An Eye-witness from Russia/Chapter 5
V.
The "Red" and the "Red and White"
Terrors.
The two opposing forces in Russia and Siberia which we have grouped under the names of Red Army and Czecho-Slovaks were really composite, but the names given indicate in both cases the dominant military force. The Bolsheviks had ranged against them an alliance, or, perhaps more properly, an association, which did not gain in strength by including groups of widely differing character. From a military point of view the Czecho-Slovak forces were the most important. They acted as a screen behind which it was possible to raise regiments which, it was hoped, later could co-operate with them. In the Samara region of Russia the "Narodny Army," which, translated, means the "People's Army," was so formed, and was officered by men of the Cadet and Social Revolutionary Right persuasions, and received both sympathy and actual support from the reactionary old régime element. Another of the associates had always shown a reactionary tendency—the Cossacks. Those from Orenburg and Uralsk at first professed themselves Republicans, later Limited Monarchists, and eventually rallied round the Grand Duke Michael and desired his restoration to the throne, as was suggested in the manifesto of abdication of Nicholas II. In Siberia the regiments raised behind the Czecho-Slovak screen adopted the green and white colours of the "Republic of Siberia," and were officered by old régime officials and people of the Social Revolutionary Right party. In Manchuria politics and the military were in such a state of constant change and confusion that relatively slight military assistance could be rendered from that quarter.
In the other camp divisions of party were by no means so strongly marked, but the difficulty of carrying out an active military campaign arose from the fact that the units composing the Bolshevik army, while united for the general purpose of upholding and "protecting" the Revolution, contained within themselves a factor which tended towards disintegration, because of the intensely strong feeling of localism which pervaded the regiments. In one respect the Bolsheviks were at an advantage in that they were fighting an association of reactionaries, Cossacks, Czechs, and later the Allies, whereas their enemies were fighting but a single army, which, though it was heterogeneous, yet roughly represented a single idea. Considering the great diversity of the two associations, it is perhaps remarkable that the co-operation on both sides was as good as it proved to be. It certainly speaks for a generosity of sentiment towards one's friends which is all the more noteworthy when one considers the bitterness of political relations in Russia during the last fifty years. The Czech-Cossack-Reactionary combination was not led by any dominating personality, nor did it stand for any clearly expressed ideals. It sought but one thing—to eliminate Bolshevism and the Bolsheviks from Russia and Siberia and leave a clear field for political parties of lively, though varied, enthusiasms.
A Contrast in Aims.
Permitting oneself to generalise, it may be said that the Czech combination sought to re-establish in Russia a political system; the Bolsheviks sought to construct a new Russia. The Bolsheviks turned their attention to the undeveloped capacities of the people; their opponents concentrated their attention on building up a new State from the débris of the old. Time was the most important factor in bringing both parties to action. It seemed clear to some people that the longer the Bolsheviks were in power the greater would be the process of dissolution, and, to continue the metaphor, the débris would be reduced to a finer state of subdivision. Therefore the longer the delay the harder would be the task of reconstructing the State from the broken remains of the old régime. At all costs the Bolshevik power must be broken at once, and, however distasteful it might be, the use of severe measures and bloodshed must in the end be a wise economy. Faith in the essential soundness of the system of the old régime justified the means they adopted, and appeared to sanctify their hatred for the Bolsheviks. Orders were promulgated that all commissaries and members of the Soviet and all men in the Red Guard captured were to be shot. In the Buzuluk department of the Samara government, the district of which I am now speaking, the "Red and White" (Czech) Terror preceded the "Red" Terror. Under the "Red" Terror one morning two dozen people were executed after the publication of the orders just mentioned, the victims belonging to families who had pronounced their affection for the old régime, and therefore were not popular in the district.
The effect of these Terrors on the civil population was easy to observe and as easy to estimate. When the Czechs had taken our town there was a "Te Deum" in the principal church, and thanks were offered up to God because the country had been rid of a vile enemy, which enemy, the people said, they had elected to govern them. It is true that there was not perfect freedom under the Bolsheviks, but in the welter of ideas in which we all lived the restraints were not very obvious, and, though there was a censorship of the telegraph and to some extent of the press up to the time of the Czech outbreak, we were conscious more of the influence of public opinion than of political pressure put upon us by any one party.
Under the new régime instituted behind the screen of the Czech forces we were conscious of the pressure of one political party, and we noted the suppression of the influence of public opinion. In the town of Buzuluk we saw the Cossacks driving through the streets with a cartload of headless bodies, the peasants remarking, "Those bodies were our sons; they joined the Red Guard to defend the Revolution." The next day, while the Cossacks were patrolling the town, an "election" was held on a limited franchise, and candidates for office were required to have the signature on their papers of certain persons who had held office under the old régime. A Council was thus elected which bore a close resemblance to that which had existed in 1916, the comment of people on the street being, "This is too reactionary for us."
Within about a week the Bolshevik days seemed but a memory. For the first time for many months the rank of officers was distinguished by their insignia, the social position of the ladies by their silk dresses. Public notices told the people of the reign of "prosperity." The banks were opened and free trading re-established. It was no longer necessary, in a country almost destitute of materials, to show proof that an old suit was worn out before a new one could be bought. Articles of adornment and the necessities of life were on sale in the shops and bazaars, but at such prices that only the rich could buy. If the Bolshevik programme came upon Russia too hastily, it is true to add that the return to "prosperity" was also too rapid. The people grumbled.
Bolshevism Preferred to Reaction.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the Czecho-Slovaks should after three months have found their position on the Volga and in the Samara government to be untenable, and that they should have been forced to retire because of grave discontent among the people. Faced with the alternative of Bolshevism or a Government which they considered both oppressive and reactionary, it was not unnatural that the people should prefer Bolshevism, because, though it might spell chaos, it did permit a degree of freedom for opinions, and its programme included projects, such as those dealing with education, which the people considered of vital importance.
When I was discussing Bolshevism with peasants last April they used to say to me: "How do we know whether it is good or bad? It will need to be tried for ten or twenty years." And when I expostulated and said that our Governments changed more rapidly than that, they were wont to reply that that surely indicated that the political intuitions of the English were more acute than theirs. It is clear that the unfair impatience of those who screened their Government behind the Cossacks and the Czechs, and who overthrew the Bolsheviks, was also shared by those who in October, 1918, turned out the new Government and embraced Bolshevism again. For the new régime had not had time to prove its worth, and had this to its credit, that it expended a great deal of energy in re-establishing the railway service, in opening the banks, and in placing the large business concerns on a different basis. Those who had tolerated the confusion of the Bolsheviks should not have been too exacting in their demands on the new Government. The débris of an old system littered the path of the Bolsheviks in their task of regeneration; no less did the débris resulting from Bolshevism lie in the path of those who desired to see the old political system rebuilt.