king’s daughters to Francis of Modena, and getting the Salic law abolished so that the succession would pass to the duke and Austria would thus dominate Piedmont. The Liberal movement had gained ground in Piedmont as in Naples among the younger nobles and officers, and the events of Spain and southern Italy aroused much excitement. In March 1821, Count Santorre di Santarosa and other conspirators informed Charles Albert of a constitutional and anti-Austrian plot, and asked for his help. After a momentary hesitation he informed the king; but at his request no arrests were made, and no precautions were taken. On the 10th of March the garrison of Alessandria mutinied, and its example was followed on the 12th by that of Turin, where the Spanish constitution was demanded, and the black, red and blue flag of the Carbonari paraded the streets. The next day the king abdicated after appointing Charles Albert regent. The latter immediately proclaimed the constitution, but the new king, Charles Felix, who was at Modena at the time, repudiated the regent’s acts and exiled him to Tuscany; and, with his consent, an Austrian army invaded Piedmont and crushed the constitutionalists at Novara. Many of the conspirators were condemned to death, but all succeeded in escaping. Charles Felix was most indignant with the ex-regent, but he resented, as an unwarrantable interference, Austria’s attempt to have him excluded from the succession at the congress of Verona (1822). Charles Albert’s somewhat equivocal conduct also roused the hatred of the Liberals, and for a long time the esecrato Carignano was regarded, most unjustly, as a traitor even by many who were not republicans.
Carbonarism had been introduced into Lombardy by two Romagnols, Count Laderchi and Pietro Maroncelli, but the leader of the movement was Count F. Confalonieri, who was in favour of an Italian federation composed of northern Italy under Liberalism in Lombardy.the house of Savoy, central Italy under the pope, and the kingdom of Naples. There had been some mild plotting against Austria in Milan, and an attempt was made to co-operate with the Piedmontese movement of 1821; already in 1820 Maroncelli and the poet Silvio Pellico had been arrested as Carbonari, and after the movement in Piedmont more arrests were made. The mission of Gaetano Castiglia and Marquis Giorgio Pallavicini to Turin, where they had interviewed Charles Albert, although without any definite result—for Confalonieri had warned the prince that Lombardy was not ready to rise—was accidentally discovered, and Confalonieri was himself arrested. The plot would never have been a menace to Austria but for her treatment of the conspirators. Pellico and Maroncelli were immured in the Spielberg; Confalonieri and two dozen others were condemned to death, their sentences being, however, commuted to imprisonment in that same terrible fortress. The heroism of the prisoners, and Silvio Pellico’s account of his imprisonment (Le mie Prigioni), did much to enlist the sympathy of Europe for the Italian cause.
During the next few years order reigned in Italy, save for a few unimportant outbreaks in the Papal States; there was, however, perpetual discontent and agitation, especially in Romagna, where misgovernment was extreme. Under Pius VII. and his The Papal States.minister Cardinal Consalvi oppression had not been very severe, and Metternich’s proposal to establish a central inquisitorial tribunal for political offences throughout Italy had been rejected by the papal government. But on the death of Pius in 1823, his successor Leo XII. (Cardinal Della Genga) proved a ferocious reactionary under whom barbarous laws were enacted and torture frequently applied. The secret societies, such as the Carbonari, the Adelfi and the Bersaglieri d’America, which flourished in Romagna, replied to these persecutions by assassinating the more brutal officials and spies. The events of 1820–1821 increased the agitation in Romagna, and in 1825 large numbers of persons were condemned to death, imprisonment or exile. The society of the Sanfedisti, formed of the dregs of the populace, whose object was to murder every Liberal, was openly protected and encouraged. Leo died in 1829, and the mild, religious Pius VIII. (Cardinal Castiglioni) only reigned until 1830, when Gregory XVI. (Cardinal Cappellari) was elected through Austrian influence, and proved another Revolutions of 1830. zelante. The July revolution in Paris and the declaration of the new king, Louis Philippe, that France, as a Liberal monarchy, would not only not intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, but would not permit other powers to do so, aroused great hopes among the oppressed peoples, and was the immediate cause of a revolution in Romagna and the Marches. In February 1831 these provinces rose, raised the red, white and green tricolor (which henceforth took the place of the Carbonarist colours as the Italian flag), and shook off the papal yoke with surprising ease.[11] At Parma too there was an outbreak and a demand for the constitution; Marie Louise could not grant it because of her engagements with Austria, and, therefore, abandoned her dominions. In Modena Duke Francis, ambitious of enlarging his territories, coquetted with the Carbonari of Paris, and opened indirect negotiations with Menotti, the revolutionary leader in his state, believing that he might assist him in his plans. Menotti, for his part, conceived the idea of a united Italian state under the duke. A rising was organized for February 1831; but Francis got wind of it, and, repenting of his dangerous dallying with revolution, arrested Menotti and fled to Austrian territory with his prisoner. In his absence the insurrection took place, and Biagio Nardi, having been elected dictator, proclaimed that “Italy is one; the Italian nation one sole nation.” But the French king soon abandoned his principle of non-intervention on which the Italian revolutionists had built their hopes; the Austrians intervened unhindered; the old governments were re-established in Parma, Modena and Romagna; and Menotti and many other patriots were hanged. The Austrians evacuated Romagna in July, but another insurrection having broken out immediately afterwards which the papal troops were unable to quell, they returned. This second intervention gave umbrage to France, who by way of a counterpoise sent a force to occupy Ancona. These two foreign occupations, which were almost as displeasing to the pope as to the Liberals, lasted until 1838. The powers, immediately after the revolt, presented a memorandum to Gregory recommending certain moderate reforms, but no attention was paid to it. These various movements proved in the first place that the masses were by no means ripe for revolution, and that the idea of unity, although now advocated by a few revolutionary leaders, was far from being generally accepted even by the Liberals; and, secondly, that, in spite of the indifference of the masses, the despotic governments were unable to hold their own without the assistance of foreign bayonets.
On the 27th of April 1831, Charles Albert succeeded Charles Felix on the throne of Piedmont. Shortly afterwards he received a letter from an unknown person, in which he was exhorted with fiery eloquence to place himself at the head of the movement for liberating and uniting Mazzini and “Young Italy.” Italy and expelling the foreigner, and told that he was free to choose whether he would be “the first of men or the last of Italian tyrants.” The author was Giuseppe Mazzini, then a young man of twenty-six years, who, though in theory a republican, was ready to accept the leadership of a prince of the house of Savoy if he would guide the nation to freedom. The only result of his letter, however, was that he was forbidden to re-enter Sardinian territory. Mazzini, who had learned to distrust Carbonarism owing to its lack of a guiding principle and its absurd paraphernalia of ritual and mystery, had conceived the idea of a more serious political association for the emancipation of his country not only from foreign and domestic despotism but from national faults of character; and this idea he had materialized in the organization of a society called the Giovane Italia (Young Italy) among the Italian refugees at Marseilles. After the events of 1831 he declared that the liberation of Italy could only be achieved through unity, and his great merit lies in having inspired a large number of Italians with that idea at a time when provincial jealousies and the difficulty of communications maintained separatist feelings. Young Italy spread to all centres of Italian exiles, and by means of literature carried on an active propaganda in Italy itself, where the party came to be called “Ghibellini,” as though reviving the traditions of medieval anti-Papalism. Though eventually this activity of the Giovane Italia supplanted that of the older societies, in practice it met with no better success; the two attempts to invade Savoy in the hope of seducing the army from its allegiance failed miserably, and only resulted in a series of barbarous sentences of death and imprisonment which made most Liberals despair of Charles Albert, while they called down much criticism on Mazzini as the organizer of raids in which he himself took no part. He was now forced to leave France, but continued his work of agitation from London. The disorders in Naples and Sicily in 1837 had no connexion with Mazzini, but the forlorn hope of the brothers Bandiera, who in 1844 landed on the Calabrian coast, was the work of the Giovane Italia. The rebels were captured and shot, but the significance of the attempt lies in the fact that it was the first occasion on which north Italians (the Bandieras were Venetians and officers in the Austrian navy) had tried to raise the standard of revolt in the south.
Romagna had continued a prey to anarchy ever since 1831; the government organized armed bands called the Centurioni (descended from the earlier Sanfedisti), to terrorize the Liberals, while the secret societies continued their “propaganda by deeds.” It is noteworthy that Romagna was the only part of Italy where the revolutionary movement was accompanied by murder. In 1845 several outbreaks occurred, and a band led by Pietro Renzi captured Rimini, whence a proclamation drawn up by L. C. Farini was issued demanding the reforms advocated by the powers’ memorandum of 1831. But the movement collapsed without result, and the leaders fled to Tuscany.
Side by side with the Mazzinian propaganda in favour of a united Italian republic, which manifested itself in secret societies, plots and insurrections, there was another Liberal movement based on the education of opinion and on economic development. In Piedmont, in spite of the government’s reactionary Liberalism and economic development. methods, a large part of the population were genuinely attached to the Savoy dynasty, and the idea of a regeneration of Italy under its auspices began to gain ground. Some writers proclaimed the necessity of building railways, developing agriculture and encouraging industries, before resorting to revolution; while others, like the Tuscan Gino Capponi, inspired by the example of England and France, wished to make the people fit for freedom by means of improved schools, books and periodicals. Vincenzo Gioberti (q.v.) published in 1843 his famous treatise Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani, a work, which, in striking contrast to the prevailing pessimism of the day, extolled the past greatness and achievements of the Italian people and their present virtues. His political ideal was a federation of all the Italian states under the presidency of the pope, on a basis of Catholicism, but without a constitution. In spite of all its inaccuracies and exaggerations the book served a useful purpose in reviving the self-respect of a despondent people. Another work of a similar kind was Le Speranze d’Italia (1844) by the Piedmontese Count Cesare Balbo (q.v.). Like Gioberti he advocated a federation of Italian states, but he declared that before this could be achieved Austria must be expelled from Italy and compensation found for her in the Near East by making her a Danubian power—a curious forecast that Italy’s liberation would begin with an eastern war. He extolled Charles Albert and appealed to his patriotism; he believed that the church was necessary and the secret societies harmful; representative government was undesirable, but he advocated a consultative assembly. Above all Italian character must be reformed and the nation educated. A third important publication was Massimo d’Azeglio’s Degli ultimi casi di Romagna, in which the author, another Piedmontese nobleman, exposed papal misgovernment while condemning the secret societies and advocating open resistance and protest. He upheld the papacy in principle, regarded Austria as the great enemy of Italian regeneration, and believed that the means of expelling her were only to be found in Piedmont.
Besides the revolutionists and republicans who promoted conspiracy and insurrection whenever possible, and the moderates or “Neo-Guelphs,” as Gioberti’s followers were called, we must mention the Italian exiles who were learning the art of war in foreign countries—in Spain, in Greece, in The Italian exiles. Poland, in South America—and those other exiles who, in Paris or London, eked out a bare subsistence by teaching Italian or by their pen, and laid the foundations of that love of Italy which, especially in England, eventually brought the weight of diplomacy into the scales for Italian freedom. All these forces were equally necessary—the revolutionists to keep up agitation and make government by bayonets impossible; the moderates to curb the impetuosity of the revolutionists and to present a scheme of society that was neither reactionary nor anarchical; the volunteers abroad to gain military experience; and the more peaceful exiles to spread the name of Italy among foreign peoples. All the while a vast amount of revolutionary literature was being printed in Switzerland, France and England, and smuggled into Italy; the poet Giusti satirized the Italian princes, the dramatist G. B. Niccolini blasted tyranny in his tragedies, the novelist Guerrazzi re-evoked the memories of the last struggle for Florentine freedom in L’Assedio di Firenze, and Verdi’s operas bristled with political double entendres which escaped the censor but were understood and applauded by the audience.
On the death of Pope Gregory XVI. in 1846 Austria hoped to secure the election of another zealot; but the Italian cardinals, who did not want an Austrophil, finished the conclave before the arrival of Cardinal Gaysrück, Austria’s mouthpiece, and in June elected Giovanni Maria Election of Pius IX. Mastai Ferretti as Pius IX. The new pope, who while bishop of Imole had evinced a certain interest in Liberalism, was a kindly man, of inferior intelligence, who thought that all difficulties could be settled with a little good-will, some reforms and a political amnesty. The amnesty which he granted was the beginning of the immense if short-lived popularity which he was to enjoy. But he did not move so fast in the path of reform as was expected, and agitation continued throughout the papal states.[12] In 1847 some administrative reforms were enacted, the laity were admitted to certain offices, railways were talked about, and political newspapers permitted. In April Pius created a Consulta, or consultative assembly, and soon afterwards a council of ministers and a municipality for Rome. Here he would willingly have stopped, but he soon realized that he had hardly begun. Every fresh reform edict was greeted with demonstrations of enthusiasm, but the ominous cry “Viva Pio Nono solo!” signified dissatisfaction with the whole system of government. A lay ministry was now demanded, a constitution, and an Italian federation for war against Austria. Rumours of a reactionary plot by Austria and the Jesuits against Pius, induced him to create a national guard and to appoint Cardinal Ferretti as secretary of state.
Events in Rome produced widespread excitement throughout Europe. Metternich had declared that the one thing which had not entered into his calculations was a Liberal pope, only that was an impossibility; still he was much disturbed by Pius’s attitude, and tried to stem the revolutionary tide by frightening the princes. Seizing the agitation in Romagna as a pretext, he had the town of Ferrara occupied by Austrian troops, which provoked the indignation not only of the Liberals but also of the pope, for according to the treaties Austria had the right of occupying the citadel alone. There was great resentment throughout Italy, and in answer to the pope’s request Charles Albert declared that he was with him in everything, while from South America Giuseppe Garibaldi wrote to offer his services to His Holiness. Charles Albert, although maintaining his reactionary policy, had introduced administrative reforms, built railways, reorganized the army and developed the resources of the country. He had little sympathy with Liberalism and abhorred revolution, but his hatred of Austria and his resentment at the galling tutelage to which she subjected him had gained strength year by year. Religion was still his dominant passion, and when a pope in Liberal guise appeared on the scene and was bullied by Austria, his two strongest feelings—piety and hatred of Austria—ceased Revolutionary agitation, 1847. to be incompatible. In 1847 Lord Minto visited the Italian courts to try to induce the recalcitrant despots to mend their ways, so as to avoid revolution and war, the latter being England’s especial anxiety; this mission, although not destined to produce much effect, aroused extravagant hopes among the Liberals. Charles Louis, the opera-bouffe duke of Lucca, who had coquetted with Liberalism in the past, now refused to make any concessions to his subjects, and in 1847 sold his duchy to Leopold II. of Tuscany (the successor of Ferdinand III. since 1824) to whom it would have reverted in any case at the death of the duchess of Parma. At the same time Leopold ceded Lunigiana to Parma and Modena in equal parts, an arrangement which provoked the indignation of the inhabitants of the district (especially of those destined to be ruled by Francis V. of Modena, who had succeeded to Francis IV. in 1846), and led to disturbances at Fivizzano. In September 1847, Leopold gave way to the popular agitation for a national guard, in spite of Metternich’s threats, and allowed greater freedom of the press; every concession made by the pope was followed by demands for a similar measure in Tuscany.
Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies had died in 1825, and was succeeded by Francis I. At the latter’s death in 1830 Ferdinand II. succeeded, and although at first he gave promise of proving a wiser ruler, he soon reverted to the traditional Bourbon methods. An ignorant bigot, he concentrated the whole of the executive into his own hands, was surrounded by priests and monks, and served by an army of spies. In 1847 there were unimportant disturbances in various parts of the kingdom, but there was no anti-dynastic outbreak, the jealousy between Naples and Sicily largely contributing to the weakness of the movement. On the 12th of January, however, a revolution, the first of the many throughout Europe that was to make the year 1848 memorable, broke out at Palermo under the leadership of Ruggiero Settimo. The Neapolitan army sent to crush the rising was at first unsuccessful, and the insurgents demanded the constitution of 1812 or complete independence. Disturbances occurred at Naples also, and the king, who could not obtain Austrian help, as the pope refused to allow Austrian troops to pass through his dominions, on the advice of his prime minister, the duke of Serracapriola, granted a constitution, freedom of the press, the national guard, &c. (January 28).
The news from Naples strengthened the demand for a constitution in Piedmont. Count Camillo Cavour, then editor of a new and influential paper called Il Risorgimento, had advocated it strongly, and monster demonstrations were held every day. The king disliked the idea, but Revolutions of 1848. great pressure was brought to bear on him, and finally, on the 4th of March 1848, he granted the charter which was destined to be the constitution of the future Italian kingdom. It provided for a nominated senate and an elective chamber of deputies, the king retaining the right of veto; the press censorship was abolished, and freedom of meeting, of the press and of speech were guaranteed. Balbo was called upon to form the first constitutional ministry. Three days later the grand-duke of Tuscany promised similar liberties, and a charter, prepared by a commission which included Gino Capponi and Bettino Ricasoli, was promulgated on the 17th.
In the Austrian provinces the situation seemed calmer, and the government rejected the moderate proposals of Daniele Manin and N. Tommaseo. A demonstration in favour of Pius IX. on the 3rd of January at Milan was dispersed with unnecessary severity, and martial law was proclaimed the following month. The revolution which broke out on the 8th of March in Vienna itself and the subsequent flight of Metternich (see Austria-Hungary: History), led to the granting of feeble concessions to Lombardy and Venetia, which were announced in Milan on the 18th. But it was too late; and in spite of the exhortations of the mayor, Gabrio Casati, and of the republican C. Cattaneo, who believed that a rising against 15,000 Austrian soldiers under Field-Marshal Radetzky was madness, the famous Five Days’ revolution began. It was a popular outburst of pent-up hate, unprepared by leaders, although leaders such as Luciano Manara soon arose. Radetzky occupied the citadel and other points of vantage; but in the night barricades sprang up by the hundred and were manned by citizens of all classes, armed with every kind of weapon. The desperate struggle lasted until the 22nd, when the Austrians, having lost 5000 killed and wounded, were forced to evacuate the city. The rest of Lombardy and Venetia now flew to arms, and the Austrian garrisons, except in the Quadrilateral (Verona, Peschiera, Mantua and Legnano) were expelled. In Venice the people, under the leadership of Manin, rose in arms and forced the military and civil governors (Counts Zichy and Palffy) to sign a capitulation on the 22nd of March, after which the republic was proclaimed. At Milan, where there was a division of opinion between the monarchists under Casati and the republicans under Cattaneo, a provisional administration was formed and the question of the form of government postponed for the moment. The duke of Modena and Charles Louis of Parma (Marie Louise was now dead) abandoned their capitals; in both cities provisional governments were set up which subsequently proclaimed annexation to Piedmont. In Rome the pope gave way to popular clamour, granting one concession after another, and on the 8th of February he publicly called down God’s blessing on Italy—that Italy hated by the Austrians, whose name it had hitherto been a crime to mention. On the 10th of March he appointed a new ministry, under Cardinal Antonelli, which included several Liberal laymen, such as Marco Minghetti, G. Pasolini, L. C. Farini and Count G. Recchi. On the 11th a constitution drawn up by a commission of cardinals, without the knowledge of the ministry, was promulgated, a constitution which attempted the impossible task of reconciling the pope’s temporal power with free institutions. In the meanwhile preparations for war against Austria were being carried on with Pius’s sanction.
There were now three main political tendencies, viz. the union of north Italy under Charles Albert and an alliance with the pope and Naples, a federation of the different states under their present rulers, and a united republic of all Italy. All parties, however, were agreed in favour of war against Austria, for which the peoples forced their unwilling rulers to prepare. But the only state capable of taking the initiative was Piedmont, and the king still hesitated. Then came the news of the Five Days of Milan, which produced the wildest excitement in Turin; unless First war of Italy against Austria. the army were sent to assist the struggling Lombards at once the dynasty was in jeopardy. Cavour’s stirring articles in the Risorgimento hastened the king’s decision, and on the 23rd of March he declared war (see for the military events Italian Wars, 1848–70). But much precious time had been lost, and even then the army was not ready. Charles Albert could dispose of 90,000 men, including some 30,000 from central Italy, but he took the field with only half his force. He might yet have cut off Radetzky on his retreat, or captured Mantua, which was only held by 300 men. But his delays lost him both chances and enabled Radetzky to receive reinforcements from Austria. The pope, unable to resist the popular demand for war, allowed his army to depart (March 23) under the command of General Durando, with instructions to act in concert with Charles Albert, and he corresponded with the grand-duke of Tuscany and the king of Naples with a view to a military alliance. But at the same time, fearing a schism in the church should he attack Catholic Austria, he forbade his troops to do more than defend the frontier, and in his Encyclical of the 29th of April stated that, as head of the church, he could not declare war, but that he was unable to prevent his subjects from following the example of other Italians. He then requested Charles Albert to take the papal troops under his command, and also wrote to the emperor of Austria asking him voluntarily to relinquish Lombardy and Venetia. Tuscany and Naples had both joined the Italian league; a Tuscan army started for Lombardy on the 30th of April, and 17,000 Neapolitans commanded by Pepe (who had returned after 28 years of exile) went to assist Durando in intercepting the Austrian reinforcements under Nugent. The Piedmontese defeated the enemy at Pastrengo (April 30), but did not profit by the victory. The Neapolitans reached Bologna on the 17th of May, but in the meantime a dispute had broken out at Naples between the king and parliament as to the nature of the royal oath; a cry of treason was raised by a group of factious youngsters, barricades were erected and street fighting ensued (May 15). On the 17th Ferdinand dissolved parliament and recalled the army. On receiving the order to return, Pepe, after hesitating for some time between his oath to the king and his desire to fight for Italy, finally resigned his commission and crossed the Po with a few thousand men, the rest of his force returning south. The effects of this were soon felt. A force of Tuscan volunteers was attacked by a superior body of Austrians at Curtatone and Montanaro and defeated after a gallant resistance on the 27th of May; Charles Albert, after wasting precious time round Peschiera, which capitulated on the 30th of May, defeated Radetzky at Goito. But the withdrawal of the Neapolitans left Durando too weak to intercept Nugent and his 30,000 men; and the latter, although harassed by the inhabitants of Venetia and repulsed at Vicenza, succeeded in joining Radetzky, who was soon further reinforced from Tirol. The whole Austrian army now turned on Vicenza, which after a brave resistance surrendered on the 10th of June. All Venetia except the capital was thus once more occupied by the Austrians. On the 23rd, 24th and 25th of July (first battle of Custozza) the Piedmontese were defeated and forced to retire on Milan with Radetzky’s superior force in pursuit. The king was the object of a hostile demonstration in Milan, and although he was ready to defend the city to the last, the town council negotiated a capitulation with Radetzky. The mob, egged on by the republicans, attacked the palace where the king was lodged, and he escaped with difficulty, returning to Piedmont with the remnants of his army. On the 6th of August Radetzky re-entered Milan, and three days later an armistice was concluded between Austria and Piedmont, the latter agreeing to evacuate Lombardy and Venetia. The offer of French assistance, made after the proclamation of the republic in the spring of 1848, had been rejected mainly because France, fearing that the creation of a strong Italian state would be a danger to her, would have demanded the cession of Nice and Savoy, which the king refused to consider.
Meanwhile, the republic had been proclaimed in Venice; but on the 7th of July the assembly declared in favour of fusion with Piedmont, and Manin, who had been elected president, resigned his powers to the royal commissioners. Soon after Custozza, however, the Daniele Manin and Venice. Austrians blockaded the city on the land side. In Rome the pope’s authority weakened day by day, and disorder increased. The Austrian attempt to occupy Bologna was repulsed by the citizens, but unfortunately this success was followed by anarchy and murder, and Farini only with difficulty restored a semblance of order. The Mamiani ministry having failed to achieve anything, Pius summoned Pellegrino Rossi, a learned lawyer who had long been exiled in France, to form a cabinet. On the 15th of November he was assassinated, and as no one was punished for this crime the insolence of the disorderly elements increased, and shots were exchanged with the Swiss Guard. The terrified pope fled in disguise to Gaeta (November 25), and when parliament requested him to return he refused even to receive the deputation. This meant a complete rupture; on the 5th of February 1849 a constituent assembly was summoned, and on the 9th it voted the downfall of the temporal Proclamation of the Roman Republic. power and proclaimed the republic. Mazzini hurried to Rome to see his dream realized, and was chosen head of the Triumvirate. On the 18th Pius invited the armed intervention of France, Austria, Naples and Spain to restore his authority. In Tuscany the government drifted from the moderates to the extreme democrats; the Ridolfi ministry was succeeded after Custozza by that of Ricasoli, and the latter by that of Capponi. The lower classes provoked disorders, which were very serious at Leghorn, and were only quelled by Guerrazzi’s energy. Capponi resigned in October 1848, and Leopold reluctantly consented to a democratic ministry led by Guerrazzi and Montanelli, the former a very ambitious and unscrupulous man, the latter honest but fantastic. Following the Roman example, a constituent assembly was demanded to vote on union with Rome and eventually with the rest of Italy. The grand-duke, fearing an excommunication from the pope, refused the request, and left Florence for Siena and S. Stefano; on the 8th of February 1849 the republic was proclaimed, and on the 21st, at the pressing request of the pope and the king of Naples, Leopold went to Gaeta.
Ferdinand did not openly break his constitutional promises until Sicily was reconquered. His troops had captured Messina after a bombardment which earned him the sobriquet of “King Bomba”; Catania and Syracuse fell soon after, hideous atrocities being everywhere committed with his sanction. He now prorogued parliament, adopted stringent measures against the Liberals, and retired to Gaeta, the haven of refuge for deposed despots.
But so long as Piedmont was not completely crushed none of
the princes dared to take decisive measures against their subjects;
in spite of Custozza, Charles Albert still had an army, and Austria,
with revolutions in Vienna, Hungary and Bohemia on her
hands, could not intervene. In Piedmont the Pinelli-Revel
ministry, which had continued the negotiations for an alliance
with Leopold and the pope, resigned as it could not count
on a parliamentary majority, and in December the returned
exile Gioberti formed a new ministry. His proposal to reinstate
Leopold and the pope with Piedmontese arms, so as to avoid
Austrian intervention, was rejected by both potentates, and met
with opposition even in Piedmont, which would thereby have
forfeited its prestige throughout Italy. Austrian mediation
was now imminent, as the Vienna revolution had been crushed,
and the new emperor, Francis Joseph, refused to consider any
settlement other than on the basis of the treaties of 1815. But
Charles Albert renews
the war.
Charles Albert, who, whatever his faults, had a generous
nature, was determined that so long as he had an
army in being he could not abandon the Lombards
and the Venetians, whom he had encouraged in their
resistance, without one more effort, though he knew full well
that he was staking all on a desperate chance. On the 12th of
March 1849, he denounced the armistice, and, owing to the
want of confidence in Piedmontese strategy after 1848, gave the
chief command to the Polish General Chrzanowski. His forces
amounted to 80,000 men, including a Lombard corps and some
Roman, Tuscan and other volunteers. But the discipline and
moral of the army were shaken and its organization faulty.
General Ramorino, disobeying his instructions, failed to prevent
a corps of Austrians under Lieut. Field-Marshal d’Aspre
from seizing Mortara, a fault for which he was afterwards court-martialled
and shot, and after some preliminary fighting Radetzky
won the decisive battle of Novara (March 23) which broke up
the Piedmontese army. The king, who had sought death in vain
all day, had to ask terms of Radetzky; the latter demanded
Accession of Victor Emmanuel II.
a slice of Piedmont and the heir to the throne (Victor
Emmanuel) as a hostage, without a reservation for
the consent of parliament. Charles Albert, realizing
his own failure and thinking that his son might obtain
better terms, abdicated and departed at once for Portugal, where
he died in a monastery a few months later. Victor Emmanuel
went in person to treat with Radetzky on the 24th of March.
The Field-Marshal received him most courteously and offered
not only to waive the demand for a part of Piedmontese territory,
but to enlarge the kingdom, on condition that the constitution
should be abolished and the blue Piedmontese flag substituted
for the tricolor. But the young king was determined to abide
by his father’s oath, and had therefore to agree to an Austrian
occupation of the territory between the Po, the Ticino and the
Sesia, and of half the citadel of Alessandria, until peace should
be concluded, the evacuation of all districts occupied by his
troops outside Piedmont, the dissolution of his corps of Lombard,
Polish and Hungarian volunteers and the withdrawal of his
fleet from the Adriatic.
Novara set Austria free to reinstate the Italian despots. Ferdinand at once re-established autocracy in Naples; though the struggle in Sicily did not end until May, when Palermo, after a splendid resistance, capitulated. In Tuscany disorder continued, and although Guerrazzi, who had been appointed dictator, saved the country from complete anarchy, a large part of the population, especially among the peasantry, was still loyal to the grand-duke. After Novara the chief question was how to avoid an Austrian occupation, and owing to the prevailing confusion the town council of Florence took matters into its own hands and declared the grand-duke reinstated, but on a constitutional basis and without foreign help (April 12). Leopold accepted as regards the constitution, but said nothing about foreign intervention. Count Serristori, the grand-ducal commissioner, arrived in Florence on the 4th of May 1849; the national guard was disbanded; and on the 25th, the Austrians under d’Aspre entered Florence.
On the 28th of July Leopold returned to his capital, and while that event was welcomed by a part of the people, the fact that he had come under Austrian protection ended by destroying all loyalty to the dynasty, and consequently contributed not a little to Italian unity.
In Rome the triumvirate decided to defend the republic to the last. The city was quieter and more orderly than it had ever been before, for Mazzini and Ciceruacchio successfully opposed all class warfare; and in April the defenders received a priceless addition to their strength in the Garibaldi. person of Garibaldi, who, on the outbreak of the revolution in 1848, had returned with a few of his followers from his exile in South America, and in April 1849 entered Rome with some 500 men to fight for the republic. At this time France, as a counterpoise to Austrian intervention in other parts of Italy, decided to restore the pope, regardless of the fact that this France and the Roman Republic. action would necessitate the crushing of a sister republic. As yet, however, no such intention was publicly avowed. On the 25th of April General Oudinot landed with 8000 men at Civitavecchia, and on the 30th attempted to capture Rome by surprise, but was completely defeated by Garibaldi, who might have driven the French into the sea, had Mazzini allowed him to leave the city. The French republican government, in order to gain time for reinforcements to arrive, sent Ferdinand de Lesseps to pretend to treat with Mazzini, the envoy himself not being a party to this deception. Mazzini refused to allow the French into the city, but while the negotiations were being dragged on Oudinot’s force was increased to 35,000 men. At the same time an Austrian army was marching through the Legations, and Neapolitan and Spanish troops were advancing from the south. The Roman army (20,000 men) was commanded by General Rosselli, and included, besides Garibaldi’s red-shirted legionaries, volunteers from all parts of Italy, mostly very young men, many of them wealthy and of noble family. The Neapolitans were ignominiously beaten in May and retired to the frontier; on the 1st of June Oudinot declared that he would attack Rome on the 4th, but by beginning operations on the 3rd, when no attack was expected, he captured an important position in the Pamphili gardens.
In spite of this success, however, it was not until the end of the month, and after desperate fighting, that the French penetrated within the walls and the defence ceased (June 29). The Assembly, which had continued in session, was dispersed by the French troops on the 2nd of July, but Mazzini escaped a week later. Garibaldi quitted the city, followed by 4000 of his men, and attempted to join the defenders of Venice. In spite of the fact that he was pursued by the armies of four Powers, he succeeded in reaching San Marino; but his force melted away and, after hiding in the marshes of Ravenna, he fled across the peninsula, assisted by nobles, peasants and priests, to the Tuscan coast, whence he reached Piedmont and eventually America, to await a new call to fight for Italy (see Garibaldi).
After a heroic defence, conducted by Giuseppe Martinengo,
Brescia was recaptured in April by the Austrians under Lieut.
Field-Marshal von Haynau, the atrocities which
followed earning for Haynau the name of “The
Hyena of Brescia.” In May they seized Bologna,
Reduction
of Venice
by Austria.
and Ancona in June, restoring order in those towns
by the same methods as at Brescia. Venice alone still held out;
after Novara the Piedmontese commissioners withdrew and
Manin again took charge of the government. The assembly
voted: “Venice resists the Austrians at all costs,” and the
citizens and soldiers, strengthened by the arrival of volunteers
from all parts of Italy, including Pepe, who was given the chief
command of the defenders, showed the most splendid devotion
in their hopeless task. By the end of May the city was blockaded
by land and sea, and in July the bombardment began. On the
24th the city, reduced by famine, capitulated on favourable
terms. Manin, Pepe and a few others were excluded from the
amnesty and went into exile.
Thus were despotism and foreign predominance re-established throughout Italy save in Piedmont. Yet the “terrible year” was by no means all loss. The Italian cause had been crushed, but revolution and war had strengthened the feeling of unity, for Neapolitans had fought for Venice, Lombards for Rome, Piedmontese for all Italy. Piedmont was shown to possess the qualities necessary to constitute the nucleus of a great nation. It was now evident that the federal idea was impossible, for none of the princes except Victor Emmanuel could be trusted, and that unity and freedom could not be achieved under a republic, for nothing could be done without the Piedmontese army, which was royalist to the core. All reasonable men were now convinced that the question of the ultimate form of the Italian government was secondary, and that the national efforts should be concentrated on the task of expelling the Austrians; the form of government could be decided afterwards. Liberals were by no means inclined to despair of accomplishing this task; for hatred of the foreigners, and of the despots restored by their bayonets, had been deepened by the humiliations and cruelties suffered during the war into a passion common to all Italy.
When the terms of the Austro-Piedmontese armistice were announced in the Chamber at Turin they aroused great indignation, but the king succeeded in convincing the deputies that they were inevitable. The peace negotiations dragged on for several months, involving two changes Piedmont after the war. of ministry, and D’Azeglio became premier. Through Anglo-French mediation Piedmont’s war indemnity was reduced from 230,000,000 to 75,000,000 lire, but the question of the amnesty remained. The king declared himself ready to go to war again if those compromised in the Lombard revolution were not freely pardoned, and at last Austria agreed to amnesty all save a very few, and in August the peace terms were agreed upon. The Chamber, however, refused to ratify them, and it was not until the king’s eloquent appeal from Moncalieri to his people’s loyalty, and after a dissolution and the election of a new parliament, that the treaty was ratified (January 9, 1850). The situation in Piedmont was far from promising, the exchequer was empty, the army disorganized, the country despondent and suspicious of the king. If Piedmont was to be fitted for the part which optimists expected it to play, everything must be built up anew. Legislation had to be entirely reformed, and the bill for abolishing the special jurisdiction for the clergy (foro ecclesiastico) and other medieval privileges aroused the bitter opposition of the Vatican as well as of the Piedmontese clericals. This Cavour. same year (1850) Cavour, who had been in parliament for some time and had in his speech of the 7th of March struck the first note of encouragement after the gloom of Novara, became minister of agriculture, and in 1851 also assumed the portfolio of finance. He ended by dominating the cabinet, but owing to his having negotiated a union of the Right Centre and the Left Centre (the Connubio) in the conviction that the country needed the moderate elements of both parties, he quarrelled with D’Azeglio (who, as an uncompromising conservative, failed to see the value of such a move) and resigned. But D’Azeglio was not equal to the situation, and he, too, resigned in November 1852; whereupon the king appointed Cavour prime minister, a position which with short intervals he held until his death.
The Austrians in the period from 1849 to 1859, known as the decennio della resistenza (decade of resistance), were made to feel that they were in a conquered country where they could have no social intercourse with the people; for no self-respecting Lombard or Venetian would even speak to an Austrian. Austria, Austrian rule after 1849. on the other hand, treated her Italian subjects with great severity. The Italian provinces were the most heavily taxed in the whole empire, and much of the money thus levied was spent either for the benefit of other provinces or to pay for the huge army of occupation and the fortresses in Italy. The promise of a constitution for the empire, made in 1849, was never carried out; the government of Lombardo-Venetia was vested in Field-Marshal Radetzky; and although only very few of the revolutionists were excluded from the amnesty, the carrying of arms or the distribution or possession of revolutionary literature was punished with death. Long terms of imprisonment and the bastinado, the latter even inflicted on women, were the penalties for the least expression of anti-Austrian opinion.
The Lombard republicans had been greatly weakened by the events of 1848, but Mazzini still believed that a bold act by a few revolutionists would make the people rise en masse and expel the Austrians. A conspiracy, planned with the object, among others, of kidnapping the emperor while on a visit to Venice and forcing him to make concessions, was postponed in consequence of the coup d’état by which Louis Napoleon became emperor of the French (1852); but a chance discovery led to a large number of arrests, and the state trials at Mantua, conducted in the most shamelessly inquisitorial manner, resulted in five death sentences, including that of the priest Tazzoli, and many of imprisonment for long terms. Even this did not convince Mazzini of the hopelessness of such attempts, for he was out of touch with Italian public opinion, and he greatly weakened his influence by favouring a crack-brained outbreak at Milan on the 6th of February 1853, which was easily quelled, numbers of the insurgents being executed or imprisoned. Radetzky, not satisfied with this, laid an embargo on the property of many Lombard emigrants who had settled in Piedmont and become naturalized, accusing them of complicity. The Piedmontese government rightly regarded this measure as a violation of the peace treaty of 1850, and Cavour recalled the Piedmontese minister from Vienna, an action which was endorsed by Italian public opinion generally, and won the approval of France and England.
Cavour’s ideal for the present was the expulsion of Austria from Italy and the expansion of Piedmont into a north Italian kingdom; and, although he did not yet think of Italian unity as a question of practical policy, he began to foresee it as a future possibility. But in reorganizing the shattered finances of the state and preparing it for its greater destinies, he had to impose heavy taxes, which led to rioting and involved the minister himself in considerable though temporary unpopularity. His ecclesiastical legislation, too, met with bitter opposition from the Church.
But the question was soon forgotten in the turmoil caused by the Crimean War. Cavour believed that by taking part in the war his country would gain for itself a military status and a place in the councils of the great Powers, and establish claims on Great Britain and France for the Crimean War. realization of its Italian ambitions. One section of public opinion desired to make Piedmont’s co-operation subject to definite promises by the Powers; but the latter refused to bind themselves, and both Victor Emmanuel and Cavour realized that, even without such promises, participation would give Piedmont a claim. There was also the danger that Austria might join the allies first and Piedmont be left isolated; but there were also strong arguments on the other side, for while the Radical party saw no obvious reason why Piedmont should fight other people’s battles, and therefore opposed the alliance, there was the risk that Austria might join the alliance together with Piedmont, which would have constituted a disastrous situation. Da Italy and the Congress of Paris, 1856. Bormida, the minister for foreign affairs, resigned rather than agree to the proposal, and other statesmen were equally opposed to it. But after long negotiations the treaty of alliance was signed in January 1855, and while Austria remained neutral, a well-equipped Piedmontese force of 15,000 men, under General La Marmora, sailed for the Crimea. Everything turned out as Cavour had hoped. The Piedmontese troops distinguished themselves in the field, gaining the sympathies of the French and English; and at the subsequent congress of Paris (1856), where Cavour himself was Sardinian representative, the Italian question was discussed, and the intolerable oppression of the Italian peoples by Austria and the despots ventilated.
Austria at last began to see that a policy of coercion was useless and dangerous, and made tentative efforts at conciliation. Taxation was somewhat reduced, the censorship was made less severe, political amnesties were granted, humaner officials were appointed and the Congregations (a sort of shadowy consultative assembly) were revived. In 1856 the emperor and empress visited their Italian dominions, but were received with icy coldness; the following year, on the retirement of Radetzky at the age of ninety-three, the archduke Maximilian, an able, cultivated and kind-hearted man, was appointed viceroy. He made desperate efforts to conciliate the population, and succeeded with a few of the nobles, who were led to believe in the possibility of an Italian confederation, including Lombardy and Venetia which would be united to Austria by a personal union alone; but the immense majority of all classes rejected these advances, and came to regard union with Piedmont with increasing favour.[13]
Meanwhile Francis V. of Modena, restored to his duchy by
Austrian bayonets, continued to govern according to the traditions
of his house. Charles II. of Parma, after having been
reinstated by the Austrians, abdicated in favour of his
son Charles III. a drunken libertine and a cruel tyrant
Restored governments after 1849.
(May 1849); the latter was assassinated in 1854, and
a regency under his widow, Marie Louise, was instituted
during which the government became somewhat more
tolerable, although by no means free from political persecution;
in 1857 the Austrian troops evacuated the duchy. Leopold of
Tuscany suspended the constitution, and in 1852 formally
abolished it by order from Vienna; he also concluded a treaty of
semi-subjection with Austria and a Concordat with the pope for
granting fresh privileges to the Church. His government, however,
was not characterized by cruelty like those of his brother
despots, and Guerrazzi and the other Liberals of 1849, although
tried and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, were merely
exiled. Yet the opposition gained recruits among all the ablest
and most respectable Tuscans. In Rome, after the restoration of
the temporal power by the French troops, the pope paid no
attention to Louis Napoleon’s advice to maintain some form of
constitution, to grant a general amnesty, and to secularize the
administration. He promised, indeed, a consultative council of
state, and granted an amnesty from which no less than 25,000
persons were excluded; but on his return to Rome (12th April
1850), after he was quite certain that France had given up all
idea of imposing constitutional limitations on him, he re-established
his government on the old lines of priestly absolutism, and,
devoting himself to religious practices, left political affairs mostly
to the astute cardinal Antonelli, who repressed with great
severity the political agitation which still continued. At Naples
Persecution of Liberals
in Naples.
a trifling disturbance in September 1849, led to the
arrest of a large number of persons connected with the
Unità Italiana, a society somewhat similar to the
Carbonari. The prisoners included Silvio Spaventa,
Luigi Settembrini, Carlo Poerio and many other cultured and
worthy citizens. Many condemnations followed, and hundreds of
“politicals” were immured in hideous dungeons, a state of
things which provoked Gladstone’s famous letters to Lord
Aberdeen, in which Bourbon rule was branded for all time as
“the negation of God erected into a system of government.”
But oppressive, corrupt and inefficient as it was, the government
was not confronted by the uncompromising hostility of the
whole people; the ignorant priest-ridden masses were either
indifferent or of mildly Bourbon sympathies; the opposition was
constituted by the educated middle classes and a part of the
nobility. The revolutionary attempts of Bentivegna in Sicily
(1856) and of the Mazzinian Carlo Pisacane, who landed at
Sapri in Calabria with a few followers in 1857, failed from lack of
popular support, and the leaders were killed.
The decline of Mazzini’s influence was accompanied by the rise of a new movement in favour of Italian unity under Victor Emmanuel, inspired by the Milanese marquis Giorgio Pallavicini, who had spent 14 years in the Spielberg, and by Manin, living in exile in Paris, both of them New Unionist movement. ex-republicans who had become monarchists. The propaganda was organized by the Sicilian La Farina by means of the Società Nazionale. All who accepted the motto “Unity, Independence and Victor Emmanuel” were admitted into the society. Many of the republicans and Mazzinians joined it, but Mazzini himself regarded it with no sympathy. In the Austrian provinces and in the duchies it carried all before it, and gained many adherents in the Legations, Rome and Naples, although in the latter regions the autonomist feeling was still strong even among the Liberals. In Piedmont itself it was at first less successful; and Cavour, although he aspired ultimately to a united Italy with Rome as the capital,[14] openly professed no ambition beyond the expulsion of Austria and the formation of a North Italian kingdom. But he gave secret encouragement to the movement, and ended by practically directing its activity through La Farina. The king, too, was in close sympathy with the society’s aims, but for the present it was necessary to hide this attitude from the eyes of the Powers, whose sympathy Cavour could only hope to gain by professing hostility to everything that savoured of revolution. Both the king and his minister realized that Piedmont alone, even with the help of the National Society, could not expel Austria from Italy without foreign assistance. Piedmontese finances had been strained to breaking-point to organize an army obviously intended for other than merely defensive purposes. Cavour now set himself to the task of isolating Austria and securing an alliance for her expulsion. A British alliance would have been preferable, but the British government was too much concerned with the preservation of Napoleon III. and Italy. European peace. The emperor Napoleon, almost alone among Frenchmen, had genuine Italian sympathies. But were he to intervene in Italy, the intervention would not only have to be successful; it would have to bring tangible advantages to France. Hence his hesitations and vacillations, which Cavour steadily worked to overcome. Suddenly on the 14th of January 1858 Napoleon’s life was attempted by Felice Orsini (q.v.) a Mazzinian Romagnol, who believed that Napoleon was the chief obstacle to the success of the revolution in Italy. The attempt failed and its author was caught and executed, but while it appeared at first to destroy Napoleon’s Italian sympathies and led to a sharp interchange of notes between Paris and Turin, the emperor was really impressed by the attempt and by Orsini’s letter from prison exhorting him to intervene in Italy. He realized how deep the Italian feeling for independence must be, and that a refusal to act now might result in further attempts on his life, as indeed Orsini’s letter stated. Consequently negotiations with Cavour were resumed, and a meeting with him was arranged to take place at Plombières (20th and 21st of July 1858). There it was agreed that France should supply 200,000 men and Piedmont 100,000 for the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, that Piedmont should be expanded into a kingdom of North Italy, that central Italy should form a separate kingdom, on the throne of which the emperor contemplated placing one of his own relatives, and Naples another, possibly under Lucien Murat; the pope, while retaining only the “Patrimony of St Peter” (the Roman province), would be president of the Italian confederation. In exchange for French assistance Piedmont would cede Savoy and perhaps Nice to France; and a marriage between Victor Emmanuel’s daughter Clothilde and Jerome Bonaparte, to which Napoleon attached great importance, although not made a definite condition, was also discussed. No written agreement, however, was signed.
On the 1st of January 1859, Napoleon astounded the diplomatic
world by remarking to Baron Hübner, the Austrian
ambassador, at the New Year’s reception at the Tuileries, that
he regretted that relations between France and Austria were
“not so good as they had been”; and at the opening of the
Piedmontese parliament on the 10th Victor Emmanuel pronounced
the memorable words that he could not be insensible
to the cry of pain (il grido di dolore) which reached him from all
parts of Italy. Yet after these warlike declarations and after
the signing of a military convention at Turin, the king agreeing
to all the conditions proposed by Napoleon, the latter suddenly
became pacific again, and adopted the Russian suggestion that
Italian affairs should be settled by a congress. Austria agreed
on condition that Piedmont should disarm and should not be
admitted to the congress. Lord Malmesbury urged the Sardinian
government to yield; but Cavour refused to disarm, or to accept
the principle of a congress, unless Piedmont were admitted to
it on equal terms with the other Powers. As neither the Sardinian
nor the Austrian government seemed disposed to yield, the idea
of a congress had to be abandoned. Lord Malmesbury now
proposed that all three Powers should disarm simultaneously
and that, as suggested by Austria, the precedent of Laibach
should be followed and all the Italian states invited to plead
their cause at the bar of the Great Powers. To this course
Napoleon consented, to the despair of King Victor Emmanuel
and Cavour, who saw in this a proof that he wished to back out
of his engagement and make war impossible. When war seemed
imminent volunteers from all parts of Italy, especially from
Lombardy, had come pouring into Piedmont to enrol themselves
in the army or in the specially raised volunteer corps (the command
of which was given to Garibaldi), and “to go to Piedmont”
became a test of patriotism throughout the country. Urged by
a peremptory message from Napoleon, Cavour saw the necessity
of bowing to the will of Europe, of disbanding the volunteers
and reducing the army to a peace footing. The situation, however,
was saved by a false move on the part of Austria. At
Vienna the war party was in the ascendant; the convention
for disarmament had been signed, but so far from its being
carried out, the reserves were actually called out on the 12th of
April; and on the 23rd, before Cavour’s decision was known
at Vienna, an Austrian ultimatum reached Turin, summoning
Piedmont to disarm within three days on pain of invasion.
Cavour was filled with joy at the turn affairs had taken, for
Italian war
of 1859.
Austria now appeared as the aggressor. On the
29th Francis Joseph declared war, and the next day
his troops crossed the Ticino, a move which was followed,
as Napoleon had stated it would be, by a French
declaration of war. The military events of the Italian war of
1859 are described under Italian Wars. The actions of
Montebello (May 20), Palestro (May 31) and Melegnano (June
8) and the battles of Magenta (June 4) and Solferino (June 24)
all went against the Austrians. Garibaldi’s volunteers raised
the standard of insurrection and held the field in the region of
the Italian lakes. After Solferino the allies prepared to besiege
the Quadrilateral. Then Napoleon suddenly drew back, unwilling,
for many reasons, to continue the campaign. Firstly,
he doubted whether the allies were strong enough to attack the
Quadrilateral, for he saw the defects of his own army’s organization;
secondly, he began to fear intervention by Prussia, whose
attitude appeared menacing; thirdly, although really anxious
to expel the Austrians from Italy, he did not wish to create a
too powerful Italian state at the foot of the Alps, which, besides
constituting a potential danger to France, might threaten the
pope’s temporal power, and Napoleon believed that he could not
stand without the clerical vote; fourthly, the war had been
declared against the wishes of the great majority of Frenchmen
and was even now far from popular. Consequently, to the
surprise of all Europe, while the allied forces were drawn up
ready for battle, Napoleon, without consulting Victor Emmanuel,
sent General Fleury on the 6th of July to Francis Joseph to ask
for an armistice, which was agreed to. The king was now
informed, and on the 8th Generals Vaillant, Della Rocca and
Hess met at Villafranca and arranged an armistice until the
15th of August. But the king and Cavour were terribly upset by
Armistice of Villafranca.
this move, which meant peace without Venetia; Cavour
hurried to the king’s headquarters at Monzambano
and in excited, almost disrespectful, language implored
him not to agree to peace and to continue the war
alone, relying on the Piedmontese army and a general Italian
revolution. But Victor Emmanuel on this occasion proved the
greater statesman of the two; he understood that, hard as it
was, he must content himself with Lombardy for the present, lest
all be lost. On the 11th the two emperors met at Villafranca,
where they agreed that Lombardy should be ceded to Piedmont,
and Venetia retained by Austria but governed by Liberal methods;
that the rulers of Tuscany, Parma and Modena, who had been
again deposed, should be restored, the Papal States reformed,
the Legations given a separate administration and the pope
made president of an Italian confederation including Austria
as mistress of Venetia. It was a revival of the old impossible
federal idea, which would have left Italy divided and dominated
by Austria and France. Victor Emmanuel regretfully signed
the peace preliminaries, adding, however, pour ce qui me concerne
(which meant that he made no undertaking with regard to
central Italy), and Cavour resigned office.
The Lombard campaign had produced important effects throughout the rest of Italy. The Sardinian government had formally invited that of Tuscany to participate in the war of liberation, and on the grand-duke rejecting the proposal, moderates and democrats combined to Unionist movements in Central Italy. present an ultimatum to Leopold demanding that he should abdicate in favour of his son, grant a constitution and take part in the campaign. On his refusal Florence rose as one man, and he, feeling that he could not rely on his troops, abandoned Tuscany on the 27th of April 1859. A provisional government was formed, led by Ubaldino Peruzzi, and was strengthened on the 8th of May by the inclusion of Baron Bettino Ricasoli, a man of great force of character, who became the real head of the administration, and all through the ensuing critical period aimed unswervingly at Italian unity. Victor Emmanuel, at the request of the people, assumed the protectorate over Tuscany, where he was represented by the Sardinian minister Boncompagni. On the 23rd of May Prince Napoleon, with a French army corps, landed at Leghorn, his avowed object being to threaten the Austrian flank;[15] and in June these troops, together with a Tuscan contingent, departed for Lombardy. In the duchy of Modena an insurrection had broken out, and after Magenta Duke Francis joined the Austrian army in Lombardy, leaving a regency in charge. But on the 14th of June the municipality formed a provisional government and proclaimed annexation to Piedmont; L. C. Farini was chosen dictator, and 4000 Modenese joined the allies. The duchess-regent of Parma also withdrew to Austrian territory, and on the 11th of June annexation to Piedmont was proclaimed. At the same time the Austrians evacuated the Legations and Cardinal Milesi, the papal representative, departed. The municipality of Bologna formed a Giunta, to which Romagna and the Marches adhered, and invoked the dictatorship of Victor Emmanuel; at Perugia, too, a provisional government was constituted under F. Guardabassi. But the Marches were soon reoccupied by pontifical troops, and Perugia fell, its capture being followed by an indiscriminate massacre of men, women and children. In July the marquis D’Azeglio arrived at Bologna as royal commissioner.
After the meetings at Villafranca Napoleon returned to France. The question of the cession of Nice and Savoy had not been raised; for the emperor had not fulfilled his part of the bargain, that he would drive the Austrians out of Italy, since Venice was yet to be freed. At the same time he was resolutely opposed to the Piedmontese annexations in central Italy. But here Cavour intervened, for he was determined to maintain the annexations, at all costs. Although he had resigned, he remained in office until Rattazzi could form a new ministry; and while officially recalling the royal commissioners according to the preliminaries of Villafranca, he privately encouraged them to remain and organize resistance to the return of the despots, if necessary by force (see Cavour). Farini, who in August was elected dictator of Parma as well as Modena, and Ricasoli, who since, on the withdrawal of the Sardinian commissioner Boncompagni, had become supreme in Tuscany, were now the men who by their energy and determination achieved the annexation of central Italy to Piedmont, in spite of the strenuous opposition of the French emperor and the weakness of many Italian Liberals. In August Marco Minghetti succeeded in forming a military league and a customs union between Tuscany, Romagna and the duchies, and in procuring the adoption of the Piedmontese codes; and envoys were sent to Paris to mollify Napoleon. Constituent assemblies met and voted for unity under Victor Emmanuel, but the king could not openly accept the proposal owing to the emperor’s opposition, backed by the presence of French armies in Lombardy; at a word from Napoleon there might have been an Austrian, and perhaps a Franco-Austrian, invasion of central Italy. But to Napoleon’s statement that he could not agree to the unification of Italy, as he was bound by his promises to Austria at Villafranca, Victor Emmanuel replied that he himself, after Magenta and Solferino, was bound in honour to link his fate with that of the Italian people; and General Manfredo Fanti was sent by the Turin government to organize the army of the Central League, with Garibaldi under him.
The terms of the treaty of peace signed at Zürich on the 10th of November were practically identical with those of the preliminaries of Villafranca. It was soon evident, however, that the Italian question was far from being settled. Central Italy refused to be bound by the treaty, and Treaty of Zürich. offered the dictatorship to Prince Carignano, who, himself unable to accept owing to Napoleon’s opposition, suggested Boncompagni, who was accordingly elected. Napoleon now realized that it would be impossible, without running serious risks, to oppose the movement in favour of unity. He suggested an international congress on the question; inspired a pamphlet, Le Pape et le Congrès, which proposed a reduction of the papal territory, and wrote to the pope advising him to cede Romagna in order to obtain better guarantees for the rest of his dominions. The proposed congress fell through, and Napoleon thereupon raised the question of the cession of Nice and Savoy as the price of his consent to the union of the central provinces with the Italian kingdom. In January 1866 the Rattazzi ministry fell, after completing the fusion of Lombardy with Piedmont, and Cavour was again summoned by the king to the head of affairs.
Cavour well knew the unpopularity that would fall upon him by consenting to the cession of Nice, the birthplace of Garibaldi, and Savoy, the cradle of the royal house; but he realized the necessity of the sacrifice, if central Italy was to be won. The negotiations were long drawn out; for Cavour struggled to save Nice and Napoleon was anxious to make conditions, especially as regards Tuscany. At last, on the 24th of March, the treaty was signed whereby the cession was agreed upon, but subject to the vote of the populations concerned and ratification by the Italian parliament. The king having formally accepted the voluntary annexation of the duchies, Tuscany and Romagna, appointed the prince of Carignano viceroy with Ricasoli as governor-general (22nd of March), and was immediately afterwards excommunicated by the pope. On the 2nd of April 1860 the new Italian parliament, including members from central Italy, assembled at Turin. Three weeks later the treaty of Turin ceding Savoy and Nice to France was ratified, though not without much opposition, and Cavour was fiercely reviled for his share in the transaction, especially by Garibaldi, who even contemplated an expedition to Nice, but was induced to desist by the king.
In May 1859 Ferdinand of Naples was succeeded by his son Francis II., who gave no signs of any intention to change his father’s policy, and, in spite of Napoleon’s advice, refused to grant a constitution or to enter into an alliance with Sardinia. The result was a revolutionary agitation which in Sicily, stirred Naples under Francis II. up by Mazzini’s agents, Rosalino Pilo and Francesco Crispi, culminated, on the 5th of April 1860, in open revolt. An invitation had been sent Garibaldi to put himself at the head of the movement; at first he had refused, but reports of the progress of the insurrection soon determined him to risk all on a bold stroke, and on the 5th of May he embarked at Quarto, near Genoa, with Bixio, the Hungarian Türr and some 1000 picked followers, on two steamers. The preparations for the expedition, openly made, were viewed by Cavour with mixed feelings. With its object he sympathized; yet he could not give official sanction to an armed attack on a friendly power, nor on the other hand could he forbid an action enthusiastically approved by public opinion. He accordingly directed the Sardinian admiral Persano only to arrest the expedition should it touch at a Sardinian port; while in reply to the indignant protests of the continental powers he disclaimed all knowledge of the affair. On the 11th Garibaldi landed at Marsala, without opposition, defeated the Neapolitan forces at Calatafimi on the 15th, and on the 27th entered Palermo in triumph, where he proclaimed himself, in King Victor Emmanuel’s name, dictator of Sicily. By the end of July, after the hard-won victory of Milazzo, the whole island, with the exception of the citadel of Messina and a few unimportant ports, was in his hands.
From Cavour’s point of view, the situation was now one of extreme anxiety. It was certain that, his work in Sicily done, Garibaldi would turn his attention to the Neapolitan dominions on the mainland; and beyond these lay Umbria and the Marches and—Rome. It was all-important that whatever victories Garibaldi might win should be won for the Italian kingdom, and, above all, that no ill-timed attack on the Papal States should provoke an intervention of the powers. La Farina was accordingly sent to Palermo to urge the immediate annexation of Sicily to Piedmont. But Garibaldi, who wished to keep a free hand, distrusted Cavour and scorned all counsels of expediency, refused to agree; Sicily was the necessary base for his projected invasion of Naples; it would be time enough to announce its union with Piedmont when Victor Emmanuel had been proclaimed king of United Italy in Rome. Foiled by the dictator’s stubbornness, Cavour had once more to take to underhand methods; and, while continuing futile negotiations with King Francis, sent his agents into Naples to stir up disaffection and create a sentiment in favour of national unity strong enough, in any event, to force Garibaldi’s hand.
On the 8th of August, in spite of the protests and threats of
most of the powers, the Garibaldians began to cross the Straits,
and in a short time 20,000 of them were on the mainland.
The Bourbonists in Calabria, utterly disorganized,
broke before the invincible red-shirts, and
Garibaldi
in Naples.
the 40,000 men defending the Salerno-Avellino line made
no better resistance, being eventually ordered to fall back
on the Volturno. On the 6th of September King Francis, with
his family and several of the ministers, sailed for Gaeta, and the
next day Garibaldi entered Naples alone in advance of the army,
and was enthusiastically welcomed. He proclaimed himself
dictator of the kingdom, with Bertani as secretary of state, but
as a proof of his loyalty he consigned the Neapolitan fleet to
Persano.
His rapid success, meanwhile, inspired both the French emperor and the government of Turin with misgivings. There was a danger that Garibaldi’s entourage, composed of ex-Mazzinians, might induce him to proclaim a republic and march on Rome; which would have meant Intervention of Piedmont. French intervention and the undoing of all Cavour’s work. King Victor Emmanuel and Cavour both wrote to Garibaldi urging him not to spoil all by aiming at too much. But Garibaldi poured scorn on all suggestions of compromise; and Cavour saw that the situation could only be saved by the armed participation of Piedmont in the liberation of south Italy.
The situation was, indeed, sufficiently critical. The unrest in Naples had spread into Umbria and the Marches, and the papal troops, under General Lamoricière, were preparing to suppress it. Had they succeeded, the position of the Piedmontese in Romagna would have been imperilled; had they failed, the road would have been open for Garibaldi to march on Rome. In the circumstances, Cavour decided that Piedmont must anticipate Garibaldi, occupy Umbria and the Marches and place Italy between the red-shirts and Rome. His excuse was the pope’s refusal to dismiss his foreign levies (September 7). On the 11th of September a Piedmontese army of 35,000 men crossed the frontier at La Cattolica; on the 18th the pontifical army was crushed at Castelfidardo; and when, on the 29th, Ancona fell, Umbria and the Marches were in the power of Piedmont. On the 15th of October King Victor Emmanuel crossed the Neapolitan border at the head of his troops.
It had been a race between Garibaldi and the Piedmontese. “If we do not arrive at the Volturno before Garibaldi reaches La Cattolica,” Cavour had said, “the monarchy is lost, and Italy will remain in the prison-house of the Revolution.”[16] Fortunately for his policy, the red-shirts had encountered a formidable obstacle to their advance in the Neapolitan army entrenched on the Volturno under the guns of Capua. On the 19th of September the Garibaldians began their attack on this position with their usual impetuous valour; but they were repulsed again and again, and it was not till the 2nd of October, after a two days’ pitched battle, that they succeeded in carrying the position. The way was now open for the advance of the Piedmontese, who, save at Isernia, encountered practically no resistance. On the 29th Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi met, and on the 7th of November they entered Naples together. Garibaldi now resigned his authority into the king’s hands and, refusing the title and other honours offered to him, retired to his island home of Caprera.[17]
Gaeta remained still to be taken. The Piedmontese under Cialdini had begun the siege on the 5th of November, but it was not until the 10th of January 1861, when at the instance of Great Britain Napoleon withdrew his squadron, that the blockade could be made complete. Recognition of the united kingdom of Italy. On the 13th of February the fortress surrendered, Francis and his family having departed by sea for papal territory. The citadel of Messina capitulated on the 22nd, and Civitella del Tronto, the last stronghold of Bourbonism, on the 21st of March. On the 18th of February the first Italian parliament met at Turin, and Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed king of Italy. The new kingdom was recognized by Great Britain within a fortnight, by France three months later, and subsequently by other powers. It included the whole peninsula except Venetia and Rome, and these the government and the nation were determined to annex sooner or later.
There were, however, other serious problems calling for immediate attention. The country had to be built up and converted from an agglomeration of scattered medieval principalities into a unified modern nation. The first question which arose was that of brigandage in the south. Brigandage Problems of the new government. Brigandage. had always existed in the Neapolitan kingdom, largely owing to the poverty of the people; but the evil was now aggravated by the mistake of the new government in dismissing the Bourbon troops, and then calling them out again as recruits. A great many turned brigands rather than serve again, and together with the remaining adherents of Bourbon rule and malefactors of all kinds, were made use of by the ex-king and his entourage to harass the Italian administration. Bands of desperadoes were formed, commanded by the most infamous criminals and by foreigners who came to fight in what they were led to believe was an Italian Vendée, but which was in reality a campaign of butchery and plunder. Villages were sacked and burnt, men, women and children mutilated, tortured or roasted alive, and women outraged. The authors of these deeds when pursued by troops fled into papal territory, where they were welcomed by the authorities and allowed to refit and raise fresh recruits under the aegis of the Church. The prime organizers of the movement were King Francis’s uncle, the count of Trapani, and Mons. de Mérode, a Belgian ecclesiastic who enjoyed immense influence at the Vatican. The task of suppressing brigandage was entrusted to Generals La Marmora and Cialdini; but in spite of extreme severity, justifiable in the circumstances, it took four or five years completely to suppress the movement. Its vitality, indeed, was largely due to the mistakes made by the new administration, conducted as this was by officials ignorant of southern conditions and out of sympathy with a people far more primitive than in any other part of the peninsula. Politically, its sole outcome was to prove the impossibility of allowing the continuance of an independent Roman state in the heart of Italy.
Another of the government’s difficulties was the question of what to do with Garibaldi’s volunteers. Fanti, the minister of war, had three armies to incorporate in that of Piedmont, viz. that of central Italy, that of the Bourbons and that of Garibaldi. The first caused no difficulty; the rank and file of the Garibaldi’s volunteers. second were mostly disbanded, but a number of the officers were taken into the Italian army; the third offered a more serious problem. Garibaldi demanded that all his officers should be given equivalent rank in the Italian army, and in this he had the support of Fanti. Cavour, on the other hand, while anxious to deal generously with the Garibaldians, recognized the impossibility of such a course, which would not only have offended the conservative spirit of the Piedmontese military caste, which disliked and despised irregular troops, but would almost certainly have introduced into the army an element of indiscipline and disorder.
On the 18th of April the question of the volunteers was discussed in one of the most dramatic sittings of the Italian parliament. Garibaldi, elected member for Naples, denounced Cavour in unmeasured terms for his treatment of the volunteers and for the cession of Nice, accusing him of leading the country to civil war. These charges produced a tremendous uproar, but Bixio by a splendid appeal for concord succeeded in calming the two adversaries. On the 23rd of April they were formally reconciled in the presence of the king, but the scene of the 18th of April hastened Cavour’s end. In May the Roman question was discussed in parliament. Cavour had often declared that in the end the capital of Italy must be Rome, for it alone of all Italian cities had an unquestioned claim to moral supremacy, and his views of a free church in a free state were well known. He had negotiated secretly with the pope through unofficial agents, and sketched out a scheme of settlement of the Roman question, which foreshadowed in its main features the law of papal guarantees. But it was not given him to see this problem Death of Cavour. solved, for his health was broken by the strain of the last few years, during which practically the whole administration of the country was concentrated in his hands. He died after a short illness on the 6th of June 1861, at a moment when Italy had the greatest need of his statesmanship.
Ricasoli now became prime minister, Cavour having advised
the king to that effect. The financial situation was far from
brilliant, for the expenses of the administration of
Italy were far larger than the total of those of all the
separate states, and everything had to be created or
Ricasoli Ministry. Financial difficulties.
rebuilt. The budget of 1861 showed a deficit of
344,000,000 lire, while the service of the debt was
110,000,000; deficits were met by new loans issued on unfavourable
terms (that of July 1861 for 500,000,000 lire cost the government
714,833,000), and government stock fell as low as 36. It
was now that the period of reckless finance began which, save for
a lucid interval under Sella, was to last until nearly the end of the
century. Considering the state of the country and the coming
war for Venice, heavy expenditure was inevitable, but good
management might have rendered the situation less dangerous.
Ricasoli, honest and capable as he was, failed to win popularity;
his attitude on the Roman question, which became more uncompromising
after the failure of his attempt at conciliation,
and his desire to emancipate Italy from French predominance,
brought down on him the hostility of Napoleon. He fell in
March 1862, and was succeeded by Rattazzi, who being more
Rattazzi Ministry.
pliable and intriguing managed at first to please everybody,
including Garibaldi. At this time the extremists
and even the moderates were full of schemes for liberating
Venice and Rome. Garibaldi had a plan, with which the
premier was connected, for attacking Austria by raising a revolt
in the Balkans and Hungary, and later he contemplated a raid into the Trentino; but the government, seeing the danger of such
an attempt, arrested several Garibaldians at Sarnico (near
Brescia), and in the émeute which followed several persons were
shot. Garibaldi now became an opponent of the ministry, and
Garibaldi and Rome. Affair of Aspromonte, 1862.
Minghetti Ministry.
in June went to Sicily, where, after taking counsel
with his former followers, he decided on an immediate
raid on Rome. He summoned his legionaries, and in
August crossed over to Calabria with 1000 men. His
intentions in the main were still loyal, for he desired
to capture Rome for the kingdom; and he did his
best to avoid the regulars tardily sent against him. On the
29th of August 1862, however, he encountered a force under
Pallavicini at Aspromonte, and, although Garibaldi ordered his
men not to fire, some of the raw Sicilian volunteers discharged a
few volleys which were returned by the regulars. Garibaldi
himself was seriously wounded and taken prisoner. He was shut
up in the fortress of Varignano, and after endless discussions as to
whether he should be tried or not, the question was settled by an
amnesty. The affair made the ministry so unpopular
that it was forced to resign. Farini, who succeeded,
retired almost at once on account of ill-health, and
Minghetti became premier, with Visconti-Venosta as minister
for foreign affairs. The financial situation continued to be
seriously embarrassing; deficit was piled on deficit, loan upon
loan, and the service of the debt rose from 90,000,000 lire in
1860 to 220,000,000 in 1864.
Negotiations were resumed with Napoleon for the evacuation of Rome by the French troops; but the emperor, though he saw that the temporal power could not for ever be supported by French bayonets, desired some guarantee that the evacuation should not be followed, at all events France, Italy and the Roman question. immediately, by an Italian occupation, lest Catholic opinion should lay the blame for this upon France. Ultimately the two governments concluded a convention on the 15th of September 1864, whereby France agreed to withdraw her troops from Rome so soon as the papal army should be reorganized, or at the outside within two years, Italy undertaking not to attack it nor permit others to do so, and to transfer the capital from Turin to some other city within six months.[18] The change of capital would have the appearance of a definite abandonment of the Roma capitale programme, although in reality it was to be merely a tappa (stage) on the way. The convention was kept secret, but the last clause leaked out and caused the bitterest Capital transferred to Florence, 1865. feeling among the people of Turin, who would have been resigned to losing the capital provided it were transferred to Rome, but resented the fact that it was to be established in any other city, and that the convention was made without consulting parliament. Demonstrations were held which were repressed with unnecessary violence, and although the change of capital was not unpopular in the rest of Italy, where the Piemontesismo of the new régime was beginning to arouse jealousy, the secrecy with which the affair was arranged and the shooting down of the people in Turin raised such a storm of disapproval that the king for the first time used his privilege of dismissing the ministry. Under La Marmora’s administration the September convention was ratified, La Marmora Ministry. and the capital was transferred to Florence the following year. This affair resulted in an important political change, for the Piedmontese deputies, hitherto the bulwarks of moderate conservatism, now shifted to the Left or constitutional opposition.
Meanwhile, the Venetian question was becoming more and
more acute. Every Italian felt the presence of the Austrians in
the lagoons as a national humiliation, and between
1859 and 1866 countless plots were hatched for their
expulsion. But, in spite of the sympathy of the king,
Venetian question.
the attempt to raise armed bands in Venetia had no success, and
it became clear that the foreigner could only be driven from the
peninsula by regular war. To wage this alone Italy was still too
weak, and it was necessary to look round for an ally. Napoleon
was sympathetic; he desired to see the Austrians expelled, and
the Syllabus of Pius IX., which had stirred up the more aggressive
elements among the French clergy against his government, had
brought him once more into harmony with the views of Victor
Emmanuel; but he dared not brave French public opinion by
another war with Austria, nor did Italy desire an alliance
which would only have been bought at the price of further
cessions. There remained Prussia, which, now that the Danish
campaign of 1864 was over, was completing her preparations
for the final struggle with Austria for the hegemony
of Germany; and Napoleon, who saw in the furthering of
Bismarck’s plans the surest means of securing his own influence
in a divided Europe, willingly lent his aid in negotiating a Prusso-Italian
alliance. In the summer of 1865 Bismarck made formal
proposals to La Marmora; but the pourparlers were interrupted by
the conclusion of the convention of Gastein (August 14), to which
Austria agreed partly under pressure of the Prusso-Italian entente.
Prusso-Italian Alliance
of 1866.
To Italy the convention seemed like a betrayal; to
Napoleon it was a set-back which he tried to retrieve by
suggesting to Austria the peaceful cession of Venetia to
the Italian kingdom, in order to prevent any danger of
its alliance with Prussia. This proposal broke on the refusal of the
emperor Francis Joseph to cede Austrian territory except as the
result of a struggle; and Napoleon, won over by Bismarck at
the famous interview at Biarritz, once more took up the idea of
a Prusso-Italian offensive and defensive alliance. This was
actually concluded on the 8th of April 1866. Its terms, dictated
by a natural suspicion on the part of the Italian government,
stipulated that it should only become effective in the event of
Prussia declaring war on Austria within three months. Peace
was not to be concluded until Italy should have received Venetia,
and Prussia an equivalent territory in Germany.
The outbreak of war was postponed by further diplomatic complications. On the 12th of June Napoleon, whose policy throughout had been obscure and contradictory, signed a secret treaty with Austria, under which Venice was to be handed over to him, to be given to Italy in the event of her making a separate peace. La Marmora, however, who believed himself bound in honour to Prussia, refused to enter into a separate arrangement. On the 16th the Prussians began hostilities, and on the 20th Italy declared war.
Victor Emmanuel took the supreme command of the Italian army, and La Marmora resigned the premiership (which was assumed by Ricasoli), to become chief of the staff. La Marmora had three army corps (130,000 men) under his immediate command, to operate on the Ricasoli Ministry. Mincio, while Cialdini with 80,000 men was to operate on the Po. The Austrian southern army consisting of 95,000 men was commanded by the archduke Albert, with General von John as chief of the staff. On the 23rd of June La Marmora crossed the Mincio, and on the 24th a battle was fought at Custozza, under circumstances highly disadvantageous to the Italians, which after a stubborn contest ended in a crushing Austrian victory. Bad generalship, bad organization and the jealousy between La Marmora and Della Rocca were responsible for this defeat. Custozza might have been afterwards retrieved, for the Italians had plenty of fresh troops besides Cialdini’s army; but nothing was done, as both the king and La Marmora believed the situation to be much worse than it actually was. On the Battle of Königgrätz. 3rd of July the Prussians completely defeated the Austrians at Königgrätz, and on the 5th Austria ceded Venetia to Napoleon, accepting his mediation in favour of peace. The Italian iron-clad fleet commanded by the incapable Persano, after wasting much time at Taranto and Ancona, made an unsuccessful attack on the Dalmatian island of Lissa on the 18th of July, and on the 20th was completely defeated by the Austrian squadron, consisting of wooden ships, but commanded by the capable Admiral Tegethoff.
On the 22nd Prussia, without consulting Italy, made an armistice
with Austria, while Italy obtained an eight days’ truce on
condition of evacuating the Trentino, which had almost entirely fallen into the hands of Garibaldi and his volunteers. Ricasoli
wished to go on with the war, rather than accept Venetia as a
gift from France; but the king and La Marmora saw that
peace must be made, as the whole Austrian army of 350,000
men was now free to fall on Italy. An armistice was accordingly
signed at Cormons on the 12th of August; Austria
Venice
united
to Italy.
handed Venetia over to General Leboeuf, representing
Napoleon; and on the 3rd of October peace between
Austria and Italy was concluded at Vienna. On the
19th Leboeuf handed Venetia over to the Venetian
representatives, and at the plebiscite held on the 21st and 22nd,
647,246 votes were returned in favour of union with Italy, only
69 against it. When this result was announced to the king by
a deputation from Venice he said: “This is the finest day of
my life; Italy is made, but it is not complete.” Rome was
still wanting.
Custozza and Lissa were not Italy’s only misfortunes in 1866.
There had been considerable discontent in Sicily, where the
government had made itself unpopular. The priesthood
and the remnants of the Bourbon party fomented
an agitation, which in September culminated in an
Revolt in Sicily, 1866.
Rattazzi Ministry.
attack on Palermo by 3000 armed insurgents, and in
similar outbreaks elsewhere. The revolt was put down owing
to the energy of the mayor of Palermo, Marquis A. Di Rudini,
and the arrival of reinforcements. The Ricasoli cabinet fell
over the law against the religious houses, and was succeeded
by that of Rattazzi, who with the support of the Left
was apparently more fortunate. The French regular
troops were withdrawn from Rome in December 1866;
but the pontifical forces were largely recruited in France and
commanded by officers of the imperial army, and service under
the pope was considered by the French war office as equivalent
to service in France. This was a violation of the letter as well
as of the spirit of the September convention, and a stronger
and more straightforward statesman than Rattazzi would have
declared Italy absolved from its provisions. Mazzini now wanted
to promote an insurrection in Roman territory, whereas Garibaldi
advocated an invasion from without. He delivered a series
of violent speeches against the papacy, and made open preparations
for a raid, which were not interfered with by the government;
but on the 23rd of September 1867 Rattazzi had him
suddenly arrested and confined to Caprera. In spite of the
Garibaldi attacks Rome.
vigilance of the warships he escaped on the 14th of
October and landed in Tuscany. Armed bands had
already entered papal territory, but achieved nothing
in particular. Their presence, however, was a sufficient
excuse for Napoleon, under pressure of the clerical party, to
send another expedition to Rome (26th of October). Rattazzi,
after ordering a body of troops to enter papal territory with no
Menabrea Ministry.
Battle of Mentana.
definite object, now resigned, and was succeeded by
Menabrea. Garibaldi joined the bands on the 23rd,
but his ill-armed and ill-disciplined force was very
inferior to his volunteers of ’49, ’60 and ’66. On the 24th he
captured Monte Rotondo, but did not enter Rome as the expected
insurrection had not broken out. On the 29th a French force,
under de Failly, arrived, and on the 3rd of November a battle
took place at Mentana between 4000 or 5000 red-shirts
and a somewhat superior force of French and
pontificals. The Garibaldians, mowed down by the
new French chassepôt rifles, fought until their last cartridges
were exhausted, and retreated the next day towards the Italian
frontier, leaving 800 prisoners.
The affair of Mentana caused considerable excitement throughout Europe, and the Roman question entered on an acute stage. Napoleon suggested his favourite expedient of a congress but the proposal broke down owing to Great Britain’s refusal to participate; and Rouher, the French premier, declared in the Chamber (5th of December 1867) that France could never permit the Italians to occupy Rome. The attitude of France strengthened that anti-French feeling in Italy which had begun with Villafranca; and Bismarck was not slow to make use of this hostility, with a view to preventing Italy from taking sides with France against Germany in the struggle between the two powers which he saw to be inevitable. At the same time Napoleon was making overtures both to Austria and to Italy, overtures which were favourably received. Victor Emmanuel was sincerely anxious to assist Napoleon, for in spite of Nice and Savoy and Mentana he felt a chivalrous desire to help the man who had fought for Italy. But with the French at Civitavecchia (they had left Rome very soon after Mentana) a war for France was not to be thought of, and Napoleon would not promise more than the literal observance of the September convention. Austria would not join France unless Italy did the same, and she realized that that was impossible unless Napoleon gave way about Rome. Consequently the negotiations were suspended. Lanza Ministry. A scandal concerning the tobacco monopoly led to the fall of Menabrea, who was succeeded in December 1869 by Giovanni Lanza, with Visconti-Venosta at the foreign office and Q. Sella as finance minister. The latter introduced a sounder financial policy, which was maintained until the fall of the Right in 1876. Mazzini, now openly hostile to the monarchy, was seized with a perfect monomania for insurrections, and promoted various small risings, the only effect of which was to show how completely his influence was gone.
In December 1869 the XXI. oecumenical council began its sittings in Rome, and on the 18th of July 1870 proclaimed the infallibility of the pope (see Vatican Council). Two days previously Napoleon had declared war on Prussia, and immediately afterwards he withdrew his troops from Civitavecchia; but he persuaded Lanza to promise to abide by the September convention, and it was not until after Worth and Gravelotte that he offered to give Italy a free hand to occupy Rome. Then it was too late; Victor Emmanuel asked Thiers if he could give his word of honour that with 100,000 Italian troops France could be saved, but Thiers remained silent. Austria replied like Italy: “It is too late.” On the 9th of August Italy made a declaration of neutrality, and three weeks later Visconti-Venosta informed the powers that Italy was about to occupy Rome. On the 3rd of September the news of Sédan reached Florence, and with the fall of Napoleon’s empire the September convention ceased to have any value. The powers having engaged to abstain from intervention in Italian affairs, Victor Emmanuel addressed a letter to Pius IX. asking him in the name of religion and peace to accept Italian protection instead of the Italian occupation of Rome. temporal power, to which the pope replied that he would only yield to force. On the 11th of September General Cadorna at the head of 60,000 men entered papal territory. The garrison of Civitavecchia surrendered to Bixio, but the 10,000 men in Rome, mostly French, Belgians, Swiss and Bavarians, under Kanzler, were ready to fight. Cardinal Antonelli would have come to terms, but the pope decided on making a sufficient show of resistance to prove that he was yielding to force. On the 20th the Italians began the attack, and General Mazé de la Roche’s division having effected a breach in the Porta Pia, the pope ordered the garrison to cease fire and the Italians poured into the Eternal City followed by thousands of Roman exiles. By noon the whole city on the left of the Tiber was occupied and the garrison laid down their arms; the next day, at the pope’s request, the Leonine City on the right bank was also occupied. It had been intended to leave that part of Rome to the pope, but by the earnest desire of the inhabitants it too was included in the Italian kingdom. At the plebiscite there were 133,681 votes for union and 1507 against it. In July 1872 King Victor Emmanuel made his solemn entry into Rome, which was then declared the capital of Italy. Thus, after a struggle of more than half a century, in spite of apparently insuperable obstacles, the liberation and the unity of Italy were accomplished.
Bibliography.—A vast amount of material on the Risorgimento has been published both in Italy and abroad as well as numerous works of a literary and critical nature. The most detailed Italian history of the period is Carlo Tivaroni’s Storia critica del Risorgimento Italiano in 9 vols. (Turin, 1888–1897), based on a diligent study of the original authorities and containing a large amount of information; the author is a Mazzinian, which fact should be taken into account, but he generally quotes the opinions of those who disagree with him as well. Another voluminous but less valuable work is F. Bertolini’s Storia d’Italia dal 1814 al 1878, in 2 parts (Milan, 1880–1881.) L. Chiala’s Lettere del Conte di Cavour (7 vols., Turin, 1883–1887) and D. Zanichelli’s Scritti del Conte di Cavour (Bologna, 1892) are very important, and so are Prince Metternich’s Mémoires (7 vols., Paris, 1881). P. Orsi’s L’Italia moderna (Milan, 1901) should also be mentioned. N. Bianchi’s Storia della diplomazia europea in Italia (8 vols., Turin, 1865) is an invaluable and thoroughly reliable work. See also Zini’s Storia d’ Italia (4 vols., Milan, 1875); Gualterio’s Gli ultimi rivolgimenti italiani (4 vols., Florence, 1850) is important for the period from 1831 to 1847, and so also is L. Farina’s Storia d’ Italia dal 1815 al 1849 (5 vols., Turin, 1851); W. R. Thayer’s Dawn of Italian Independence (Boston, 1893) is gushing and not always accurate; C. Cantù’s Dell’ indipendenza italiana cronistoria (Naples, 1872–1877) is reactionary and often unreliable; V. Bersezio, Il Regno di Vittorio Emanuele II (8 vols., Turin, 1889, &c.). For English readers Countess E. Martinengo Cesaresco’s Liberation of Italy (London, 1895) is to be strongly recommended, and is indeed, for accuracy, fairness and synthesis, as well as for charm of style, one of the very best books on the subject in any language; Bolton King’s History of Italian Unity (2 vols., London, 1899) is bulkier and less satisfactory, but contains a useful bibliography. A succinct account of the chief events of the period will be found in Sir Spencer Walpole’s History of Twenty-Five Years (London, 1904). See also the Cambridge Modern History, vols. x. and xi. (Cambridge, 1907, &c.), where full bibliographies will be found. (L. V.*)
F. History, 1870–1902
The downfall of the temporal power was hailed throughout Italy with unbounded enthusiasm. Abroad, Catholic countries at first received the tidings with resignation, and Protestant countries with joy. In France, where the Government of National Defence had replaced the Italian occupation of Rome. Empire, Crémieux, as president of the government delegation at Tours, hastened to offer his congratulations to Italy. The occupation of Rome caused no surprise to the French government, which had been forewarned on 11th September of the Italian intentions. On that occasion Jules Favre had recognized the September convention to be dead, and, while refusing explicitly to denounce it, had admitted that unless Italy went to Rome the city would become a prey to dangerous agitators. At the same time he made it clear that Italy would occupy Rome upon her own responsibility. Agreeably surprised by this attitude on the part of France, Visconti-Venosta lost no time in conveying officially the thanks of Italy to the French government. He doubtless foresaw that the language of Favre and Crémieux would not be endorsed by the French Clericals. Prussia, while satisfied at the fall of the temporal power, seemed to fear lest Italy might recompense the absence of French opposition to the occupation of Rome by armed intervention in favour of France. Bismarck, moreover, was indignant at the connivance of the Italian government in the Garibaldian expedition to Dijon, and was irritated by Visconti-Venosta’s plea in the Italian parliament for the integrity of French territory. The course of events in France, however, soon calmed German apprehensions. The advent of Thiers, his attitude towards the petition of French bishops on behalf of the pope, the recall of Senard, the French minister at Florence—who had written to congratulate Victor Emmanuel on the capture of Rome—and the instructions given to his successor, the comte de Choiseul, to absent himself from Italy at the moment of the king’s official entry into the new capital (2nd July 1871), together with the haste displayed in appointing a French ambassador to the Holy See, rapidly cooled the cordiality of Franco-Italian relations, and reassured Bismarck on the score of any dangerous intimacy between the two governments.
The friendly attitude of France towards Italy during the period immediately subsequent to the occupation of Rome seemed to cow and to dishearten the Vatican. For a few weeks the relations between the Curia and the Italian authorities were marked by a conciliatory Attitude of the Vatican. spirit. The secretary-general of the Italian foreign office, Baron Blanc, who had accompanied General Cadorna to Rome, was received almost daily by Cardinal Antonelli, papal secretary of state, in order to settle innumerable questions arising out of the Italian occupation. The royal commissioner for finance, Giacomelli, had, as a precautionary measure, seized the pontifical treasury; but upon being informed by Cardinal Antonelli that among the funds deposited in the treasury were 1,000,000 crowns of Peter’s Pence offered by the faithful to the pope in person, the commissioner was authorized by the Italian council of state not only to restore this sum, but also to indemnify the Holy See for moneys expended for the service of the October coupon of the pontifical debt, that debt having been taken over by the Italian state. On the 29th of September Cardinal Antonelli further apprised Baron Blanc that he was about to issue drafts for the monthly payment of the 50,000 crowns inscribed in the pontifical budget for the maintenance of the pope, the Sacred College, the apostolic palaces and the papal guards. The Italian treasury at once honoured all the papal drafts, and thus contributed a first instalment of the 3,225,000 lire per annum afterwards placed by Article 4 of the Law of Guarantees at the disposal of the Holy See. Payments would have been regularly continued had not pressure from the French Clerical party coerced the Vatican into refusing any further instalment.
Once in possession of Rome, and guarantor to the Catholic world of the spiritual independence of the pope, the Italian government prepared juridically to regulate its relations to the Holy See. A bill known as the Law of Guarantees was therefore framed and laid before The Law of Guarantees. parliament. The measure was an amalgam of Cavour’s scheme for a “free church in a free state,” of Ricasoli’s Free Church Bill, rejected by parliament four years previously, and of the proposals presented to Pius IX. by Count Ponza di San Martino in September 1870. After a debate lasting nearly two months the Law of Guarantees was adopted in secret ballot on the 21st of March 1871 by 185 votes against 106.
It consisted of two parts. The first, containing thirteen articles, recognized (Articles 1 and 2) the person of the pontiff as sacred and intangible, and while providing for free discussion of religious questions, punished insults and outrages against the pope in the same way as insults and outrages against the king. Royal honours were attributed to the pope (Article 3), who was further guaranteed the same precedence as that accorded to him by other Catholic sovereigns, and the right to maintain his Noble and Swiss guards. Article 4 allotted the pontiff an annuity of 3,225,000 lire (£129,000) for the maintenance of the Sacred College, the sacred palaces, the congregations, the Vatican chancery and the diplomatic service. The sacred palaces, museums and libraries were, by Article 5, exempted from all taxation, and the pope was assured perpetual enjoyment of the Vatican and Lateran buildings and gardens, and of the papal villa at Castel Gandolfo. Articles 6 and 7 forbade access of any Italian official or agent to the above-mentioned palaces or to any eventual conclave or oecumenical council without special authorization from the pope, conclave or council. Article 8 prohibited the seizure or examination of any ecclesiastical papers, documents, books or registers of purely spiritual character. Article 9 guaranteed to the pope full freedom for the exercise of his spiritual ministry, and provided for the publication of pontifical announcements on the doors of the Roman churches and basilicas. Article 10 extended immunity to ecclesiastics employed by the Holy See, and bestowed upon foreign ecclesiastics in Rome the personal rights of Italian citizens. By Article 11, diplomatists accredited to the Holy See, and papal diplomatists while in Italy, were placed on the same footing as diplomatists accredited to the Quirinal. Article 12 provided for the transmission free of cost in Italy of all papal telegrams and correspondence both with bishops and foreign governments, and sanctioned the establishment, at the expense of the Italian state, of a papal telegraph office served by papal officials in communication with the Italian postal and telegraph system. Article 13 exempted all ecclesiastical seminaries, academies, colleges and schools for the education of priests in the city of Rome from all interference on the part of the Italian government.
This portion of the law, designed to reassure foreign Catholics, met with little opposition; but the second portion, regulating the relations between state and church in Italy, was sharply criticized by deputies who, like Sella, recognized the ideal of a “free church in a free state” to be an impracticable dream. The second division of the law abolished (Article 14) all restrictions upon the right of meeting of members of the clergy. By Article 15 the government relinquished its rights to apostolic legation in Sicily, and to the appointment of its own nominees to the chief benefices throughout the kingdom. Bishops were further dispensed from swearing fealty to the king, though, except in Rome and suburbs, the choice of bishops was limited to ecclesiastics of Italian nationality. Article 16 abolished the need for royal exequatur and placet for ecclesiastical publications, but subordinated the enjoyment of temporalities by bishops and priests to the concession of state exequatur and placet. Article 17 maintained the independence of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction in spiritual and disciplinary matters, but reserved for the state the exclusive right to carry out coercive measures.
On the 12th of July 1871, Articles 268, 269 and 270 of the Italian Penal Code were so modified as to make ecclesiastics liable to imprisonment for periods varying from six months to five years, and to fines from 1000 to 3000 lire, for spoken or written attacks against the laws of the state, or for the fomentation of disorder. An encyclical of Pius IX. to the bishops of the Catholic Church on the 15th of May 1871 repudiated the Law of Guarantees, and summoned Catholic princes to co-operate in restoring the temporal power. Practically, therefore, the law has remained a one-sided enactment, by which Italy considers herself bound, and of which she has always observed the spirit, even though the exigencies of self-defence may have led in some minor respects to non-observance of the letter. The annuity payable to the pope has, for instance, been made subject to quinquennial prescription, so that in the event of tardy recognition of the law the Vatican could at no time claim payment of more than five years’ annuity with interest.
For a few months after the occupation of Rome pressing questions incidental to a new change of capital and to the administration of a new domain distracted public attention from the real condition of Italian affairs. The rise of the Tiber and the flooding of Rome in December 1870 (tactfully used by Victor Emmanuel as an opportunity for a first visit to the new capital) illustrated the imperative necessity of reorganizing the drainage of the city and of constructing the Tiber embankment. In spite of pressure from the French government, which desired Italy to maintain Florence as the political and to regard Rome merely as the moral capital of the realm, the government offices and both legislative chambers were transferred in 1871 to the Eternal City. Early in the year the crown prince Humbert with the Princess Margherita took up their residence in the Quirinal Palace, which, in view of the Vatican refusal to deliver up the keys, had to be opened by force. Eight monasteries were expropriated to make room for the chief state departments, pending the construction of more suitable edifices. The growth of Clerical influence in France engendered a belief that Italy would soon have to defend with the sword her newly-won unity, while the tremendous lesson of the Franco-Prussian War convinced the military authorities of the need for thorough military reform. General Ricotti Magnani, minister of war, therefore framed an Army Reform Bill designed to bring the Italian army as nearly as possible up to the Prussian standard. Sella, minister of finance, notwithstanding the sorry plight of the Italian exchequer, readily granted the means for the reform. “We must arm,” he said, “since we have overturned the papal throne,” and he pointed to France as the quarter from which attack was most likely to come.
Though perhaps less desperate than during the previous decade, the condition of Italian finance was precarious indeed. With taxation screwed up to breaking point on personal and real estate, on all forms of commercial and industrial activity, and on salt, flour and other necessaries of life; with a Finance. deficit of £8,500,000 for the current year, and the prospect of a further aggregate deficit of £12,000,000 during the next quinquennium, Sella’s heroic struggle against national bankruptcy was still far from a successful termination. He chiefly had borne the brunt and won the laurels of the unprecedented fight against deficit in which Italy had been involved since 1862. As finance minister in the Rattazzi cabinet of that year he had been confronted with a public debt of nearly £120,000,000, and with an immediate deficit of nearly £18,000,000. In 1864, as minister in the La Marmora cabinet, he had again to face an excess of expenditure over income amounting to more than £14,600,000. By the seizure and sale of Church lands, by the sale of state railways, by “economy to the bone” and on one supreme occasion by an appeal to taxpayers to advance a year’s quota of the land-tax, he had met the most pressing engagements of that troublous period. The king was persuaded to forgo one-fifth of his civil list, ministers and the higher civil servants were required to relinquish a portion of their meagre salaries, but, in spite of all, Sella had found himself in 1865 compelled to propose the most hated of fiscal burdens—a grist tax on cereals. This tax (macinato) had long been known in Italy. Vexatious methods of assessment and collection had made it so unpopular that the Italian government in 1859–1860 had thought it expedient to abolish it throughout the realm. Sella hoped by the application of a mechanical meter both to obviate the odium attaching to former methods of collection and to avoid the maintenance of an army of inspectors and tax-gatherers, whose stipends had formerly eaten up most of the proceeds of the impost. Before proposing the reintroduction of the tax, Sella and his friend Ferrara improved and made exhaustive experiments with the meter. The result of their efforts was laid before parliament in one of the most monumental and most painstaking preambles ever prefixed to a bill. Sella, nevertheless, fell before the storm of opposition which his scheme aroused. Scialoja, who succeeded him, was obliged to adopt a similar proposal, but parliament again proved refractory. Ferrara, successor of Scialoja, met a like fate; but Count Cambray-Digny, finance minister in the Menabrea cabinet of 1868–1869, driven to find means to cover a deficit aggravated by the interest on the Venetian debt, succeeded, with Sella’s help, in forcing a Grist Tax Bill through parliament, though in a form of which Sella could not entirely approve. When, on the 1st of January 1869, the new tax came into force, nearly half the flour-mills in Italy ceased work. In many districts the government was obliged to open mills on its own account. Inspectors and tax-gatherers did their work under police protection, and in several parts of the country riots had to be suppressed manu militari. At first the net revenue from the impost was less than £1,100,000; but under Sella’s firm administration (1869–1873), and in consequence of improvements gradually introduced by him, the net return ultimately exceeded £3,200,000. The parliamentary opposition to the impost, which the Left denounced as “the tax on hunger,” was largely factitious. Few, except the open partisans of national bankruptcy, doubted its necessity; yet so strong was the current of feeling worked up for party purposes by opponents of the measure, that Sella’s achievement in having by its means saved the financial situation of Italy deserves to rank among the most noteworthy performances of modern parliamentary statesmanship.
Under the stress of the appalling financial conditions represented by chronic deficit, crushing taxation, the heavy expenditure necessary for the consolidation of the kingdom, the reform of the army and the interest on the pontifical debt, Sella, on the 11th of December 1871, exposed to parliament the financial situation in all its nakedness. He recognized that considerable improvement had already taken place. Revenue from taxation had risen in a decade from £7,000,000 to £20,200,000; profit on state monopolies had increased from £7,000,000 to £9,400,000; exports had grown to exceed imports; income from the working of telegraphs had tripled itself; railways had been extended from 2200 to 6200 kilometres, and the annual travelling public had augmented from 15,000,000 to 25,000,000 persons. The serious feature of the situation lay less in the income than in the “intangible” expenditure, namely, the vast sums required for interest on the various forms of public debt and for pensions. Within ten years this category of outlay had increased from £8,000,000 to £28,800,000. During the same period the assumption of the Venetian and Roman debts, losses on the issue of loans and the accumulation of annual deficits, had caused public indebtedness to rise from £92,000,000 to £328,000,000, no less than £100,000,000 of the latter sum having been sacrificed in premiums and commissions to bankers and underwriters of loans. By economies and new taxes Sella had reduced the deficit to less than £2,000,000 in 1871, but for 1872 he found himself confronted with a total expenditure of £8,000,000 in excess of revenue. He therefore proposed to make over the treasury service to the state banks, to increase the forced currency, to raise the stamp and registration duties and to impose a new tax on textile fabrics. An optional conversion of sundry internal loans into consolidated stock at a lower rate of interest was calculated to effect considerable saving. The battle over these proposals was long and fierce. But for the tactics of Rattazzi, leader of the Left, who, by basing his opposition on party considerations, impeded the secession of Minghetti and a part of the Right from the ministerial majority, Sella would have been defeated. On the 23rd of March 1872, however, he succeeded in carrying his programme, which not only provided for the pressing needs of the moment, but laid the foundation of the much-needed equilibrium between expenditure and revenue.
In the spring of 1873 it became evident that the days of the Lanza-Sella cabinet were numbered. Fear of the advent of a Radical administration under Rattazzi alone prevented the Minghettian Right from revolting against the government. The Left, conscious of its strength, impatiently awaited the moment of accession to power. Sella, the real head of the Lanza cabinet, was worn out by four years’ continuous work and disheartened by the perfidious misrepresentation in which Italian politicians, particularly those of the Left, have ever excelled. By sheer force of will he compelled the Chamber early in 1873 to adopt some minor financial reforms, but on the 29th of April found himself in a minority on the question of a credit for a proposed state arsenal at Taranto. Pressure from all sides of the House, however, induced the ministry to retain office until after the debate on the application to Rome and the Papal States of the Religious Orders Bill (originally passed in 1866)—a measure which, with the help of Ricasoli, was carried at the end of May. While leaving intact the general houses of the various confraternities Religious Orders Bill. (except that of the Jesuits), the bill abolished the corporate personality of religious orders, handed over their schools and hospitals to civil administrators, placed their churches at the disposal of the secular clergy, and provided pensions for nuns and monks, those who had families being sent to reside with their relatives, and those who by reason of age or bereavement had no home but their monasteries being allowed to end their days in religious houses specially set apart for the purpose. The proceeds of the sale of the suppressed convents and monasteries were partly converted into pensions for monks and nuns, and partly allotted to the municipal charity boards which had undertaken the educational and charitable functions formerly exercised by the religious orders. To the pope was made over £16,000 per annum as a contribution to the expense of maintaining in Rome representatives of foreign orders; the Sacred College, however, rejected this endowment, and summoned all the suppressed confraternities to reconstitute themselves under the ordinary Italian law of association. A few days after the passage of the Religious Orders Bill, the death of Rattazzi (5th June 1873) removed all probability of the immediate advent of the Left. Sella, uncertain of the loyalty of the Right, challenged a vote on the immediate discussion of further financial reforms, and on the 23rd of June was overthrown by a coalition of the Left under Depretis with a part of the Right under Minghetti and the Tuscan Centre under Correnti. The administration which thus fell was unquestionably the most important since the death of Cavour. It had completed national unity, transferred the capital to Rome, overcome the chief obstacles to financial equilibrium, initiated military reform and laid the foundation of the relations between state and church.
The succeeding Minghetti-Visconti-Venosta cabinet—which held office from the 10th of July 1873 to the 18th of March 1876—continued in essential points the work of the preceding administration. Minghetti’s finance, though less clear-sighted and less resolute than that of Sella, was on the whole Minghetti. prudent and beneficial. With the aid of Sella he concluded conventions for the redemption of the chief Italian railways from their French and Austrian proprietors. By dint of expedients he gradually overcame the chronic deficit, and, owing to the normal increase of revenue, ended his term of office with the announcement of a surplus of some £720,000. The question whether this surplus was real or only apparent has been much debated, but there is no reason to doubt its substantial reality. It left out of account a sum of £1,000,000 for railway construction which was covered by credit, but, on the other hand, took no note of £360,000 expended in the redemption of debt. Practically, therefore, the Right, of which the Minghetti cabinet was the last representative administration, left Italian finance with a surplus of £80,000. Outside the all-important domain of finance, the attention of Minghetti and his colleagues was principally absorbed by strife between church and state, army reform and railway redemption. For some time after the occupation of Rome the pope, in order to substantiate the pretence that his spiritual freedom had been diminished, avoided the creation of cardinals and the nomination of bishops. On the 22nd of December 1873, however, he unexpectedly created twelve cardinals, and subsequently proceeded to nominate a number of bishops. Visconti-Venosta, who had retained the portfolio for foreign affairs in the Minghetti cabinet, at once drew the attention of the European powers to this proof of the pope’s spiritual freedom and of the imaginary nature of his “imprisonment” in the Vatican. At the same time he assured them that absolute liberty would be guaranteed to the deliberations of a conclave. In relation to the Church in Italy, Minghetti’s policy was less perspicacious. He let it be understood that the announcement of the appointment of bishops and the request for the royal exequatur might be made to the government impersonally by the congregation of bishops and regulars, by a municipal council or by any other corporate body—a concession of which the bishops were quick to take advantage, but which so irritated Italian political opinion that, in July 1875, the government was compelled to withdraw the temporalities of ecclesiastics who had neglected to apply for the exequatur, and to evict sundry bishops who had taken possession of their palaces without authorization from the state. Parliamentary pressure further obliged Bonghi, minister of public instruction, to compel clerical seminaries either to forgo the instruction of lay pupils or to conform to the laws of the state in regard to inspection and examination, an ordinance which gave rise to conflicts between ecclesiastical and lay authorities, and led to the forcible dissolution of the Mantua seminary and to the suppression of the Catholic university in Rome.
More noteworthy than its management of internal affairs were the efforts of the Minghetti cabinet to strengthen and consolidate national defence. Appalled by the weakness, or rather the non-existence, of the navy, Admiral Saint-Bon, with his coadjutor Signor Brin, addressed Military and naval reform. himself earnestly to the task of recreating the fleet, which had never recovered from the effects of the disaster of Lissa. During his three years of office he laid the foundation upon which Brin was afterwards to build up a new Italian navy. Simultaneously General Ricotti Magnani matured the army reform scheme which he had elaborated under the preceding administration. His bill, adopted by parliament on the 7th of June 1875, still forms the ground plan of the Italian army.
It was fortunate for Italy that during the whole period 1860–1876 the direction of her foreign policy remained in the experienced hands of Visconti-Venosta, a statesman whose trustworthiness, dignity and moderation even political opponents have been compelled to recognize. Diplomatic Foreign policy under the Right. records fail to substantiate the accusations of lack of initiative and instability of political criterion currently brought against him by contemporaries. As foreign minister of a young state which had attained unity in defiance of the most formidable religious organization in the world and in opposition to the traditional policy of France, it could but be Visconti-Venosta’s aim to uphold the dignity of his country while convincing European diplomacy that United Italy was an element of order and progress, and that the spiritual independence of the Roman pontiff had suffered no diminution. Prudence, moreover, counselled avoidance of all action likely to serve the predominant anti-Italian party in France as a pretext for violent intervention in favour of the pope. On the occasion of the Metrical Congress, which met in Paris in 1872, he, however, successfully protested against the recognition of the Vatican delegate, Father Secchi, as a representative of a “state,” and obtained from Count de Rémusat, French foreign minister, a formal declaration that the presence of Father Secchi on that occasion could not constitute a diplomatic precedent. The irritation displayed by Bismarck at the Francophil attitude of Italy towards the end of the Franco-German War gave place to a certain show of goodwill when the great chancellor found himself in his turn involved in a struggle against the Vatican and when the policy of Thiers began to strain Franco-Italian relations. Thiers had consistently opposed the emperor Napoleon’s pro-Italian policy. In the case of Italy, as in that of Germany, he frankly regretted the constitution of powerful homogeneous states upon the borders of France. Personal pique accentuated this feeling in regard to Italy. The refusal of Victor Emmanuel II. to meet Thiers at the opening of the Mont Cenis tunnel (a refusal not unconnected with offensive language employed at Florence in October 1870 by Thiers during his European tour, and with his instructions to the French minister to remain absent from Victor Emmanuel’s official entry into Rome) had wounded the amour propre of the French statesman, and had decreased whatever inclination he might otherwise have felt to oppose the French Clerical agitation for the restoration of the temporal power, and for French interference with the Italian Religious Orders Bill. Consequently relations between France and Italy became so strained that in 1873 both the French minister to the Quirinal and the Italian minister to the Republic remained for several months absent from their posts. At this juncture the emperor of Austria invited Victor Emmanuel to visit the Vienna Exhibition, and the Italian government received a confidential intimation that acceptance of the invitation to Vienna would be followed by a further invitation from Berlin. Perceiving the advantage of a visit to the imperial and apostolic court after the Italian occupation of Rome and the suppression of the religious orders, and convinced of the value of more cordial intercourse with the German empire, Visconti-Venosta and Minghetti advised their sovereign to accept both the Austrian and the subsequent German invitations. The visit to Vienna took place on the 17th to the 22nd of September, and that to Berlin on the 22nd to the 26th of September 1873, the Italian monarch being accorded in both capitals a most cordial reception, although the contemporaneous publication of La Marmora’s famous pamphlet, More Light on the Events of 1866, prevented intercourse between the Italian ministers and Bismarck from being entirely confidential. Visconti-Venosta and Minghetti, moreover, wisely resisted the chancellor’s pressure to override the Law of Guarantees and to engage in an Italian Kulturkampf. Nevertheless the royal journey contributed notably to the establishment of cordial relations between Italy and the central powers, relations which were further strengthened by the visit of the emperor Francis Joseph to Victor Emmanuel at Venice in April 1875, and by that of the German emperor to Milan in October of the same year. Meanwhile Thiers had given place to Marshal Macmahon, who effected a decided improvement in Franco-Italian relations by recalling from Civitavecchia the cruiser “Orénoque,” which since 1870 had been stationed in that port at the disposal of the pope in case he should desire to quit Rome. The foreign policy of Visconti-Venosta may be said to have reinforced the international position of Italy without sacrifice of dignity, and without the vacillation and short-sightedness which was to characterize the ensuing administrations of the Left.
The fall of the Right on the 18th of March 1876 was an event destined profoundly and in many respects adversely to affect the course of Italian history. Except at rare and not auspicious intervals, the Right had held office from 1849 to 1876. Its rule was associated in the popular mind with severe administration; hostility to the democratic elements represented by Garibaldi, Crispi, Depretis and Bertani; ruthless imposition and collection of taxes in order to meet the financial engagements forced upon Italy by the vicissitudes of her Risorgimento; strong predilection for Piedmontese, Lombards and Tuscans, and a steady determination, not always scrupulous in its choice of means, to retain executive power and the most important administrative offices of the state for the consorteria, or close corporation, of its own adherents. For years the men of the Left had worked to inoculate the electorate with suspicion of Conservative methods and with hatred of the imposts which they nevertheless knew to be indispensable to sound finance. In regard to the grist tax especially, the agitators of the Left had placed their party in a radically false position. Moreover, the redemption of the railways by the state—contracts for which had been signed by Sella in 1875 on behalf of the Minghetti cabinet with Rothschild at Basel and with the Austrian government at Vienna—had been fiercely opposed by the Left, although its members were for the most part convinced of the utility of the operation. When, at the beginning of March 1876, these contracts were submitted to parliament, a group of Tuscan deputies, under Cesare Correnti, joined the opposition, and on the 18th of March took advantage of a chance motion concerning the date of discussion of an interpellation on the grist tax to place the Minghetti cabinet in a minority. Depretis, ex-pro-dictator of Sicily, and successor of Rattazzi in the leadership of the Left, was entrusted by the king with the formation of a Liberal ministry. Besides the premiership, Depretis assumed the First Depretis Cabinet. portfolio of finance; Nicotera, an ex-Garibaldian of somewhat tarnished reputation, but a man of energetic and conservative temperament, was placed at the ministry of the interior; public works were entrusted to Zanardelli, a Radical doctrinaire of considerable juridical attainments; General Mezzacapo and Signor Brin replaced General Ricotti Magnani and Admiral Saint-Bon at the war office and ministry of marine; while to Mancini and Coppino, prominent members of the Left, were allotted the portfolios of justice and public instruction. Great difficulty was experienced in finding a foreign minister willing to challenge comparison with Visconti-Venosta. Several diplomatists in active service were approached, but, partly on account of their refusal, and partly from the desire of the Left to avoid giving so important a post to a diplomatist bound by ties of friendship or of interest to the Right, the choice fell upon Melegari, Italian minister at Bern.
The new ministers had long since made monarchical professions of faith, but, up to the moment of taking office, were nevertheless considered to be tinged with an almost revolutionary hue. The king alone appeared to feel no misgiving. His shrewd sense of political expediency and his loyalty to constitutional principles saved him from the error of obstructing the advent and driving into an anti-dynastic attitude politicians who had succeeded in winning popular favour. Indeed, the patriotism and loyalty of the new ministers were above suspicion. Danger lay rather in entrusting men schooled in political conspiracy and in unscrupulous parliamentary opposition with the government of a young state still beset by enemies at home and abroad. As an opposition party the Left had lived upon the facile credit of political promises, but had no well-considered programme nor other discipline nor unity of purpose than that born of the common eagerness of its leaders for office and their common hostility to the Right. Neither Depretis, Nicotera, Crispi, Cairoli nor Zanardelli was disposed permanently to recognize the superiority of any one chief. The dissensions which broke out among them within a few months of the accession of their party to power never afterwards disappeared, except at rare moments when it became necessary to unite in preventing the return of the Conservatives. Considerations such as these could not be expected to appeal to the nation at large, which hailed the advent of the Left as the dawn of an era of unlimited popular sovereignty, diminished administrative pressure, reduction of taxation and general prosperity. The programme of Depretis corresponded only in part to these expectations. Its chief points were extension of the franchise, incompatibility of a Programme of the Left. parliamentary mandate with an official position, strict enforcement of the rights of the State in regard to the Church, protection of freedom of conscience, maintenance of the military and naval policy inaugurated by the Conservatives, acceptance of the railway redemption contracts, consolidation of the financial equilibrium, abolition of the forced currency, and, eventually, fiscal reform. The long-promised abolition of the grist tax was not explicitly mentioned, opposition to the railway redemption contracts was transformed into approval, and the vaunted reduction of taxation replaced by lip-service to the Conservative deity of financial equilibrium. The railway redemption contracts were in fact immediately voted by parliament, with a clause pledging the government to legislate in favour of farming out the railways to private companies.
Nicotera, minister of the interior, began his administration of home affairs by a sweeping change in the personnel of the prefects, sub-prefects and public prosecutors, but found himself obliged to incur the wrath of his supporters by prohibiting Radical meetings likely to endanger public order, and by enunciating administrative principles which would have befitted an inveterate Conservative. In regard to the Church, he instructed the prefects strictly to prevent infraction of the law against religious orders. At the same time the cabinet, as a whole, brought in a Clerical Abuses Bill, threatening with severe punishment priests guilty of disturbing the peace of families, of opposing the laws of the state, or of fomenting disorder. Depretis, for his part, was compelled to declare impracticable the immediate abolition of the grist tax, and to frame a bill for the increase of revenue, acts which caused the secession of some sixty Radicals and Republicans from the ministerial majority, and gave the signal for an agitation against the premier similar to that which he himself had formerly undertaken against the Right. The first general election under the Left (November 1876) had yielded the cabinet the overwhelming majority of 421 Ministerialists against 87 Conservatives, but the very size of the majority rendered it unmanageable. The Clerical Abuses Bill provoked further dissensions: Nicotera was severely affected by revelations concerning his political past; Zanardelli refused to sanction the construction of a railway in Calabria in which Nicotera was interested; and Depretis saw fit to compensate the supporters of his bill for the increase of revenue by decorating at one stroke sixty ministerial deputies with the Order of the Crown of Italy. A further derogation from the ideal of democratic austerity was committed by adding £80,000 per annum to the king’s civil list (14th May 1877) and by burdening the state exchequer with royal household pensions amounting to £20,000 a year. The civil list, which the law of the 10th of August 1862 had fixed at £650,000 a year, but which had been voluntarily reduced by the king to £530,000 in 1864, and to £490,000 in 1867, was thus raised to £570,000 a year. Almost the only respect in which the Left could boast a decided improvement over the administration of the Right was the energy displayed by Nicotera in combating brigandage and the mafia in Calabria and Sicily. Successes achieved in those provinces failed, however, to save Nicotera from the wrath of the Chamber, and on the 14th of December 1877 a cabinet crisis arose over a question concerning the secrecy of telegraphic correspondence. Depretis thereupon reconstructed his administration, excluding Nicotera, Melegari and Zanardelli, placing Crispi at the home office, entrusting Magliani with finance, and himself assuming the direction of foreign affairs.
In regard to foreign affairs, the début of the Left as a governing
party was scarcely more satisfactory than its home policy.
Since the war of 1866 the Left had advocated an Italo-Prussian
alliance in opposition to the Francophil
tendencies of the Right. On more than one occasion
Foreign policy of
the Left.
Bismarck had maintained direct relations with the
chiefs of the Left, and had in 1870 worked to prevent a Franco-Italian
alliance by encouraging the “party of action” to press
for the occupation of Rome. Besides, the Left stood for anti-clericalism
and for the retention by the State of means of coercing
the Church, in opposition to the men of the Right, who, with
the exception of Sella, favoured Cavour’s ideal of “a free Church
in a free State,” and the consequent abandonment of state
control over ecclesiastical government. Upon the outbreak of
the Prussian Kulturkampf the Left had pressed the Right to
introduce an Italian counterpart to the Prussian May laws,
especially as the attitude of Thiers and the hostility of the
French Clericals obviated the need for sparing French susceptibilities.
Visconti-Venosta and Minghetti, partly from
aversion to a Jacobin policy, and partly from a conviction that
Bismarck sooner or later would undertake his Gang nach Canossa,
regardless of any tacit engagement he might have assumed
towards Italy, had wisely declined to be drawn into any infraction
of the Law of Guarantees. It was, however, expected that the
chiefs of the Left, upon attaining office, would turn resolutely
towards Prussia in search of a guarantee against the Clerical
menace embodied in the régime of Marshal Macmahon. On the
contrary, Depretis and Melegari, both of whom were imbued
with French Liberal doctrines, adopted towards the Republic
an attitude so deferential as to arouse suspicion in Vienna and
Berlin. Depretis recalled Nigra from Paris and replaced him by
General Cialdini, whose ardent plea for Italian intervention
in favour of France in 1870, and whose comradeship with Marshal
Macmahon in 1859, would, it was supposed, render him persona
gratissima to the French government. This calculation was
falsified by events. Incensed by the elevation to the rank of
embassies of the Italian legation in Paris and the French legation
to the Quirinal, and by the introduction of the Italian bill
against clerical abuses, the French Clerical party not only attacked
Italy and her representative, General Cialdini, in the Chamber
of Deputies, but promoted a monster petition against the Italian
bill. Even the coup d’état of the 16th of May 1877 (when
Macmahon dismissed the Jules Simon cabinet for opposing the
Clerical petition) hardly availed to change the attitude of
Depretis. As a precaution against an eventual French attempt
to restore the temporal power, orders were hurriedly given to
complete the defences of Rome, but in other respects the Italian
government maintained its subservient attitude. Yet at that
moment the adoption of a clear line of policy, in accord with
the central powers, might have saved Italy from the loss of
prestige entailed by her bearing in regard to the Russo-Turkish
War and the Austrian acquisition of Bosnia, and might have
prevented the disappointment subsequently occasioned by the
outcome of the Congress of Berlin. In the hope of inducing
the European powers to “compensate” Italy for the increase
of Austrian influence on the Adriatic, Crispi undertook in the
autumn of 1877, with the approval of the king, and in spite of
the half-disguised opposition of Depretis, a semi-official mission
to Paris, Berlin, London and Vienna. The mission appears
not to have been an unqualified success, though Crispi afterwards
affirmed in the Chamber (4th March 1886) that Depretis might in
1877 “have harnessed fortune to the Italian chariot.” Depretis,
anxious only to avoid “a policy of adventure,” let slip whatever
opportunity may have presented itself, and neglected even to
deal energetically with the impotent but mischievous Italian
agitation for a “rectification” of the Italo-Austrian frontier.
He greeted the treaty of San Stefano (3rd March 1878) with
undisguised relief, and by the mouth of the king, congratulated
Italy (7th March 1878) on having maintained with the powers
friendly and cordial relations “free from suspicious precautions,”
and upon having secured for herself “that most precious of
alliances, the alliance of the future”—a phrase of which the
empty rhetoric was to be bitterly demonstrated by the Berlin
Congress and the French occupation of Tunisia.
The entry of Crispi into the Depretis cabinet (December 1877) placed at the ministry of the interior a strong hand and sure eye at a moment when they were about to become imperatively necessary. Crispi was the only man of truly statesmanlike calibre in the ranks of the Left. Formerly a friend Crispi. and disciple of Mazzini, with whom he had broken on the question of the monarchical form of government which Crispi believed indispensable to the unification of Italy, he had afterwards been one of Garibaldi’s most efficient coadjutors and an active member of the “party of action.” Passionate, not always scrupulous in his choice and use of political weapons, intensely patriotic, loyal with a loyalty based rather on reason than sentiment, quick-witted, prompt in action, determined and pertinacious, he possessed in eminent degree many qualities lacking in other Liberal chieftains. Hardly had he assumed office when the unexpected death of Victor Emmanuel II. (9th January Deaths of Victor Emmanuel II. and Pius IX. 1878) stirred national feeling to an unprecedented depth, and placed the continuity of monarchical institutions in Italy upon trial before Europe. For thirty years Victor Emmanuel had been the centre point of national hopes, the token and embodiment of the struggle for national redemption. He had led the country out of the despondency which followed the defeat of Novara and the abdication of Charles Albert, through all the vicissitudes of national unification to the final triumph at Rome. His disappearance snapped the chief link with the heroic period, and removed from the helm of state a ruler of large heart, great experience and civil courage, at a moment when elements of continuity were needed and vital problems of internal reorganization had still to be faced. Crispi adopted the measures necessary to ensure the tranquil accession of King Humbert with a quick energy which precluded any Radical or Republican demonstrations. His influence decided the choice of the Roman Pantheon as the late monarch’s burial-place, in spite of formidable pressure from the Piedmontese, who wished Victor Emmanuel II. to rest with the Sardinian kings at Superga. He also persuaded the new ruler to inaugurate, as King Humbert I., the new dynastical epoch of the kings of Italy, instead of continuing as Humbert IV. the succession of the kings of Sardinia. Before the commotion caused by the death of Victor Emmanuel had passed away, the decease of Pius IX. (7th February 1878) placed further demands upon Crispi’s sagacity and promptitude. Like Victor Emmanuel, Pius IX. had been bound up with the history of the Risorgimento, but, unlike him, had represented and embodied the anti-national, reactionary spirit. Ecclesiastically, he had become the instrument of the triumph of Jesuit influence, and had in turn set his seal upon the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, the Syllabus and Papal Infallibility. Yet, in spite of all, his jovial disposition and good-humoured cynicism saved him from unpopularity, and rendered his death an occasion of mourning. Notwithstanding the pontiff’s bestowal of the apostolic benediction in articulo mortis upon Victor Emmanuel, the attitude of the Vatican had remained so inimical as to make it doubtful whether the conclave would be held in Rome. Crispi, whose strong anti-clerical convictions did not prevent him from regarding the papacy as pre-eminently an Italian institution, was determined both to prove to the Catholic world the practical independence of the government of the Church and to retain for Rome so potent a centre of universal attraction as the presence of the future pope. The Sacred College having decided to hold the conclave abroad, Crispi assured them of absolute freedom if they remained in Rome, or of protection to the frontier should they migrate, but warned them that, once evacuated, the Vatican would be occupied in the name of the Italian government and be lost to the Church as headquarters of the papacy. The cardinals thereupon overruled their former decision, and the conclave was held in Rome, the new pope, Cardinal Pecci, being elected on the 20th of February 1878 without let or hindrance. The Italian government not only Leo XIII. prorogued the Chamber during the conclave to prevent unseemly inquiries or demonstrations on the part of deputies, but by means of Mancini, minister of justice, and Cardinal di Pietro, assured the new pope protection during the settlement of his outstanding personal affairs, an assurance of which Leo XIII. on the evening after his election, took full advantage. At the same time the duke of Aosta, commander of the Rome army corps, ordered the troops to render royal honours to the pontiff should he officially appear in the capital. King Humbert addressed to the pope a letter of congratulation upon his election, and received a courteous reply. The improvement thus signalized in the relations between Quirinal and Vatican was further exemplified on the 18th of October 1878, when the Italian government accepted a papal formula with regard to the granting of the royal exequatur for bishops, whereby they, upon nomination by the Holy See, recognized state control over, and made application for, the payment of their temporalities.
The Depretis-Crispi cabinet did not long survive the opening of the new reign. Crispi’s position was shaken by a morally plausible but juridically untenable charge of bigamy, while on the 8th of March the election of Cairoli, an opponent of the ministry and head of the extremer section of the Cairoli. Left, to the presidency of the Chamber, induced Depretis to tender his resignation to the new king. Cairoli succeeded in forming an administration, in which his friend Count Corti, Italian ambassador at Constantinople, accepted the portfolio of foreign affairs, Zanardelli the ministry of the interior, and Seismit Doda the ministry of finance. Though the cabinet had no stable majority, it induced the Chamber to sanction a commercial treaty which had been negotiated with France and a general “autonomous” customs tariff. The commercial treaty was, however, rejected by the French Chamber in June 1878, a circumstance necessitating the application of the Italian general tariff, which implied a 10 to 20% increase in the duties on the principal French exports. A highly imaginative financial exposition by Seismit Doda, who announced a surplus of £2,400,000, paved the way for a Grist Tax Reduction Bill, which Cairoli had taken over from the Depretis programme. The Chamber, though convinced of the danger of this reform, the perils of which were incisively demonstrated by Sella, voted by an overwhelming majority for an immediate reduction of the impost by one-fourth, and its complete abolition within four years. Cairoli’s premiership was, however, destined to be cut short by an attempt made upon the king’s life in November 1878, during a royal visit to Naples, by a miscreant named Passanante. In spite of the courage and presence of mind of Cairoli, who received the dagger thrust intended for the king, public and parliamentary indignation found expression in a vote which compelled the ministry to resign.
Though brief, Cairoli’s term of office was momentous in regard
to foreign affairs. The treaty of San Stefano had led to the
convocation of the Berlin Congress, and though Count
Corti was by no means ignorant of the rumours concerning
secret agreements between Germany, Austria
Italy and
the Berlin Congress.
and Russia, and Germany, Austria and Great Britain,
he scarcely seemed alive to the possible effect of such agreements
upon Italy. Replying on the 9th of April 1878 to interpellations
by Visconti-Venosta and other deputies on the impending
Congress of Berlin, he appeared free from apprehension lest
Italy, isolated, might find herself face to face with a change of
the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and declared that
in the event of serious complications Italy would be “too much
sought after rather than too much forgotten.” The policy of
Italy in the congress, he added, would be to support the interests
of the young Balkan nations. Wrapped in this optimism, Count
Corti proceeded, as first Italian delegate, to Berlin, where he
found himself obliged, on the 28th of May, to join reluctantly in
sanctioning the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
On the 8th of July the revelation of the Anglo-Ottoman treaty
for the British occupation of Cyprus took the congress by surprise.
Italy, who had made the integrity of the Ottoman empire a
cardinal point of her Eastern policy, felt this change of the
Mediterranean status quo the more severely inasmuch as, in
order not to strain her relations with France, she had turned a
deaf ear to Austrian, Russian and German advice to prepare to
occupy Tunisia in agreement with Great Britain. Count Corti
had no suspicion that France had adopted a less disinterested
attitude towards similar suggestions from Bismarck and Lord
Salisbury. He therefore returned from the German capital
with “clean” but empty hands, a plight which found marked
disfavour in Italian eyes, and stimulated anti-Austrian Irredentism.
Irredentism.
Ever since Venetia had been ceded by
Austria to the emperor Napoleon, and by him to Italy,
after the war of 1866, secret revolutionary committees
had been formed in the northern Italian provinces to
prepare for the “redemption” of Trent and Trieste. For
twelve years these committees had remained comparatively inactive,
but in 1878 the presence of the ex-Garibaldian Cairoli
at the head of the government, and popular dissatisfaction at the
spread of Austrian sway on the Adriatic, encouraged them to
begin a series of noisy demonstrations. On the evening of the
signature at Berlin of the clause sanctioning the Austrian occupation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an Irredentist riot took place
before the Austrian consulate at Venice. The Italian government
attached little importance to the occurrence, and believed
that a diplomatic expression of regret would suffice to allay
Austrian irritation. Austria, indeed, might easily have been
persuaded to ignore the Irredentist agitation, had not the
equivocal attitude of Cairoli and Zanardelli cast doubt upon the
sincerity of their regret. The former at Pavia (15th October
1878), and the latter at Arco (3rd November), declared publicly
that Irredentist manifestations could not be prevented under
existing laws, but gave no hint of introducing any law to sanction
their prevention. “Repression, not prevention” became the
official formula, the enunciation of which by Cairoli at Pavia
caused Count Corti and two other ministers to resign.
The fall of Cairoli, and the formation of a second Depretis cabinet in 1878, brought no substantial change in the attitude of the government towards Irredentism, nor was the position improved by the return of Cairoli to power in the following July. Though aware of Bismarck’s hostility towards Italy, of the conclusion of the Austro-German alliance of 1879, and of the undisguised ill-will of France, Italy not only made no attempt to crush an agitation as mischievous as it was futile, but granted a state funeral to General Avezzana, president of the Irredentist League. In Bonghi’s mordant phrase, the foreign policy of Italy during this period may be said to have been characterized by “enormous intellectual impotence counterbalanced by equal moral feebleness.” Home affairs were scarcely better managed. Parliament had degenerated into a congeries of personal groups, whose members were eager only to overturn cabinets in order to secure power for the leaders and official favours for themselves. Depretis, who had succeeded Cairoli in December 1878, fell in July 1879, after a vote in which Cairoli and Nicotera joined the Conservative opposition. On 12th July Cairoli formed a new administration, only to resign on 24th November, and to reconstruct his cabinet with the help of Depretis. The administration of finance was as chaotic as the condition of parliament. The £2,400,000 surplus announced by Seismit Doda proved to be a myth. Nevertheless Magliani, who succeeded Seismit Doda, had neither the perspicacity nor the courage to resist the abolition of the grist tax. The first vote of the Chamber for the immediate diminution of the tax, and for its total abolition on 1st January Finance. 1883, had been opposed by the Senate. A second bill was passed by the Chamber on 18th July 1879, providing for the immediate repeal of the grist tax on minor cereals, and for its total abolition on 1st January 1884. While approving the repeal in regard to minor cereals, the Senate (24th January 1880) again rejected the repeal of the tax on grinding wheat as prejudicial to national finance. After the general election of 1880, however, the Ministerialists, aided by a number of factious Conservatives, passed a third bill repealing the grist tax on wheat (10th July 1880), the repeal to take effect from the 1st of January 1884 onwards. The Senate, in which the partisans of the ministry had been increased by numerous appointments ad hoc, finally set the seal of its approval upon the measure. Notwithstanding this prospective loss of revenue, parliament showed great reluctance to vote any new impost, although hardly a year previously it had sanctioned (30th June 1879) Depretis’s scheme for spending during the next eighteen years £43,200,000 in building 5000 kilometres of railway, an expenditure not wholly justified by the importance of the lines, and useful principally as a source of electoral sops for the constituents of ministerial deputies. The unsatisfactory financial condition of the Florence, Rome and Naples municipalities necessitated state help, but the Chamber nevertheless proceeded with a light heart (23rd February 1881) to sanction the issue of a foreign loan for £26,000,000, with a view to the abolition of the forced currency, thus adding to the burdens of the exchequer a load which three years later again dragged Italy into the gulf of chronic deficit.
In no modern country is error or incompetence on the part of administrators more swiftly followed by retribution than in Italy; both at home and abroad she is hemmed in by political and economic conditions which leave little margin for folly, and still less for “mental and moral Tunisia. insufficiency,” such as had been displayed by the Left. Nemesis came in the spring of 1881, in the form of the French invasion of Tunisia. Guiccioli, the biographer of Sella, observes that Italian politicians find it especially hard to resist “the temptation of appearing crafty.” The men of the Left believed themselves subtle enough to retain the confidence and esteem of all foreign powers while coquetting at home with elements which some of these powers had reason to regard with suspicion. Italy, in constant danger from France, needed good relations with Austria and Germany, but could only attain the goodwill of the former by firm treatment of the revolutionary Irredentist agitation, and of the latter by clear demonstration of Italian will and ability to cope with all anti-monarchical forces. Depretis and Cairoli did neither the one nor the other. Hence, when opportunity offered firmly to establish Italian predominance in the central Mediterranean by an occupation of Tunisia, they found themselves deprived of those confidential relations with the central powers, and even with Great Britain, which might have enabled them to use the opportunity to full advantage. The conduct of Italy in declining the suggestions received from Count Andrássy and General Ignatiev on the eve of the Russo-Turkish War—that Italy should seek compensation in Tunisia for the extension of Austrian sway in the Balkans—and in subsequently rejecting the German suggestion to come to an arrangement with Great Britain for the occupation of Tunisia as compensation for the British occupation of Cyprus, was certainly due to fear lest an attempt on Tunisia should lead to a war with France, for which Italy knew herself to be totally unprepared. This very unpreparedness, however, rendered still less excusable her treatment of the Irredentist agitation, which brought her within a hair’s-breadth of a conflict with Austria. Although Cairoli, upon learning of the Anglo-Ottoman convention in regard to Cyprus, had advised Count Corti of the possibility that Great Britain might seek to placate France by conniving at a French occupation of Tunisia, neither he nor Count Corti had any inkling of the verbal arrangement made between Lord Salisbury and Waddington at the instance of Bismarck, that, when convenient, France should occupy Tunisia, an agreement afterwards confirmed (with a reserve as to the eventual attitude of Italy) in despatches exchanged in July and August 1878 between the Quai d’Orsay and Downing Street. Almost up to the moment of the French occupation of Tunisia the Italian government believed that Great Britain, if only out of gratitude for the bearing of Italy in connexion with the Dulcigno demonstration in the autumn of 1880, would prevent French acquisition of the Regency. Ignorant of the assurance conveyed to France by Lord Granville that the Gladstone cabinet would respect the engagements of the Beaconsfield-Salisbury administration, Cairoli, in deference to Italian public opinion, endeavoured to neutralize the activity of the French consul Roustan by the appointment of an equally energetic Italian consul, Macciò. The rivalry between these two officials in Tunisia contributed not a little to strain Franco-Italian relations, but it is doubtful whether France would have precipitated her action had not General Menabrea, Italian ambassador in London, urged his government to purchase the Tunis-Goletta railway from the English company by which it had been constructed. A French attempt to purchase the line was upset in the English courts, and the railway was finally secured by Italy at a price more than eight times its real value. This pertinacity engendered a belief in France that Italy was about to undertake in Tunisia a more aggressive policy than necessary for the protection of her commercial interests. Roustan therefore hastened to extort from the bey concessions calculated to neutralize the advantages which Italy had hoped to secure by the possession of the Tunis-Goletta line, and at the same time the French government prepared at Toulon an expeditionary corps for the occupation of the Regency. In the spring of 1881 the Kroumir tribe was reported to have attacked a French force on the Algerian border, and on the 9th of April Roustan informed the bey of Tunis that France would chastise the assailants. The bey issued futile protests to the powers. On the 26th of April the island of Tabarca was occupied by the French, Bizerta was seized on the 2nd of May, and on the 12th of May the bey signed the treaty of Bardo accepting the French protectorate. France undertook the maintenance of order in the Regency, and assumed the representation of Tunisia in all dealings with other countries.
Italian indignation at the French coup de main was the deeper on account of the apparent duplicity of the government of the Republic. On the 11th of May the French foreign minister, Barthélémy Saint Hilaire, had officially assured the Italian ambassador in Paris that France “had no thought of occupying Tunisia or any part of Tunisian territory, beyond some points of the Kroumir country.” This assurance, dictated by Jules Ferry to Barthélémy Saint Hilaire in the presence of the Italian ambassador, and by him telegraphed en clair to Rome, was considered a binding pledge that France would not materially alter the status quo in Tunisia. Documents subsequently published have somewhat attenuated the responsibility of Ferry and Saint Hilaire for this breach of faith, and have shown that the French forces in Tunisia acted upon secret instructions from General Farre, minister of war in the Ferry cabinet, who pursued a policy diametrically opposed to the official declarations made by the premier and the foreign minister. Even had this circumstance been known at the time, it could scarcely have mitigated the intense resentment of the whole Italian nation at an event which was considered tantamount not only to the destruction of Italian aspirations to Tunisia, but to the ruin of the interests of the numerous Italian colony and to a constant menace against the security of the Sicilian and south Italian coasts.
Had the blow thus struck at Italian influence in the Mediterranean induced politicians to sink for a while their personal differences and to unite in presenting a firm front to foreign nations, the crisis in regard to Tunisia might not have been wholly unproductive of good. Unfortunately, on this, as on other critical occasions, deputies proved themselves incapable of common effort to promote general welfare. While excitement over Tunisia was at its height, but before the situation was irretrievably compromised to the disadvantage of Italy, Cairoli had been compelled to resign by a vote of want of confidence in the Chamber. The only politician capable of dealing adequately with the situation was Sella, leader of the Right, and to him the crown appealed. The faction leaders of the Left, though divided by personal jealousies and mutually incompatible ambitions, agreed that the worst evil which could befall Italy would be the return of the Right to power, and conspired to preclude the possibility of a Sella cabinet. An attempt by Depretis to recompose the Cairoli ministry proved fruitless, and after eleven precious days had been lost, King Humbert was obliged, on the 19th of April 1881, to refuse Cairoli’s resignation. The conclusion of the treaty of Bardo on the 12th of May, however, compelled Cairoli to sacrifice himself to popular indignation. Again Sella was called upon, but again the dog-in-the-manger policy of Depretis, Cairoli, Nicotera and Baccarini, in conjunction with the intolerant attitude of some extreme Conservatives, proved fatal to his endeavours. Depretis then succeeded in recomposing the Cairoli cabinet without Cairoli, Mancini being placed at the foreign office. Except in regard to an increase of the army estimates, urgently demanded by public opinion, the new ministry had practically no programme. Public opinion was further irritated against France by the massacre of some Italian workmen at Marseilles on the occasion of the return of the French expedition from Tunisia, and Depretis, in response to public feeling, found himself obliged to mobilize a part of the militia for military exercises. In this condition of home and foreign affairs occurred disorders at Rome in connexion with the transfer of the remains of Pius IX. from St Peter’s to the basilica of San Lorenzo. Most of the responsibility lay with the Vatican, which had arranged the procession in the way best calculated to irritate Italian feeling, but little excuse can be offered for the failure of the Italian authorities to maintain public order. In conjunction with the occupation of Tunisia, the effect of these disorders was to exhibit Italy as a country powerless to defend its interests abroad or to keep peace at home. The scandal and the pressure of foreign Catholic opinion compelled Depretis to pursue a more energetic policy, and to publish a formal declaration of the intangibility of the Law of Guarantees.
Meanwhile a conviction was spreading that the only way of escape from the dangerous isolation of Italy lay in closer agreement with Austria and Germany. Depretis tardily recognized the need for such agreement, if only to remove the “coldness and invincible diffidence” which, Growth of the Triple Alliance. by subsequent confession of Mancini, then characterized the attitude of the central powers; but he was opposed to any formal alliance, lest it might arouse French resentment, while the new Franco-Italian treaty was still unconcluded, and the foreign loan for the abolition of the forced currency had still to be floated. He, indeed, was not disposed to concede to public opinion anything beyond an increase of the army, a measure insistently demanded by Garibaldi and the Left. The Right likewise desired to strengthen both army and navy, but advocated cordial relations with Berlin and Vienna as a guarantee against French domineering, and as a pledge that Italy would be vouchsafed time to effect her armaments without disturbing financial equilibrium. The Right also hoped that closer accord with Germany and Austria would compel Italy to conform her home policy more nearly to the principles of order prevailing in those empires. More resolute than Right or Left was the Centre, a small group led by Sidney Sonnino, a young politician of unusual fibre, which sought in the press and in parliament to spread a conviction that the only sound basis for Italian policy would be close alliance with the central powers and a friendly understanding with Great Britain in regard to Mediterranean affairs. The principal Italian public men were divided in opinion on the subject of an alliance. Peruzzi, Lanza and Bonghi pleaded for equal friendship with all powers, and especially with France; Crispi, Minghetti, Cadorna and others, including Blanc, secretary-general to the foreign office, openly favoured a pro-Austrian policy. Austria and Germany, however, scarcely reciprocated these dispositions. The Irredentist agitation had left profound traces at Berlin as well as at Vienna, and had given rise to a distrust of Depretis which nothing had yet occurred to allay. Nor, in view of the comparative weakness of Italian armaments, could eagerness to find an ally be deemed conclusive proof of the value of Italian friendship. Count di Robilant, Italian ambassador at Vienna, warned his government not to yield too readily to pro-Austrian pressure, lest the dignity of Italy be compromised, or her desire for an alliance be granted on onerous terms. Mancini, foreign minister, who was as anxious as Depretis for the conclusion of the Franco-Italian commercial treaty, gladly followed this advice, and limited his efforts to the maintenance of correct diplomatic relations with the central powers. Except in regard to the Roman question, the advantages and disadvantages of an Italian alliance with Austria and Germany counterbalanced each other. A rapprochement with France and a continuance of the Irredentist movement could not fail to arouse Austro-German hostility; but, on the other hand, to draw near to the central powers would inevitably accentuate the diffidence of France. In the one hypothesis, as in the other, Italy could count upon the moral support of Great Britain, but could not make of British friendship the keystone of a Continental policy. Apart from resentment against France on account of Tunisia there remained the question of the temporal power of the pope to turn the scale in favour of Austria and Germany. Danger of foreign interference in the relations between Italy and the papacy had never been so great since the Italian occupation of Rome, as when, in the summer of 1881, the disorders during the transfer of the remains of Pius IX. had lent an unwonted ring of plausibility to the papal complaint concerning the “miserable” position of the Holy See. Bismarck at that moment had entered upon his “pilgrimage to Canossa,” and was anxious to obtain from the Vatican the support of German Catholics. What resistance could Italy have offered had the German chancellor, seconded by Austria, and assuredly supported by France, called upon Italy to revise the Law of Guarantees in conformity with Catholic exigencies, or had he taken the initiative of making papal independence the subject of an international conference? Friendship and alliance with Catholic Austria and powerful Germany could alone lay this spectre. This was the only immediate advantage Italy could hope to obtain by drawing nearer the central Powers.
The political conditions of Europe favoured the realization of Italian desires. Growing rivalry between Austria and Russia in the Balkans rendered the continuance of the “League of the Three Emperors” a practical impossibility. The Austro-German alliance of 1879 formally guaranteed the territory of the contracting parties, but Austria could not count upon effectual help from Germany in case of war, since Russian attack upon Austria would certainly have been followed by French attack upon Germany. As in 1860–1870, it therefore became a matter of the highest importance for Austria to retain full disposal of all her troops by assuring herself against Italian aggression. The tsar, Alexander III., under the impression of the assassination of his father, desired, however, the renewal of the Dreikaiserbund, both as a guarantee of European peace and as a conservative league against revolutionary parties. The German emperor shared this desire, but Bismarck and the Austrian emperor wished to substitute for the imperial league some more advantageous combination. Hence a tacit understanding between Bismarck and Austria that the latter should profit by Italian resentment against France to draw Italy into the orbit of the Austro-German alliance. For the moment Germany was to hold aloof lest any active initiative on her part should displease the Vatican, of whose help Bismarck stood in need.
At the beginning of August 1881 the Austrian press mooted the idea of a visit from King Humbert to the emperor Francis Joseph. Count di Robilant, anxious that Italy should not seem to beg a smile from the central Powers, advised Mancini to receive with caution the suggestions of the Austrian press. Depretis took occasion to deny, in a form scarcely courteous, the probability of the visit. Robilant’s opposition to a precipitate acceptance of the Austrian hint was founded upon fear lest King Humbert at Vienna might be pressed to disavow Irredentist aspirations, and upon a desire to arrange for a visit of the emperor Francis Joseph to Rome in return for King Humbert’s visit to Vienna. Seeing the hesitation of the Italian government, the Austrian and German semi-official press redoubled their efforts to bring about the visit. By the end of September the idea had gained such ground in Italy that the visit was practically settled, and on the 7th of October Mancini informed Robilant (who was then in Italy) of the fact. Though he considered such precipitation impolitic, Robilant, finding that confidential information of Italian intentions had already been conveyed to the Austrian government, sought an interview with King Humbert, and on the 17th of October started for Vienna to settle the conditions of the visit. Depretis, fearing to jeopardize the impending conclusion of the Franco-Italian commercial treaty, would have preferred the visit to take the form of an act of personal courtesy between sovereigns. The Austrian government, for its part, desired that the king should be accompanied by Depretis, though not by Mancini, lest the presence of the Italian foreign minister should lend to the occasion too marked a political character. Mancini, unable to brook exclusion, insisted, however, upon accompanying the king. King Humbert with Queen Margherita reached Vienna on the morning of the 27th of October, and stayed at the Hofburg until the 31st of October. The visit was marked by the greatest cordiality, Count Robilant’s fears of inopportune pressure with regard to Irredentism proving groundless. Both in Germany and Austria the visit was construed as a preliminary to the adhesion of Italy to the Austro-German alliance. Count Hatzfeldt, on behalf of the German Foreign Office, informed the Italian ambassador in Berlin that whatever was done at Vienna would be regarded as having been done in the German capital. Nor did nascent irritation in France prevent the conclusion of the Franco-Italian commercial treaty, which was signed at Paris on the 3rd of November.
In Italy public opinion as a whole was favourable to the visit, especially as it was not considered an obstacle to the projected increase of the army and navy. Doubts, however, soon sprang up as to its effect upon the minds of Austrian statesmen, since on the 8th of November the language employed by Kállay and Count Andrássy to the Hungarian delegations on the subject of Irredentism was scarcely calculated to soothe Italian susceptibilities. But on 9th November the European situation was suddenly modified by the formation of the Gambetta cabinet, and, in view of the policy of revenge with which Gambetta was supposed to be identified, it became imperative for Bismarck to assure himself that Italy would not be enticed into a Francophil attitude by any concession Gambetta might offer. As usual when dealing with weaker nations, the German chancellor resorted to intimidation. He not only re-established the Prussian legation to the Vatican, suppressed since 1874, and omitted from the imperial message to the Reichstag (17th November 1881) all reference to King Humbert’s visit to Vienna, but took occasion on the 29th of November to refer to Italy as a country tottering on the verge of revolution, and opened in the German semi-official press a campaign in favour of an international guarantee for the independence of the papacy. These manœuvres produced their effect upon Italian public opinion. In the long and important debate upon foreign policy in the Italian Chamber of Deputies (6th to 9th December) the fear was repeatedly expressed lest Bismarck should seek to purchase the support of German Catholics by raising the Roman question. Mancini, still unwilling frankly to adhere to the Austro-German alliance, found his policy of “friendship all round” impeded by Gambetta’s uncompromising attitude in regard to Tunisia. Bismarck nevertheless continued his press campaign in favour of the temporal power until, reassured by Gambetta’s decision to send Roustan back to Tunis to complete as minister the anti-Italian programme begun as consul, he finally instructed his organs to emphasize the common interests of Germany and Italy on the occasion of the opening of the St Gothard tunnel. But the effect of the German press campaign could not be effaced in a day. At the new year’s reception of deputies King Humbert aroused enthusiasm by a significant remark that Italy intended to remain “mistress in her own house”; while Mancini addressed to Count de Launay, Italian ambassador in Berlin, a haughty despatch, repudiating the supposition that the pope might (as Bismarckian emissaries had suggested to the Vatican) obtain abroad greater spiritual liberty than in Rome, or that closer relations between Italy and Germany, such as were required by the interests and aspirations of the two countries, could be made in any way contingent upon a modification of Italian freedom of action in regard to home affairs.
The sudden fall of Gambetta (26th January 1882) having
removed the fear of immediate European complications, the
cabinets of Berlin and Vienna again displayed diffidence towards
Italy. So great was Bismarck’s distrust of Italian parliamentary
instability, his doubts of Italian capacity for offensive warfare
and his fear of the Francophil tendencies of Depretis, that for
many weeks the Italian ambassador at Berlin was unable to
obtain audience of the chancellor. But for the Tunisian question
Italy might again have been drawn into the wake of France.
Mancini tried to impede the organization of French rule in the
Regency by refusing to recognize the treaty of Bardo, yet so
careless was Bismarck of Italian susceptibilities that he instructed
the German consul at Tunis to recognize French decrees.
Partly under the influence of these circumstances, and partly
in response to persuasion by Baron Blanc, secretary-general
for foreign affairs, Mancini instructed Count di Robilant to open
negotiations for an Italo-Austrian alliance—instructions which
Robilant neglected until questioned by Count Kalnóky on the subject.
The first exchange of ideas between the two Governments
proved fruitless, since Kalnóky, somewhat Clerical-minded,
was averse from guaranteeing the integrity of all Italian
territory, and Mancini was equally unwilling to guarantee to
Austria permanent possession of Trent and Trieste. Mancini,
moreover, wished the treaty of alliance to provide for reciprocal
protection of the chief interests of the contracting Powers,
Italy undertaking to second Austria-Hungary in the Balkans,
and Austria and Germany pledging themselves to support
Italy in Mediterranean questions. Without some such proviso
Italy would, in Mancini’s opinion, be exposed single-handed
to French resentment. At the request of Kalnóky, Mancini
defined his proposal in a memorandum, but the illness of himself
and Depretis, combined with an untoward discussion in the
Italian press on the failure of the Austrian emperor to return in
Rome King Humbert’s visit to Vienna, caused negotiations to
drag. The pope, it transpired, had refused to receive the
emperor if he came to Rome on a visit to the Quirinal, and
Francis Joseph, though anxious to return King Humbert’s
visit, was unable to offend the feelings of his Catholic subjects.
Meanwhile (11th May 1882) the Italian parliament adopted the
new Army Bill, involving a special credit of £5,100,000 for the
creation of two new army corps, by which the war footing of the
regular army was raised to nearly 850,000 men and the ordinary
military estimates to £8,000,000 per annum. Garibaldi, who,
since the French occupation of Tunis, had ardently worked for
the increase of the army, had thus the satisfaction of seeing his
Death of Garibaldi.
desire realized before his death at Caprera, on the 2nd
of June 1882. “In spirit a child, in character a man
of classic mould,” Garibaldi had remained the nation’s
idol, an almost legendary hero whose place none could aspire
to fill. Gratitude for his achievements and sorrow for his death
found expression in universal mourning wherein king and
peasant equally joined. Before his death, and almost contemporaneously
with the passing of the Army Bill, negotiations
for the alliance were renewed. Encouraged from Berlin, Kalnóky
agreed to the reciprocal territorial guarantee, but declined
reciprocity in support of special interests. Mancini had therefore
to be content with a declaration that the allies would act in
mutually friendly intelligence. Depretis made some opposition,
but finally acquiesced, and the treaty of triple alliance was signed
on the 20th of May 1882, five days after the promulgation of
the Franco-Italian commercial treaty in Paris. Though partial
Signature
of the
Treaty,
1882.
revelations have been made, the exact tenor of the
treaty of triple alliance has never been divulged.
It is known to have been concluded for a period of
five years, to have pledged the contracting parties
to join in resisting attack upon the territory of any one of them,
and to have specified the military disposition to be adopted by
each in case attack should come either from France, or from
Russia, or from both simultaneously. The Italian General
Staff is said to have undertaken, in the event of war against
France, to operate with two armies on the north-western frontier
against the French armée des Alpes, of which the war strength is
about 250,000 men. A third Italian army would, if expedient,
pass into Germany, to operate against either France or Russia.
Austria undertook to guard the Adriatic on land and sea, and
to help Germany by checkmating Russia on land. Germany
would be sufficiently employed in carrying on war against two
fronts. Kalnóky desired that both the terms of the treaty and
the fact of its conclusion should remain secret, but Bismarck
and Mancini hastened to hint at its existence, the former in the
Reichstag on the 12th of June 1882, and the latter in the Italian
semi-official press. A revival of Irredentism in connexion with
the execution of an Austrian deserter named Oberdank, who
after escaping into Italy endeavoured to return to Austria with
explosive bombs in his possession, and the cordial references to
France made by Depretis at Stradella (8th October 1882),
prevented the French government from suspecting the existence
of the alliance, or from ceasing to strive after a Franco-Italian
understanding. Suspicion was not aroused until March 1883,
when Mancini, in defending himself against strictures upon his
refusal to co-operate with Great Britain in Egypt, practically
revealed the existence of the treaty, thereby irritating France
and destroying Depretis’s secret hope of finding in the triple
alliance the advantage of an Austro-German guarantee without
the disadvantage of French enmity. In Italy the revelation
of the treaty was hailed with satisfaction except by the Clericals,
who were enraged at the blow thus struck at the restoration
of the pope’s temporal power, and by the Radicals, who feared
both the inevitable breach with republican France and the
reinforcement of Italian constitutional parties by intimacy
with strong monarchical states such as Germany and Austria.
These very considerations naturally combined to recommend
the fact to constitutionalists, who saw in it, besides the territorial
guarantee, the elimination of the danger of foreign interference
in the relations between Italy and the Vatican, such as Bismarck
had recently threatened and such as France was believed ready
to propose.
Nevertheless, during its first period (1882–1887) the triple alliance failed to ensure cordiality between the contracting Powers. Mancini exerted himself in a hundred ways to soothe French resentment. He not only refused to join Great Britain in the Egyptian expedition, but agreed to suspend Italian consular jurisdiction in Tunis, and deprecated suspicion of French designs upon Morocco. His efforts were worse than futile. France remained cold, while Bismarck and Kalnóky, distrustful of the Radicalism of Depretis and Mancini, assumed towards their ally an attitude almost hostile. Possibly Germany and Austria may have been influenced by the secret treaty signed between Austria, Germany and Russia on the 21st of March 1884, and ratified during the meeting of the three emperors at Skierniewice in September of that year, by which Bismarck, in return for “honest brokerage” in the Balkans, is understood to have obtained from Austria and Russia a promise of benevolent neutrality in case Germany should be “forced” to make war upon a fourth power—France. Guaranteed thus against Russian attack, Italy became in the eyes of the central powers a negligible quantity, and was treated accordingly. Though kept in the dark as to the Skierniewice arrangement, the Italian government soon discovered from the course of events that the triple alliance had practically lost its object, European peace having been assured without Italian co-operation. Meanwhile France provided Italy with fresh cause for uneasiness by abating her hostility to Germany. Italy in consequence drew nearer to Great Britain, and at the London conference on the Egyptian financial question sided with Great Britain against Austria and Germany. At the same time negotiations took place with Great Britain for an Italian occupation of Massawa, and Mancini, dreaming of a vast Anglo-Italian enterprise against the Mahdi, expatiated in the spring of 1885 upon the glories of an Anglo-Italian alliance, an indiscretion which drew upon him a scarcely-veiled démenti from London. Again speaking in the Chamber, Mancini claimed for Italy the principal merit in the conclusion of the triple alliance, but declared that the alliance left Italy full liberty of action in regard to interests outside its scope, “especially as there was no possibility of obtaining protection for such interests from those who by the alliance had not undertaken to protect them.” These words, which revealed the absence of any stipulation in regard to the protection of Italian interests in the Mediterranean, created lively dissatisfaction in Italy and corresponding satisfaction in France. They hastened Mancini’s downfall (17th June 1885), and prepared the advent of count di Robilant, who three months later succeeded Mancini at the Italian Foreign Office. Robilant, for whom the Skierniewice pact was no secret, followed a firmly independent policy throughout the Bulgarian crisis of 1885–1886, declining to be drawn into any action beyond that required by the treaty of Berlin and the protection of Italian interests in the Balkans. Italy, indeed, came out of the Eastern crisis with enhanced prestige and with her relations to Austria greatly improved. Towards Prince Bismarck Robilant maintained an attitude of dignified independence, and as, in the spring of 1886, the moment for the renewal of the triple alliance drew near, he profited by the development of the Bulgarian crisis and the threatened Franco-Russian understanding to secure from the central powers “something more” than the bare territorial guarantee of the original treaty. This “something more” consisted, at least in part, of the arrangement, with the help of Austria and Germany, of an Anglo-Italian naval understanding having special reference to the Eastern question, but providing for common action by the British and Italian fleets in the Mediterranean in case of war. A vote of the Italian Chamber on the 4th of February 1887, in connexion with the disaster to Italian troops at Dogali, in Abyssinia, brought about the resignation of the Depretis-Robilant cabinet. The crisis dragged for three months, and before its definitive solution by the formation of a Depretis-Crispi ministry, Robilant succeeded (17th March 1887) in renewing the triple alliance on terms more favourable to First renewal of the Triple Alliance. Italy than those obtained in 1882. Not only did he secure concessions from Austria and Germany corresponding in some degree to the improved state of the Italian army and navy, but, in virtue of the Anglo-Italian understanding, assured the practical adhesion of Great Britain to the European policy of the central powers, a triumph probably greater than any registered by Italian diplomacy since the completion of national unity.
The period between May 1881 and July 1887 occupied, in the region of foreign affairs, by the negotiation, conclusion and renewal of the triple alliance, by the Bulgarian crisis and by the dawn of an Italian colonial policy, was marked at home by urgent political and economic Internal reforms. problems, and by the parliamentary phenomena known as trasformismo. On the 29th of June 1881 the Chamber adopted a Franchise Reform Bill, which increased the electorate from 600,000 to 2,000,000 by lowering the fiscal qualification from 40 to 19.80 lire in direct taxation, and by extending the suffrage to all persons who had passed through the two lower standards of the elementary schools, and practically to all persons able to read and write. The immediate result of the reform was to increase the political influence of large cities where the proportion of illiterate workmen was lower than in the country districts, and to exclude from the franchise numbers of peasants and small proprietors who, though of more conservative temperament and of better economic position than the artizan population of the large towns, were often unable to fulfil the scholarship qualification. On the 12th of April 1883 the forced currency was formally abolished by the resumption of treasury payments in gold with funds obtained through a loan of £14,500,000 issued in London on the 5th of May 1882. Owing to the hostility of the French market, the loan was covered with difficulty, and, though the gold premium fell and commercial exchanges were temporarily facilitated by the resumption of cash payments, it is doubtful whether these advantages made up for the burden of £640,000 additional annual interest thrown upon the exchequer. On the 6th of March 1885 parliament finally sanctioned the conventions by which state railways were farmed out to three private companies—the Mediterranean, Adriatic and Sicilian. The railways redeemed in 1875–1876 had been worked in the interval by the government at a heavy loss. A commission of inquiry reported in favour of private management. The conventions, concluded for a period of sixty years, but terminable by either party after twenty or forty years, retained for the state the possession of the lines (except the southern railway, viz. the line from Bologna to Brindisi belonging to the Società Meridionale to whom the Adriatic lines were now farmed), but sold rolling stock to the companies, arranged various schedules of state subsidy for lines projected or in course of construction, guaranteed interest on the bonds of the companies and arranged for the division of revenue between the companies, the reserve fund and the state. National control of the railways was secured by a proviso that the directors must be of Italian nationality. Depretis and his colleague Genala, minister of public works, experienced great difficulty in securing parliamentary sanction for the conventions, not so much on account of their defective character, as from the opposition of local interests anxious to extort new lines from the government. In fact, the conventions were only voted by a majority of twenty-three votes after the government had undertaken to increase the length of new state-built lines from 1500 to 2500 kilometres. Unfortunately, The railway conventions. the calculation of probable railway revenue on which the conventions had been based proved to be enormously exaggerated. For many years the 3712% of the gross revenue (less the cost of maintaining the rolling stock, incumbent on the state) scarcely sufficed to pay the interest on debts incurred for railway construction and on the guaranteed bonds. Gradually the increase of traffic consequent upon the industrial development of Italy decreased the annual losses of the state, but the position of the government in regard to the railways still remained so unsatisfactory as to render the resumption of the whole system by the state on the expiration of the first period of twenty years in 1905 inevitable.
Intimately bound up with the forced currency, the railway conventions and public works was the financial question in general. From 1876, when equilibrium between expenditure and revenue had first been attained, taxation yielded steady annual surpluses, which in 1881 reached Finance. the satisfactory level of £2,120,000. The gradual abolition of the grist tax on minor cereals diminished the surplus in 1882 to £236,000, and in 1883 to £110,000, while the total repeal of the grist tax on wheat, which took effect on the 1st of January 1884, coincided with the opening of a new and disastrous period of deficit. True, the repeal of the grist tax was not the only, nor possibly even the principal, cause of the deficit. The policy of “fiscal transformation” inaugurated by the Left increased revenue from indirect taxation from £17,000,000 in 1876 to more than £24,000,000 in 1887, by substituting heavy corn duties for the grist tax, and by raising the sugar and petroleum duties to unprecedented levels. But partly from lack of firm financial administration, partly through the increase of military and naval expenditure (which in 1887 amounted to £9,000,000 for the army, while special efforts were made to strengthen the navy), and principally through the constant drain of railway construction and public works, the demands upon the exchequer grew largely to exceed the normal increase of revenue, and necessitated the contraction of new debts. In their anxiety to remain in office Depretis and the finance minister, Magliani, never hesitated to mortgage the financial future of their country. No concession could be denied to deputies, or groups of deputies, whose support was indispensable to the life of the cabinet, nor, under such conditions, was it possible to place any effective check upon administrative abuses in which politicians or their electors were interested. Railways, roads and harbours which contractors had undertaken to construct for reasonable amounts were frequently made to cost thrice the original estimates. Minghetti, in a trenchant exposure of the parliamentary condition of Italy during this period, cites a case in which a credit for certain public works was, during a debate in the Chamber, increased by the government from £6,600,000 to £9,000,000 in order to conciliate local political interests. In the spring of 1887 Genala, minister of public works, was taken to task for having sanctioned expenditure of £80,000,000 on railway construction while only £40,000,000 had been included in the estimates. As most of these credits were spread over a series of years, succeeding administrations found their financial liberty of action destroyed, and were obliged to cover deficit by constant issues of consolidated stock. Thus the deficit of £940,000 for the financial year 1885–1886 rose to nearly £2,920,000 in 1887–1888, and in 1888–1889 attained the terrible level of £9,400,000.
Nevertheless, in spite of many and serious shortcomings, the long series of Depretis administrations was marked by the adoption of some useful measures. Besides the realization of the formal programme of the Left, consisting of the repeal of the grist tax, the abolition of the forced currency, the extension of the suffrage and the development of the railway system, Depretis laid the foundation for land tax re-assessment by introducing a new cadastral survey. Unfortunately, the new survey was made largely optional, so that provinces which had reason to hope for a diminution of land tax under a revised assessment hastened to complete their survey, while others, in which the average of the land tax was below a normal assessment, neglected to comply with the provisions of the scheme. An important undertaking, known as the Agricultural Inquiry, brought to light vast quantities of information valuable for future agrarian legislation. The year 1885 saw the introduction and adoption of a measure embodying the principle of employers’ liability for accidents to workmen, a principle subsequently extended and more equitably defined in the spring of 1899. An effort to encourage the development of the mercantile marine was made in the same year, and a convention was concluded with the chief lines of passenger steamers to retain their fastest vessels as auxiliaries to the fleet in case of war. Sanitation and public hygiene received a potent impulse from the cholera epidemic of 1884, many of the unhealthiest quarters in Naples and other cities being demolished and rebuilt, with funds chiefly furnished by the state. The movement was strongly supported by King Humbert, whose intrepidity in visiting the most dangerous spots at Busca and Naples while the epidemic was at its height, reassuring the panic-stricken inhabitants by his presence, excited the enthusiasm of his people and the admiration of Europe.
During the accomplishment of these and other reforms the condition of parliament underwent profound change. By degrees the administrations of the Left had ceased to rely solely upon the Liberal sections of the Chamber, and had carried their most important bills with the help “Trasformismo.” of the Right. This process of transformation was not exclusively the work of Depretis, but had been initiated as early as 1873, when a portion of the Right under Minghetti had, by joining the Left, overturned the Lanza-Sella cabinet. In 1876 Minghetti himself had fallen a victim to a similar defection of Conservative deputies. The practical annihilation of the old Right in the elections of 1876 opened a new parliamentary era. Reduced in number to less than one hundred, and radically changed in spirit and composition, the Right gave way, if not to despair, at least to a despondency unsuited to an opposition party. Though on more than one occasion personal rancour against the men of the Moderate Left prevented the Right from following Sella’s advice and regaining, by timely coalition with cognate parliamentary elements, a portion of its former influence, the bulk of the party, with singular inconsistency, drew nearer and nearer to the Liberal cabinets. The process was accelerated by Sella’s illness and death (14th March 1884), an event which cast profound discouragement over the more thoughtful of the Conservatives and Moderate Liberals, by whom Sella had been regarded as a supreme political reserve, as a statesman whose experienced vigour and patriotic sagacity might have been trusted to lift Italy from any depth of folly or misfortune. By a strange anomaly the Radical measures brought forward by the Left diminished instead of increasing the distance between it and the Conservatives. Numerically insufficient to reject such measures, and lacking the fibre and the cohesion necessary for the pursuance of a far-sighted policy, the Right thought prudent not to employ its strength in uncompromising opposition, but rather, by supporting the government, to endeavour to modify Radical legislation in a Conservative sense. In every case the calculation proved fallacious. Radical measures were passed unmodified, and the Right was compelled sadly to accept the accomplished fact. Thus it was with the abolition of the grist tax, the reform of the suffrage, the railway conventions and many other bills. When, in course of time, the extended suffrage increased the Republican and Extreme Radical elements in the Chamber, and the Liberal “Pentarchy” (composed of Crispi, Cairoli, Nicotera, Zanardelli and Baccarini) assumed an attitude of bitter hostility to Depretis, the Right, obeying the impulse of Minghetti, rallied openly to Depretis, lending him aid without which his prolonged term of office would have been impossible. The result was parliamentary chaos, baptized trasformismo. In May 1883 this process received official recognition by the elimination of the Radicals Zanardelli and Baccarini from the Depretis cabinet, while in the course of 1884 a Conservative, Signor Biancheri, was elected to the presidency of the Chamber, and another Conservative, General Ricotti, appointed to the War Office. Though Depretis, at the end of his life in 1887, showed signs of repenting of the confusion thus created, he had established a parliamentary system destined largely to sterilize and vitiate the political life of Italy.
Contemporaneously with the vicissitudes of home and foreign policy under the Left there grew up in Italy a marked tendency towards colonial enterprise. The tendency itself dated from 1869, when a congress of the Italian chambers of commerce at Genoa had urged the Lanza cabinet to Colonial policy. establish a commercial depôt on the Red Sea. On the 11th of March 1870 an Italian shipper, Signor Rubattino, had bought the bay of Assab, with the neighbouring island of Darmakieh, from Beheran, sultan of Raheita, for £1880, the funds being furnished by the government. The Egyptian government being unwilling to recognize the sovereignty of Beheran over Assab or his right to sell territory to a foreign power, Visconti-Venosta thought it opportune not then to occupy Assab. No further step was taken until, at the end of 1879, Rubattino prepared to establish a commercial station at Assab. The British government made inquiry as to his intentions, and on the 19th of April 1880 received a formal undertaking from Cairoli that Assab would never be fortified nor be made a military establishment. Meanwhile (January 1880) stores and materials were landed, and Assab was permanently occupied. Eighteen months later a party of Italian sailors and explorers under Lieutenant Biglieri and Signor Giulietti were massacred in Egyptian territory. Egypt, however, refused to make thorough inquiry into the massacre, and was only prevented from occupying Raheita and coming into conflict with Italy by the good offices of Lord Granville, who dissuaded the Egyptian government from enforcing its sovereignty. On the 20th of September 1881 Beheran formally accepted Italian protection, and in the following February an Anglo-Italian convention established the Italian title to Assab on condition that Italy should formally recognise the suzerainty of the Porte and of the khedive over the Red Sea coast, and should prevent the transport of arms and munitions of war through the territory of Assab. This convention was never recognized by the Porte nor by the Egyptian government. A month later (10th March 1882) Rubattino made over his establishment to the Italian government, and on the 12th of June the Chamber adopted a bill constituting Assab an Italian crown colony.
Within four weeks of the adoption of this bill the bombardment
of Alexandria by the British fleet (11th July 1882) opened an
era destined profoundly to affect the colonial position of
Italy. The revolt of Arabi Pasha (September 1881)
had led to the meeting of an ambassadorial conference
The Egyptian Question.
at Constantinople, promoted by Mancini, Italian
minister for foreign affairs, in the hope of preventing European
intervention in Egypt and the permanent establishment of an
Anglo-French condominium to the detriment of Italian influence.
At the opening of the conference (23rd June 1882) Italy secured
the signature of a self-denying protocol whereby all the great
powers undertook to avoid isolated action; but the rapid development
of the crisis in Egypt, and the refusal of France to co-operate
with Great Britain in the restoration of order, necessitated
vigorous action by the latter alone. In view of the French
refusal, Lord Granville on the 27th of July invited Italy to join
in restoring order in Egypt; but Mancini and Depretis, in
spite of the efforts of Crispi, then in London, declined the
offer. Financial considerations, lack of proper transports for an
expeditionary corps, fear of displeasing France, dislike of a
“policy of adventure,” misplaced deference towards the ambassadorial
conference in Constantinople, and unwillingness to thwart
the current of Italian sentiment in favour of the Egyptian
“nationalists,” were the chief motives of the Italian refusal,
which had the effect of somewhat estranging Great Britain and
Italy. Anglo-Italian relations, however, regained their normal
cordiality two years later, and found expression in the support
lent by Italy to the British proposal at the London conference on
the Egyptian question (July 1884). About the same time
Mancini was informed by the Italian agent in Cairo that Great
Britain would be well disposed towards an extension of Italian
influence on the Red Sea coast. Having sounded Lord Granville,
Mancini received encouragement to seize Beilul and Massawa,
in view of the projected restriction of the Egyptian zone of
military occupation consequent on the Mahdist rising in the
Sudan. Lord Granville further inquired whether Italy would
co-operate in pacifying the Sudan, and received an affirmative
reply. Italian action was hastened by news that, in December
1884, an exploring party under Signor Bianchi, royal commissioner
for Assab, had been massacred in the Aussa (Danakil)
country, an event which aroused in Italy a desire to punish the
assassins and to obtain satisfaction for the still unpunished
massacre of Signor Giulietti and his companions. Partly to
satisfy public opinion, partly in order to profit by the favourable
disposition of the British government, and partly in the hope of
remedying the error committed in 1882 by refusal to co-operate
with Great Britain in Egypt, the Italian government in January
1885 despatched an expedition under Admiral Caimi and Colonel
Saletta to occupy Massawa and Beilul. The occupation, effected
on the 5th of February, was accelerated by fear lest Italy might
be forestalled by France or Russia, both of which powers were
suspected of desiring to establish themselves firmly on the Red
Sea and to exercise a protectorate over Abyssinia. News of the
occupation reached Europe simultaneously with the tidings of the
fall of Khartum, an event which disappointed Italian hopes of
military co-operation with Great Britain in the Sudan. The
resignation of the Gladstone-Granville cabinet further precluded
the projected Italian occupation of Suakin, and the Italians,
wisely refraining from an independent attempt to succour
Kassala, then besieged by the Mahdists, bent their efforts to the
increase of their zone of occupation around Massawa. The extension
of the Italian zone excited the suspicions of John, negus
of Abyssinia, whose apprehensions were assiduously fomented
by Alula, ras of Tigré, and by French and Greek adventurers.
Measures, apparently successful, were taken to reassure the negus,
but shortly afterwards protection inopportunely accorded by
Italy to enemies of Ras Alula, induced the Abyssinians to enter
upon hostilities. In January 1886 Ras Alula raided the village of
Wa, to the west of Zula, but towards the end of the year (23rd
November) Wa was occupied by the irregular troops of General
Gené, who had superseded Colonel Saletta at Massawa. Angered
by this step, Ras Alula took prisoners the members of an Italian
exploring party commanded by Count Salimbeni, and held them
as hostages for the evacuation of Wa. General Gené nevertheless
reinforced Wa and pushed forward a detachment to Saati. On
the 25th of January 1887 Ras Alula attacked Saati, but was
repulsed with loss. On the following day, however, the Abyssinians
succeeded in surprising, near the village of Dogali, an
Italian force of 524 officers and men under Colonel De Cristoforis,
Disaster
of Dogali.
who were convoying provisions to the garrison of Saati.
The Abyssinians, 20,000 strong, speedily overwhelmed
the small Italian force, which, after exhausting its
ammunition, was destroyed where it stood. One man only
escaped. Four hundred and seven men and twenty-three officers
were killed outright, and one officer and eighty-one men wounded.
Dead and wounded alike were horribly mutilated by order of
Alula. Fearing a new attack, General Gené withdrew his forces
from Saati, Wa and Arafali; but the losses of the Abyssinians
at Saati and Dogali had been so heavy as to dissuade Alula from
further hostilities.
In Italy the disaster of Dogali produced consternation, and caused the fall of the Depretis-Robilant cabinet. The Chamber, eager for revenge, voted a credit of £200,000, and sanctioned the despatch of reinforcements. Meanwhile Signor Crispi, who, though averse from colonial adventure, Abyssinia. desired to vindicate Italian honour, entered the Depretis cabinet as minister of the interior, and obtained from parliament a new credit of £800,000. In November 1887 a strong expedition under General di San Marzano raised the strength of the Massawa garrison to nearly 20,000 men. The British government, desirous of preventing an Italo-Abyssinian conflict, which could but strengthen the position of the Mahdists, despatched Mr (afterwards Sir) Gerald Portal from Massawa on the 29th of October to mediate with the negus. The mission proved fruitless. Portal returned to Massawa on the 25th of December 1887, and warned the Italians that John was preparing to attack them in the following spring with an army of 100,000 men. On the 28th of March 1888 the negus indeed descended from the Abyssinian high plateau in the direction of Saati, but finding the Italian position too strong to be carried by assault, temporized and opened negotiations for peace. His tactics failed to entice the Italians from their position, and on the 3rd of April sickness among his men compelled John to withdraw the Abyssinian army. The negus next marched against Menelek, king of Shoa, whose neutrality Italy had purchased with 5000 Remington rifles and a supply of ammunition, but found him with 80,000 men too strongly entrenched to be successfully attacked. Tidings of a new Mahdist incursion into Abyssinian territory reaching the negus induced him to postpone the settlement of his quarrel with Menelek until the dervishes had been chastised. Marching towards the Blue Nile, he joined battle with the Mahdists, but on the 10th of March 1889 was killed, in the hour of victory, near Gallabat. His death gave rise to an Abyssinian war of succession between Mangashà, natural son of John, and Menelek, grandson of the Negus Sella-Sellassié. Menelek, by means of Count Antonelli, resident in the Shoa country, requested Italy to execute a diversion in his favour by occupying Asmarà and other points on the high plateau. Antonelli profited by the situation to obtain Menelek’s signature to a treaty fixing the frontiers of the Italian Treaty of Uccialli. colony and defining Italo-Abyssinian relations. The treaty, signed at Uccialli on the 2nd of May 1899, arranged for regular intercourse between Italy and Abyssinia and conceded to Italy a portion of the high plateau, with the positions of Halai, Saganeiti and Asmarà. The main point of the treaty, however, lay in clause 17:—
“His Majesty the king of kings of Ethiopia consents to make use of the government of His Majesty the king of Italy for the treatment of all questions concerning other powers and governments.”
Upon this clause Italy founded her claim to a protectorate over Abyssinia. In September 1889 the treaty of Uccialli was ratified in Italy by Menelek’s lieutenant, the Ras Makonnen. Makonnen further concluded with the Italian premier, Crispi, a convention whereby Italy recognized Menelek as emperor of Ethiopia, Menelek recognized the Italian colony, and arranged for a special Italo-Abyssinian currency and for a loan. On the 11th of October Italy communicated article 17 of the treaty of Uccialli to the European powers, interpreting it as a valid title to an Italian protectorate over Abyssinia. Russia alone neglected to take note of the communication, and persisted in the hostile attitude she had assumed at the moment of the occupation of Massawa. Meanwhile the Italian mint coined thalers bearing the portrait of King Humbert, with an inscription referring to the Italian protectorate, and on the 1st of January 1890 a royal decree conferred upon the colony the name of “Eritrea.”
In the colony itself General Baldissera, who had replaced General Saletta, delayed the movement against Mangashà desired by Menelek. The Italian general would have preferred to wait until his intervention was requested by both pretenders to the Abyssinian throne. Pressed Operations in Abyssinia. by the home government, he, however, instructed a native ally to occupy the important positions of Keren and Asmarà, and prepared himself to take the offensive against Mangashà and Ras Alula. The latter retreated south of the river Mareb, leaving the whole of the cis-Mareb territory, including the provinces of Hamasen, Agameh, Seraè and Okulè-Kusai, in Italian hands. General Orero, successor of Baldissera, pushed offensive action more vigorously, and on the 26th of January 1890 entered Adowa, a city considerably to the south of the Mareb—an imprudent step which aroused Menelek’s suspicions, and had hurriedly to be retraced. Mangashà, seeing further resistance to be useless, submitted to Menelek, who at the end of February ratified at Makallé the additional convention to the treaty of Uccialli, but refused to recognize the Italian occupation of the Mareb. The negus, however, conformed to article 17 of the treaty of Uccialli by requesting Italy to represent Abyssinia at the Brussels anti-slavery conference, an act which strengthened Italian illusions as to Menelek’s readiness to submit to their protectorate. Menelek had previously notified the chief European powers of his coronation at Entotto (14th December 1889), but Germany and Great Britain replied that such notification should have been made through the Italian government. Germany, moreover, wounded Menelek’s pride by employing merely the title of “highness.” The negus took advantage of the incident to protest against the Italian text of article 17, and to contend that the Amharic text contained no equivalent for the word “consent,” but merely stipulated that Abyssinia “might” make use of Italy in her relations with foreign powers. On the 28th of October 1890 Count Antonelli, negotiator of the treaty, was despatched to settle the controversy, but on arriving at Adis Ababa, the new residence of the negus, found agreement impossible either with regard to the frontier or the protectorate. On the 10th of April 1891, Menelek communicated to the powers his views with regard to the Italian frontier, and announced his intention of re-establishing the ancient boundaries of Ethiopia as far as Khartum to the north-west and Victoria Nyanza to the south. Meanwhile the marquis de Rudini, who had succeeded Crispi as Italian premier, had authorized the abandonment of article 17 even before he had heard of the failure of Antonelli’s negotiations. Rudini was glad to leave the whole dispute in abeyance and to make with the local ras, or chieftains, of the high plateau an arrangement securing for Italy the cis-Mareb provinces of Seraè and Okulè-Kusai under the rule of an allied native chief named Bath-Agos. Rudini, however, was able to conclude two protocols with Great Britain (March and April 1891) whereby the British government definitely recognized Abyssinia as within the Italian sphere of influence in return for an Italian recognition of British rights in the Upper Nile.
The period 1887–1890 was marked in Italy by great political activity. The entry of Crispi into the Depretis cabinet as minister of the interior (4th April 1887) introduced into the government an element of vigour which had long been lacking. Though sixty-eight years of age, First Crispi Cabinet. Crispi possessed an activity, a rapidity of decision and an energy in execution with which none of his contemporaries could vie. Within four months the death of Depretis (29th July 1887) opened for Crispi the way to the premiership. Besides assuming the presidency of the council of ministers and retaining the ministry of the interior, Crispi took over the portfolio of foreign affairs which Depretis had held since the resignation of Count di Robilant. One of the first questions with which he had to deal was that of conciliation between Italy and the Vatican. At the end of May the pope, in an allocution to the cardinals, had spoken of Italy in terms of unusual cordiality, and had expressed a wish for peace. A few days later Signor Bonghi, one of the framers of the Law of Guarantees, published in the Nuova Antologia a plea for reconciliation on the basis of an amendment to the Law of Guarantees and recognition by the pope of the Italian title to Rome. The chief incident of the movement towards conciliation consisted, however, in the publication of a pamphlet entitled La Conciliazione by Father Tosti, a close friend and confidant of the pope, extolling the advantages of peace between Vatican and Quirinal. Tosti’s pamphlet was known to represent papal ideas, and Tosti himself Tosti and conciliation. was persona grata to the Italian government. Reconciliation seemed within sight when suddenly Tosti’s pamphlet was placed on the Index, ostensibly on account of a phrase, “The whole of Italy entered Rome by the breach of Porta Pia; the king cannot restore Rome to the pope, since Rome belongs to the Italian people.” On the 4th of June 1887 the official Vatican organ, the Osservatore Romano, published a letter written by Tosti to the pope conditionally retracting the views expressed in the pamphlet. The letter had been written at the pope’s request, on the understanding that it should not be published. On the 15th of June the pope addressed to Cardinal Rampolla del Tindaro, secretary of state, a letter reiterating in uncompromising terms the papal claim to the temporal power, and at the end of July Cardinal Rampolla reformulated the same claim in a circular to the papal nuncios abroad. The dream of conciliation was at an end, but the Tosti incident had served once more to illustrate the true position of the Vatican in regard to Italy. It became clear that neither the influence of the regular clergy, of which the Society of Jesus is the most powerful embodiment, nor that of foreign clerical parties, which largely control the Peter’s Pence fund, would ever permit renunciation of the papal claim to temporal power. France, and the French Catholics especially, feared lest conciliation Terms of the “Roman Question.” should diminish the reliance of the Vatican upon France, and consequently French hold over the Vatican. The Vatican, for its part, felt its claim to temporal power to be too valuable a pecuniary asset and too efficacious an instrument of church discipline lightly to be thrown away. The legend of an “imprisoned pope,” subject to every whim of his gaolers, had never failed to arouse the pity and loosen the purse-strings of the faithful; dangerous innovators and would-be reformers within the church could be compelled to bow before the symbol of the temporal power, and their spirit of submission tested by their readiness to forgo the realization of their aims until the head of the church should be restored to his rightful domain. More important than all was the interest of the Roman curia, composed almost exclusively of Italians, to retain in its own hands the choice of the pontiff and to maintain the predominance of the Italian element and the Italian spirit in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Conciliation with Italy would expose the pope and his Italian entourage to suspicion of being unduly subject to Italian political influence—of being, in a word, more Italian than Catholic. Such a suspicion would inevitably lead to a movement in favour of the internationalization of the curia and of the papacy. In order to avoid this danger it was therefore necessary to refuse all compromise, and, by perpetual reiteration of a claim incompatible with Italian territorial unity, to prove to the church at large that the pope and the curia were more Catholic than Italian. Such rigidity of principle need not be extended to the affairs of everyday contact between the Vatican and the Italian authorities, with regard to which, indeed, a tacit modus vivendi was easily attainable. Italy, for her part, could not go back upon the achievements of the Risorgimento by restoring Rome or any portion of Italian territory to the pope. She had hoped by conciliation to arrive at an understanding which should have ranged the church among the conservative and not among the disruptive forces of the country, but she was keenly desirous to retain the papacy as a preponderatingly Italian institution, and was ready to make whatever formal concessions might have appeared necessary to reassure foreign Catholics concerning the reality of the pope’s spiritual independence. The failure of the conciliation movement left profound irritation between Vatican and Quirinal, an irritation which, on the Vatican side, found expression in vivacious protests and in threats of leaving Rome; and, on the Italian side, in the deposition of the syndic of Rome for having visited the cardinal-vicar, in the anti-clerical provisions of the new penal code, and in the inauguration (9th June 1889) of a monument to Giordano Bruno on the very site of his martyrdom.
The internal situation inherited by Crispi from Depretis was very unsatisfactory. Extravagant expenditure on railways and public works, loose administration of finance, the cost of colonial enterprise, the growing demands for the army and navy, the impending tariff war with France, and the over-speculation in building and in industrial ventures, which had absorbed all the floating capital of the country, had combined to produce a state of affairs calling for firm and radical treatment. Crispi, burdened by the premiership and by the two most important portfolios in the cabinet, was, however, unable to exercise efficient control over all departments of state. Nevertheless his administration was by no means unfruitful. Zanardelli, minister of justice, secured in June 1888 the adoption of a new penal code; state surveillance was extended to the opere pie, or charitable institutions; municipal franchise was reformed by granting what was practically manhood suffrage with residential qualification, provision being made for minority representation; and the central state administration was reformed by a bill fixing the number and functions of the various ministries. The management of finance was scarcely satisfactory, for though Giolitti, who had succeeded Magliani and Perazzi at the treasury, suppressed the former’s illusory “pension fund,” he lacked the fibre necessary to deal with the enormous deficit of nearly £10,000,000 in 1888–1889, the existence of which both Perazzi and he had recognized. The most successful feature of Crispi’s term of office was his strict maintenance of order and the suppression of Radical and Irredentist agitation. So vigorous was his treatment of Irredentism that he dismissed without warning his colleague Seismit Doda, minister of finance, for having failed to protest against Irredentist speeches delivered in his presence at Udine. Firmness such as this secured for him the support of all constitutional elements, and after three years’ premiership his position was infinitely stronger than at the outset. The general election of 1890 gave the cabinet an almost unwieldy majority, comprising four-fifths of the Chamber. A lengthy term of office seemed to be opening out before him when, on the 31st of January 1891, Crispi, speaking in a debate upon an unimportant bill, angrily rebuked the Right for its noisy interruptions. The rebuke infuriated the Conservative deputies, who, protesting against Crispi’s words in the name of the “sacred memories” of their party, precipitated a division and placed the cabinet in a minority. The incident, whether due to chance or guile, brought about the resignation of Crispi. A few days later he was succeeded in the premiership by the marquis di Rudini, leader of the Right, who formed a coalition cabinet with Nicotera and a part of the Left.
The sudden fall of Crispi wrought a great change in the character of Italian relations with foreign powers. His policy had been characterized by extreme cordiality towards Austria and Germany, by a close understanding with Great Britain in regard to Mediterranean questions, and by an Rudini. apparent animosity towards France, which at one moment seemed likely to lead to war. Shortly before the fall of the Depretis-Robilant cabinet Count Robilant had announced the intention of Italy to denounce the commercial treaties with France and Austria, which would lapse on the 31st of December 1887, and had intimated his readiness to negotiate new treaties. On the 24th of June 1887, in view of a possible rupture of commercial relations with France, the Depretis-Crispi cabinet introduced a new general tariff. The probability of the conclusion of a new Franco-Italian treaty was small, both on account of the protectionist spirit of France and of French resentment at the renewal of the triple alliance, but even such slight probability vanished after a visit paid to Bismarck by Crispi (October 1887) within three months of his appointment to the premiership. Crispi entertained no a priori animosity towards France, but was strongly convinced that Italy must emancipate herself from the position of political dependence on her powerful neighbour which had vitiated the foreign policy of the Left. So far was he from desiring a rupture with France, that he had subordinated acceptance of the portfolio of the interior in the Depretis cabinet to an assurance that the triple alliance contained no provision for offensive warfare. But his ostentatious visit to Friedrichsruh, and a subsequent speech at Turin, in which, while professing sentiments of friendship and esteem for France, he eulogized the personality of Bismarck, aroused against him a hostility on the part of the French which he was never afterwards able to allay. France was equally careless of Italian susceptibilities, and in April 1888 Goblet made a futile but irritating attempt to enforce at Massawa the Ottoman régime of the capitulations in regard to non-Italian residents. In such circumstances the negotiations for the new commercial treaty could but fail, and though the old treaty was prolonged by special arrangement for two months, differential tariffs were put in force on both sides of the frontier on the 29th of February 1888. The value of French exports into Italy decreased immediately by one-half, while Italian exports to France decreased by nearly two-thirds. At the end of 1889 Crispi abolished the differential duties against French imports and returned to the general Italian tariff, but France declined to follow his lead and maintained her prohibitive dues. Meanwhile the enthusiastic reception accorded to the young German emperor on the occasion of his visit to Rome in October 1888, and the cordiality shown towards King Humbert and Crispi at Berlin in May 1889, increased the tension of Franco-Italian relations; nor was it until after the fall of Prince Bismarck in March 1890 that Crispi adopted towards the Republic a more friendly attitude by sending an Italian squadron to salute President Carnot at Toulon. The chief advantage derived by Italy from Crispi’s foreign policy was the increase of confidence in her government on the part of her allies and of Great Britain. On the occasion of the incident raised by Goblet with regard to Massawa, Bismarck made it clear to France that, in case of complications, Italy would not stand alone; and when in February 1888 a strong French fleet appeared to menace the Italian coast, the British Mediterranean squadron demonstrated its readiness to support Italian naval dispositions. Moreover, under Crispi’s hand Italy awoke from the apathy of former years and gained consciousness of her place in the world. The conflict with France, the operations in Eritrea, the vigorous interpretation of the triple alliance, the questions of Morocco and Bulgaria, were all used by him as means to stimulate national sentiment. With the instinct of a true statesman, he felt the pulse of the people, divined their need for prestige, and their preference for a government heavy-handed rather than lax. How great had been Crispi’s power was seen by contrast with the policy of the Rudini cabinet which succeeded him in February 1891. Crispi’s so-called “megalomania” gave place to retrenchment in home affairs and to a deferential Second renewal of the Triple Alliance. attitude towards all foreign powers. The premiership of Rudini was hailed by the Radical leader, Cavallotti, as a pledge of the non-renewal of the triple alliance, against which the Radicals began a vociferous campaign. Their tactics, however, produced a contrary effect, for Rudini, accepting proposals from Berlin, renewed the alliance in June 1891 for a period of twelve years. None of Rudini’s public utterances justify the supposition that he assumed office with the intention of allowing the alliance to lapse on its expiry in May 1892; indeed, he frankly declared it to form the basis of his foreign policy. The attitude of several of his colleagues was more equivocal, but though they coquetted with French financiers in the hope of obtaining the support of the Paris Bourse for Italian securities, the precipitate renewal of the alliance destroyed all probability of a close understanding with France. The desire of Rudini to live on the best possible terms with all powers was further evinced in the course of a visit paid to Monza by M. de Giers in October 1891, when the Russian statesman was apprised of the entirely defensive nature of Italian engagements under the triple alliance. At the same time he carried to a successful conclusion negotiations begun by Crispi for the renewal of commercial treaties with Austria and Germany upon terms which to some extent compensated Italy for the reduction of her commerce with France, and concluded with Great Britain conventions for the delimitation of British and Italian spheres of influence in north-east Africa. In home affairs his administration was weak and vacillating, nor did the economies effected in naval and military expenditure and in other departments suffice to strengthen the position of a cabinet which had disappointed the hopes of its supporters. On the 14th of April 1892 dissensions between ministers concerning the financial programme led to a cabinet crisis, and though Rudini succeeded in reconstructing his administration, he was defeated in the Chamber on the 5th of May and obliged to resign. King Humbert, Giolitti. who, from lack of confidence in Rudini, had declined to allow him to dissolve parliament, entrusted Signor Giolitti, a Piedmontese deputy, sometime treasury minister in the Crispi cabinet, with the formation of a ministry of the Left, which contrived to obtain six months’ supply on account, and dissolved the Chamber.
The ensuing general election (November 1892), marked by unprecedented violence and abuse of official pressure upon the electorate, fitly ushered in what proved to be the most unfortunate period of Italian history since the completion of national unity. The influence of Bank scandals. Giolitti was based largely upon the favour of a court clique, and especially of Rattazzi, minister of the royal household. Early in 1893 a scandal arose in connexion with the management of state banks, and particularly of the Banca Romana, whose managing director, Tanlongo, had issued £2,500,000 of duplicate bank-notes. Giolitti scarcely improved matters by creating Tanlongo a member of the senate, and by denying in parliament the existence of any mismanagement. The senate, however, manifested the utmost hostility to Tanlongo, whom Giolitti, in consequence of an interpellation in the Chamber, was compelled to arrest. Arrests of other prominent persons followed, and on the 3rd of February the Chamber authorized the prosecution of De Zerbi, a Neapolitan deputy accused of corruption. On the 20th of February De Zerbi suddenly expired. For a time Giolitti successfully opposed inquiry into the conditions of the state banks, but on the 21st of March was compelled to sanction an official investigation by a parliamentary commission composed of seven members. On the 23rd of November the report of the commission was read to the Chamber amid intense excitement. It established that all Italian cabinets since 1880 had grossly neglected the state banks; that the two preceding cabinets had been aware of the irregularities committed by Tanlongo; that Tanlongo had heavily subsidized the press, paying as much as £20,000 for that purpose in 1888 alone; that a number of deputies, including several ex-ministers, had received from him loans of a considerable amount, which they had apparently made no effort to refund; that Giolitti had deceived the Chamber with regard to the state banks, and was open to suspicion of having, after the arrest of Tanlongo, abstracted a number of documents from the latter’s papers before placing the remainder in the hands of the judicial authorities. In spite of the gravity of the charges formulated against many prominent men, the report merely “deplored” and “disapproved” of their conduct, without proposing penal proceedings. Fear of extending still farther a scandal which had already attained huge dimensions, and the desire to avoid any further shock to national credit, convinced the commissioners of the expediency of avoiding a long series of prosecutions. The report, however, sealed the fate of the Giolitti cabinet, and on the 24th of November it resigned amid general execration.
Apart from the lack of scruple manifested by Giolitti in the bank scandals, he exhibited incompetence in the conduct of foreign and home affairs. On the 16th and 18th of August 1893 a number of Italian workmen were massacred at Aigues-Mortes. The French authorities, Aigues-Mortes massacre. under whose eyes the massacre was perpetrated, did nothing to prevent or repress it, and the mayor of Marseilles even refused to admit the wounded Italian workmen to the municipal hospital. These occurrences provoked anti-French demonstrations in many parts of Italy, and revived the chronic Italian rancour against France. The Italian foreign minister, Brin, began by demanding the punishment of the persons guilty of the massacre, but hastened to accept as satisfactory the anodyne measures adopted by the French government. Giolitti removed the prefect of Rome for not having prevented an expression of popular anger, and presented formal excuses to the French consul at Messina for a demonstration against that consulate. In the following December the French tribunal at Angoulême acquitted all the authors of the massacre. At home Giolitti displayed the same weakness. Riots at Naples in August 1893 and symptoms of unrest in Sicily found him, as usual, unprepared and vacillating. The closing of the French market to Sicilian produce, the devastation wrought by the phylloxera and the decrease of the sulphur trade had combined to produce in Sicily a discontent of which Socialist agitators took advantage to organize the workmen of the towns and the peasants of the country into groups known as fasci. Insurrection in Sicily. The movement had no well-defined object. Here and there it was based upon a bastard Socialism, in other places it was made a means of municipal party warfare under the guidance of the local mafia, and in some districts it was simply popular effervescence against the local octrois on bread and flour. As early as January 1893 a conflict had occurred between the police and the populace, in which several men, women and children were killed, an occurrence used by the agitators further to inflame the populace. Instead of maintaining a firm policy, Giolitti allowed the movement to spread until, towards the autumn of 1893, he became alarmed and drafted troops into the island, though in numbers insufficient to restore order. At the moment of his fall the movement assumed the aspect of an insurrection, and during the interval between his resignation (24th November) and the formation of a new Crispi cabinet (10th December) conflicts between the public forces and the rioters were frequent. The return of Crispi to power—a return imposed by public opinion as that of the only man capable of dealing with the desperate situation—marked the turning-point of the crisis. Intimately acquainted with the conditions of his native island, Crispi adopted efficacious remedies. The fasci were suppressed, Sicily was filled with troops, the reserves were called out, a state of siege proclaimed, military courts instituted and the whole movement crushed in a few weeks. The chief agitators were either sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment or were compelled to flee the country. A simultaneous insurrection at Massa-Carrara was crushed with similar vigour. Crispi’s methods aroused great outcry in the Radical press, but the severe sentences of the military courts were in time tempered by the Royal prerogative of amnesty.
But it was not alone in regard to public order that heroic measures were necessary. The financial situation inspired serious misgivings. While engagements contracted by Depretis in regard to public works had more than neutralized the normal increase of revenue from taxation, Financial crisis. the whole credit of the state had been affected by the severe economic and financial crises of the years 1889–1893. The state banks, already hampered by maladministration, were encumbered by huge quantities of real estate which had been taken over as compensation for unredeemed mortgages. Baron Sidney Sonnino, minister of finance in the Crispi cabinet, found a prospective deficit of £7,080,000, and in spite of economies was obliged to face an actual deficit of more than £6,000,000. Drastic measures were necessary to limit expenditure and to provide new sources of revenue. Sonnino applied, and subsequently amended, the Bank Reform Bill passed by the previous Administration (August 10, 1893) for the creation of a supreme state bank, the Bank of Italy, which was entrusted with the liquidation of the insolvent Banca Romana. The new law forbade the state banks to lend money on real estate, limited their powers of discounting bills and securities, and reduced the maximum of their paper currency. In order to diminish the gold premium, which under Giolitti had risen to 16%, forced currency was given to the existing notes of the banks of Italy, Naples and Sicily, while special state notes were issued to meet immediate currency needs. Measures were enforced to prevent Italian holders of consols from sending their coupons abroad to be paid in gold, with the result that, whereas in 1893 £3,240,000 had been paid abroad in gold for the service of the January coupons and only £680,000 in paper in Italy, the same coupon was paid a year later with only £1,360,000 abroad and £2,540,000 at home. Economies for more than £1,000,000, were immediately effected, taxes, calculated to produce £2,440,000, were proposed to be placed upon land, incomes, salt and corn, while the existing income-tax upon consols (fixed at 8% by Cambray-Digny in 1868, and raised to 13.20% by Sella in 1870) was increased to 20% irrespectively of the stockholders’ nationality. These proposals met with opposition so fierce as to cause a cabinet crisis, but Sonnino who resigned office as minister of finance, returned to power as minister of the treasury, promulgated some of his proposals by royal decree, and in spite of vehement opposition secured their ratification by the Chamber. The tax upon consols, which, in conjunction with the other severe fiscal measures, was regarded abroad as a pledge that Italy intended at all costs to avoid bankruptcy, caused a rise in Italian stocks. When the Crispi cabinet fell in March 1896 Sonnino had the satisfaction of seeing revenue increased by £3,400,000, expenditure diminished by £2,800,000, the gold premium reduced from 16 to 5%, consolidated stock at 95 instead of 72, and, notwithstanding the expenditure necessitated by the Abyssinian War, financial equilibrium practically restored.
While engaged in restoring order and in supporting Sonnino’s courageous struggle against bankruptcy, Crispi became the object of fierce attacks from the Radicals, Socialists and anarchists. On the 16th of June an attempt by an anarchist named Lega was made on Crispi’s life; Attacks on Crispi. on the 24th of June President Carnot was assassinated by the anarchist Caserio; and on the 30th of June an Italian journalist was murdered at Leghorn for a newspaper attack upon anarchism—a series of outrages which led the government to frame and parliament to adopt (11th July) a Public Safety Bill for the prevention of anarchist propaganda and crime. At the end of July the trial of the persons implicated in the Banca Romana scandal revealed the fact that among the documents abstracted by Giolitti from the papers of the bank manager, Tanlongo, were several bearing upon Crispi’s political and private life. On the 11th of December Giolitti laid these and other papers before the Chamber, in the hope of ruining Crispi, but upon examination most of them were found to be worthless, and the rest of so private a nature as to be unfit for publication. The effect of the incident was rather to increase detestation of Giolitti than to damage Crispi. The latter, indeed, prosecuted the former for libel and for abuse of his position when premier, but after many vicissitudes, including the flight of Giolitti to Berlin in order to avoid arrest, the Chamber refused authorization for the prosecution, and the matter dropped. A fresh attempt of the same kind was then made against Crispi by the Radical leader Cavallotti, who advanced unproven charges of corruption and embezzlement. These attacks were, however, unavailing to shake Crispi’s position, and in the general election of May 1895 his government obtained a majority of nearly 200 votes. Nevertheless public confidence in the efficacy of the parliamentary system and in the honesty of politicians was seriously diminished by these unsavoury occurrences, which, in combination with the acquittal of all the defendants in the Banca Romana trial, and the abandonment of the proceedings against Giolitti, reinforced to an alarming degree the propaganda of the revolutionary parties.
The foreign policy of the second Crispi Administration, in which the portfolio of foreign affairs was held by Baron Blanc, was, as before, marked by a cordial interpretation of the triple alliance, and by close accord with Great Britain. In the Armenian question Italy seconded with Complications in Eritrea. energy the diplomacy of Austria and Germany, while the Italian fleet joined the British Mediterranean squadron in a demonstration off the Syrian coast. Graver than any foreign question were the complications in Eritrea. Under the arrangement concluded in 1891 by Rudini with native chiefs in regard to the Italo-Abyssinian frontier districts, relations with Abyssinia had remained comparatively satisfactory. Towards the Sudan, however, the Mahdists, who had recovered from a defeat inflicted by an Italian force at Agordat in 1890, resumed operations in December 1893. Colonel Arimondi, commander of the colonial forces in the absence of the military governor, General Baratieri, attacked and routed a dervish force 10,000 strong on the 21st of December. The Italian troops, mostly native levies, numbered only 2200 men. The dervish loss was more than 1000 killed, while the total Italian casualties amounted to less than 230. General Baratieri, upon returning to the colony, decided to execute a coup de main against the dervish base at Kassala, both in order to relieve pressure from that quarter and to preclude a combined Abyssinian and dervish attack upon the colony at the end of 1894. The protocol concluded with Great Britain on the 15th of April 1891, already referred to, contained a clause to the effect that, were Kassala occupied by the Italians, the place should be transferred to the Egyptian government as soon as the latter should be in a position to restore order in the Sudan. Concentrating a little army of 2600 men, Baratieri surprised and captured Kassala on the 17th of July 1894, and garrisoned the place with native levies under Italian officers. Meanwhile Menelek, jealous of the extension of Italian influence to a part of northern Somaliland and to the Benadir coast, had, with the support of France and Russia, completed his preparations for asserting his authority as independent ruler of Ethiopia. On the 11th of May 1893 he denounced the treaty of Uccialli, but the Giolitti cabinet, absorbed by the bank scandals, paid no heed to his action. Possibly an adroit repetition in favour of Mangashà and against Menelek of the policy formerly followed in favour of Menelek against the negus John might have consolidated Italian influence in Abyssinia by preventing the ascendancy of any single chieftain. The Italian government, however, neglected this opening, and Mangashà came to terms with Menelek. Consequently the efforts of Crispi and his envoy, Colonel Piano, to conclude a new treaty with Menelek in June 1894 not only proved unsuccessful, but formed a prelude to troubles on the Italo-Abyssinian frontier. Bath-Agos, the native chieftain who ruled the Okulé-Kusai and the cis-Mareb provinces on behalf of Italy, intrigued with Mangashà, ras of the trans-Mareb province of Tigre, and with Menelek, to raise a revolt against Italian rule on the high plateau. In December 1894 the revolt broke out, but Major Toselli with a small force marched rapidly against Bath Agos, whom he routed and killed at Halai. General Baratieri, having reason to suspect the complicity of Mangashà in the revolt, called upon him to furnish troops for a projected Italo-Abyssinian campaign against the Mahdists. Mangashà made no reply, and Baratieri crossing the Mareb advanced to Adowa, but four days later was obliged to return northwards. Mangashà thereupon took the offensive and attempted to occupy the village of Coatit in Okulé-Kusai, but was forestalled and defeated by Baratieri on the 13th of January 1895. Hurriedly retreating to Senafé, hard pressed by the Italians, who shelled Senafé on the evening of the 15th of January, Mangashà was obliged to abandon his camp and provisions to Baratieri, who also secured a quantity of correspondence establishing the complicity of Menelek and Mangashà in the revolt of Bath-Agos.
The comparatively facile success achieved by Baratieri
against Mangashà seems to have led him to undervalue his
enemy, and to forget that Menelek, negus and king
of Shoa, had an interest in allowing Mangashà to be
crushed, in order that the imperial authority and the
Conquest
of Tigre.
superiority of Shoan over Tigrin arms might be the more strikingly
asserted. After obtaining the establishment of an apostolic
prefecture in Eritrea under the charge of Italian Franciscans,
Baratieri expelled from the colony the French Lazarist missionaries
for their alleged complicity in the Bath-Agos insurrection,
and in March 1895 undertook the conquest of Tigre. Occupying
Adigrat and Makallè, he reached Adowa on the 1st of April, and
thence pushed forward to Axum, the holy city of Abyssinia. These
places were garrisoned, and during the rainy season Baratieri
returned to Italy, where he was received with unbounded
enthusiasm. Whether he or the Crispi cabinet had any inkling
of the enterprise to which they were committed by the occupation
of Tigre is more than doubtful. Certainly Baratieri made
no adequate preparations to repel an Abyssinian attempt to
reconquer the province. Early in September both Mangashà
and Menelek showed signs of activity, and on the 20th of September
Makonnen, ras of Harrar, who up till then had been
regarded as a friend and quasi-ally by Italy, expelled all Italians
from his territory and marched with 30,000 men to join the
negus. On returning to Eritrea, Baratieri mobilized his native
reserves and pushed forward columns under Major Toselli and
General Arimondi as far south as Amba Alagi. Mangashà fell
back before the Italians, who obtained several minor successes;
but on the 6th of December Toselli’s column, 2000 strong, which through a misunderstanding continued to hold Amba Alagi, was
almost annihilated by the Abyssinian vanguard of 40,000 men.
Toselli and all but three officers and 300 men fell at their posts
after a desperate resistance. Arimondi, collecting the survivors
of the Toselli column, retreated to Makallè and Adigrat. At
Makallè, however, he left a small garrison in the fort, which on
the 7th of January 1896 was invested by the Abyssinian army.
Repeated attempts to capture the fort having failed, Menelek
and Makonnen opened negotiations with Baratieri for its capitulation,
and on the 21st of January the garrison, under Major
Galliano, who had heroically defended the position, were permitted
to march out with the honours of war. Meanwhile
Baratieri received reinforcements from Italy, but remained
undecided as to the best plan of campaign. Thus a month was
lost, during which the Abyssinian army advanced to Hausen,
a position slightly south of Adowa. The Italian commander
attempted to treat with Menelek, but his negotiations merely
enabled the Italian envoy, Major Salsa, to ascertain that the
Abyssinians were nearly 100,000 strong mostly armed with
rifles and well supplied with artillery. The Italians, including
camp-followers, numbered less than 25,000 men, a force too
small for effective action, but too large to be easily provisioned
at 200 m. from its base, in a roadless, mountainous country,
almost devoid of water. For a moment Baratieri thought of
retreat, especially as the hope of creating a diversion from Zaila
towards Harrar had failed in consequence of the British refusal
to permit the landing of an Italian force without the consent
of France. The defection of a number of native allies (who,
however, were attacked and defeated by Colonel Stevani on
the 18th of February) rendered the Italian position still more
precarious; but Baratieri, unable to make up his mind, continued
to manœuvre in the hope of drawing an Abyssinian attack.
These futile tactics exasperated the home government, which
on the 22nd of February despatched General Baldissera, with
strong reinforcements, to supersede Baratieri. On the 25th of
February Crispi telegraphed to Baratieri, denouncing his operations
as “mllitary phthisis,” and urging him to decide upon
some strategic plan. Baratieri, anxious probably to obtain
some success before the arrival of Baldissera, and alarmed by
the rapid diminution of his stores, which precluded further
immobility, called a council of war (29th of February) and
obtained the approval of the divisional commanders for a plan
of attack. During the night the army advanced towards
Adowa in three divisions, under Generals Dabormida, Arimondi
and Albertone, each division being between 4000 and 5000
Battle of Adowa.
strong, and a brigade 5300 strong under General
Ellena remaining in reserve. All the divisions,
save that of Albertone, consisted chiefly of Italian
troops. During the march Albertone’s native division mistook
the road, and found itself obliged to delay in the Arimondi column
by retracing its steps. Marching rapidly, however, Albertone
outdistanced the other columns, but, in consequence of allowing
his men an hour’s rest, arrived upon the scene of action when
the Abyssinians, whom it had been hoped to surprise at dawn,
were ready to receive the attack. Pressed by overwhelming
forces, the Italians, after a violent combat, began to give way.
The Dabormida division, unsupported by Albertone, found
itself likewise engaged in a separate combat against superior
numbers. Similarly the Arimondi brigade was attacked by
30,000 Shoans, and encumbered by the débris of Albertone’s
troops. Baratieri vainly attempted to push forward the reserve,
but the Italians were already overwhelmed, and the battle—or
rather, series of distinct engagements—ended in a general rout.
The Italian loss is estimated to have been more than 6000,
of whom 3125 were whites. Between 3000 and 4000 prisoners
were taken by the Abyssinians, including General Albertone,
while Generals Arimondi and Dabormida were killed and General
Ellena wounded. The Abyssinians lost more than 5000 killed
and 8000 wounded. Baratieri, after a futile attempt to direct
the retreat, fled in haste and reached Adi-Cajè before the débris
of his army. Thence he despatched telegrams to Italy throwing
blame for the defeat upon his troops, a proceeding which subsequent
evidence proved to be as unjustifiable as it was unsoldier-like.
Placed under court-martial for his conduct, Baratieri
was acquitted of the charge for having been led to give battle
by other than military considerations, but the sentence “deplored
that in such difficult circumstances the command should have
been given to a general so inferior to the exigencies of the
situation.”
In Italy the news of the defeat of Adowa caused deep discouragement and dismay. On the 5th of March the Crispi cabinet resigned before an outburst of indignation which the Opposition had assiduously fomented, and five days later a new cabinet was formed by General Ricotti-Magnani, who, however, made over the premiership to the marquis di Rudini. The latter, though leader of the Right, had long been intriguing with Cavallotti, leader of the Extreme Left, to overthrow Crispi, but without the disaster of Adowa his plan would scarcely have succeeded. The first act of the new cabinet was to confirm instructions given by its predecessor to General Baldissera (who had succeeded General Baratieri on the 2nd of March) to treat for peace with Menelek if he thought desirable. Baldissera opened negotiations with the negus through Major Salsa, and simultaneously reorganized the Italian army. The negotiations having failed, he marched to relieve the beleaguered garrison of Adigrat; but Menelek, discouraged by the heavy losses at Abyssinian settlement. Adowa, broke up his camp and returned southwards to Shoa. At the same time Baldissera detached Colonel Stevani with four native battalions to relieve Kassala, then hard pressed by the Mahdists. Kassala was relieved on the 1st of April, and Stevani a few days later severely defeated the dervishes at Jebel Mokram and Tucruff. Returning from Kassala Colonel Stevani rejoined Baldissera, who on the 4th of May relieved Adigrat after a well-executed march. By adroit negotiations with Mangashà the Italian general obtained the release of the Italian prisoners in Tigré, and towards the end of May withdrew his whole force north of the Mareb. Major Nerazzini was then despatched as special envoy to the negus to arrange terms of peace. On the 26th of October Nerazzini succeeded in concluding, at Adis Ababa, a provisional treaty annulling the treaty of Uccialli; recognizing the absolute independence of Ethiopia; postponing for one year the definitive delimitation of the Italo-Abyssinian boundary, but allowing the Italians meanwhile to hold the strong Mareb-Belesa-Muna line; and arranging for the release of the Italian prisoners after ratification of the treaty in exchange for an indemnity of which the amount was to be fixed by the Italian government. The treaty having been duly ratified, and an indemnity of £400,000 paid to Menelek, the Shoan prisoners were released, and Major Nerazzini once more returned to Abyssinia with instructions to secure, if possible, Menelek’s assent to the definitive retention of the Mareb-Belesa-Muna line by Italy. Before Nerazzini could reach Adis Ababa, Rudini, in order partially to satisfy the demands of his Radical supporters for the abandonment of the colony, announced in the Chamber the intention of Italy to limit her occupation to the triangular zone between the points Asmarà, Keren and Massawa, and, possibly, to withdraw to Massawa alone. This declaration, of which Menelek was swiftly apprised by French agents, rendered it impossible to Nerazzini to obtain more than a boundary leaving to Italy but a small portion of the high plateau and ceding to Abyssinia the fertile provinces of Seraè and Okulé-Kusai. The fall of the Rudini cabinet in June 1898, however, enabled Signor Ferdinando Martini and Captain Cicco di Cola, who had been appointed respectively civil governor of Eritrea and minister resident at Adis Ababa, to prevent the cession of Seraè and Okulé-Kusai, and to secure the assent of Menelek to Italian retention of the Mareb-Belesa-Muna frontier. Eritrea has now approximately the same extent as before the revolt of Bath-Agos, except in regard (1) to Kassala, which was transferred to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities on the 25th of December 1897, in pursuance of the above-mentioned Anglo-Italian convention; and (2) to slight rectifications of its northern and eastern boundaries by conventions concluded between the Eritrean and the Anglo-Egyptian authorities. Under Signor Ferdinando Martini’s able administration (1898–1906) the cost of the colony to Italy was reduced and its trade and agriculture have vastly improved.
While marked in regard to Eritrea by vacillation and undignified readiness to yield to Radical clamour, the policy of the marquis di Rudini was in other respects chiefly characterized by a desire to demolish Crispi and his supporters. Actuated by rancour against Crispi, he, on the 29th of April 1896, authorized the publication of a Green Book on Abyssinian affairs, in which, without the consent of Great Britain, the confidential Anglo-Italian negotiations in regard to the Abyssinian war were disclosed. This publication, which amounted to a gross breach of diplomatic confidence, might have endangered the cordiality of Anglo-Italian relations, had not the esteem of the British government for General Ferrero, Italian ambassador in London, induced it to overlook the incident. Fortunately for Italy, the marquis Visconti Venosta shortly afterwards consented to assume the portfolio of foreign affairs, which had been resigned by Duke Caetani di Sermoneta, and again to place, after an interval of twenty years, his unrivalled experience at the service of his country. In September 1896 he succeeded in concluding with France a treaty with regard to Tunisia in place of the old Italo-Tunisian treaty, denounced by the French Government a year previously. During the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 Visconti Venosta laboured to maintain the European concert, joined Great Britain in preserving Greece from the worst consequences of her folly, and lent moral and material aid in establishing an autonomous government in Crete. At the same time he mitigated the Francophil tendencies of some of his colleagues, accompanied King Humbert and Queen Margherita on their visit to Homburg in September 1897, and, by loyal observance of the spirit of the triple alliance, retained for Italy the confidence of her allies without forfeiting the goodwill of France.
The home administration of the Rudini cabinet compared
unfavourably with that of foreign affairs. Bound by a secret
understanding with the Radical leader Cavallotti, an able but
unscrupulous demagogue, Rudini was compelled to bow to
Radical exigencies. He threw all the influence of the government
against Crispi, who was charged with complicity in embezzlements
perpetrated by Favilla, managing director of the Bologna
branch of the Bank of Naples. After being subjected to persecution
for nearly two years, Crispi’s character was substantially
vindicated by the report of a parliamentary commission appointed
to inquire into his relations with Favilla. True, the
commission proposed and the Chamber adopted a vote of censure
upon Crispi’s conduct in 1894, when, as premier and minister
of the interior, he had borrowed £12,000 from Favilla to replenish |
the secret service fund, and had subsequently repaid the money
as instalments for secret service were in due course furnished by
the treasury. Though irregular, his action was to some extent
justified by the depletion of the secret service fund under Giolitti
and by the abnormal circumstances prevailing in 1893–1894,
when he had been obliged to quell the insurrections in Sicily
and Massa-Carrara. But the Rudini-Cavallotti alliance was
destined to produce other results than those of the campaign
against Crispi. Pressed by Cavallotti, Rudini in March 1897
dissolved the Chamber and conducted the general election in
such a way as to crush by government pressure the partisans of
Crispi, and greatly to strengthen the (Socialist, Republican and
Radical) revolutionary parties. More than ever at the mercy
of the Radicals and of their revolutionary allies, Rudini continued
so to administer public affairs that subversive propaganda
and associations obtained unprecedented extension. The effect
was seen in May 1898, when, in consequence of a rise in the
price of bread, disturbances occurred in southern Italy. The
corn duty was reduced to meet the emergency, but the disturbed
Riots of
May, 1898.
area extended to Naples, Foggia, Bari, Minervino-Murge,
Molfetta and thence along the line of railway
which skirts the Adriatic coast. At Faenza, Piacenza,
Cremona, Pavia and Milan, where subversive associations
were stronger, it assumed the complexion of a political revolt.
From the 7th to the 9th of May Milan remained practically in
the hands of the mob. A palace was sacked, barricades were
erected and for forty-eight hours the troops under General
Bava-Beccaris, notwithstanding the employment of artillery,
were unable to restore order. In view of these occurrences,
Rudini authorized the proclamation of a state of siege at Milan,
Florence, Leghorn and Naples, delegating the suppression of
disorder to special military commissioners. By these means
order was restored, though not without considerable loss of life
at Milan and elsewhere. At Milan alone the official returns
confessed to eighty killed and several hundred wounded, a total
generally considered below the real figures. As in 1894, excessively
severe sentences were passed by the military tribunals
upon revolutionary leaders and other persons considered to have
been implicated in the outbreak, but successive royal amnesties
obliterated these condemnations within three years.
No Italian administration since the death of Depretis underwent so many metamorphoses as that of the marquis di Rudini. Modified a first time within five months of its formation (July 1896) in connexion with General Ricotti’s Army Reform Bill, and again in December 1897, Pelloux and obstruction. when Zanardelli entered the cabinet, it was reconstructed for a third time at the end of May 1898 upon the question of a Public Safety Bill, but fell for the fourth and last time on the 18th of June 1898, on account of public indignation at the results of Rudini’s home policy as exemplified in the May riots. On the 29th of June Rudini was succeeded in the premiership by General Luigi Pelloux, a Savoyard, whose only title to office was the confidence of the king. The Pelloux cabinet possessed no clear programme except in regard to the Public Safety Bill, which it had taken over from its predecessor. Presented to parliament in November 1898, the bill was read a second time in the following spring, but its third reading was violently obstructed by the Socialists, Radicals and Republicans of the Extreme Left. After a series of scenes and scuffles the bill was promulgated by royal decree, the decree being postdated to allow time for the third reading. Again obstruction precluded debate, and on the 22nd of July 1899 the decree automatically acquired force of law, pending the adoption of a bill of indemnity by the Chamber. In February 1900 it was, however, quashed by the supreme court on a point of procedure, and the Public Safety Bill as a whole had again to be presented to the Chamber. In view of the violence of Extremist obstruction, an effort was made to reform the standing orders of the Lower House, but parliamentary feeling ran so high that General Pelloux thought it expedient to appeal to the country. The general election of June 1900 not only failed to reinforce the cabinet, but largely increased the strength of the extreme parties (Radicals, Republicans and Socialists), who in the new Chamber numbered nearly 100 out of a total of 508. General Pelloux therefore resigned, and on the 24th of June a moderate Liberal cabinet was formed by the aged Signor Saracco, president of the senate. Within five weeks of its formation King Humbert was shot by an anarchist assassin named Bresci while leaving an athletic festival at Monza, where his Majesty had distributed the prizes (29th July 1900). The death of the unfortunate Death of King Humbert. monarch, against whom an attempt had previously been made by the anarchist Acciarito (22nd April 1897), caused an outburst of profound sorrow and indignation. Though not a great monarch, King Humbert had, by his unfailing generosity and personal courage, won the esteem and affection of his people. During the cholera epidemic at Naples and Busca in 1884, and the Ischia earthquake of 1885, he, regardless of danger, brought relief and encouragement to sufferers, and rescued many lives. More than £100,000 of his civil list was annually devoted to charitable purposes. Accession of King Victor Emmanuel III. Humbert was succeeded by his only son, Victor Emmanuel III. (b. November 11, 1869), a liberal-minded and well-educated prince, who at the time of his father’s assassination was returning from a cruise in the eastern Mediterranean. The remains of King Humbert were laid to rest in the Pantheon at Rome beside those of his father, Victor Emmanuel II. (9th August). Two days later Victor Emmanuel III. swore fidelity to the constitution before the assembled Houses of Parliament and in the presence of his consort, Elena of Montenegro, whom he had married in October 1896.
The later course of Italian foreign policy was marked by many vicissitudes. Admiral Canevaro, who had gained distinction as commander of the international forces in Crete (1896–1898), assumed the direction of foreign affairs in the first period of the Pelloux administration. Foreign affairs. His diplomacy, though energetic, lacked steadiness. Soon after taking office he completed the negotiations begun by the Rudini administration for a new commercial treaty with France (October 1898), whereby Franco-Italian commercial relations were placed upon a normal footing after a breach which had lasted for more than ten years. By the despatch of a squadron to South America he obtained satisfaction for injuries inflicted thirteen years previously upon an Italian subject by the United States of Colombia. In December 1898 he convoked a diplomatic conference in Rome to discuss secret means for the repression of anarchist propaganda and crime in view of the assassination of the empress of Austria by an Italian anarchist (Luccheni), but it is doubtful whether results of practical value were achieved. The action of the tsar of Russia in convening the Peace Conference at The Hague in May 1900 gave rise to a question as to the right of the Vatican to be officially represented, and Admiral Canevaro, supported by Great Britain and Germany, succeeded in preventing the invitation of a papal delegate. Shortly afterwards his term of office was brought to a close by the failure of an attempt to secure for Italy a coaling station at Sanmen and a sphere of influence in China; but his policy of active participation in Chinese affairs was continued in a modified form by his successor, the Marquis Visconti Venosta, who, entering the reconstructed Pelloux cabinet in May 1899, retained the portfolio of foreign affairs in the ensuing Saracco administration, and secured the despatch of an Italian expedition, 2000 strong, to aid in repressing the Chinese outbreak and in protecting Italian interests in the Far East (July 1900). With characteristic foresight, Visconti Venosta promoted an exchange of views between Italy and France in regard to the Tripolitan hinterland, which the Anglo-French convention of 1899 had placed within the French sphere of influence—a modification of the status quo ante considered highly detrimental to Italian aspirations in Tripoli. For this reason the Anglo-French convention had caused profound irritation in Italy, and had tended somewhat to diminish the cordiality of Anglo-Italian relations. Visconti Venosta is believed, however, to have obtained from France a formal declaration that France would not transgress the limits assigned to her influence by the convention. Similarly, in regard to Albania, Visconti Venosta exchanged notes with Austria with a view to the prevention of any misunderstanding through the conflict between Italian and Austrian interests in that part of the Adriatic coast. Upon the fall of the Saracco cabinet (9th February 1901) Visconti Venosta was succeeded at the foreign office by Signor Prinetti, a Lombard manufacturer of strong temperament, but without previous diplomatic experience. The new minister continued in most respects the policy of his predecessor. The outset of his administration was marked by Franco-Italian fêtes at Toulon (10th to 14th April 1901), when the Italian fleet returned a visit paid by the French Mediterranean squadron to Cagliari in April 1899; and by the despatch of three Italian warships to Prevesa to obtain satisfaction for damage done to Italian subjects by Turkish officials.
The Saracco administration, formed after the obstructionist crisis of 1899–1900 as a cabinet of transition and pacification, was overthrown in February 1901 in consequence of its vacillating conduct towards a dock strike at Genoa. It was succeeded by a Zanardelli cabinet, in which the Zanardelli-Giolitti Cabinet. portfolio of the interior was allotted to Giolitti. Composed mainly of elements drawn from the Left, and dependent for a majority upon the support of the subversive groups of the Extreme Left, the formation of this cabinet gave the signal for a vast working-class movement, during which the Socialist party sought to extend its political influence by means of strikes and the organization of labour leagues among agricultural labourers and artisans. The movement was confined chiefly to the northern and central provinces. During the first six months of 1901 the strikes numbered 600, and involved more than 1,000,000 workmen. (H. W. S.)
G. 1902–1909
In 1901–1902 the social economic condition of Italy was a matter of grave concern. The strikes and other economic agitations at this time may be divided roughly into three groups: strikes in industrial centres for higher wages, shorter hours and better labour conditions generally; Labour troubles. strikes of agricultural labourers in northern Italy for better contracts with the landlords; disturbances among the south Italian peasantry due to low wages, unemployment (particularly in Apulia), and the claims of the labourers to public land occupied illegally by the landlords, combined with local feuds and the struggle for power of the various influential families. The prime cause in most cases was the unsatisfactory economic condition of the working classes, which they realized all the more vividly for the very improvements that had been made in it, while education and better communications enabled them to organize themselves. Unfortunately these genuine grievances were taken advantage of by the Socialists for their own purposes, and strikes and disorders were sometimes promoted without cause and conciliation impeded by outsiders who acted from motives of personal ambition or profit. Moreover, while many strikes were quite orderly, the turbulent character of a part of the Italian people and their hatred of authority often converted peaceful demands for better conditions into dangerous riots, in which the dregs of the urban population (known as teppisti or the mala vita) joined.
Whereas in the past the strikes had been purely local and due to local conditions, they now appeared of more general and political character, and the “sympathy” strike came to be a frequent and undesirable addition to the ordinary economic agitation. The most serious movement at this time was that of the railway servants. The agitation had begun some fifteen years before, and the men had at various times demanded better pay and shorter hours, often with success. The next demand was for greater fixity of tenure and more regular promotion, as well as for the recognition by the companies of the railwaymen’s union. On the 4th of January 1902, the employees of the Mediterranean railway advanced these demands at a meeting at Turin, and threatened to strike if they were not satisfied. By the beginning of February the agitation had spread all over Italy, and the government was faced by the possibility of a strike which would paralyse the whole economic life of the country. Then the Turin gas men struck, and a general “sympathy” strike broke out in that city in consequence, which resulted in scenes of violence lasting two days. The government called out all the railwaymen who were army reservists, but continued to keep them at their railway work, exercising military discipline over them and thus ensuring the continuance of the service. At the same time it mediated between the companies and the employees, and in June a settlement was formally concluded between the ministers of public works and of the treasury and the directors of the companies concerning the grievances of the employees.
One consequence of the agrarian agitations was the increased use of machinery and the reduction in the number of hands employed, which if it proved advantageous to the landlord and to the few labourers retained, who received higher wages, resulted in an increase of unemployment. The Socialist party, which had grown powerful under a series of weak-kneed administrations, now began to show signs of division; on the one hand there was the revolutionary wing, led by Signor Enrico Ferri, the Mantuan deputy, which advocated a policy of uncompromising class warfare, and on the other the riformisti, or moderate Socialists, led by Signor Filippo Turati, deputy for Milan, who adopted a more conciliatory attitude and were ready to ally themselves with other parliamentary parties. Later the division took another aspect, the extreme wing being constituted by the sindacalisti, who were opposed to all legislative parliamentary action and favoured only direct revolutionary propaganda by means of the sindacati or unions which organized strikes and demonstrations. In March 1902 agrarian strikes organized by the leghe broke out in the district of Copparo and Polesine (lower valley of the Po), owing to a dispute about the labour contracts, and in Apulia on account of unemployment. In August there were strikes among the dock labourers of Genoa and the iron workers of Florence; the latter agitation developed into a general strike in that city, which aroused widespread indignation among the orderly part of the population and ended without any definite result. At Como 15,000 textile workers remained on strike for nearly a month, but there were no disorders.
The year 1903, although not free from strikes and minor disturbances, was quieter, but in September 1904 a very serious situation was brought about by a general economic and political agitation. The troubles began with the disturbances at Buggeru in Sardinia and Castelluzzo in General strike of 1904. Sicily, in both of which places the troops were compelled to use their arms and several persons were killed and wounded; at a demonstration at Sestri Ponente in Liguria to protest against what was called the Buggeru “massacre,” four carabineers and eleven rioters were injured. The Monza labour exchange then took the initiative of proclaiming a general strike throughout Italy (September 15th) as a protest against the government for daring to maintain order. The strike spread to nearly all the industrial centres, although in many places it was limited to a few trades. At Milan it was more serious and lasted longer than elsewhere, as the movement was controlled by the anarchists under Arturo Labriola; the hooligans committed many acts of savage violence, especially against those workmen who refused to strike, and much property was wilfully destroyed. At Genoa, which was in the hands of the teppisti for a couple of days, three persons were killed and 50 wounded, including 14 policemen, and railway communications were interrupted for a short time. Venice was cut off from the mainland for two days and all the public services were suspended. Riots broke out also in Naples, Florence, Rome and Bologna. The deputies of the Extreme Left, instead of using their influence in favour of pacification, could think of nothing better than to demand an immediate convocation of parliament in order that they might present a bill forbidding the troops and police to use their arms in all conflicts between capital and labour, whatever the provocation might be. This preposterous proposal was of course not even discussed, and the movement caused a strong feeling of reaction against Socialism and of hostility to the government for its weakness; for, however much sympathy there might be with the genuine grievances of the working classes, the September strikes were of a frankly revolutionary character and had been fomented by professional agitators and kept going by the dregs of the people. The mayor of Venice sent a firm and dignified protest to the government for its inaction, and the people of Liguria raised a large subscription in favour of the troops, in recognition of their gallantry and admirable discipline during the troubles.
Early in 1905 there was a fresh agitation among the railway servants, who were dissatisfied with the clauses concerning the personnel in the bill for the purchase of the lines by the state. They initiated a system of obstruction which hampered and delayed the traffic without altogether Unrest of 1905. suspending it. On the 17th of April a general railway strike was ordered by the union, but owing to the action of the authorities, who for once showed energy, the traffic was carried on. Other disturbances of a serious character occurred among the steelworkers of Terni, at Grammichele in Sicily and at Alessandria. The extreme parties now began to direct especial attention to propaganda in the army, with a view to destroying its cohesion and thus paralysing the action of the government. The campaign was conducted on the lines of the anti-militarist movement in France identified with the name of Hervé. Fortunately, however, this policy was not successful, as military service is less unpopular in Italy than in many other countries; aggressive militarism is quite unknown, and without it anti-militarism can gain no foothold. No serious mutinies have ever occurred in the Italian army, and the only results of the propaganda were occasional meetings of hooligans, where Hervéist sentiments were expressed and applauded, and a few minor disturbances among reservists unexpectedly called back to the colours. In the army itself the esprit de corps and the sense of duty and discipline nullified the work of the propagandists.
In June and July 1907 there were again disturbances among the agricultural labourers of Ferrara and Rovigo, and a widespread strike organized by the leghe throughout those provinces caused very serious losses to all concerned. The leghisti, moreover, were guilty of much criminal Strikes in 1907. violence; they committed one murder and established a veritable reign of terror, boycotting, beating and wounding numbers of peaceful labourers who would not join the unions, and brutally maltreating solitary policemen and soldiers. The authorities, however, by arresting a number of the more prominent leaders succeeded in restoring order. Almost immediately afterwards an agitation of a still less defensible character broke out in various towns under the guise of anti-clericalism. Certain scandals had come to light in a small convent school at Greco near Milan. This was seized upon as a pretext for violent anti-clerical demonstrations all over Italy and for brutal and unprovoked attacks on unoffending priests; at Spezia a church was set on fire and another dismantled, at Marino Cardinal Merry del Val was attacked by a gang of hooligans, and at Rome the violence of the teppisti reached such a pitch as to provoke reaction on the part of all respectable people, and some of the aggressors were very roughly handled. The Socialists and the Freemasons were largely responsible for the agitation, and they filled the country with stories of other priestly and conventual immoralities, nearly all of which, except the original case at Greco, proved to be without foundation. In September 1907 disorders in Apulia over the repartition of communal lands broke out anew, and were particularly serious at Ruvo, Bari, Cerignola and Satriano del Colle. In some cases there was foundation for the labourers’ claims, but unfortunately the movement got into the hands of professional agitators and common swindlers, and the leader, a certain Giampetruzzi, who at one time seemed to be a worthy colleague of Marcelin Albert, was afterwards tried and condemned for having cheated his own followers.
In October 1907 there was again a general strike at Milan, which was rendered more serious on account of the action of the railway servants, and extended to other cities; traffic was disorganized over a large part of northern Italy, until the government, being now owner of the railways, dismissed the ringleaders from the service. This had the desired effect, and although the Sindacato dei ferrovieri (railway servants’ union) threatened a general railway strike if the dismissed men were not reinstated, there was no further trouble. In the spring of 1908 there were agrarian strikes at Parma; the labour contracts had pressed hardly on the peasantry, who had cause for complaint; but while some improvement had been effected in the new contracts, certain unscrupulous demagogues, of whom Alceste De Ambris, representing the “syndacalist” wing of the Socialist party, was the chief, organized a widespread agitation. The landlords on their part organized an agrarian union to defend their interests and enrolled numbers of non-union labourers to carry on the necessary work and save the crops. Conflicts occurred between the strikers and the independent labourers and the police; the trouble spread to the city of Parma, where violent scenes occurred when the labour exchange was occupied by the troops, and many soldiers and policemen, whose behaviour as usual was exemplary throughout, were seriously wounded. The agitation ceased in June with the defeat of the strikers, but not until a vast amount of damage had been done to the crops and all had suffered heavy losses, including the government, whose expenses for the maintenance of public order ran into tens of millions of lire. The failure of the strike caused the Socialists to quarrel among themselves and to accuse each other of dishonesty in the management of party funds; it appeared in fact that the large sums collected throughout Italy on behalf of the strikers had been squandered or appropriated by the “syndacalist” leaders. The spirit of indiscipline had begun to reach the lower classes of state employees, especially the school teachers and the postal and telegraph clerks, and at one time it seemed as though the country were about to face a situation similar to that which arose in France in the spring of 1909. Fortunately, however, the government, by dismissing the ringleader, Dr Campanozzi, in time nipped the agitation in the bud, and it did attempt to redress some of the genuine grievances. Public opinion upheld the government in its attitude, for all persons of common sense realized that the suspension of the public services could not be permitted for a moment in a civilized country.
In parliamentary politics the most notable event in 1902 was the presentation of a divorce bill by Signor Zanardelli’s government; this was done not because there was any real demand for it, but to please the doctrinaire anti-clericals and freemasons, divorce being regarded Internal politics, 1902. not as a social institution but as a weapon against Catholicism. But while the majority of the deputies were nominally in favour of the bill, the parliamentary committee reported against it, and public opinion was so hostile that an anti-divorce petition received 3,500,000 signatures, including not only those of professing Catholics, but of free-thinkers and Jews, who regarded divorce as unsuitable to Italian conditions. The opposition outside parliament was in fact so overwhelming that the ministry decided to drop the bill. The financial situation continued satisfactory; a new loan at 312% was voted by the Chamber in April 1902, and by June the whole of it had been placed in Italy. In October the rate of exchange was at par, the premium on gold had disappeared, and by the end of the year the budget showed a surplus of sixteen millions.
In January 1903 Signor Prinetti, the minister for foreign affairs, resigned on account of ill-health, and was succeeded by Admiral Morin, while Admiral Bettolo took the latter’s place as minister of marine. The unpopularity of the ministry forced Signor Giolitti, the minister of the 1903–1905. interior, to resign (June 1903), and he was followed by Admiral Bettolo, whose administration had been violently attacked by the Socialists; in October Signor Zanardelli, the premier, resigned on account of his health, and the king entrusted the formation of the cabinet to Signor Giolitti. The latter accepted the task, and the new administration included Signor Tittoni, late prefect of Naples, as foreign minister, Signor Luigi Luzzatti, the eminent financier, at the treasury, General Pedotti at the war office, and Admiral Mirabello as minister of marine. Almost immediately after his appointment Signor Tittoni accompanied the king and queen of Italy on a state visit to France and then to England, where various international questions were discussed, and the cordial reception which the royal pair met with in London and at Windsor served to dispel the small cloud which had arisen in the relations of the two countries on account of the Tripoli agreements and the language question in Malta. The premier’s programme was not well received by the Chamber, although the treasury minister’s financial statement was again satisfactory. The weakness of the government in dealing with the strike riots caused a feeling of profound dissatisfaction, and the so-called “experiment of liberty,” conducted with the object of conciliating the extreme parties, proved a dismal failure. In October 1904, after the September strikes, the Chamber was dissolved, and at the general elections in November a ministerial majority was returned, while the deputies of the Extreme Left (Socialists, Republicans and Radicals) were reduced from 107 to 94, and a few mild clericals elected. The municipal elections in several of the larger cities, which had hitherto been regarded as strongholds of socialism, marked an overwhelming triumph for the constitutional parties, notably in Milan, Turin and Genoa, for the strikes had wrought as much harm to the working classes as to the bourgeoisie. In spite of its majority the Giolitti cabinet, realizing that it had lost its hold over the country, resigned in March 1905.
Signor Fortis then became premier and minister of the interior, Signor Maiorano finance minister and Signor Carcano treasury minister, while Signor Tittoni, Admiral Mirabello and General Pedotti retained the portfolios they had held in the previous administration. The new government 1905–1906. was colourless in the extreme, and the premier’s programme aroused no enthusiasm in the House, the most important bill presented being that for the purchase of the railways, which was voted in June 1905. But the ministry never had any real hold over the country or parliament, and the dissatisfaction caused by the modus vivendi with Spain, which would have wrought much injury to the Italian wine-growers, led to demonstrations and riots, and a hostile vote in the Chamber produced a cabinet crisis (December 17, 1905); Signor Fortis, however, reconstructed the ministry, inducing the marquis di San Giuliano to accept the portfolio of foreign affairs. This last fact was significant, as the new foreign secretary, a Sicilian deputy and a specialist on international politics, had hitherto been one of Signor Sonnino’s staunchest adherents; his defection, which was but one of many, showed that the more prominent members of the Sonnino party were tired of waiting in vain for their chief’s access to power. Even this cabinet was still-born, and a hostile vote in the Chamber on the 30th of January 1906 brought about its fall.
Now at last, after waiting so long, Signor Sonnino’s hour had struck, and he became premier for the first time. This result was most satisfactory to all the best elements in the country, and great hopes were entertained that the advent of a rigid and honest statesman would usher 1906–1909. in a new era of Italian parliamentary life. Unfortunately at the very outset of its career the composition of the new cabinet proved disappointing; for while such men as Count Guicciardini, the minister for foreign affairs, and Signor Luzzatti at the treasury commanded general approval, the choice of Signor Sacchi as minister of justice and of Signor Pantano as minister of agriculture and trade, both of them advanced and militant Radicals, savoured of an unholy compact between the premier and his erstwhile bitter enemies, which boded ill for the success of the administration. For this unfortunate combination Signor Sonnino himself was not altogether to blame; having lost many of his most faithful followers, who, weary of waiting for office, had gone over to the enemy, he had been forced to seek support among men who had professed hostility to the existing order of things and thus to secure at least the neutrality of the Extreme Left and make the public realize that the “reddest” of Socialists, Radicals and Republicans may be tamed and rendered harmless by the offer of cabinet appointments. A similar experiment had been tried in France not without success. Unfortunately in the case of Signor Sonnino public opinion expected too much and did not take to the idea of such a compromise. The new premier’s first act was one which cannot be sufficiently praised: he suppressed all subsidies to journalists, and although this resulted in bitter attacks against him in the columns of the “reptile press” it commanded the approval of all right-thinking men. Signor Sonnino realized, however, that his majority was not to be counted on: “The country is with me,” he said to a friend, “but the Chamber is against me.” In April 1906 an eruption of Mount Etna caused the destruction of several villages and much loss of life and damage to property; in appointing a committee to distribute the relief funds the premier refused to include any of the deputies of the devastated districts among its members, and when asked by them for the reason of this omission, he replied, with a frankness more characteristic of the man than politic, that he knew they would prove more solicitous in the distribution of relief for their own electors than for the real sufferers. A motion presented by the Socialists in the Chamber for the immediate discussion of a bill to prevent “the massacres of the proletariate” having been rejected by an enormous majority, the 28 Socialist deputies resigned their seats; on presenting themselves for re-election their number was reduced to 25. A few days later the ministry, having received an adverse vote on a question of procedure, sent in its resignation (May 17).
The fall of Signor Sonnino, the disappointment caused by the non-fulfilment of the expectations to which his advent to power had given rise throughout Italy and the dearth of influential statesmen, made the return to power of Signor Giolitti inevitable. An appeal to the country might have brought about a different result, but it is said that opposition from the highest quarters rendered this course practically impossible. The change of government brought Signor Tittoni back to the foreign office; Signor Maiorano became treasury minister, General Viganò minister of war, Signor Cocco Ortu, whose chief claim to consideration was the fact of his being a Sardinian (the island had rarely been represented in the cabinet) minister of agriculture, Signor Gianturco of justice, Signor Massimini of finance, Signor Schanzer of posts and telegraphs and Signor Fusinato of education. The new ministry began auspiciously with the conversion of the public debt from 4% to 334%, to be eventually reduced to 312%. This operation had been prepared by Signor Luzzatti under Signor Sonnino’s leadership, and although carried out by Signor Maiorano it was Luzzatti who deservedly reaped the honour and glory; the bill was presented, discussed and voted by both Houses on the 29th of June, and by the 7th of July the conversion was completed most successfully, showing on how sound a basis Italian finance was now placed. The surplus for the year amounted to 65,000,000 lire. In November Signor Gianturco died, and Signor Pietro Bertolini took his place as minister of public works; the latter proved perhaps the ablest member of the cabinet, but the acceptance of office under Giolitti of a man who had been one of the most trusted and valuable lieutenants of Signor Sonnino marked a further step in the dégringolade of that statesman’s party, and was attributed to the fact that Signor Bertolini resented not having had a place in the late Sonnino ministry. General Viganò was succeeded in December by Senator Casana, the first civilian to become minister of war in Italy. He made various reforms which were badly wanted in army administration, but on the whole the experiment of a civilian “War Lord” was not a complete success, and in April 1909 Senator Casana retired and was succeeded by General Spingardi, an appointment which received general approval.
The elections of March 1909 returned a chamber very slightly different from its predecessor. The ministerial majority was over three hundred, and although the Extreme Left was somewhat increased in numbers it was weakened in tone, and many of the newly elected “reds” were hardly more than pale pink.
Meanwhile, the relations between Church and State began to
show signs of change. The chief supporters of the claims of the
papacy to temporal power were the clericals of France
and Austria, but in the former country they had lost
all influence, and the situation between the Church and
Church
and State.
the government was becoming every day more strained.
With the rebellion of her “Eldest Daughter,” the Roman
Church could not continue in her old attitude of uncompromising
hostility towards United Italy, and the Vatican began to realize
the folly of placing every Italian in the dilemma of being either a
good Italian or a good Catholic, when the majority wished to be
both. Outside of Rome relations between the clergy and the
authorities were as a rule quite cordial, and in May 1903 Cardinal
Sarto, the patriarch of Venice, asked for and obtained an audience
with the king when he visited that city, and the meeting which
followed was of a very friendly character. In July following Leo
XIII. died, and that same Cardinal Sarto became pope under the
style of Pius X. The new pontiff, although nominally upholding
the claims of the temporal power, in practice attached but little
importance to it. At the elections for the local bodies the
Catholics had already been permitted to vote, and, availing
themselves of the privilege, they gained seats in many municipal
councils and obtained the majority in some. At the general
parliamentary elections of 1904 a few Catholics had been elected
as such, and the encyclical of the 11th of June 1905 on the political
organization of the Catholics, practically abolished the non
expedit. In September of that year a number of religious institutions
in the Near East, formerly under the protectorate of the
French government, in view of the rupture between Church and
State in France, formally asked to be placed under Italian protection,
which was granted in January 1907. The situation thus
became the very reverse of what it had been in Crispi’s time,
when the French government, even when anti-clerical, protected
the Catholic Church abroad for political purposes, whereas the
conflict between Church and State in Italy extended to foreign
countries, to the detriment of Italian political interests. A more
difficult question was that of religious education in the public
elementary schools. Signor Giolitti wished to conciliate the
Vatican by facilitating religious education, which was desired
by the majority of the parents, but he did not wish to offend the
Freemasons and other anti-clericals too much, as they could
always give trouble at awkward moments. Consequently the
minister of education, Signor Rava, concocted a body of rules
which, it was hoped, would satisfy every one: religious instruction
was to be maintained as a necessary part of the curriculum, but
in communes where the majority of the municipal councillors
were opposed to it it might be suppressed; the council in that
case must, however, facilitate the teaching of religion to those
children whose parents desire it. In practice, however, when the
council has suppressed religious instruction no such facilities are
given. At the general elections of March 1909, over a score of
Clerical deputies were returned, Clericals of a very mild tone who
had no thought of the temporal power and were supporters of the
monarchy and anti-socialists; where no Clerical candidate was
in the field the Catholic voters plumped for the constitutional
candidate against all representatives of the Extreme Left. On
the other hand, the attitude of the Vatican towards Liberalism
within the Church was one of uncompromising reaction, and
under the new pope the doctrines of Christian Democracy and
Modernism were condemned in no uncertain tone. Don Romolo
Murri, the Christian Democratic leader, who exercised much
influence over the younger and more progressive clergy, having
been severely censured by the Vatican, made formal submission,
and declared his intention of retiring from the struggle. But he
appeared again on the scene in the general elections of 1909, as a
Christian Democratic candidate; he was elected, and alone of the
Catholic deputies took his seat in the Chamber on the Extreme
Left, where all his neighbours were violent anti-clericals.
At 5 a.m. on the 28th of December 1908, an earthquake of appalling severity shook the whole of southern Calabria and the eastern part of Sicily, completely destroying the cities of Reggio and Messina, the smaller towns of Canitello, Scilla, Villa San Giovanni, Bagnara, Palmi, Melito, Earthquake of December 1908. Porto Salvo and Santa Eufemia, as well as a large number of villages. In the case of Messina the horror of the situation was heightened by a tidal wave. The catastrophe was the greatest of its kind that has ever occurred in any country; the number of persons killed was approximately 150,000, while the injured were beyond calculation.
The characteristic feature of Italy’s foreign relations during this period was the weakening of the bonds of the Triple Alliance and the improved relations with France, while the traditional friendship with England remained unimpaired. Franco-Italian friendship was officially Foreign affairs. cemented by the visit of King Victor Emmanuel and Queen Elena in October 1903 to Paris where they received a very cordial welcome. The visit was returned in April 1904 when M. Loubet, the French president, came to Rome; this action was strongly resented by the pope, who, like his predecessor since 1870, objected to the presence of foreign Catholic rulers in Rome, and led to the final rupture between France and the Vatican. The Franco-Italian understanding had the effect of raising Italy’s credit, and the Italian rente, which had been shut out of the French bourses, resumed its place there once more, a fact which contributed to increase its price and to reduce the unfavourable rate of exchange. That agreement also served to clear up the situation in Tripoli; while Italian aspirations towards Tunisia had been ended by the French occupation of that territory, Tripoli and Bengazi were now recognized as coming within the Italian “sphere of influence.” The Tripoli hinterland, however, was in danger of being absorbed by other powers having large African interests; the Anglo-French declaration of the 21st of March 1899 in particular seemed likely to interfere with Italian activity.
The Triple Alliance was maintained and renewed as far as paper documents were concerned (in June 1902 it was reconfirmed for 12 years), but public opinion was no longer so favourably disposed towards it. Austria’s petty persecutions of her Italian subjects in the irredente provinces, her active propaganda incompatible with Italian interests in the Balkans, and the anti-Italian war talk of Austrian military circles, imperilled the relations of the two “allies”; it was remarked, indeed, that the object of the alliance between Austria and Italy was to prevent war between them. Austria had persistently adopted a policy of pin-pricks and aggravating police provocation towards the Italians of the Adriatic Littoral and of the Trentino, while encouraging the Slavonic element in the former and the Germans in the latter. One of the causes of ill-feeling was the university question; the Austrian government had persistently refused to create an Italian university for its Italian subjects, fearing lest it should become a hotbed of “irredentism,” the Italian-speaking students being thus obliged to attend the German-Austrian universities. An attempt at compromise resulted in the institution of an Italian law faculty at Innsbruck, but this aroused the violent hostility of the German students and populace, who gave proof of their superior civilization by an unprovoked attack on the Italians in October 1902. Further acts of violence were committed by the Germans in 1903, which led to anti-Austrian demonstrations in Italy. The worst tumults occurred in November 1904, when Italian students and professors were attacked at Innsbruck without provocation; being outnumbered by a hundred to one the Italians were forced to use their revolvers in self-defence, and several persons were wounded on both sides. Anti-Italian demonstrations occurred periodically also at Vienna, while in Dalmatia and Croatia Italian fishermen and workmen (Italian citizens, not natives) were subject to attacks by gangs of half-savage Croats, which led to frequent diplomatic “incidents.” A further cause of resentment was Austria’s attitude towards the Vatican, inspired by the strong clerical tendencies of the imperial family, and indeed of a large section of the Austrian people. But the most serious point at issue was the Balkan question. Italian public opinion could not view without serious misgivings the active political propaganda which Austria was conducting in Albania. The two governments frequently discussed the situation, but although they had agreed to a self-denying ordinance whereby each bound itself not to occupy any part of Albanian territory, Austria’s declarations and promises were hardly borne out by the activity of her agents in the Balkans. Italy, therefore, instituted a counter-propaganda by means of schools and commercial agencies. The Macedonian troubles of 1903 again brought Austria and Italy into conflict. The acceptance by the powers of the Mürzsteg programme and the appointment of Austrian and Russian financial agents in Macedonia was an advantage for Austria and a set-back for Italy; but the latter scored a success in the appointment of General de Giorgis as commander of the international Macedonian gendarmerie; she also obtained, with the support of Great Britain, France and Russia, the assignment of the partly Albanian district of Monastir to the Italian officers of that corps.
In October 1908 came the bombshell of the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, announced to King Victor Emmanuel and to other rulers by autograph letters from the emperor-king. The news caused the most widespread sensation, and public opinion in Italy was greatly agitated at what it regarded as an act of brigandage on the part of Austria, when Signor Tittoni in a speech at Carate Brianza (October 6th) declared that “Italy might await events with serenity, and that these could find her neither unprepared nor isolated.” These words were taken to mean that Italy would receive compensation to restore the balance of power upset in Austria’s favour. When it was found that there was to be no direct compensation for Italy a storm of indignation was aroused against Austria, and also against Signor Tittoni.
On the 29th of October, however, Austria abandoned her military posts in the sandjak of Novibazar, and the frontier between Austria and Turkey, formerly an uncertain one, which left Austria a half-open back door to the Aegean, was now a distinct line of demarcation. Thus the danger of a “pacific penetration” of Macedonia by Austria became more remote. Austria also gave way on another point, renouncing her right to police the Montenegrin coast and to prevent Montenegro from having warships of its own (paragraphs 5, 6 and 11 of art. 29 of the Berlin Treaty) in a note presented to the Italian foreign office on the 12th of April 1909. Italy had developed some important commercial interests in Montenegro, and anything which strengthened the position of that principality was a guarantee against further Austrian encroachments. The harbour works in the Montenegrin port of Antivari, commenced in March 1905 and completed early in 1909, were an Italian concern, and Italy became a party to the agreement for the Danube-Adriatic Railway (June 2, 1908) together with Russia, France and Servia; Italy was to contribute 35,000,000 lire out of a total capital of 100,000,000, and to be represented by four directors out of twelve. But the whole episode was a warning to Italy, and the result was a national movement for security. Credits for the army and navy were voted almost without a dissentient voice; new battleships were laid down, the strength of the army was increased, and the defences of the exposed eastern border were strengthened. It was clear that so long as Austria, bribed by Germany, could act in a way so opposed to Italian interests in the Balkans, the Triple Alliance was a mockery, and Italy could only meet the situation by being prepared for all contingencies.
Bibliography.—It is difficult to indicate in a short space the most important sources of general Italian history. Muratori’s great collection, the Rerum Italicarum scriptores in combination with his Dissertationes, the chronicles and other historical material published by the Archivio Storico Italiano, and the works of detached annalists of whom the Villani are the most notable, take first rank. Next we may mention Muratori’s Annali d’ Italia, together with Guicciardini’s Storia d’ Italia and its modern continuation by Carlo Botta. Among the more recent contributions S. de Sismondi’s Républiques italiennes (Brussels, 1838) and Carlo Troya’s Storia d’ Italia nel medio evo are among the most valuable general works, while the large Storia Politica d’ Italia by various authors, published at Milan, is also important—F. Bertolini, I Barbari; F. Lanzani, Storia dei comuni italiani dalle origini fino al 1313 (1882); C. Cipolla, Storia delle Signorie Italiane dal 1313 al 1530 (1881); A. Cosci, L’ Italia durante le preponderanze straniere, 1530–1789 (1875); A. Franchetti, Storia d’ Italia dal 1789 al 1799; G. de Castro, Storia d’ Italia dal 1789 al 1814 (1881). For the beginnings of Italian history the chief works are T. Hodgkin’s Italy and her Invaders (Oxford, 1892–1899) and P. Villari’s Le Invasioni barbariche (Milan, 1900), both based on original research and sound scholarship. The period from 1494 to modern times is dealt with in various volumes of the Cambridge Modern History, especially in vol. i., “The Renaissance,” which contains valuable bibliographies. Giuseppe Ferrari’s Rivoluzioni d’ Italia (1858) deserves notice as a work of singular vigour, though no great scientific importance, and Cesare Balbo’s Sommario (Florence, 1856) presents the main outlines of the subject with brevity and clearness. For the period of the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars see F. Lemmi’s Le Origini del risorgimento italiano (Milan, 1906); E. Bonnal de Ganges, La Chute d’une république [Venise] (Paris, 1885); D. Carutti, Storia della corte di Savoia durante la rivoluzione e l’ impero francese (2 vols., Turin, 1892); G. de Castro, Storia d’ Italia dal 1797 al 1814 (Milan, 1881); A. Dufourcq, Le Régime jacobin en Italie, 1796–1799 (Paris, 1900); A. Franchetti, Storia d’ Italia dal 1789 al 1799 (Milan, 1878); P. Gaffarel, Bonaparte et les républiques italiennes (1796–1799) (Paris, 1895); R. M. Johnston, The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy (2 vols., with full bibliography, London, 1904); E. Ramondini, L’ Italia durante la dominazione francese (Naples, 1882); E. Ruth, Geschichte des italienischen Volkes unter der napoleonischen Herrschaft (Leipzig, 1859). For modern times, see Bolton King’s History of Italian Unity (1899) and Bolton King and Thomas Okey’s Italy To-day (1901). With regard to the history of separate provinces it may suffice to notice N. Machiaveili’s Storia fiorentina, B. Corio’s Storia di Milano, G. Capponi’s Storia della repubblica di Firenze (Florence, 1875), P. Villari’s I primi due secoli della storia di Firenze (Florence, 1905), F. Pagano’s Istoria del regno di Napoli (Palermo-Naples, 1832, &c.), P. Romanin’s Storia documentata di Venezia (Venice, 1853), M. Amari’s Musulmani di Sicilia (1854–1875), F. Gregorovius’s Geschichte der Stadt Rom (Stuttgart, 1881), A. von Reumont’s Geschichte der Stadt Rom (Berlin, 1867), L. Cibrario’s Storia della monarchia piemontese (Turin, 1840), and D. Carutti’s Storia della diplomazia della corte di Savoia (Rome, 1875). The Archivii storici and Deputazioni di storia patria of the various Italian towns and provinces contain a great deal of valuable material for local history. From the point of view of papal history, L. von Ranke’s History of the Popes (English edition, London, 1870), M. Creighton’s History of the Papacy (London, 1897) and L. Pastor’s Geschichte der Päpste (Freiburg i. B., 1886–1896), should be mentioned. From the point of view of general culture, Jacob Burckhardt’s Cultur der Renaissance in Italien (Basel, 1860), E. Guinet’s Révolutions d'Italie (Paris, 1857), and J. A. Symonds’s Renaissance in Italy (5 vols., London, 1875, &c.) should be consulted. (L. V.*)
- ↑ On the derivation see below, History, section A, ad. init.
- ↑ The actually highest point is the Maschio delle Faete (3137 ft.). (See Albanus Mons.)
- ↑ On the influence of malaria on the population of Early Italy see W. H. S. Jones in Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology, ii. 97 sqq. (Liverpool, 1909).
- ↑ The 2nd category of the 1875 law had practically ceased to exist.
- ↑ This may be reduced, in consequence of the adoption of the new Q.F. gun, 1 to 6.
- ↑ “Movement of capital” consists, as regards “income,” of the proceeds of the sale of buildings, Church or Crown lands, old prisons, barracks, &c., or of moneys derived from sale of consolidated stock. Thus “income” really signifies diminution of patrimony or increase of debt. In regard to “expenditure,” “movement of capital” refers to extinction of debt by amortization or otherwise, to purchases of buildings or to advances made by the state. Thus “expenditure” really represents a patrimonial improvement, a creation of credit or a decrease of indebtedness. The items referring to “railway construction” represent, on the one hand, repayments made to the exchequer by the communes and provinces of money disbursed on their account by the State Treasury; and, on the other, the cost of new railways incurred by the Treasury. The items of the “partite di giro” are inscribed both on the credit and debit sides of the budget, and have merely a figurative value.
- ↑ Financial operations (mainly in connexion with railway purchase) figure on each side of the account for about £22,000,000.
- ↑ For example, wheat, the price of which was in 1902 26 lire per cwt., pays a tax of 712 lire; sugar pays four times its wholesale value in tax; coffee twice its wholesale value.
- ↑ “Privileges” assure to creditors priority of claim in case of foreclosure for debt or mortgage. Prior to the law of the 23rd of January 1887 harvested produce and agricultural implements were legally exempt from “privilege.”
- ↑ At the beginning of 1902 the Italian parliament sanctioned a bill providing for the abolition of municipal duties on bread and farinaceous products within three years of the promulgation of the bill on 1st July 1902.
- ↑ Among the insurgents of Romagna was Louis Napoleon, afterwards emperor of the French.
- ↑ In Rome itself a certain Angelo Brunetti, known as Ciceruacchio, a forage merchant of lowly birth and a Carbonaro, exercised great influence over the masses and kept the peace where the authorities would have failed.
- ↑ The popular cry of “Viva Verdi!” did not merely express enthusiasm for Italy’s most eminent musician, but signified, in initials: “Viva Vittorio Emanuele Re d’ Italia!”
- ↑ La Farina’s Epistolario, ii. 426.
- ↑ In reality the emperor was contemplating an Etrurian kingdom with the prince at its head.
- ↑ N. Bianchi, Cavour, p. 118.
- ↑ He asked for the Neapolitan viceroyalty for life, which the king very wisely refused.
- ↑ The counterblast of Pius IX. to this convention was the encyclical Quanta Cura of Dec. 8, 1864, followed by the famous Syllabus.