Gray v. Rollo

by Joseph P. Bradley

United States Supreme Court

85 U.S. 629

Gray  v.  Rollo

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois; the case being thus:

The Bankrupt Act enacts: ^[1]

'That in all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the parties, the account between them shall be stated, and one debt set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid.'

And a statute of Illinois ^[2] enacts that—

'All joint obligations shall be taken and held to be joint and several obligations.'

These statutes being in force, Moses Gray filed a bill in the court below against William Rollo, assignee in bankruptcy of the estate of the Merchants' Insurance Company of Chicago, to compel a set-off of alleged mutual debts. The insurance company had become bankrupt by the great fire at Chicago, and at that time held two promissory notes for $5555 each, made by the complainant, Gray, jointly with one Gaylord, which the company had received from the payee in the regular course of business. By the fire referred to, Moses Gray, the complainant, and his brother, Franklin Gray, doing business under the firm of Gray Brothers, suffered in the destruction of buildings, and these being insured by the said insurance company for $30,000 on three several policies, the company became indebted to them in the sum named. The complainant alleged in his bill that his just share of liability on the two notes was one-half of the amount, and he desired to have that half extinguished by a set-off of the like amount due on the policies. The money due on the policies was confessedly not due to him alone, but to Gray Brothers. But he alleged that his brother assented to and authorized such appropriation.

The insurance company demurred, and the demurrer being sustained the court dismissed the bill. From its action herein Gray took this appeal.

Mr. J. S. Norton, for the appellant, argued that under the statute of Illinois the whole debt, under both notes, which Moses Gray owed to the assignee in bankruptcy, was a several debt; that while it would be inequitable that Gaylord's debt should be paid by the application of a policy of insurance in which he had no interest, the reverse was true in regard to the share of the notes which Moses Gray owed. The counsel cited Tucker v. Oxley, ^[3] in this court, as much in point and binding; a case which he observed was supported by Wrenshall v. Cook, in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, ^[4] ever more in point, and by other cases in that tribunal. ^[5]

Mr. A. M. Pence, contra.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

Notes

1. 14 Stat. at Large, 526, § 20.
2. 1 Gross's Statutes of Illinois, 377.
3. 5 Cranch, 34.
4. 7 Watts, 464.
5. Tustin v. Cameron, 5 Wharton, 379; Craig v. Henderson, 2 Pennsylvania State, 261.