Cary v. Curtis/Dissent McLean

by John McLean

United States Supreme Court

44 U.S. 236

Cary  v.  Curtis

Mr. Justice McLEAN.

This suit was brought to recover from the defendant, collector of the customs, an excess of duties exacted by him of the plaintiffs against law. And on the trial in the Circuit Court the judges were divided on the question, 'whether the act of the 3d of March, 1839, was a bar to the action.' This point has been certified to this court.

The 2d section of the above act provides, 'that from and after the passage of this act, all money paid to any collector of the customs, or to any person acting as such, for unascertained duties, or for duties paid under protest against the rate or amount of duties charged, shall be placed to the credit of the treasurer of the United States, kept and disposed of as all other money paid for duties is required by law or by regulation of the Treasury Department to be placed to the credit of the said treasurer, kept and disposed of; and shall not be held by the said collector, or person acting as such, to await any ascertainment of duties or the result of any litigation in relation to the rate or amount of duty legally chargeable and collectible in any case where money is so paid; but whenever it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury, that, in any case of unascertained duties or duties paid under protest, more money has been paid to the collector or person acting as such than the law requires should have been paid, it shall be his duty to draw his warrant upon the treasurer in favor of the person or persons entitled to the over-payment, directing the said treasurer to refund the same out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.'

In the case of Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet., 137, and in Bend v. Hoyt, 13 Id., 263, this court held, that illegal duties exacted by the collector were recoverable from him, where paid under protest, by the importer, in an action of assumpsit. This doctrine is not questioned in this country or in England. Has the 2d section of the act above cited changed the law in this respect? A majority of the judges have decided in the affirmative, and that that act constitutes a bar to an action in such a case. I dissent from the opinion of the court.

The above section, in my judgment, so far from taking away the legal remedy, expressly recognises it. The collector is required, 'from and after the passage of the act,' to pay over to the treasurer the moneys in his hands, and not 'to await any ascertainment of duties, or the result of any litigation in relation to the rate or amount of duty legally chargeable,' &c. Now, if Congress intended by this section to withdraw this subject from the courts, and vest the exclusive right to decide the matter in the Secretary of the Treasury, could they have used this language? The law was not to operate upon the past, but upon the future acts of the collector. And I ask in sober earnestness, whether the collector could be required to pay over money, 'and not await the result of a litigation,' as 'to the amount of duties legally chargeable,' if the intention was to prohibit such litigation. I use the words of the section; and the words of the section alone, as I think, are conclusive as to the intention of Congress. The collector must pay over the money, and not retain it until the termination of a suit. Does this take away the right to bring a suit? Such an inference, it seems to me, would be as exceptionable in logic as in law.

From the proceedings of this court we know that collectors of the customs after their removal from office or the expiration of their term, and sometimes while in office, under the pretext of indemnifying themselves against suits for the exaction of illegal duties, were in the practice of withholding from the Treasury large sums of money. And it was to remedy this evil, that the above law was passed. As to the remission of duties illegally charged, it vested in the secretary no new powers; but it authorizes him, where the excess of duty has been paid into the Treasury, to draw it out by a warrant, and pay it over to the person entitled to receive it. By the 21st section of the Duty Act of 1799, (1 Story, 592,) the collectors 'were required, at all times, to pay to the order of the proper officer the whole of the moneys which they may respectively receive, &c., and shall once in three months, or oftener, if required, transmit their accounts,' &c. Now, it is known from public documents and from cases before this court, that the Secretary of the Treasury has, for a long time before the act of 1839, required the collector of New York to pay over moneys received by him, weekly or at short intervals. And can it be pretended that the act of 1799, under the instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury, was not as binding upon collectors as the act of 1839? In a legal point of view the liability of a collector was the same for illegal duties received by him, whether paid into the Treasury under the one law or the other.

It is said that the law cannot raise a promise to pay by an officer, where it requires him to pay the same money into the Treasury. The action is founded on the illegality of the transaction. None other than legal duties are payable to the government; and where an officer by his own volition, or acting under the instructions of his superior, demands a higher duty than the law authorizes, he is guilty of a wrong which his instructions cannot justify. And having done this, can it be contended, that by paying over moneys so obtained he can escape the legal consequence of his unlawful act? Where one person obtains money illegally from another, is he not bound in conscience to return it? And may not an action of assumpsit be sustained for the recovery of the money? In such an action the question is, whether the defendant has received money which he is bound in good conscience to pay to the plaintiff. Now, if the defendant, as collector, exacted a higher duty of the plaintiffs than the law authorized, is he not bound in conscience to return the excess? But it is said that he has paid it over to the Treasury of the United States, in pursuance of the act of 1839, and that this is a bar to the action. Why has not this bar been set up under the act of 1799? By that act the collector, when ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury, was as much bound to pay over the money in his hands into the Treasury as under the act of 1839. And yet for forty-four years such a defence has not been thought of. It has never been supposed that the payment of the money into the Treasury exonerated the collector. He has violated the law, and he is answerable for that violation. This must be the case, unless, in the language of this court in the case of Elliott v. Swartwout above cited, 'the broad proposition can be maintained, that no action will lie against a collector to recover back an excess of duties paid him, but that recourse must be had to the government for redress. Such a principle,' the court say, 'would be carrying an exemption to a public officer beyond any protection sanctioned by any principles of law or sound public policy.'

In Townson v. Wilson et al., 1 Campb., 396, Lord Ellenborough says, 'If any person gets money into his hands illegally, he cannot discharge himself by paying it over to another.' The same doctrine is held in Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr., 1986. And this court in the above case of Elliott v. Swartwout say, 'It may be assumed as the settled doctrine of the law, that where money is illegally demanded and received by an agent, he cannot exonerate himself from responsibility by paying it over to his principal, if he has had notice not to pay it over. A notice not to pay over the money to the principal, it is contended, presupposes a right in the agent to retain it. No such inference could arise under the act of 1799, nor can it be made under the present law. The notice should induce the collector to reconsider his act, and if found to have been against law to correct it. But it is said, he may have acted under the orders of the Secretary of the Treasury. Suppose he did, would that justify or excuse an illegal act? I will answer this in the language of this court in the case last cited: 'Any instructions from the Treasury Department could not change the law or affect the rights of the plaintiff. He, the collector, was not bound to take and adopt that instruction. He was at liberty to judge for himself, and act accordingly.' And in Tracy v. Swartwout, 10 Pet., 99, this court say, 'that the personal inconvenience of the collector is not to be considered.' When acting under instructions the government is bound to indemnify him. In my judgment the act of 1839 interposes no bar to this action.

But there is another aspect in which this case must be considered. Feeling, as I do, an unfeigned respect for the opinion of the judges who differ from me, yet I cannot, without concern, look at the consequences of the principle established in this case. The right of a citizen to resort to the judicial tribunals of the country, federal or state, for redress for an injury done by a public officer, is taken away by the construction of an act of Congress, which, in my judgment, bears no such construction. But I will take higher ground, and say, that Congress have no constitutional power to pass such an act as the statute of 1839 is construed to be by this decision.

By the 2d section of the 3d article of the Constitution of the United States, the judicial power extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the union. And by the 7th section of the amendments to the Constitution it is provided, that 'in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.'

The act of 1839, in my judgment, does not conflict with either of the above constitutional provisions. But if it take away the right of the citizen to sue in a court of law for the injury complained of, as construed by my brethren, then it is in direct conflict with both of the above provisions.

In a matter of private right it takes from the judiciary the power of construing the law, and vests it in the Secretary of the Treasury; the executive officer under whose sanction or instruction the wrong complained of was done.

And in the second place it takes from the citizen the right of trial by jury, which is expressly given to him by the Constitution.

I again repeat that Congress have not done this, nor did they intend to do it by the act of 1839. But the act is so construed by the decision just pronounced. Under this view, I feel myself bound to consider the principle established by the court, and to speak of its consequences.

That the act, as construed, is in direct conflict with the above provisions of the Constitution, is so palpable that it seems to me no illustration could make it clearer.

The right to construe the laws in all matters of controversy, is of the very essence of judicial power. Executive officers who are required to act under the laws, of necessity, must give a construction to them. But their construction is not final. When it operates injuriously to the citizen, he may, by any and every possible means through which it may be brought before the courts, have the construction of the law submitted to them, and their decision is final.

But the court say, that the plaintiffs in this case cannot seek redress for the injury complained of, by an action at law, but, under the act of 1839, are referred to the Secretary of the Treasury; an executive officer, who has prejudged the case, who can exercise neither the forms nor the functions of a judicial officer; who acts summarily, without a jury, and from whose judgment there is no appeal. The case turns upon facts; facts properly triable by a jury. The question is, whether the articles on which the duties have been assessed, are such articles as under the law are liable to be thus taxed. This is a question most fit to be answered by a jury of merchants, under the instructions of a court of law. The plaintiffs allege that the duty was not authorized by law, but to obtain possession of their goods, they were compelled to pay it, protesting against the right of the government. And they brought an action at law to recover from the collector the excess of duty paid. This course had been sanctioned by previous decisions. It was, in fact, the only effectual course they could take to obtain possession of their goods. A tender of the legal duty, and a replevin, if it would lie, involved the necessity of security for the return of the goods which, if in the power of the importers, might not have been convenient to them. But a replevin is expressly prohibited in such a case by the act of 2d March, 1833.

The question arises on the facts stated. Illegal duties were demanded by the collector and paid to him by the plaintiffs, before they could obtain their goods; and the question is, has their remedy at law been cut off by the statute of 1839? This is a taxing power; the most delicate power that is exercised by the government. It reaches the concerns of the citizen, and takes from him a part of his property for purposes of revenue. The tax should be judicious, and the mode of collecting it should be specially guarded. Care should be taken not to infringe private right in making this public exaction. But, especially, where, in this respect, a wrong has been done to the citizen, the courts should be open to him. His remedy should be without obstruction. But my brethren say that the act of 1839 takes away from the plaintiff all remedy except an appeal to the Secretary. The state courts as well as the federal are closed against the injured party.

The able men who laid the foundation of this government saw that, to secure the great objects they had in view, the executive, legislative and judicial powers, must occupy distinct and independent spheres of action. That the union of these in one individual or body of men constitutes a despotism. And every approximation to this union partakes of this character.

What though no positive injustice be done to the plaintiffs in this case; is that any reason why the great principle involved in it should be yielded? What is this principle? It is nothing less than this: that throughout the whole course of executive action, summary, diversified, and multiform as it is, for wrongs done the citizen, all legal redress may be withdrawn from him; and he may be turned over as a petitioner to the power that did the wrong. If this may be done in the case under consideration, it may, on the same principle, be done in every similar case.

A seizure of a vessel and cargo may be made by an officer under a supposed breach of the revenue law, and the question of forfeiture may be referred to the Secretary of the Treasury. Private property may be taken for public purposes, and the owner may be limited to the remedy, if remedy it may be called, of petitioning some executive officer for remuneration. Military violence may be perpetrated on the person of a citizen or on his property, and his relief may be made to depend on the will of the commander-in-chief. In short, in every line of the executive power, wrongs may be done and legal redress may be denied.

The cases put may seem to be extreme ones, and therefore not likely to happen. But do they not test the principle? I think they do. If Congress may deprive these plaintiffs of their remedy by action at law, they may do the same thing in the cases specified. Indeed it would be difficult to prescribe any limit to legislative action on this subject. It can, at least, be extended through all the ramifications of executive power.

To say that this will never be done, and that the consequences spoken of can never happen, is no answer to the argument. Do the consequences lie within the exercise of the principle? If they do, the consequences must follow a general exercise of the power. The danger is in sanctioning the principle. At this point, I meet the principle and combat it. I object to it because it is dangerous and may be ruinous. It takes from the citizen his rights-rights secured to him by the Constitution; the trial by jury, in a court of law. This is, done by the act of 1839, if it be what it is now construed to be. In this aspect, then, I say, the act is unconstitutional and void. It not only strikes down the rights of the citizen, but it inflicts a blow on the judicial power of the country. It unites, in the same department, the executive and judicial power. And on a subject the most delicate and interesting; and one which, of all others, may most easily be converted into an engine of oppression.

In this government, balances and checks have been carefully adjusted, with a view to secure public and private rights; and any departure from this organization endangers all. We have less to apprehend from a bold and open usurpation by one department of the government, of powers which belong to another, than by a more gradual and insidious course. In my judgment, no principle can be more dangerous than the one mentioned in this case. It covers from legal responsibility executive officers. In the performance of their ministerial duties, however they may disregard and trample upon the rights of the citizen, he can claim no indemnity by an action at law. This doctrine has no standing in England. No ministerial officer in that country is sheltered from legal responsibility. Shall we in this country be less jealous of private rights and of the exercise of power? Is it not our boast that the law is paramount, and that all are subject to it, from the highest officer of the country to its humblest citizen? But can this be the case if any or every executive officer is clothed with the immunities of the sovereignty? If he cannot be sued, what may he not do with impunity? I am sure that my brethren are as sincere as I am, in their convictions of what the law is, in this case; and I have only to regret, that their views do not coincide with those I have stated.