Cook v. Tullis

by Stephen Johnson Field

United States Supreme Court

85 U.S. 332

Cook  v.  Tullis

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

Cook and others, trustees in bankruptcy of the estate of Homans, filed a bill in equity in the court below to set aside the transfer of a certain note for $7000, secured by mortgage, alleged to have been made by the said Homans to the defendant, Tullis, in violation of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act, and to compel an assignment of the note and mortgage to them.

It appeared from the record that in August, 1869, and for two years before, Homans, the bankrupt, was engaged in business as a banker, in Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio; that on several occasions during this period he had purchased bonds of the United States for the defendant, Tullis; that these bonds were left with him on special deposit for safe keeping; that the bonds were inclosed in envelopes and kept in a package by themselves, marked with the name of Tullis, and placed in a separate box; that on one occasion, about eighteen months before his failure, Homans had been permitted by the defendant to use $20,000 of the bonds thus purchased, upon condition of substituting for them in the package an equivalent in amount in bills receivable, and agreeing to replace the bonds when called for; that the bonds thus used were subsequently replaced; that on another occasion, about a year afterwards, in March, 1869, he took, without any such permission, from the package and used $6000 of the bonds, substituting in their place an equivalent amount in bills receivable; that in April following he removed these bills receivable and substituted in their place, for the bonds taken, a note and mortgage belonging to him, of one Hardestly, for $7000, the note bearing date April 17th, 1869, and payable in ninety days, and the mortgage being on real property; that this note was not paid at maturity, and in August following was placed by Homans, with the mortgage, in the hands of attorneys, with instructions to give notice to the maker of the note that if it were not paid by the beginning of the next term of the court, proceedings by suit would be taken for its collection; that Homans failed on the 26th of August, 1869; that soon afterwards Tullis was informed of the substitution of the note and mortgage for his bonds; and that thereupon he siguified his acceptance of the same and his satisfaction with the transaction, and directed proceedings to be commenced by the attorneys, in whose hands the papers had been placed, for the foreclosure of the mortgage.

It further appeared from the record that, on the 20th of September following, Homans was adjudged a bankrupt upon a petition in involuntary bankruptcy, filed on the 13th of the month, and that in December afterwards the complainants were appointed trustees of his estate.

The deposition of Homans was taken in the case, and he stated in explanation of his conduct in appropriating the bonds in question, that as on a former occasion Tullis had consented to his using a much larger amount, he inferred that there would be no objection to his using a smaller amount if it could be done without risk to Tullis; that at this time he was carrying on his business as usual, and did not apprehend insolvency or bankruptcy; that he did not think it necessary when he placed the note and mortgage with his attorneys to give them notice that they belonged in Tullis's package, and did not do so until the day of his failure, when, remembering the omission, he gave them notice to that effect, and directed them to account to Tullis for $6000 of the note, stating that this proportion of it belonged to him. It did not appear that Tullis had any knowledge leading him to suppose that Homans, until the day of his failure, was insolvent, or contemplated insolvency.

The trustees of Homans by this suit sought, as already said, to set aside the transfer to the defendant of the note and mortgage, and to obtain possession of the same, on the alleged ground that the transfer was made for the purpose of giving the defendant a preference over the other creditors of the bankrupt, and preventing a distribution of the proceeds of the note equally among his creditors, in violation of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act.

The provisions relied on by the trustees are in the thirtieth section of the act (by the forty-third made applicable to trustees), and in these words: ^[1]

'If any person, being insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency, within four months before the filing of the petition by or against him, with a view to give a preference to any creditor or person having a claim against him, . . . makes any payment, pledge, assignment, transfer or conveyance of any part of his property, either directly or indirectly, . . . the person receiving such payment, pledge, assignment, transfer or conveyance, or to be benefited thereby, . . . having reasonable cause to believe such person is insolvent, and that such . . . payment, pledge, assignment or conveyance is made in fraud of the provisions of this act, the same shall be void, and the assignee may recover the property, or the value of it, from the person so receiving it or so to be benefited.'

The court below adjudged that the defendant was entitled to $6000 of the proceeds of the note of Hardesty; and that he held the balance of the proceeds as trustee for the complainants, and entered a decree to that effect. From that decree the complainants appealed to this court.

Messrs. George Hoadly and E. M. Johnson, for the appellants:

1. The Hardesty note and mortgage were part of Homans's assets, procured by him, as we may reasonably presume, by means obtained from his general creditors. There is no evidence by which to apply the rule that the proceeds of a trust estate may be followed by the cestui que trust as far as they can be traced. We admit that property held in trust does not pass to the assignee by the proceedings in bankruptcy, but we assert that the trust must be such that the property can be followed or distinguished. 'When the trust property does not remain in specie, but has been made way with by the trustee, the cestui que trust has no longer a specific remedy against the estate, and must come in pari passu with the other creditors.' ^[2]

Homans took and used the bonds, but he does not suggest that he applied their proceeds, or anything bought with such proceeds, in obtaining this note and mortgage. For aught that appears he lost the proceeds of these bonds in his business.

2. The ratification could not retroact, for several reasons:

First. The doctrine of relation is a fiction applicable only when demanded by considerations of justice, and therefore not required when it will defeat the intervening rights of third persons, as here of Homans's trustees, representing his creditors, whose rights, for the same reason, and by the express provision of the act, relate back four months, for the purpose of avoiding preferences. ^[3]

Secondly. This fiction cannot apply to this case, because its effect would be the evasion of a statute enacted in the interests of morality. 'Directly or indirectly' shall no preference be permitted, says the Bankrupt Act. Now, with the ratification, a preference is achieved; without it, none. The ratification is the consummation of an incomplete preference; and, as such, is itself forbidden by the act, and therefore to be treated as not having taken place at all, in fact or in law.

Thirdly. A ratification is not allowed by law when the act ratified is itself forbidden at the time of ratification. As Homans after he broke could not prefer Tullis directly, neither could he prefer him by the indirect way of ratification. If an agent, without authority, assumes to do that which is afterwards prohibited by law, it is too late to give validity to the act by a ratification subsequent in date to the prohibition. To permit this is to defeat the law. ^[4]

In Bird v. Brown, ^[5] Baron Rolfe discussing the effect of ratification, says:

'But this doctrine must be taken with the qualification, that the act of ratification must take place at a time, and under circumstances, when the ratifying party might himself have lawfully done the act which he ratifies.'He cites Lord Audley's Case, ^[6] reported alike by Croke, Moore, and Popham, which seems in point, and is cited with approval by Lord Coke in Margaret Podger's Case. ^[7]

Fourthly. The alleged ratification amounts to nothing. What was there to ratify? Nothing but the conversion of the bonds, which made Tullis the creditor of Homans. By ratifying this Tullis could deprive the transaction of its tortious aspect, and make the liability one by contract also, instead of sounding both in trover and assumpsit. But he could do no more.

Mr. H. A. Morrill, contra.

Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:

Notes

1. 14 Stat. at Large, 534.
2. In re Janeway, 4 Bankrupt Register, 26; and see Paley on Agency, 90, by Dunlap, and cases cited.
3. Fleckner v. Bank of the United States, 8 Wheaton, 363; Stoddart v. United States, 4 Court of Claims, 511; Taylor v. Robinson, 14 California, 396; Wood v. McCain, 7 Alabama, 806; Reed v. Powell, 11 Robinson's Louisiana, 98; Smith v. McMicken, 12 Id. 653; Augusta Insurance Co. v. Packwood, 9 Louisiana Annual, 83.
4. McCracken v. City of San Francisco, 16 California, 591.
5. 4 Exchequer, 799.
6. Croke, Eliz. 561; Moore, 457; Popham, 176.
7. 9 Reports, 104a.