A manual of moral theology for English-speaking countries/Book 1

by Thomas Slater

BOOK I

HUMAN ACTS

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS A HUMAN ACT?

i. THE Christian faith teaches that the end of human life is to know, love, and serve God. If a man fulfils this obligation faithfully till death, it further gives him the assured hope of eternal happiness with God in heaven. All our actions should be directed towards the end for which the whole man exists; if an action is such that it conduces to that end, it is a good, moral action; if, on the contrary, it does not conduce to that end, it is a bad, immoral action.

Not all man's actions, however, are capable of being invested with this moral quality. There are many actions of man which have no more moral quality than the growth of a tree in the garden or the running of a dog in the street. Good or bad digestion is an operation to a great extent removed from man's control; he is in general no more responsible for it than for the condition in which he was born. Or, if some immoral picture is suddenly thrust under his eyes, he cannot help seeing it. Such acts are neither moral nor immoral; they are neither capable of conducing to the end of moral human action, nor of diverting the agent from it: they merit neither praise nor blame.

2. A man is a good man morally if he performs well the good actions over which he has control; he is a bad man if he wilfully performs bad actions. So that the actions over which a man has control, the actions which he freely performs, are alone capable of making him a good or a bad man; they are the only actions of man which have a moral quality; they alone are treated of in moral theology. It is the task of moral theology to frame rules for human conduct according to the teaching of the Catholic Church, to decide what actions are good and what bad according to the principles of the Christian faith.

3. The actions over which a man has control are in a special sense called human acts, because they are due to his free choice. That man has the power of free choice or free will, is clearly taught in Holy Scripture, and is a dogma of faith. ^[1] It is also a truth of sound philosophy, ^[2] vouched for by the consciousness of each individual and by the common sense of mankind. It does not belong to our province to prove the doctrine. We suppose that, at any rate in many of his daily actions, when all the conditions requisite for action are present, a man is free to act or not, to perform this action rather than that other. A man must indeed have a motive for action, but that motive does not constrain him to act; if he has the use and control of his reason, he may as long as he is in life perform or abstain from the action proposed to him. Man has the wonderful power, unique in all the visible creation, of directing his mental and bodily activity in this way or that according to his good pleasure; and it is this wonderful power which makes him a moral agent, and makes it worth while to discuss and formulate rules of human conduct. Man himself is the cause of his human acts; he freely directs them to the end of human existence, or to some perverse end of his own choice.

4. This power of free choice is a property of the rational will, and is the natural complement of the deliberative reason with which man is also endowed. For among the various objects offered to the will's acceptance, the reason can propose motives for the selection of one object rather than of another, and, at any rate in many actions, until the deliberation is finished, the will need not decide between them. If an object capable of satisfying all our desires were presented to us, there would indeed be no room for deliberation; as Dante expresses it:

Such one becomes, admiring that blest Ray,
That, whatsoever else allure the sight,
Impossible it is to turn away;
Because the one sole wished-for Good is there,
And everything defective elsewhere found,
In it is perfected beyond compare.

Paradise, xxxiii 100. Wright's translation.

In the presence of such an, object, the whole man, with all the vehemence of his will made for good, would rush into the embrace of his God. For God alone is capable of wholly satisfying all man's desires. Or again, if some object of ardent natural desire were suddenly thrust upon us, leaving no time for deliberation, overwhelming us with the idea of its power to satisfy our appetite, it might be that no room was left for free choice, that we should be necessitated to action. There would be at least some indeliberate motion towards the object, a movement of the will which divines call motus primo-primus. If in such a case the power of deliberation is not altogether smothered, but is exercised, though imperfectly, the movement of the will which follows is called secundo-primus. If the power of deliberation is wholly wanting, the act which follows cannot be sinful, however wrong objectively; if the act is semi- deliberate, however grievously wrong in itself, it will be imputed to the agent only as a more or less serious venial sin. ^[3]

These principles are of great importance for forming an estimate of the moral guilt of children, of habitual drunkards, of persons long habituated to sins of the flesh, and persons with weak intellect.

It follows from what has been said that previous knowledge of, and deliberation about, the object proposed by the intellect to the will, is necessary to free and moral action, which is defined by divines to be action which proceeds from man's deliberative will. ^[4]

5. Human acts are by theologians divided into various classes:

(a) Internal acts are performed by the internal powers of the soul; external, by the bodily organs.

(b) Elicited acts are such as proceed immediately from the will and are performed by it alone. They are usually said to be six in number; three having reference to the end, and three others to the means for the attaining of the end. A wish is a simple inclination of the will or an ineffectual desire of an object; an intention is a firm resolve to attain an object by the use of the appropriate means; fruition is a peaceful delight in the possession, real or imagined, of a loved object. The act of selection between various means to an end is called choice; if no alternative is offered by the intellect, acceptance of the means by the will is called consent, though this term is more commonly used of every act of acceptance by the will of an object proposed to it; use or execution is said of the act of the will which applies the means chosen to the obtaining of the end proposed.

Commanded acts are executed by other faculties than the will by which they are commanded.

(c) Natural acts are performed by man's faculties unaided by divine grace; supernatural, by the help of God's grace.

(d) Good actions are conformed to the rules of morality; bad actions are contrary to them; those that are indifferent may be good or bad according to circumstances.

(e) Valid acts are such as have all the conditions requisite, and so produce their effect; invalid acts are destitute of some condition necessary to produce their effect.

CHAPTER II

VOLUNTARY ACTS

1. HUMAN acts, the subject-matter of moral theology, are also called voluntary acts to distinguish them from such actions as are produced under external compulsion. For voluntary acts are the effect of an internal principle, the will (voluntas). The term, however, is ordinarily used not of all actions which are produced by an internal principle, for some of these are specially denominated spontaneous or reflex actions. These latter are the immediate result of sense excitation without the intervention of consciousness. Thus the eyelid closes to protect the threatened organ, and the hand rises involuntarily to drive off a troublesome fly. Voluntary in the strict sense is used only of actions produced by the will with rational knowledge of, and inclination towards, the object. Voluntary actions are produced with consciousness and deliberation. Thus, practically and in the concrete, voluntary actions are identical with human acts, though their connotation is different. For human acts connote freedom, as we have seen, while an act may be voluntary and yet not free. The beatific vision by which the blessed see God face to face, and are thereby thrilled with ineffable delight, is a voluntary act; it proceeds from the will with full and clear knowledge of God, but it is not free; the blessed cannot avert their gaze from the Infinite Beauty which enraptures every fibre of their being. However, all voluntary acts of man are in this life free, and so, for the purposes of moral theology, human acts and voluntary acts are interchangeable terms.

2. An act may be voluntary in various ways:

(a) An act is perfectly voluntary if it proceeds from the will with full knowledge and deliberation; if the knowledge and deliberation are not full, the act is imperfectly voluntary.

(b) Simply or absolutely voluntary is distinguished from voluntary under a certain respect, or secundum quid. More commonly an action which under the circumstances is willed, but which would not be willed if the circumstances were different, is said to be simply or absolutely voluntary; while inasmuch as the same action would not be willed if the circumstances were different, it may also be said to be only voluntary under a certain respect. Thus, to take the well-worn example, when the merchant is willing in a storm that his goods should be thrown overboard to save the ship, the action is simply voluntary; he would not will it unless the ship were in danger, so that it is also voluntary only under a certain respect.

(c) An action is said to be voluntary in itself when it is in itself and by itself the object of the will; if it is merely the effect of something else which is willed, it is then called voluntary in something else, or voluntary in the cause.

Frequently directly and indirectly voluntary are used in the same sense as voluntary in itself and voluntary in the cause.

3. All voluntary action is imputed to the agent for praise or blame, merit or demerit; for the action is free, as we have seen, and proceeds from a positive inclination of the will. This inclination of the will is an important element in voluntary actions; the absence of it prevents the sin of man being imputed to God as voluntary, and the same principle sometimes justifies us in performing an action which is right in itself, though some of its effects are evil. But this is an important point and requires fuller treatment.

First of all then, let us see what is required before an evil effect of my action can justly be imputed to me and make me morally guilty.

(a) The evil effect must in some measure be foreseen, otherwise it will be involuntary and not imputable. And so no moral blame attaches to a man who, thinking that he is drinking water, swallows poison.

(b) The agent must be able to prevent the evil effect, for we are only responsible for what is under our control. The engine-driver of an express train is not responsible for the death of a person who suddenly throws himself under the wheels of the engine.

(c) There must be an obligation not to perform the action by reason of the evil effect which would follow from it. If the evil effect follows merely by accident, it does not render an otherwise lawful action unlawful, and I am not bound to abstain from it on account of the mere possibility of the evil effect following from it. Thus, if a hundred people indulge in hunting or motoring for a considerable time, some one of them is morally certain to meet with an accident endangering life or limb. But this does not make hunting or motoring morally wrong. Though I am conscious that the accident may happen to me, I may nevertheless hunt or use the motorcar as usual. If I kill myself or someone else, it will be merely by accident, for it is presumed that I use reasonable care to avoid mishap.

On the other hand, a superior, whose commands I am bound to obey, may have used his authority to forbid an action on account of the possible evil effect which may follow therefrom. In that case I must abstain from the action by reason of the command of my superior, though otherwise I should be free. And so if a father, for special reasons, forbids his son to go to the theatre, the son should obey, as long as he is subject to parental authority. Again, even though there may be no positive command of a superior, in cases where no good would come from the action, and where the only effects would be evil, I am bound to abstain from the action, which in that case itself becomes evil. Similarly, where the evil effects are largely in excess of the good, right reason tells me that I must abstain from the action. But there are many actions which are forbidden by no lawful authority, which have both good and evil effects, while it is not clear that the latter largely outweigh the former. Am I bound to abstain from such actions, or when am I bound to abstain from them?

4. In order to provide a general rule of conduct in such circumstances, divines have formulated what is known as the principle of a double effect. That principle may be enunciated as follows:

It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad, provided that (i) the action, viewed in itself, is good, or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good; (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as that is, not by means of the bad; and (4) there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect.

This rule will furnish us with a guide in case of doubt whether we are bound to abstain from any given action because of some evil effect which will follow from it. We shall be at liberty to perform the action in question provided that four conditions are realized. In the first place, the action itself, apart from the evil effect, must not be bad. If it is bad in itself, there can be no question about its lawfulness. Further, the agent must not intend the evil effect, though he foresees that it will follow. If he intends it, the evil effect becomes voluntary in itself and imputable to the agent. Then, the good effect must not be the result of the bad, for we must not do evil that good may come; the end does not justify the means. ^[5] Lastly, there must be such a proportion between the good and bad effects that right reason tells me that I am not forbidden to forego the good effect of the action on account of the bad being inextricably bound up with it.

The question as to whether a general is justified in ordering his army to take a stronghold by assault in war will serve to illustrate the principle and its use. In the first place, the assault must be justified by itself, apart from the cost in human life. The assault will be justified in itself if the war is just and the stronghold belongs to the enemy; it will not be justified if the war is one of unjust aggression, or if the general has been expressly ordered by his Government not to take the place. Moreover, the general must not directly intend the necessary loss of life among the innocent non-belligerents. He foresees and deplores it; he is said in the technical language of theology to permit the evil effect, not to intend it. The slaughter of innocent non-belligerents must not be the means chosen to capture the stronghold; evil may not be done that good may come. Finally, the capture of the place must be a matter of sufficient importance in the war to warrant the shedding of innocent blood in the bombardment, and the other evils necessarily entailed in an assault. The question as to when the good result is sufficient to outweigh the evil is largely a matter of sound judgement after a careful examination of all the circumstances. If the successful storming of the place would only add to the personal reputation of the general without bringing the end of the war any the nearer, the assault would be a crime; if it would compel the enemy to sue for peace, it would usually be justified.

This principle is of great importance in Moral Theology; it has in its support the common consent of divines, and is expressly used by St Thomas. ^[6]

5. If I am not justified, according to the foregoing principle, in performing an action which causes some evil effect, that evil effect is imputable to me though I did not intend it in itself; it is not indeed voluntary in itself, but it is voluntary in its cause, and I am bound to avoid evil even though only voluntary in its cause.

When, however, evil is not voluntary in itself, but only voluntary in its cause, a question arises concerning the degree of moral guilt which is contracted when such a cause of evil is posited unwarrantably. The case arises especially when grave evil is the result of an action which in itself is only venially sinful, as when grave harm is the result of slight negligence. Of course, great evil arising from grave negligence is seriously sinful even though only voluntary in the cause; and so a doctor who through grave negligence kills his patient is guilty of a great sin, though he did not intend the homicide. But supposing that in passing through a gate in the country I leave it open, owing to slight negligence, and in consequence a neighbour's crop is seriously damaged by his cows getting among the corn; do I commit a grave sin in that case? Of course, if owing to the circumstances I clearly foresaw that the damage was certain to follow and I could easily have closed the gate if I chose, I certainly sin grievously in not closing it; the negligence is then grave. But our case supposes circumstances to be such that the negligence is only slight, partly on account of the uncertainty of harm following, partly because I had frequently seen the gate standing open, and for other reasons. Will the neglect to close the gate after me in such circumstances be grievously sinful on account of the serious harm to my neighbour which was the consequence? The answer must be " No." For the harm did not follow necessarily and exclusively from my neglect; my action was not the immediate and necessary cause of the damage done to the crop; other agents intervened; my action was only slightly responsible for what followed. Inasmuch, then, as the malice of the cause is only slight, and this alone is voluntary in itself, the evil effect which is only voluntary in the cause will be imputed only as a venial sin.

6. Theologians dispute about the question whether such a sin of omission as is committed by not closing the gate after me, with resulting loss to my neighbour, can be committed without a special act, by simply neglecting to put the act which was of obligation.

The question is not a very practical one; it will be sufficient to say in reply that physically a man who adverts to the obligation of doing something may hold himself neutral, and so sin by omission without doing anything; practically, however, in such cases, a positive determination is formed not to perform the duty, or at least to perform something else which is foreseen to be an obstacle to the performance of the duty.^[7]

7. The question sometimes arises at what time a sin of omission or a sin which is voluntary only in the cause is committed. When a man gets drunk on the Saturday evening and foresees that in consequence he will not be able to attend Mass on the following day, is the sin of omitting to hear Mass committed on the Saturday night, when he voluntarily posits the cause of his not hearing Mass on the following day, or on the Sunday, when Mass is not heard as is of obligation? Inasmuch as a formal sin is a human act, it would seem that we must say with St Alphonsus^[8] that the sin is committed when the cause of the omission or of the evil is voluntarily posited, otherwise we should have to say that a man may commit sin without knowing it, or while he is asleep.

CHAPTER III

OBSTACLES TO VOLUNTARY ACTION

WE have seen that we are responsible only for those actions which are performed with knowledge or advertence and freedom of choice. Whatever tends to prevent or lessen advertence, or to restrict liberty, will tend to diminish our responsibility. Ignorance affects advertence, fear and violence influence freedom of choice, and concupiscence influences both. Something must now be said on each of these causes which affect the voluntariness and imputability of our actions.

SECTION I

On Ignorance

1. Ignorance is the absence of knowledge which the person who is ignorant should have. It is thus distinguished from nescience, which is merely the absence of knowledge, without the implication that the knowledge should be possessed.

Ignorance must also be carefully distinguished from error or mistake, which is a false judgement concerning something. Thus, if I simply do not know the person to whom I am speaking, I am in ignorance of his identity; if I mistake him for someone else, I am in error.

2. (a) With reference to the subject who is ignorant, ignorance is either invincible or vincible.

Invincible ignorance cannot be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence. This may arise in my mind either because no thought of my want of knowledge occurs to me, and so the idea of making inquiries never enters into my head, or because I have failed to acquire knowledge on the point, though I made all reasonable efforts to do so. What efforts should be made in any given case depends on the character and circumstances of the person and the matter on which he is ignorant. If the matter is of great importance, if it affects the salvation of souls or the spiritual and temporal welfare of large numbers, great efforts must be made to dissipate ignorance; the efforts which would be sufficient in the case of one poorly instructed, or very much occupied with other weighty affairs, would not be sufficient in other cases where these suppositions are not verified. In general, where knowledge is of obligation those efforts must be made to acquire it which ordinarily prudent and good men would exert in the circumstances.

Vincible ignorance is such as can be removed by the use of the requisite diligence. Various degrees are distinguished by divines according as some, or little, or no diligence is exercised to dispel it or means are used to foster it. If means are used to foster it, the ignorance is called affected; if little or no diligence is used to dispel it, it is called crass or supine; if some diligence is used, but not what is required in the case, it is called simply vincible ignorance.

(b) With reference to the object of ignorance, we must distinguish ignorance of law, fact, and penalty. There is ignorance of law, if the law's existence is not known, as when a Catholic does not know that the Church forbids marriage within the third degree of kindred. There would be ignorance of fact, if it were not known that A. B. is related to C. D. within the third degree. Ignorance of the penalty is distinguished from ignorance of law when some special sanction is not known, though the law itself is known.

(c) With reference to the action of the subject, we distinguish antecedent, consequent, and concomitant ignorance. Antecedent ignorance is not voluntary, it is not willed by the subject; consequent ignorance is voluntary; concomitant is not expressly willed, but the action which is done with concomitant ignorance would ex hypothesi be done, even if the ignorance did not exist.

3. Invincible ignorance, as defined above, excuses from fault, so that, however bad an action done in invincible ignorance may be, it cannot be a formal sin. The reason is obvious; there is no knowledge in the agent of the malice of the action, and so the bad action is involuntary, and not imputable.^[9]

4. Vincible ignorance of the malice of the act, however, cannot excuse one who does wrong. He does not indeed will the evil in itself, but he wills its cause, and so it is voluntary in its cause and imputable. A person who sins in simply vincible ignorance, or even in crass ignorance, is indeed less blameworthy than one who sins with full knowledge of the malice of his act; the sin is only imperfectly voluntary, and less imputable than if perfectly voluntary. There is an apparent difference of opinion among theologians as to whether affected ignorance increases or lessens the malice of a wrong action. With many modern authors it seems best to distinguish the motive with which in each case ignorance is fostered. If the state of ignorance is fostered through fear of being compelled by knowledge to abstain from the sinful act, such affected ignorance would seem to lessen the malice of the sin; the wrongdoer would not in this case venture to sin if he had full knowledge, and so he fosters his ignorance; his will is less malicious than if he sinned with full deliberation and consent. If, on the contrary, he merely fosters his ignorance to be able to plead it in excuse, and he is so bent on sinning that he would do the act in the same way even if he had full knowledge of its malice, then it does not seem to diminish the sin; it is rather a sign of an absolute determination to commit the sin. ^[10]

We saw in a former chapter that the degree of malice which attaches to a sin committed in more or less culpable ignorance is measured rather by the sinfulhess of the neglect to put away the ignorance, than by the sinfulness of the act in itself.

5. Ignorance itself of what we are bound to know, as of the obligations of our state of life, of the truths of faith which are necessary to salvation, is sinful if consequent and vincible; antecedent and invincible ignorance is of course not sinful.

6. Ignorance does not render an act invalid which has all other requisites for its validity; and so baptism conferred by one who knows nothing about its effects will be valid, if the matter and form are correctly applied with the intention of doing what the Church does. Substantial error or mistake about the person with whom marriage is contracted will invalidate the contract, while ignorance of who the person is will not, if there be the will to marry.

SECTION II

On Concupiscence

I. In theology concupiscence is used in two distinct senses. It frequently signifies the inclination to evil, which in human nature is a result of the fall of our first parents. In this sense it is called sin by the Apostle. ^[11] Without any moral or immoral implication the word is used here to denote any passion or any movement of the sensitive appetite towards its proper object. It comprehends, therefore, any movement of love, desire, or hatred, sorrow, anger, or delight.

Concupiscence is antecedent or consequent. The former precedes any action of the will, and so is involuntary. The latter is voluntary, either because it is deliberately and directly excited by the will, or at any rate willed in its cause.

2. Antecedent concupiscence lessens the malice of an evil action which is done under its impulse. For concupiscence troubles the intellect, so that it cannot dispassionately weigh the moral quality of the object proposed to the will and the motives for rejecting it; moreover, concupiscence paints the object in more than naturally attractive colours, so that it exerts an undue influence on the will. Concupiscence thus disturbs the indifference of the will and renders the act which follows less voluntary and free. It is accordingly less imputable to the agent.

It sometimes happens that antecedent concupiscence renders the subsequent action involuntary, and so in no wise imputable, however wrong it may be. This will be the case when some sudden onslaught of passion deprives the agent of the use of reason and blindly impels him to evil. Strong passions, such as love or anger, especially in impressionable natures, sometimes produce this result, and even when murder or suicide is committed in such circumstances juries are warranted in bringing in a merciful verdict of murder or suicide while temporarily insane. If, however, the passion was not altogether antecedent, but in the early stages of its onslaught there was room for deliberation, the consequent evil will not be altogether involuntary; it will to some extent be voluntary in its cause at least. ^[12]

3. It used to be a matter of dispute among theologians whether a man could be insane and not responsible for his actions in some one category, while he retained his self-control in others. In our days it will hardly be disputed that monomania exists, and if it exists, as, for example, in the matter of intoxicating drink, the monomaniac will not be directly responsible for his actions done under the influence of his madness, although he may be responsible for them in their cause. ^[13]

4. Consequent concupiscence increases the malice of a bad action if it is wilfully excited, because the tendency of the will to evil is voluntarily made more intense. If the passion is voluntary only in its cause, it is rather a sign of the great intensity of the perverse will from which it flows, but which it does not cause.

5. The evil motions of anger, impurity, rash judgement which precede all advertence and deliberation of the mind, cannot of course be sinful, as they are not voluntary. They become sinful when consent is yielded to them after advertence to their malice. The question is discussed among theologians, whether it be sinful, and in what degree, to remain neutral under an evil motion of concupiscence, neither giving consent to it nor positively resisting it. If the question is raised concerning a vehement temptation to impurity, it may reasonably be denied that it is ordinarily possible to remain neutral; the danger of consenting would be too great. In such a case there will usually be a grave obligation to resist positively for fear of being drawn into giving consent. Positive resistance does not mean direct and physical effort, which would be worse than useless; but it means that we must, under temptation, avert our minds from the evil suggestion and occupy them with other thoughts. If, however, the question be put, whether sin is committed by remaining neutral under temptation to evil, not deliberating about committing it, but simply neither consenting to it nor rejecting it, the correct answer would seem to be that a venial but not a mortal sin is thereby committed. There is some sin, because we are commanded to rule the lower appetites and keep them in subjection to reason, which is not done in the case supposed. But the sin cannot be mortal, for there is no consent of the will, by which alone mortal sin can be committed. This is the teaching of St Thomas and of St Alphonsus. ^[14]

SECTION III

On Fear

I. Fear is defined to be a perturbation of the mind on account of some present or future danger.

It is grave or slight in proportion as the danger is serious or not serious. Absolutely grave fear is such as will seriously affect an ordinarily constant man, as the fear of death, of perpetual imprisonment, or of loss of goods; relatively grave is such as will seriously affect anyone of timid disposition.

Reverential fear is that which a subject feels lest he should offend his superior. Ordinarily, divines rank it as slight fear, but it may become grave if, for example, a very austere father threaten his daughter with loss of home or with his perpetual displeasure.

Fear from without is the result of some external danger, which may arise either from a necessary cause, as, e.g., from the danger of shipwreck; or it may be threatening from a free agent. Fear from within is from an internal cause, as the fear of death from a disease which has been contracted.

2. The actions which are done out of fear are simply voluntary, but they are usually also involuntary under a certain respect.

There is no question here of actions which are done in fear or with fear, as when I walk with fear and trembling along a lonely road by night. We are concerned with the effect which fear has on human actions done in consequence of fear; and unless it deprives the agent of the use of reason, which in rare cases may happen, the action remains voluntary, because it is done freely and deliberately to avoid the threatened danger. In such circumstances, as we saw above, the action is said to be simply voluntary; but it is also involuntary under a certain respect, for, unless the danger threatened, the action would not be done. An exception must be made with regard to attrition elicited from fear of hell, which, if it is to be efficacious, must be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary, for otherwise it would not help to justify the sinner in the sacrament of Penance. ^[15] We can easily see how this is possible with regard to sin. For other actions done through fear have some evil or loss annexed to them, on which account they are involuntary under some respect; while aversion from sin is wholly good and reasonable, and so there is no reason why repentance for sin from fear of hell should not be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary. ^[16]

^[17]. Inasmuch as bad actions done through fear are simply voluntary, it would follow that they are imputable to the agent, so that fear does not excuse him from sin. And this is true of such actions as are intrinsically bad and against the natural law. The Church has always considered those to be apostates who through fear of death or persecution deny their faith, though less culpable than those who renounce it without excuse (Can. 2205).

However, with regard to positive precepts, grave fear ordinarily excuses transgressors of them from sin. The reason is, -because the legislator is not presumed to desire that his laws should bind when their observance would entail such grave consequences to his subjects. Divines, relying on what we read in Holy Scripture, teach this doctrine concerning the positive law of God, and it will be all the more true of positive human legislation. 3 But if non-observance of a law or a command of a superior would cause great damage to the common good, then the law or command must be obeyed, even with loss of life; for private advantage must yield to the requirements of the common weal. And so a soldier must stick to his post in war, even at the risk of life.

SECTION IV

On Violence

i. Violence or coercion is the using of greater force than can be resisted to compel another to perform some action against his will. In certain connections the person who suffers violence is said in English law to be under duress.

It follows from the definition that violence is from something external to the agent; no one can offer violence to himself; and that the subject resists to the utmost of his power. If the resistance is only partial, there is violence only under a certain respect (secundum quid).

2. The elicited acts of the will cannot be forced by violence, for in that case the agent would will and not will at the same time.

3. The other internal faculties, and much more the external faculties of man, may be subject to violence. If the violence is absolute, the resulting action is involuntary and not imputable to him who suffers violence; if the resistance is only partial, the action will be voluntary to a certain extent, and in the same degree it will be imputable to the agent (Can. 2205, sec. i; 2218, sec. 2).

CHAPTER IV

THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS

SECTION I

On the Essence of Morality

I. BY performing good actions a man becomes a good man morally, and he is a bad man morally if he performs bad actions. Actions are called good or bad morally with reference to the norm or rule of human conduct. So that the morality of an action is its relation to the rule of human conduct. It will be a morally good action if it be conformed to the rule of conduct; otherwise it will be a morally bad action. As men have differed, and do differ, widely in their views as to the meaning of human life and as to man's destiny, they naturally have differed, and do differ, widely in deciding what is the rule of human conduct. The rule in different systems will be progress, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or pleasure, or the categorical imperative of the individual reason. Even among Catholic philosophers and divines there is some difference of opinion as to what constitutes the fundamental norm of morality. Practically the different opinions come to much the same, especially as there is greater agreement among Catholics as to what are the formal and proximate rules of morality. The teaching of St Thomas and many others seems to be that the fundamental norm of morality is rational human nature as such. Good in general is that which is conformable to the being whose good it is; and so morally good actions will be such as are conformable to the rational nature of man considered in itself and in all its relations. Man's intellect can know man himself, the existence of God and our relation to him, our relations to other human beings, and to the world round about us; knowing these things, our reason can tell us what actions are becoming and what unbecoming to such a nature. Moreover, reason tells us that although we have the physical liberty to do wrong, we are nevertheless under a moral obligation to abstain from it. Our most wise, and good, and provident Creator, who has given us our nature and placed us in the position which we hold, cannot be indifferent as to the manner in which we conduct ourselves. The still, small voice of conscience is there to tell us what is right, in the name of God whose herald it is, to approve of what we do well, to condemn what we do ill. The fundamental norm of right conduct, then, is man's moral nature, morally right conduct is conduct in conformity with man's nature in itself and in all its relations. This constitutes right order in the moral world, which God the Creator and provident Ruler of the universe cannot but will us to observe, and this divine Will or Reason bidding us to observe right order and prohibiting its violation is the eternal law of God, the formal objective rule of morality. Human reason, applied to conduct, or conscience, is the formal subjective rule which makes known to us and applies the objective rule. ^[18]

2. The morality of a human act belongs to it inasmuch as it issues freely from the will with knowledge of its moral quality. Because it is the free product of the human will, a human or a moral act makes a man culpable or praiseworthy. Now the will alone is free, and so morality belongs properly to the internal act of the will. In a perfect human action, indeed, the external act must follow, if it is in the agent's power, in order to the completeness and perfection of the internal act; otherwise there will be no perfect and efficacious will. But the external act, which is called free only with reference to the will from which it proceeds, cannot have any separate morality of its own, nor of itself can it add to the morality of the internal act. In a complete human act, therefore, consisting of an internal and external action, morality is formally in the internal act alone. Accidentally, on account of longer duration, or repetition, or greater intensity which the external act causes, it may add something to the goodness or malice of the internal act, but not in and by itself. A man is good or bad as his will is good or bad.

From this it must not be concluded that an external sin is the same as an internal sin; that if a man has committed fornication, it is sufficient to confess the desire and intention to do so; the malice of the internal and external acts are the same substantially, but an internal act is different from an external act; and so the sins also differ, for sin is a bad human act.

3. There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether, besides the division into good and bad actions, we must also admit a third class, neither good nor bad, but indifferent. In the abstract, indifferent actions certainly exist; to take a walk, for example, in itself and in the abstract, is neither a good nor a bad action. But in the concrete, a man's intention, and the circumstances in which the action is performed, necessarily give it a moral quality. The intention must be honest or not, the circumstances must be such as to make the action conformable to right reason or not, and so in the concrete any particular action must be either right or wrong; it must be either good or bad, it cannot be indifferent. An action may of course be morally good, and yet not supernaturally meritorious, and so indifferent from a supernatural point of view; and this perhaps is the meaning of some of those divines who contradict the above teaching of St Thomas and the common opinion of the schools. ^[19]

4. An action which in itself is not conformable to right reason and order is against the law of nature and intrinsically bad. An action which in itself is not bad, but only bad because forbidden for good reasons by a lawful authority, as eating flesh meat on a day of abstinence, is said to be bad because forbidden; while intrinsically bad actions are forbidden by God because they are bad and inordinate. However, not all these intrinsically bad actions are bad in the same degree. Some are necessarily and always so, because in all circumstances they remain inordinate, as hatred of God, our first beginning and last end. Others in certain circumstances may become lawful, as taking what belongs to another, which in certain circumstances may be done without sin. The State for good reason may grant leave to take another's land for a new railway; and a fortiori almighty God, the supreme Lord of all created things, may, without doing an injury, take the life, rights, or property of his creatures. Many divines explain the spoliation of the Egyptians, and the divine toleration of polygamy in the Old Law, by the aid of this principle.

Finally, some actions, as obscene touches and looks, are commonly inordinate and sinful; but if there is good reason for them, and due caution be exercised, they become lawful. ^[20]

SECTION II

The Sources of Morality

We saw in the preceding section that there are various rules by which we know whether a human action is good or bad. It will be a good action if it be conformable to right order, otherwise it will be a bad action. It remains for us to consider what elements in an action make it conformable or not with right order. What have we to attend to in order to know whether an action is according to right reason or not?

There are three such elements, of which sometimes one, sometimes another, sometimes all together, contribute to make the actions in right order or, on the contrary, inordinate. They are the object, the end, and the circumstances of the action.

Point I

The Object

1. By the object is here meant that to which the will primarily and directly tends; that which it determines to do looked at in itself, apart from the circumstances with which the action when done will be clothed; or it is the action considered in the abstract.

2. It is obvious that some objects, in the sense above defined, have an objective morality of their own, and this causes the will which tends towards them to be either good or bad as the object is good or bad. To blaspheme God is an action which no creature of his can will without the greatest inordinateness. The will to commit murder, or to steal another's property, is essentially an evil will, because it tends to an evil object. On the contrary, to love God, to relieve human misery, to show love, honour, and reverence to one's parents, are good actions, because these objects are good, and the will that tends to them is good.

Human actions, then, derive their specific morality from the object, whenever that object is of itself conformable to rational human nature or, on the contrary, not conformable to it. If the object is indifferent, without any objective moral quality, as walking, the action will derive its morality from the circumstances in which the action is performed.

Point II

The End

1. By the end is here understood the reason or motive which induces the agent to act.

The end of all human life is called the last end; other motives for action are intermediate ends. An end is primary if it holds the first place among several, and would be sufficient by itself to induce action; otherwise it is secondary.

2. It is obvious that the end or motive which induces the agent to act holds a very prominent place among the sources of the morality of an action. For it is the object to which the will tends, the prospect of gaining which moves the agent to act; but, as we saw in the last point, the motion of the will takes its moral quality from the object; a will, then, which tends to a good end will so far be good; a will which tends to a bad end will be bad. But the morality of an action resides chiefly in the will, so that a good or bad will, derived from the motive of an action, must necessarily contribute to the goodness or badness of that action. It is the end or motive which sets the will in motion and gives its own moral quality to the action which follows. One, then, who steals money in order to be able to commit adultery commits a sin against justice, induced thereto by a desire to sin against chastity, and as St Thomas, following Aristotle, says, he is more of an adulterer than a thief. ^[21]

3. The end which the agent has in view may coincide with the natural scope of the action, as when a man eats to support life. The extrinsic end is then said to correspond with the intrinsic end of the object. Or it may be different, as when a man eats merely for the sake of pleasure; and a man may be moved to action by a variety of subordinate ends, as when he eats to keep up his strength, to be able to work, to obtain the money wherewith to be able to support his family, and so fulfil his duty.

4. If the object of the action be good, and the extrinsic end of the agent be good also, the action will have a twofold merit. And so there is a twofold merit in giving an alms to relieve distress for the love of God. On the other hand, a grievously sinful motive corrupts and makes an otherwise good action grievously wrong. It turns the agent altogether away from God, his last end. And so it would be a mortal sin to give an alms to a poor woman in order to seduce her.

Even a venially sinful motive, if it be the whole or the primary motive for the action, corrupts the whole act and makes it venially sinful; for then a bad object is sought by good means indeed, but the means are infected with the purpose to which they are prostituted. And so one who preaches merely out of vanity commits a venial sin.

If, however, an end be only venially sinful, and be not the whole or primary motive of the agent, the resulting action will be partly good and partly evil. We suppose that the object is good, a partial motive or motives are also good; in this case a partial and secondary bad motive, which is only Venially sinful, cannot corrupt the whole action. One who preaches principally out of obedience, but more willingly because his vanity is flattered, performs an action which is substantially good, but which is infected with a slight defect.

5. A good motive gives its own moral quality to an indifferent action and makes it good. And so I do an act of charity by depriving a man of a knife with which he was threatening to commit suicide, while the same action done with a view to making the knife my own would be theft.

There is a controversy among theologians as to whether the purpose or intention with which an action is performed can make an action unjust, which, apart from that intention, is not so.

Would a man, for example, be guilty of an act of injustice towards his enemy, and bound to make restitution to him, if he committed a crime, foreseeing and intending that it should be imputed to his enemy, who would be punished for it? Of course he is guilty of a grave sin by giving way to such an act of hatred, and if by any means he procures the false accusation of his enemy he is also guilty of injustice by causing his undeserved punishment. But supposing the false accusation, though foreseen, was in no way procured by him, but was brought about by other causes, would his intention make him guilty of injustice towards his enemy and bound to make restitution to him?

Many theologians affirm tha,t it would, ^[22] but seeing that the false accusation is indeed occasioned by the crime, but not caused by it, it would seem that the bad intention of the man who committed the crime was incapable of supplying the causal connection between the crime and the false accusation. The intention alone cannot change the nature of the external action. But if this be so, he is not the effective cause of the injury done to his enemy, and he is not bound to make restitution to him.

A good intention certainly cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to tell a lie even to save another's life, according to the teaching of Innocent III. Evil must not be done that good may come of it. This is the teaching of Holy Scripture and of the Catholic Church, nor have Jesuits any other doctrine different from that of the Church. Father Dasbach promised to give anyone two thousand florins who would prove in opejn court that the Jesuits had ever taught that the end justifies the means. Count Paul von Hoensbroech undertook to do so, but he failed in his suit when it was tried at Cologne in the spring of 1905. ^[23]

6. Here we must touch upon a question which has raised a good deal of controversy among divines, and which still divides them. Some, following the great St Augustine, hold that it is a venial sin to eat and to perform other operations of our animal nature for the sake of the pleasure which they give us. Others, on the contrary, hold that the sensible pleasure which accompanies the satisfaction of our animal appetites is good, inasmuch as it is natural and intended by the Author of nature, and so to perform actions which are not wrong in themselves from the motive of pleasure cannot be sinful. If it were not for the sake of the pleasure afforded by eating and by other animal functions many men would abstain from them altogether through disgust. The imperious stimulus of our fleshly appetites and their satisfaction is required for the preservation and increase of the human race. These satisfactions of our animal nature must indeed be ruled and moderated by right reason, the norm of human conduct. If they are thus moderated, they are conformable to man's nature, they are in right order and morally good. This seems to be the teaching of St Thomas; ^[24] it is the commoner opinion among modern theologians, nor is it involved in the condemnation of the eighth and ninth propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679. ^[25]

Point III

On the Circumstances of an Action

I. By the circumstances of an action we understand certain accidental conditions, which, as it were, surround (circumstant) and complete the substance of the action. There are seven enumerated in the doggerel line

Who, what, where, when, by what means, why, and how.

The circumstance indicated by who does not signify the agent merely as the author of the action; the action must necessarily be done by someone; but it signifies some special quality in him or condition which affects the morality of the action. Thus if a son strike his father, the circumstance of the parental relation changes the morality of the act, and makes it a sin not only against justice, but also against the fourth commandment or the virtue of piety. If a thief steals a consecrated chalice, the sacredness of the object makes the sin a sacrilegious theft, a circumstance indicated by what. And so of the rest.

It is obvious that circumstances of this kind are sources of morality, for they make the action conformable or not to the norm of morality. It is against right reason to strike anyone unjustly, but it is still more inordinate to strike a parent. At the proper time it is a good action to play in the proper place and with good playmates; if any of these circumstances be wanting, the action becomes so far bad.

2. Some circumstances affecting the intensity, or quantity, or duration of an action add to or lessen its malice, but they do not change its moral species; such circumstances are called aggravating circumstances. Although they do not change the moral species of the act, they sometimes make a venial sin mortal, or vice versa, as the quantity in theft; they are then said to change the theological species of the action. If the circumstances add to the action a special and distinct malice of their own, they change its moral species, as the sacred object or place in a sacrilegious theft. Such a theft is not only against justice, but also against the virtue of religion.

3. In order that an action may be altogether and simply good, the object, the end, and the circumstances must all be good; for good indicates completeness and perfection; there .is evil in any defect. If all the sources of morality are evil, the action may have a triple malice; as when a thief steals Church plate in order to be able to indulge his vicious propensities. If only one source or circumstance of an action be mortally sinful, the perpetration of it turns the evil-doer away from God and makes the action wholly bad. An accidental and secondary circumstance, when only venially sinful, does not corrupt the whole action; it only lessens its merit. Thus it is a grievous sacrilege to receive Holy Communion in a state of mortal sin; a state of venial sin only makes the Communion less fruitful.

SECTION III

On Merit

I. It follows from what has been said in the preceding section, that an action will be morally good if the object, end, and circumstances are good. The object, end, and circumstances will be good if they are conformable to man's rational nature and to the eternal law of God. An opinion was held by some theologians that besides these conditions it is necessary to refer, actually or at least virtually, all our actions to God; otherwise they will at least be venially sinful. These theologians rested their opinion on certain texts of Holy Scripture and on passages from some of the Fathers, especially St Augustine. The principal Scripture text is from St Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, x 31: " Therefore whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do; do all to the glory of God." There are various interpretations of the passage, but the meaning seems plain from the context. St Paul is teaching the Corinthians the duty of avoiding scandal to Jews, Gentiles, and to the Church of God. They must so order their actions, even those that are indifferent in themselves, such as eating certain kinds of food, as not to be a cause of offence to others. Then will their actions all tend to the honour and glory of God, then will they do all things in charity (i Cor. xv 14). There is obviously no word here which can be legitimately construed into a command to direct all our actions to God by an actual or virtual intention of the will. Such a merely internal act would not tend to edify others, and in the text quoted this is what St Paul is urging the Corinthians to do. Other passages which are quoted in support of the opinion are similarly capable of being explained in a sense which affords the opinion no support. It is indeed a truth, which is insisted on by other theologians, that if an action be honest and good and performed because it is conformable to right order, it is thereby implicitly directed to God, who wills the observance of right order, and who is himself the end to which rightly ordered action tends. In this sense it is true that every good action must be referred to God; but every good action is thus referred to him by the very fact that the object, the end, and the circumstances are good.^[26]

2. Something else is required to make a naturally good action supernaturally meritorious. The question of merit belongs to the dogmatic treatise on grace; here it will be sufficient to give something about the subject in outline, in order to round off our treatment of human acts.

Merit in general is a certain value in an action which gives the agent the right to be rewarded by him in whose behalf the action is performed. Merit, then, with God will be a right to be rewarded for one's actions by God. Theologians distinguish between condign and congruous merit. The former implies that there is some sort of equality between the value of the action and the reward, so that the reward is due to the agent in justice. If there is not this equality and title in justice, the merit will be only congruous. We can merit condignly an increase of grace, life eternal, and an increase of glory, as the Council of Trent defined. ^[27] Efficacious graces, by which we receive, preserve, and increase sanctifying grace, and the gift of final perseverance, are the objects of congruous merit.

3. In order that an action may be condignly meritorious, two conditions are required on the part of the agent, two on the part of the action, and one on the part of God.

The agent must be still on his probation in this present life; there is no meriting when man's day is done. He must also be in the state of grace and friendship with God; the actions of one who is out of grace and who is a rebel and an enemy of God cannot deserve any reward from him.

The action itself must be morally good, not bad, as is obvious; and it must be supernatural, elicited by means of grace and from a motive which is rooted in faith. Otherwise it will be merely of the natural order, deserving indeed of a natural reward, but having no proportion to the supernatural end to which we know by faith that man is destined by God.

On the part of God there must be a promise made by him to grant such a reward to such an action. For otherwise, after doing all that we can, we must acknowledge that we are useless servants, who cannot claim anything as due to them in justice from God, their Creator and Lord. He has every claim to our service without our having a strict right to any reward in return. According to the very probable teaching of St Thomas, ^[28] all the deliberate actions of one who is in a state of grace are either meritorious or sinful. In order to be in a state of grace, such a one must have fulfilled all the duties which bind him under pain of grievous sin, and among these is the obligation of eliciting at the proper times an act of love of God. By such an act the just man refers himself and all he does to God, and thus his good actions are elicited by the help of grace and tend to man's supernatural end, the beatific vision of God. In any case, if we are careful frequently to renew our intention of pleasing God, and with his grace remain free from mortal sin, we may rest in the assured hope that all our good actions are meritorious of life eternal.

1. Ecclus. xxxi 10; Trent, sess. 6, can. 5, 6.
2. M. Maher, Psychology, 5th ed., p. 394,
3. St Thomas, i-z, q. 77, a. 7.
4. St Thomas, 1-2, q. i, a. i.
5. Rom. iii 8.
6. Summa, 2-2,, q. 64, a. 7.
7. Suarez, tract. 5, d. 3, sec. 2, n. 6.
8. Theol. Mor. lib. 5, 10.
9. Prop. 2 damn, ab Alex, viii; 68 inter Baianas, can. 2,2,02.
10. Bucceroni, i, n. 51, can. 2229.
11. Trent, sess. 5, de pec. orig.
12. St Thomas, 1-2, q. 77, a. 7, can. 2206.
13. Similarly, those who suffer from illusions may be so demented on the particular point as not to be responsible for actions which they perform under the influence of their illusion. It is a question of fact when this is the case, a fact which it is difficult even for experts to determine. Natural propensities to evil arising from hereditary taint or from temperament lessen the voluntariness of the action just as passion does, but they are not as a rule so strong as to make what in itself is mortally sinful only venial. The struggle against vice is more difficult for those who are subject to such propensities, but as long as they are in their right senses with the help of God's grace they can resist, if only they take the necessary means. The same must be said of those who have strengthened their passions and weakened their will by long indulgence in a habit of sin. V. Frins, De Act. Hum. i, n. 236. " There is not, and there never has been, a person who labours under partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane." C. Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, 1905, p. 174. However, on p. 203 the same author writes: " The majority of insane persons are sane in a considerable proportion of their conduct; and when in this part of their conduct they commit offences they are rightly punishable." Perhaps the explanation of this apparent contradiction lies in a sentence which immediately follows the last. It is this: " Since the limits between the sane and the insane areas of conduct of insane persons are ill defined, no insane person should be punished with the same severity that would be awarded to a sane person for the same offence."
14. Theol. Mor. 5, n. 6.
15. Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.
16. St Alphonsus, 6, n. 442.
17. St Thomas, 3, q. 40, a. 4, ad 3; 1-2, q. 100, a. 8, ad 4; Suarez, De Leg. 3, c. 30, n. 6; Can. 2205, sec. 2.
18. V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 65.
19. St Thomas, 1-3, q. 18, a. 9.
20. Gury, i, n. 26.
21. St Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, a. 6.
22. Lugo, Dejustitia, disp. 8, n. 75.
23. Civilta Cattolica, Oct. 7, 1905, p. 3.
24. Oont. Gent. 3, c. 9, n. i; Summa, 2-2, q. 141, a. i, ad i.
25. V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 505.
26. V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 290.
27. Trent, sess. 6, can. 32.
28. De Malo, q. 2, a. 5, obj. 10; in lib. 2, dist. 40, a. 5, ad 6.