An Antidote Against Atheism/Book I/Chapter VIII
Chap. VIII.
1. That the very Idea of God implies his necessary Existence. 2. That his Existence is not hypothetically necessary, but absolutely, with the occasion noted of that slippery Evasion. 3. That to acknowledge God a Being necessarily Existent according to the true Notion of him, and yet to say he may not Exist, is a plain contradiction. 4. That Necessity is a Logical term, and implies an indissoluble connexion betwixt Subject and Praedicate, whence again this Axiome is necessarily and eternally true, God doth exist. 5. A further Demonstration of his Existence from the incompetibility of Contingency or Impossibility to his Nature or Idea. 6. That necessary Self-existence belongs either to God, or to Matter, or to both. 7. The great Incongruities that follow the admission of the Self-existency of Matter. 8. An Answer to an Evasion. 9. That a number of Self essentiated Deities plainly takes away the Being of the true God. 10. The onely undeniable Demonstration of the Unity of the Godhead. 11. The absurdness in admitting actual Self-existence in the Matter, and denying it in God. 12. That this absurdity cannot be excused from the sensibleness of Matter, sith the Atheist himself is forced to admit such things as fall not under Sense. 13. That it is as foolish a thing to reject the Being of God because he does not immediately fall under the Senses, as it were to reject the Being of Matter because it is so incomprehensible to the Phansy. 14. The factious Humour someness of the Atheist in siding with some Faculties of the Soul, and rejecting the rest, though equally competent judges.
1. And now verily casting my eyes upon the true Idea of God which we have found out, I seem to my self to have struck further into this business then I was aware of. For if this Idea or Notion of God be true, as I have undeniably proved, it is also undeniably true That he doth exist: For this Idea of God being no arbitrarious Figment taken up at pleasure, but the necessary and natural Emanation of the Minde of Man, if it signifies to us that the Notion and Nature of God implies in it necessary Existence, as we have shewn it does, unless we will wink against our own natural Light, we are without any further Scruple to acknowledge That God does exist.
2. Nor is it sufficient ground to diffide to the strength of this Argument, because our Phansy can shuffle in this Abater, viz. That indeed this Idea of God, supposing God did exist, shews us that his Existence is necessary, but it does not shew us that he doth necessarily exist. For he that answers thus, does not observe out of what prejudice he is enabled to make this Answer, which is this: He being accustomed to fancy the Nature or Notion of every thing else without Existence, and so ever easily separating Essence and Existence in them, here unawares he takes the same liberty, and divides Existence from that Essence to which Existence it self is essential. And that's the witty Fallacy his unwariness has intangled him in.
3. Again, when as we contend that the true Idea of God represents him as a Being necessarily existent, and therefore that he does exist; and you to avoid the edge of the Argument reply, If he did at all exist; by this answer you involve your self in a manifest Contradiction. For first, you say with us, That the Nature of God is such, that in its very Notion it implies its Necessary Existence; and then again you unsay it, by intimating that notwithstanding this true Idea and Notion, God may not exist; and so acknowledge that what is absolutely necessary according to the free Emanation of our Faculties, yet may be otherwise; Which is a palpable Contradiction as much as respects us and our Faculties, and we have nothing more inward and immediate then these to steer our selves by.
4. And to make this yet plainer at least, if not stronger; when we say that the Existence of God is Necessary, we are to take notice that Necessity is a Logical Term, and signifies so firm a Connexion betwixt the Subject and Prædicate (as they call them) that it is impossible that they should be dissevered, or should not hold together; and therefore if they be affirm'd one of the other, that they make Axioma Necessarium, an Axiome that is necessary, or eternally true. Wherefore there being a Necessary Connexion betwixt God and Existence, this Axiome, God does Exist, is an Axiome Necessarily and Eternally true. Which we shall yet more clearly understand, if we compare Necessity and Contingency together. For as Contingency signifies not onely the Manner of Existence in that which is Contingent according to its Idea, but does intimate also a Possibility of Actual Existence; so (to make up the true and easie Analogy) Necessity does not onely signifie the Manner of Exigence in that which is Necessary, but also that it does actually Exist, and could never possibly do otherwise. For ἁναγκαῖον εἶναι and ἀδύνατον μή εἶναι, Necessity of being and Impossibility of Not being, are all one with Arisiotle and the rest of the Logicians. But the Atheist and the Enthusiast are usually such profess'd Enemies against Logick; the one merely out of Dotage upon outward gross Sense, the other in a dear regard to his stiffe and untamed Phansy, that shop of Mysteries and fine things.
5. Thirdly, we may further adde, That whereas we must needs attribute to the Idea of God either Contingency, Impossibility, or Necessity of Actuall Existence, (some one of these belonging to every Idea imaginable) and that Contingency is incompetible to an Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, much more Imposibility, the Idea of God being compiled of no Notions but such as are possible according to the Light of Nature, to which we now appeal; it remains therefore that Necessity of Actuall Existence be unavoidably cast upon the Idea of God, and that therefore God does actually Exist.
6. But fourthly and lastly, If this seem more subtile, though it be no lesse true for it, I shall now propound that which is so palpable, that it is impossible for any one that has the use of his wits for to deny it. I say therefore, that either God, or this corporeall and sensible World must of it self necessarily exist. Or thus, Either God, or Matter, or both, do of themselves necessarily exist: If both we have what we would drive at, the Existency of God.
7. But yet to acknowledge the necessary Existence of the Matter of it self, is not so congruous and suteable to the Light of Nature. For if any thing can exist independently of God, all things may: so that not onely the Omnipotency of God might be in vain, but beside, there would be a letting in from hence of all confusion and disorder imaginable; nay, of some grand Devil of equal Power and of as large Command as God himself; or, if you will, of six thousand Millions of such monstrous Gigantick Spirits, fraught with various and mischievous Passions, as well as armed with immense power, who in anger or humour appearing in huge shapes, might take the Planets up in their prodigious Clutches, and pelt one another with them as Boyes are wont to doe with snow-balls. And that this has not yet happened, will be resolved onely into this, that the humour has not yet taken them: but the frame of Nature and the generation of things would be still liable to this ruine and disorder. So dangerous a thing it is to slight the natural dependencies and correspondencies of our Innate Ideas and Conceptions.
8. Nor is there any Refuge in such a Reply as this. That the full and perfect Infinitude of the Power of God is able easily to overmaster these six thousand Millions of Monsters, and to stay their hands. For I say that six or fewer may equalize the Infinite Power of God. For if any thing may be Self-essentiated besides God, why may not a Spirit of just six times less power then God exist of it self? and then six such will equalize him, a seventh will over-power him.
9. But such a rabble of Self-essentiated and divided Deities does not onely hazzard the pulling the world in pieces, but plainly takes away the Existence of the true God. For if there be any Power or Perfection whatsoever which has its original from any other then God, it manifestly demonstrates that God is not God, that is, is not a Being absolutely and fully Perfect because we see some Power in the world that is not his, that is, that is not from him. But what is fully and wholly from him is very truly and properly his, as the thought of my mind is rather my mind's then my thought's.
10. And this is the onely way that I know to demonstrate that it is impossible that there should be any more then One true God in the world: For is we did admit another beside him, this other must be also Self-originated; and so neither of them would be God. For the Idea of God swallows up into it self all Power and Perfection conceivable, and therefore necessarily implies that whatever hath any Being derives it from him.
11. But if you say the Matter does only exist, and not God, then this Matter does necessarily exist of it self, and so we give that Attribute unto the Matter which our Natural Light taught us to be contain'd in the Essential conception of no other thing besides God. Wherefore to deny that of God which is so necessarily comprehended in the true Idea of him, and to acknowledge it in that in whose Idea it is not at all contain'd, (for necessary Existence is not contain'd in the Idea of any thing but of a Being absolutely Perfect) is to pronounce contrary to our Natural Light, and to doe manifest violence to our Faculties.
12. Nor can this be excused by saying that the Corporeal Matter is palpable and sensible unto us, but God is not, and therefore we pronounce confidently that it is, though God be not; and also that it is necessary of it self, sith that which is without the help of another, must necessarily be, and eternally.
For I demand of you then, sith you professe your selves to believe nothing but Sense, how could Sense ever help you to that Truth you acknowledged last, viz. That that which exists without the help of another is necessary and eternall? For Necessity and Eternity are no sensible Qualities, and therefore are not the Objects of any Sense; and I have already very plentifully proved, that there is other Knowledge and perception in the Soul besides that of Sense. Wherefore it is very unreasonable, whenas we have other Faculties of Knowledge besides the Senses, that we should consult with the Senses alone about matters of Knowledge, and exclude those Faculties that penetrate beyond Sense. A thing that the profess'd Atheists themselves will not doe when they are in the humor of Philosophising; for their Principle of Atomes is a business that does not fall under Sense, as Lucretius at large confesses.
13. But now seeing it is so manifest that the Soul of man has other Cognoscitive Faculties besides that of Sense, (which I have clearly above demonstrated) it is as incongruous to deny there is a God, because God is not an Object fitted to the Senses, as it were to deny there is Matter or a Body, because Body or Matter, in the imaginative Notion thereof, lies so unevenly and troublesomly in our Phasy and Reason.
In the contemplation whereof our Understanding discovereth such contradictious incoherencies, that were it not that the Notion is sustain'd by the confident dictates of Sense, Reason appealing to those more crass Representations of Phansy, would by her shrewd Dilemmas be able to argue it quite out of the world. But our reason being well aware that corporeall Matter is the proper Object of the Sensitive Faculty, she gives full belief to the information of Sense in her own sphear, slighting the puzling objections of perplexed Phansy, and freely admits the Existence of Matter, notwithstanding the intanglements of Imagination; as she does also the Existence of God, from the contemplation of his Idea in our Soul, notwithstanding the silence of the Senses therein.
14. For indeed it were an unexcusable piece of folly and madnesse in a man, whenas he has Cognoscitive Faculties reaching to the knowledge of God, and has a certain and unalterable Idea of God in his Soul, which he can by no device wipe out, as well as he has the knowledge of Sense that reaches to the discovery of the Matter; to give necessary Self-existence to the Matter, no Faculty at all informing him so; and to take necessary Existence from God, though the natural Notion of God in the Soul inform him to the contrary; and onely upon this pretence, because God does not immediately fall under the Knowledge of the Senses: thus partially siding with one kinde of Faculty onely of the Soul, and proscribing all the rest. Which is as humoursomely and foolishly done, as if a man should make a faction amongst the Senses themselves, and resolve to believe nothing to be but what he could see with his Eyes, and so confidently pronounce that there is no such thing as the Element of Aire, nor Winds, nor Musick, nor Thunder. And the reason, forsooth, must be, because he can see none of these things with his Eyes, and that's the sole Sense that he intends to believe.