An Antidote Against Atheism/Appendix/Chapter X
Chap. X.
1. That though the Common might be the Seat of Common Sense, yet it cannot be the Common Percipient; 2. As being incapable of Sensation, 3. Of Memory, 4.Of Imagination, 5. Of Reason, 6. And of Spontaneous Motion. 7. That these Arguments do not equally prove an Incorporeal Substance in Brutes; nor, if they did, were their Souls straightway immortal. 8. That we cannot admit Perception in Matter as well as Divisibility, upon pretence the one is no more perplex'd then the other; because both Sense and Reason averres the one, but no faculty gives witness to the other. 9. In what sense the Soul is both divisible and extended. 10. A Symbolical representation how she may receive multitudes of distinct figurations into one indivisible Principle of perception. 11. That the manifest incapacity in the Matter for the Functions of a Soul assures us of the Existence hereof, be we never so much puzzled in the speculation of her Essence.
1. We have in the last Chapter of our first Book largely and evidently enough demonstrated, That neither the Animal Spirits the nor Brain are the first Principle of Spontaneous motion in us; we touch'd also upon the Conarion: but because our Opposers will not be so slightly put off, we shall here more fully & particularly shew the impossibility of that part proving any such Principle of Motion, though I confess it bids very fair to be the Organical seat of Common sense, because it is so conveniently placed near the Center of the Brain; and if the transmisson of Motions which act upon the Organs had not some such one part to terminate in, it is conceiv'd by some (but I suspect more wittily then solidly) that these outward Organs of Sense being two, the Objects would seem two also; which is contrary to experience.
But though the Conarion may be the Organ of sundry perceptions from corporeal Objects, and the Tent or Pavilion wherein the Soul is chiefly seated; yet we utterly deny that without an Immaterial inhabitant this arbitrarious Motion which. we are conscious to our selves of can at all be performed in us or by us: for if we attend to the condition of our own natures, we cannot but acknowledge that that which moves our Body thus arbitrariously, does not only perceive sensible Objects, but also remembers, has a power of free Imagination and of Reason.
2. And to begin with the first of these; I may that mere Perception of external Objects seems incompetible to the Conarion. For it being of like nature with the rest of the Brain, it is not only divisible, but in a sort actually divided one particle from another; else it could not be so soft as it is, though it be something harder then the rest of the Brain. Now I say, the Images of sensible Objects, they spreading to some space in the surface of the Conarion against which they hit, one part of the Conarion has the perception, suppose, of the head of a man, the other of a leg, the third of an arm, the fourth of his breast; and therefore though we should admit that every particle of such a space of the Conarion may perceive such a part of a man, yet there is nothing to perceive the whole man, unless you'l say they communicate their perceptions one to another. But this communication seems impossible; for if Perception be by impression from the external Object, no particle in the Conarion shall perceive any part of the Object but what it receives an impress from. But if you will yet say, that every part of the Object impresses upon every part of the Conarion wherein the Image is, it will be utterly impossible but that the whole Image will be confused, and the distinctness of Colours lost, especially in lesser Objects.
3. Now for the Faculty of remembring of things, that it cannot be in the Conarion we prove thus: For that Memory, which is the standing seal or impression of external Objects, is not there, is plain; for if it were, it would spoil the representation of things present, or rather after-Objects would be sure to deface all former impressions whatsoever. But if you'l say that Memory is in the Brain, but Reminiscency in the Conarion; I answer, That these Impresses or signatures made by outward Objects in the Brain must also of necessity be obliterated by superadvenient Impressions. For whether these Images or Impresses consist in a certain posture or motion of the Plicatile Fibres or subtile threds of which the Brain consists, it is evident that they cannot but be cancelled and obliterated by occasion of thousands of Objects that invade our Senses daily, which must needs displace them, or give them a new motion from what they had before.
But suppose Memory were thus seal'd upon the Brain, and transmitted its Image through the Animal Spirits in the ventricles, as an outward Object does its Species through the Aire to the Eye; being that perception is by impression, and that the impression was lost in the Conarion, though retain'd in the Brain, how can the Conarion ever say that it had any such impression before? for the impression once wiped out, it is as if it never had any, and therefore can never remember that it had. Besides, the perception of this image in the Brain is as incompetible to the Conarion as the perception of any external Object, upon which we have already insisted.
4. And thirdly, For the power of free Imagination, whereby the Conarion is supposed to excogitate the several forms or shapes of things which it never saw; I enquire, whether it be the thin Membrane, or the inward and something soft and fuzzy Pulpe it contains, that raises and represents to it self these arbitrarious Figments and Chimeras; and then, what part or particle of either of them can perform these fine feats; and (what is most material) whether the representations being corporeal, there be not a necessity of the Conarion's being so affected or impressed as in external corporeal Objects: and then I demand how this passive soft substance should be able to impress or signe it self, or how one part of this body should be able to act upon another for this purpose, and there being a memory also of these figmental impressions, how they can be sealed upon the Brain the feat of Memory. For admitting the Conarion to imitate the manner of impression of outward Objects in inventing Images of her own, she then impressing these Images upon the Brain, it will be like as if we should make use of the impression of a Seal upon some hard matter to seal some softer matter with; in which case the two impressions will be notoriously different, those parts that give out in the one, in the other giving in.
5. Fourthly, As concerning Reason, besides that it is manifest in the use thereof that we comprehend at once the Images or Phantasms of not only different but contrary things in the very same part or particle of the Conarion, (for if they be in different parts, what shall judge of them both,) as when, for example, we conclude hot is not cold, or a crooked line is not a straight line, which cannot be conceived without a confusion of both impressions: there is also another consideration of Notions plainly immaterial, which do not impress themselves upon the Conarion, nor any part of the Brain, or on the outward Organs from sensible Objects, but are our own innate conceptions in the speculation of things; and such are sundry Logical, Metaphysical and Mathematical Notions, as I have elsewhere made good. Wherefore it seems altogether incredible that the Conarion, being so gross and palpable a body as it is, should have any Notions or Conceptions that are not corporeal and conveyed to it from material Objects from without.
6. But fifthly and lastly. It is very hardly conceivable how the Conarion, if it were capable of Sense and perception, should, being thus but a mere pulpous protuberant knob, by its nods or joggs drive the Animal spirits so curiously, as not to miss the key that leads to the motion of the least joynt of our body, or to drive them in so forcibly and smartly, as to enable us to strike so fierce strokes as we see men do, especially these Animal spirits being so very thin and fluid, and the Conarion so broad and blunt: For the one gives as to conceive, That the Spirits, especially being so faintly struck as they are likely to be by the Conarion, and certainly sometimes are, will gently wheel about all over the ventricles of the Brain, and be determinated to no key thereof that leads to the Muscle of this or that particular joynt of the body; and the other, That it this impulse of the Conarion will forcibly enough drive forward the Spirits in the ventricles of the Brain, that that wind will, fling open more doors then one, whenas yet we see we can with a very considerable force move a finger or a toe, the rest of our body remaining unmoved. We might adde also, That it is hard to conceive how this Pineal Glandula can move it self thus spontaneously without Muscles and Spirits, or some equivalent mechanical contrivance, and if it do, to what purpose is that great care in Nature of Muscles and Animal Spirits in the frame of Animals? if it do not, we shall further inquire concerning the Spring of Motion, and demand what moves the Animal Spirits that must be imagined to move the Conarion. For in Motion corporeal it is an acknowledged Maxime, Whatever is moved, is moved by another. So demonstrable is it every way that the first principle of our spontaneous motion is not nor can be seated in any part of our Body, but in a Substance really distinct from it, which men ordinarily call the Soul.
7. Nor does that at all invalid the force of our Demonstration which some alledge, that our Arguments are Sophistical, because they as certainly conclude that there is an Incorporeal substance in Beasts as they do that there is one in Men.
For I answer, first, That they conclude absolutely concerning Men, that there is an Incorporeal Soul in them, because we are certain there be in them such Operations that evidently argue such a nature; but we are not so certain of what is in Beasts: and very knowing men, but of a more mechanical Genius, have at least doubted whether Beasts have any Cogitation or no, though in the mean time they have professed themselves sure, that if they had, they could not but have also Immaterial Souls really distinct from their Bodies.
Secondly, Admit our Arguments proved that there were Souls in Brutes really distinct: from their Bodies, is it any thing more then what all Philosophers and School-men, that have held Substantial forms, have either expressely or implicitly acknowledged to be true? But if they be Incorporeal, say they, they will be also Immortal, which is ridiculous. If they mean by Immortal, unperishable, as Matter is, why should they not be so as well as Matter it self, this active substance of the Soul, though but of a Brute, being a more noble Essence, and partaking more of its Makers perfection, then the dull and dissipable Matter? But if they mean by Immortality, a capacity of eternal life and bliss after the dissolution of their Bodies, that's a ridiculous consequence of their own, which we give the Authors of free leave to laugh at; it concerns not us nor our present Argument. For we conceive that the Soul of a Brute may be of that nature as to be vitally affected only in a Terrestrial Body, and that out of it it may have neither sense nor perception of any thing; so as to it self it utterly perishes.
8. That seems an Objection of more moment, Being there are Properties that cannot but be acknowledged to be in a Body or Matter, and yet such as imply strange repugnancies in the conception thereof, (as suppose that perplexed property of Divisibility, which must be into points or in infinitum, either of which confounds our Imagination to think of them) why we may not acknowledge that a Body may also have Sense and Understanding, though it seem never so contradictious in the more close consideration thereof. But I answer, This arguing is very Sophistical, because by the same reason we should admit that the Head of an Onion understands and perceives as well as the Conarion in a Man. For you can bring no greater Argument against it then that it is contradictious and repugnant that it should so be. But you'l reply, That we plainly see that some part of the Body of man must have Sense and Understanding in it, but we discern no such thing in an Onion. But I demand, By what Faculty do we discern this? If you answer, Our own Sense tells us so; I say, our own Sense, if we did not correct it, would confidently suggest to us that our Finger feels and our Eye sees; whenas 'tis plain they do not, for the very same thing that feels and sees, moves also our Body: but neither our Eye nor our Finger move the Body, and therefore they neither feel nor see.
And yet Without our Eye we cannot see in this state of conjunction, as without the due frame and temper of our Brain we cannot well understand: but it no more follows from thence that the Brain understands, and not something distinct from it, then that the Eye sees. Wherefore it is apparent that there is no Faculty in us that can clearly inform us that any part of our Body is indued with Sense and Understanding.
From whence we see the great disparity betwixt admitting of Divisibility in Matter (though the Notion be never so perplex'd) and of Sense and Understanding in a Body, (which indeed brings on more perplexity then the other, if it be very accurately look'd into;) because we are fully ascertained by Sense, and I may say by Reason too, that Matter is divisible, but no Faculty at all can pretend to ascertain us that a Body is capable of either Sense or Reason.
9. But there seems to be a worser Objection then this still behinde, which is this: That though we have evidently proved the impossibility of there being either Sense, Understanding or Spontaneous Motion in Matter or a Body, yet we are never the nearer; for the like difficulties may be urged against there being any Sense or Understanding in a Spirit, sith a Spirit cannot but be extended, nor extended but divisible, nor divisible but incapable of Sense or Understanding, as we have argued before against Matter.
But to this I answer, If by Extension be meant a Juxta-position of parts, or placing of them one by another, as it is in Matter, I utterly deny that a Spirit is at all in this sense extended. But if you mean only a certain Amplitude of presence, that it can be at every part of so much Matter at once, I say it ts extended; but that this kind of Extension does not imply any divisibility in the substance thus extended; for Juxta-position of parts, Impenetrability and Divisibility goe together, and therefore where the two former are wanting, Extension implyes not the Third.
But when I speak of Indivisibility, that Imagination create not new troubles to her self, I mean not such an Indivisibility as is fancied in a Mathematical point; but as we conceive in a Sphere of light made from one lucid point or radiant Center. For that Sphere or Orbe of light though it be in some sense extended, yet it is truly indivisible, supposing the Center such: For there is no means imaginable to discerp or separate any one ray of this Orbe, and keep it apart by it self disjoyned from the Center.
10. Now a little to invert the property of this luminous Orbe when we would apply it to a Soul or Spirit, As there can be no alteration in the radiant Center, but therewith it is necessarily in every part of the Orbe, as suppose it were redder, all would be redder, if dimmer, all dimmer, and the like: so there is also that unity and indivisibility of the exteriour parts, if I may so call them, of a Spirit or Soul with their inmost Center, that if any of them be affected, the Center of life is also thereby necessarily affected, and these exteriour parts of the Soul being affected by the parts of the Object with such circumstances as they are in, the inward Center receives all so circumstantiated, that it has necessarily the intire and unconfused images of things without, though they be contrived into so small a compasse, and are in the very center of this Spiritual Substance,
This Symbolical representation I used before, and I cannot excogitate any thing that will better set off the nature of a Spirit, wherein is implied a power of receiving multitudes of particular figurations into one indivisible Principle of Sense, where all are exactly united into one Subject, and yet distincty represented; which cannot be performed by the Conarion it self, as I have demonstrated, and therefore it remains that it must refer to a Soul, whose chief seat may haply be there as to the act of perception.
11. But if any shall abuse our Courtesie of endeavouring to help his Imagination (or at least to gratifie it) in this Symbolical representation we have made, by conceiving of this Center of the Soul but as some dull dirisible point in Matter, and of no greater efficacy, and of the vital or arbitrarious extension of it, as grossely as if it would necessarily argue as real a divisibility and seperability of the parts as in a Body, to prevent all such cavils, we shall omit those spinosities of the extension or indivisibility of a Soul or Spirit, and conclude briefly thus:
That the manifold contradictions and repugnancies we finde in the nature of Matter to be able to either think or spontaneously to move it self, do well assure us that these operations belong not to it, but to some other Substance: wherefore we finding those operations in us, it is manifest that we have in us an Immaterial Being really distinct from the Body, which we ordinarily call a Soul. The speculation of whose bare Essence though it may well puzzle us, yet those Properties that we find incompetible to a Body, do sufficiently inform us of the different nature of her; for it is plain she is a Substance indued with the power of cogitation (that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects) as also of penetrating and Spontaneously moving of a Body: which Properties are as immediate to her as impenetrability and seperability of parts to the Matter; and we are not to demand the cause of the one no more then of the other.