Blystone v. Pennsylvania/Opinion of the Court

by William Rehnquist

A Pennsylvania jury sentenced petitioner Scott Wayne Blystone to death after finding him guilty of robbing and murdering a hitchhiker who was unlucky enough to have accepted a ride in his car. Petitioner challenges his sentence on the ground that the State's death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it requires the jury to impose a sentence of death if, as in this case, it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. We hold that the Pennsylvania death penalty statute, and petitioner's sentence under it, comport with our decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

On a September night in 1983, Dalton Charles Smithburger, Jr., an individual characterized at trial as possessing a learning disability, was attempting to hitch a ride along a Pennsylvania road. Petitioner, who was driving an auto carrying his girlfriend and another couple, observed Smithburger and announced: "I am going to pick this guy up and rob him, okay . . .?" His friends acquiesced in the idea. Once petitioner had Smithburger in the car, he asked him if he had any money for gas. Smithburger responded that he only had a few dollars and began searching a pocket for money. Dissatisfied, petitioner pulled out a revolver, held it to Smithburger's head, and demanded that Smithburger close his eyes and put his hands on the dash. Petitioner then pulled off the road and ordered Smithburger out of the car and into a nearby field. After searching his victim at gunpoint and recovering $13, petitioner told Smithburger to lie face down in the field. He later said to a friend: " 'He [Smithburger] was so scared. When I was searching him, his body was shaking.' " 519 Pa. 450, 490, 549 A.2d 81, 100 (1988).

Petitioner then ordered his victim not to move, and crept back to the car to tell his companions he was going to kill Smithburger. Petitioner returned to the field where, paralyzed by fright, Smithburger remained with his face to the ground. Petitioner asked his victim what kind of car he had been in. Smithburger responded with the wrong answer-he accurately described the car as green with a wrecked back end. Petitioner then said " 'goodbye' " and discharged six bullets into the back of Smithburger's head. During a subsequent conversation with a friend, petitioner was recorded on a concealed device "bragging in vivid and grisly detail of the killing of that unlucky lad." Id., at 457, 549 A.2d, at 84. In response to a query during the conversation as to whether petitioner dreamed about, or felt anything from, the murder, petitioner stated: " 'We laugh about it. . . . [I]t gives you a realization that you can do it. . . . You can walk and blow somebody's brains out and you know that you can get away with it. It gives you a feeling of power, self-confidence. . . .' " Id., at 489-490, 549 A.2d, at 100.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit homicide, and criminal conspiracy to commit robbery. The same jury that convicted petitioner found as an aggravating circumstance that petitioner "committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony." 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 9711(d)(6) (1988). The jury found that no mitigating circumstances existed, and accordingly sentenced petitioner to death pursuant to the Pennsylvania death penalty statute which provides that "[t]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances." § 9711(c)(1)(iv). On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, petitioner argued that the death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it mandated a sentence of death based on the outcome of the weighing process. The court summarily rejected this argument, see 519 Pa., at 473, 549 A.2d, at 92, noting that it had been expressly refuted in its decision in Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 326-328, 513 A.2d 373, 387-388 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 962, 93 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1987). In Peterkin, the court reasoned that the statute properly accommodated the concerns of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), that jury discretion be channeled to avoid arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing, and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), that a capital jury be allowed to consider all relevant mitigating evidence. 511 Pa., at 326-328, 513 A.2d, at 387-388. We granted certiorari, 489 U.S. 1096, 109 S.Ct. 1567, 103 L.Ed.2d 934 (1989), to decide whether the mandatory aspect of the Pennsylvania death penalty statute renders the penalty imposed upon petitioner unconstitutional because it improperly limited the discretion of the jury in deciding the appropriate penalty for his crime. We now affirm.

The constitutionality of a death penalty statute having some "mandatory" aspects is not a novel issue for this Court. In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), we upheld a statute requiring the imposition of a death sentence if the jury made certain findings against the defendant beyond the initial conviction for murder. See id., at 278, 96 S.Ct., at 2959 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). A majority of the Court believed that the Texas sentencing scheme at issue in Jurek cured the constitutional defect identified in Furman-namely, that unguided juries were imposing the death penalty in an inconsistent and random manner on defendants. See Furman, supra, 408 U.S., at 309-310, 92 S.Ct., at 2762-2763 (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus, by suitably directing and limiting a sentencing jury's discretion "so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.), the Texas death penalty scheme was found to pass constitutional muster. See Jurek, 428 U.S., at 276, 96 S.Ct., at 2958. ^[1]

It was also thought significant that the Texas sentencing scheme allowed the jury to consider relevant mitigating evidence. "A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed." Id., at 271, 96 S.Ct., at 2956 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.). On the same day that Jurek was decided, the Court struck down two capital sentencing schemes largely because they automatically imposed a sentence of death upon an individual convicted of certain murders, without allowing "particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2990, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-334, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 3006-3007, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S., at 604, 98 S.Ct., at 2964 (plurality opinion) ("The mandatory death penalty statute in Woodson was held invalid because it permitted no consideration of relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense") (emphasis in original; quotation omitted).

In Lockett, the Court provided further guidance on the nature of "relevant" mitigating circumstances, concluding that a sentencer must be allowed to consider, "as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Ibid. (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Last Term, we elaborated on this principle, holding that "the jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's background and character or the circumstances of the crime." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989).

We think that the Pennsylvania death penalty statute satisfies the requirement that a capital sentencing jury be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence. Section 9711 does not limit the types of mitigating evidence which may be considered, and subsection (e) provides a jury with a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors which may be taken into account-including a "catchall" category providing for the consideration of "[a]ny other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense." See 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 9711(e)(8) (1988). ^[2] Nor is the statute impermissibly "mandatory" as that term was understood in Woodson or Roberts. Death is not automatically imposed upon conviction for certain types of murder. It is imposed only after a determination that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances present in the particular crime committed by the particular defendant, or that there are no such mitigating circumstances. This is sufficient under Lockett and Penry. ^[3]

Petitioner challenges the statute as it was applied in his particular case. This challenge essentially consists of a claim that his sentencing proceeding was rendered "unreliable" by the mandatory aspect of § 9711 for two reasons. See Woodson, supra, 428 U.S., at 305, 96 S.Ct., at 2991 (there is a "need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case") (plurality opinion). First, petitioner asserts that the mandatory feature of his jury instructions-derived, of course, from the statute-precluded the jury from evaluating the weight of the particular aggravating circumstance found in his case. Second, petitioner contends that the mandatory feature of the sentencing instructions unconstitutionally limited the jury's consideration of unenumerated mitigating circumstances. We address these arguments in turn.

At sentencing, petitioner's jury found one aggravating circumstance present in this case-that petitioner committed a killing while in the perpetration of a robbery. No mitigating circumstances were found. ^[4] Petitioner contends that the mandatory imposition of death in this situation violates the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing since the jury was precluded from considering whether the severity of his aggravating circumstance warranted the death sentence. We reject this argument. The presence of aggravating circumstances serves the purpose of limiting the class of death-eligible defendants, and the EighthAmend ment does not require that these aggravating circumstances be further refined or weighed by a jury. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244, 108 S.Ct. 546, 554, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988) ("The use of 'aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury's discretion"). The requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence. ^[5] In petitioner's case the jury was specifically instructed to consider, as mitigating evidence, any "matter concerning the character or record of the defendant, or the circumstances of his offense." App. 12-13. This was sufficient to satisfy the dictates of the Eighth Amendment.

Next, petitioner maintains that the mandatory aspect of his sentencing instructions foreclosed the jury's consideration of certain mitigating circumstances. The trial judge gave the jury examples of mitigating circumstances that it was entitled to consider, essentially the list of factors contained in § 9711(e). Among these, the judge stated that the jury was allowed to consider whether petitioner was affected by an "extreme" mental or emotional disturbance, whether petitioner was "substantially" impaired from appreciating his conduct, or whether petitioner acted under "extreme" duress. Petitioner argues that these instructions impermissibly precluded the jury's consideration of lesser degrees of disturbance, impairment, or duress. This claim bears scant relation to the mandatory aspect of Pennsylvania's statute, but in any event we reject it. The judge at petitioner's trial made clear to the jury that these were merely items it could consider, and that it was also entitled to consider "any other mitigating matter concerning the character or record of the defendant, or the circumstances of his offense." App. 12-13. This instruction fully complied with the requirements of Lockett and Penry.

Three Terms ago, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), we summarized the teachings of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence:

"In sum, our decisions since Furman have identified a constitutionally permissible range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. First, there is a required threshold below which the death penalty cannot be imposed. In this context, the State must establish rational criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet the threshold. Moreover, a societal consensus that the death penalty is disproportionate to a particular offense prevents a State from imposing the death penalty for that offense. Second, States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In this respect, the State cannot channel the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant information offered by the defendant." Id., at 305-306, 107 S.Ct., at 1774.

We think petitioner's sentence under the Pennsylvania statute satisfied these requirements. The fact that other States have enacted different forms of death penalty statutes which also satisfy constitutional requirements casts no doubt on Pennsylvania's choice. Within the constitutional limits defined by our cases, the States enjoy their traditional latitude to prescribe the method by which those who commit murder shall be punished.

Affirmed.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, and with whom Justice BLACKMUN and Justice STEVENS join except as to Part IV, dissenting.

Notes

1. Only three Members of the Court expressly relied on the mandatory nature of the Texas sentencing scheme as one reason why it passed muster under Furman. See Jurek, 428 U.S., at 278, 96 S.Ct., at 2959 (WHITE, J., joined by Burger, C.J. and REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment). While Justices Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS did not explicitly rely on the mandatory character of that scheme in upholding it, those Justices certainly did not believe the mandatory language posed any constitutional difficulties. See generally id., at 268-277, 96 S.Ct., at 2954-2959.
2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has construed § 9711(e) to allow consideration of any relevant mitigating evidence, even that falling outside the catchall provision of subsection (e)(8). Commonwealth v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 470, n. 26, 498 A.2d 833, 856, n. 26 (1985) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1150, 106 S.Ct. 1804, 90 L.Ed.2d 349 (1986); see also Commonwealth v. Fahy, 512 Pa. 298, 315-316, 516 A.2d 689, 698 (1986).
3. The dissent states that our discussion of the facial validity of the Pennsylvania statute under Penry and Lockett is irrelevant because "[w]e did not grant certiorari to determine if the statute allows sufficient consideration of mitigating circumstances as required by Lockett. We granted certiorari to consider whether a State may mandate the death penalty when the jury finds no mitigating circumstances." Post, at 316, n. 5. This statement is in error. The question presented reads as follows: "Whether the mandatory nature of the Pennsylvania death penalty statute renders said statute facially unconstitutional or renders the death penalty imposed upon petitioner unconstitutional because it improperly limits the full discretion the sentencer must have in deciding the appropriate penalty for a particular defendant." Pet. for Cert. 2. The jury's ability to consider mitigating evidence is indeed germane to this question.
4. After receiving repeated warnings from the trial judge, and contrary advice from his counsel, petitioner decided not to present any proof of mitigating evidence during his sentencing proceedings. Asked to explain this decision by the trial judge, petitioner responded: "I don't want anybody else brought into it." App. 8. Nonetheless, the jury was specifically instructed that it should consider any mitigating circumstances which petitioner had proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and in making this determination the jury should consider any mitigating evidence presented at trial, including that presented by either side during the guilt phase of the proceedings. Id., at 13.
5. Petitioner's reliance on Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 107 S.Ct. 2716, 97 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987), is misplaced. There we held that a statute mandating the death penalty for a prison inmate convicted of murder while serving a life sentence without possibility of parole violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although noting that "[p]ast convictions of other criminal offenses can be considered as a valid aggravating factor in determining whether a defendant deserves to be sentenced to death for a later murder," id., at 81, 107 S.Ct., at 2725, we recognized that "the inferences to be drawn concerning an inmate's character and moral culpability may vary depending on the nature of the past offense." The sentencing scheme involved in that case, however, did not provide for the consideration of any mitigating circumstances. Id., at 67-68, n. 1, 107 S.Ct., at 2718, n. 1.

The dissent attempts to undermine our reliance on Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), by arguing that the requirement of individualized sentencing was fulfilled under the Texas death penalty statute in a way not allowed by the Pennsylvania scheme through the jury's consideration of special findings required to be made before death could be imposed. Post, at 320-323. The dissent ignores the fact that the three-Justice opinion in Jurek concluded that the Texas statute fulfilled the requirement of individualized sentencing precisely because one of the special findings had been construed by Texas courts to permit the consideration of mitigating evidence. Jurek, supra, at 272, 96 S.Ct., at 2956 (opinion of Stewart, Powell and STEVENS, JJ.) ("Thus, the constitutionality of the Texas procedures turns on whether the enumerated questions allow consideration of particularized mitigating factors"). Nowhere in that opinion was it implied that the mandatory feature of the Texas statute was constitutional only because a jury could still weigh other factors under a particular construction of the special findings when it found no mitigating circumstances.