ARMOR-CAVALRY: Part 1; Regular Army and Army Reserve/Tank Destroyers

by Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor

• A paramount reaction in the United States to the German blitzkrieg in Europe, which appeared to be irresistible in 1940, was the demand for some means of stopping German armor. The German successes were adversely affecting morale of combat troops, and there was an urgent need for new, effective weapons to calm their fears and prove the vulnerability of the tank.

• The main question was whether the job could be done better by tanks or by guns. The American answer was high-velocity guns that were eventually called tank destroyers, although many leaders still favored tanks. Among the most aggressive proponents of mobile antitank guns were General McNair and Lt. Col. Andrew D. Bruce, the latter becoming the first commander of the Tank Destroyer Center.

• Other antitank questions that arose involved whether or not the guns should be self-propelled and the size of their caliber. The answers to these and related questions depended principally upon the tactical doctrine to be adopted for antitank units, which, in time, was to be based upon combat experience.

• Following experiments in the maneuvers of 1940, the War Department adopted the doctrine of mass employment of high-velocity guns by fast-moving antitank units against tanks. The doctrine called for a minimum of antitank guns to be placed in fixed initial positions and a maximum to be held in mobile reserve. Choosing the motto "Seek, Strike, and Destroy," tank destroyers were to be aggressive in reconnaissance- seeking out the enemy main armored attack formations and to be prepared for them, but not to chase them. To help dispel the passive connotation of their mission, the antitank battalions were redesignated in late 1941 as tank destroyer battalions.

• Antitank companies, equipped with towed 37-mm. guns, first appeared in infantry regiments in the fall of 1940 and augmented the infantry division artillery's 37-mm. antitank guns. Later equipped with 57-mm. guns, the antitank company remained in the infantry regiment for the duration of the war. The divisional artillery antitank units were mostly absorbed by the larger antitank battalions organized in 1941.

• When antitank units were first formed, many National Guard divisions were already in Federal service. Consequently, several National Guard units or their personnel were used in the formation of these and later tank destroyer organizations.

• The Tank Destroyer Center was temporarily established at Fort Meade, Maryland, then moved to the new Camp Hood, Texas, in February 1942. Later that year, having virtually become a new arm, tank destroyer strength reached almost 100,000. It had 80 active battalions, with 64 more planned. By early 1943, 106 battalions were active, the maximum for the war, only 13 short of the total number of tank battalions. The numerical designations of most tank destroyer battalions were in the 600, 700, and 800 series.

• By early 1944 a combination of two principal factors resulted in the inactivation of 28 tank destroyer battalions. First, massed armored forces had not been used against American forces during 1943, and thus fewer tank destroyer units were required. Second, divisions in combat had serious strength shortages, and personnel from tank destroyer units were used as replacements. The rapid decrease left only 78 active tank destroyer battalions, and by the end of March 1945 an additional 10 battalions had been inactivated.

• Although there was little need for the concentration of tank destroyer battalions during combat, thirteen tank destroyer groups and a tank destroyer brigade saw action in World War II campaigns, but not as complete organizations. The groups were the 1st through the 9th and the 12th, 16th, 20th, and 23d. The brigade was designated as the 1st. Two brigade headquarters had been organized, but the 2d Tank Destroyer Brigade was inactivated in early 1944.

• On the question of self-propelled versus towed guns, combat commanders wavered until the decision was finally made in November 1943 that half the battalions would be self-propelled and half would be towed. Generally the towed gun delivered more accurate fire and was easier to conceal, while the self-propelled one was more mobile and more easily positioned for action. The self-propelled gun, like the tank, was often employed in close support of infantry, although the tank destroyer was not designed or intended for an offensive role.

• With a strength of a little less than 800 men, the tank destroyer battalion of 1944 was largely self-sufficient and included strong reconnaissance and antiaircraft elements. It had a total of thirty-six 3-inch or 76-mm. guns (towed or self-propelled), which, in addition to performing their primary antitank missions, were frequently used in a general role of supporting artillery. Various other uses included destroying antitank guns, covering withdrawals, helping to clear minefields, and reinforcing artillery fires. In combat, tank destroyer battalions were usually attached to divisions or other separate organizations.

• In general, antitank developments confirmed that tanks could be stopped by guns, and even the psychological influence of tank destroyers upon friendly troops was very effective. Tank destroyers had become a quasi-arm, operating independently, and had successfully resisted all attempts to be absorbed by the old arms and the Armored Force. Battlefield experience, however, showed that a superior tank was a better antitank weapon than the very thinly protected tank destroyer and, with the end of the war, tank destroyers went out of existence. Tank destroyer units were either redesignated, inactivated, or disbanded, and many became tank units.