Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Brothers/Dissent Douglas

by William O. Douglas

United States Supreme Court

348 U.S. 511

Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America  v.  Richman Brothers

 Argued: March 4 and 7, 1955. --- Decided: April 4, 1955

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom the CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BLACK concur, dissenting.

'A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.' So reads 28 U.S.C. § 2283, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283. So read, apart from exceptions not relevant here, former § 265 of the Judicial Code.

The purpose of the law, as explained in Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9, 60 S.Ct. 215, 218, 84 L.Ed. 537, was 'to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts.' It is, however, construed and applied today in a way which can only defeat a federal regulatory scheme. For today's decision allows state courts to intrude in a domain where the federal agencies, i.e., the National Labor Relations Board and the District Court, have been granted primary and exclusive jurisdiction, without leaving the aggrieved party any effective relief.

This is not a case where the state court has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal agencies. The matter on which the state court takes hold has been pre-empted by the Congress and placed as firmly and completely in the federal domain as if Congress by express words had forbidden state courts to intrude. The addition of an express exception to § 2283 would not make the congressional purpose any clearer.

Where Congress has made clear that federal agencies have exclusive jurisdiction of a controversy, that legislation should be taken to qualify § 2283 pro tanto. That has been the view up to this time. The Removal Acts, starting with 1 Stat. 73, 79, allowed cases to be removed from state to federal courts, and provided that a case once removed passed beyond the jurisdiction of the state courts. Those Acts were construed to qualify the predecessor of § 2283. Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494, 26 L.Ed. 497; Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 245, 25 S.Ct. 251, 253, 49 L.Ed. 462. The same construction was given an Act of 1851 which limited the liability of shipowners and provided that, after a shipowner transfers his interest in the vessel to a trustee for the benefit of the claimants, 'all claims and proceedings against the owner or owners shall cease.' 9 Stat. 635, 636. The Court held in Providence & N.Y.S.S.C.o. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 600, 3 S.Ct. 379, 393, 617, 27 L.Ed. 1038, that, despite the predecessor to § 2283, the Limited Liability Act ousted the state courts, since otherwise the Act would be thwarted.

Those cases showed no clearer need for the qualification of § 2283 pro tanto than does the Taft-Hartley Act.

The Court has been ready to imply other exceptions to § 2283, where the common sense of the situation required it. Thus, if the federal court first takes possession of a res, it may protect its control over it, even to the extent of enjoining a state court from interfering with the property. That result flies in the face of the literal words of § 2283. Yet the injunction is allowed to issue as the preferable way of avoiding unseemly clashes between state and federal authorities. See Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400, 403, 9 L.Ed. 470; Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229, 235, 43 S.Ct. 79, 81, 83, 67 L.Ed. 226. Another illustration, as The Chief Justice points out, is Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, 88 L.Ed. 892, where the case for exclusive jurisdiction of the federal authorities was no stronger than the one now presented.

A like exception is needed here, if the state suit is not to dislocate severely the federal regulatory scheme. Under the present decision, an employer can move in the state courts for an injunction against the strike. The injunction, if granted, may for all practical purposes settle the matter. There is no way for the union to transfer the dispute to the federal Board, for it seems to be assumed by both parties that the employer has committed no unfair labor practice. By today's decision the federal court is powerless to enjoin the state action. The case lingers on in the state court. There can be no appeal to this Court from the temporary injunction. Montgomery Building & Construction Trades Council Union v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178, 73 S.Ct. 196, 97 L.Ed. 204. It may take substantial time in the trial court to prepare a record to support a permanent injunction. Once one is granted, the long, drawn-out appeal through the state hierarchy and on to this Court commences. Yet by the time this Court decides that from the very beginning the state court had no jurisdiction, as it must under the principle of Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union, No. 776 (A.F.L.), 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228, a year or more has passed; and time alone has probably defeated the claim.

That course undermines the federal regulation; it emasculates the federal remedy; it allows one party to a labormanagement controversy to circumvent the law which Congress enacted to resolve these disputes.

The federal regulatory scheme cries out for protection against these tactics of evasion. No one is in a position to seek the protection of the federal court, except the federal Board or a party to the dispute who is aggrieved. Either should be allowed standing under the principle of Capital Service, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Board, 347 U.S. 501, 74 S.Ct. 699, 98 L.Ed. 887, to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court. Certainly a suit to protect the exclusive jurisdiction of federal agencies under the Taft-Hartley Act is a suit 'arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1337, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337. See Capital Service, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 347 U.S. at page 504, 74 S.Ct. 701.

Notes