All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Introduction

by Epictetus

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INTRODUCTION.

§. 1.he Stoic Sect was founded by Zeno, about three hundred Years before the Christian Æra: and flourished in great Reputation, till the Declension of the Roman Empire. A complete History of this Philosophy would be the Work of a large Volume: and nothing further is intended here, than such a summary View of it, as may be of Use to give a clearer Notion of those Passages in Epictetus, a strict Professor of it, which allude to some of its peculiar Doctrines.

§. 2. That the End of Man is to live conformably to Nature, was universally agreed on amongst all the Philosophers: but, in what that Conformity to Nature consists, was the Point in Dispute. The Epicureans maintained, that it consisted in Pleasure; of which they constituted Sense the Judge^[1]. The Stoics, on the contrary, placed it in an absolute Perfection of the Soul. Neither of them seem to have understood Man in his mixed Capacity; but while the first debased him to a mere Animal, the last exalted him to a pure Intelligence; and both considered him as independent, uncorrupted and sufficient, either by Heighth of Virtue or by well-regulated Indulgence, to his own Happiness. The Stoical Excess was more useful to the Public, as it often produced great and noble Efforts towards that Perfection, to which it was supposed possible for human Nature to arrive. Yet, at the same time, by flattering Man with false and presumptuous Ideas of his own Power and Excellence, it tempted even the best to Pride: a Vice not only dreadfully mischievous in human Society, but, perhaps of all others, the most insuperable Bar to real inward Improvement.

§. 3. Epictetus often mentions Three Topics, or Classes, under which the whole of Moral Philosophy is comprehended. These are, the Desires and Aversions, the Pursuits and Avoidances, or the Exercise of the active Powers, and the Assents of the Understanding.

Ορεξεις
Εκκλισεις.§. 4. The Desires and Aversions were considered as simple Affections of the Mind, arising from the Apprehension, that any thing was conducive to Happiness, or the contrary. The first Care of a Proficient in Philosophy was, to regulate these in such a manner, as never to be disappointed of the one, or incur the other: a Point no otherwise attainable, than by regarding all Externals as absolutely indifferent. Good must always be the Object of Desire, and Evil of Aversion. The Person then, who considers Life, Health, Ease, Friends, Reputation, &c. as Good; and their Contraries as Evil, must necessarily desire the one, and be averse to the other: and, consequently, must often find his Desire disappointed, and his Aversion incurred. The Stoics, therefore, restrained Good and Evil to Virtue and Vice alone: and excluded all Externals from any Share in human Happiness, which they made entirely dependent on a right Choice. From this Regulation of the Desires and Aversions follows that Freedom from Perturbation, Grief, Anger, Pity, &c. and in short, that universal Apathy, which they every-where strongly inculcate.

Ορμας
Αφορμας.§. 5. The next Step to Stoical Perfection was, the Class of Pursuits and Avoidances^[2]. As the Desires and Aversions are simple Affections, the Pursuits and Avoidances are Exertions of the active Powers towards the procuring or declining any thing. Under this Head was comprehended the whole System of moral Duties, according to their incomplete Ideas of them: and a due Regard to it was supposed to ensure a proper Behaviour in all the social Relations. The constant Performance of what these point out, naturally followed from a Regulation of the Desires and Aversions in the first Topic: for where the Inclinations are exerted and restrained as they ought, there will be nothing to mislead us in Action.

§. 6. The last Topic, and the Completion of the Stoic Character, was that of the Assents^[3]. As the second was to produce a Security from Failure in Practice, this was to secure an Infallibility in Judgment, and to guard the Mind from ever either admitting a Falshood, or dissenting from Truth. A wise Man, in the Stoic Scheme, was never to be mistaken, or to form any Opinion. Where Evidence could not be obtained, he was to continue in Suspense. His Understanding was never to be misled, even in Sleep, or under the Influence of Wine, or in a Delirium. In this last Particular, however, there is not a perfect Agreement: and some Authors are so very reasonable, as to admit it possible for a Philosopher to be mistaken in his Judgment, after he hath lost his Senses^[4].

Φαντασιαι.§. 7. The Subjects of these several Classes of philosophic Exercise are, the Appearances of Things^[5]. By these Appearances the Stoics understood the Impressions^[6] made on the Soul, by any Objects, presented either to the Senses, or to the Understanding. Thus a House, an Estate, Life, Death, Pain, Reputation, &c. (considered in the View, under which they are presented to the perceptive Faculties) in the Stoical Sense are, Appearances. The Use of Appearances is common to Brutes, and Men; an intelligent Use of them belongs only to the latter: a Distinction, which is carefully to be observed in reading these Discourses.

Δογματα.§. 8. That Judgment, which is formed by the Mind concerning the Appearances, the Stoics termed Principles: and these Principles give a Determination to the Choice.

Προαιρεσεις.§. 9. The Choice, among the Stoics, signified, either the Faculty of Willing, or a deliberate Election made of some Action, or Course of Life.

Προληψεις.§. 10. As the Appearances respect particular Objects, the Pre-conceptions are general innate Notions, such as they supposed to take original Possession of the Mind, before it forms any of its own^[7]. To adapt these Pre-conceptions to particular Cases, is the Office of Reason and is often insisted on by Epictetus, as a Point of the highest Importance.

Ευροια.§. 11. By the Word, which throughout this Translation is rendered Prosperity, the Stoics understood the internal State of the Mind, when the Affections and active Powers were so regulated, that it considered all Events as happy: and, consequently, must enjoy an uninterrupted Flow of Success: since nothing could fall out contrary to its Wishes^[8].

These, which have been mentioned, are the technical Terms of the greatest Consequence in the Stoic Philosophy: and which, for that Reason, are, except in a very few Places, always rendered by the same English Word. There are other Words used in a peculiar Sense by this Sect: but, as they are not of equal Importance, they are neither so strictly translated, nor need any particular Definition.

§. 12. The Stoics held Logic in the highest Esteem: and often carried it to such a trifling Degree of Subtilty, as rendered their Arguments very tedious and perplexed. The frequent References to logical Questions and the Use of syllogistical Terms, are the least agreeable Part of the Discourses of Epictetus: since, however well they might be understood by some of his Hearers, they are now unintelligible to the greatest Part of his Readers. Indeed, with all his Strength and Clearness of Understanding, he seems to have been hurt by this favourite Science of his Sect. One is sometimes surprised to find his Reasoning incoherent and perplexed: and his Scholars rather silenced by Interrogatories, which they are unable to comprehend, than convinced by the Force of Truth; and then given up by him, as if they were hopeless and unteachable. Yet many a well-meaning Understanding may be lost in a Wood by the Confusion of dialectical Quibbles, which might have been led, without Difficulty, to the Point in view, if it had been suffered to follow the Track of common Sense.

§. 13. The Stoic Scheme of Theology, as it is explained in Cicero, and other antient Writers, appears, in many Parts of it, strangely perplexed and absurd. Some however of this seeming Absurdity may possibly arise from the Use of strong Figures; and the infinite Difficulty of treating a Subject, for which no human Language can supply proper and adequate Terms^[9]. The Writings of the first Founders of the Stoic Philosophy, who treated expressly on Physiology and Metaphysics, are now lost: and all that can be known of their Doctrine is from Fragments, and the Accounts given of them by other Authors. By what can be collected from these, and particularly by the Account which Diogenes Laertius gives of the Stoics, they appear to have held, that there is one supreme God, incorruptible, unoriginated^[10], immortal, rational, and perfect in Intelligence and Happiness: unsusceptible of all Evil: governing the World, and every thing in it, by his Providence: not however of the human Form; but the Creator of the Universe: the Father likewise of all^[11]: and that the several Names of Apollo, Minerva, Ceres, &c. only denote different Exertions of his Power in the different Parts of the Universe^[12]. It would be well, if they had stopt here: but they plainly speak of the World, as God, or of God as the Soul of the World, which they call his Substance^[13]: and I do not recollect any Proof, that they believed Him to exist in the extramundane Space. Yet they held the World to be finite^[14], and corruptible: and that, at certain Periods, it was to undergo successive Conflagrations, and then all Beings were to be resorbed into God, and again reproduced by Him^[15]. What they intended by being resorbed into God, as I do not comprehend, I will not attempt to explain: but I fear they understood by it, a Loss of separate personal Existence. Yet some of the later Stoics departed from this Doctrine of the Conflagration, and supposed the World to be immortal^[16]. Indeed there is often so much Obscurity, and Appearance of Contradiction, in their Expressions, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to form any precise Idea of their Meaning. They who, with Impartiality, read what the ancient Philosophers, of all Sects, have written on the Nature of God, will often find Cause to think, with the utmost Veneration and Gratitude, on the only Book, in which this important Article is explained, so far as is necessary to be known, in a manner perfectly agreeable to the Principles of simple, unperverted Reason. For what it graciously teaches more than Reason could, it confirms by such Evidences of its Authority, as Reason must admit, or contradict itself.

$. 14. The Stoics sometimes define God to be an intelligent, fiery Spirit, without Form, but passing into whatever things it pleases, and assimilating itself to all^[17]: sometimes active operative Fire^[18]. It might be hoped, that these were only metaphorical Phrases, if they did not expressly speak of God as corporeal; which is objected to them by Plutarch^[19]. Indeed they defined all Essence to be Body^[20]. which, probably, they did not discover the ill Tendency, any more than Tertullian; who inconsiderately followed them in this very unphilosophical Notion, that what is not Body, is nothing at all^[21]. His Christian Faith secures him from the Imputation of Impiety: and the just and becoming Manner, in which the Stoics, in many Instances, speak of God, should incline one to form the same favourable Judgment of them: and those Authors seem guilty of great Injustice, who represent them, as little better than Atheists.

§. 15. They held the Eternity of Matter, as a passive Principle; but that it was reduced into Form by God; and that the World was made, and is continually governed by Him^[22]. They sometimes represent him, as modelling the Constitution of the World with supreme Authority^[23]: at others, as limited by the Materials, which He had not the Power to change^[24]. Epictetus may be thought to incline to this latter Opinion^[25]: yet his Words are capable of a different Turn. And there are, perhaps, more Arguments, in the Writings of the Stoics, to prove their Belief of the uncontroulable Power of the Deity in the Formation of things, than those, which some unguarded Expressions appear to furnish against it.

§. 16. Of all the Philosophers the Stoics were the clearest and most zealous Assertors of a particular Providence^[26]: a Belief, which was treated with the utmost Contempt by the Epicureans^[27]. As this Principle is, of all others, the most conducive to the Interest of Virtue, and lays the Foundation of all true Piety, the Stoics are intitled to the highest Honour for their steady Defence of it; and their utter Rejection of the idle, and contemptible Notion, of Chance^[28].

§. 17. By Fate they seem to have understood a Series of Events, appointed by the immutable Counsels of God: or, that Law of his Providence, by which he governs the World^[29]. It is evident by their Writings, that they meant it in no Sense, which interferes with the Liberty of human Actions. Cicero allows, that Chrysippus endeavoured to reconcile Fate with Free Will and that it was contrary to his Intention, that, by a perplexed Way of arguing, he confirmed the Doctrine of Necessity^[30]. Whenever they speak of God, as subject to Fate, which it must be owned they sometimes do in a very strong and unguarded manner, their Meaning seems to be, that his own eternal Will is his Law that he cannot change; because He always ordains what is best^[31]: and that, as Fate is no more than a connected Series of Causes, God is the First Original Cause, on which all the rest depend^[32].

§. 18. They imagined the whole Universe to be peopled with Gods, Genii, and Demons: and among other inferior Divinities reckoned the Sun, Moon, and Stars, which they conceived to be animated and intelligent; or inhabited by particular Deities, as the Body is by the Soul, who presided over them, and directed their Motions^[33].

§. 19. The Stoics held both the above-mentioned Intelligences, and the Souls of Men, to be Portions of the Essence of God^[34], or Parts of the Soul of the World^[35]: and to be corporeal^[36], and perishable^[37]. Some of them indeed maintained, that human Souls subsisted after Death: but that they were, like all other Beings, to be consumed at the Conflagration, Cleanthes taught, that all Souls lasted till that Time: Chrysippus, only those of the Good^[38]. Seneca is perpetually wavering: sometimes speaking of the Soul as immortal; and, at others, as perishing with the Body. And indeed there is nothing but Confusion, and a melancholy Uncertainty, to be met with among the Stoics, on this Subject.

§. 20. There is, I think, very little Evidence to be found, that they believed future Rewards or Punishments, compared with that which appears to the contrary^[39]: at least the Reader will observe, that Epictetus never asserts either. He strongly insists, that a bad Man hath no other Punishment, than being such; and a good Man, no other Reward^[40]: and he tells his Disciple, that, when Want of Necessaries obliges him to go out of Life, he returns to the Four Elements, of which he was made that there is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Pyriphlegethon^[41]: and he clearly affirms, that personal Existence is lost in Death^[42]. Had Epictetus believed future Rewards, he must, of Course, have made frequent mention of them^[43]. M. Antoninus, upon a Supposition that Souls continue after Death, makes them to remain for some Time in the Air: and then to be changed, diffused, kindled, and resumed into the productive Intelligence of the Universe^[44]. In another Place, he vindicates the Conduct of Providence, on the Hypothesis, that the Souls of the Good are extinguished by Death^[45].

§. 21. The Stoics thought, that every single Person had a tutelary Genius assigned him by God, as a Guardian of his Soul, and a Superintendent of his Conduct^[46]: and that all Virtue and Happiness consist in acting in concert with this Genius, with Reference to the Will of the supreme Director of the whole^[47]. Sometimes, however, they make the Genius to be only the ruling Faculty of every one's own Mind^[48].

§. 22. A very slight Examination of their Writings is sufficient to convince any impartial Reader how little the Doctrines of this Sect were fitted to influence the Generality of Mankind. But indeed, about the Generality of Mankind, the Stoics do not appear to have given themselves any kind of Trouble. They seemed to consider All (except the few, who were Students in the Intricacies of a philosophic System) as very little superior to Beasts: and, with great Tranquillity, left them to follow the Devices of their own ungoverned Appetites and Passions. How unlike was this to the diffusive Benevolence of the Divine Author of the Christian Religion, who adapted his Discourses to the Comprehension, and extended the Means of Happiness, to the Attainment of all Mankind!

§. 23. There seem to be only two Methods, by which the present Appearances of things are capable of being reconciled to our Ideas of the Justice, Wisdom, and Goodness of God: the one is the Doctrine of a future State; the other, the Position, that Virtue alone is sufficient to human Happiness in this^[49]. The first, which was the Method chosen by Socrates, solves every Difficulty, without contradicting either Sense or Reason: the latter, which was unfortunately maintained by the Stoics, is repugnant to both.

§. 24. That there is an intrinsic Beauty and Excellency in moral Goodness; that it is the Ornament and Perfection of all rational Beings; and that, till Conscience is stifled by repeated Guilt, we feel an Obligation to prefer and follow, so far as we perceive it, in all Cases; and find an inward Satisfaction, and generally receive outward Advantages from so doing, are Positions, which no thinking Person can contradict: but it doth not follow from hence, that in such a Mixture, as Mankind, it is its own sufficient Reward. God alone, infinitely perfect, is happy in, and from Himself. The Virtue of finite Beings must be defective: and the Happiness of created Beings must be dependent. It is undeniable Fact, that the natural Consequences of Virtue in some, may be interrupted by the Vices of others. How much are the best Persons liable to suffer from the Follies of the Unthinking; from the Ill-nature, the Rage, the Scorn of the Malevolent; from the cold and the penurious Hardheartedness of the Unfeeling; from Persecutions, for the sake both of Religion and Honesty; from ill Returns to conjugal, to paternal, to friendly Affection; and from an innumerable Train of other Evils, to which the most amiable Dispositions, are usually the most sensible. It is no less undeniable, that the natural Consequences of Virtue are interrupted by Struggles of our own Passions; (which we may overcome rewardably, though very imperfectly; or, if we live to overcome more perfectly, we may not live to enjoy the Victory;) by Sickness, Pain, Languor, Want; and by what we feel from the Death, or the Sufferings of those, with whom we are most nearly connected. We are often indeed afflicted by many of these things, more than we ought to be. But Concern for some, at least our own Failings, for Instance, is directly a Duty; for others, it is visibly the Instrument of moral Improvement; for more still, it is the unavoidable Result of our Frame and they who carry it too far, may, on the whole, be good Characters; and even they who do not, in any considerable Degree, may however be extremely wretched. How then can Virtue be its own Reward to Mankind in general, or indeed a proportionable Reward to almost any Man? Or how, unless the View be extended beyond such a Scene of things, the certain Means of Happiness? The originally appointed Means of Happiness it undoubtedly is: but that it should be an effectual and infallible Means to Creatures so imperfect, passing through such a disordered World, is impossible, without a State of future Reward; and of this the Gospel alone gives us full Assurance.

§. 25. By rejecting the Doctrine of Recompences in another Life, the Stoics were reduced to the Extravagance of supposing Felicity to be enjoyed in Circumstances, which are incapable of it. That a good Man stretched on a Rack, or reposing on a Bed of Roses, should enjoy himself equally, was a Notion which could gain but few Proselytes: and a sad Experience, that Pain was an Evil, sometimes drove their own Disciples from the thorny Asperities of the Portico, to the flowery Gardens of Epicurus.

§. 26. The absolute Indifference of all Externals, and the Position, That things independent on Choice are nothing to us, the grand Point on which their Arguments turned, every one, who feels, knows to be false: and the Practice of the Wisest and Best among them, proved it in Fact to be so. It is remarkable, that no Sect of Philosophers ever so dogmatically prescribed, or so frequently committed, Suicide, as those very Stoics, who taught that the Pains and Sufferings, which they strove to end by this Act of Rebellion against the Decrees of Providence, were no Evils. How absolutely this horrid Practice contradicted all their noble Precepts of Resignation and Submission to the Divine Will, is too evident to need any Enlargement. They professed indeed in Suicide to follow the divine Will: but this was a lamentably weak Pretence. Even supposing Sufferings to be Evils, they are no Proof of a Signal from God to abandon Life; but to shew an exemplary Patience, which he will Reward: but, supposing them, as the Stoics did, not to be Evils, they afford not so much as the Shadow of a Proof.

§. 27. As the Stoics by the Permission of Suicide, plainly implied, that external Inconveniences were not indifferent in the Extremity; it follows, that they must proportionably be allowed not to be indifferent in the inferior Degrees: of which Zeno seemed to be perfectly well convinced by hanging himself when his Finger aked. And where was the Use of taking so much Pains to say, and believe what they knew to be false? It might, perhaps, be thought to be of some Benefit, in the Time of the later Stoics, to the great Men of Rome, whom the Emperors frequently butchered at their Pleasure: and this is the Use, to which Epictetus is perpetually applying it. Yet, even in this Case, the Stoic Doctrine, where Men could bring themselves to act upon it, made them absurdly rough, as appears by the History of Helvidius Priscus and hindered the Good, they might otherwise have done. And, if a Man, taught thus to despise Tortures and Death, should happen at the same time to be wrong-headed, for which he had no small Chance, he would, in one Respect, be a more terrible wild Beast, than an Enthusiast of any other Sect; as he would not think his Sufferings Evils: though in another he would be less so, as he would not hope to be rewarded for them hereafter.

§. 28. The Stoics are frequently, and justly, charged with great Arrogance in their Discourses, and even in their Addresses to God. They assert however the Doctrine of Grace, and the Duty of Praise and Thanksgiving for the divine Assistance in moral Improvements^[50]. But there doth not, I think, appear any Instance of a Stoic, or perhaps any other Heathen Philosopher, addressing his Repentance to God, and begging Pardon for his Failings, or directing his Disciples to do it. Indeed nothing can excuse their Idolatry of human Nature: which they proudly, and inconsistently supposed perfect and self-sufficient. Seneca carried the Matter so far, as by an impious Antithesis, to give his wise Man the Superiority to God^[51]. Epictetus indeed was attentive enough to the Voice of Conscience to own himself not perfect^[52]: and he sometimes tells his Hearers, that they cannot be perfect yet^[53]. But even He at other times informs them, that they are not inferior to the Gods^[54]. The Stoical Boasting will, however, imply less of personal Arrogance, if we can suppose, that those Speeches, which so ill become human Imperfection, were always uttered, as perhaps in part they often were, in the Character of their Idol, the perfectly wise and good Man, which they owned to be merely an ideal Being^[55]. At least, it may be affirmed with Truth, that they frequently mention themselves with Decency and Humility, and with an express Confession of their Deviation from this faultless Exemplar.

§. 29. But then where was the Use of their favourite Doctrine, that a wise Man must always be happy? Might not a Person, determined to follow his own Inclinations, very reasonably object, "What is that to me, if I am not, or to any body else, if no one ever was, a wise Man? But, suppose I were one; which is the better grounded Argument? You must always be happy, and therefore Externals are no Evils: or, These things are Evils, and therefore I am not happy.——But Epictetus will say, You have a Remedy: the Door is open; go, with great good Humour and Thankfulness, and hang yourself: and there will be an End of your Pain and you together.——A fine Scheme of Happiness indeed! and much to be thankful for! Why, is it not the shorter and merrier Way, instead of studying this crabbed Philosophy, to indulge myself, in whatever I like, as long as I can, (it may chance to be a good while) and hang myself thankfully, when I feel Inconveniences from that? The Door is just as open in one Case, as in the other; and nothing beyond it, either pleasing or terrible in either."——Such, alas! is the Conclusion too commonly drawn; and such must be the Consequence of every Doctrine, not built upon solid Foundations.

§. 30. Epictetus often lays it down as a Maxim, that it is impossible for one Person to be in Fault, and another to be the Sufferer. This, on the Supposition of a future State, will certainly be made true at last; but in the Stoical Sense, and System, is an absolute Extravagance. Take any Person of plain Understanding, with all the Feelings of Humanity about him, and see whether the subtlest Stoic will ever be able to convince him, that while he is insulted, oppressed, and tortured, he doth not suffer. See what Comfort it will afford him, to be told, that, if he supports his Afflictions and ill Treatment with Fortitude and Patience, Death will set him free, and then he and his Persecutor will be equally rewarded; will equally lose all personal Existence, and return to the Elements. How different are the Consolations proposed by Christianity, which not only assures its Disciples, that they shall rest from their Labours in Death, but that their Works shall follow them: and, by allowing them to rejoice in Hope, teaches them the most effectual Way of becoming patient in Tribulation.

§. 31. The Stoical Doctrine, that human Souls are literally Parts of the Deity, was equally shocking, and hurtful: as it supposed Portions of his Being to be wicked and miserable; and, by debasing Mens Ideas of the divine Dignity, and teaching them to think themselves essentially as good as He, nourished in their Minds an irreligious and fatal Presumption. Far differently the Christian System, represents Mankind, not as a Part of the Essence, but a Work of the Hand of God: as created in a State of improvable Virtue and Happiness: Fallen, by an Abuse of Free Will, into Sin, Misery, and Weakness^[56]; but redeemed from them by an Almighty Saviour; furnished with additional Knowledge and Strength; commanded to use their best Endeavours; made sensible, at the same time, how wretchedly defective they are; yet assured of endless Felicity on a due Exertion of them. The Stoic Philosophy insults human Nature, and discourages all our Attempts, by enjoining and promising a Perfection in this Life, of which we feel ourselves Incapable. The Christian Religion shows Compassion to our Weakness, by prescribing to us only the practicable Task of aiming continually at further Improvements; and animates our Endeavours, by the Promise of a divine Aid, equal to every Trial.

§. 32. Specifying thus the Errors and Defects of so celebrated a System, is an unpleasing Employment: but in an Age, fond of preferring the Guesses of human Sagacity before the unerring Declarations of God, it seemed on this Occasion necessary to observe, that the Christian Morality is agreeable to Reason and Nature: that of the Stoics, for the most part, founded on Notions, intelligible to few; and which none could admit, without Contradiction to their own Hearts. They reasoned, many times, admirably well, but from false Principles and the noblest of their practical Precepts, being built on a sandy Basis, lay at the Mercy of every strong Temptation.

§. 33. Stoicism is, indeed, in many Points inferior to the Doctrine of Socrates: which did not teach, that all Externals were indifferent which did teach a future State of Recompence; and, agreeably to that, forbad Suicide. It doth not belong to the present Subject to show, how much even this best System is excelled by Christianity. It is sufficient just to observe, that the Author of it died in a Profession, which he had always made, of his Belief in the popular Deities, whose Superstitions, and impure Worship was the great Source of Corruption in the Heathen World: and the last Words he uttered, were a Direction to his Friend, for the Performance of an idolatrous Ceremony. This melancholy Instance of Ignorance and Error, in the most illustrious Character for Wisdom and Virtue, in all Heathen Antiquity, is not mentioned as a Reflection on his Memory, but as a Proof of human Weakness in general. Whether Reason could have discovered the great Truths, which in these Days are ascribed to it, because now seen so clearly by the Light of the Gospel, may be a Question; but that it never did, is an undeniable Fact: and that is enough to teach us Thankfulness for the Blessing of a better Information. Socrates, who had, of all Mankind, the fairest Pretensions to set up for an Instructor and Reformer of the World, confessed, that he knew nothing, referred to Tradition, and acknowledged the Want of a superior Guide: and there is a remarkable Passage in Epictetus, in which he represents it, as the Office of his supreme God, or of One deputed by Him, to appear among Mankind, as a Teacher and Example^[57].

§. 34. Upon the whole, the several Sects of Heathen Philosophy serve, as so many striking Instances of the Imperfection of human Wisdom; and of the extreme Need of a divine Assistance, to rectify the Mistakes of depraved Reason, and to replace natural Religion on its true Foundation. The Stoics every where testify the noblest Zeal for Virtue, and the Honour of God: but they attempted to establish them on Principles, inconsistent with the Nature of Man, and contradictory to Truth and Experience. By a direct Consequence of these Principles they were liable to be seduced, and in Fact, often were seduced into Pride, Hard-heartedness, and the last dreadful Extremity of human Guilt, Self-murder.

§. 35. But however indefensible the Philosophy of the Stoics in several Instances may be, it appears to have been of very important Use, in the Heathen World: and they are, on many Accounts, to be considered in a very respectable Light. Their Doctrine of Evidence and fixed Principles, was an excellent Preservative from the Mischiefs, that might have arisen from the Scepticism of the Academics and Pyrrhonists, if unopposed: and their zealous Defence of a particular Providence, a valuable Antidote to the atheistical Scheme of Epicurus. To this may be added, that their strict Notions of Virtue in most Points, (for they sadly failed in some) and the Lives of several among them, must contribute a good deal to preserve luxurious States from an absolutely universal Dissoluteness; and the Subjects of arbitrary Government, from a wretched and contemptible Pusilanimity.

§. 36. Even now, their Compositions may be read with great Advantage, as containing excellent Rules of Self-government, and of social Behaviour; of a noble Reliance on the Aid and Protection of Heaven, and of a perfect Resignation and Submission to the divine Will: Points, which are treated with great Clearness, and with admirable spirit, in the Lessons of the Stoics; and, though their Directions are seldom practicable on their Principles, in trying Cases, may be rendered highly useful in Subordination to Christian Reflections.

§. 37. If, among those, who are so unhappy as to remain unconvinced of the Truth of Christianity, any are prejudiced against it by the Influence of unwarrantable Inclinations: such Persons will find very little Advantage in rejecting the Doctrines of the New Testament for those of the Portico; unless they think it an Advantage to be laid under moral Restraints, almost equal to those of the Gospel, while they are deprived of its Encouragements and Supports. Deviations from the Rules of Sobriety, Justice and Piety, meet with small Indulgence in the Stoic Writings and they, who profess to admire Epictetus, unless they pursue that severely virtuous Conduct which he every-where prescribes, will find themselves treated by him, with the utmost Degree of Scorn and Contempt. An immoral Character is indeed, more or less, the Out-cast of all Sects of Philosophy: and Seneca quotes even Epicurus, to prove the universal Obligation of a virtuous Life^[58]. Of this great Truth, God never left himself without Witness. Persons of distinguished Talents and Opportunities seem to have been raised, from time to time, by Providence, to check the Torrent of Corruption, and to preserve the Sense of moral Obligations on the Minds of the Multitude, to whom the various Occupations of Life left but little Leisure to form Deductions of their own. But then they wanted a proper Commission to enforce their Precepts: they intermixed with them through false Reasoning, many gross Mistakes; and their unavoidable Ignorance, in several important Points, entangled them with Doubts, which easily degenerated into pernicious Errors.

§. 38. If there are others, who reject Christianity, from Motives of Dislike to its peculiar Doctrines: they will scarcely fail of entertaining more favourable Impressions of it, if they can be prevailed on, with Impartiality, to compare the holy Scriptures, from whence alone the Christian Religion is to be learned, with the Stoic Writings; and then fairly to consider, whether there is any thing to be met with in the Discourses of our blessed Saviour, in the Writings of his Apostles, or even in the obscurest Parts of the prophetic Books, by which, equitably interpreted, either their Senses, or their Reason are contradicted, as they are by the Paradoxes of these Philosophers: and if not, whether Notices from above, of things, in which, though we comprehend them but imperfectly, we are possibly much more interested, than at present we discern, ought not to be received with implicit Veneration; as useful Exercises and Trials of that Duty, which finite Understandings owe to infinite Wisdom.

§. 39. Antiquity furnishes but very few Particulars of the Life of Epictetus. He was born at Hierapolis, a City of Phrygia: but of what Parents, is unknown; as well as by what Means he came to Rome, where he was the Slave of Epaphroditus, one of Nero's Courtiers^[59]. It is reported, that when his Master once put his Leg to the Torture, Epictetus, with great Composure, and even smiling, observed to him; "You will certainly break my Leg:" which accordingly happened; and he continued, in the same Tone of Voice——"Did not I tell you, that you would break it^[60]?" This Accident might, perhaps, be the Occasion of his Lameness: which, however, some Authors say he had from his early Years^[61]; and others attribute to the Rheumatism^[62]. At what Time he obtained his Liberty doth not appear. When the Philosophers, by a Decree of Domitian, were banished from Rome, Epictetus retired to Nicopolis^[63], a City of Epirus, where he taught Philosophy; from which he doth not seem to have derived any external Advantages, as he is universally said to have been extremely poor. At least, he was so when he lived at Rome: where his whole Furniture consisted of a Bed^[64], a Pipkin, and an Earthen Lamp^[65]; which last was purchased for about a hundred Pounds after his Death, by a Person whom Lucian ridicules for it, as hoping to acquire the Wisdom of Epictetus by studying over it. His only Attendant was a Woman, whom he took in his advanced Years, to nurse a Child, whom, otherwise, one of his Friends would have exposed to perish^[66]: an amiable Proof of the poor old Man's Good-nature, and Disapprobation, it is to be hoped, of that shocking, yet common Instance of Heathen Blindness and Barbarity.

In this extreme Poverty, a Cripple, unattended, and destitute of almost every Convenience of Life, Epictetus was not not only obliged by the Rules of his Philosophy to think himself happy, but actually did so, according to the Distich of which Aulus Gellius affirms him to have been the Author^[67].

A Slave, in Body maim'd, as Irus^[68] poor;
Yet to the gods was Epictetus dear.

He is said to have returned to Rome in the Reign of Adrian, and to have been treated by him with a high Degree of Familiarity^[69]. If this be true, he lived to a great Age. But that he should continue alive, to the Time of M. Antonius, as Themistius^[70], and Suidas^[71] affirm, is utterly improbable^[72], as the learned Fabricius observes; to whose Life of Epictetus^[73] I am greatly indebted. When, or where, he died, is, I think, no-where mentioned. All Authors agree in bearing Testimony to the unblemished Conduct of his Life, and the Usefulness of his Instructions. The last-named Emperor expresses much Obligation to a Friend, who had communicated his Works to him^[74]: and in another Place, he ranks him, not only with Chrysippus, but with Socrates^[75]. A. Gellius calls him the greatest of the Stoics^[76]: Origen affirms, that his Writings had done more Good than Plato's^[77]: And Simplicius says, perhaps by way of indirect Opposition to an infinitely better Book, that he who is not influenced by them, is reclaimable by nothing but the Chastisements of another World^[78]. In what manner he instructed his Pupils, will be seen in the following Treatise.

§. 40. There are so many of the Sentiments and Expressions of Christianity, in it, that one should be strongly tempted to think, that Epictetus was acquainted with the New Testament, if such a Supposition was not highly injurious to his Character. To have known the Contents of that Book, and not to have been led by them into an Enquiry, which must have convinced him of their Truth, would argue such an Obstinacy of Prejudice, as one would not willingly impute to a Mind, which appears so well disposed. And, even passing over this Consideration, to have borrowed so much from Christianity as he seems to have done, without making the least Acknowledgment from whence he received it, would be an Instance of Disingenuity, utterly unworthy of an honest Man, and inconsistent with his Practice in other Respects: for he often quotes, with great Applause, the Sentences of many Writers, not of his own Sect. Possibly indeed he might, like the other Heathens in general, have a peculiar Contempt of, and Aversion to, Christian Authors, as akin to the Jews, and Opposers of the established Worship, notwithstanding those Parts of them, which he must approve. But still I hope, his Conformity with the sacred Writings may be accounted for, without supposing him acquainted with Christianity, as such. The great Number of its Professors, dispersed through the Roman Empire, had probably introduced several of the New Testament Phrases into the popular Language: and the Christian Religion might by that Time have diffused some Degree of general Illumination; of which many might receive the Benefit, who were ignorant of the Source, from whence it proceeded: and Epictetus I apprehend to have been of this Number. Several striking Instances of this Resemblance between him and the New Testament, have been observed in the Notes; and the attentive Reader will find many, which are not mentioned; and may perceive from them, either that the Stoics admired the Christian Language, however they came to the Knowledge of it; or that treating a Subject practically, and with a Feeling of its Force, leads Men to such strong Expressions, as we find in Scripture, and should find oftener in the Philosophers, if they had been more in earnest: but however, they occur frequently enough to vindicate those, in which the Scriptures abound, from the Contempt and Ridicule of light Minds.

§. 41. Arrian, the Disciple of Epictetus, to whom we are obliged for these Discourses, was a Greek by Birth, but a Senator and Consul of Rome; and an able Commander in War^[79]. He imitated Xenophon, both in his Life and Writings; and particularly, in delivering to Posterity the Conversations of his Master. There were originally Twenty Books of them, besides the Enchiridion, which seems to be taken out of them, and an Account of his Life and Death. Very little Order or Method is to be found in them, or was from the Nature of them to be expected. The Connexion is often scarcely discoverable: a Reference to particular Incidents, long since forgotten, at the same time that it evidences their Genuineness, often renders them obscure in some Places; and the great Corruption of the Text, in others. Yet, under all these Disadvantages, this immethodical Collection is perhaps one of the most valuable Remains of Antiquity; and they, who consult it with any Degree of Attention, can scarcely fail of receiving Improvement. Indeed it is hardly possible to be inattentive to so awakening a Speaker as Epictetus. There is such a Warmth and Spirit in his Exhortations; and his good Sense is enlivened by fuch a Keenness of Wit, and Gaiety of Humour, as render the Study of him, a most delightful as well as profitable Entertainment.

§. 42. For this Reason it was judged proper, that a Translation of him should be undertaken; there being none, I believe, but of the Enchiridion, in any modern Language, excepting a pretty good French one, published about a hundred and fifty Years ago, and so extremely scarce, that I was unable to procure it, till Mr. Harris obligingly lent it me, after I had published the Proposals for printing this: which, notwithstanding the Assistance given me in the Prosecution of it, hath still, I am sensible, great Faults. But they, who will see them the most clearly, will be the readiest to excuse, as they will know best the Difficulty of avoiding them. There is one Circumstance, which, I am apprehensive, must be particularly striking, and possibly shocking to many, the frequent Use of some Words in an unpopular Sense: an Inconvenience, which, however, I flatter myself, the Introduction and Notes will, in some Degree, remove. In the Translation of technical Terms, if the same Greek Word had not always been rendered in the same manner, at least, when the Propriety of our Language will at all permit it, every new Expression would have been apt to raise a new idea. The Reader, I hope, will pardon, if not approve, the Uncouthness, in many Places, of a Translation pretty strictly literal: as it seemed necessary, upon the whole, to preserve the original Spirit, the peculiar Turn and characteristic Roughness of the Author. For else, taking greater Liberties would have spared me no small Pains.

I have been much indebted to Mr. Upton's Edition: by which, many Passages, unintelligible before, are cleared up. His Emendations have often assisted me in the Text; and his References furnished me with Materials for the Historical Notes.

 

Footnotes

1. Sensibus ipsis judicari voluptates. Cic. de Fin. L II. By Pleasure the Epicureans sometimes explained themselves to mean, only Freedom from Uneasiness: but the Philosophers of other Sects in general, as well as Cicero, insist, producing their own Expressions for it, that they meant sensual Delights. This, indeed, was more explicitly the Doctrine of Aristippus, the Father of the Cyrenaics: a Sect, however, which sunk into the Epicureans: whose Notions plainly led to the Dissoluteness so remarkable in the Lives of most of them.
2. The Stoics define these Terms: the one, a Motion, by which we are carried toward some Object; the other, a Motion, by which we strive to shun it. The original Words, by a Happiness in the Greek Language, are properly opposed to each other; which the English will not admit. I have chosen the best I could find, and wish they were better.
3. It seems strange, that the Stoics generally put the Assents last: since both the Affections and Will should be governed by the Understanding, which, therefore, should be rectified, in order to do its Office well. Epictetus seems to be of this Opinion in B. I. c. 17. But, perhaps, they thought common Sense, or natural Logic, sufficient for this Purpose and artificial Logic, which they meant, but did not express clearly, by the Word Assents, necessary as a Guard only against Sophistry. Yet their mentioning it, as a Guard also against being misled, when they were in Drink, and even in their Dreams, leaves but little Room for this Conjecture.
4. Και μην την αρετην Χρυσιππος αποβλητην, Κλεανθης δε αναποβλητην ο μεν, αποβλητην δια μεθην και μελαγχολιαν· ὁ δε, αναποβλητην, δια βεβαιους καταληψεις. Diog. Laert. in Zeno.
   Nam si argumentaberis, sapientem multo vino inebriari, et retinere rectum tenorem, etiamsi temulentus sit: licet colligas, nec veneno poto moriturum, &c. Sen. Epist. 83.
5. The original Word is of peculiar Signification among the Stoics: and I wish it could have been rendered into English, in a manner less ambiguous, and more expressive of its Meaning. But the Stoic Language perished with the Stoic Sect: and scarcely any of its technical Terms can now be rendered intelligible, except by a Paraphrase, or a Definition.
6. Τυπωσιν εν ψυχη. Diog. Laert. L. VII. §. 45.
7. Εσι δε 'η προληψις, εννοια φυσικη των καθ' όλου. Diog. Laert. L. VII. §. 54.
8. I am sensible, that Prosperity, in common Use, relates wholly to external Circumstances: but I could find no better Word to express the internal good Condition of Mind, which the Stoics meant by Ευροια. There is an Instance of the like Use 1 John iii. 2.
9. Quidquid de Deo dixeris, quidquid tacitæ mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum transilit, et corrumpitur, sensum: nec habet propriæ significationis notam, quod nostris verbis dicitur, atque ad humana negotia compositis.
   Arnob. adv. gentes. L. III. p. 111. Ed. Ludg. Bat. 1651.
10. Αφθαρτος και αγεννητος. Diog. Laert. L. VII. §. 137.
11. Θεον δ' ειναι Ζωον αθανατον, λογικον, τελειον, η νοερον εν ευδαιμονια, κακου παντος ανεπιδεκτον, προνοητικον κοσμου τε και των εν κοσμω· μη ειναι μεντοι ανθρωπομορφον· ειναι δε τον μεν δημιουργου των ολων, ωσπερ και πατερα παντων. Ib. §. 147.
12. Πολλαι: προσηγοριας προσονομαζεται κατα τας δυναμεις. Ib.
13. Ουσιαν δε Θεου Ζηνων μεν φησι τον ολον κοσμον και τον ουρανον. Ib. §. 148.
14. ‘Ο μεν ουν κοσμος πεπερασμενος εστι. Ib.
15. Κατα χρονων ποιας περιοδους αναλισκων εις εαυτον πασαν την ουσιαν, και παλιν εξ εαυτου γεννων. Ib. §. 137.
16. See Philo Judeus, of the Incorruptibility of the World, p. 947. Ed. Par.
17. Θεος εστι πνευμα νοεραν και πυρωδες, ουκ εχον μορφην, μεταβαλλον δε εις α βουλεται και συνεξομοιουμενον πασι. Posidonius
18. Πυρ τεχνικον. Plut. de Placit. Philosoph. L. I. c. 7.
19. Ουτοι τον Θεον, αρχην οντα, Σωμα νοερον, και νουν εν υλη ποιουντες, ου καθαρον, ουδε απλουν ουδε ασυνθετον, αλλα εξ ἑτερου, και δι ἑτερου αποφαινουσι. Ρlut. de communibus notitis adv. Stoicos, p. 1085.
20. Σωμα δε εστι, κατἀ αυτους, ἡ ουσια. Diog. Laert. L. VII. §. 150.
21. Adv. Praxeam, c. 7. Yet, De Anima, c. 7. he says, Omne corporale passibile est; which he certainly did not think God was.
22. Δοκεί δ' αυτοις αρχας ειναι των ολων δυο, το ποιουν και το πασχουν· το μεν ουν πασχον ειναι την αποιον ουσιαν, την υλην. Το δε ποιουν, τον εν αυτη λογον, τον Θεον. Diog. Laert. L. VII. §. 134.
23. Deus ista temperat, quæ circumfusa Rectorem sequuntur & Ducem. Potentius autem est quod facit, quod est Deus, quam materia patiens Dei. Sen. Epist. 65.
    Nulli igitur est naturæ obediens, aut subjectus Deus. Omnem ergo regit ipse naturam. Cic. de Nat. Deor. L. II. §. 30. Ed. Dav.
24. Non potest artifex mutare materiam. Sen. de Provid. c. 8.
25. B. 1. c. 1.
26. Non universo Hominum Generi, solum, sed etiam singulis, &c. Cic. de Nat. Deor. L. III.
27. Anus fatidica. Ib. L. I.
28. Nec sine Ratione, quamvis subita, accidere. Sen. de Provid. c. 1.
29. Λογος, καθ' ον ὁ κοσμος διεξαγεται. Diog. Laert. L. VII. §. 149.
30. Chrysippus—Applicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus Animos [Animorum. Dav.] liberatos volunt. Dum autem verbis utitur suis, delabitur in eas Difficultates, ut ne cessitatem Fati confirmet invitus. Cic. de Fato, §. 17. Dav. Chrysippus autem, cum et necessitatem improbaret, &c. §. 18.
31. Sen. de Beneficiis, L. VI. c. 23.
32. Ib. L. IV. c. 7.
33. Cic. de Natura Deorum, L. II. c. 15,
34. Epic. B. I. c. 14, &c.
35. Ἡς μερη ειναι τας εν τοις Ζωοις. Diog. Laert. L. VII. §. 156.
36. Την δε ψυχην και Σωμα ειναι. Ib.
37. Την ψυχην μετα θανατον επιμενειν, φθαρτην δ' ειναι. Ib.
38. Κλεανθης πασας, επιδιαμενειν φασι, μεχρι εκπυρωσεως. Χρυσιππος δε, τας των Σοφων μονων. Ib. §. 157.
39. Lactantius, indeed, L. VII. c. 7. says: Esse inferos Zenon Stoicus docuit, et sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas: et illos quidem quietas et delectabiles incolere Regiones; hos vero luere pœnas in tenebrosis locis, atque in cœni voraginibus horrendis. But I know not that any other Author relates this of him.
40. See B. I. c. 12. p. 42.B. III. c. 7, p. 219.Id. c. 24. p. 280.B. IV. c. 9. §. 2, 3.Id. c. 10. §. 2. c. 12. §. 4.
41. B. III. c. 13. p. 233.
42. Id. c. 24. p. 288.
43. The only Passage, that I can recollect, in which any Intimation seems to be given of a future Reward, is in the XVth Chapter of the Enchiridion: and, probably, even there he means only a Happiness to be enjoyed in the present Life, after due Improvement in Philosophy; though he expresses it by the very strong Figures of partaking the Feasts and Empire of the gods. For, doubtless, the wise Man, like his Kindred Deities, feasted upon every Thing that happened; and, by willing as Jupiter did, reigned along with Him. Besides, Epictetus says there, of Diogenes, and Heraclitus, or Hercules, not that they are, but that they were divine Persons: which must refer to something which had ceased when he wrote; and, consequently, to their Felicity before, not after their Deaths. At least, he doth not intimate any thing concerning their second Life and if that was to be short, as it might be (and it could not reach beyond the Conflagration), and was not very certain neither, the Hope of it would be a very insufficient Counterbalance to vehement Appetites and Passions.
44. L. 4. §. 21. These Expressions, diffused and kindled, allude to the Stoic Doctrine, that Souls are Portions of the Deity, separated for a Time, and that His Essence is Fire.
45. L. 12. §. 5.
46. Ειναι τινας δαιμονας ανθρωπων συμπθειαν εχοντας, εποπτας των ανθρωπειων πραγματων. Diog. Laert. L. VII. §. 151.
    Scit Genius, natale comes qui temperat Astrum,
    Naturæ Deus humanæ, mortalis in unum
    Quodcunque caput.Hor. L. I. Ep. II. v. 186, &c.
    See Epict. B. I. c. 14. p. 46.
47. Ειναι δ' αυτο τουτο του ευδαιμονος αρετην και την ευροιαν βιου, οταν παντα πραττηται κατα την Συμφωνιαν του παρ εκαστω δαιμονος, προς την του ολου Διοικητου βουλησιν. Diog. Laert. L. VII. §. 88.
48. See M. Antoninus. L. II. c. 13, 17. L. III. c. 3, 5. L. V. c. 27.
49. Condonanda tamen sententia, Stoice, vestra est.
    Nam si post obitum, neque præmia sint, neque pœnæ,
    Heu, quo perventum est! Heu, quid jam denique restat!
    Scilicet humanas gerit aut Res numen inique,
    Aut nil curat iners, aut, si bene temperat orbem,
    Nemo bonus miser est, nemo improbus esse beatus
    In vita possit, Gens ut sibi Stoica fingit.
    J. Hawkins Browne.
    I have a singular Pleasure in quoting these Lines, from a Poem, which does Honour to our Country.
50. B. II. c. 18. §. 3, 4.B. III. c. 21. p. 248, 331, 332. See likewise M. Antoninus. L. I. §. 17. L. IX. §. 4. L. XII. §. 14.
51. Est aliquid, quo sapiens antecedat Deum. Ille naturæ beneficio, non suo, sapiens est: ecce res magna, habere imbecilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei. Sen. Epist. 53.
52. B. IV. c. 1. §. 17.B. IV. c. 8. p. 363.
53. B. I. c. 15. p. 48.B. IV. c. 12. §. 4.
54. B. I. c. 12. p. 43.
55. Quis sapiens sit, aut fuerit, nec ipsos Stoicos solere dicere. Cic. Acad. L. IV.
56. —Cito nequitia subrepit: virtus difficilis inventu est, rectorem, ducemque desiderat. Etiam sine magistro vitia discuntur, Sen. Natural. Quæst. L. III. c. 30.
57. B. IV. c. 8. §. 6.
58. Eo libentius Epicuri egregia dicta commemoro, ut istis, qui ad illa confugient, spe mala inducti, qua velamentum. seipsos suorum vitiorum habituros existimant, probem, quocunque ierint, honeste esse vivendum. Sen. Epist. 21. It was hard indeed to reconcile this with some of his other Doctrines.
59. Suidas in Voc.
60. Orig. contra Cels. L. VII. §. 53.
61. Suidas in Voc.
62. Simplic. Com. p. 102.
63. A. Gell. L. XV. c. 11.
64. Simplic. Com. p. 102.
65. Id. Ib.
66. Id. p. 272.
67. A. Gellius. L. II. C. 18.
68. The Name of a Beggar in Homer.
69. Ælii. Spart. Adrian. c. 17.
70. Orat. Cons. ad Jovian Imp.
71. In Voc.
72. The Reign of Nero began A. D. 54. of Adrian, 117. of M. Antoninus, 161.
73. Bibl. Gr. Vol. III. p. 257.
74. L. I. §. 7.
75. L. VII. §. 19.
76. Noct. Att. L. I. c. 2.
77. Contra Cels. L. VI. §. 2.
78. Com. p. 2.
79. Fabricii Bibl. Gr. Vol. III. L. IV. c. 8. p. 269, &c.