Bouldin v. Alexander (82 U.S. 131)/Opinion of the Court

by William Strong

United States Supreme Court

82 U.S. 131

Bouldin  v.  Alexander

It is contended that the court erroneously decided the complainants were, at the time of the commencement of the suit, the legally constituted trustees of the church. But it is very evident that Joseph Alexander, Charles Alexander, John Middleton, and William Minor were then trustees for the church of the church property, unless they had been removed by the action of the minority on the 7th of June, 1867. They were nominated as trustees in the deed from Bouldin and wife, and they had never surrendered or renounced their trust. And we think the evidence is satisfactory, that Joseph Alexander, Henry Watson, Henry Scott, John Wiggins, John Middleton, William Laws, and Willis J. Minor were then general trustees of the church, unless they, or some of them, had been removed by the action of the same minority, on the day last mentioned. It is not to be overlooked that we are not now called upon to decide who were church officers. The case involves no such question. What we have to decide is, where was the legal ownership of the property. The question respects temporalities, and temporalities alone. That the attempt made on the 7th of June, 1867, to remove the trustees then holding was inoperative, is not to be doubted in view of the facts of the case. Those who held under the deed were not removable at the will of the cestui que use, and without cause. And had there been cause, none was shown. No ecclesiastical authority has decided that the defendants, or any of them, were legitimate trustees of the church, or of its property. Even if it be assumed that it was in the power of the church to substitute other trustees for those named in the deed, it may not be admitted that a small minority of the church, convened without notice of their intention, in the absence of the trustees, and without any complaint against them, or notice of complaint, could divest them of their legal interest and substitute other persons to the enjoyment of their rights.

It is equally true that the seven persons who sue as church trustees were not removed by the action of the minority meeting held on the 7th of June, 1867. Indeed that action does not seem to have been an attempt to remove them. It was voted to turn out four trustees, but who the trustees intended were nowhere appears. None were named. In view of the fact that the number was four, it is presumable the meeting had in view the four trustees of the church lot, named in Bouldin's deed, and not the ordinary trustees of the church, those contemplated by the Baptist Church Manual. That Manual provides, that in every church seven trustees shall be elected annually, in January, or at the next regular church meeting thereafter. And the church books, which appear to have been kept with considerable regularity from September 2d, 1857, until this controvesy arose, show that on the 15th of February, 1867, at a regular church meeting, the seven persons who with the church-lot trustees are complainants in this bill, were elected trustees of the church for the ensuing year. This was before any division took place in the society. It is true, Mr. Bouldin testified that the minute of an election is a forgery, and that no such election ever took place. But we are satisfied that he is mistaken. An examination of the minute-book leaves no doubt in our minds that the election was made as claimed by the complainants, and that they were elected by a number of votes averaging more than two hundred. The entry in the minute-book is attested by the church clerk. It is in regular order, and there are subsequent minutes in the same book made by Bouldin himself. The court below was, therefore, as we think, not in error in holding that the complainants were the legally constituted trustees at the time when this suit was commenced. And if they were the rightful trustees, the decree for an account, for the surrender of the church property, and indeed the entire decree made by the court, was a matter of course upon the evidence.

But the appellants insist that the complainants and those who acted with them, withdrew from the church and formed a new congregation. This, they argue, was a relinquishment of all their rights in the Third Colored Baptist Church. It may be conceded, that withdrawal from a church and uniting with another church or denomination, is a relinquishment of all rights in the church abandoned. But there is no sufficient evidence in this case that any new congregation was formed, or that there was any withdrawal from the church, or union with any other. The complainants, and those who acted with them, after the church building had been wrested from the custody and control of the rightful trustees, and after very many of them had been excommunicated in mass by the small minority, held their religious services at another place. But they formed no new organization. They still had the same trustees, the same deacons, and they claimed to be the Third Colored Baptist Church, and as such they were recognized by councils of Baptist churches duly called, and by the Philadelphia Baptist Association, an ecclesiastical body with which the church was associated. That body, it is true, was not a judicatory. Its action was not conclusive of any rights. But the fact that the complainants and those acting with them applied for recognition as the Third Colored Baptist Church, and that the Association thus recognized them, is persuasive evidence that they were not seceders, and that their rights have not been forfeited.

This is not a question of membership of the church, nor of the rights of members as such. It may be conceded that we have no power to revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision from membership. We have only to do with rights of property. As was said in Shannon v. Frost, ^[1] we cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been regularly or irregularly cut off. We must take the fact of excommunication as conclusive proof that the persons exscinded are not members. But we may inquire whether the resolution of expulsion was the act of the church, or of persons who were not the church and who consequently had no right to excommunicate others. And, thus inquiring, we hold that the action of the small minority, on the 7th and 10th of June, 1867, by which the old trustees were attempted to be removed, and by which a large number of the church members were attempted to be exscinded, was not the action of the church, and that it was wholly inoperative. In a congregational church, the majority, if they adhere to the organization and to the doctrines, represent the church. An expulsion of the majority by a minority is a void act. We need not, however, dwell upon this. Certain it is, that trustees are not necessarily communing members of the church. Excommunication from communing membership does not disqualify them, even if the excision be regular. Still more certain is it that they cannot be removed from their trusteeship by a minority of the church society or meeting, without warning, and acting without charges, without citation or trial, and in direct contravention of the church rules.

DECREE AFFIRMED.

Notes

1. 3 B. Monroe, 253.