Bumper v. North Carolina/Dissent White

by Byron White

United States Supreme Court

391 U.S. 543

Bumper  v.  North Carolina

 Argued: April 24 and 25, 1968. --- Decided: June 3, 1968

Mr. Justice WHITE, dissenting.

When 'consent' to a search is given after the occupant has been told by police officers that they have a warrant for the search, it seems reasonable to me for Fourth Amendment purposes to view the consent as conditioned on there being a valid warrant, absent clear proof that the consent was actually unconditional. The evidence in this record does not show unconditional consent with sufficient clarity, and perhaps this would be the result in most cases. But this does not mean that every search following conditional consent is invalid. If upon a motion to suppress or upon an objection to evidence offered at the trial, the State produces a valid warrant for the search, there is no good reason to exclude the evidence simply because police at the time of the search relied on the consent and neither served nor returned the warrant. In the case before us the State represented in this Court that there was a warrant for the challenged search. Unlike the Court and Mr. Justice HARLAN, I would not brush this matter aside. Since the existence and validity of the warrant have not been determined in the state courts, the case is not ripe for reversal or affirmance. I would therefore not reverse, but vacate, this conviction, returning the case to the state courts for a determination of the validity of the warrant. If because of the absence of probable cause, or for some other reason, the warrant would not have been a proper predicate for the search, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), would require reversal of the conviction unless it is saved under the harmless-error rule of Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

Notes