Yeaton v. Lynn

by John Marshall

United States Supreme Court

30 U.S. 224

Yeaton  v.  Lynn

It may safely be affirmed that a fact which destroys the action, if it cannot be pleaded in bar, cannot be given in evidence on a plea in bar, to which it has no relation. If any matter of defence has arisen after an issue in fact, it may be pleaded by the defendant; as that the plaintiff has given him a release; or in an action by an administrator that the plaintiff's letters of administration have been revoked.

ERROR to the circuit court of the United States for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia.

The defendant in error, as executor of John Wise, on the 8th of April 1826, instituted an action of assumpsit in the circuit court. The declaration contained two counts; the first for money paid, laid out and expended; the second on account for money paid, &c., in which the defendant is alleged to have been found in arrears to the plaintiff, as executor. The letters testamentary of the plaintiff, as executor of John Wise, were recorded by the orphan's court on the 9th of November 1826.

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed the damages at two thousand four hundred and thirty-one dollars fifty-nine cents, with interest from the 1st of January 1820; subject to the opinion of the court on a case agreed. The circuit court gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant prosecuted this writ of error.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr E. J. Lee, for the plaintiff in error, contended that there was error in the judgment of the circuit court,

1. Because Adam Lynn, as executor of John Wise, could not maintain an action against Yeaton for money which he had been decreed to pay as trustee under a deed of trust out of the trust fund, which forms no part of the assets of his testator.

2. Because the case agreed does not sustain the allegation of the first count of the declaration that he as executor of John Wise paid money for William Yeaton. But it shows he never as executor had the means of paying money to any one.

3. There is no evidence in the record to sustain the second count in the declaration.

4. Because by the case agreed, and the proceedings referred to by it, it appears that at the time the verdict and judgment were rendered, Adam Lynn had ceased to be executor. This fact having been given in evidence on the general issue, it is as competent for the plaintiff in error to avail himself of it now, as if it had been at the proper time specially pleaded.

Mr Lee said it would not be denied that the orphan's court had authority to revoke the letters testamentary. This was fully warranted by the law of Maryland. The letters testamentary having been revoked, Mr Lynn was put out of court as executor, and was no longer competent to prosecute the suit.

In the case of a revocation of letters testamentary, all the intermediate acts of the executor are void. 11 Viner's Abridg. 114, 117. Bornhurst vs. Yelverton, Yelv. Rep. 83. Klett's case, Yelv. 125. Turner vs. Davis, 2 Saund. 148. Mod. Rep. 63.

He also contended that no money has been paid by Adam Lynn as executor, but only as trustee: the evidence authorized this position.

Mr Jones, for defendant, argued that the liability or capacity of the executor, Mr Lynn, to sue was not affected by the proceedings of the orphan's court. That court was one of limited jurisdiction, with powers specially designated; and among them was not that of removing an executor under the circumstances of this case. The court could have called on the executor to give security, but could not proceed under the law as it had done. The court could take away the assets from the executor, but not displace him.

The case stated shows that the trust fund was by the decree in the chancery proceedings made assets in the hands of the executor.

Mr Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Notes