Breaking the Hindenburg Line/Part 3
Part III
The Battle of Andigny
Chapter VI
The clearing of the Bois de Riquerval and the Battle of Andigny les Fermes
While Divisional Headquarters were establishing themselves in Fresnoy, the leading troops of the Division—the 138th Infantry Brigade—pushing forward from Bohain, encountered strong enemy resistance on the edge of the Bois de Riquerval. This wood, an outlier of the larger Forest of Andigny, stretched north and south right across the Divisional front of 3,000 yards. Filled as it was with machine-gun nests and strongly organized networks of trenches and strong-points, it opposed a serious obstacle in the path of our advance. A considerable portion of the wood had been cleared by the Germans, trees having been cut down and converted into timber for the lining of dug-outs and other military works. These recently cleared areas, however, while affording better observation both for ourselves and for the enemy, were still choked with thick undergrowth and were sown with strongly organized defences hidden by the scrub. From well-concealed emplacements, enemy machine gunners were able to command all approaches to the wood.
Thus, on October 10th, strong patrols of the 1/4th Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment, advancing cautiously along the Bohain-Aisonville Road and over the country to the north of this road, were met by heavy machine-gun fire from the edge of the wood. Attempts to enter the wood all along its front were repulsed, the battalion suffering a considerable number of casualties. Later in the day, the 1/5th Battalion Leicestershire Regiment, who had relieved their sister-battalion, made determined attempts to penetrate into the wood. This attack, which was pressed with determination and carried out with skill, at first met with some success, and the leading patrols of the battalion pushed some distance into the outer fringes of the wood. The principal success was achieved by the Headquarters of the battalion, who established themselves in a house on the western edge of the southern lobe of the wood. The companies on either side, however, were driven back by the enemy, and the Battalion Headquarters Staff found itself isolated, enemy forces holding the wood on either side. Aided by nine or ten Frenchmen, who had become separated from the main body of their comrades and who had with them two mitrailleuses, the Battalion Staff put up a very stout fight and managed to hold on to the outskirts of the wood and to the captured house for some hours.
On the 11th October, while this fighting was actually in progress, instructions were issued for the 137th Infantry Brigade to relieve the 138th Infantry Brigade. The 1/5th Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment was ordered to move forward and take over from the 1/5th Battalion Leicestershire Regiment when and where possible. This was easier said than done. A stiff fight was in progress, and the situation as regards the disposition of our own and the enemy's forces was extremely obscure. The C.O. of the Staffords, with his Adjutant and Company Commanders, rode forward to get into touch with the Headquarters of the battalion they were to relieve. After riding about for several hours, during which they had frequently to go to ground to avoid hostile machine-gun fire, they were reluctantly obliged to give up their quest and ride back to obtain more exact information. Battalion Headquarters, situated as described above, was then located, touch was gained with it, and provisional arrangements for the relief were made. The actual handing over, however, was not carried out for some hours, owing to the rough-and-tumble fighting on the outskirts of the wood, the Leicesters being pinned to their positions and unable either to advance or to retreat. Communication between the companies of the relieving battalions was established by means of the Lucas lamp and, at 9.30 a.m., the Staffordshire men advanced with two companies in the line, one in support and one in reserve. The right company in the line was ordered to move to the south-west edge of the wood and the left company was given orders to advance towards Fontaine de Colombier, on the Bohain-Andigny Road. Both companies deployed and advanced and, at 10.30 a.m., touch was established with the enemy. The attack was held up by machine-gun fire from all along the edge of the wood, the support company at the same time coming under machine-gun fire from Retheuil Farm, to the south of the wood. By this time the relief of the platoons of the left company of the 1/5th Leicesters had been carried out and touch established with the 6th Division on our left flank, but the Headquarters and the right company of the Leicesters were still isolated in the south-west outskirts of the wood and hard pressed by the enemy. At 2.25 p.m., therefore, the Staffords were ordered to attack the trench system in the clearing east of Riquerval Farm, with the aid of a tank which was to work south and assist in extricating the Battalion Headquarters from the wood. The tank, however, broke down and was unable to move, and the attack, which was launched at 4 p.m., failed.
Orders were then given for a bombardment of the trench system, and this was carried out by the guns of the 16th Army Brigade, R.H.A., which was supporting the 137th Infantry Brigade. Another attack was then launched, but this also was repulsed before it was well started, the enemy putting down a barrage on the company detailed for the attack, at the moment of its assembly. At the same rime, a further attempt was made to relieve the right company of the Leicesters, but this also failed. The enemy, counter-attacking heavily, then solved the problem by driving the Leicesters, Battalion Headquarters and all, out of the wood and down on to the Bohain-Aisonville Road. Here, the relief took place without further incident.
In view of the extremely stubborn resistance of the enemy concealed in the wood, the Divisional Commander now decided to withdraw all his troops to a line conforming roughly to the outline of the western outskirts of the wood and about two hundred yards from it. All available guns were then turned on the wood and a concentrated bombardment carried out, particular attention being paid to the trench systems and strong-points in the clearings, and to the few existing buildings which had been organized for defence, as, for example, the house in the south-western outskirts already won and lost by our troops.
It was now quite plain that the enemy's rearguard intended to make as prolonged a stand as possible on this line. Favoured as they were by the freedom from observation and the facilities for machine-gun defence afforded by the trees and thick undergrowth of the wood, the obstacle was one which promised to be very difficult indeed to overcome. At the same time also, the 126th French Division on our right, though not confronted by closely wooded country, had experienced much difficulty in making progress against well-organized defences based on a series of strongly built farm-houses, all of which had been converted by the enemy's engineering genius into miniature forts.
On the 12th October, therefore, a joint attack by the French and ourselves was arranged, with the object of storming these defences and once more starting the enemy on the run. The ultimate objective of the French Division was the village of Mennevret, while that of the 137th Brigade was a line running approximately along the eastern edge of the Bois de Riquerval and the western edge of the Forêt Dominale d'Andigny.
The attack was arranged to commence at noon, but, through some miscalculation, the French barrage descended quite rive minutes before our own. The enemy on our front, warned by the thunder of the guns on their left, were ready and waiting for our men. The 6th South Staffords, advancing behind our barrage, were met by heavy machine-gun fire, while the enemy barrage fell right upon them and caused them to become much disorganized before the wood was reached. In spite of this harassing fire, however, the battalion pressed forward and, on the left, one company managed to penetrate into the trench system in the clearing which had been the object of the previous day's attack. At the same time, "D" Company, under Captain G. H. Ball, forced its way into the south-west outskirts of the wood, but the enemy artillery, trench-mortar and machine-gun barrage was so heavy and caused so many casualties that the company was compelled to fall back from the wood. Here, however, Captain Ball rallied his men and, reinforced by "B" Company of the 1/6th South Staffords, coolly reorganized his company and again advanced into the wood at its head. Much opposition was encountered from enemy machine guns, in particular from the house at the edge of the wood and from a derelict British tank which had been abandoned in the previous attack. In face of this, however, the men managed to make their way forward amidst a hurricane of bullets. The two companies penetrated into the wood some 200 yards without coming across any sign of German occupation except the barrage, but, on this line, dire shadowy figures were seen moving amongst the dense undergrowth and the already galling fire was redoubled, while for the first time rifle fire was added to the little inferno already raging.
As it was obvious that further progress was impossible unless the attackers were strongly reinforced, an attempt was made to consolidate the line already held. Officers and men proceeded hastily to dig themselves in and obtain what shelter they could, but the enemy opened trench-mortar fire with disconcerting accuracy, and orders had to be given to withdraw to the edge of the wood. The enemy, who must have been exceptionally well served by his scouts, now dropped a heavy barrage along the edge of the wood, and Captain Ball decided to order a retirement to the high ground west of the wood. Here the original line held before the attack was once more taken over.
Many casualties had been suffered during this little operation and the men engaged were much shaken by their experiences. The enemy was so well hidden in the undergrowth, and so well supplied with machine guns, that he possessed an overwhelming advantage, and this, to do him justice, he utilized to the utmost extent. There is no more unnerving type of battle than such hole-and-corner fighting as is necessary to oust a well-organized defending force from a wood which they are determined to hold. The enemy's rearguards were formed of picked troops, who fought stoutly and with more individuality than was usually shown by the Germans during these last months of the war. In the circumstances, the men of the South Staffords had been set an impossible task and had acquitted themselves well. Let us give honour when honour is due. It may be honestly said that never during the German retreat did their machine gunners fight better, or more stubbornly, than in those days when Riquerval Wood held up the Division.
Day after day for several days in succession, our troops advanced to the attack, only to be denied by a devoted band of men who were willing to sacrifice themselves, in order to permit the demoralized remainder to walk away in comparative immunity. So, the actions of the 10th, 11th and 12th October, and the skirmishing on the following days, left the Germans on the Divisional front masters of the field, while on our right also, the French were unable to capture Retheuil Farm. For the space of a week the pursuit was checked, while some way of circumventing this obstacle and the Forest of Andigny, of which it was an outlier, exercised the ingenuity of the General Staff. The solution of this problem gave rise to the tactical triumph known as the Battle of Andigny, which we will now consider in so far as it affected the 46th Division.
All frontal attacks on Riquerval Wood and the Forest of Andigny having thus been repulsed by the enemy rearguards, orders were issued on the 15th October for a general action on the part of the IX Corps, in conjunction with the XV French Corps on its right and the II American Corps on its left. The object of the battle was to reach the line of the Sambre-Oise Canal.
To the 46th Division were allotted the tasks of turning Riquerval Wood and the capture and retention of the Andigny-les-Fermes Ridge. The success of the Division was of extreme importance to the IX Corps as a whole, for not only did this ridge dominate and protect the whole right flank of the advance, but its possession in British hands also gave room to, and ensured the safety of, the passage of the 1st Division, when they advanced through the 6th Division towards their final objective. If the general assault proved successful, the French, advancing up the southern side of the wood and capturing the village of Mennevret, would then press on round the Forest of Andigny and join hands with the 1st Division about Wassigny.
The general scheme, necessitating as it did an attack from the flank instead of from the front, involved, of course, a drastic rearrangement of the forces of the Division. A glance at the map will show that, instead of driving due east as heretofore, the new attack, in order to be successful in its objects, must be made from almost due north, necessitating a forming-up line in the territory occupied by the Division on our left flank. The obvious line for a flank attack on Riquerval Wood was the Bohain-Vaux Andigny Road, and it was along this road that, on the morning of the 17th October, the day selected for the attack, the 138th and 139th Infantry Brigades took up position for the assault.
The objective allotted to the 46th Division was the Bohain-Wassigny Road, from the north-east corner of Riquerval Wood to the village of Andigny les Fermes, and included that village and the hamlet of Regnicourt. It was arranged that the Division should not take over the line held by the 6th Division, but that our Infantry should take up position on the line of deployment, shortly before zero. By this hour, all troops of the 6th Division were to be withdrawn west of this line, to avoid the artillery barrage which would cover the attack.
As in the case of former battles on a major scale, the approach to the day of conflict was heralded by the arrival of various free-lance units which had been assigned to the Division by the Corps, for the purpose of assisting our own Artillery and Infantry. On this occasion, a troop of Scots Greys was attached for reconnoitring purposes, and a section of three tanks to assist in mopping up various strong-points whose existence was known or suspected. Two companies of the Life Guards M.G. Battalion and one company of the 6th M.G. Battalion were also allotted to the Division. These were detailed to fire in the machine-gun barrage which would cover the advance of the Infantry, or were given definite tasks in the protection of the flanks of the Division, or in the consolidation of the objectives once they had been gained. Last but not least, the Divisional Artillery was reinforced by the addition of four Brigades of R.H.A. and R.F.A., who were, as before, placed under the orders of the C.R.A., 46th Division.
Owing to the nature and direction of the projected attack, the Artillery, in particular, were faced with a very intricate problem. Similar concentrations of artillery had been arranged to cover the advance of the 6th Division and the American Divisions, and the guns of the Brigades covering the former occupied every available gun-position which existed within range of the 6th Division front. It was, therefore, impossible to site the batteries covering the advance of the 46th Division in such a position that a normal frontal barrage could be fired, and it was decided to try the novel experiment of an oblique or "enfilade" barrage. With this object in view, all the guns were arranged as nearly as possible in enfilade of the front on which the attacking Brigades would advance, and time-tables for a creeping enfilade barrage were made out, the necessary lifts being made on the leap-frog principle.
In discussing this, the last barrage of great intensity under which the troops of the Division were fated to advance in the present war, it may be permissible to enter into a little more detail. The reader of this account who is not conversant with modern artillery may thus be given some idea of the uses of an artillery barrage, a factor which has played so important a part in this war and which has been developed to a very high state of perfection. The idea of the barrage is first and foremost to afford the attacking troops a certain measure of protection, by forcing the enemy to take refuge in his dug-outs, saps and trenches. Intense, well-directed covering artillery fire will so plaster the ground over which the assault is being made, that troops exposed in the open stand very little chance indeed of survival. They are, therefore, constrained to take shelter, and a determined attacking force keeping well up to the line of bursting shells can overrun the strongest defences without much trouble. On the other hand, should the barrage, through badly worked-out time-tables, or through the Infantry being delayed by some unforeseen accident, get ahead of the latter, it is of little use. The defending troops can lie snugly hidden in their shelters until the rain of shells has passed and then, emerging from their dug-outs, can man their machine guns and shoot down the approaching enemy riflemen at their leisure. Were it not for the artillery barrage, not one attack in a hundred made against strong works held by determined machine gunners could achieve success, while the losses of the attacking Infantry would outnumber those of the defenders to a colossal extent.
Reproduced by courtesy of Elliott & Fry, 55, Baker Street, London, W.1.
While, however, the artillery fire is mainly directed towards the protection of the advancing Infantry, it has other rôles to play as well. By the inclusion of rounds of smoke shell, a dense wall of fog can be formed which hot only hides the advancing Infantry from sight, but which, under favourable circumstances, may shroud the whole battlefield. It may thus entirely obscure the intentions of the attacker, rendering if very difficult indeed for the defender to counter his moves. Such a fog may, and probably will, exercise a definite influence in favour of the attacking side, which possesses the initiative and is able to make the greatest use of the power and moral effect of unexpected action.
Again, a well-thought-out barrage has a very decisive effect in enabling the assaulting Infantry to rest and reorganize at intermediate objectives selected by the staff as suitable places for pauses in the operations.
A normal barrage will also assist the attacking troops in maintaining direction under adverse weather conditions and in the confusion and smoke of a battle. In an attack which involves an advance of several thousand yards to particular objectives, this function of the barrage is most important. The effect of the frontal barrage, or rather the effect of its absence, was to be well seen in the present battle. The men, accustomed to hear the guns behind them and the scream of the shells passing over their heads, were bewildered by the transverse fire of the enfilade barrage and lost direction very badly. Much confusion resulted from this, and many casualties were caused by the crews of machine-gun nests which were left undestroyed and so were in a position to fire from the rear upon our men, when the latter were sweeping forward to the attack of positions beyond them.
One other use of the guns which should be mentioned is the retaliatory barrage fired by the defender's Artillery. The plans for this barrage are carefully worked out beforehand in the event of an attack. As soon as news of the assault can be got back to the guns by S.O.S. signals, by the noise of the enemy's barrage, or by line or runner, all available guns are brought into action. These fire on pre-arranged objectives, with the idea of isolating the attacking troops, preventing supplies and reinforcements from reaching them, and inflicting as many casualties as possible during the earlier stages of their advance.
A fair example of the number of shells which are fired in a normal barrage is afforded from consideration of the barrage at the Battle of Bellenglise. Here on a 500-yard front, fifty-four 18-pounders and eighteen 4.5 howitzers were engaged in forming the barrage. Of these guns, the 18-pounders fired two rounds per minute and the howitzers one round per minute. The shells were fired to spread the bursts evenly along the barrage line, so that, in all, a total of 126 shells fell on a line 500 yards long within the minute, giving a total of one shell per four yards per minute. This barrage was kept up for eight hours and, allowing for slowing down of the rate of fire during the intervals when a stationary protective barrage was being fired, there cannot have been less than some 50,000 shells fired on this short frontage during the battle.
While five of the six Artillery Brigades attached to the Division fired in the enfilade barrage covering the main attack from the north, the remaining Brigade, the 14th Army Brigade R.F.A., was detailed to assist the 137th Infantry Brigade, whose orders were to hold the original line on which the fighting had taken place a few days previous, and to act as the "pivot" of the attack.
In order to distract the enemy's attention from the main attack, arrangements were made for a "Chinese" attack to be carried out by this Brigade, every effort being directed towards giving to this the appearance of reality. With this idea, all the visible and audible signs of a frontal attack on the wood from our old front line were simulated in detail. In the preparation of this attack, the Engineers were once more given opportunity to display the genius for construction which is essentially their strong point and, once more, this work had to be carried through against time. At four hours' notice, apparatus for elevating ninety dummies was made by three carpenters; in addition, the work was carried out to a new design, so that the whole range of ninety men could be packed in one lorry. These dummies were laid out during the night in front of convenient shell holes, in which the men operating them could lie concealed. One man could operate nine dummies and, at zero hour when the barrage opened, the dummies were pulled up, thus giving the appearance of men springing forward to the attack. The men controlling them then fastened the raising-line around some convenient stump and made the best of their way back to avoid the retaliatory barrage.
In addition to the dummy figures, three dummy tanks had been provided, and these also were taken up during the night to positions where they would be likely to attract the enemy's attention. Of these dummy tanks, one was a full-sized replica of the largest and most modern type of tank. Most of the Division will remember this as a legacy left by the Australians near Vendelles, when we first took over the sector. The other two were profiles only, and were drawn from Corps Stores for the occasion. These latter two were erected during the night sideways on to the enemy. All three were sighted by the enemy and received considerable attention from his guns during the following morning.
To complete the thorough simulation of the false attack, a special rolling barrage was arranged and, in this barrage, the machine-gun company attached to the Brigade took part. This barrage was arranged to come down at zero hour on a line at safety distance in front of our most advanced posts. It was then to move through the Bois de Riquerval in an easterly direction, by jumps of one hundred yards every four minutes. Thus no pains were spared to deceive the enemy as to the real intentions of the Division, and events showed that the trouble taken in these elaborate preparations and the ammunition expended in the barrage were not thrown away. Ten minutes after zero, a heavy barrage was put down by the enemy on the front of the 137th Brigade, thus materially decreasing the weight of enemy gunfire available for the main front of the attack. The attention paid to the tanks has already been referred to, and whole ranges of the dummy figures were torn to pieces, or overset, by the German artillery fire.
During the period of preparation for the battle, Divisional Headquarters remained at Fresnoy. As this village, however, was several miles from the scene of action, an advanced report centre was opened in Bohain. This report centre was connected with Divisional Headquarters by a strong poled route of three pairs of cable and, during the two or three days immediately preceding the action, this route was extended up the Bohain-Vaux Andigny Road to the farm which had been selected as a joint Brigade Headquarters for the two fighting Brigades. For this extension, the poles of a German permanent route were employed, one cable being slung on the poles at a height of 15 feet above the ground, and the other run along the ground. The latter was fastened to each pole of the permanent route in order to localize breaks caused by shell fire. This route was reinforced by both wireless and visual, but the cable held so well, in spite of heavy shelling, that the latter systems were only employed to a limited extent. The Headquarters of the 137th Brigade was in Bohain itself and was connected with the Headquarters of the Battalion holding the front to the west of the wood by both cable and wireless. The latter proved very useful during the early hours of the attack, when the German barrage made it impossible for some hours to maintain lines to this unit.
Aeroplane photographs had supplied material for very complete maps of the German defences in all the more open portions of the area to be attacked and, during the 16th October, a heavy preliminary bombardment was carried out. Special attention was paid to wire-cutting, and destructive fire was directed for some hours on the hamlets of Regnicourt and Andigny les Fermes and on all known strong-points.
Zero hour was finally fixed for 5.20 a.m. on the 17th October and, well before that time, the attacking Brigades had formed up, with a front of 2,000 yards, on a line one hundred yards south-east of the Bohain-Vaux Andigny Road, the inter-brigade boundary being about Vallée Hasard. The 139th Infantry Brigade advanced on the right of the Divisional Sector and the 138th Infantry Brigade on the left. One battalion of the 137th Infantry Brigade held out front to the west of the Bois de Riquerval, the other two battalions being held in Divisional Reserve to the west of Bohain and on the Bohain-Seboncourt Road.
The country over which the attack was to be made was very open, the only patch of woodland being situated just to the west of the village of Regnicourt. In clear weather, the task of the flank guides of the different units would have been very simple and little trouble would have been experienced in keeping direction, especially as the objective throughout its length was a well-marked main road. Dawn broke, however, to show the whole line shrouded in a dense fog, which was quite as thick as any of the mists which, during the last weeks of the war, made direction-keeping in early-morning attacks no mean problem. The waiting troops could see nothing of the country over which they were to attack.
Punctually to the minute the barrage opened, and the Sherwoods on the right and the Lincolns and Leicesters on the left moved forward to the attack. The 46th Division was advancing to the last general action in which it was to take part.
On the right of the attack, the 8th Battalion Sherwood Foresters moved forward on a three-company front, "D" Company following in close reserve. Immediately behind the attacking battalion, two companies of the 5th Sherwoods were held in support. The remainder of this battalion were dug in under a bank in shelter of the small wood near the joint Brigade Headquarters. About this spot also was grouped the remaining battalion of the Brigade, the 6th Sherwoods, in Brigade Reserve.
From the commencement of the advance, difficulty was experienced in keeping direction. A gently rising slope led up to the road which was the final objective of the Brigade, while down the centre of the battalion front ran a slight ridge which divided the area of attack into two nearly equal halves. It was impossible to see more than five yards ahead and the centre company, losing direction, gravitated down the slope of the ridge towards the east and so left the summit practically untouched. The first obstacle to the advance—machine-gun nests on some high ground where a little copse gave shelter to the machine gunners—was overrun without difficulty and, on the extreme right and left of the attack, good progress was made. The right company, in particular, experienced little opposition, reached its final objective without trouble, and commenced to dig in. A sudden lightening of the mist, however, betrayed the presence of this company to some enemy machine gunners who were strongly posted in a clearing on the Regnicourt Ridge which overlooked the position. Promptly seizing their opportunity, the enemy turned a concentrated machine-gun fire on this company and inflicted heavy casualties, the survivors experiencing the greatest difficulty in hanging on to their exposed position.
The clearing of the fog, however, had also given the officers of the attacking battalion their first chance to obtain a general idea of the situation, and the centre company, who had found themselves somewhere immediately west of Andigny les Fermes when the fog lifted, commenced to work their way back across the front towards the scene of the setback, being joined on their way by the Reserve Company. At the same time, Lieutenant M. E. Thomas, R.E., of the 465th Field Company, who was attached to the 8th Sherwoods for the attack, gallantly collected a party of N.C.O.s and men from various units who had become mixed up in the attack and led these men, together with the sappers of his own section, to the assistance of the right company. All officers on this flank having become casualties, he assumed command and reorganized the firing-line under the heavy fire which was still being poured in from the clearing. At the same time, Colonel Curran, of the 8th Sherwoods, collected a party of one hundred men, reorganized them, and sent them forward under Major Robinson, his second-in-command, to attack the ridge from the north. Seeing themselves thus out-manœuvred, the enemy in the clearing surrendered, and 140 prisoners and twenty-seven machine guns were collected from this small area, which had been the main bastion of the German forward defences. The enemy in this small action showed very good spirit indeed, and the casualties suffered by the Sherwoods were severe. The German machine gunners fought very stoutly, although many of them were under the impression that an armistice was to have been signed on the day of the attack. One stalwart German protested vehemently at our lack of taste in attacking on the day of "peace," his last remark, hurled through the mist as he departed cagewards, being "Noch nicht Friede! Noch nicht Friede!" The enemy, having been driven from his forward defences, now took up his position on the main Bohain-Regnicourt Road, but the 8th Sherwoods, reinforced first by the support companies and later by the remainder of the 6th Battalion, were not to be gainsaid. The line swept forward, swamping all further resistance and capturing the road which was our final objective. The enemy were thus forced to retreat to the woods beyond, and our advanced troops dug themselves in well south of the road, the Engineers, meanwhile, setting to work on the formation of a strong-point in Regnicourt.
The capture of the Brigade objectives was thus complete by 9.45 a.m. All enemy resistance now ceased, though, throughout the morning, desultory machine-gun fire from Hennechies Wood, and a field gun firing at 1,400 yards range from near the Borne des Trois Evêchés, forced our men to lie low.
On the left of the attack, the 138th Brigade advanced on a two-battalion front, the 4th Leicesters being on the right and the 5th Lincolns on the left, the 5th Leicesters being held in Brigade Reserve. When forming-up, a few casualties were caused through the enemy shelling the Brigade assembly-area with high-explosive and gas shells, but at zero minus one hour, forming-up was complete and, when the barrage opened, all were ready to advance.
Here also the fog caused trouble and, at 7 a.m., the O.C. 4th Leicesters reported that he had under his command elements of the Cameron Highlanders, Black Watch and Loyal North Lancashires—all from the 1st Division on our left—also men from both Sherwoods and Lincolns, besides remnants of his own companies. This being so, it was inevitable that machine-gun nests should have been overlooked during the advance and, here also, these "unscotched scorpions" caused many casualties. No particular hitch occurred on the Divisional front, however, but machine-gun fire from the high ground about Les Gobelets and Belle Vue proved very harassing. These strong-points were cleared in the face of great opposition by the 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashires. This same battalion was later on of the greatest assistance in clearing the left edge of Andigny les Fermes, in which village the enemy put up a very stiff fight.
Instructions were issued from Divisional Headquarters that, immediately Andigny was occupied, strong patrols were to be pushed out in the direction of Mennevret, in order, if possible, to obtain touch with the French. These patrols encountered stiff resistance, however, and until 7 p.m., the company of 5th Leicesters detailed for this purpose were held up by machine-gun fire from the north of the village. Later on, touch was obtained with a French patrol at La Nation cross-roads, but the position could not be held. It was, indeed, not until 5.30 a.m. on the 18th that our line was definitely established in continuation with that of the French.
Throughout the action, the supporting artillery fire had been, as it was in all the battles and skirmishes of the advance, extraordinarily accurate, the initial programme being modified accurately and in good time as the situation developed. Especially good was the work of certain "forward guns," selected from different batteries and placed directly under the orders of battalion commanders. Kept well advanced and man-handled by their crews into good positions as close as possible behind the advancing Infantry, these guns were fought with great resolution, and were markedly successful in dealing with isolated machine-gun emplacements and strong-points where the enemy were making a successful stand against our riflemen, bombers and machine gunners. Firing over open sights and from behind hedges, brushwood, or any slight cover which could be made use of, the guns' crews necessarily took great risks and suffered comparatively severe casualties. These forward guns indeed proved invaluable and well repaid the audacity with which they were handled, while the moral of our own Infantry was by no means lessened by the realization that, as ever, their Artillery was close behind them and sharing both their triumphs and their dangers in the fullest degree.
On the front held by the 138th Brigade after the attack, no counter-attack was attempted by the enemy, but, at 11 a.m., he was reported by the Sherwoods to be massing for a counter-attack in front of Hennechies Wood. By this time, he must have realized the perilous position in which he stood, and the counter-attack was his last attempt to restore the situation. The effort, however, was not successful. His assembling troops were caught by our artillery fire, and the few men who survived the barrage were shot down by Lewis-gun fire, only one man reaching our trenches alive.
On this front also, much difficulty was experienced in obtaining touch with the French, who were to have joined up with us at the northern edge of the strip of woodland where Hennechies Wood merges into Andigny Forest. Patrols were sent out to get into touch and eventually located our Allies holding a post about one hundred yards south of Forester's House.
Meanwhile, at 7.30 a.m., when the main attack was well launched, the 6th North Staffords moved back to the original line along the western edge of the wood, from which they had withdrawn slightly to avoid our barrage and the enemy reply. Strong fighting patrols were at once sent out and the Bois de Riquerval was cleared without difficulty, touch being obtained with the French north-west of Retheuil Farm.
This task accomplished early in the day, the battalion then pushed forward, clearing Hennechies Wood as they went and securing a few prisoners and machine guns. At 2.30 p.m., the wood was completely free of the enemy, and contact was established with the Sherwoods on the left and the French on the right. Night fell with the Brigade established on the line Mennevret-Andigny and, at dawn on the 18th, the 138th Brigade took over the front held by the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division, from Andigny northwards.
Later in the day, the whole front was taken over by the 137th Infantry Brigade, who were able to side-slip to the left, to a certain extent, as the French worked their way up and completed the capture of the outskirts of Mennevret. The relieved Brigades then withdrew into Divisional Reserve about Regnicourt, Guyot Farm, and Vallée Hasard.
The Battle of Andigny, complete success as it was, bears no comparison to Bellenglise and Ramicourt as regards the toll of prisoners taken from the enemy. Some hundreds were captured, it is true, but owing to the thick mist that prevailed, the greater portion of the two battalions who formed the garrison of Riquerval Wood managed to slip through our fingers and rejoin the main body of their comrades on the new line they had taken up. The Division was thus robbed of the visible reward of its labours, but, as against this, the men rested on their final objectives and the enemy, especially in the abortive counter-attack towards the end of the day, had left a heavy toll of dead behind him. It was no small feat to have driven him out of such strong positions, and all ranks went into reserve for a well-earned rest, feeling that the enemy had been repaid in good measure for the trouble he had caused during the frontal assault on the Riquerval Wood.
On the following day, the 137th Brigade were ordered to keep touch with the 126th French Division on their right and the 1st Division on their left. For this purpose, one troop of Scots Greys and one platoon of Cyclists were placed at the disposal of the Brigadier. The function of these troops was to scout forward through the forest, feeling their way cautiously and mopping up as they went. No great amount of resistance was expected from the retiring enemy and none was encountered, but, to guard against the possibility of a counter-attack, these mobile troops were closely supported by Infantry and forward sections of Artillery.
The advance continued without check during the day and, at 11.50 p.m., the 1st Division and the 126th French Division succeeded in effecting a junction at Wassigny, squeezing the 46th Division out of the line.
In all the delicate and anxious work of clearing these forest obstacles, a main feature of the operations was the close liaison maintained under difficult circumstances between the French and the 46th Division. Again and again, in order to envelop some more than ordinarily difficult obstacle, French and British troops were compelled to separate with the intention of meeting again on the farther side of the strong-point or wood in question. Continually during the fighting our flank troops, or the French, were extricated from serious situations by their Allies, and throughout the troops worked together with the greatest camaraderie. The only visible effect of their fighting alongside one another was an obvious desire to excel in gallantry and in courtesy. Considerable difficulty was experienced in gaining touch, and unfortunate contretemps occurred, as when, at Forester's House, a French officer, advancing through the open under the impression that the post was already in our possession, was shot down at point-blank range by German machine gunners. On the same occasion, further fighting resulted in a junction being effected about 200 yards south of the post, and here perhaps the "Entente Cordiale" reached its highest pitch. French "poilus," themselves exhausted by a day's hard fighting, insisted on emptying all their water-bottles and presented our men with the last drops of liquid they possessed. It is such incidents as these that, long after the troubles of war are forgotten, will stand out in the memories of the men who shared these trials and passed through tragic days together. Memories of such deeds of comradeship should go far indeed to smooth over the pin-pricks of petty international squabbles. should such recur in the halcyon days of peace.
In after-days, when our minds hark back to these never-to-be-forgotten times, the men of the "cent-vingt-sixième" will be among the best-remembered by their comrades of the 46th Division, while, amongst the most pleasant memories of the Staff, will be the recollection of the courtesy which throughout was the hall-mark of the French Command.
The part played by the 46th Division in the clearing of Andigny Forest and its outlying woods came to an end on October 18th, when the Division retired for a few well-earned days' rest. During the last ten days of battling through wooded and enclosed country, checks were frequent and casualties severe. The calibre of the resistance encountered may be gauged from the fact that, in the Battle of Andigny alone, prisoners were captured from seventeen different regiments of six separate Divisions. They were undoubtedly picked men chosen to fight in carefully selected positions as rearguards, while the main German Armies made good their retreat fo the line of the Sambre-Oise Canal.
By the devoted work of his rearguards the enemy's withdrawal to this line was successfully effected, in spite of the utmost our troops could do. A pause in the operations then took place, while the Allied Armies dug themselves in in their new positions, and drew breath for the greater effort which was to break, once and for all, the new canal and river line. The 46th Division, in the meantime, in comfortable billets in Fresnoy and Bohain, settled down to systematic training for its next leap forward. These few days when the Division rested, flushed with a series of successes which, they felt, equalled the record of the best of the fighting troops of a fighting Army, will not soon be forgotten. The records of the past three weeks were written with blood and iron across a stretch of twenty miles of captured country. Over 7,000 prisoners, seventy guns, and machine guns too numerous to count, had been sent back to swell the tale of captures taken by the victorious British Armies in this, the zenith of their career. Exhausted by the recent heavy fighting, ail ranks were in a condition thoroughly to enjoy the test that had been merited so well.
Yet, while the enemy still stood at bay, rest could not be allowed, even for a week, to monopolize our minds and bodies. A carefully prepared training programme provided both organized recreation and the more serious preparation for future operations which was essential if the Division was to maintain its high level of effort. Each morning, the rolling downs round about Fresnoy and Bohain were crowded with officers and men engaged in tactical training. The afternoon saw dozens of football teams engaged in mimic battle, while, evening after evening, the crowded houses at the cinema and "Whizz-bangs"[1] were sufficient witness that the lighter side of life was being catered for so far as open warfare conditions would permit.
Meanwhile, the news from all points was such as must cheer the least sanguine heart amongst us. Bulgaria and Turkey were down and out, and Austria was on her last legs. In France, the chief enemy was being slowly but inexorably beaten back; the roar of the conflict receded, slowly but surely, from the great cities he had threatened and those he had held in iron grip so long. Thousands of rejoicing citizens were being restored to France each day and thousands more were streaming back along the roads to homes denied to them for years. No wonder the soldiers of the Allies walked like Kings. No thought of possible reverse clouded their horizon near or far. Germany, sullen but hopeless, was being beaten to her knees and, already, rumours of an incredibly early break-up were being bandied from lip to lip. Fatigue of body and weariness of soul were alike forgotten. When, on November 3rd, the call came for the Division to move up in close support of the 1st Division, every man was ready and eager to try conclusions with the enemy once more.
- ↑ The 46th Divisional concert-troupe.