9/11 Commission Report/Notes/Part 7
The Attack Looms
[edit]1. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 16.
2. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.Although KSM's stated reasons for sending Hazmi and Mihdhar to California do not seem especially compelling, we have uncovered no evidence tending to establish any more plausible explanation for the California destination.The possibility that the two hijackers were pursuing another al Qaeda mission on the West Coast, while certainly conceivable-see, e.g., CIA analytic report, "Alternate View:Two 11 September Hijackers Possibly Involved in Previous US Plot," CTC 2002-30064, July 5, 2002-conflicts with the organization's preference for having its 9/11 operatives concentrate on that mission exclusively.
3. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 19, 2003; Aug. 14, 2003.
4. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003.According to Hambali, in late 1999 or early 2000 KSM sent an al Qaeda operative named Issa al Britani to visit Hambali in Malaysia.At the end of the visit, Issa provided Hambali with two addresses-one in the United States ("possibly in California") and one in South Africa- and told Hambali he could contact "people in those locations" if he "needed help." Hambali claims he never contacted anyone at either address or passed either address to anyone else, and claims not to remember the addresses. Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 12, 2003. In an assessment of KSM's reporting, the CIA concluded that protecting operatives in the United States appeared to be a "major part" of KSM's resistance efforts. For example, in response to questions about U.S. zip codes found in his notebooks, KSM provided the less than satisfactory explanation that he was planning to use the zip codes to open new email accounts. CIA report, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment,"Khalid Shaykh Muhammed's Threat Reporting-Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,"Apr. 3, 2003, pp. 4-5.
5. Notably, as discussed in chapter 5, precisely such arrangements-in the form of lodging and travel assistance provided by Hambali's minions-were in place when the first contingent of operatives (including Hazmi and Mihdhar) journeyed to Kuala Lumpur in late 1999 and early 2000.
6. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.
7. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 19, 2003;Aug. 14, 2003. KSM also has stated that in addition to providing Hazmi and Mihdhar with a San Diego telephone book, he gave them another directory "possibly covering Long Beach, California." Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 15, 2004.
8. Although Hazmi and Mihdhar told immigration authorities on January 15, 2000, that they would be staying at the Sheraton Hotel in Los Angeles, their names do not appear in the hotel's registration records for the second half of January. FBI searches of the records of other hotels near the airport and smaller establishments in Culver City failed to locate the hijackers, as did our own investigation. See FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (Apr. 3, 1999, entry, citing 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 4062; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134); Commission investigation in Culver City;Vicki G. interview (Sept. 30, 2003).
9. For the FBI source's claims, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Oct. 8, 2002. For Abdullah's recollections, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Jan. 15, 2002. Other reporting indicates that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd mosque.A scholar lecturing at the mosque was reportedly approached by either Hazmi or Mihdhar about performing a wedding ceremony. Khalil A. Khalil interview (Feb. 24, 2004). On "Khallam," see FBI electronic communication, "Fahad Althumairy," Sept. 4, 2002; FBI electronic communication,"Ziyat Kharfan," Jan. 8, 2002 (giving description of visitor with whom Hazmi and Mihdhar met at mosque).The Khallam story has never been corroborated.The FBI considered the possibility that Khallam might be Khallad, the al Qaeda member whose role in the 9/11 plot and the Cole attack we discussed in chapter 5.This speculation was based on reporting that Khallad was in the United States in June 2000 and was seen in the company of Fahad al Thumairy, an imam at the mosque. FBI electronic communication, investigation of Cole bombing, interview of witness, Mar. 19, 2003; CIA cable, source reporting, Mar. 18, 2003. Neither we nor the FBI have found any travel documentation establishing Khallad's presence in the United States at any time.We doubt that the person allegedly seen with Thumairy actually was Khallad.
10. Patrick J. McDonnell,"Saudi Envoy in L.A. Is Deported," Los Angeles Times, May 10, 2003, p. B1; Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, with Jamie Reno,"Failure to Communicate," Newsweek,Aug. 4, 2003, p. 34.As of January 2000,Thumairy was employed by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance, to act as the consulate's liaison to the mosque. FBI electronic communication,"Fahad Al Thumairy," Sept. 4, 2002. Before 9/11, Saudi imams employed by the ministry often were dispatched to help serve Muslim communities around the world, sometimes-as in Thumairy's case-with diplomatic status in the host country. On Thumairy's leadership, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman al Muhanna, July 9, 2003; FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohamed Ibrahim Aliter, Dec. 2, 2002.
11. FBI electronic communication,"Abdulaziz Alroomi," Apr. 2, 2003.
12. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Khaled Charif, Dec. 4, 2002. After 9/11, arguments arose within the Saudi government over whether to allow reputedly radical imams, including Thumairy, to work for the Saudi government in the United States. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman al Muhanna, July 9, 2003. In May 2003, the U.S. government settled the matter, at least in Thumairy's case, by refusing to let him back into the country. DOS memo, Karl Hoffman to the Commission, June 8, 2004, and the attached materials.
13. On Thumairy's religious views, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohamed Aliter, Dec. 2, 2002; Fahad al Thumairy interviews (Feb. 23-25, 2004). However, two witnesses we interviewed who knew Thumairy and used to hear him preach at the King Fahd mosque deny that he promoted extremism. Sami A. Mekhemar interview (Apr. 21, 2004); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Despite the disparate views as to whether Thumairy qualified as an extremist while he was in Los Angeles, it does appear that both the Saudi Arabian government and the leadership of the mosque attempted to discipline him in the summer of 2002 and early 2003 for espousing extremist views. Thumairy denies incurring any such disciplinary measures. Fahad al Thumairy interviews (Feb. 23-25, 2004); FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman al Muhanna, July 9, 2003. On Bayoumi, see Khalil A. Khalil interview (Feb. 24, 2004). Bayoumi and Thumairy had numerous telephonic contacts between December 1998 and December 2000. Specifically, Bayoumi called Thumairy's home telephone 10 times during this period, and Thumairy called Bayoumi's cellular and home phones 11 times between December 3 and December 20, 2000. FBI electronic communication, "Fahad Al-Thumairy," Nov. 20, 2002. Bayoumi recalls consulting with Thumairy, solely on religious matters, both by telephone and in person at the mosque. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003).As to Thumairy's contact with Mohdar Abdullah, see FBI electronic com-munication,"Fahad Althumairy,"Oct. 25, 2002; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002.According to one individual,Abdullah visited the mosque frequently and was "very close" to radical followers of Thumairy. FBI electronic communication,"Fahad Althumairy," Oct. 25, 2002.
14.We have checked, for example, the records for apartments where Thumairy is known to have placed Saudi visitors during 2001.The most intriguing lead concerns an Arabic-speaking taxicab driver, Qualid Benomrane, who was arrested on immigration charges in early 2002.When asked to look at a series of photographs that included the 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks, Benomrane responded ambiguously, seeming first to pick out the photographs of Hazmi and Mihdhar but then denying that he recognized them. Later in the interview, Benomrane told the FBI about driving "two Saudis" around Los Angeles and to San Diego's Sea World after being introduced to them by Thumairy at the King Fahd mosque before 9/11. According to Benomrane, someone at the consulate had asked Thumairy to assist the two Saudis, who had recently arrived in Los Angeles and had moved to an apartment near the mosque. FBI electronic communication,"Fahad Althumairy," Sept. 4, 2002;Ashour E. interview (May 20, 2004); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Qualid Moncef Benomrane, Mar. 7, 2002; Mar. 13, 2002; May 23, 2002.Working with agencies of the U.S. government, we have attempted to locate and interview Benomrane overseas, since he was deported in 2002. After checking many possible avenues of corroboration for this story, our investigation has not substantiated the hypothesis that Benomrane's "two Saudis" were Hazmi and Mihdhar. In fact, we have established that Benomrane did not obtain a taxi license, or even a driver's license, until months after he could be supposed to have chauffeured Hazmi and Mihdhar. Moreover, before his deportation, Benomrane described the two Saudis as sons of a sick father who was seeking medical treatment in Los Angeles. Ibid.We have found evidence corroborating this account.
15. FBI document made available to the Commission; Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). In Bin Don's presence, Bayoumi met with a still-unidentified consular employee whom Bayoumi already knew and whom Bin Don says he saw in Anaheim as recently as November 2003.The employee provided Bayoumi with Qur'ans and other religious materials during the February 1, 2000, meeting. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003). At the time of the February 1, 2000, restaurant encounter, Bin Don, a U.S. citizen, went by the name Isamu Dyson.
16. Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Isamu Dyson, Oct. 8, 2001.
17. See Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Isamu Dyson, Oct. 8, 2001. Bin Don himself has been inconsistent about visiting the mosque. In his initial interviews, he recalled praying with Bayoumi at the consulate before lunch and visiting the mosque only once, after the meal; when we interviewed him recently, however, he stated that both prayer sessions took place at the mosque. For Bayoumi's visits to Los Angeles, see FBI report of investigation, recovery of hotel records, Jan. 15, 2002.Although Bayoumi might deny visiting the mosque on February 1 to conceal some contact he may have made there that day, we have seen no evidence of such contact.
18. Saudi Civil Aviation Authority employment records for Bayoumi, Mar. 2000-Jan. 2002 (provided by the FBI); FBI report of investigation,"Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia," undated; FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Bayoumi,Apr. 15, 2002.While in San Diego, Bayoumi was officially employed by Ercan, a subsidiary of a contractor for the Saudi Civil Aviation Administration, although a fellow employee described Bayoumi as a "ghost employee," noting that he was one of many Saudis on the payroll who was not required to work. In April 2000, Bayoumi received a promotion and his status was also adjusted from "single" to "married" (despite the fact that he was already married). As a result, his salary was raised and his "other allowances" stipend increased significantly, from approximately $465 to $3,925 a month, remaining at that level until December 2000. In January 2001, the stipend was reduced to $3,427. It stayed constant until August 2001, when Bayoumi left the United States. Saudi Civil Aviation Authority employment records for Bayoumi, Mar. 2000-Jan. 2002 (provided by the FBI); Richard L. Lambert prepared statement, June 26, 2003, pp. 7-9; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Samuel George Coombs,Apr. 8, 2002; July 24, 2002;Aug. 26, 2002.
19. On Bayoumi's activities, see FBI electronic communication, interview of Bayoumi, Sept. 17, 2003.Although Bayoumi admits knowing Thumairy, no telephone records document any contact between the two just before Bay-oumi's lunch with Hazmi and Mihdhar in Los Angeles. Nor do individuals who regard Thumairy as an extremist
place Bayoumi in Thumairy's circle of associates. KSM has denied knowing Bayoumi. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003.
Bayoumi was once the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation, prompted by allegations about him that appear to have been groundless. On the closing of the investigation, see FBI electronic communication,"Omar Ahmed Al Bayoumi," June 7, 1999. Another possible source of suspicion is his passport, which contains a cachet that intelligence investigators associate with possible adherence to al Qaeda. It is a marking that can be obtained by especially devout Muslims.Although we believe the marking suggests the need for further inquiry, it is not the kind of fraudulent manipulation that would conclusively link the document with a terrorist organization. INS records, copy of Bayoumi passport; CIA analytic report, Al-Qa'ida Travel Issues, CTC 2004-40002H, Nov. 14, 2003, pp. ii, 18.
20. On Abdullah's assistance to the hijackers, see FBI electronic communication, Abdullah investigation, May 19, 2004. In a post-9/11 interview with law enforcement, Abdullah claimed that Bayoumi specifically asked him "to be the individual to acclimate the hijackers to the United States, particularly San Diego, California."FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002. Bayoumi, however, denies even introducing Hazmi and Mihdhar to Abdullah, much less asking him to assist them. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003).
21. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; FBI electronic communication, "Osama Bassnan," Oct. 17, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2001; FBI electronic communication, "Shareef Abdulmuttaleb el Arbi," Feb. 4, 2003. For the possibility of the notebook belonging to someone else, see FBI report, Behavioral Analysis Activity, Oct. 4, 2001.
22. FBI electronic communication, interview of Charles Sabah Toma, May 18, 2004.
23. On Abdullah's claims of advance knowledge, see FBI electronic communication, interview, May 17, 2004. On Abdullah's telephone use after August 25, 2001, and acting strangely, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; Danny G. interviews (Nov. 18, 2003; May 24, 2004).
24.The hijackers' mode of transportation and the exact date of their arrival in San Diego are not known. On their locating Bayoumi on February 4 and his assistance, see Richard L. Lambert prepared statement, June 26, 2003, pp. 6-7; Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003); FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar al Bayoumi, Aug. 4-5, 2003.The rental application states that Hazmi and Mihdhar resided in Bayoumi's apartment from January 15 to February 2, 2000, but Bayoumi denies it, and we have found no reason to dispute his denial.Accord-ing to Bayoumi, he was in such a hurry to complete the rental transaction that he signed the application form without reading it. Bayoumi also denies receiving any money from Hazmi or Mihdhar for helping them with the apartment. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003). On opening an account, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 12.
Contrary to highly publicized allegations, we have found no evidence that Hazmi or Mihdhar received money from another Saudi citizen, Osama Bassnan.
25. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003).According to Bayoumi, he originally intended to hold the party at his own apartment, but moved it to the hijackers' apartment when one of the guests created an awkward social circumstance by bringing his wife; Bayoumi solved the problem by having the friend's wife stay with his own wife in Bayoumi's apartment and moving the party to the hijackers' residence. Bayoumi maintains that a visiting sheikh was the party's principal honoree. Ibid. Although Bin Don has recalled that the party was intended to welcome Hazmi and Mihdhar to the community, this is belied by the hijackers' apparent decision to sequester themselves in the back room, and by the account of another party attendee. Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Khalid Abdulrab al Yafai interview (Feb. 24, 2004). Of the two operatives, only Mihdhar appears briefly on the video shot by Bin Don. Bayoumi videotape of party (provided by the FBI).
26. On the hijackers' efforts to relocate, see Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16-17, 2003); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004); FBI report,"San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commission," June 26, 2003, p. 17.Telephone records indicate that on February 9 and February 14, 2000, Bayoumi's cell phone was used to call the landlord of the operatives' acquaintance, Hashim al Attas, who had decided to vacate his apartment. On February 15, 2000, when the landlord returned a page from Bayoumi's cell phone, Hazmi answered the phone. Steve O. interview (Nov. 17, 2003); FBI report of investigation, interview of George Harb, Oct. 30, 2001. Hazmi and Mihdhar appear to have used Bayoumi's cell phone until telephone service (subscribed in Hazmi's name) was installed in their apartment.
27. FBI report of investigation, interview of George Harb, Sept. 16, 2001.The hijackers may actually have lived in Attas's apartment for a short while. Bayoumi has stated that he recalls hearing that Hazmi and Mihdhar moved into the apartment for two weeks but then returned to their original apartment while Bayoumi was in Washington, D.C. FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar al Bayoumi,Aug. 4-6, 2003.This account is confirmed by Attas's girlfriend, who recalls that Attas met Mihdhar and Hazmi either through friends or at the mosque, and that the pair moved into Attas's apartment for approximately two weeks before moving out and taking Attas's furnishings with them. FBI report,"San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commission," June 26, 2003, p. 18.
28. Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Hazmi and Mihdhar did not officially vacate their first apartment until May 31, 2000. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-SD, serial 1445).The exact details
of the hijackers' move to their final San Diego address are not altogether clear, as their landlord-who has been interviewed many times by the FBI and once by us-has provided various accounts of how he first met them. See also FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Oct. 3, 2001. On Mihdhar's travels, see Interview (Apr. 23, 2004); FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 46. On Hazmi's departure, see FBI report,"San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commission," June 26, 2003, p. 18.
29. On the purchase of the car, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing Bank of America records). Law enforcement officials recovered the blue 1988 Toyota from the parking lot at Dulles International Airport on September 11. On the wire transfer, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 17, 2001.After 9/11, the mosque administrator came forward because he feared he had unwittingly aided the hijackers. He recalled Hazmi and Mihdhar arriving at the mosque on their own and describing themselves as clerks employed by the Saudi Arabian government.The two said they needed help finding a school where they could study English, which neither spoke well enough, in the administrator's opinion, to permit them to become pilots. The administrator also suspected that Mihdhar might have been an intelligence agent of the Saudi government.After first declining Hazmi's request for a loan, the administrator agreed to permit him to use the administrator's bank account to receive the $5,000 wire transfer. Claiming to have been suspicious of the entire transaction, the administrator distanced himself from Hazmi and Mihdhar, but not before they had received the assistance they needed. Ibid.We have no evidence contradicting the administrator's account.
30. On visits to other mosques, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Ali Ahmad Mesdaq, Jan. 28, 2002; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Samir Abdoun, Oct. 28, 2001; May 15, 2002. On Bayoumi's assistance, see Richard L. Lambert prepared statement, June 26, 2003, p. 7; FBI electronic communication,"Jay Steven Barlow," Sept. 24, 2002. On April 12, 2000, Hazmi registered for a one-month class in conversational English. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (Apr. 12, 2000, entry, citing Bank of America records).
31. Even before learning of Abdullah's alleged jailhouse conversations, we attempted to interview him in November 2003, while he was incarcerated and awaiting deportation. Through counsel, Abdullah refused to be interviewed unless he was released from custody.The U.S. Department of Justice declined to obtain an order of use immunity so that Abdullah's testimony could be compelled. See Commission letter to Daniel Levin, DOJ, Dec. 31, 2003; DOJ letter, Daniel Levin to the Commission, Jan. 5, 2004. On Abdullah's deportation, see FBI electronic communication, Abdullah investigation, July 1, 2004. Abdullah appears to be at liberty in Yemen, although he claims Yemeni authorities are watching him. H. G. Reza, "Deported Friend of Terrorists in Report," Los Angeles Times, June 17, 2004, p. A31.
32. On Awadallah, see FBI electronic communication, interview of Osama Awadallah, June 6, 2002; FBI electronic communication, interview of Osama Awadallah, Feb. 4, 2003. On Bakarbashat, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar Bakarbashat, Sept. 17, 2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Apr. 11, 2002. Another associate of Hazmi and Mihdhar allegedly referred to them after the September 11 attacks as "more than heroes." FBI letterhead memorandum,"Diah Thabet," Oct. 25, 2002.
33. On Anwar Aulaqi, see Wade A. interview (Oct. 16, 2003).The FBI investigated Aulaqi in 1999 and 2000 after learning that he may have been contacted by a possible procurement agent for Bin Ladin. During this investigation, the FBI learned that Aulaqi knew individuals from the Holy Land Foundation and others involved in raising money for the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas. Sources alleged that Aulaqi had other extremist connections. FBI electronic communication, background searches, Feb. 3, 2000; FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI electronic communication, interview, Oct. 8, 2002. None of this information was considered strong enough to support a criminal prosecution. For evidence of possible early contacts between Hazmi/Mihdhar and Aulaqi, see Steve O. interview (Nov. 17, 2003), noting that four calls took place between Aulaqi's phone and Bay-oumi's phone on February 4, 2000, the day Bayoumi helped Hazmi and Mihdhar find an apartment and perhaps lent them his phone.
One witness remembered meeting Hazmi through Aulaqi and Mohdar Abdullah, and later meeting Mihdhar at Aulaqi's mosque.This same witness recalled seeing Hazmi and Mihdhar in the guest room on the second floor of the mosque and, on one occasion, leaving the room just after Aulaqi, at the conclusion of a meeting. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Samir Abdoun, Oct. 28, 2001; May 15, 2002; FBI report of investigation, interview of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 25, 2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 2002.
34. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 17, 2001; Sept. 19, 2001.
35. Aulaqi took a position at the Dar al Hijra mosque in early 2001. By the time we sought to interview him in 2003, he had left the United States, reportedly returning to Yemen.We attempted to locate and interview him in Yemen, working with U.S. agencies and the Yemeni government, as well as other governments that might have knowledge of his whereabouts.Those attempts were unsuccessful.
36.Whereas Hazmi managed to speak broken English, Mihdhar did not even have this much command of the language, which he appeared uninterested in learning. Interview (Apr. 23, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar Bakarbashat, Sept. 17, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ramez Noaman, Oct. 1, 2001. On April 4, 2000, Hazmi took his first flying lesson, a one-hour introductory session at the National Air College in San Diego. Exactly one month later, Hazmi and Mihdhar purchased flight equipment from an instructor at the Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego. On May 5, both of them took a lesson at Sorbi, followed by a second lesson at the same school five days later. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 18.
37. On the Sorbi Flying Club, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Khaled al Kayed, Sept. 15, 2001. For other instructors' views, see FBI electronic communication, Penttbomb investigation, Apr. 11, 2002.
38. On Mihdhar's phone calls, see, e.g., FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (Mar. 20, 2000, entry, citing 265A-NY-280350-19426). On Mihdhar's travels, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 17. On KSM's views, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003. On Mihdhar's status, see INS record, NIIS record of Mihdhar, June 10, 2000.
39. On KSM's communication methods, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 15, 2003. Even here, the West Coast operatives' language limitation posed a problem, as KSM had to send emails in Arabic using the English alphabet. Ibid. In addition to having his nephew Ali Abdul Aziz Ali transmit funds to the operatives in the United States, KSM used Ali as an intermediary for telephone messages. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 7, 2004. On Khallad's role, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 15, 2003; Aug. 18, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. On KSM's annoyance with and views on Mihdhar, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 15, 2004; May 19, 2003.
40. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004; FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 2001; FBI electronic communication, interview, July 26, 2002; Interview (Apr. 23, 2004); FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 2001. Both KSM and Khallad were aware of Hazmi's interest in finding a bride, and KSM reportedly went so far as to promise Hazmi a monthly stipend of $700 in the event he succeeded in marrying. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,Aug. 6, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004.Although Hazmi did not use his housemate's telephone to make calls, he apparently received calls on it, including calls from an individual named Ashraf Suboh, who called the house 16 times between July 20 and November 18, 2000. Suboh's name and address appear in a printed email recovered during searches at an al Qaeda site in Pakistan in May 2002.The document was dated Jan. 9, 2001, and included his name and a mailing address. FBI letterhead memorandum, San Diego investigation, July 2, 2002.
41. Salmi arrived in San Diego on August 7, 2000, and three days later moved into the house where Hazmi resided. Omar al Bayoumi-who reported (at least nominally) to Salmi's uncle at the Saudi Civil Aviation min-istry-found this accommodation for Salmi, although Salmi claims not to have known Bayoumi before coming to San Diego. FBI report of investigation, interview of Yazeed al Salmi, Oct. 8, 2001. On Salmi's move to Abdullah's house in La Mesa, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Salmi, Sept. 21, 2001. On possible financial links, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 59279); FBI electronic communication, Information and questions re Salmi interview, June 9, 2004; FBI report of investigation, interview of Salmi, June 17, 2004. For Salmi's possible link to Hanjour, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Abdullah, July 23, 2002.We made efforts with the assistance of the FBI to interview Salmi, but without success.The FBI interviewed Salmi on its own in June 2004 but failed to ask about his reported childhood ties to Hanjour. FBI report of investigation interview of Yazeed al Salmi, June 14, 2004.
42.At KSM's direction, Khallad notified Hazmi that another operative, who turned out to be Hanjour, would be joining Hazmi soon. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. On Hazmi's work at the gas station and his statement about becoming famous, see FBI report of investigation, interview, May 21, 2002. The owner of the gas station, Osama Mustafa, and the manager of the station, Iyad Kreiwesh, have both been the subject of FBI counterterrorism investigations. The investigations did not yield evidence of criminal conduct. Thumairy, the Saudi imam in Los Angeles, allegedly presided over Kreiwesh's wedding at the King Fahd mosque, witnessed by Abdullah and Benomrane, likely around September 2000. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; 4377 Parks Avenue, San Diego record,"Application to Rent and Rental Deposit," Sept. 21, 2000.
43. On Hanjour's travel to San Diego, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Dec. 8, 2000. Hazmi's housemate remembers him taking an unexplained trip to the San Diego airport around this time. FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001. On Hanjour and Hazmi leaving San Diego and the visit to the gas station, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 19, 2001. On Hazmi's comment to his housemate, see Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Although Hazmi's housemate claims that the "Hani" whom Hazmi introduced him to is not the same person pictured in Hanjour's photograph, we have little doubt that the housemate did in fact see Hanjour on the day he and Hazmi left San Diego. Ibid.; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 2001.
44. On Hazmi's contact with Abdullah, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 19, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ramez Noaman, Oct. 1, 2001. On Hazmi's contact with his housemate, see FBI reports of investigation, interviews, Sept. 24, 2001; July 26, 2002. On Hazmi's contact to acquaintances in San Diego, see Danny G. interviews (Nov. 18, 2003; May 24, 2004).
45. For Shehhi's arrival, see INS record, NIIS record of Shehhi, May 29, 2000; Customs record, secondary inspection record of Shehhi, May 29, 2000. For Shehhi going to New York City, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 30, 2000, entry citing Dresdner bank records). For Atta's travel to the Czech Republic,
see ibid. (June 2, 2000, entry citing Teletype, Sept. 21, 2001, 280350-PR, serial 111). Upon entry, Atta received the customary authorization to stay six months as a tourist. For Atta's arrival in Newark on June 3, 2000, see INS record, non-NIIS record of Atta, June 3, 2000. For Atta's apparent motivation, see CIA analytic report,"11 Sep-tember:The Plot and the Plotters," CTC 2003-40044HC, June 1, 2003, p. 13; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002; Mar. 3, 2004.
46. Demonstrating Atta and Shehhi's uncertainty regarding flight schools,Atta emailed a New Hampshire school on June 5, 2000, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 3975); and inquired with a New Jersey school on June 22, 2000, see ibid. (citing 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 15965).As they looked at flight schools on the East Coast, Atta and Shehhi stayed in a series of short-term rentals in New York City. Ibid. (June 19, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 80926, 86069; June 25, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 74902). For Jarrah's travel and training, see INS record, NIIS record of Jarrah, June 27, 2000; FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For Jarrah living with instructors, see ibid. For Jarrah purchasing a vehicle, see FBI briefing materials, Penttbom, Dec. 10-11, 2003, p. 150 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 21113, 66098).
47. For Atta and Shehhi visiting the Oklahoma school, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (July 2, 2000, entry citing FBI electronic communication, Sept. 13, 2001). For Moussaoui's enrollment, see Superseding Indictment, United States v. Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01-455-A (E.D.Va. filed July 16, 2002), para. 44. For Atta's initial training in Florida, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (July 7, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-TP-5382). Atta and Shehhi did not take their return flight to New York, and there are no travel records indicating how they traveled from Oklahoma to Florida. Ibid. (July 7, 2000, entry citing FBI electronic communication, Sept. 19, 2001). For Atta and Shehhi's enrollment in the advanced course, see ibid. (July 17, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 4234; 265A-NY-280350-CE, serial 632).The two also soon rented an apartment and opened a joint bank account. Ibid. (July 13, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-TP-5679; July 7, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302-16752). Atta bought a car. FBI briefing materials, Penttbom, Dec. 10-11, 2003, p. 150. For their solo flights, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (July 30, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-CE-624, 632). For passing the test, see ibid. (Aug. 14, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 9715, 26590). For Atta and Shehhi continuing training, see ibid. (Sept. 1, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-2435). For Jarrah's training, see ibid. (June 27, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-TP (FD-302), serial 1442).
48. Ali reportedly received the money sent to the United States from KSM in Pakistan and via courier. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Feb. 11, 2004 (two reports). Ramzi Binalshibh wired some funds withdrawn from Shehhi's bank account in Germany, a total of more than $10,000 in four transfers between June 13 and September 27, 2000. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 16-17; German BKA (Bundeskriminalamt) report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002, pp. 39-41.
49. Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); wire transfer documents (provided by the FBI), pp. 6-37. Ali did provide identification for his initial wire transfer to Hazmi in April that, along with some contact information he provided when he made subsequent transfers, helped the FBI unravel his aliases after 9/11. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Feb. 11, 2004 (two reports).
50.The applications of Atta and Shehhi for student status include the same supporting financial documentation. See INS record, Atta application to change status, Sept. 19, 2000; INS record, Shehhi application to change status, Sept. 15, 2000. For Atta and Shehhi's enrolling at Jones Aviation, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Sept. 23, 2000, entry citing SunTrust Financial Records). For Atta and Shehhi's behavior, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Ivan Chirivella, Sept. 15, 2001. For their failure, haste, and return to Huffman, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 4, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-TP, serial 1474; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 1361).
51. For Jarrah's certificate, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For Jarrah's leaving the United States, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 7, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302-7134). For Jarrah and Senguen's travel to Paris, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For Jarrah's return to the United States, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 29, 2000, entry citing INS NIIS Report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134). For their telephone contact, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For their email contact, see FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, p. 5.
52. For Binalshibh's deposit, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (June 27, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-TP (FD-302), serial 1442; 265A-NY-280350-TP, serial 9500). For his May and June visa applications, see DOS records, Binalshibh visa applications, May 31, 2000; July 18, 2000; FBI briefing materials, Penttbom, Dec. 10-11, 2003, pp. 136-137; CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp. 10, 12. For his September application in Yemen, see DOS record, Binalshibh visa application, Sept. 16, 2000. For his October application in Berlin, see DOS record, Binalshibh visa application, Nov. 1, 2000. Even after the last application was rejected, Binalshibh sought ways to get a visa, such as by marrying a U.S. citizen. He corresponded by email with a woman in California, but Atta told him to discontinue this effort. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002.
Essabar may have been intended to replace Binalshibh. Like Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah, Essabar obtained a new passport even though his old one was nearly a year from expiration, evidently to conceal his prior travel to Afghanistan during the first half of 2000. On December 12, 2000, and January 28, 2001-after Binalshibh's four
U.S. visa applications had been denied-Essabar made two unsuccessful U.S. visa applications, stating that he wished to visit the United States during the week of February 15, 2001. DOS records, Essabar visa applications, Dec. 12, 2000; Jan. 8, 2001. See Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 14. Neither Binalshibh nor Essabar were denied visas based on terrorism concerns.
53. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 82.
54. For KSM sending Moussaoui to Malaysia, see Intelligence Report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. For Moussaoui not finding a flight school, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 22, 2002. For the ammonium nitrate purchase, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,Apr. 9, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,Apr. 12, 2004. For the cargo planes operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 12, 2004. For KSM's reaction, see Intelligence Report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. For Moussaoui's and Binalshibh's trips and Moussaoui's emails, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 85.There are no witnesses who report that Moussaoui and Binalshibh actually met in London, but Moussaoui's subsequent travel to Afghanistan implies that he received instructions from Binalshibh. See ibid., p. 86. Somewhere in his travels, Moussaoui obtained the funds he would bring to the United States. He declared $35,000 upon arrival on February 23, 2001, and he deposited $32,000 into a Norman, Oklahoma, bank account on February 26. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 78.
55. For Hanjour's entry, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Oct. 3, 1991. For his university studies, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 14, 1991, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 3792). For Hanjour being religious, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Jan. 4, 2004, p. 10. One witness interviewed by the FBI after 9/11 remembers Hanjour and Nawaf al Hazmi becoming so entranced during a prayer that both men began to cry. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mourad Jdaini, Sept. 22, 2001. For Hanjour's trip to Afghanistan, his initial studies in the United States, his rejection by the Saudi flight school, and his desire for flight training in the United States, see Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Adnan Khalil, Sept. 29, 2001.
56. For Hanjour's 1996 trip to the United States, see, e.g., FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 1, 1996, entry citing 265A-NT-280350, serial 2746; 265A-NT-280350-302, serial 9130). For his interest in flight training in Florida and his training in California, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Adnan Khalil, Sep. 14, 2001; FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Sept. 3, 1996, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-SF, serial 1847). For his 1996 flight instruction in Arizona and return to Saudi Arabia, see ibid. (Sept. 29, 1996, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 953; Nov. 26, 1996, entry citing INS: 265A-NY-280350-NK). For his return to Florida, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Bandar al Hazmi, Jan. 15, 2002. For his 1998 flight training in Arizona, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Feb. 2, 1998, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 4468). For his flight training in Arizona with his two friends, see ibid. (Feb. 24, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280530-IN, serial 4468). Hanjour initially was nervous if not fearful in flight training. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Lotfi Raissi, Jan. 4, 2004, p. 11. His instructor described him as a terrible pilot. FBI letterhead memorandum, interview of James McRae, Sept. 17, 2001.
We have seen no evidence of a familial relationship between Bandar al Hazmi and hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi.Tim T. interview (Jan. 5, 2004); Ken Williams interview (May 11, 2004). Bandar al Hazmi claims he met Hanjour in Florida, as they were both studying at the same English-language institute. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Bandar al Hazmi, Jan. 15, 2002. Rayed Abdullah, who knew Bandar al Hazmi from high school, says he moved to Florida to become a commercial pilot after speaking with Bandar al Hazmi, and claims he met Hanjour upon arriving in Florida. FBI report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 15, 2001; FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Abdullah Rayed Abdullah, Nov. 16, 2001, p. 8.This account is not credible, because Abdullah arrived in the United States on November 15, 1997, the day before Hanjour arrived. Ken Williams interview (May 11, 2004); FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 1379).The three of them did attend language school together but not until after all three had arrived in the United States. FBI report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 15, 2001. The Phoenix FBI office remains suspicious of Abdullah and Hazmi and their association with Hanjour. Ken Williams interview (May 11, 2004). (Williams is the FBI agent who authored what is referred to as the "Phoenix memo," discussed in chapter 8.)
For Hanjour obtaining his pilot's license in three months, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Amro Hassan, Sept. 17, 2001, p. 2. For Hanjour receiving his commercial pilot's license, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 15, 1999, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 334). For Hanjour's apparent return to Saudi Arabia, see ibid. (Apr. 28, 1999, entry citing INS I-94, 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 1379). Bandar al Hazmi continued his training at Arizona Aviation with intermittent trips home to Saudi Arabia, before departing the United States for the last time in January 2000. Tim T. interview (Jan. 5, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Amro Hassan, Sept. 19, 2001. Rayed Abdullah trained at Arizona Aviation and obtained a private pilot's license in December 1998. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Rayed Abdullah, May 5, 2001, p. 9. Abdullah then worked as a computer programmer in Arizona before resuming flight training during the summer of 2001. FBI report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 16, 2001, p. 5.
57. Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001.
58. Al Qaeda figures at the university or in Tucson included Mubarak al Duri, reportedly Bin Ladin's principal procurement agent for weapons of mass destruction; Muhammad Bayazid, an al Qaeda arms procurer and trainer; Wadi al Hage, an operative convicted for the East Africa bombings; and Wail Julaidan, a Saudi extremist with ties to al Qaeda. CIA and FBI joint analytic report, "Arizona: Long Term Nexus for Islamic Extremists," May 15, 2002, p. 3.
59. Rayed Abdullah, who lived and trained with Hanjour, was a leader at the Islamic Cultural Center in Phoenix and reportedly gave extremist speeches at the mosque. Ken Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004); FBI electronic communication, Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2003. Another Hanjour associate, Faisal al Salmi, took flight training with Rayed Abdullah but wanted to keep his training secret. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Rayed Abdullah, May 5, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Malek Seif, Oct. 25, 2001.When polygraphed on whether he had taken flight training at the behest of an organization, al Salmi's negative response was deemed deceptive. FBI electronic communication, investigation of Zakaria Soubra, June 5, 2002, p. 8.
60. For al Qaeda activity in Arizona, see Ken Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004). On al Qaeda directing individuals in the Phoenix area to enroll in flight training without telling them why, see FBI electronic communication, investigation of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2003. Ghassan al Sharbi, who was captured in March 2002 in Pakistan along with Abu Zubaydah, studied at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott,Arizona. Greg Krikorian, "Detainee Facing Deportation Summoned to Probe," Los Angeles Times, Jan. 24, 2003; Ken Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004). Although Sharbi has not been tied to the 9/11 attacks, he reportedly attended the training camps in Afghanistan and swore bayat to Bin Ladin during the summer of 2001. FBI memorandum, investigation of Hamed al Sulami, Aug. 1, 2002, p. 6.
After he left the camps, Sharbi looked for his friend Hamdan al Shalawi, another student in Arizona, for a secret project. Shalawi reportedly trained in the camps in November 2000, learning how to conduct "Khobar Towers"-type attacks that he and a colleague planned to execute in Saudi Arabia. FBI electronic communication, investigation of Hamdan al Shalawi, Oct. 16, 2003, p. 2; Intelligence report, trace request on Shalawi, Nov. 27, 2000. Shalawi, however, denies this, claiming to have been studying in Arizona at the time, which neither the FBI nor we have been able to confirm. Shalawi was involved in a widely publicized incident in November 1999, when he and his friend Muhammed al Qudhaieen were detained because the crew of a cross-country America West flight reported that Qudhaieen had attempted to open the cockpit door on two occasions. FBI letterhead memorandum, Hamed al Sulami, July 25, 2002, p. 7. After the 9/11 attacks, FBI agents in Phoenix considered whether the incident was a "dry run" for the attacks. See, e.g., FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Fahad al Wahedi, Nov. 8, 2002, p. 4. In our interviews of Shalawi and Qudhaieen, they both claimed that Qudhaieen was only looking for the lavatory on the plane. Mohammad al Qudhaieen interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Hamdan al Shalawi interview (Oct. 22, 2003). Shalawi admits having gone to Afghanistan, but only once in the late 1980s after the war with the Soviet Union. Shalawi interview (Oct. 22, 2003).
Finally, another admitted associate of Hani Hanjour in Arizona, Hamed al Sulami, has had telephone contact with Sulayman al Alwan, a radical Saudi cleric from Qassim Province who was reported to be Abu Zubaydah's spiritual advisor and, as discussed later in this chapter, may have had a role in recruiting one or more of the muscle hijackers. FBI memorandum, investigation of Hamed al Sulami,Aug. 1, 2002, p. 2; FBI memorandum, investigation of Fahad al Wahedi, Nov. 8, 2002, p. 4; CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 27.
61. For Hanjour's meeting KSM, experience in the camp, and incorporation into the 9/11 operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. It is unknown how Hanjour got to the camps or who may have directed him to go there. For new arrivals' procedures, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15, 2003.
62. For Hanjour returning home and obtaining a visa, see DOS records, visa applications for Hanjour, Sept. 10, 2000; Sept. 25, 2000. For Hanjour's statement to his family, see Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001. For the meeting, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 7, 2004.
63.Ali initially gave Hanjour $3,000 to open the account and later deposited another $5,000 into the account. See FBI report, financial timeline of 9/11 hijackers, Dec. 9, 2004, p. 36 (Dec. 5, 2000, and Jan. 28, 2001, entries). Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 11, 2004. Hanjour also maintained another account, into which more than $9,600 was deposited. While in the United States, he accessed both accounts via ATM. FBI Report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 9, 11, 13, 17-18, 19. For Hanjour's travel and supposed destination, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Dec. 8, 2000; DOS record, Hanjour visa application, Sept. 25, 2000. For his enrollment but failure to attend, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Nov. 6, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 11165; 265A-NY-280350-SF, serial 160).
64. For Hanjour's refresher training, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Dec. 13, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 29652). For his desire to train on multi-engine planes, his language difficulties, the instructor's advice, and his reaction, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Rodney McAlear, Apr. 10,
2002. For his training at Pan Am International Flight Academy and completion by March 2001, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Feb. 8, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 2870; 265A-NY-280350-PX, serials 334, 1033). For the Academy's instructor's reaction, see FBI report of investigation, interview of James Milton,Apr. 12, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 16, 2001, pp. 2-3. For his perseverance, see ibid., p. 3. For vacating their apartment, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Mar. 31, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 762). During the cross-country drive, Hazmi received a speeding ticket in Oklahoma on April 1, 2001. Ibid. (citing 265A-NY-280350-W, serial 693, items k2453, k2454; 265A-NY-280350-OC, serial 1541; 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 58753, 58757). For arrival in Virginia, see ibid. (citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859).
65. For Atta's training at Huffman, see, e.g., FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Nov. 19, 2000, entry citing 265A-280350-TP-5382). For Atta's certificate, see ibid. (Nov. 20, 2000, entry citing FAA records). For She-hhi's training at Huffman, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Erik Seiberlich, Sept. 12, 2001. For Shehhi's certificate, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 20. For Atta and Shehhi taking the commercial pilot test, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Dec. 19, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302-9715, serial 26590). For Atta and Shehhi's commercial pilot licenses, see ibid. (Dec. 21, 2000, entries citing FAA records; 265A-NY-280350-302-2340). For Atta and Shehhi's simulator training, see ibid. (Dec. 30, 2000, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 1177). For Jarrah's training, see ibid. (Dec. 15, 2000, entries citing 265D-NY-280350-1399, serial 8048).
66. For Jarrah's trip to Beirut and return trip with Senguen, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For Senguen accompanying Jarrah to flight training, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002, p. 60.According to Binalshibh, Senguen visited Jarrah in order to verify that he actually was studying to become a pilot. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, June 9, 2004. For Jarrah's second trip to Beirut and visiting Senguen, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, p. 5.
67. For Atta's trip to Germany and meeting with Binalshibh, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Dec. 10, 2002; FBI Penttbom timeline briefing (Dec. 10-11, 2003). For Atta giving money to Binalshibh, see ibid. For Atta returning to Florida, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Jan. 10, 2001, entry citing INS NIIS report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134). For Binalshibh's trip to Afghanistan, see FBI Penttbom timeline briefing (Dec. 10-11, 2003).
68. For Shehhi's trip, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Jan. 11 and 12, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-TP, serials 11182, 11183; 265A-NY-280350-OUT, serials 2248, 2256, Intelligence report).We do not have information on what Shehhi did in Morocco.Atta's cell phone was used on January 2 to call the Moroccan embassy in Washington, D.C. before Shehhi left. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing cellular telephone records). Shehhi's trip occurred at a time when Abdelghani Mzoudi, one of the Hamburg cell associates, was also in Morocco. Mzoudi claims he went home to Morocco to get married but could not because he was injured in a car accident there. German BKA report, investigative summary re Mzoudi, Jan. 13, 2003, p. 43. He denies having met with Shehhi, and neither German nor U.S. investigators have uncovered evidence of a meeting. See Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004. For Shehhi's family contacting the UAE embassy, which contacted Hamburg police, and the UAE official's search, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002, p. 23. For Shehhi's call home, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-BN-98). For the search being called off, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002, p. 24.
69. Reports that Atta was in the Prague airport on May 30-31, 2000, and that he was turned back because he lacked a visa appear to be a case of mistaken identity: a Pakistani traveler with a name similar to Atta's attempted to enter the Czech Republic from Saudi Arabia via Germany but was forced to return to Germany because he lacked a valid Czech visa. CIA cable, report re traveler to Prague, Dec. 8, 2001.
70. For Czech source reporting and credibility assessment, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Eliska T. interview (May 20, 2004). For the information being reported to CIA, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004). For the leak and the ministers' statements, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). On April 4, 2001, Atta cashed an $8,000 check at a bank in Virginia Beach; he appears on a bank surveillance tape. For FBI evidence of Atta being in Virginia Beach, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 4, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302-615, 688, 896, 898). For FBI evidence of Atta being in Coral Springs, see ibid. (Apr. 11, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 381; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serials 3817, 5214). For Czech government finding no evidence of Atta's presence and having evidence that Ani was not in Prague, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004). Aside from scrutinizing various official records, the Czech government also reviewed surveillance photos taken outside the Iraqi embassy. CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). None of the people photographed that day resembled Atta, although the surveillance only operated from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. CIA cable, review of surveillance photos, Feb. 27, 2002. For Ani's denials of any meetings and request to superiors, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, Oct. 1, 2003. For KSM's denial of the meeting, see Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). Binalshibh has stated that Atta and he were so close that Atta probably would have told him of a meeting with an Iraqi official. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002. Binalshibh also stated that Bin Ladin was upset with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein for committing atrocities against Iraqi Muslims, and that Bin Ladin would never have approved such a meeting. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 4, 2002. For Atta not using an alias during his July 2001 trip, see FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, Jan. 14, 2002.
71.Atta was admitted as a tourist for an eight-month stay, even though the legal limit for tourists is six months. Shehhi was admitted for a four-month "business" stay.The Atta and Shehhi applications to change status were ultimately adjudicated on July 17 and August 9, 2001. Each received until October 1, 2001, to complete his studies. For Atta's INS inspection, see INS records, NIIS record of Atta, Jan. 10, 2001; copy of Atta's Egyptian passport;Atta's inspection results; student/school form presented by Atta; primary and secondary inspectors interviews (Mar. 25, 2004). For Shehhi's INS inspection, see INS records, NIIS record of Shehhi, Jan. 18, 2001; Shehhi's inspection results; primary inspector interview (Mar. 26, 2004); secondary inspector interview (Mar. 22, 2004).
72. For Atta and Shehhi staying in Norcross and Decatur, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Jan. 25, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-3631; 265A-NY-280350-AT-141). For the plane rental in Lawrenceville, see ibid. (Jan. 31, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 13850). These locations are all near Atlanta. For return to Virginia, see ibid. (citing 265A-NY-280350-NF-48). For mailbox rental, see ibid. (Feb. 20, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-NF-48, 51). For check cashing, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 26. For return to Georgia, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Feb. 21, 2001, entry citing 65A-NY-280350-302, serial 49563). For Jarrah staying in Decatur, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Mar. 15, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 15661). For Atta-Jarrah call, see FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002. For Jarrah's apparent visit with Senguen, see INS records, NIIS record for Jarrah, Feb. 25, 2001 (with departure date of Mar. 30, 2001); NIIS record for Jarrah,Apr. 13, 2001. For Atta and Shehhi returning to Virginia Beach, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 3, 2001, entry citing FBI electronic communication, Sept. 17, 2001). For Atta closing the mailbox, see ibid. (Apr. 4, 2001, entry citing FBI electronic communication, Sept. 18, 2001).
73. For Atta and Shehhi arriving in Virginia, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 3, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302-615, 688, 896, 898). For Hazmi and Hanjour arriving in Virginia, see ibid. (Apr. 4, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859). For their attendance at the Dar al Hijra mosque, see FBI electronic communication, request for interviews, Aug. 6, 2002.
74. For Aulaqi moving to Virginia, see FBI electronic communication, analysis related to Penttbom investigation, Oct. 23, 2001. For his denial of contacts with Hazmi and Hanjour, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 17, 2001.
75. The apartment was already occupied by two other individuals. The al Qaeda operatives spent little time with their roommates, but did mention at one point that they had considered going to Afghanistan for jihad. FBI report of investigation, interview of Ahmad Ahmad, Oct. 4, 2002. For Hazmi and Hanjour meeting Rababah, see FBI electronic communication, request for interviews of certain individuals, Aug. 6, 2002. For Rababah seeking work at the mosque, his meeting them, and his assistance in finding them an apartment, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002. For Hazmi and Hanjour renting the apartment, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Derar Mohammed Saleh, Jan. 16, 2003.
76. For FBI agents' suspicions, see Jim B. interview (Nov. 6, 2003). Rababah was reluctant to admit meeting the hijackers at the mosque and initially told a story about meeting them for the first time at a store. Rababah attributed his initial prevarication to wanting to protect the mosque from anti-Arab sentiment following September 11. FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002; Robert B. interview (Nov. 6, 2003). For Rababah's deportation, see Peter A. interview (Oct. 10, 2003).
77. FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002.
78. For Rababah going to the apartment and finding new roommates, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002. For the trips to Connecticut and New Jersey, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 8, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859); FBI electronic communication, summary of Penttbom investigation, June 3, 2002. For the telephone calls, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 8, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859). For return to Connecticut and Rababah not seeing the hijackers again, see ibid. (May 10, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-NH, serial 1859); FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002.
79. For the apartment rental in New Jersey, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Eyad al Rababah, June 10, 2002; FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 21, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serials 25453, 25445). For the landlord finding six people, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Jimi Nouri, Sept. 19, 2001. Although no specific evidence places Omari in the apartment, the muscle hijackers based in New Jersey likely lived together, as they apparently conducted other activities jointly, such as obtaining identification cards. See, e.g., FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (July 1, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-FD-302, serials 4718, 11815, 20900, 21529).
80. For Atta's renting the apartment, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 381; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 3817). For Shehhi's presence in Florida, see, e.g., ibid. (Apr. 13, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575).
81. For Shehhi's ticket purchase, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 13, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575;Apr. 18, 2001 entry citing 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 1928; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 16379;Apr. 19, 2001, entry citing CIA report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575). For Shehhi's visit with Atta's father, see ibid. (Apr. 20, 2001, entry citing CIA report). For Atta having license during April 26, 2001, traffic stop and Shehhi spending two weeks abroad, see ibid. (citing 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 2746; May 2, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 16379; 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 1928); FBI Penttbom timeline briefing (Dec. 10-11, 2003).
82. For Shehhi's return, see INS record, NIIS record of Shehhi, May 2, 2001. For Atta and Jarrah obtaining driver's licenses, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 2, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 59). Also on May 2, Atta and two unidentified companions appeared at the Miami District Immigration Office, where an inspector reduced Atta's authorized length of stay by two months, correcting the mistake made back in January. Interview of inspector (Mar. 25, 2004).
83. For a description of the muscle hijackers, see CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp. 34-52.
84. On Banihammad, see CIA analytic report,"Facilitating Disaster:An Overview of 11 September Finance," CTC 2002-40093H, Aug. 22, 2002, p. 4
85. Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July 17, 2002; Saudi Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003) (disclosing that two of the muscle hijackers had married shortly before joining the plot and only one,Wail al Shehri, was employed, as a physical education teacher).
86. CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 25.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 26.
89. Ibid., p. 25. On Nawaf 's efforts on behalf of his brother, see CIA analytic report,"Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can al-Qa'ida Train on the Run?" CTC 2003-40071CH, June 20, 2003, p. 1; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 18, 2001.
90. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogations of KSM and another detainee, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Feb. 19, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 18, 2004.
91. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan 7, 2004. Khallad agrees about the recruit pool, but also argues that operatives' ethnicity was important for symbolic reasons, citing the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bombings and the planes operation as examples. In the planes operation, Khallad notes, Bin Ladin selected operatives from Mecca (Mihdhar and the Hazmi brothers) and would have used more had they been available. Moreover, with respect to the remaining Saudi muscle hijackers, Khallad claims Bin Ladin chose them because he wanted the 9/11 attacks to resound across Saudi Arabia, especially among the southern tribes and those of the hijackers themselves. According to Khallad, Bin Ladin wanted operatives from strong tribal areas of Saudi Arabia and chose two Saudi brothers from the al Shehri tribe, of which their father was a leader. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 18, 2004.
92. CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp. 24, 26. According to Saudi authorities, none of the hijackers had any record of extremist activity, but Satam al Suqami and Salem al Hazmi both had minor criminal offense records. Saudi Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003).
93. CIA analytic report,"Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot," June 20, 2003, pp. 1-2.
94. For trainer's comments, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2002. For Omari's, Ghamdi's, and Shehri's backgrounds, see CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 27; Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July 17, 2002.
95. CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 26; Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July 17, 2002.According to Saudi authorities, a substantial number of the hijackers isolated themselves and became religious only within a few months of leaving the Kingdom. All but Ahmad al Haznawi, who called his aunt to inquire about his sick mother, ceased contact with their families about six months before the attacks. Saudi Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003).
96. CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 26; Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July, 17, 2002.
97. On Khattab, see CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 26, n. 2. For KSM's claim, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15, 2003. For difficulties traveling to Chechnya, see also Saudi Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003).
98. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 5, 2003; Mar. 26, 2004; Jan. 8, 2004; Jan. 7, 2004. Khallad claims he also encouraged Salem al Hazmi to participate in a suicide operation. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004.
99. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 15, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Oct. 21, 2003. KSM does acknowledge that the commander of al Faruq training camp was known to urge trainees to swear bayat. Moreover, peer pressure certainly appears to have been a factor in swaying recruits to choose "martyrdom." Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Apr. 30, 2004.
100. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 8, 2004.
101. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 7, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2003.
102. CIA analytic report,"Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot," June 20, 2003, pp. 2-3.
103. Ibid., p. 8; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15, 2003.
104. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 15, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004;Apr. 2, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 14, 2004. For description of martyrdom video filming, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 21, 2004.
105. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 20, 2003; Apr. 13, 2004; Apr. 5, 2004;Apr. 3, 2004.
Dates of U.S. visas obtained in 2000:Ahmed al Ghamdi (September 3), Saeed al Ghamdi (September 4), Hamza al Ghamdi (October 17), Mohand al Shehri (October 23),Wail and Waleed al Shehri (October 24),Ahmed al Nami (October 28), Ahmad al Haznawi (November 12), Majed Moqed (November 20), and Satam al Suqami (November 21). Five Saudi muscle hijackers obtained visas in 2001: Ahmed al Nami (April 23), Saeed al Ghamdi (June 12),Khalid al Mihdhar (June 13), Abdul Aziz Omari (June 18) and Salem al Hazmi (June 20). For Nami, Ghamdi, and Mihdhar, this was their second visa, and each applied using a new passport. Banihammad, the only non-Saudi muscle hijacker, also obtained his visa much later than most of the Saudi muscle hijackers, on June 18, 2001. See Commission analysis of DOS records; CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 55.Accord-ing to KSM, the three hijackers who obtained their first visas much later than the others were not replacements for unsuccessful candidates. KSM simply wanted to get as many hijackers into the United States as possible to enhance the odds for success, even if each flight ended up with as many as six or seven. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
106. Only the passports of Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari were recovered after 9/11. Both had been doctored. According to KSM, two hijacker passports were damaged in the doctoring process. These may have belonged to Saeed al Ghamdi and Ahmed al Nami, as both acquired new passports and new U.S. visas, although the old visas were still valid. Of the hijacker visa applications we were able to review, all were incomplete.Tourist visas were granted anyway. On obtaining "clean" passports and the two damaged passports, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003; Sept. 9, 2003.Wail and Waleed al Shehri had a family member in the Saudi passport office who provided them with new passports for their trip to the United States. See CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda Travel Issues, CTC 2004-40002H, Jan. 2004, p. 12.
107. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Apr. 5, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 20, 2004. The candidate operatives were
1. Muhammad Mani Ahmad al Kahtani. Currently in custody, he is the last known Saudi muscle candidate to be sent to the United States, in early August 2001, to round out the number of hijackers. As discussed later in this chapter, he was refused entry. Secretary of Defense interview with David Frost (BBC), June 27, 2004, available at www.defenselink.mil. CIA analytic report, "Threat Threads: Recent Advances in Understanding 11 September," CTC 2002-30086CH, Sept. 16, 2002, p. 4; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 3, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 3, 2003.
2. Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani. He traveled to Afghanistan illegally after being prohibited by Saudi authorities from leaving Saudi Arabia.After being assigned to a mission in the U.S., he secretly reentered the Kingdom but failed in an attempt to have his name removed from the list of prohibited travelers so that he could obtain a U.S. visa. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Apr. 20, 2002; Oct. 4, 2002; Apr. 3, 2003.
3. Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi. (aka Abu Bakr al Azdi) He reportedly was to have been part of the planes operation but was held in reserve by Bin Ladin for a later, even larger operation. Like other muscle hijackers, he reportedly set out for Chechnya but diverted to Afghanistan. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of Abu Bakr al Azdi, July 23, 2003; Sept. 25, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003.
4 and 5. Saeed al Baluchi and Qutaybah al Najdi. Both were sent to Saudi Arabia via Bahrain, where Najdi was stopped and briefly questioned by airport security officials. Both were so frightened by the experience that they withdrew from the operation. KSM urged Baluchi to obtain a U.S. visa, but Baluchi refused, fearing that he might be watchlisted at the U.S. embassy. See Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 9, 2003; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 27, 2003; July 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004.
6. Zuhair al Thubaiti: He has reportedly admitted membership in al Qaeda, stating "proudly" that he was among a select number of operatives who had the personal endorsement of Bin Ladin. He was not ultimately selected for the 9/11 attacks because the al Qaeda leadership considered him too high-strung and lacking the necessary temperament. CIA analytic report,"Threat Threads," Sept. 16, 2002, p. 3; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 21, 2002; June 17, 2002; June 20, 2002; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004 (two reports).
7. Saeed Abdullah Saeed ("Jihad") al Ghamdi. He arranged to travel to Afghanistan in March 2000, swore allegiance to Bin Ladin (agreeing to serve as a suicide operative), and was sent to Saudi Arabia by KSM with 9/11 hijacker Ahmad al Haznawi to obtain a U.S. visa, but his visa application was denied because he appeared to be intending to immigrate. DOS record, Ghamdi visa application, Nov. 13, 2000. CIA analytic report,"Threat Threads," Sept. 16, 2002, p. 4; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Apr. 11, 2002; Sept. 11, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
8. Saud al Rashid. Describing him as headstrong and immature, KSM says he disappeared after being sent to Saudi Arabia for a U.S. visa, either because he had second thoughts or because his family interceded and confiscated his passport. Passport photos of Rashid and three 9/11 hijackers-Nawaf al Hazmi, Mihdhar, and Omari-were found together during a May 2002 raid in Karachi.After discovery of the photos in 2002, Rashid turned himself in to the Saudi authorities, but he has since been released from custody. In a Commission interview, he has admitted training in Afghanistan but denies hearing of al Qaeda before returning from Afghanistan or meeting Bin Ladin, KSM, or any 9/11 hijacker other than Ahmad al Haznawi, whom he claims seeing only once or twice at a guesthouse. He has no credible explanation why photos of him were found with those of three other hijackers, or why others identified him as a candidate hijacker. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 27, 2003; June 11, 2003; July 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 9, 2003; Saud al Rashid interview (Feb. 24, 2004).
9. Mushabib al Hamlan. Sent to Saudi Arabia to acquire a U.S. visa, he and his travel companion, 9/11 hijacker Ahmed al Nami, both applied for and received visas on October 28, 2000. Hamlan never returned to Afghanistan, probably dropping out either because he changed his mind or because his family intervened.
In December 1999, while still in high school in Saudi Arabia, Hamlan became involved with a group that gathered periodically to watch jihad propaganda tapes, and was encouraged by a mentor named Bandar Marui to pursue jihad, especially as practiced in the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Russian-Afghan wars and a book titled Gladiator of Passion. As instructed, Hamlan acquired a passport, on February 15, 2000, and agreed to go to Afghanistan after the hajj in mid-March 2000. He and two travel companions obtained Pakistani visas in Sharjah, UAE, and traveled to Islamabad, where al Qaeda facilitator Hassan Ghul took them to a guesthouse managed by Abu Zubaydah. Days later, two men helped Hamlan cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
At the Khaldan camp, Hamlan received military training courses. Upon hearing that the camp was to be closed, he and others traveled to al Faruq camp near Kandahar, where they received more training. He also met and proclaimed allegiance to Bin Ladin at this time. Injured during a further training session, Hamlan was assigned to guard the airport, where he met future hijacker Ahmed al Nami (whose recent laser eye surgery had interrupted his training).An individual named Abu Basir al Yemeni indoctrinated the two in Bin Ladin's anti-U.S. position and extolled the virtues of martyrdom. Hamlan and Nami eventually agreed to approach Abu Hafs al Mauritani about participating in a suicide operation.The day after visiting Abu Hafs, Hamlan and Nami heard from Abu Basir that Bin Ladin was planning an attack against the United States. After taking their passports, Abu Basir arranged for Hamlan and Nami to meet Bin Ladin and instructed them to use the following phrase to express their desire to become martyrs:"I want to be one of this religion's bricks and glorify this religion."The al Qaeda leader accepted both applicants.
In October 2000, Abu Basir took Hamlan and Nami to Kandahar to meet KSM, who impressed on them the high expectations for martyrs and instructed them on using coded telephone numbers. He returned their passports, which had been altered and now contained forged tourism stamps for Singapore, Malaysia,Turkey, and Egypt. KSM told them to meet with Atef before returning to Saudi Arabia, where they should contact hijacker future 9/11 hijacker Waleed al Shehri for additional documentation.
After meeting with Atef, Hamlan and Nami traveled by car and by air to an address KSM had given them in Tehran, where arrangements were made for them to fly to Qatar. From Qatar they traveled onward to the UAE and then to Mecca. Nami contacted KSM and received coded instructions to go to Jeddah, call Waleed al Shehri, and obtain visas at the U.S. consulate. In Jeddah, they briefly shared an apartment with Shehri, who provided them with directions to the consulate and showed them how to fill out the visa application. After acquiring visas, Hamlan and Nami presented their passports to Shehri for inspection and returned to Mecca. Nami called KSM, who told them to return to Afghanistan the next day.
Despite instructions to the contrary, Hamlan insisted on calling his family before leaving Saudi Arabia because he had begun to have second thoughts after acquiring the visa.Told by his brother that their mother had fallen ill. Hamlan decided not to return to Afghanistan even after Nami reminded him of his allegiance to Bin Ladin and commitment to complete the suicide mission. In Riyadh, he told his brothers that he had been on jihad in Chechnya. Fearing that they might ask for his passport, he removed the U.S. visa-as later confirmed by forensic analysis performed by Saudi authorities. Hamlan returned to college and resumed living with his parents, who confiscated his passport.
Thereafter, Hamlan received a visit at the college from a former associate at al Faruq camp, Khalid al Zahrani, who asked why he had not returned to Afghanistan. Zahrani admitted having been sent by KSM to convince Hamlan to return to Afghanistan. Hamlan never did. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Mar. 16, 2003.
10. Abderraouf Jdey, a.k.a. Faruq al Tunisi. A Canadian passport holder, he may have trained in Afghanistan with Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi and received instruction from KSM with Atta and Binalshibh.A letter recovered from a safehouse in Pakistan, apparently written by Sayf al Adl, also suggests that Jdey was initially part of the 9/11 operation at the same time as the Hamburg group. A videotape of Jdey's martyrdom statement was found in the rubble of Atef 's house near Kabul following a November 2001 airstrike, together with a martyrdom video of Binalshibh. While both Binalshibh and Khallad confirm Jdey's status as an al Qaeda recruit, KSM says Jdey was slated for a "second wave" of attacks but had dropped out by the summer of 2001 while in Canada. FBI briefing (June 24, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 21, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 1, 2003.
108. On the few operatives fully aware of the plot and Abu Turab's training, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004.Abu Turab was the son-in-law of Ayman al Zawahiri. Intelligence report, interrogation of Zubaydah, Feb. 18, 2004. KSM also taught the muscle hijackers English and provided lessons about airplanes. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. Binalshibh also has discussed this training in post-capture statements, describing it as hand-to-hand combat training. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Jan. 8, 2004. According to Binalshibh, after returning to Afghanistan, muscle hijacker recruits fought on the front lines alongside the Taliban and participated in the March 2001 destruction of the giant Buddha statues in Bamian Province, Afghanistan. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Mar. 31, 2004.
109. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004.According to KSM, the muscle hijackers learned about the specific targets and the Atta's completed operational plan only in late August. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004.
110. On the facilitator's comments, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Sept. 14, 2002; Oct. 3, 2002; May 5, 2003 (two reports), in which he claims also to have assisted the Hamburg pilots and Binalshibh. On KSM's funding of the hijackers, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 15, 2004; July 25, 2003.
111. On Ali's role and the transit of the hijackers, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 12, 2004. According to the detainee, the operatives arrived with their own money to buy plane tickets and anything else they needed. Ali referred them to places where they could obtain travelers checks. He also helped Ahmed al Ghamdi, one of the earliest operatives to transit Dubai, acquire a mobile phone account so that the operatives could use that number as a travel agency point of contact. Ibid.
112. In May 2001, however,Ali asked KSM to participate in a suicide mission and offered to travel to the United States and assist the operatives there.As discussed in a set of Atta-Binalshibh exchanges in August 2001,Ali (referred to by the nickname "Losh") appears to have contacted Atta and expressed the desire to join the operation.Ali actually applied for a U.S. visa on August 27, 2001, listing his intended arrival date as September 4 for a one-week stay. His application was denied because he appeared to be an economic immigrant. DOS record, visa application of Ali Abdul Aziz Ali,Aug. 27, 2001. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Nov. 17, 2003; Intelligence report, documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003; CIA notes,"DRG Research Notes," Jan. 17, 2004; FBI report,"Sum-mary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 72.
113. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 6, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. Hawsawi's role as financial facilitator appears to have begun when he and hijacker Banihammad opened bank accounts at the same UAE bank while Banihammad was his way to the United States. Banihammad, who was from the UAE, was familiar with the country's procedures and helped Hawsawi complete his account application. Banihammad gave Hawsawi roughly $3,000 and granted him power of attorney over his account so that Hawsawi could forward the bank card to him in the United States. After Banihammad arrived in the United States, Hawsawi deposited $4,900 into the account. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 29.
114. All but 2 of the 15 muscle hijackers were admitted as tourists, affording a six-month stay in the United States (except in the case of Mihdhar, who received four months).The first pair to arrive were Waleed al Shehri (Flight 11) and Satam al Suqami (Flight 11), who flew from the UAE to London and arrived in Orlando on April 23, 2001, where Atta most likely met them. Suqami was admitted as a business visitor, allowing him only a one-month stay and thus making him an illegal overstay by May 21, 2001. INS records, NIIS records of Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami, Apr. 23, 2001. Suqami was the only hijacker not to obtain a U.S. identification document.
Shehri and another individual (presumably Suqami) settled in Hollywood, Florida, moving into a motel on April
30. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing London EC, serial 2236; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 7134; 315N-NY-280350, serial 8082).
The next set,Ahmed al Ghamdi (Flight 175) and Moqed (Flight 77), arrived at Dulles Airport on May 2, 2001, on a flight from London originating in Dubai. INS records, NIIS records of Ghamdi and Moqed, May 2, 2001. Although Customs declarations of the two indicate that Moqed claimed to be carrying more than $10,000, the Customs Service generated no report of this event. Both Ghamdi and Moqed gave the Hyatt Hotel in Washington as their intended destination, but instead moved into the apartment in Alexandria,Virginia, that Nawaf al Hazmi and Hani Hanjour had rented. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing flight manifest and Customs records, referenced in 265A-NY-280350, serial 2746; 265A-NY-280359-RY, serial 5; 265A-NY-280350-302, New Hampshire ECs dated Sept. 28, 2001, Sept. 29, 2001; 265A-NY-280350, serial 9776; 265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 5151; 265A-NY-280350-302).
Hamza al Ghamdi (Flight 175), Mohand al Shehri (Flight 175), and Ahmed al Nami (Flight 93) arrived in Miami on May 28, 2001. INS records, NIIS records of Hamza al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, May 28, 2001.The three had taken a flight from London after starting out in Dubai. Atta probably picked up the group at the airport, having rented a Ford Explorer for the day. Shehri and Nami gave the Sheraton in Miami as their intended destination, but do not appear to have stayed there. Marwan al Shehhi helped them settle in Florida. Within a few days, Shehhi found the group an apartment in Delray Beach, Florida. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 2851; 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 1928; 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 2851; 265A-NY-280350-DL, serial 1778; 265A-NY-280350-DL, 838; 265D-NY-280350-A, serial 16; 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 2851; 265A-NY-280350-MM-302, serial 11703).
Haznawi (Flight 93) and Wail al Shehri (Flight 11) arrived in Miami from London on June 8, 2001 using the same route as the previous three. INS records, NIIS records of Haznawi and Wail al Shehri (June 8, 2001). FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-RY, serial 5).
Saeed al Ghamdi (Flight 93) and Banihammad (Flight 175) arrived in Orlando from London on June 27, 2001. INS records, NIIS records of Saeed al Ghamdi and Banihammad, June 27, 2001. Saeed al Ghamdi was questioned by immigration authorities as a possible intending immigrant, as he spoke little English, had no return ticket, and listed no address on his arrival record. INS record, inspection results for Ghamdi, June 27, 2001; primary inspector interview (Mar. 17, 2004); secondary inspector interview (Apr. 19, 2004). Ghamdi and Banihammad presumably stayed with the hijackers who preceded them or with Atta and Shehhi in the Hollywood, Florida, apartment. Post-9/11 investigation revealed that during this time period Atta and Shehhi also checked into hotels or rented apartments with unidentified males, probably the newly arrived muscle hijackers. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302-19615; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 3255; 265A-NY-280350-MM-302, serial 34927; 265A-NY-280350-MM-Sub, serial 3255; 265A-NY-280350-RY, serial 5; 265A-NY-280350-MM-302, serial 34927; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serials 48418, 2374, 4449, 4696; 265A-NY-280350, serials 925, 449, 18695).
The remaining hijackers entered the United States through New York. Salem al Hazmi (Flight 77) and Omari (Flight 11) arrived at JFK on June 29, 2001, from Dubai with a connection in Zurich. INS records, arrival records of Salem al Hazmi and Omari, June 29, 2001.They likely were picked up by Salem's older brother Nawaf-who was then living in Paterson, New Jersey, with Hani Hanjour-the following day, for on June 30, Nawaf had a minor car accident traveling eastbound on the George Washington Bridge, toward JFK. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing Bern EC Sept. 15, 2001; INS NIIS report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134; 265A-NY-280350-HQ, serial 11297; Bern EC (Omari PNR, Swiss Air); 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 60839). On Salem al Hazmi in the Paterson apartment, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Jimi Nouri, Oct. 6, 2001, p. 5.
115. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 29-41;Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
116. In some cases, bank employees completed the Social Security number fields on the new account application with a hijacker's date of birth or visa control number, but did so on their own to complete the form.Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004). Contrary to persistent media reports, no financial institution filed a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR)-which U.S. law requires banks to file within 30 days of a suspicious transaction-with respect to any transaction of any of 19 hijackers before 9/11. A number of banks did file SARs after 9/11, when the hijackers' names became public.Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); James Sloan interview (Nov. 14, 2003). Nor should SARs have been filed.The hijackers' transactions themselves were not extraordinary or remarkable. See Commission analysis of financial transactions; Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Dennis Lormel interview (Jan. 16, 2004).
117. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Mar. 26, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.
118. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Nov. 27, 2001; Feb. 5, 2002.
119. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-DL, serial 2812; 315N-NY-
280350-302, serial 21529; 315N-NY-280350-NK, serials 21529, 11815, 4718).
120. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Oct. 18, 2001; Mar. 13, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Mar. 7, 2002; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,Aug. 20, 2003; Sept. 12, 2003, July 16, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 12, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Sept. 30, 2003; CIA analytic report, "Iran and al-Qa'ida: Ties Forged in Islamic Extremism," CTC 200440009HCX, March 2004, pp. i, 6-12.
121. Intelligence report, analysis of Hezbollah, Iran, and 9/11, Dec. 20, 2001; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, July 16, 2004.
122. Ibid.; Intelligence report, Hezbollah activities, Oct. 11, 2001; Intelligence report, operative's travel to Saudi Arabia,Aug. 9, 2002.
123. Intelligence reports, hijacker activities, Oct. 11, 2001; Oct. 29, 2001; Nov. 14, 2001; Intelligence report, operative's claimed identification of photos of two Sept. 11 hijackers, Aug. 9, 2002.
124. Intelligence reports, hijacker activities, Nov. 14, 2001; Oct. 2, 2001; Oct. 31, 2001.
125. Intelligence reports, hijacker activities, Oct. 19, 2001; Dec. 7, 2001.
126. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 16, 2004; Intelligence report; interrogation of Binalshibh, July 16, 2004.
127. Intelligence report, analysis of Hezbollah, Iran, and 9/11, Dec. 20, 2001.
128. Intelligence report, Hezbollah and Sunni terrorist activities, Sept. 21, 2001; Intelligence report, Hezbollah denies involvement in 9/11, Sept. 22, 2001.
129. For Atta and Shehhi's efforts, see FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 25-37.
130. Ibid., pp. 29-41.
131. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 12436, 7134); see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 15, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, June 9, 2004. Another example of unusual travel was a trip by Suqami on July 10 from Fort Lauderdale to Orlando; he stayed at a hotel in Lake Buena Vista with an unidentified male through July 12. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 31.
132. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 27063; 315N-NY-280350-DL, serial 2245); Commission investigation in Las Vegas.
133. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2001, pp. 41-44.
134. FBI letterhead memorandum, profile of Jarrah, Mar. 20, 2002.
135. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 7228; 315N-NY-280350-F, serial 99; 315N-NY-280350-NK, serial 263). Documents from Sawyer Aviation in Phoenix, Arizona, show Hanjour joining the flight simulator club on June 23, 2001, with Faisal al Salmi, Rayed Abdullah, and Lotfi Raissi. FBI report of investigation, interview of Jennifer Stangel, Sept. 14, 2001. But the documents are inconclusive, as there are no invoices or payment records for Hanjour, while such documents do exist for the other three. FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, Oct. 7, 2001; FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, summary of dispatch sheets, Oct. 12, 2001; Don W. and Steve B. interview (Jan. 6, 2004). One Sawyer employee identified Hanjour as being there during the time period, though she was less than 100 percent sure. FBI report of investigation, interview of Tina Arnold, Oct. 17, 2001. Another witness identified Hanjour as being with Salmi in the Phoenix area during the summer of 2001. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Lotfi Raissi, Jan. 4, 2004, p. 18. Documentary evidence for Hanjour, however, shows that he was in New Jersey for most of June, and no travel records have been recovered showing that he returned to Arizona after leaving with Hazmi in March. Nevertheless, the FBI's Phoenix office believes it plausible that Hanjour returned to Arizona for additional training. FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Feb. 19, 2002.
136. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002.
137. CIA cable, communications analysis, Sept. 11, 2003.
138. On Hazmi, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 46. On obtaining photo identification, see ibid.; FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-NK, serial 1243; 315N-NY-280350-BS, serial 352; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 33059, 64343).
139. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 47.
140. For Binalshibh moving the muscle hijackers, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, June 9, 2004. According to Binalshibh, he took each of the muscle hijackers shopping for clothes and set them up with email accounts during their time in Karachi. Ibid. For meeting with Atta and Bin Ladin, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Feb. 18, 2004. Binalshibh has provided inconsistent information about who else was present during his meeting with Bin Ladin. In one interview, Binalshibh claimed he attended two different meetings, one of which was attended by Bin Ladin,Atef, KSM, and Abu Turab al Jordani, and the second of which was attended just by Bin Ladin, Atef, and KSM. More recently, however, Binalshibh has mentioned only one meeting and has claimed he alone met with Bin Ladin because Atef and KSM were busy with other matters. Compare Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002, with Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Feb. 18, 2004.
141. On Binalshibh's meeting with Bin Ladin, Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002; Sept. 24, 2002; Feb. 18, 2004; Apr. 7, 2004. KSM claims that the White House and the Capitol were both acceptable targets and had been on the list since the spring of 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. On Binalshibh's receipt of money, Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 23, 2002; Dec. 11, 2002. In one report, Binalshibh says that Atef provided him with $3,000; in another he claims it was $5,000.
142. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Oct. 23, 2002; Dec. 11, 2002.
143. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Dec. 11, 2002.
144. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;Apr. 8, 2004.
145. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"Feb. 29, 2004, p. 48. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Dec. 21, 2002.Atta had a stopover in Zurich, where he bought two Swiss Army knives and withdrew 1,700 Swiss francs from his SunTrust bank account. He may have intended to use the knives during the attacks. It is unknown why he withdrew the money. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 47.
Although U.S. authorities have not uncovered evidence that anyone met with Atta or Binalshibh in Spain in July 2001, Spanish investigators contend that members of the Spanish al Qaeda cell were involved in the July meeting and were connected to the 9/11 attacks. In an indictment of the Spanish cell members dated September 17, 2003, the Spanish government relies on three main points. First is a 1997 trip to the United States by Ghasoub al Abrash Ghalyoun, a Syrian living in Spain. During the trip, Ghalyoun videotaped a number of U.S. landmarks, including the World Trade Center.The Spanish indictment alleges that an al Qaeda courier was in Ghalyoun's town in Spain shortly after the trip and that the courier probably delivered the tape to al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan. Second, the Spanish government contends that during the relevant time period, an individual named Muhammed Belfatmi was near the town where the Atta-Binalshibh meeting took place. and that Belfatmi traveled to Karachi shortly before September 11 on the same flight as Said Bahaji, one of Atta's Hamburg associates, and even stayed at the same hotel. Finally, Spanish authorities rely on an intercepted telephone conversation between cell leader Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas and an individual named "Shakur" in August 2001, in which "Shakur" describes himself as entering "the field of aviation" and "slitting the throat of the bird.""Shakur" has been identified by Spanish authorities as Farid Hilali. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that other facts will come to light as the Spanish case progresses to trial, we have not found evidence that individuals in Spain participated in the July meeting or in the 9/11 plot. See Baltasar Garzon interview (Feb. 13, 2004); Indictment, Central Investigating Court No. 5, Madrid, Sept. 17, 2003, pp. 151-200, 315-366; Superseding Indictment, Central Investigating Court No. 5, Madrid, April 28, 2004.
146. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;Apr. 17, 2003.
147. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Sept. 11, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003; Feb. 18, 2004;Apr. 7, 2004. KSM claims to have assigned the Pentagon specifically to Hanjour, the operation's most experienced pilot. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
148. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Mar. 7, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003. Binalshibh since has denied that the term electrical engineering was used to refer to a potential nuclear target despite having said so earlier. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. KSM has admitted that he considered targeting a nuclear power plant as part of his initial proposal for the planes operation. See chapter 5.2. He has also stated that Atta included a nuclear plant in his preliminary target list, but that Bin Ladin decided to drop that idea. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 12, 2002.
149. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Feb. 18, 2004.
150. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;Apr. 17, 2003.
151. On Binalshibh's new phones, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 21, 2002. On Binal-shibh's call to KSM, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 31, 2003. CIA cable, Sept. 10, 2003; CIA report, Director's Review Group, Oct. 2003.
152. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 1, 2003. KSM may also have intended to include these documents as part of the historical file he maintained about the 9/11 operation. He says the file included letters and email communications among those involved with the attacks, but was lost in Afghanistan when he fled after September 11. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 15, 2003.
153. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Nov. 1, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 31, 2002.
154. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 31, 2002; Dec. 19, 2002; Apr. 17, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003; Nov. 1, 2003; Intelligence report interrogation of KSM, Sept. 11, 2003.
155. FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Mar. 20, 2002, p. 60; FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 20874); Jarrah travel documents (provided by the FBI).
156. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002; Apr. 8, 2004.
157. According to Binalshibh, Jarrah was not aware of Moussaoui or the wire transfers. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002; Apr. 17, 2003. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), pp. 89-90.
158. FBI report, Moussaoui, Zacarias, a.k.a. Shaqil, Aug. 18, 2001, pp. 7, 11; FBI briefing materials, Penttbom, Dec. 10-11, 2003, p. 148 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 98252).
159. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 90; DOJ Inspector General interview of John Weess, Oct. 22, 2002; FBI letterhead memorandum,"Moussaoui, Zacarias,"Aug. 31, 2001.
160. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 2, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 11, 2003.
161. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 1, 2003; July 8, 2003. In addition to Moussaoui, the two al Qaeda operatives identified by KSM as candidates for the second wave of attacks were Abderraouf Jdey, a.k.a. Faruq al Tunisi (a Canadian passport holder, discussed earlier as a candidate hijacker) and Zaini Zakaria, a.k.a. Mussa (a Jemaah Islamiah member who worked in Hambali's Malaysia stronghold and was directed by Atef to enroll in flight training sometime in 2000, according to KSM). Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 8, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Mar. 4, 2004.
162. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh,Apr. 17, 2003.According to Binalshibh, KSM said that the operative had been raised and educated in Europe and that his arrest resulted, at least in part, from his having been insufficiently discreet. KSM identified this operative as an exception in Bin Ladin's overall record of selecting the right people for the 9/11 attacks. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 18, 2002. Subsequently, however, Binalshibh has sought, somewhat incredibly, to exculpate a host of individuals, including Moussaoui, from complicity in the 9/11 plot. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Apr. 2, 2004.
163. For Binalshibh's claims, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Nov. 7, 2002; Feb. 13, 2003; Feb. 27, 2003. On KSM, see intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 2, 2003.
164. Jarrah returned to the United States on August 5, 2001. INS record, arrival record of Jarrah,Aug. 5, 2001.
165. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 14139; Boston electronic communication).The communications were recovered from materials seized during the March 2003 capture of KSM. For background, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 13, 2002 (two cables); Intelligence report, documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003.
166. Intelligence reports, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 12, 2003. Binalshibh, however, has denied that law and politics referred to two separate targets; he claims that both terms referred to the U.S. Capitol, even though in the context of the exchange it seems clear that two different targets were contemplated. Intelligence report, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003 (two reports).
167. CIA notes,"DRG Research Notes," Jan. 17, 2004. In another exchange between Atta and Binalshibh on September 9-two days before the attacks-it still appears as though the White House would be the primary target for the fourth plane and the U.S. Capitol the alternate. See CIA report, Documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003.
168. On the Atta-Binalshibh communication, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. On Kahtani's attempt to enter the U.S., see INS record, withdrawal of application for admission of Kahtani, Aug. 4, 2001. For Hawsawi, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 3, 2003.
169. On Atta's trip to Newark, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 50. On arrivals in Florida, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2004 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serials 388, 5860; 315N-NY-280350-BS, serial 294; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 66933). On travel to Las Vegas, see ibid. (citing 315N-NY-280350-LV, serial 53299; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 110).Atta's flight from Washington, D.C., arrived in Las Vegas within an hour of Hazmi and Hanjour's arrival. Ibid.The three hijackers stayed in Las Vegas only one night, departing on August 14. Ibid. (citing 315N-NY-280350-DL, serial 829; 315N-NY-280350-SD, serial 569; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 165970). Detainee interviews have not explained the Las Vegas meeting site. See, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 5, 2003.
170. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 52-57. Hanjour successfully conducted a challenging certification flight supervised by an instructor at Congressional Air Charters of Gaithersburg, Maryland, landing at a small airport with a difficult approach.The instructor thought Hanjour may have had training from a military pilot because he used a terrain recognition system for navigation. Eddie Shalev interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
171. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation,"Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 57-60.According to Binalshibh,Atta deliberately selected morning flights because he anticipated that the most people would be at work then. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, June 3, 2004.
172. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Dec. 17, 2002; Dec. 21, 2002.
173. On KSM's receipt of date of attacks, see Intelligence report, interrogations of KSM and Binalshibh, May 27, 2003. Although Binalshibh also has claimed that he called KSM with the date after receiving the information from Atta, KSM insists that he learned of the date in a letter delivered by Essabar, and that it would have been a serious breach of communications security to communicate the date over the phone. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Dec. 17, 2002. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. Most recently, Binalshibh has claimed that he neither called nor sent a letter to KSM, but rather passed a verbal message via Essabar. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Apr. 8, 2004. On Binalshibh's communication to Essabar, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 17, 2002; Nov. 6, 2003; Apr. 8, 2004.
174. On Binalshibh's travel, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 84. On Binalshibh's communication with Atta, see Intelligence report, Documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. On Atta's call to his father, see Intelligence report, re Atta, Sept. 13, 2001. On Jarrah's letter, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002, p. 67.
175. Shortly after 9/11, Abdullah told at least one witness that the FBI was asking questions about his having received a phone a call from Hazmi in August. FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001. In a July 2002 FBI interview,Abdullah asked whether the FBI had taped the call. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002. Also on possibility of Hazmi-Abdullah contact shortly before 9/11, see Danny G. interviews (Nov. 18, 2003; May 24, 2004). On the change in Abdullah's mood, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2001. On the sudden interest of Abdullah and Salmi in proceeding with marriage plans, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Samir Abdoun, Oct. 21, 2001. On anticipated law enforcement interest in gas station employees and September 10, 2001, meeting, see FBI report of investigation, interview, May 21, 2002.
176. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 5, 2002.
177. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 14, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004.
178. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004;Apr. 3, 2004.
179. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Nov. 27, 2001; Feb. 5, 2002. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, May 30, 2002.
180. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, June 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 5, 2002. KSM also says that he and Atef were so concerned about this lack of discretion that they urged Bin Ladin not to make any additional remarks about the plot. According to KSM, only Bin Ladin,Atef,Abu Turab al Jordani, Binalshibh, and a few of the senior hijackers knew the specific targets, timing, operatives, and methods of attack. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 27, 2003; Feb. 23, 2004. Indeed, it was not until midsummer that Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al Zawahiri learned of the operation, and only after his group had cemented its alliance with al Qaeda and Zawahiri had become Bin Ladin's deputy. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004.
181. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 24, 2003.
182. On Omar's opposition, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, May 30, 2002, in which the detainee says that when Bin Ladin returned after the general alert during July, he spoke to his confidants about Omar's unwillingness to allow an attack against the United States to originate from Afghanistan. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 27, 2003. There is some discrepancy about the position of Zawahiri. According to KSM, Zawahiri believed in following the injunction of Mullah Omar not to attack the United States; other detainees, however, have said that Zawahiri was squarely behind Bin Ladin. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, June 20, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, June 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 26, 2003.
183. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, June 27, 2003; Dec. 26, 2003. On Abu Hafs's views, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 7, 2003.
184. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 27, 2003; Sept. 27, 2003, in which KSM also says Bin Ladin had sworn bayat to Omar upon first moving to Afghanistan, following the Shura Council's advice. KSM claims he would have disobeyed even had the council ordered Bin Ladin to cancel the operation. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004.
185. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 24, 2003.
186. Abdul Faheem Khan interview (Oct. 23, 2003); see also Arif Sarwari interview (Oct. 23, 2003).
187. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 8, 2003; July 24, 2003.
188. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serial 3112; Western Union records; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 28398, 37864). In addition, Nawaf al Hazmi attempted to send Hawsawi the debit card for Mihdhar's bank account, which still contained approximately $10,000.The package containing the card was intercepted after the FBI found the Express Mail receipt for it in Hazmi's car at Dulles Airport on 9/11. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 61.
189. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-WF, serial 64; 315N-NY-280350-BA, serials 273, 931, 628; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 10092, 17495).
190. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serials 6307, 9739). In the early morning hours of September 11, Jarrah made one final call to Senguen from his hotel. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003.The conversation was brief and, according to Senguen, not unusual. FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, pp. 5-6.
191. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-FD-302; 315N-NY-280350-SD, serial 1522; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 16597, 5029, 6072, 11098, 11114, 11133, 4119; 315N-NY-280350-BS, serials 349, 19106, 16624; 315N-NY-280350-CD, serial 373; 315N-NY-280350, serials 7441, 21340; 315N-NY-280350-AT, serial 135). There have been many speculations about why Atta scheduled the Portland flight. Although he may have believed that security was more relaxed at the smaller airport, he and Omari had to pass through security again at Logan. Ibid. (citing 315N-NY-280350-BS, serial 2909). Interrogation of detainees has produced no solid explanation for the trip. See, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Mar. 3, 2004.
192. FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline,"Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serial 2268; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 32036, 9873; 315N-NY-280350-LO, serial 2).