Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume VII/Lactantius/The Divine Institutes/Book I/Chap. XVI

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Ante-Nicene Fathers Vol. VII, The Divine Institutes, Book I
by Lactantius, translated by William Fletcher
Chap. XVI
159066Ante-Nicene Fathers Vol. VII, The Divine Institutes, Book I — Chap. XVIWilliam FletcherLactantius

Chap. xvi.— by what argument it is proved that those who are distinguished by a difference of sex cannot be gods.[1]

I might be content with those things which I have related, but there still remain many things which are necessary for the work which I have undertaken. For although, by destroying the principal part of superstitions, I have taken away the whole, yet it pleases me to follow up the remaining parts, and more fully to refute so inveterate a persuasion, that men may at length be ashamed and repent of their errors. This is a great undertaking, and worthy of a man. “I proceed to release the minds of men from the ties of superstitions,” as Lucretius[2] says; and he indeed was unable to effect this, because he brought forward nothing true. This is our duty, who both assert the existence of the true God and refute false deities. They, therefore, who entertain the opinion that the poets have invented fables about the gods, and yet believe in the existence of female deities, and worship them, are unconsciously brought back to that which they had denied—that they have sexual intercourse, and bring forth. For it is impossible that the two sexes can have been instituted except for the sake of generation. But a difference of sex being admitted, they do not perceive that conception follows as a consequence. And this cannot be the case with a God. But let the matter be as they imagine; for they say that there are sons of Jupiter and of the other gods. Therefore new gods are born, and that indeed daily, for gods are not surpassed in fruitfulness by men. It follows that all things are full of gods without number, since forsooth none of them dies. For since the multitude of men is incredible, and their number not to be estimated—though, as they are born, they must of necessity die—what must we suppose to be the case with the gods who have been born through so many ages, and have remained immortal? How is it, then, that so few are worshipped? Unless we think by any means that there are two sexes of the gods, not for the sake of generation, but for mere gratification, and that the gods practise those things which men are ashamed to do, and to submit to. But when any are said to be born from any, it follows that they always continue to be born, if they are born at any time; or if they ceased at any time to be born, it is befitting that we should know why or at what time they so ceased. Seneca, in his books of moral philosophy, not without some pleasantry, asks, “What is the reason why Jupiter, who is represented by the poets as most addicted to lust, ceased to beget children? Was it that he was become a sexagenarian, and was restrained by the Papian law?[3] Or did he obtain the privileges conferred by having three children? Or did the sentiment at length occur to him, ‘What you have done to another, you may expect from another;’ and does he fear lest any one should act towards him as he himself did to Saturn?” But let those who maintain that they are gods, see in what manner they can answer this argument which I shall bring forward. If there are two sexes of the gods, conjugal intercourse follows; and if this takes place, they must have houses, for they are not without virtue and a sense of shame, so as to do this openly and promiscuously, as we see that the brute animals do. If they have houses, it follows that they also have cities; and for this we have the authority of Ovid, who says, “The multitude of gods occupy separate places; in this front the powerful and illustrious inhabitants of heaven have placed their dwellings.” If they have cities, they will also have fields. Now who cannot see the consequence,—namely, that they plough and cultivate their lands? And this is done for the sake of food. Therefore they are mortal. And this argument is of the same weight when reversed. For if they have no lands, they have no cities; and if they have no cities, they are also without houses. And if they have no houses, they have no conjugal intercourse; and if they are without this, they have no female sex. But we see that there are females among the gods also. Therefore there are not gods. If any one is able, let him do away with this argument. For one thing so follows the other, that it is impossible not to admit these last things. But no one will refute even the former argument. Of the two sexes the one is stronger, the other weaker. For the males are more robust, the females more feeble. But a god is not liable to feebleness; therefore there is no female sex. To this is added that last conclusion of the former argument, that there are no gods, since there are females also among the gods.  


Footnotes

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  1. And that the office of propagating (his race) does not fall within the nature of God.  
  2. i. 931. [i.e., De Rerum Natura, lib. i. verse 931.]  
  3. [Cicero, De Officiis, lib. iii. 11.]