Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere/Opinion of the Court
ROBERT H. DUDLEY, Justice. In this original action the petitioner, the Arkansas Womens Political Caucus, asks this court to declare invalid proposed Constitutional Amendment No. 65, "The Unborn Child Amendment." We hold that the popular name of the proposed amendment constitutes a partisan coloring of the ballot and declare the measure ineligible for consideration at the November 6, 1984, election.
In two historic cases, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the Constitution protects a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy and that a state may not unduly burden the exercise of a woman's fundamental right to obtain an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). These two 1973 cases did not resolve all of the complex issues involved in the abortion controversy. In 1977, in a trilogy of cases, the Court ruled that neither the Constitution nor federal statutes required public funding of elective abortions for poverty stricken women. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977). The 1977 trilogy did not address the question of whether state laws could validly prohibit governmental funding of medically necessary abortions.
The original action now before us is a continuation of the abortion controversy at the state level. On one side, the intervenor, The Unborn Child Amendment Committee, desires to amend the Arkansas Constitution to adopt a policy limiting abortion, not only from viability, but from conception. The intervenor would also prohibit the use of public funds for abortion, directly or indirectly, unless it was for the purpose of saving the woman's life. On the other side, the petitioners, the Arkansas Womens Political Caucus, desires to maintain the present silence of the Constitution of Arkansas on the subject. That silence allows a statute to provide that a woman and her physician may make the choice under certain circumstances. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2554. It allows the state, if it chooses, to treat abortion as an accepted medical procedure under Medicaid type programs.
Amendment 7 to the Constitution of Arkansas gives all citizens of this state the right to initiate constitutional amendments. The intervenor, Unborn Child Amendment Committee, seeks to exercise that right. They have drafted a proposed amendment, a proposed popular name and a proposed ballot title. They have submitted the proposed popular name and ballot title to the Attorney General for approval. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 2-208 (Repl. 1976 and Supp. 1983). The Attorney General has ruled that the popular name and title are not misleading and has approved them for circulation. They have circulated initiative petitions and the Secretary of State has determined that they had obtained sufficient signatures in order to have the initiated proposed amendment on the November 6, 1984, ballot.
The petitioner contends that the ballot title and popular name are partial and misleading to the extent that the electorate will be deceived. Our standard of review for these actions is clear. It is the duty of this court to see that ballot titles and popular names are (1) intelligible, (2) honest, and (3) impartial. Leigh v. Hall, 232 Ark. 558, 339 S.W.2d 104 (1960).
The requirements for the popular name are not as stringent as those for the ballot title. It is simply a legislative device which is useful for voters to discuss a measure before an election. Pafford v. Hall, 217 Ark. 734, 233 S.W.2d 72 (1950). However, popular ballot names which contain catch phrases or slogans that tend to mislead or give partisan colorings to the merit of a proposal will be rejected. Moore v. Hall, 229 Ark. 411, 316 S.W.2d 207 (1958). The popular ballot name, "The Unborn Child Amendment" is misleading.
An unborn child cannot exist before life begins, but those trained in the disciplines of law, medicine, philosophy and theology are unable to arrive at a consensus of when life begins. A synopsis of thought is found in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 160–61.
. . .There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. It appears to be the predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith. It may be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community, insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and her family. As we have noted, the common law found greater significance in quickening. Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes "viable," that is, potentially able to live outside the mothers womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks. The Aristotelian theory of "mediate animation," that held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman Catholic Dogma until the 19th century, despite opposition to this "ensoulment" theory from those in the Church who would recognize the existence of life from the moment of conception. The latter is now, of course, the official belief of the Catholic Church. As one brief amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by many non-Catholics as well, and by many physicians. Substantial problems for precise definition of this view are posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a "process" over time, rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the "Morning-after" pill, implantations of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial wombs.
From this synopsis it can be seen that there are three schools of thought on the issue of when life begins; at conception, upon live birth, or at the point upon which the fetus becomes viable. The intervenor committee follows that school of thought which believes that life begins at conception. The ballot name "unborn child," standing alone, would tend to mislead those voters who follow an alternate school of thought and do not think of fetuses of certain gestational ages as unborn children. Those voters could well make a distinction between a one-second old conceptus and a fetus of eight months gestation which this popular name does not acknowledge. More significantly, the enactment of the proposed amendment would do two things, equally far-reaching: it would immediately prohibit the use of public funds for abortion, including a female impregnated by rape or incest, unless the life of the mother were in danger; and two, it would empower the General Assembly to prohibit abortion under any circumstances to the extent permitted under the Constitution of the United States. Yet, the popular name makes no reference whatsoever to this emotionally charged subject. Instead, the ballot name contains only the inviting catch words "unborn child," which gives the voters only the impression the proponents of the amendment want them to have. Very few would vote against a child, born or unborn, even though they are for a woman's right to have an abortion or for the state paying for it. The popular name is a clear-cut example of the partisan coloring of ballots which we have uniformly condemned in our decisions holding that a ballot name must be fair and impartial.
We are aware that overshadowing this particular proposed amendment are the rights of initiative and voting. We are keenly aware that all citizens of this state are being denied those rights by this opinion, even after the sponsors have been through a long and expensive process. However, in a case of this kind, the Constitution plainly places the responsibility on this court to see that the result of an election represents the objective judgment of the voters. The popular ballot title conveys a biased view of the merits of the proposal. It is plainly our duty to declare it misleading.
Petition granted.
HUBBELL, C.J., and HICKMAN, J., dissent.
Purtle, J., not participating.