A Political History of Parthia/Chapter 4

by Neilson Carel Debevoise

 

CHAPTER IV

DRUMS OF CARRHAE

PHRAATES III THEOS^[1] succeeded his father Sinatruces on the Parthian throne at a time when the fortunes of Mithradates of Pontus were at a low ebb. Tigranes of Armenia, the Pontian ally, though stripped of much of his territory, remained one of the great figures in the Orient. That the Parthian king should be drawn into the maelstrom of international politics was inevitable.

Shortly before the Battle of Tigranocerta in 69 b.c., Mithradates and Tigranes sent pleas for aid against Rome to Phraates, offering the "seventy valleys," Adiabene, and northern Mesopotamia as an inducement.^[2] Mithradates proposed that the Parthian should attack Mesopotamia while he and his ally advanced on Armenia, thus cutting Lucullus off from supplies.^[3] After his victory Lucullus, learning of these negotiations, sent some of his allies to threaten the Parthian king, should he join forces with Mithradates and Tigranes, and to promise rewards for his friendship. Phraates replied in a conciliatory manner to the overtures of both parties, and both felt that he had promised them support. The Parthian response reached Lucullus in Gorduene, and the legate Sextilius^[4] was sent to continue negotiations. Phraates suspected, perhaps rightly, that the officer was sent to report Parthian movements; the net result was that he did not give aid to either side, but attempted the dangerous procedure of straddling the diplomatic fence. Lucullus, who felt that Mithradates and Tigranes were both so exhausted from the prolonged struggle that they were not dangerous, determined to attack Parthia.^[5] Sornatius^[6] was ordered to bring the army from Pontus to Gorduene, but the troops refused to move and even threatened to leave Pontus undefended. When this news reached the legions with Lucullus they also mutinied, and the Parthian expedition had to be abandoned for one against Tigranes.^[7]

In 66 b.c., under the Lex Manilia, Pompey was appointed to replace Lucullus and at once secured an agreement with Phraates to insure Parthian neutrality in the same manner as under the previous treaty. But Tigranes the Younger, after an unsuccessful revolt against his father, sought refuge with Phraates and urged him to invade that part of Armenia held by the elder Tigranes.^[8] Phraates acquiesced, though with some hesitation because of his agreement with Pompey. News of the Parthian treaty with the Romans alarmed Mithradates, and he began to negotiate for a truce.

The Parthian forces advanced to Artaxata (Artashat). When the siege promised to be of considerable duration, Phraates left a detachment of his troops with the younger Tigranes and returned to his own country. Tigranes the Elder then took the field and defeated his son. The young man thought of seeking refuge with Mithradates of Pontus, but felt that Mithradates was now little stronger than he; so, perhaps at the suggestion of Phraates, he threw himself on the mercy of Pompey. The Roman commander was already marching on Artaxata, and Tigranes acted as guide. Tigranes the Elder despaired of further resistance and submitted to Pompey. In the partition which followed, Sophene and Gorduene were to be given to Tigranes the Younger.^[9] His father retained Armenia proper, but was forced to relinquish his conquests in Syria. Almost immediately after this decision there were fresh disputes, and Pompey seized the younger Tigranes. Cappadocia was then restored to its king Ariobarzanes I, and along with it went the districts of Sophene and Gorduene;^[10] but the latter at least was never effectively occupied.^[11]

In 65 b.c. Pompey made an extended campaign against the Iberians and Albanians, leaving L. Afranius to maintain control of Armenia. Pompey was within three days' march of the Caspian Sea and was even inquiring the distance to India when he was forced to abandon his advance.^[12] In the meantime A. Gabinius, then a legate under Pompey, made a raid across the Euphrates as far as the Tigris,^[13] and Phraates, who had learned of the seizure of Tigranes the Younger, again invaded Gorduene, which he rapidly won from Tigranes the Elder.^[14] While Pompey was returning through Lesser Armenia he received ambassadors of the Medes and the Elymaeans,^[15] who came perhaps because of the Roman attack on Darius of Media Atropatene, who had befriended Antiochus I of Commagene or Tigranes.^[16] Phraates too sent an embassy, perhaps inspired by Gabinius' raid, requesting that Tigranes the Younger, his son-in-law, be delivered over to him, and at the same time demanding formal recognition of the Euphrates as the boundary between Rome and Parthia.

Pompey asked the return of the newly captured district of Gorduene and refused to surrender Tigranes. As for the boundary the only satisfaction Phraates could obtain was the lofty sentiment that the Romans set justice as their boundary toward the Parthians.^[17] Since the ambassadors were not instructed with regard to Gorduene, Pompey wrote briefly to Phraates, addressing him merely as "king," not "king of kings," a title which he wished to reserve for Tigranes, and without waiting for a reply sent Afranius to occupy the disputed territory. Whether this was accomplished without fighting we cannot be sure;^[18] but Gorduene was given again to Tigranes of Armenia. Contrary to a treaty with the Parthians, Afranius returned through Mesopotamia to Syria, encountering many hardships and nearly losing his army.

The quarrel between Tigranes and Phraates was not yet ended. In 64 b.c., while Pompey was in Syria, ambassadors from both parties arrived to consult him. As an excuse for not supporting his Armenian appointee, Pompey replied that he could take no action without orders from the Senate; but he did send three commissioners to settle the boundary dispute.^[19] Apparently Phraates retained Adiabene, and Tigranes Gorduene and Nisibis. No doubt the ambassadors found the matter somewhat simplified by the fact that both kings now realized they must conserve their strength for attacks on their common enemy, Rome, rather than waste it in petty quarrels.^[20] About 58/57 b.c.^[21] Phraates III was murdered by his sons Orodes and Mithradates,^[22] who immediately began a lengthy and bitter quarrel over the kingdom.

Numismatic evidence appears to support the claims of earlier historians that the elder brother, Mithradates III, succeeded to the throne upon the murder of his father.^[23] Mithradates, whose chief center of power was in Iran,^[24] made himself so objectionable that he was expelled by the nobles,^[25] who installed Orodes as ruler. Compelled to flee, Mithradates took refuge with the Roman commander, A. Gabinius,^[26] whom he persuaded to lend him assistance in recovering the lost territory. In this case Gabinius might grasp some straw of legality, since the decree of the Senate had included in his command the Syrians, Arabs, Persians, and Babylon.^[27] The proconsul crossed the Euphrates with a detachment; but Ptolemy XI Auletes (80–51 b.c.), who likewise had been expelled from his country, backed a request for aid with more money than the Parthian could offer. Mithradates, with Orsames, one of his aides, remained with Gabinius and did not give up hope until after the Roman victory over the Nabateans won en route to Egypt in the spring of 55 b.c.^[28]

Undaunted by this failure, Mithradates started a civil war, in the course of which he won over the city of Babylon^[29] and also the royal city of Seleucia, where he struck coins depicting the Tyche, palm of victory in hand, welcoming the new ruler.^[30] Not long afterward the troops of Orodes retook Seleucia under the leadership of his very able commander in chief,^[31] who was the first to mount the walls. Babylon capitulated as the result of a famine caused by the long siege. Mithradates then voluntarily surrendered to Orodes, who considered him more enemy than brother and ordered him killed before his eyes.^[32] Orodes apparently seized the entire issue of coins struck at Seleucia by Mithradates and restruck them with a design which shows Seleucia kneeling in submission while Orodes stretches out his right hand to assist her to rise.^[33] By the execution of Mithradates late in 55 b.c.^[34] Orodes was left sole ruler of the Parthians.

While this struggle between the two brothers was in progress, M. Licinius Crassus, then over sixty years of age,^[35] was appointed to the Syrian command.^[36] the senatorial decree proposed by Pompey, Crassus was made governor of Syria; everyone knew a Parthian war was intended.^[37] Opposition to the war arose at once, but Crassus was urged on by Caesar, who was then in Gaul, and his position was defended by Cicero.^[38] Italy was scoured for troops, and in spite of the legitimate cry of an unjust war Crassus left Rome on the ides of November, 55 b.c. The curses of the tribune Ateius, leader of the antiwar party, followed him as he departed for Brundisium, where he set sail for Dyrrachium. Thence he marched overland, arriving in Syria during April or May, 54 b.c., and took over the command and troops of Gabinius. With the Syrian garrisons he now had an army of seven legions. His quaestor was C. Cassius Longinus; his legates were his son Publius Crassus, Varguntius, and Octavius. He might expect Abgarus of Osroene, Alchaudonius, an Arab prince, and Artavasdes, then king of Armenia, as allies, to furnish light cavalry, though their help was always a doubtful quantity; but Abgarus was definitely playing both sides, and Alchaudonius soon openly declared himself pro-Parthian.

The first year was spent in minor operations, the purpose of which is not clear; perhaps it was to train the troops, or possibly Crassus wished to establish a base of supplies in Mesopotamia.^[39] Roman troops crossed the Euphrates and advanced into the Land of the Two Rivers. The small force of Silaces, the Parthian satrap, was easily scattered and its leader wounded. The Greek cities, including Nicephorium, were easily won over; but after the inhabitants of Zenodotium had massacred some legionaries that town was stormed—an exploit for which Crassus was hailed as "imperator" by his troops.^[40] Silaces retired to report to Orodes the news of the Roman invasion, for sufficient Parthian troops were not available to attempt further resistance.

Crassus failed to follow up his advantage, but left two cohorts from each legion, a total of seven thousand men, and one thousand cavalry to garrison the captured towns; he then returned to Syria for the winter. Orodes sent two generals to harry the garrisons of the newly taken villages, and spent the winter thus allowed him in preparation for the coming struggle.

During the winter Crassus stripped the temple at Jerusalem of such money and gold as Pompey had left,^[41] plundered the temple of Atargatis at Hierapolis-Bambyce (Membidj),^[42] and enrolled a few additional soldiers. About the same time, or perhaps in the spring, Orodes sent ambassadors to Crassus to demand the reason for this unprovoked invasion. If the war was being waged without the consent of the Roman people, as the Parthians had been informed, then they would show mercy and take pity on the old age of Crassus; but if the attack were official, then it was to be a war without truce or treaty. If the message is correctly reported, this is one of the numerous examples proving the superiority of the Parthian intelligence service over the Roman, which seems to have been notoriously bad in the East.^[43] Such a reply was not calculated to pacify the Roman; on the contrary it provoked him to fury, as perhaps Orodes intended. Crassus replied that he would answer their demands in Seleucia. The eldest of the Parthians then stretched out the palm of his hand and responded: "Hair will grow here before you see Seleucia."^[44] The gesture and retort are still in use among present-day Arabs.

Because he had garrisoned the captured towns Crassus had no choice but to follow the same road on his next campaign, for, as he said, he had left many good men there. This decision cost him the support of a large body of foot and horse tendered by Artavasdes the Armenian,^[45] who advised Crassus to advance by way of Armenia and thus keep in the hills, where the Parthian cavalry would be least useful. His advice and support were refused, and he rode away.

Crassus crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma^[46] with a force which numbered about forty-two thousand, including four thousand cavalry and a like number of light-armed men.^[47] Opposed to these troops were ten thousand cavalrymen (ten dragons^[48]), munitioned by a thousand camels which carried additional supplies of arrows. These forces were in command of Suren,^[49] the Parthian commander in chief, assisted by the satrap Silaces; for Orodes, taking with him the bulk of the infantry, had gone to Armenia to hold in check Artavasdes the king and to await the Roman attack, which he had every reason to expect would fall in that direction. But even Orodes was unable to foresee the foolhardiness of Crassus; hence the brunt of the campaign was borne by the cavalry left to defend Mesopotamia, where they were eminently suited to the level country.

Cassius, the quaestor, suggested a halt to rest the men in one of the garrisoned villages and the dispatch of scouts to gather information on the enemy forces. He argued that, if the advance had to be made at once, the best route lay along the Euphrates to Seleucia, which was the objective. But when Abgarus of Osroene rode into camp with news that the Parthians were retreating and taking their goods with them, and that they had left only two subordinates to cover their flight, Crassus permitted his enthusiasm to win the upper hand, and immediate advance across Mesopotamia was decided upon. Abgarus was later accused of acting as agent of the Parthians, but it is difficult to substantiate the charge.^[50]

Suren was undoubtedly a man of great ability and courage, although not yet thirty years of age. He traveled with a large number of personal attendants, a bodyguard of a thousand mail-clad horsemen, and a sufficient number of concubines to require two hundred wagons. Apparently his force was composed entirely of cavalry,^[51] the logical arm for the open country and for the distances to be traversed.

Crassus hastened across Mesopotamia through territory which the Roman authorities who seek an excuse for the subsequent defeat claim was trackless desert waste. Actually the country was rolling, and there were some villages and water holes throughout the region. Since the legions, among the most rapid marchers in the world, set out in the spring, they probably arrived before the lush grass of the last rains had burned away. On May 6 the troops reached the river Balicha (Balīkh) at a point below the city of Carrhae (Harran).

At Carrhae the Roman commander was informed by his scouts that Suren was near by. The officers urged a rest and a reconnoitering expedition; but Crassus, carried away by the ardor of his son, advanced almost immediately, allowing his men barely sufficient time to eat and drink while standing in ranks. As Cassius had advised, Crassus moved forward with a wide front and little depth to his line, the wings supported by cavalry. To his son Publius he gave the command of one wing, to Cassius that of the other, while he himself took the center. The hurried advance tired still more the already weary Romans. On the approach of the Parthians, the bulk of the troops were formed into a square. The strength of the enemy remained an unknown quantity, for their numbers were masked by an advance guard and the heavy armor of the cataphracts was concealed under skins. At a given signal the Parthians discarded the coverings and with the roar of a multitude of kettledrums charged the Roman line. This move resulted in a general withdrawal of the scouts and light-armed to positions within the square; and before the astonished Crassus was aware of the maneuver, he was surrounded.

To understand the disaster which followed, some discussion of the character of the forces involved is demanded. The chief strength of the Parthian army was in its cavalry, which was divided into two branches, the light- and the heavy-armed. The light-armed wore no armor at all, though each man probably bore a small oval shield and carried a powerful bow and a quiver of arrows. This compound bow outranged the Roman weapons and had sufficient force to penetrate the armor of the legionaries. Camels stationed behind the fighting lines carried an extra supply of arrows from which the light-armed replenished their quivers.

The heavy cavalry, the cataphracts, wore scale armor which covered horse and rider^[52] from head to foot. Their weapon was a long, heavy lance, with which they charged the enemy, relying on weight to carry them through the opposing forces. Scale armor was first developed in Iran and spread rapidly eastward into China and more slowly westward through Parthia to the later Roman army.^[53] In direct contrast to the Parthians were the Romans, armored foot soldiers, equipped for close fighting, each man protected by a shield and by a javelin (pilum) which he hurled before closing in with his short sword. In cavalry the army was weak, for the Romans as yet depended on their allies to supply this branch of the service; the lesson taught at Carrhae eventually caused the expansion of the Roman mounted forces.

The Roman infantry were surrounded by the Parthian bowmen, who poured into them a deadly hail of arrows from every side. A charge by the Roman light-armed proved ineffectual. When the legions attempted the hand-to-hand fighting by which they hitherto had always conquered, the Parthians retired before them and continued to wield their bows with telling effect until they drove the legionaries back to the main body. Crassus realized the necessity of decisive action at once; the order was given for his son to charge the Parthians. With thirteen hundred horsemen, five hundred archers, and eight cohorts (about four thousand men), the young Publius drove the enemy before him with ease until, caught far from all support, the Parthians turned upon him. Many of those engaged in the attack on Crassus left and joined the assault on Publius. The bowmen rode Indian fashion around the bewildered Romans, shooting as they passed. Only the light-armed Gauls were effective against the Parthians, for they slipped from their mounts and stabbed the unprotected bellies of the Parthian horses or seized the lances and dragged the heavily armored riders to earth. But they were too few. Publius was wounded and attempted to fall back on the legions. His soldiers retired to a little hill, perhaps a tell, locked their shields, and fought on until they were killed or forced to surrender; not more than five hundred were taken alive. Publius^[54] and the majority of his officers ordered their shield-bearers to kill them or committed suicide. The Parthians cut off the head of Publius, fixed it on a lance, and returned to the main attack.

In the meantime Crassus, relieved somewhat by the departure of those who had joined the assault on Publius, took courage and drew up his troops on sloping ground. Warned by a messenger of the danger to which his son was exposed, Crassus prepared to move to his aid; but scarcely had he set his forces in motion when the returning Parthians appeared with the head of Publius. Attacked by bowmen on the flanks and crowded by the heavy cavalry in front, the situation of the Romans was extremely serious until nightfall, when the Parthians withdrew.

Crassus had sunk so far into the depths of despair that his officers were unable to rouse him, and on their own authority they ordered a general retreat to Carrhae. The cries of the wounded who were left behind informed the Parthians that the Romans were retreating; but they did not attack, as their bowmen and horses would have been at a great disadvantage in the darkness. About midnight a band of three hundred horsemen arrived at Carrhae and sent a message to tell Coponius, the commandant, of the disaster. He ordered his men to arms at once, and when positive news of the defeat was received he marched out to meet Crassus.

The following day the Parthians tarried to dispatch some four thousand Roman wounded and the numerous stragglers who were fleeing in all directions; four cohorts under Varguntius were also destroyed. Since the slaughter did not begin until dawn, it doubtless occupied most of the day. Their task finished, the Parthians took up the pursuit and surrounded the town of Carrhae where Crassus and the remnant of his army had taken refuge. There was no prospect of relief, since the whole Near East had been denuded of troops for the expedition; hence Crassus determined to abandon the shelter of the friendly but dangerous walls and to seek protection in the hills of Armenia. For obvious reasons the time of departure was kept secret; but the Parthians managed to place a citizen of Carrhae, one Andromachus, who was in their service, in the position of guide to the Roman forces. Crassus set out at night toward the hill town of Sinnaca,^[55] but Andromachus wasted time until day broke. For this service he was rewarded with the tyranny of Carrhae, which he held until his cruelty led the citizens to kill him and his family.^[56] Octavius, more successful in his choice of guides, reached the hill country safely with about five thousand men. Meanwhile Cassius, disgusted with the meanderings of Andromachus, had returned to Carrhae, whence he fled with five hundred horsemen to Syria. Unnerved by this bitter experience, he ever after kept a man ready to kill him should he so direct.^[57]

At dawn Crassus was still a mile and a half from Octavius and the safety of the rough country when the appearance of the Parthians forced him to take refuge on a knoll. Surrounded by an enemy numerically far superior, his situation was extremely dangerous; Octavius perceived his peril and courageously left a safe position on high ground to relieve Crassus.

Suren realized that he must act immediately, for if the Romans reached the near-by hills it would be impossible to use the Parthian cavalry. His next move, though possibly motivated by a desire to secure the person of Crassus, who was believed to be the instigator of the war, may also have been caused by a genuine desire to make peace, perhaps for purposes of self-aggrandizement. He released some Roman prisoners who had been allowed to overhear a conversation in the course of which assurances of kind treatment for Crassus and a desire for peace were expressed. The Parthians were ordered to cease fighting, and Suren with his staff advanced to the base of the rise on which the Romans had made their stand and offered safe passage and a treaty of peace. Crassus, fearing treachery, was disinclined to accept; but his men threatened him, and he was forced to comply.^[58] The meeting took place in the open space between the two armies, and each commander was accompanied by an equal number of men, presumably unarmed. The Parthians were on horseback, the Romans on foot. After a short conversation Crassus was offered a horse and the party started in the direction of the Euphrates, the boundary where most of the preceding treaties had been signed. But the Romans, weary with fighting and expecting treachery, perhaps failed to understand the purpose of this act, seeing in it an abduction of their commander. Octavius seized the bridle of Crassus' horse, and a general scuffle ensued, during which Octavius drew a sword and slew one of the Parthian grooms. This precipitated a mêlée in which Crassus, Octavius, and other Romans were slain. Whether or not the Parthians intended treachery we cannot be sure, but one of the supposedly unarmed Romans struck the first blow, and the whole affair may have been a tragic misunderstanding.^[59] Later the headless bodies of the Romans were dragged around the walls of Sinnaca.^[60]

The Roman troops either surrendered or scattered during the night, only to be hunted down when daylight broke. Of the forty-two thousand who had set out with Crassus, scarcely one-fourth escaped, for twenty thousand were slain and ten thousand were made prisoners. The captives were settled at Margiana^[61] (Merv), where they intermarried with native women.^[62] Some were pressed into the Parthian armies and later betrayed their captors.^[63] Suren proceeded to Seleucia, where he held a mock triumph to impress the citizens. Not long afterward, realizing the danger from so able a man, Orodes put Suren to death.

While the campaign against Crassus was in progress, Orodes had come to terms with Artavasdes, who was no longer under Roman influence. The Parthian had arranged a marriage between his son Pacorus and the sister of the Armenian monarch. While the festivities were in progress and the entire company was watching a performance of the Bacchae of Euripides, messengers arrived with the head and hand of Crassus, gruesome trophies of Carrhae. In announcing the victory the head was thrown upon the stage, an action scarcely in keeping with Greek tradition, though both of the kings and their attendants were familiar with the Greek language and literature, and Artavasdes had written orations and histories and composed tragedies in that language.^[64]

The result of Crassus' fiasco was to place Parthia on an equal if not superior plane with Rome in the minds of men from the Mediterranean to the Indus.^[65] The lands east of the Euphrates became definitely Parthian, and the Euphrates remained the boundary between Rome and Parthia until a.d. 63, when the defeat of Paetus took place. The Parthians failed to follow up their victory, although Cassius, now in command of the Roman troops in Syria, was short of men and unlikely to receive reinforcements while civil war was threatening in Rome.

Among the groups most strongly affected by this increase in Parthian prestige were the Jews. For years they had looked to this newly risen power in the East as a possible source of support, and the strong Jewish colonies in Babylonia must have kept their more westerly brethren informed of the Parthian successes. As the Greeks of Mesopotamia directed their appeals for aid to the rulers of Seleucid Syria, so the Palestinian Jews turned their eyes toward Parthia for deliverance from oppression.

Perhaps in the time of Antiochus Sidetes (139/38–129 b.c.) an agreement for co-ordinated action had been reached between the Jews and the Parthians.^[66] Certainly either during the ill-fated Parthian expedition or immediately afterward John Hyrcanus had made attacks on Syrian cities.^[67] A passage of about that date in the Talmud seems to mention an attack by the Jews on Antioch.^[68] In the time of Alexander Jannaeus (103–78 b.c.) a Parthian embassy of good will is mentioned as having been feasted at Jerusalem. During the celebration they inquired for the old man Simeon, then in exile, who had entertained them previously.^[69] It is noteworthy that during the reign of Alexander no mention is made of Jewish embassies to Rome such as had commonly been sent by his predecessors.^[70] The disaster which the Roman arms had suffered at Carrhae made certain the supremacy, at least for the time being, of pro-Parthian over pro-Roman sentiment among the Jews.

In 52 b.c. raids were made on Syria; but the Parthians were driven out by Cassius, who then hastily marched southward into Judea, where he assaulted and captured the city of Taricheae. Large numbers of Jews who had revolted, perhaps inspired by the Parthian success, were sold into slavery.^[71] The Jews discovered in plots against members of the pro-Roman party naturally turned toward Parthia as a certain refuge.^[72]

The next, more determined, attempt by Parthia opened the way for expansion to its farthest western limits. This advance forms the subject of the following chapter.

 

1. Phlegon fr. 12. 7 (J, II B, p. 1164); Appian Mith. 104; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 45; cf. the coins assigned Phraates by Wroth, Parthia, pp. 45–55.
2. Memnon fr. lviii. 2 (FHG, III, 556 f.), "Phradates"; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 1; Appian Mith. 87; Plut. Lucullus 30.
3. Sallust Hist. iv. fr. 69. In the letter of Mithradates as reported by Sallust the last historical reference (line 15) concerns the defeat of a large Pontian force in a defile. This is obviously the defeat described in Plut. Lucullus 25, which occurred before the Battle of Tigranocerta. Maurenbrecher's edition of Sallust's history, where the letter is placed after the battle, must therefore be corrected. With this rearrangement we understand why in line 16 Sallust could say that the kingdom of Tigranes was still unimpaired. Cf. also line 21: "Quod haud difficile est, si tu Mesopotamia, nos Armenia circumgredimur exercitum sine frumento, sine auxiliis, fortuna aut nostris vitiis adhuc incolumem." If we may trust Orosius vi. 13. 2, the Euphrates was recognized as the boundary.
4. PW, art. "Sextilius," No. 2.
5. Plut. Lucullus 30; Appian Mith. 87; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 3.
6. PW, art. "Sornatius."
7. Cicero Manil. 23–24; Plut. Lucullus 30; Sallust Hist. iv. fr. 72. See also PW, arts. "Licinius (Lucullus)," No. 102, and "Mithradates," No. 12. From about this time comes a tablet of the year 68 b.c. mentioning an Arshakan, king, and Pi-ir(?)-us(or -ri)-ta-na-a, his wife, queen. The king must be Phraates III; cf. Strassmaier, in ZA, VIII (1893), 112; Kugler, Sternkunde, II, 447 and n. 3; Minns, "Avroman Parchments," JHS XXXV (1915), 36.
8. Cf. Dio Cass. xxxvi. 45, where the invasion of Armenia seems to have been required by the treaty with Pompey, and ibid. 51, where it is the result of the efforts of Tigranes the Younger. But since the treaty was the same as that made by Lucullus, and Phraates had misgivings about violating his agreement with Pompey, the version of xxxvi. 51 is correct. See also Appian Mith. 104. On the younger Tigranes see PW, art. "Tigranes," No. 2.
9. Strabo xvi. i. 24; Appian, Mith. 105. Plut. Pompey 33 and Dio Cass. xxxvi. 53 mention only Sophene. On this district see PW s.v. Cf. also Eutrop. Brev. vi. 13 and Zonaras x. 4.
10. Appian Mith. 105.
11. See p. 74.
12. Plut. Pompey 36; Pliny Hist. nat. vi. 52.
13. Dio Cass, xxxvii. 5. 2.
14. Dio Cass, xxxvii. 5. 3; Appian Mith. 106; Plut. Pompey 36.
15. Plut. Pompey 36.
16. Appian Mith. 106 and 117; Diod. Sic. xl. 4.
17. Plut. Pompey 33 and Reg. imp. apophtheg. 204. 8 (Loeb, TII, p. 210).
18. Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5 says the district was taken without a battle, whereas Plut. Pompey 36 states that Afranius drove Phraates from the district and pursued him as far as Arbela. Strabo xvi. 1. 24 mentions Pompey's giving of Gorduene to Tigranes.
19. Appian Mith. 106; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5; Plut. Pompey 39.
20. Plut. Pompey 39; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 7.
21. J. Saint-Martin, Fragments d'une histoire des Arsacides (Paris, 1850), II, 107; Friedrich von Spiegel, Erânische Alterthumskunde (Leipzig, 1871–78), III, 98; J. H. Schneiderwirth, Die Parther oder das neupersische Reich unter den Arsaciden nach griechisch-römischen Quellen (Heiligenstadt, 1874), p. 50; Wroth, Parthia, p. xxxii; K. Regling, "Crassus' Partherkrieg," Klio, VII (1907), 359 f. and n. 1. Cf. L. du Four de Longuerue, Annales Arsacidarum (Argentorati, 1732), p. 22 (not available).
22. Dio Cass. xxxix. 56. The name Orodes is more properly spelled Hyrodes; its forms are as follows: cuneiform, Strassmaier in ZA, III (1888), 147, No. 9, line 3, Ú-ru-da-a; coins, Wroth, Parthia, p. 96, ΥΡΩΔΟΣ; Plut. Crassus 21 and Polyaenus Strat. vii. 41, 'Υρωδης; Appian Syr. 51 and Dio Cass. xl. 12, Ὀρωδης. Justin xlii. 4. 2, Vell. Pat. ii. 46, Pliny Hist. nat. vi. 47, Ampelius 31, and Eutrop. Brev. vi. 18 all use Orodes; Orosius vi. 13. 2, Horodes.
23. Justin xliii. 4. 1; cf. Dio Cass. xxxix. 56, who apparently makes Orodes the first to attain the throne, and assigns Media to Mithradates. But Dio is only sketching Parthian affairs and may not refer to the succession. See Rawlinson, Sixth Mon., p. 147 and notes. Gutschmid, Geschichte Irans, p. 86 and n. 2, corrects Justin to support Dio; but on the numismatic evidence see McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 212, and Newell "Coinage of the Parthians," in Survey of Persian Art (in press). The coins assigned by Wroth, Parthia, pp. 56–60, to an "unknown king" (about the time of Phraates III or Mithradates III) are given to Mithradates III by Gutschmid, Geschichte Irans, p. 86, n. 1; Allotte de la Fuÿe, "Nouveau classement des monnaies arsacides," Rev num., 1904, pp. 349 f.; Petrowicz, Arsaciden-Münzen, pp. 52–55; J. de Morgan, Num. de la Perse antique. Fasc. 1. Introduction.—Arsacides (Babelon, Traité des monnaies gr. et rom. III. Monnaies or. I1), pp. 261–64, Nos. 95–105; and Newell, op. cit.
24. Dio Cass. xxxix. 56; McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, pp. 214 f.
25. Justin xlii. 4. 1.
26. Proconsul of Syria, 57 b.c. Cf. W. Drumann, Geschichte Roms, III (2d ed.; Leipzig, 1906), 39 ff.; F. Vonder Mühll, "Zur Lebensgeschichte des A. Gabinius cos. 58," Juvenes dum sumus (Basel, 1907), pp. 75–81; PW, art. "Gabinius," No. 11.
27. Cicero De domo sua 60 and 124.
28. Dio Cass. xxxix. 56; Appian Syr. 51; Josephus Bell. i. 175 and 178 and Ant. xiv. 98–104; cf. also Strabo xii. 3. 34; xvii. 1. 11.
29. Justin xlii. 4. 2.
30. This issue apparently never circulated, for no examples were found at Seleucia. This is understandable, since the rule of Mithradates in Seleucia must have been very short and the condition of the coins would make the identification of the issue as restruck by Orodes difficult; see n. 33.
31. Plut. Crassus 21.
32. Justin xlii. 4. 4.
33. Allotte de la Fuÿe, "Monnaies arsacides de la collection Petrowicz," Rev. num., 1905, pp. 155 f.; H. Dressel, "Ein Tetradrachmon des Arsakiden Mithradates III," Zeitschrift für Numismatik, XXXIII (1922), 156–77. The coins assigned by Wroth, Parthia, pp. 56–60, to an "unknown king" are now generally given to Mithradates III, and those assigned to Mithradates III, pp. 61–67, to Orodes II. See also McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 213 and n. 29.
34. Dio Cass. xl. 12; Crassus heard that Orodes was but lately established on the throne.
35. Plut. Crassus 17.
36. The following is a partial bibliography on the campaign of Crassus. Primary sources: Ampelius 31; Appian Bell. civ. ii. 18; Caesar Bell. civ. iii. 31; Cicero De div. ii. 22; Dio Cass. xl. 12–27; Eutrop. Brev. vi. 18; Florus i. 46; Hegesippus Historia i. 21; Josephus Bell. i. 179–80 and Ant. xiv. 105 and 119; Justin xlii. 4; Livy Epit. cvi; Moses Chor. ii. 17; Nic. Dam. Hist. cxv in Athen. Deip. vi. 252 d (J, II A, p. 378, fr. 79); Obsequens 64 (124); Orosius vi. 13; Petronius Satyricon 120; Plut. Crassus 16–33, Cicero 36, Caesar 28; Polyaenus Strat. vii. 41; Ruf. Fest. 17; Seneca Epist. iv. 7; Servius Comm. in Verg. Aen. vii. 606; Strabo xvi. 1. 23; Vell. Pat. ii. 46. 2; Zonaras v. 7; Zosimus iii. 32. Secondary sources: J. Foy-Vaillant, Arsacidarum imperium (Paris, 1725), pp. 108–23; L. du Four de Longuerue, Annales Arsacidarum (Argentorati, 1732), pp. 23 f. (not available); G. E. J. Guilhem de Sainte-Crox, "Mémoire sur le gouvernement des Parthes," Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres, Mém. de litt. L (1808), 48–78; Carl Ritter, Die Erdkunde von Asien, VII 1 (Berlin, 1843), pp. 1117–25; E. W. Fischer, Römische Zeittafeln (Altona, 1846), pp. 250 and 253; F. R. Chesney, The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris (London, 1850), II, 407–12; J. Saint-Martin, Fragments d'une histoire des Arsacides (Paris, 1850), II, 110–16; Charles Merivale, History of the Romans under the Empire, I (4th ed.; New York, 1896), 407–30; F. von Spiegel, Erânische Alterthumskunde (Leipzig, 1871–78), III, 110 f.; J. H. Schneiderwirth, Die Parther oder das neupersische Reich unter den Arsaciden nach griechisch-römischen Quellen (Heiligenstadt, 1874), pp. 51–67; T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, VI (Leipzig, 1886), 429–40; Gius. Stocchi, La prima guerra dei Romani nella Mesopotamia (Firenze, 1887; not available); L. von Ranke, Weltegschichte, II 2 (5th ed.; Leipzig, 1898), pp. 252–56; A. von Gutschmid, Geschichte Irans (Tübingen, 1888), pp. 87–92; F. Justi in Geiger and Kuhn, Grundriss der iranischen Philologie (Strassburg, 1895–1904), II, 498 f.; P. Manfrin, La cavalleria dei Parthi (Roma, 1893), pp. 37–99; A. Steinmann, De Parthis ab Horatio memoratis (Berlin, 1898), pp. 6–8; W. Drumann, Geschichte Roms, IV (2nd ed.; Leipzig, 1908), 105–22; B. Niese, Grundrisse der römischen Geschichte nebst Quellenkunde (4th ed.; München, 1910), p. 236; K. Regling, De belli Parthici Crassiani fontibus (Berlin, 1899), reviewed by van Höck, Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie, 1899, cols. 1147 f., and L. Holzapfel, Berl. philol. Wochenschr., 1901, cols. 850–55; Regling, "Zur historischen Geographie des mesopotamischen Parallelogramms," Klio, I (1902), 443–76, and "Crassus' Partherkrieg," Klio, VII (1907), 357–94; P. Groebe, "Der Schlachttag von Karrhae," Hermes, XLII (1907), 315–22; H. Delbrück, "Antike Kavallerie," Klio, X (1910), 335–40; Francis Smith, "Die Schlacht bei Carrhä," Historische Zeitschrift, CXV (1916), 237–62; K. Hartmann, "Ueber das Verhältnis des Cassius Dio zur Parthergeschichte des Flavius Arrianus," Philologus, LXXIV (1917), 73–91; Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, I (3d ed.; Berlin, 1920), 475–78; A. Gunther, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kriege zwischen Römern und Parthern (Berlin, 1922), pp. 14–38; M. Gelzer in PW, art. "Licinius (Crassus)," No. 68; F. Lammert, Die römische Taktik zu Beginn der Kaiserzeit und die Geschichtschreibung (Philologus, Supp., XXIII 2 [Leipzig, 1931]); W. W. Tarn in CAH, IX, pp. 605–12.
37. Plut. Pompey 52; Veil. Pat. ii. 46. 2; Livy Epit. cv; cf. Plut. Crassus 16.
38. Cicero Ep. ad fam., i. 9. 20 and v. 8; Ep. ad Att. iv. 13. 2.
39. Tarn in CAH, IX, 606.
40. Plut. Crassus 17; Dio Cass. xl. 13.
41. Josephus Bell. i. 179 and Ant. xiv. 105; cf. Orosius vi. 13. 1.
42. Plut. Crassus 17.
43. Cf. Trajan's difficulties (pp. 234 f.).
44. Dio Cass. xl. 16; Plut. Crassus 17–18.
45. Said by Plut. Crassus 19 to have numbered thirty thousand foot and sixteen thousand mailed horse.
46. On the location of this Zeugma and the earlier one to the north see F. Cumont, Études syriennes (Paris, 1917), pp. 119–42; J. Dobiáš, "Séleucie sur l'Euphrate," Syria, VI (1925), 253–68.
47. Plut. Crassus 20 gives the force at seven legions with four thousand horse and as many light-armed men. Florus i. 46. 2 speaks of eleven legions; Appian Bell. civ. ii. 18 makes the total force a hundred thousand! The legions are estimated at thirty-five thousand by Rawlinson, Sixth Mon., pp. 155 f.; thirty-four thousand by Sykes, Hist. of Persia, I, 347 f.; and twenty-eight thousand by Tarn in CAH, IX, 608.
48. The Parthian military unit was a "dragon," consisting of one thousand men, according to Lucian Quomodo hist. 29.
49. This is a family name; see Herzfeld, "Sakastan," AMI, IV (1932), 70 ff.
50. Dio Cass. xl. 20. Rawlinson, Sixth Mon., pp. 162 f., expressed doubts as to the accuracy of the original source; Tarn in CAH, IX, 608, believes Abgarus innocent.
51. Plut. Crassus 23 ff.; cf. Vell. Pat. ii. 46.
52. Examples were found at Dura-Europus, Illust. London News, September 2, 1933, p. 362. The horses apparently were not as heavy as Tarn in CAH, IX, 601, has supposed, since the Dura armor fitted light Arab horses. However, the Dura armor is later in date than the time of Crassus. See also the figures clad in scale armor on Trajan's column (p. 217).
53. B. Laufer, Chinese Clay Figures. I. Prolegomena on the History of Defensive Armor (Field Museum Anthropological Series, XIII 2; Chicago, 1914), pp. 217 ff.
54. Cicero Pro Scauro iii. i.
55. Strabo xvi. i. 23; Tarn in CAH, IX, 610, n. 1.
56. Nic. Dam. cxiv (J, II A, p. 378, fr. 79); Plut. Crassus 29.
57. Plut. Brutus 43.
58. Plut. Crassus 30; but cf. Dio Cass. xl. 26, who says that Crassus trusted Suren without hesitation.
59. G. E. J. Guilhem de Sainte-Croix, "Mémoire sur le gouvernement des Parthes," Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres, Mém. de litt., L (1808), 62, was the first to point out this very possible interpretation of the story.
60. Lucan De bell. civ. viii. 436 f.; Strabo xvi. 1. 23.
61. Pliny Hist. nat. vi. 47.
62. Horace Od. iii. 5. 5.
63. Vell. Pat. ii. 82; Florus ii. 20. 4.
64. Plut. Crassus 33. Just how much reliance can be placed on this much overworked story is doubtful. In any case, the evidence concerns only the immediate court circle, and the extent to which Hellenism penetrated the life of the common people yet remains to be determined.
65. Strabo xi. 9. 2; Dio Cass. xl. 14; Pliny Hist. nat. v. 88 (25); Justin xli. 1. i; Herodian iv. 10; Plut. Antony 34.
66. A late writer, Josippon, chap. 28, says that John Hyrcanus received an embassy which proposed such an agreement.
67. Josephus Ant. xiii. 254 and Bell. 1. 62.
68. Sotah 33a. "Antioch" is by many emended to "Antiochus"; see J. Klausner, Israelitic History [in Hebrew], II (Jerusalem, 1924), 74.
69. Yerushalmi, Berakoth 7. 2 (Krotoschin ed., reproduced by L. Lamm [Berlin, 1920], I, 11b) and Nazir 5. 5 (ibid., II, 54b).
70. Eleazar Isar Szadzunski, The Talmudical Writings as a Source for Parthian and Sassanid History (unpublished M.A. diss., University of Chicago, 1932), pp. 30–34, and abstract of a paper in JAOS, LII (1932), 305.
71. Dio Cass. xl. 28; Josephus Bell. i. 180.
72. Cf. the example in Josephus Bell. i. 485 f.