Holt v. Hobbs
Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) provides that "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise" of an institutionalized person unless the government demonstrates that the burden "is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
Petitioner is an Arkansas inmate and devout Muslim who wishes to grow a ½-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs. Respondent Arkansas Department of Correction (Department) prohibits its prisoners from growing beards, with the single exception that inmates with diagnosed skin conditions may grow ¼-inch beards. Petitioner sought an exemption on religious grounds and, although he believes that his faith requires him not to trim his beard at all, he proposed a compromise under which he would be allowed to maintain a ½-inch beard. Prison officials denied his request, and petitioner sued in Federal District Court. At an evidentiary hearing before a Magistrate Judge, Department witnesses testified that beards compromised prison safety because they could be used to hide contraband and because an inmate could quickly shave his beard to disguise his identity. The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing petitioner's complaint, emphasizing that prison officials are entitled to deference on security matters and that the prison permitted petitioner to exercise his religion in other ways. The District Court adopted the recommendation in full, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Department had satisfied its burden of showing that the grooming policy was the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling security interests, and reiterating that courts should defer to prison officials on matters of security.
Held: The Department's grooming policy violates RLUIPA insofar as it prevents petitioner from growing a ½-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs. Pp. 360–370.
(a) Under RLUIPA, the challenging party bears the initial burden of proving that his religious exercise is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief, see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 717, n.28, and that the government's action substantially burdens his reli- [p353] gious exercise. Here, petitioner's sincerity is not in dispute, and he easily satisfies the second obligation. The Department's policy forces him to choose between "engag[ing] in conduct that seriously violates [his] religious belie[f]," id., at 720, or contravening the grooming policy and risking disciplinary action. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the District Court misunderstood the analysis that RLUIPA demands. First, the District Court erred by concluding that the grooming policy did not substantially burden petitioner's religious exercise because he could practice his religion in other ways. Second, the District Court erroneously suggested that the burden on petitioner's religious exercise was slight because petitioner testified that his religion would "credit" him for attempting to follow his religious beliefs, even if that attempt proved unsuccessful. RLUIPA, however, applies to religious exercise regardless of whether it is "compelled." § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Finally, the District Court improperly relied on petitioner's testimony that not all Muslims believe that men must grow beards. Even if petitioner's belief were idiosyncratic, RLUIPA's guarantees are "not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–716. Pp. 360–362.
(b) Once the challenging party satisfies his burden, the burden shifts to the government to show that substantially burdening the religious exercise of the "particular claimant" is "the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest." Hobby Lobby, supra, at 726; § 2000cc-1(a). The Department fails to show that enforcing its beard prohibition against petitioner furthers its compelling interests in preventing prisoners from hiding contraband and disguising their identities. Pp. 362–367.
(i) While the Department has a compelling interest in regulating contraband, its argument that this interest is compromised by allowing an inmate to grow a ½-inch beard is unavailing, especially given the difficulty of hiding contraband in such a short beard and the lack of a corresponding policy regulating the length of hair on the head. RLUIPA does not permit the unquestioning deference required to accept the Department's assessment. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniõ do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 434. Even if the Department could show that denying petitioner a ½-inch beard furthers its interest in rooting out contraband, it would still have to show that its policy is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest, a standard that is "exceptionally demanding" and requires the government to "sho[w] that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting part[y]." Hobby Lobby, supra, at 728. Here, the Department fails to establish that its security concerns cannot be satisfied by simply searching a ½-inch beard. Pp. 363–365.
[p354] (ii) Even if the Department's grooming policy furthers its compelling interest in prisoner identification, its policy still violates RLUIPA as applied in the present circumstances. As petitioner argues, requiring inmates to be photographed both with and without beards and then periodically thereafter is a less restrictive means of solving the Department's identification concerns. The Department fails to show why its prison system is so different from the many institutions that allow facial hair that the dual-photo method cannot be employed at its institutions. It also fails to show why the security risk presented by a prisoner shaving a ½-inch beard is so different from the risk of a prisoner shaving a mustache, head hair, or ¼-inch beard. Pp. 365–367.
(c) In addition to the Department's failure to prove that petitioner's proposed alternatives would not sufficiently serve its security interests, the Department also fails to adequately explain the substantial underinclusiveness of its policy, since it permits ¼-inch beards for prisoners with medical conditions and more than one-half inch of hair on the head. Its failure to pursue its proffered objectives with regard to such "analogous nonreligious conduct" suggests that its interests "could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree." Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546. Nor does the Department explain why the vast majority of States and the Federal Government can permit inmates to grow ½-inch beards, either for any reason or for religious reasons, but it cannot. Such evidence requires a prison, at a minimum, to offer persuasive reasons why it believes it must take a different course. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414, n.14. Pp. 367–369.
509 Fed. Appx. 561, reversed and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined, post, p. 370. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 370.
Douglas Laycock argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Eric C. Rassbach, Luke W. Goodrich, Mark L. Rienzi, Hannah C. Smith, and Asma T. Uddin.
Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuels, Deputy Solicitor General Gershengorn, Sarah E. Harrington, Mark L. Gross, and April J. Anderson.
David A. Curran, Deputy Attorney General of Arkansas, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief [p355] were Dustin McDaniel, Attorney General, and Christine A. Cryer, Senior Assistant Attorney General.*
* ↑ Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American Jewish Committee et al. by Marc D. Stern, Adam S. Lurie, and Samantha A. Dreilinger; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State by Evan M. Tager, Richard B. Katskee, James F. Tierney, Ayesha N. Khan, and Gregory M. Lipper; for the Anti-Defamation League et al. by Derek L. Shaffer; for the International Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. by Brian R. Matsui, Derek Gaubatz, and Joel C. Haims; for Islamic Law Scholars by Christopher C. Lund; for the National Congress of American Indians et al. by Joel West Williams, Richard A. Guest, Steven C. Moore, and Gabriel S. Galanda; for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs et al. by Nathan Lewin, Alyza D. Lewin, and Dennis Rapps; for Prison Fellowship Ministries et al. by Roger G. Brooks; for The Rutherford Institute by John W. Whitehead, Anand Agneshwar, and Anna K. Thompson; for the Sikh Coalition and Muslim Public Affairs Council by Mark E. Haddad and Collin P. Wedel; for the Women's Prison Association by James A. Sonne; for John Clark et al. by Jonathan L. Abram, Andrea W. Trento, Steven R. Shapiro, David Fathi, Daniel Mach, and Randall Marshall; for Jesse Wiese et al. by Matthew A. Fitzgerald; for Former Prison Wardens by Carolyn F. Corwin and Stephanie Hall Barclay; and for Ronald L. Akers et al. by Kelly Shackelford and Jeffrey C. Mateer.
A brief of amici curiae urging affrmance was fled for the State of Alabama et al. by Luther Strange, Attorney General of Alabama, Andrew L. Brasher, Solicitor General, and Megan A. Kirkpatrick, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Micheal C. Geraghty of Alaska, Tom Horne of Arizona, Sam Olens of Georgia, David Louie of Hawaii, Greg Zoeller of Indiana, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Tim Fox of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Scott Pruitt of Oklahoma, Kathleen G. Kane of Pennsylvania, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and Peter K. Michael of Wyoming.
David A. Cortman, Kevin H. Theriot, and Erik W. Stanley fled a brief for Alliance Defending Freedom as amicus curiae.
Notes
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This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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