New York Life Insurance Company v. Davis

by Joseph P. Bradley

United States Supreme Court

95 U.S. 425

New York Life Insurance Company  v.  Davis

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia.

This was an action on a policy of life insurance issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, before the war, upon the life of Sloman Davis, a citizen and resident of the State of Virginia. The policy contained the usual condition, to be void if the renewal premiums were not promptly paid. They were regularly paid until the beginning of the war. The last payment was made Dec. 28, 1860. The company, previous to the war, had an agent, A. B. Garland, residing in Petersburg, Va., where the assured also resided; and premiums on this policy were paid to him in the usual way, he giving receipts therefor, signed by the president and actuary, as provided on the margin of the policy, which were usually sent to the agent about thirty days in advance of the maturity of the premium. About a year after the war broke out, the agent entered the Confederate service as a major, and remained in that service until the close of the war.

Offer of payment of the premium next due was made to the agent in December, 1861, which he declined, alleging that he had received no receipts from the company, and that the money, if he did receive it, would be confiscated by the Confederate government. A similar offer was made to him after the close of the war, which he also declined. He testified that he refused to receive any premiums, had no communication with the company during the war, and after it terminated did not resume his agency.

Sloman Davis died in September, 1867.

The plaintiff below was assignee of the policy, and claimed to recover the amount thereof, $10,000, upon the ground that he was guilty of no laches, and that at the close of the war the policy revived.

It is unnecessary to state, in detail, the proceedings at the trial. The plaintiff contended, and the judge instructed the jury, in substance, that they might infer from the evidence that the place of payment intended by the parties was at the residence of the plaintiff, and that, if the company did not furnish receipts to its agent, so that the premiums could be paid according to the terms of the policy, it was not the fault of the plaintiff; and, if he was ready and offered to pay his premium to the agent, there could be no forfeiture of the policy, if within reasonable time after the war he endeavored to pay his premiums, and the company refused to receive them. On the other hand, the defendant contended that the war put an end to the agency of Garland, and the offer to pay the premium to him was of no validity, and the failure to pay rendered the policy void. This view was rejected by the court, and a verdict was rendered for the amount of the policy, ess the amount of certain premium notes which had been given by the assured.

Judgment was rendered upon the verdict, and the company then brought the case here.

Mr. Matt. H. Carpenter for the plaintiff in error.

This case falls exactly within the principles declared in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Statham et al., 93 U.S. 24, and the judgment below must be reversed. The outbreak of the war dissolved all executory contracts between citizens of one belligerent and those of the other, and put an end to all intercourse or dealings. Matthews v. McStea, 91 U.S. 7. The policy was, therefore, absolutely annulled, and no subsequent agreement between the assured and the company during the war could revive it. It follows that every agency of the company in any State declared to be in rebellion was terminated. The company could not authorize its agent to do what it was expressly forbidden to do by the President's proclamation of Aug. 16, 1861, issued in pursuance of the act of Congress of July 13 of that year.

But if the law were otherwise, there was no evidence from which the jury could find that the party to whom the renewal premium was tendered in December, 1861, was authorized by the company to act in its behalf after the commencement of the war. He refused the money, upon the ground that he had no authority to accept it.

Mr. Samuel B. Paul, contra.

Garland was duly appointed agent of the company, and acted as such. This authority was not revoked by the company after hostilities commenced. The presumption is, that the same relations continued between him and the company which had previously existed, and a payment or a tender of payment to him was as valid as if it had been made to the company. His agency was not revoked by the war. Fretz v. Storer, 22 Wall. 198.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

Notes