All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Fragments

by Epictetus

 

FRAGMENTS

 

OF

 

EPICTETUS.

 

FRAGMENTS.

OF

EPICTETUS.

FROM

Stobæus, Antonius, and Maximus^[1].

I.

life entangled with Fortune, resembles a wintry Torrent: for it is turbulent, and muddy, and difficult to pass, and violent and noisy, and of short Continuance.

A Soul conversant with Virtue, resembles a perpetual Fountain: for it is clear, and gentle, and potable, and sweet, and communicative, and rich, and harmless, and innocent.

II.

If you would be good, first believe that you are bad.

III.

It is better to offend seldom (owning it when we do), and act often wisely, than to say, we seldom err, and offend frequently.

IV.

Chastise your Passions, that they may not punish you.

V.

Be not so much ashamed of what is void of Glory, as studious to shun what is void of Truth.

VI.

If you would be well spoken of, learn to speak well of others. And, when you have learned to speak well of them, endeavour likewise to do well to them; and thus you will reap the Fruit of being well spoken of by them.

VII.

Freedom is the Name of Virtue; and Slavery, of Vice: and both these are Actions of Choice. But neither of them belongs to Things, in which Choice hath no Share. But Fortune^[2] is accustomed to dispose at her Pleasure of the Body, and those Things relating to the Body in which Choice hath no Share. For no one is a Slave, whose Choice is free. Fortune is an evil Chain to the Body; and Vice, to the Soul. For he whose Body is unbound, and whose Soul is chained, is a Slave. On the contrary, he whose Body is chained, and his Soul unbound, is free. The Chain of the Body, Nature unbinds by Death; and Vice, by^[3] Money: the Chain of the Soul, Virtue unbinds, by Learning, and Experience, and philosophic Exercise.

VIII.

If you would live with Tranquillity and Content, endeavour to have all who live with you, good. And you will have them good, by instructing the Willing, and dismissing the Unwilling^[4]. For together with the Fugitives, will Wickedness and Slavery fly: and with those who remain with you, will Goodness and Liberty be left.

IX.

^[5]It is scandalous, that he who sweetens his Drink by the Gifts of the Bees, should, by Vice, embitter Reason, the Gift of the Gods.

X.

No one, who is a Lover of Money, a Lover of Pleasure, or a Lover of Glory, is likewise a Lover of Mankind: but only he who is a Lover of Virtue.

XI.

As you would not wish to sail in a large, and finely decorated, and gilded Ship, and sink: so neither is it eligible to inhabit a grand and sumptuous House, and be in a Storm [of Passions and Cares].

XII.

When We are invited to an Entertainment, we take what we find: and, if any one should bid the Master of the House set Fish, or Tarts, before him, he would be thought absurd. Yet, in the World, we ask the Gods for what they do not give us; and that, though they have given us so many Things.

XIII.

They are pretty Fellows indeed, said he, who value themselves on Things not in our own Power. I am a better Man than you, says one; for I have many Estates, and you are pining with Hunger. I have been Consul, says another: I am a Governor, a third; and I have a fine Head of Hair, says a fourth. Yet one Horse doth not say to another, "I am better than you; for I have a great deal of Hay, and a great deal of Oats; and I have a Gold Bridle, and embroidered Trappings:" but, "I am swifter than you." And every Creature is better or worse, from its own good or bad Qualities. Is Man, then, the only Creature, which hath no natural good Quality? And must we consider Hair, and Clothes, and Ancestors, [to judge of him]?

XIV.

Patients are displeased with a Physician, who doth not prescribe to them; and think he gives them over. And why are none so affected towards a Philosopher, as to conclude, he despairs of their Recovery to a right Way of Thinking, if he tells them nothing, which may be for their Good?

XV.

They who have a good Constitution of Body, support Heats and Colds: and so they, who have a right Constitution of Soul, bear [the Attacks of] Anger, and Grief, and immoderate Joy, and the other Passions.

XVI.

Examine yourself, whether you had rather be rich, or happy: and, if rich, be assured, that this is neither a Good, nor altogether in your own Power: but, if happy, that this is both a Good, and in your own Power: since the one is a temporary Loan of Fortune^[6], and the other depends on Choice.

XVII.

As when you see a Viper, or an Asp, or a Scorpion, in an Ivory or Gold Box, you do not love, or think it happy, on Account of the Magnificence of the Materials, in which it is inclosed; but shun and detest it, because it is of a pernicious Nature: so likewise, when you see Vice lodged in the midst of Wealth, and the swelling Pride of Fortune, be not struck by the Splendour of the Materials, with which it is surrounded; but despise the base Alloy of its Manners.

XVIII.

Riches are not among the Number of Things, which are good: Prodigality is of the Number of those, which are evil: Rightness of Mind, of those which are good. Now Rightness of Mind invites to Frugality, and the Acquisition of Things that are good but Riches invite to Prodigality, and seduce from Rightness of Mind. It is difficult therefore for a rich Person to be right-minded; or a right-minded Person, rich^[7].

XIX.

^[8]———Just as if you had been bred and born in a Ship, you would not be eager to become the Pilot. For neither would the Ship have any natural and perpetual Connexion^[9] with you there; nor have Riches here; but Reason every where. That therefore, which is natural and congenial to you, Reason, think likewise to be in a peculiar Manner your own, and take care of it.

XX.

If you were born in Persia, you would not endeavour to live in Greece; but to be happy in the Place where you are. Why then, if you are born in Poverty, do you endeavour to be rich, and not to be happy in the Condition where you are?

XXI.

As it is better to lie straitened for Room upon a little Couch in Health, than to toss upon a wide Bed in Sickness; so it is better to contract yourself within the Compass of a small Fortune, and be happy, than to have a great one, and be wretched.

XXII.

It is not Poverty that causes Sorrow; but covetous^[10] Desires: nor do Riches deliver from Fear; but Reasoning. If, therefore, you acquire a Habit of Reasoning, you will neither desire Riches, nor complain of Poverty.

XXIII.

A horse is not elated, and doth not value himself on his fine Manger or Trappings, or Saddle-cloths; nor a Bird, on the warm Materials of its Nest: but the former, on the Swiftness of his Feet; and the latter, of its Wings. Do not you, therefore, glory in your Eating, or Dress; or, briefly, in any external Advantage; but in Good nature and Beneficence.

XXIV.

There is a Difference between living well, and living profusely. The one arises from Contentment, and Order, and Decency, and Frugality: the other from Dissoluteness, and Luxury, and Disorder, and Indecency. In short, to the one belongs true Praise; to the other, Censure. If, therefore, you would live well, do not seek to be praised for Profuseness:

XXV.

Let the first satisfying of Appetite be always the Measure to you of eating and drinking; and Appetite itself the Sawce and the Pleasure. Thus you will never take more [Food] than is necessary, nor will you want Cooks: and you will be contented with whatever Drink falls in your Way^[11].

XXVI.

Be careful not to^[12] thrive by the Meats in your Stomach; but by Chearfulness in the Soul. For the former, as you see, are evacuated, and carried off together; but the latter, though the Soul be^[13] separated, remains uncorrupted, and sincere.

XXVII.

In every Feast remember, that there are two Guests to be entertained, the Body, and the Soul: and that what you give the Body, you presently lose; but what you give the Soul, remains for ever.

XXVIII.

Do not mix Anger with Profusion, and set them before your Guests. Profusion makes its Way through the Body, and is quickly gone: but Anger, when it hath penetrated the Soul, abides for a long Time. Take care, not to be transported with Anger, and affront your Guests, at a great Expence; but rather delight them at a cheap Rate, by gentle Behaviour.

XXIX.

Take care at your Meals, that the Attendants be not more in Number than those whom they are to attend. For it is absurd, that many Persons should wait on a few Chairs.

XXX.

It would be best, if both while you are personally making your Preparations, and while you are feasting at Table, you could give among the Servants Part of what is before you^[14]. But, if such a Thing be difficult at that Time, remember, that you, who are not weary, are attended by those who are; you, who are eating and drinking, by those who are not; you who are talking, by those who are silent; you who are at Ease, by those who are under Constraint^[15]: and thus you will never be heated into any unreasonable Passion yourself; nor do any Mischief, by provoking another.

XXXI.

Strife and Contention are always absurd; but particularly unbecoming at Table Conversations. For a Person warmed with Wine will never either teach, or be convinced by, one who is sober. And where-ever Sobriety is wanting, the End will show, that you have exerted yourself to no Purpose.

XXXII.

Grashoppers are musical; but Snails are dumb. The one rejoice in being wet; and the others, in being warm. Then the Dew calls out the one; and for this they come forth: but, on the contrary, the Noon-day Sun awakens the other; and in this they sing. If, therefore, you would be a musical and harmonious Person, whenever, in Parties of Drinking, the Soul is bedewed with Wine, suffer her not to go forth, and defile herself. But when, in Parties of Conversation, she glows by the Beams of Reason, then command her to speak from Inspiration, and utter the Oracles of Justice.

XXXIII.

Consider him, with whom you converse, in one of these three Ways; either as superior to you [in Abilities], or inferior, or equal. If superior, you ought to hear him, and be convinced if inferior, to convince^[16] him: if equal, to agree with him; and thus you will never be found guilty of Litigiousness.

XXXIV.

It is better, by yielding to Truth, to conquer Opinion; than by yielding to Opinion, to be defeated by Truth.

XXXV.

If you seek Truth, you will not seek to conquer by all possible Means: and, when you have found Truth, you will have a Security against being conquered.

XXXVI.

Truth conquers by itself, Opinion, by foreign Aids.

XXXVII.

It is better, by living with one free Person, to be fearless, and free, than to be a Slave in Company with many.

XXXVIII.

What you avoid suffering yourself, attempt not to impose on others. You avoid Slavery, for instance: take care not to enslave. For, if you can bear to exact Slavery from others, you appear to have been first yourself a Slave. For Vice hath no Communication with Virtue; nor Freedom with Slavery. As a Person in Health would not wish to be attended by the Sick, nor to have those who live with him be in a State of Sickness; so neither would a Person who is free, bear to be served by Slaves, or to have those who live with him in a State of Slavery.

XXXIX.

Whoever you are, that would live at a Distance from Slaves, deliver yourself from Slavery. And you will be free, if you deliver yourself from [the Power of] Appetite. For neither was Aristides called Just, nor Epaminondas, Divine, nor Lycurgus, a Preserver, because they were rich, and were served by Slaves; but because, being poor, they delivered Greece from Slavery.

XL.

If you would have your House securely inhabited, imitate the Spartan Lycurgus. And as he did not inclose his City with Walls, but fortified the Inhabitants with Virtue, and preserved the City always free; so do you likewise: not surround yourself with a great Court-yard, nor raise high Towers; but strengthen those that live with you by Benevolence, and Fidelity, and Friendship. And thus nothing hurtful will enter, even if the whole Band of Wickedness was set in Array against it.

XLI.

Do not hang your House round with Tablets, and Pictures; but adorn it with Sobriety. For those are merely foreign, and a^[17] fading Deception of the Eyes: but this, a congenial, and indelible, and perpetual Ornament to the House.

XLII.

Instead of Herds of Oxen, endeavour to assemble Flocks of Friends about your House.

XLIII.

As a Wolf resembles a Dog, so doth a Flatterer, and an Adulterer, and a Parasite, resemble a Friend. Take heed, therefore, that instead of Guardian Dogs, you do not inadvertently admit ravening Wolves.

XLIV.

He is void of true Taste, who strives to have his House admired, by decorating it with a showish Outside: but to adorn our Characters by the Gentleness of a communicative Temper, is at once a Proof of good Taste, and Good-nature.

XLV.

If you admire little Things, in the first Place, you will never^[18] be thought to deserve great ones: but, if you despise little Things, you will be greatly admired.

XLVI.

Nothing is meaner than the Love of Pleasure, the Love of Gain, and Insolence. Nothing is nobler than Magnanimity, Meekness, and Good-nature.

XLVII.

——Producing the Sentiments of those intractable Philosophers, who do not think [the Enjoyment of] Pleasure to be [in itself] the natural State of Man; but merely an adventitious Circumstance of those things, in which his natural State consists, Justice, Sobriety, and Freedom. For what manner of Reason then should the Soul rejoice, and feel a Serenity from the lesser Good of the Body, as Epicurus says [it doth]; and not be pleased with its own Good, which is the very greatest? And yet Nature hath given me likewise a Sense of Shame: and I am covered with Blushes, when I think I have uttered any indecent Expression. This Emotion will not suffer me to lay down Pleasure as [in itself] a Good, and the End of Life.

XLVIII.

The Ladies at Rome have Plato's Republic in their Hands, because he allows a Community of Wives: for they attend merely to the Words of the Author, and not to his Sense. For he doth not first order one Man and one Woman to marry and live together, and then allow a Community of Wives: but he abolishes that kind of Marriage, and introduces one of another kind^[19]. And, in general, Men are pleased in finding out Excuses for their own Faults. Yet Philosophy says, it is not fit even to move a Finger without some Reason.

XLIX.

The more rarely the Objects of Pleasure occur, the more delightful they are.

L.

Whenever any one exceeds Moderation, the most delightful things may become the most undelightful.

LI.

Agrippinus was justly entitled to Praise on this Account, that, though he was a Man of the highest Worth, he never praised himself; but blushed, even if another praised him. And he was a Man of such a Character, as to write in Praise of every harsh Event that befel him if he was feverish, of a Fever; if disgraced, of Disgrace; if banished, of Banishment. And, when once, as he was going to dine, a Messenger brought him Word, that Nero ordered him to Banishment; Well then, says Agrippinus, we will dine at Aricia^[20].

LII.

Diogenes affirmed no Labour to be good, unless the End was a due State and Tone of the Soul, and not of the Body,

LIII.

As a true Balance is neither set right by a true one, nor judged by a false one:^[21] so likewise a just Person is neither set right by just Persons, nor judged by unjust ones.

LIV.

As what is straight hath no need of what is straight, so neither what is just, of what is just, [to assist or amend it].

LV.

Do not give Judgment from another Tribunal, before you have been judged yourself at the Tribunal of Justice^[22].

LVI.

If you would give a just Sentence, mind neither Parties nor Pleaders; but the Cause itself.

LVII.

You will commit the fewest Faults in judging, if you are faultless in your own Life,

LVIII.

It is better, by giving a just Judgment, to be^[23] blamed by him who is deservedly condemned, than by giving an unjust Judgment, to be justly censured by Nature.

LIX.

As the Touch-stone which tries Gold, is not itself tried by the Gold; such is he, who hath the Rule of judging.

LX.

It is scandalous for a Judge to be judged by others.

LXI.

As nothing is straighter than what is straight, so nothing is juster than what is just^[24].

LXII.

Who among you do not admire the Action of Lycurgus the Lacedemonian? For when he had been deprived of one of his Eyes, by one of the Citizens, and the People had delivered the young Man to him, to be punished in whatever Manner he should think proper; Lycurgus forbore to give him any Punishment. But, having instructed, and rendered him a good Man, he brought him into the Theatre: and, while the Lacedemonians were struck with Admiration; "I received," says he, "this Person from you, injurious and violent, and I restore him to you gentle, and a good Citizen."

LXIII.

When Pittacus had been unjustly treated by some Person, and had the Power of chastising him, he let him go; saying, "Forgiveness is better than Punishment: for the one is the Proof of a gentle, the other of a savage Nature."

LXIV.

——But, above all, this is the Business of Nature, to connect and mutually adapt the Exertion of the active Powers^[25] to the Appearance of what is fit and beneficial.

LXV.

It is the Character of the most meanspirited and foolish Men, to suppose they shall be despised by others; unless, by every Method, they hurt those who are first their Enemies^[26].

LXVI.

When you are going to attack any one with Vehemence and Threatning, remember to say first to yourself, that you are [by Nature] a gentle Animal, and that by doing nothing violent, you shall live without Repentance, and without need of being set right.

LXVII.

We ought to know, that it is not easy for a Man to form a Principle of Action, unless he daily speaks and hears the same things, and, at the same time, accommodates them to the Use of Life.

LXVIII.

Nicias was so intent on Business, that he often asked his Domestics, whether he had bathed, and whether he had dined.

LXIX.

While Archimedes was intent on his Diagrams, his Servants drew him away by Violence, and anointed^[27] him, and, after his Body was anointed, he traced his Figures upon that.

LXX.

When Lampis, the Sea Commander, was asked how he acquired Riches: "A great deal," said he, “without Difficulty, but a little with Labour."

LXXI.

Solon, when he was silent at an Entertainment, being asked by Periander, whether he was silent for want of Words, or from Folly; "No Fool," answered he, "can be silent at a Feast."

LXXII.

Consult nothing so much, upon every Occasion, as Safety. Now it is safer to be silent, than to speak: and omit speaking whatever is not accompanied with Sense and Reason.

LXXIII.

As Light-houses in Havens, by kindling a great Flame from a few Faggots, afford a considerable Assistance to Ships wandering on the Sea: so an illustrious Person, in a State harrassed by Storms, while he is contented with little himself, confers great Benefits on his Fellow-Citizens.

LXXIV.

——As you would certainly, if you undertook to steer a Ship, learn the Steersman's Art. For it will be in your Power, as in that Case, to steer the whole Ship: so, in this, the whole State.

LXXV.

If you have a mind to adorn your City by consecrated Monuments, first consecrate in yourself the most beautiful Monument of Gentleness, and Justice, and Benevolence.

LXXVI.

You will confer the greatest Benefits on your City, not by raising the Roofs, but by exalting the Souls [of your Fellow-Citizens]. For it is better, that great Souls should live in small Habitations, than that abject Slaves should burrow in great Houses.

LXXVII.

Do not variegate the Structure of your Walls with Euboean and Spartan Stone: but adorn both the Minds of the Citizens, and of those who govern them, by the Grecian Education. For Cities are made good Habitations by the Sentiments of those who live in them; not by Wood or Stone.

LXXVIII.

As, if you were to breed Lions, you would not be solicitous about the Magnificence of their Dens, but the Qualities of the Animals [themselves]: so, if undertake to preside over your Fellow-Citizens, be not so solicitous about the Magnificence of the Buildings, as careful of the Fortitude of those who inhabit them.

LXXIX.

As a skilful Manager of Horses doth not feed the good Colts, and suffer the unruly ones to starve; but feeds them both alike; only whips one more, to make him draw equally with his Fellow: so a Man of Care, and Skill in the Art of Civil Government, endeavours to do^[28] Good to the well-disposed Citizens, but not at once to destroy those that are otherwise. He by no means denies Subsistence to either of them: only he disciplines and urges on, with the greater Vehemence, him who resists Reason and the Laws.

LXXX.

As neither a Goose is alarmed by Gaggling, nor a Sheep by Bleating: so neither be you terrified by the Voice of a senseless Multitude.

LXXXI.

As you do not comply with a Multitude, when it injudiciously asks of you any Part of your own Property: so neither be disconcerted by a Mob, when it endeavours to force you to any unjust Compliance.

LXXXII.

Pay in, before you are called upon, what is due to the Public, and you will never be asked for what is not due.

LXXXIII.

As the Sun doth not wait for Prayers and Incantations, to be prevailed on to rise, but immediately shines forth, and is received with universal Salutation; so neither do you wait for Applauses, and Shouts, and Praises, in order to do Good; but be a voluntary Benefactor; and you will be beloved like the Sun^[29].

LXXXIV.

A Ship ought not to be fixed by one Anchor; nor Life on a single Hope^[30].

LXXXV.

We ought not to stretch either our Legs or our Hopes to a Point they cannot reach.

LXXXVI.

Thales, being asked, what was the most universally enjoyed of all things, answered, "Hope for they have it, who have nothing else."

LXXXVII.

It is more necessary for the Soul to be cured, than the Body: for it is better to die, than to live ill.

LXXXVIII.

Pyrrho used to say, "There is no Difference between living and dying." A Person asked him, Why then do not you die? "Because," answered Pyrrho, "there is no Difference^[31]."

LXXXIX.

Nature is admirable, and, as Xenophon says, fond of Life. Hence we love, and take Care of the Body, which is of all things the most unpleasant and squalid. For if we were obliged, only for five Days, to take care of our Neighbour's Body, we could not support it. For only consider what it would be, when we get up in a Morning, to wash the Teeth of others, and do all requisite Offices besides. In reality, it is wonderful we should love a thing, which every Day demands so much Attendance. I stuff this Sack, and then I empty it again. What is more troublesome? But I must obey God. Therefore I stay, and bear to wash, and feed, and clothe this paltry, miserable Body. When I was younger, he commanded me something still more, and I bore it. And will you not, when Nature, which gave the Body, takes it away, bear that? "I love it;" say you. Well: this is what I have just been observing: and this very Love hath Nature given you: but she also says, "Now let it go, and have no farther Trouble."

XC.

When a young Man dies, [an old one] accuses the gods, that, at the Time when he ought to be at rest, he is incumbered with the Troubles of Life. Yet,^[32] nevertheless, when Death approaches, he wishes to live; and sends for the Physician, and intreats him to omit no Care or Pains. It is marvellous, that Men should not be willing either to live, or die.

XCI.

To a longer and worse Life, a shorter and better is by all Means to be preferred by every one.

XCII.

When we are Children, our Parents deliver us to the Care of a Tutor: who is continually to watch over us, that we get no Hurt. When we are become Men, God delivers us to the Guardianship of an implanted Conscience. We ought by no means then to despise this Guardian: for it will both displease^[33] God, and we shall be Enemies to our own conscious Principle.

XCIII.

Riches ought to be used as the Materials of some Action; and not upon every Оссаsion alike.

XCIV.

All Men should rather wish for Virtue than Wealth; which is dangerous to the Foolish: for Vice is increased by Riches. And in proportion as any one is destitute of Understanding, into the more injurious Excess he flies out, by having the Means of gratifying the Rage of his Pleasures.

XCV.

What ought not to be done, be not even suspected [or, entertain not even a Thought] of doing^[34].

XCVI.

Deliberate much before you say and do any thing for it will not be in your Power to recall what is said or done.

XCVII.

Every Place is safe to him who lives with Justice.

XCVIII.

Crows pick out the Eyes of the Dead, when they are no longer of any Use. But Flatterers destroy the Soul of the Living, and blind its Eyes.

XCIX.

The Anger of a Monkey, and the Threats of a Flatterer, deserve equal Regard.

C.

Kindly receive those, who are willing to give good Advice: but not those, who upon every Occasion are eager to flatter. For the former truly see what is advantageous: but the latter consider only the Opinions of their Superiors; and imitate the Shadows of Bodies, by nodding Assent to what they say.

CI.

A Monitor ought, in the first Place, to have a Regard to the Delicacy and Sense^[35] of Shame of the Person admonished. For they, who are hardened against a Blush, are incorrigible.

CII.

It is better to admonish than reproach: for the one is mild and friendly; the other, harsh and affronting: and the one corrects the Faulty; the other only convicts them.

CIII.

^[36]Communicate to Strangers, and Persons in Need, according to your Ability^[37]. For he who gives nothing to the Needy, shall receive nothing in his own Need.

CIV.

A Person once brought Clothes to a Pirate, who had been cast ashore, and almost killed by the Severity of the Weather; then carried him to his House, and furnished him with other Conveniencies. Being reproached by some Person, for doing Good to bad People; "I have paid this Regard," answered he, "not to the Man, but to human Nature.'

CV.

We ought not to chuse every Pleasure: but that, which tends to something good.

CVI.

It is the Character of a Wise Man, to resist Pleasure; and of a Fool, to be enslaved by it.

CVII.

In all Vice, Pleasure being presented like a Bait, draws sensual Minds to the Hook of Perdition.

CVIII.

Chuse rather to punish your Appetites, than to be punished by them.

CIX.

No one is free, who doth not command himself.

CX.

The Vine bears three Clusters. The first, of Pleasure; the second, of Intoxication; the third, of Outrage^[38].

CXI.

Do not talk much over Wine, to shew your Learning: for your Discourse will be loathsome.

CXII.

He is a Drunkard, who takes more than three Glasses and though he be not drunk, he hath exceeded Moderation.

CXIII.

^[39]Let Discourse of God be renewed every Day, preferably to our Food.

CXIV.

Think oftener of God, than you breathe.

CXV.

If you always remember, that God stands by, an Inspector of whatever you do, either in Soul or Body: you will never err, either in your Prayers or Actions; and you will have God abiding with you.

CXVI.

As it is pleasant to view the Sea from the Shore so it is pleasant to one who hath escaped, to remember his past Labours.

CXVII.

The Intention of the Law is, to benefit human Life: but it cannot, when Men themselves chuse to suffer: for it discovers its proper Virtue in the Obedient.

CXVIII.

As Physicians are the Preservers of the Sick; so are the Laws, of the Injured.

CXIX.

The justest Laws are the truest.

CXX.

It is decent to yield to a Law, to a Governor, and to a wiser Man.

CXXI.

Things, done contrary to Law, are the same as if they were undone.

CXXII.

In Prosperity, it is very easy to find a Friend; in Adversity, nothing is so difficult.

CXXIII.

Time delivers Fools from Grief: and Reason, wise Men.

CXXIV.

He is a Man of Sense, who doth not grieve for what he hath not; but rejoices in what he hath.

CXXV.

Epictetus being asked, how a Person might grieve his Enemy, answered, "By doing as well as possible himself."

CXXVI.

Let no wise Man estrange himself from the Government of the State: for it is both impious to withdraw from being useful to those that need it, and cowardly to give way to the Worthless. For it is foolish to chuse rather to be governed ill, than to govern well.

CXXVII.

Nothing is more^[40] becoming a Governor, than to despise no one, nor be insolent; but to preside over all impartially.

CXXVIII.

Any Person may live happy in Poverty; but few, in Wealth and Power. So great is the Advantage of Poverty, that no^[41] Man, observant of the Laws of Life, would change it for disreputable Wealth: unless, indeed, Themistocles, the Son of Neocles, the most wealthy of the Athenians, in a Poverty of Virtue, was better than Aristides and Socrates. But both himself and his Wealth are perished, and without a Name. For a bad Man loses all in Death; but Virtue is eternal.

CXXIX.

[Remember] that such is, and was, and will be, the Nature of the World; nor is it possible that things should be otherwise, than they now are: and that not only Men, and other Animals upon Earth, partake of this Change and Transformation, but the Divinities also. For indeed even the four Elements are transformed and changed up and down: and Earth becomes Water, and Water Air, and this again is transformed into other things. And the same Manner of Transformation happens from things above to those below. Whoever endeavours to turn his Mind towards these Points, and persuade himself to receive with Willingness what cannot be avoided, he will pass his Life with Moderation and Harmony.

CXXX.

He who is discontented with things present, and allotted by Fortune, is unskilful in Life. But he who bears them, and the Consequences arising from them, nobly and rationally, is worthy to be esteemed a good Man.

CXXXI.

All things obey, and are subservient to, the World^[42]; the Earth, the Sea, the Sun, and other Stars, and the Plants and Animals of the Earth. Our Body likewise obeys it, in being sick, and well, and young, and old, and passing through the other Changes, whenever That decrees. It is therefore reasonable, that what depends on ourselves, that is, our Judgment, should not be the only Rebel to it. For the World is powerful, and superior, and consults the best for us, by governing us in Conjunction with the Whole. Farther: Opposition, besides that it is unreasonable, and produces nothing except a vain Struggle, throws us likewise into Pain and Sorrows.

 

 

^[43]The following FRAGMENTS are ascribed jointly to Epictetus and other Authors.

I.

Contentment, as it is a short and delightful Way, hath much Gracefulness and little Trouble.

II.

Fortify yourself with Contentment: for this is an impregnable Fortress.

III.

Prefer nothing to Truth, not even the Choice of Friendship, lying within the Reach of the Passions: for by them Justice is both confounded and darkened.

IV.

Truth is an immortal and an eternal thing. It bestows, not a Beauty which` Time will wither, nor a Boldness of which the Sentence of a Judge can^[44] deprive us; but [the Knowledge of] what is just and lawful, distinguishing from them, and confuting what is unjust.

V.

We should have neither a blunt Sword, nor an^[45] ineffectual Boldness of Speech.

VI.

Nature hath given Man one Tongue, but two Ears, that we may hear twice as much as we speak.

VII.

Nothing is in reality either pleasant or unpleasant by Nature; but all things are effected by Custom.

VIII.

Chuse the best Life: for Custom will make it pleasant.

IX.

Chuse rather to leave your Children well instructed, than rich. For the Hopes of the Learned are better than the Riches of the Ignorant.

X.

A Daughter is a Possession to a Father; which is not his own.

XI.

The same Person advised the leaving Modesty to Children, rather than Gold.

XII.

The Reproach of a Father is an agreeable Medicine: for the Profit is greater than the Pain.

XIII.

He who succeeds in a Son-in-Law, finds a Son: he who fails in one, loses likewise a Daughter.

XIV.

The Worth of Learning, like that of Gold, is esteemed in every Place.

XV.

He who exercises Wisdom, exercises the Knowledge of God.

XVI.

There is no Animal so beautiful, as a Man adorned by Learning.

XVII.

We ought to fly the Friendship of the Wicked, and the Enmity of the Good.

XVIII.

Necessitous Circumstances prove Friends, and detect Enemies.

XIX.

We ought to do well by our Friends, when they are present; and speak well of them, when they are absent.

XX.

Let not him think he is loved by any, who loves none.

XXI.

We ought to chuse both a Physician and a Friend, not the most agreeable, but the most useful.

XXII.

If you would lead a Life without Sorrow, consider things which will happen, as if they had already happened.

XXIII.

Be exempt from Grief; not like irrational Creatures, from Insensibility; nor from Inconsiderateness, like Fools: but like a Man of Virtue, making Reason the Remedy for Grief.

XXIV.

They whose Minds are the least grieved by Calamities, and whose Actions struggle the most against them, are the greatest both in public and in private Life.

XXV.

They who are well instructed, like those who are exercised in the Palæstra, if they happen to fall, quickly and dextrously rise again from Misfortunes.

XXVI.

We ought to call in Reason, like a good Physician, to our Assistance in Misfortunes.

XXVII.

A Fool intoxicated by a long Course of good Fortune, as by one of Drinking, becomes more senseless.

XXVIII.

Envy is the Adversary of the Fortunate.

XXIX.

He who remembers what Man is, is discontented at nothing which happens.

XXX.

A Pilot and a fair Wind are necessary to a happy Voyage: Reason and Art, to a happy Life.

XXXI.

Good Fortune, like ripe Fruit, ought to be enjoyed while it is present.

XXXII.

He is unreasonable, who is displeased at Events, which happen from natural Necessity.

 

 

The following FRAGMENTS are omitted by Mr. Upton: but as they stand under the Name of Arrian, and seem to be in the spirit of Epictetus, they are added here.

I.

^[46]What does it signify to me, says he, whether the Universe is composed of Atoms or^[47] uncompounded Substances, or of Fire and Earth? Is it not sufficient to know the Essence of Good and Evil, and the proper Bounds of the Desires and Aversions; and, besides those, of the active Powers; and by the making use of these as so many certain Rules, to order the Conduct of Life, and bid these things, which are above us, farewell: which, perhaps, are incomprehensible to human Understanding: but, if one should suppose them ever so comprehensible, still, what is the Benefit of them, when comprehended? And must it not be said, that He gives Himself Trouble to no Purpose, who allots these things as necessary to the Character of a Philosopher.——"What then, is the Delphic Admonition, Know Thyself, superfluous?"——"No, surely, says he."——"What then doth it mean?" If any one should admonish a Performer in a Chorus to know himself, would not he attend to it as a Direction about his^[48] Motions——

II.

^[49]The same Person being asked, Wherein the Diligent have the Advantage of the Slothful? answered, Wherein the Pious have the Advantage of the Impious; in good Hopes.

III.

^[50]Walls give to Cities, and Cultivation of the Understanding to Minds, Ornament and Security.

IV.

^[51]When a young Man was giving himself Airs in a public Place; and saying, that he was grown wise, by conversing with many wise Men; I have conversed too, answered somebody, with many rich Men, but I am not grown rich.

V.

^[52]Socrates, being sent for by^[53] Archelaus, as designing to make him a rich Man, returned him this Answer: "Four Quarts of Meal are sold at Athens for five Farthings, and the Fountains run with Water. If what I have is not sufficient for me, yet I am sufficiently able to make a shift with that; and thus it becomes sufficient for me. Do not you perceive, that it makes no Difference in the Goodness of Polus [the Player's] Voice, whether he performs the Part of Oedipus in his regal State, or when he is a Wanderer, and a Beggar at Colonus? And shall a brave Man appear worse than Polus, and not perform well in whatever Personage is imposed upon him by the Deity? Shall he not imitate Ulysses, who made no worse Figure in Rags than in a fine purple Robe^[54]?"

VI.

There are some Persons who are calmly of a high spirit, and do all the same things quietly, and as it were without Anger, which those do who are hurried with strong Passion. We are to guard, therefore, against the Faults of such Persons, as being much worse than that of violent Anger. For People of the latter Character are quickly satiated with Vengeance; whereas the others extend it to a longer Time, like Persons in a slow Fever.

Footnotes

1. According to Fabricius, in his Bibliotheca Græca, L. V. c. 30. Stobæus was a Heathen: at least, he cites only Heathen Authors. He lived about the Beginning of the Fifth Century. Maximus was a Christian, of the Seventh; and Antonius, surnamed Melissa, or the Bee, of the Eighth Century, or later; some say, of the Twelfth. Their Collections are printed together. The Editions of Stobæus are extremely incorrect: and in him and Maximus, the Names of the Authors quoted, either were frequently wrong originally, or have been altered since. This may have happened to Antonius also: and, consequently, some of the Sayings ascribed to Epictetus may not have been his. Indeed, many of these Fragments have very little the Turn of his other Discourses. The two first, particularly, have a much stronger Resemblance of the Style and Manner of M. Antoninus.
2. The Sense absolutely requires, that ψυχη should be τυχη; and it is so translated.
3. Perhaps, by bringing a Judge, or a Jailer. However, the Sense is not clear.
4. The Translation omits επειτα κεχειρωμενους, which is in Antonius and Maximus, but not in Stobæus
5. This Sentence is ascribed to Pythagoras by Antonius and Maximus de rationali. Serm. 27. p. 75.
6. Της ευδαιμονιας seems to be merely an Interpolation, and is omitted in the Translation.
7. How hardly shall they that have Riches, enter into the Kingdom of God! Mark x. 23.
8. The former Part of the Sentence seems to be wanting; in which, probably, the Author had said, That they who have hereditary Wealth, should not think the Management of it their chief Concern: just as, &c.
9. Συνεστα should, perhaps, be συνηπται.
10. The Latin Translator supposes, that ευθυμια should be επιθυμια, which the Sense requires.
11. I have not translated the Fragment which follows this in Mr. Upton; because I do not understand it.
12. There are various Readings of this Fragment; but none which makes the Sense very clear.
13. It is doubtful whether the Meaning be, that the Effect of a chearful Behaviour will remain after the Person is dead, or after he is separated from the Company.
14. Gesner, for κυβερνας, reads κοινωνεις, which seems the best Sense, and is followed in the Translation.
15. There is something strikingly beautiful and humane in this Consideration about Servants.
16. Απειθειν, probably, should be πειθειν; and is so translated. The α seems to have been added from the preceding Word.
17. In Stobæus, the Word is επικουρος. Gesner, whom Mr. Upton follows, guessed it should be επιηρος. Επικηρος, which the Translation supposes, is a less Alteration, and makes a proper Opposition to what follows.
18. Πρωτον μεγαλων αξιωθηση is the Text of Stobæus. Mr. Upton puts in ουκ, which the Translation follows. Απαξιωθηση is a smaller Change, and the same sense.
19. This, and other shocking things in Plato's Republic, shew how apt even wise Men are to err, without a Guide.
20. See Discourses, B. I. c. 1.
21. Compare this and the next Fragment with 1 Cor. ii. 15.
22. See Rom. xiv. 10.
23. The Antithesis seems to require, that αξιως should be αδικως, and the Translation—unjustly blamed by him, who is condemned.
24. The Stoics held all Virtues, and all Faults to be equal: and this Fragment is one of their Illustrations of that Paradox.
25. The Text has της—φαντασιας; but the true reading seems evidently to be τη φαντασιᾳ; and this the Translation follows.
26. Το δε οιεσθαι ευκαταφρονητους τοις αλλοις εσεσθαι, εαν μη τους πρωτους εχθρους παντι τροπω βλαψωμεν, σφοδρα αγεννων και ανοητων ανθρωπων. Φαμεν γαρ τον ευκαταφρονητον, νοεισθαι μεν και κατα το δυνατον είναι βλαψαι. Αλλα πολυ μαλλον νοειται κατα το δυνατον ειναι ωφελειν.
    This is the whole of the Fragment: of which only the first part, which is too good to be omitted, is translated. The rest I do not understand.
27. The Ancients anointed the Body every Day.
28. The Latin Version supposes that ποιει should be ευποιει. This the sense seems to require; and it is so translated.
29. This Simile is peculiarly beautiful; and hath the force of an Argument in the Discourse of a Stoic, who held the Sun to be animated, and intelligent.
30. This Fragment, in Stobæus, is ascribed to Socrates.
31. See Discourses, B. I. c. 27. Note (a).
32. Ηττον is dropt out of the Text, probably, by Reason of the Similitude of the next Word ὁταν.
33. Απαρεστον, perhaps, should be απαρεστοι.
34. This Fragment is ascribed to Pythagoras, Stob. Serm. I.
35. Φημης in Antonius and Maximus is αισχυνης. And it is so translated here.
36. This and the following Fragment are from Antonius and Maximus, and in the margin stand there, Democriti, Isocratis, and Epicteti: so, probably, they ought to be put in the second Class.
37. The Expression in the Original is the same with Luke xi. 41.
38. This saying is likewise ascribed to Pythagoras.
39. See Deut. vi, 7. Psal. lxxi, 15, 24. cv. 2.
40. Αλλο seems a false reading for μαλλον.
41. If any one thinks this sense of νομιμος harsh, or unsuitable, he may read, φρονιμος, prudent.
42. The Stoics often confound the idea of God with that of the World.
43. I have followed Mr. Upton's Division: but many Fragments in the foregoing Class properly belong to this.
44. Αφαιρει την, probably, should be αφαιρετην, and is so translated.
45. This saying is ascribed by Stobæus to Socrates. Ατακτον, disorderly, is there απρακτον ineffectual: which I have preferred.
46. Stob. de Diis & Physiol. Serm. 211. p. 714. Ed. Francof. 1581.
47. I have translated αμερων as it stands in the Text; but, possibly, it might originally be no more than a marginal Interpretation of ατομων, changing the Full Point into a Comma; or, according to Gesner's Translation, a Corruption of ομοιομεριων.
48. The Sentence seems imperfect.
49. Maximus, περι φιλοπονιας. Serm. 118. p. 374.
50. Ant. & Max. de disciplinâ. Serm. 210. p. 704.
51. Ibid.
52. Stobæus, Compar. Paupertatis & Divitiarum. Serm. 237. p. 778.
53. Archelaus, the Philosopher, was the Master of Socrates: but the Person here mentioned was King of Macedon, who vainly endeavoured to get Socrates to his Court. The Envy of Aristophanes upon this occasion is said to have produced that infamous Piece of Scurrility and Buffoonery his Comedy of the Clouds. See Bayle, in the Article Archelaus.
54. Stobæus. Quod Eventus, &c. p. 324, 329.