ARMOR-CAVALRY: Part 1; Regular Army and Army Reserve/1892-1916

by Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor

• The years following the Indian Wars saw some improvements in the mounted arm. There were the new drill regulations, already mentioned, and the Army adopted a new shoulder arm- the Krag-Jorgensen. Manufactured as both a carbine and a rifle, the Krag-Jorgensen was a .30-caliber magazine weapon. It had a muzzle velocity of about 2,000 feet per second, and it used a cartridge containing smokeless powder. The new weapon was not in full supply by 1898 when the United States intervened in the trouble between Spain and her island possessions, but there were enough carbines to equip the Regular cavalry and one regiment of Volunteers.

• Despite minor improvements, the U.S. cavalry of 1898 was not prepared for war. Enlisted cavalrymen numbered fewer than 6,000, and they were as scattered as at the opening of the Civil War, mainly through the western part of the country, though part of the 3d Cavalry was at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, and part of the 6th Cavalry was at Fort Myer, Virginia. Most of the troopers were garrisoning posts in Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, and other western states. Again they were called in from great distances, some arriving on their mounts and others coming by rail.

• Except for their wide dispersion, the Regular cavalry regiments of 1898 were in no worse condition than was the rest of the Army at the time. There were then only 27,000 enlisted men in the entire Army and therefore the Army had to be strengthened. For the Regular cavalry, an act of 26 April 1898 authorized the reactivation of 2 troops in each regiment- some of the reactivated troops had been inactive since 1890, and others were last filled with Indians and added to each troop a lieutenant, a sergeant, 4 corporals, and 34 privates. A troop then aggregated 104 and a regiment 1,262 officers and men.

• There was no further increase in the Regular mounted arm then, but the Regular force was augmented by Volunteer organizations mustered for short terms. They were of two classes: the Volunteer Army of the United States, consisting of State Organized Militia units; and the United States Volunteers, consisting of new units recruited at large. Of the first type, three regiments and nine separate troops of cavalry were mustered in from eight states. Illinois, Texas, and Ohio each furnished a regiment; Pennsylvania, three troops (Philadelphia City Troop, Governor's Troop, and Sheridan's Troop) ; Kentucky and New York, two troops each; and Nevada and Utah, one troop each. The Pennsylvanian and New York troops served in Puerto Rico and the Nevada troop in the Philippine Islands. The others did not leave the United States. Many of these units have since had continuous existence in their respective states. Now, having been converted and reorganized to be of present-day usefulness, they no longer bear the name cavalry, but each proudly remembers its origin and record in the old arm.

• Acts of Congress approved on 22 and 23 April 1898 authorized the Secretary of War to organize from the nation at large Volunteer units having special qualifications. These units were to have federally appointed officers and were not to exceed a total of 3,000 men. Although Congress did not specify that the specially qualified units would be cavalry, the regiments organized under these acts were the First, Second, and Third United States Volunteer Cavalry. Of these, only one, the First United States Volunteer Cavalry, took part in the War with Spain. This regiment, better known as the "Rough Riders," had as its leaders Col. Leonard Wood and Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt. When organized in May 1898, the First United States Volunteer Cavalry mustered 47 officers and 994 enlisted men. It served dismounted in Cuba from 22 June until 8 August 1898 and was disbanded 15 September of the same year. The Second and Third United States Volunteer Cavalry were organized in May 1898 and disbanded in the fall of that year without having been outside the United States.

• Antiquated militia laws, in effect since 1792, permitted the induction into Federal service of state organizations, poorly trained and equipped, and far below authorized strength. A look at the equipment these units brought in explains to some extent their lack of training. The firearms belonging to many of the units were worthless outmoded pieces that had to be replaced by the Federal Government. In exchange for their unserviceable arms, they received the single-shot Springfield .45-caliber rifles or carbines. These were of two models, 1896 and 1898, and the safety lock. on the 1896 model worked exactly opposite to that on the 1898 model. This difference accounted for some of the objections raised by men who received the Springfields, but their complaints were partially adjusted when an effort was made to furnish only one model within a unit. Another objection to the Springfield was based upon a comparison of it with the newer smaller-caliber Krag-Jorgensen, adopted in 1892 as a standard arm for Regulars. The Krag-Jorgensen was in short supply, while the supply of Springfields was plentiful. Fortunately the Volunteers, after training with the Springfields, were almost convinced that its single-shot action, except in rapid-fire target practice, was as effective as the newer magazine-type carbine, and that the Springfield's larger bullet was more deadly.

• Two large forces, one in the east and one in the west, assembled simultaneously. In preparation for service in two widely separated parts of the world, thousands of men and horses moved by way of Chickamauga, Georgia, to Tampa, Florida, for shipment to the West Indies and some 10,000 men in San Francisco awaited transportation to the Philippine Islands. Many ships were needed to move them and only a few were available. No cavalry was included in the first three shipments to the Philippines.

• The Regular cavalrymen who moved east for service in the West Indies were little affected by the climate and inconveniences of the southern camps, but they were not prepared for the problems occasioned by the lack of shipping space. Because there was no room on the transports for them, about one-third of the men of each regiment and all of the horses, except those of the officers, were left behind when the expedition finally got under way. Once in combat, the troopers again demonstrated their ability to fight on foot as well as mounted.

• In accordance with the act of 22 April 1898, the U.S. forces were organized into Army corps, divisions, and brigades. These were provisional commands, which ceased to exist after the war ended. Among the general officers chosen to head these larger organizations were many who had achieved prominence as cavalry leaders in the Civil and Indian Wars. Of particular interest is the fact that two former Confederate cavalrymen, for many years forbidden to serve in the United States Army, were among them- Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler and Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee. General Wheeler commanded the cavalry division in the West Indies, and it was he who later asked for cavalrymen and their mounts in the Philippine Islands. General Lee commanded the Seventh Corps in Florida.

• General Wheeler's dismounted cavalry division in Cuba consisted of about 3,000 troopers from the 1st, 3d, 6th, 9th, and 10th Cavalry and the Rough Riders. Armed with their carbines and revolvers- their sabers were left behind with the horses- and fighting as infantry, they won a victory at La Guasima on 24 June and about a week later joined the infantrymen in storming and capturing San Juan Hill and capturing the city of Santiago. In this action the Rough Riders, who in their eagerness dashed ahead of the Regulars and caught the first fire from the Spaniards' Mauser rifles, suffered heavy casualties.

• There was also one mounted squadron in Cuba and one mounted troop in Puerto Rico. The squadron, composed of Troops A, C, D, and F of 2d Cavalry, mounted on local horses and commanded by Lt. Col. William A. Rafferty, formed part of an independent brigade under Brig. Gen. John C. Bates. In the dense undergrowth covering most of the country, the squadron was unable to perform some of the duties usually assigned to a mounted command, but in the Battle of El Caney its mounted detachments escorted batteries and trains to the front lines, and the individual troopers acted as couriers and litter bearers. The other mounted unit, in Puerto Rico, was Troop C, New York Volunteer Cavalry.

• Although no cavalry units went to the Philippine Islands in 1898, one regiment, the 4th, arrived the next year and less than two years later eight Regular regiments were employed there. In the meantime, the term of service of the Volunteers mustered for the War with Spain having expired with the signing of the Treaty of Paris, Congress acted on 2 March 1899, to increase the military force. Among other measures, it authorized three additional cavalry units and an increase in the number of enlisted men in a cavalry troop to one hundred. Two new cavalry units were organized: one the 11th United States Volunteer Cavalry, composed mainly of Americans then in the Philippine Islands; the other a squadron of Filipinos. These units were organized from volunteers recruited in accordance with the provisions of the act of 2 March 1899, which permitted enlistments of volunteers from the country at large or from localities where their services were needed, and from the Volunteer organizations whose terms of service had expired. The act also provided that volunteers having special qualifications in horsemanship and marksmanship were to be assigned to cavalry for service either mounted or dismounted. Both Volunteer cavalry organizations were disbanded on 2 July 1901.

• The service of the cavalry in the Philippine Islands after the capture of Aguinaldo, the leader of the Filipino independence movement, in March 1901 might well be described as daily and nightly patrols by small detachments commanded by junior officers. These little groups often encountered large bands of insurgents armed with bolos and U.S. rifles. A regimental report from the history of the 1st Cavalry is typical of the period

• On December 8, 1900, detachment Troop M engaged a force of two hundred insurgents on Boot Peninsula, Lake Taal, dispersing them in a running fight of two and one-half hours duration. Private Ernest Shrey, Troop M, killed. Four insurgents killed; captured three prisoners, their arms and ammunition.

• On 5 May 1901, Lieutenant Hartman with Troop K engaged about two hundred and fifty insurgents at Mount Solo, drove them from three separate positions, killing one, capturing three, also six ponies, three rifles, and three bolos.

• This type of warfare afforded little space for grand strategy and tactics, but the work performed by the enterprising and courageous junior officers won them promotions and helped prepare them for higher commands in World War I. Chief among the young American officers was John J. Pershing, Captain of Cavalry.

• While some U.S. troops were thus occupied in the Philippine Islands, affairs in China drew others still farther away from home. The United States made a substantial contribution to the international army that went to China at the turn of the century to protect the various embassies from attack by the Chinese Boxers. A cavalryman commanded the American contingent in the international force and the greater part of one U.S. cavalry regiment formed a part of it. The American commander was Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, Sr., an experienced Indian fighter; the cavalry regiment was the 6th, the same organization in which General Chaffee had enlisted as a private in 1861. While the regimental headquarters and 1st Squadron, 6th Cavalry, guarded American interests in Tientsin, the 3d Squadron formed a part of the force that stormed the walls of "The Forbidden City" at Peking and became the first white troops to enter the city. In China, the American cavalrymen met and fought beside cavalrymen of other nations. Among them were the First Bengal Lancers, of whom officers of the 6th furnished most complimentary reports.

• On 2 February 1901, when the 2-year enlistments of the Volunteers were about to expire and the end of occupation duties in the Philippines appeared to be nowhere in sight, Congress passed an act that provided for an increase in the cavalry and infantry and completely reorganized the artillery. The increase in cavalry included 5 new regiments, numbered the 11th through the 15th. Also, it added a captain, 3 second lieutenants, a commissary sergeant, and 2 color sergeants to each regiment, old and new, and by it all regiments got a regimental chaplain. The act also contained provisions for further increasing the enlisted strength of a troop from 100 to 164 at the discretion of the President. As a result, the number of enlisted men in a cavalry regiment varied. Units within the United States were reduced to the minimum, while those serving in the new island possessions were increased according to the duties being performed in each. Naturally, the greatest number were required in the Philippines, and for some years the cavalry regiments took turns serving there as well as in Hawaii, Panama, and various stations in this country, the last again mainly in the west.

• From 1901 to 1916 the size of the Army varied from year to year. In 1901 Congress set the maximum strength at 100,000, and thereafter until 1916 the actual strength was regulated by annual appropriations. From 1902 to 1911 it averaged 65,616. The cavalry continued to comprise about one-fifth of the total. The Army's actual strength on 30 June 1915 was 105,993, including the Hospital Corps, the Philippine Scouts, and a regiment of Puerto Rican infantry. Of these, 15,424 were assigned to the cavalry. More than seven full regiments, or about one-half of all the cavalry, were serving on the Mexican border, two regiments were in the Philippine Islands, and one was in Hawaii.

• During these years when greater interest in a more effective tactical organization of the Army was manifested, cavalry received special consideration. In 1908 the Army Chief of Staff and various department commanders recommended an increase in the infantry and artillery and a reorganization of the cavalry along "more modern" lines. For a .time, it was believed that U.S. cavalry regiments should be reorganized to conform to the pattern of European regiments of the same arm. New formations suggested were actually a revival of those prescribed in Scott and Poinsett's Tactics more than seventy-five years earlier and, so far as written instructions went, had been in force during the Civil War.

• European armies still clung to the idea of heavy cavalry, trained almost exclusively for the charge in mass and relying on sabers and lances. On the other hand, U.S. cavalrymen were convinced that open order formations in which the pistol, or revolver, was the principal arm produced more decisive results in mounted combat, especially when accompanied by the element of surprise and employed against fugitives or inferior troops. From 1911 until 1916 the Army conducted various experiments in cavalry reorganization and employment.

• In 1911 and 1912 the 12-troop regiment was temporarily reorganized into one of six troops by consolidating two troops into one. It was supposed that this action would result in a more compact unit and bring all men within the sound of the colonel's voice. Employment of cavalry versus cavalry in mounted action was contemplated. Experimental drill regulations prescribed double rank formations, as was the European custom, and field regulations stressed more mounted action. Horsemanship, improvement of mounts, and proficiency in the use of the saber were emphasized. At the same time, it was clearly stated that cavalry's efficiency with the rifle and in fighting dismounted must not be lessened.

• In answer to several Congressional proposals to reduce the cavalry from fifteen to ten regiments, the Chief of Staff in 1912 opposed any reduction, pointing out that the small amount of cavalry in the Organized Militia made it most essential that the fifteen Regular mounted regiments "be maintained and maintained at the highest degree of efficiency." At the same time, the Chief of Staff called attention to the damaging effects upon regiments that resulted from detaching troops to police the National Parks. Since the opening of Yellowstone in 1872, cavalry troops had been detached from their regiments to police the National Park lands. With the management of the reservations now under the Department of Interior, the Army suggested that Interior should employ its own rangers. When this advice was followed a few years later, the Army agreed to discharge cavalry enlisted men volunteering for service as rangers.

• In October 1914 experimental cavalry service regulations (based upon the experimental drill regulations) were issued to all cavalry regiments and were given an "extensive try out" in the border service of 1915 and 1916. Reports from cavalry commanders showed that 90 percent of the commanders preferred the old statutory organization of troop, squadron, and regiment employed in single rank. They believed that a mounted unit of any size from platoon through regiment, employed in successive lines each in single rank, was just as powerful as the same number of troopers in a double rank. They also contended that this system afforded much less danger of inversion and provided fresh reinforcements with proper timing, or distances, between the lines.

• Consequently, new drill and service regulations issued in 1916 retained the former organization and instruction for single rank formations, but provided for movements in double rank when circumstances required. Also taken from the 1914 experimental regulations was the basic principle- leading. The new manual stated that mounted units must be habitually led by their commanders. The manual also treated in detail the training of the recruit and the new mount.

• Plans for a more effective organization included 'better location of the cavalry. Upon their return from Cuba and the Philippine Islands, cavalry units had again been stationed at posts established during the Indian Wars, located far from centers of population and supply. Most of the posts were entirely too small, and many were in sections of the country where for several months in the year climatic conditions made outdoor work impracticable. As late as 1911, 49 posts in 24 states and territories were still in use, 16 of them by cavalry alone or by cavalry with infantry. Thirty-one posts had a capacity for less than a regiment, 6 could accommodate little more than a regiment, and only one could care for a brigade. The average number of companies at a post was 9, or about 650 men. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson described the Army so distributed as "merely groups of local constabulary instead of a national organization."

• In 1910-11 internal conditions in Mexico resulted in the overthrow of the government of that country and caused the United States to concentrate most of its Army strength in the southwest. Thus, for a while necessity solved the problem of a badly scattered Army. The greater part of the Regular Army moved to the border area in March 1911. While most of the cavalry patrolled the border from the mouth of the Rio Grande to San Diego, California, other units in the area were organized into one division and two independent brigades for maneuver purposes. One cavalry regiment, the 3d, formed a part of the division, and the 9th and 10th Cavalry plus a signal company made up the independent cavalry brigade. When the immediate danger subsided about five months later, the division and brigade organizations were broken up and the units comprising them returned to their former stations. One important result of the experiment was the decision to move cavalry to permanent stations in the southwest, and some outfits that had been employed there in mounted patrol duty remained in the area.

• When counterrevolutions occurred in Mexico in 1913, back to the border area went a large part of the Regular Army. From then throughout World War I and many years afterward, except for the short time they were in Mexico as part of the Punitive Expedition, most U.S. cavalry regiments maintained border patrols from the Gulf of Mexico almost to California, a distance of approximately 1,700 miles. The duties of these patrols included protecting the border from incursions by individuals and small raiding parties; preventing violations of neutrality laws; and, in conjunction with civil authorities, barring passage of arms and ammunition from the United States into Mexico. In addition, U.S. soldiers gave medical aid to all wounded who were brought across the border. In general, the troopers performing border service lived a monotonous and unenviable life. In that desert area there was no natural protection from the burning sun of the day, and the tents in which they were housed provided little defense against the cold nights. In addition, many troopers were wounded because the Mexicans ignored repeated U.S. warnings not to fire in the direction of the border.

• On the night of 8 March 1916 border events came to a head when Mexican bandits made a surprise attack on Columbus, New Mexico. As a result, U.S. soldiers crossed the border for the ostensible purpose of capturing the bandit leader, Francisco (Pancho) Villa. The Punitive Expedition into Mexico was principally a horse cavalry action, the last such in American history.

• In many respects the service performed by the troopers in Mexico was comparable to that they experienced in tracking down the elusive Indians in the years following the Civil War. The hardships they endured were increased by the lack of co-operation on the part of the Mexican Government and the natives. Conflicting information as to the direction the bandits took after their forays more often than not sent the Americans on long circuitous routes, thus delaying their arrival at strategic points and giving the bandits plenty of time to escape. The rough, irregular terrain and the varied climate of Mexico added many discomforts.

• It was after a forced march through the irregular terrain, during which the men were in their saddles for 17 hours out of 24, that U.S. troops fought the only battle of the expedition directly concerned with Villa. On 29 March 1916 Col. George A. Dodd and 400 men of the 7th Cavalry surprised and attacked 500 Villistas. at Guerrero.

• On 9 May 1916 National Guard units from Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona were called into Federal service for patrol duty along the Mexican border. About five weeks later, on 18 June 1916, most of the remainder of the National Guard was called in. In all, these included 3 regiments, 13 separate squadrons, and 22 separate troops of cavalry. There were 108 regiments and 7 battalions of infantry and 6 regiments, 12 battalions, and 17 batteries of field artillery. Cavalry constituted a very small portion of the National Guard since the states preferred to have infantry regiments- they were considerably less expensive- but by the National Defense Act of 1916, they were required to organize more auxiliary troops and fewer infantry. The states were in the midst of a reorganization program when National Guard units were ordered into Federal service. In spite of all the confusion, the National Guardsmen moved to the border area on schedule, and eventually better legislation corrected many of the weaknesses revealed during their tour there.

• Not since the Civil War had a sizable force been assembled for a sufficient period to train officers in the field grades. The numerous posts scattered over the vast area in which the Indian Wars were fought usually were garrisoned by a force comprised of a troop of cavalry and a company of infantry and led by company officers. Seldom were troops from several posts assembled in sufficient forces or for periods of time sufficient for officers to get practice in leading units larger than a company. In fact, during the Indian Wars many of the actions were fought by detachments commanded by lieutenants.

• Even though the transportation and supply system tested during the Punitive Expedition into Mexico was found lacking in many respects, the trial gave hope of improvement over the established system. One of the innovations was the introduction of motor trucks as part of the logistics system, and many disappointments and inconveniences were occasioned by the mechanical failures of the trucks. Members of the expedition and others in Washington averse to change were not in the least surprised or disappointed that the new equipment had not yet proved that the gasoline engine would replace the horse. Yet there were a farsighted few who believed in the gasoline engine and would not let their experiences discourage them in their plans for future developments.

• During these years some changes were made in the composition of the cavalry regiments. In 1906 a machine gun platoon, commanded by a commissioned officer, was added to each regiment, and in 1912 a headquarters detachment and a supply detachment were added. By 1915 the machine gun platoon and the headquarters and supply detachments had become experimental troops, and the next year they became permanent. At that time, too, the experimental organization of a 6-troop regiment and the idea of reorganizing U.S. cavalry along European lines were abandoned.

• Thus, the cavalry regiment of 1916 had a headquarters, a headquarters troop, a supply troop, a machine gun troop, and 12 lettered troops, the last organized into 3 squadrons of 4 troops each. All regiments had the usual complement of officers (a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, 3 majors, 15 captains, 16 first lieutenants, and 16 second lieutenants), but the number of enlisted men varied with the service required of the regiment. For example, the authorized enlisted strength of regiments serving within the continental United States was 70 men in a troop, while regiments in the Philippine Islands were permitted a total of 105 enlisted men in each lettered troop.

• The National Defense Act approved on 3 June 1916 set the peace strength of the Regular Army at 220,000 officers and men and of the National Guard at 450,000. Increases to reach these strengths were to be spread over a period of five years. In units, additions to the Regular Army amounted to 10 regiments of cavalry, 33 of infantry, and 15 of field artillery; 13 battalions of engineers; 93 companies of coast artillery; and a number of signal, medical, and other auxiliary troops.

• The act also provided for the organization of brigades and divisions, which previously had not been permanent- that is, they had been organized during an emergency and existed only so long as the specific emergency lasted. Civil War brigades and divisions, for example, were disbanded when the war ended, and new ones created for the War with Spain were not continued after the close of that struggle.

• The new plan called for 2 cavalry and 7 infantry divisions. A cavalry division consisted of a headquarters, 3 brigades (each with 3 cavalry regiments) , a horse field artillery regiment, a mounted engineer battalion, a mounted signal battalion, an aero squadron, and the necessary trains: ammunition, supply, engineer, and sanitary. The remaining 7 authorized cavalry regiments were assigned to the 7 infantry divisions, a regiment to each division, to provide a mobile force capable of performing reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and security missions for the division. Because of their mobility, the cavalry divisions were free for reconnaissance or other duties that took them considerable distances from the remainder of the Army. The regimental organization under the 1916 act remained unchanged, retaining its 12 lettered troops in 3 squadrons, a headquarters troop, a supply troop, and a machine gun troop. Enlisted strength of a line troop was fixed at 70 for peace and 105 for war.

• As part of the 1916 plan for increase of the Army, two cavalry regiments were authorized in the first increment. Designated as the 16th and 17th, they were organized in July 1916 at Forts Sam Houston and Bliss, Texas, respectively. To enable the new organizations to become operational as soon as possible, experienced officers and men from existing cavalry regiments were transferred to the new ones, and by mid-July 1916 the 16th and 17th Cavalry were in fair shape. These were the last additions to the cavalry arm until after the declaration of war on Germany.

• In the matter of arms and equipment during this period, it is important that in 1904 the new U.S. rifle Model 1903 replaced the Krag-Jorgensen as the standard arm of cavalry, as well as infantry, and remained so until the beginning of World War II. Cavalrymen readily accepted the new shoulder arm. It could be handled as well while mounted as on foot, and it had a range greater than that of the carbine.

• A new side arm, the Colt automatic pistol caliber .45, was approved 29 March 1911, and by the time of the Punitive Expedition all troops in the United States were armed with it. Units going to the Philippine Islands, where there had been so much demand for an arm of this caliber, took it with them, but no special effort was made to supply those already there.

• In 1914 the semaphore code, until that time used only by field artillery, was authorized for cavalry, infantry, and engineers. The fifty-six kits furnished for each cavalry regiment were distributed four to a troop.