Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)/Teaching of St. Augustine of Hippo
Teaching of St. Augustine of Hippo
St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) is "a philosophical and theological
genius of the first order, dominating, like a pyramid, antiquity and
the succeeding ages. Compared with the great philosophers of past
centuries and modern times, he is the equal of them all; among
theologians he is undeniably the first, and such has been his
influence that none of the Fathers, Scholastics, or Reformers has
surpassed it." (Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church)
Elsewhere, we have discussed his life and his writings; here, we
shall treat of his teaching and influence in three sections:
I. His Function as a Doctor of the Church
II. His System of Grace
III. Augustinism in History
I. HIS FUNCTION AS A DOCTOR OF THE CHURCH
When the critics endeavour to determine Augustine's place in the
history of the Church and of civilization, there can be no question
of exterior or political influence, such as was exercised by St. Leo,
St. Gregory, or St. Bernard. As Reuter justly observes, Augustine was
bishop of a third-rate city and had scarcely any direct control over
politics, and Harnack adds that perhaps he had not the qualifications
of a statesman. If Augustine occupies a place apart in the history of
humanity, it is as a thinker, his influence being felt even outside
the realm of theology, and playing a most potent part in the
orientation of Western thought. It is now universally conceded that,
in the intellectual field, this influence is unrivalled even by that
of Thomas Aquinas, and Augustine's teaching marks a distinct epoch in
the history of Christian thought. The better to emphasize this
important fact we shall try to determine: (1) the rank and degree of
influence that must be ascribed to Augustine; (2) the nature, or the
elements, of his doctrinal influence; (3) the general qualities of
his doctrine; and (4) the character of his genius.
(1) The greatest of the Doctors
It is first of all a remarkable fact that the great critics,
Protestant as well as Catholic, are almost unanimous in placing St.
Augustine in the foremost rank of Doctors and proclaiming him to be
the greatest of the Fathers. Such, indeed, was also the opinion of
his contemporaries, judging from their expressions of enthusiasm
gathered by the Bollandists. The popes attributed such exceptional
authority to the Doctor of Hippo that, even of late years, it has
given rise to lively theological controversies. Peter the Venerable
accurately summarized the general sentiment of the Middle Ages when
he ranked Augustine immediately after the Apostles; and in modern
times Bossuet, whose genius was most like that of Augustine, assigns
him the first place among the Doctors, nor does he simply call him
the incomparable Augustine," but "the Eagle of Doctors," "the Doctor
of Doctors." If the Jansenistic abuse of his works and perhaps the
exaggerations of certain Catholics, as well as the attack of Richard
Simon, seem to have alarmed some minds, the general opinion has not
varied. In the nineteenth century Stöckl expressed the thought of all
when he said, "Augustine has justly been called the greatest Doctor
of the Catholic world."
And the admiration of Protestant critics is not less enthusiastic.
More than this, it would seem as if they had in these latter days
been quite specially fascinated by the great figure of Augustine, so
deeply and so assiduously have they studied him (Bindemann, Schaff,
Dorner, Reuter, A. Harnack, Eucken, Scheel, and so on) and all of
them agree more or less with Harnack when he says: "Where, in the
history of the West, is there to be found a man who, in point of
influence, can be compared with him?" Luther and Calvin were content
to treat Augustine with a little less irreverence than they did the
other Fathers, but their descendants do him full justice, although
recognizing him as the Father of Roman Catholicism. According to
Bindemann, "Augustine is a star of extraordinary brilliancy in the
firmament of the Church. Since the apostles he has been unsurpassed."
In his "History of the Church" Dr. Kurtz calls Augustine "the
greatest, the most powerful of all the Fathers, him from whom
proceeds all the doctrinal and ecclesiastical development of the
West, and to whom each recurring crisis, each new orientation of
thought brings it back." Schaff himself (Saint Augustine, Melanchthon
and Neander, p. 98) is of the same opinion: "While most of the great
men in the history of the Church are claimed either by the Catholic
or by the Protestant confession, and their influence is therefore
confined to one or the other, he enjoys from both a respect equally
profound and enduring." Rudolf Eucken is bolder still, when he says:
"On the ground of Christianity proper a single philosopher has
appeared and that is Augustine." The English Miter, W. Cunningham, is
no less appreciative of the extent and perpetuity of this
extraordinary influence: "The whole life of the medieval Church was
framed on lines which he has suggested: its religious orders claimed
him as their patron; its mystics found a sympathetic tone in his
teaching; its polity was to some extent the actualization of his
picture of the Christian Church; it was in its various parts a
carrying out of ideas which he cherished and diffused. Nor does his
influence end with the decline of medievalism: we shall see presently
how closely his language was akin to that of Descartes, who gave the
first impulse to and defined the special character of modern
philosophy." And after having established that the doctrine of St.
Augustine was at the bottom of all the struggles between Jansenists
and Catholics in the Church of France, between Arminians and
Calvinists on the side of the Reformers, he adds: "And once more in
our own land when a reaction arose against rationalism and
Erastinianism it was to the African Doctor that men turned with
enthusiasm: Dr. Pusey's edition of the Confessions was among the
first-fruits of the Oxford Movement."
But Adolf Harnack is the one who has oftenest emphasized the unique
rôle of the Doctor of Hippo. He has studied Augustine's place in the
history of the world as reformer of Christian piety and his influence
as Doctor of the Church. In his study of the "Confessions" he comes
back to it: "No man since Paul is comparable to him" — with the
exception of Luther, he adds. — "Even today we live by Augustine, by
his thought and his spirit; it is said that we are the sons of the
Renaissance and the Reformation, but both one and the other depend
upon him."
(2) Nature and different aspects of his doctrinal influence
This influence is so varied and so complex that it is difficult to
consider under all its different aspects. First of all, in his
writings the great bishop collects and condenses the intellectual
treasures of the old world and transmits them to the new. Harnack
goes so far as to say: "It would seem that the miserable existence of
the Roman empire in the West was prolonged until then, only to permit
Augustine's influence to be exercised on universal history." It was
in order to fulfil this enormous task that Providence brought him
into contact with the three worlds whose thought he was to transmit:
with the Roman and Latin world in the midst of which he lived, with
the Oriental world partially revealed to him through the study of
Manichæism, and with the Greek world shown to him by the Platonists.
In philosophy he was initiated into the whole content and all the
subtilties of the various schools, without, however, giving his
allegiance to any one of them. In theology it was he who acquainted
the Latin Church with the great dogmatic work accomplished in the
East during the fourth century and at the beginning of the fifth; he
popularized the results of it by giving them the more exact and
precise form of the Latin genius.
To synthesis of the past, Augustine adds the incomparable wealth of
his own thought, and he may be said to have been the most powerful
instrument of Providence in development and advance of dogma. Here
the danger has been not in denying, but in exaggerating, this
advance. Augustine's dogmatic mission (in a lower sphere and apart
from inspiration) recalls that of Paul in the preaching of the
Gospel. It has also been subject to the same attacks and occasioned
the same vagaries of criticism. Just as it was sought to make of
Paulinism the real source of Christianity as we know it — a system
that had smothered the primitive germ of the Gospel of Jesus — so it
was imagined that, under the name of Augustinianism, Augustine had
installed in the Church some sort of syncretism of the ideas of Paul
and of neo-Platonism which was a deviation from ancient Christianity,
fortunate according to some, but according to others utterly
deplorable. These fantasies do not survive the reading of the texts,
and Harnack himself shows in Augustine the heir to the tradition that
preceded him. Still, on the other hand, his share of invention and
originality in the development of dogma must not be ignored, although
here and there, on special questions, human weaknesses crop out. He
realized, better than any of the Fathers, the progress so well
expressed by Vincent of Lérins, his contemporary, in a page that some
have turned against him.
In general, all Christian dogmatics are indebted to him for new
theories that better justify and explain revelation, new views, and
greater clearness and precision. The many struggles with which he was
identified, together with the speculative turn of his mind, brought
almost every question within the scope of his research. Even his way
of stating problems so left his impress upon them that there Is no
problem, one might almost say, in considering which the theologian
does not feel the study of Augustine's thought to be an imperative
obligation. Certain dogmas in particular he so amply developed, so
skilfully unsheathing the fruitful germ of the truths from their
envelope of tradition, that many of these dogmas (wrongly, in our
opinion) have been set down as "Augustinism." Augustine was not their
inventor, he was only the first to put them in a strong light. They
are chiefly the dogmas of the Fall the Atonement, Grace, and
Predestination. Schaff (op. cit. 97) has very properly said: "His
appearance in the history of dogma forms a distinct epoch, especially
as regards anthropological and soteriological doctrines, which he
advanced considerably further, and brought to a greater clearness and
precision, than they had ever had before in the consciousness of the
Church." But he is not only the Doctor of Grace, he is also the
Doctor of the Church: his twenty years' conflict with Donatism led to
a complete exposition of the dogmas of the Church, the great work and
mystical Body of Christ, and true Kingdom of God, of its part in
salvation and of the intimate efficacy of its sacraments. It is on
this point, as the very centre of Augustinian theology, that Reuter
has concentrated those "Augustinische Studien" which, according to
Harnack, are the most learned of recent studies on St. Augustine.
Manichæan controversies also led him to state clearly the great
questions of the Divine Being and of the nature of evil, and he might
also be called the Doctor of Good, or of good principles of all
things. Lastly, the very idiosyncrasy of his genius and the
practical, supernatural, and Divine imprint left upon all his
intellectual speculations have made him the Doctor of Charity.
Another step forward due to the works of Augustine is in the language
of theology, for, if he did not create it, he at least contributed
towards its definite settlement. It is indebted to him for a great
number of epigrammatic formulæ, as significant as they are terse,
afterwards singled out and adopted by Scholasticism. Besides, as
Latin was more concise and less fluid in its forms than Greek, it was
wonderfully well suited to the work. Augustine made it the dogmatic
language par excellence, and Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and others
followed his lead. At times he has even been credited with the
pseudo-Athanasian creed which is undoubtedly of later date, but those
critics were not mistaken who traced its inspiration to the formulæ
in "De Trinitate." Whoever its author may have been, he was certainly
familiar with Augustine and drew upon his works. It is unquestionably
this gift of concise expression, as well as his charity, that has so
often caused the celebrated saying to be attributed to him: "In
essentials unity, in non-essentials liberty, in all things charity."
Augustine stands forth, too, as the great inspirer of religious
thought in subsequent ages. A whole volume would not be sufficient to
contain the full account of his influence on posterity; here we shall
merely call attention to its principal manifestations. It is, in the
first place, a fact of paramount importance that, with St. Augustine,
the centre of dogmatic and theological development changed from East
to West. Hence, from this view-point again, he makes an epoch in the
history of dogma. The critics maintain that up to his time the most
powerful influence was exerted by the Greek Church, the East having
been the classic land of theology, the great workshop for the
elaboration of dogma. From the time of Augustine, the predominating
influence seems to emanate from the West, and the practical,
realistic spirit of the Latin race supplants the speculative and
idealistic spirit of Greece and the East. Another fact, no less
salient, is that it was the Doctor of Hippo who, in the bosom of the
Church, inspired the two seemingly antagonistic movements,
Scholasticism and Mysticism. From Gregory the Great to the Fathers of
Trent, Augustine's theological authority, indisputably the highest,
dominates all thinkers and is appealed to alike by the Scholastics
Anselm, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas, and by Bernard, Hugh of
St. Victor, and Tauler, exponents of Mysticism, all of whom were
nourished upon his writings and penetrated with his spirit. There is
not one of even the most modern tendencies of thought but derives
from him whatever it may have of truth or of profound religious
sentiment. Learned critics, such as Harnack, have called Augustine
"the first modern man," and in truth, he so moulded the Latin world
that it is really he who has shaped the education of modern minds.
But, without going so far, we may quote the German philosopher,
Eucken: "It is perhaps not paradoxical to say that if our age wishes
to take up and treat in an independent way the problem of religion,
it is not so much to Schleiermacher or Kant, or even Luther or St.
Thomas, that it must refer, as to Augustine.... And outside of
religion, there are points upon which Augustine is more modern than
Hegel or Schopenhauer."
(3) The dominating qualities of his doctrine
The better to understand St. Augustine's influence, we must point out
in his doctrine certain general characteristics which must not be
lost sight of, if, in reading his works, one would avoid troublesome
misapprehensions.
First, the full development of the great Doctor's mind was
progressive. It was by stages, often aided by the circumstances and
necessities of controversy, that he arrived at the exact knowledge of
each truth and a clean-cut perception of its place in the synthesis
of revelation. He also requires that his readers should know how to
"advance with him." It is necessary to study St. Augustine's works in
historical order and, as we shall see, this applies particularly to
the doctrine of grace.
Augustinian doctrine is, again, essentially theological, and has God
for its centre. To be sure Augustine is a great philosopher, and
Fénelon said of him: "If an enlightened man were to gather from the
books of St. Augustine the sublime truths which this great man has
scattered at random therein, such a compendium [ extrait], made with
discrimination, would be far superior to Descartes' Meditations." And
indeed just such a collection was made by the Oratorian ontologist,
André Martin. There is then a philosophy of St. Augustine, but in him
philosophy is so Intimately coupled with theology as to be
inseparable from it. Protestant historians have remarked this
characteristic of his writings. "The world," says Eucken, "interests
him less than" the action of God in the world and especially in
ourselves. God and the soul are the only subjects the knowledge Of
which ought to fire us with enthusiasm. All knowledge becomes moral,
religious knowledge, or rather a moral, religious conviction, an act
of faith on the part of man, who gives himself up unreservedly." And
with still greater energy Böhringer has said: "The axis on which the
heart, life and theology of Augustine move is God." Oriental
discussions on the Word had forced Athanasius and the Greek Fathers
to set faith in the Word and in Christ, the Saviour, at the very
summit of theology; Augustine, too, in his theology, places the
Incarnation at the centre of the Divine plan, but he looks upon it as
the great historic manifestation of God to humanity — the idea of
God dominates all: of God considered in His essence (On the Trinity),
in His government (The City of God) or as the last end of all
Christian life (Enchiridion and On the Christian Combat).
Lastly, Augustine's doctrine bears an eminently Catholic stamp and is
radically opposed to Protestantism. It is important to establish this
fact, principally because of the change in the attitude of Protestant
critics towards St. Augustine. Indeed, nothing is more deserving of
attention than this development so highly creditable to the
impartiality of modern writers. The thesis of the Protestants of
olden times is well known. Attempts to monopolize Augustine and to
make him an ante-Reformation reformer, were certainly not wanting. Of
course Luther had to admit that he did not find in Augustine
justification by faith alone, that generating principle of all
Protestantism; and Schaff tells us that he consoled himself with
exclaiming (op. sit., p. 100): "Augustine has often erred, he is not
to be trusted. Although good and holy, he was yet lacking in true
faith as well as the other Fathers." But in general, the Reformation
did not so easily fall into line, and for a long time it was
customary to oppose the great name of Augustine to Catholicism.
Article 20 of the Confession of Augsburg dares to ascribe to him
justification without works, and Melanchthon invokes his authority in
his "Apologia Confessionis." In the last thirty or forty years all
has been changed, and the best Protestant critics now vie with one
another in proclaiming the essentially Catholic character of
Augustinian doctrine. In fact they go to extremes when they claim him
to be the founder of Catholicism. It is thus that H. Reuter concludes
his very important studies on the Doctor of Hippo: "I consider
Augustine the founder of Roman Catholicism in the West....This is no
new discovery, as Kattenbusch seems to believe, but a truth long
since recognized by Neander, Julius Köstlin, Dorner,
Schmidt,...etc.." Then, as to whether Evangelicalism is to be found
in Augustine, he says: "Formerly this point was reasoned out very
differently from what it is nowadays. The phrases so much in use from
1830 to 1870: Augustine is the Father of evangelical Protestantism
and Pelagius is the Father of Catholicism, are now rarely met with.
They have since been acknowledged to be untenable, although they
contain a particula veri." Philip Schaff reaches the same conclusion;
and Dorner says, "It is erroneous to ascribe to Augustine the ideas
that inspired the Reformation." No one, however, has put this idea in
a stronger light than Harnack. Quite recently, in his 14th lesson on
"The Essence of Christianity," he characterized the Roman Church by
three elements, the third of which is Augustinism, the thought and
the piety of St. Augustine. "In fact Augustine has exerted over the
whole inner life of the Church, religious life and religious thought,
an absolutely decisive influence." And again he says, "In the fifth
century, at the hour when the Church inherited the Roman Empire, she
had within her a man of extraordinarily deep and powerful genius:
from him she took her ideas, and to this present hour she has been
unable to break away from them." In his "History of Dogma" (English
tr., V, 234, 235) the same critic dwells at length upon the features
of what he calls the "popular Catholicism" to which Augustine
belongs. These features are (a) the Church as a hierarchical
institution with doctrinal authority; (b) eternal life by merits, and
disregard of the Protestant thesis of "salvation by faith" — that
is, salvation by that firm confidence in God which the certainty of
pardon produces (c) the forgiveness of sins — in the Church and the
Church; (d) the distinction between commands and counsel — between
grievous sine and venial sins — the scale of wicked men and good men
— the various degrees of happiness in heaven according to one's
deserts; (e) Augustine is accused of "outdoing the superstitious
ideas" of this popular Catholicism — the infinite value of Christ's
satisfaction, salvation considered as enjoyment of God in heaven —
the mysterious efficacy of the sacraments (ex opere operato) —
Mary's virginity even in childbirth — the idea of her purity and her
conception, unique in their kind." Harnack does not assert that
Augustine taught the Immaculate Conception, but Schaff (op. cit., p.
98) says unhesitatingly: "He is responsible also for many grievous
errors of the Roman Church...he anticipated the dogma of the
immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, and his ominous word, Roma
locuta est, causa finite est, might almost be quoted in favour of the
Vatican decree of papal infallibility."
Nevertheless, it were a mistake to suppose that modern Protestants
relinquish all claim upon Augustine; they will have it that, despite
his essential Catholicism, it was he who inspired Luther and Calvin.
The new thesis, therefore, is that each of the two Churches may claim
him in turn. Burke's expression quoted by Schaff (ibid., p. 102) is
characteristic: "In Augustine ancient and modern ideas are melted and
to his authority the papal Church has as much right to appeal as the
Churches of the Reformation." No one notes this contradiction more
clearly than Loofs. After stating that Augustine has accentuated the
characteristic elements of Western (Catholic) Christianity, that in
succeeding ages he became its Father, and that "the Ecclesiasticism
of Roman Catholicism, Scholasticism, Mysticism, and even the claims
of the papacy to temporal rule, are founded upon a tendency initiated
by him," Loofs also affirms that he is the teacher of all the
reformers and their bond of union, and concludes with this strange
paradox: "The history of Catholicism is the history of the
progressive elimination of Augustinism." The singular aptitude of
these critics for supposing the existence of flagrant contradictions
in a genius like Augustine is not so astonishing when we remember
that, with Reuter, they justify this theory by the reflection: "In
whom are to be found more frequent contradictions than in Luther?"
But their theories are based upon a false interpretation of
Augustine's opinion, which is frequently misconstrued by those who
are not sufficiently familiar with his language and terminology.
(4) The character of his genius
We have now to ascertain what is the dominating quality which
accounts for his fascinating influence upon posterity. One after
another the critics have considered the various aspects of this great
genius. Some have been particularly impressed by the depth and
originality of his conceptions, and for these Augustine is the great
sower of the ideas by which future minds are to live. Others, like
Jungmann and Stöckl, have praised in him the marvellous harmony of
all the mind's higher qualities, or, again, the universality and the
compass of his doctrine. "In the great African Doctor," says the Rev.
J. A. Zahm (Bible, Science and Faith, Fr. tr., 56), "we seem to have
found united and combined the powerful and penetrating logic of
Plato, the deep scientific conceptions of Aristotle, the knowledge
and intellectual suppleness of Origen, the grace and eloquence of
Basil and Chrysostom. Whether we consider him as philosopher, as
theologian, or as exegetist...he still appears admirable the
unquestioned Master of all the centuries." Philip Schaff (op. cit.,
p. 97) admires above all "such a rare union of the speculative talent
of the Greek and of the practical spirit of the Latin Church as he
alone possessed." In all these opinions there is a great measure of
truth; nevertheless we believe that the dominating characteristic of
Augustine's genius and the true secret of his influence are to be
found in his heart — a heart that penetrates the most exalted
speculations of a profound mind and animates them with the most
ardent feeling. It is at bottom only the traditional and general
estimate of the saint that we express; for he has always been
represented with a heart for his emblem, just as Thomas Aquinas with
a sun. Mgr. Bougaud thus interpreted this symbol: "Never did man
unite in one and the same soul such stern rigour of logic with such
tenderness of heart." This is also the opinion of Harnack, Böhringer,
Nourisson, Storz, and others. Great intellectuality admirably fused
with an enlightened mysticism is Augustine's distinguishing
characteristic. Truth is not for him only an object of contemplation;
it is a good that must be possessed, that must be loved and lived by.
What constitutes Augustine's genius is his marvellous gift of
embracing truth with all the fibres of his soul; not with the heart
alone, for the heart does not think; not with the mind alone, for the
mind grasps only the abstract or, as it were, lifeless truth.
Augustine seeks the living truth, and even when he is combating
certain Platonic ideas he is of the family of Plato, not of
Aristotle. He belongs indisputably to all ages because he is in touch
with all souls, but he is preeminently modern because his doctrine is
not the cold light of the School; he is living and penetrated with
personal sentiment. Religion is not a simple theory, Christianity is
not a series of dogmas; It Is also a life, as they say nowadays, or,
more accurately, a source of life. However, let us not be deceived.
Augustine is not a sentimentalist, a pure mystic, and heart alone
does not account for his power. If in him the hard, cold
intellectuality of the metaphysician gives place to an impassioned
vision of truth, that truth is the basis of it all. He never knew the
vaporous mysticism of our day, that allows itself to be lulled by a
vague, aimless sentimentalism. His emotion is deep, true, engrossing,
precisely because it is born of a strong, secure, accurate dogmatism
that wishes to know what it loves and why it loves. Christianity is
life, but life in the eternal, unchangeable truth. And if none of the
Fathers has put so much of his heart into his writings, neither has
any turned upon truth the searchlight of a stronger, clearer
intellect.
Augustine's passion is characterized not by violence, but by a
communicative tenderness; and his exquisite delicacy experiences
first one and then another of the most intimate emotions and tests
them; hence the irresistible effect of the "Confessions." Feuerlein,
a Protestant thinker, has brought out in relief (exaggeratedly, to be
sure, and leaving the marvellous powers of his intellect in the
shade) Augustine's exquisite sensibility — what he calls the
"feminine elements" of his genius. He says: "It was not merely a
chance or accidental part that his mother, Monica, played in his
intellectual development, and therein lies what essentially
distinguishes him from Luther, of whom it was said: "Everything about
him bespeaks the man"'. And Schlösser, whom Feuerlein quotes, is not
afraid to say that Augustine's works contain more genuine poetry than
all the writings of the Greek Fathers. At least it cannot be denied
that no thinker ever caused so many and such salutary tears to flow.
This characteristic of Augustine's genius explains his doctrinal
work. Christian dogmas are considered in relation to the soul and the
great duties of Christian life, rather than to themselves and in a
speculative fashion. This alone explains his division of theology in
the "Enchiridion," which at first sight seems so strange. He
assembles all Christian doctrine in the three theological virtues,
considering in the mysteries the different activities of the soul
that must live by them. Thus, in the Incarnation, he assigns the
greatest part to the moral side, to the triumph of humility. For this
reason, also, Augustine's work bears an imprint, until then unknown,
of living personality peeping out everywhere. He inaugurates that
literature in which the author's individuality reveals itself in the
most abstract matters, the "Confessions" being an inimitable example
of it. It is in this connection that Harnack admires the African
Doctor's gift of psychological observation and a captivating facility
for portraying his penetrating observations. This talent, he says, is
the secret of Augustine's originality and greatness. Again, it is
this same characteristic that distinguishes him from the other
Doctors and gives him his own special temperament. The practical side
of a question appealed to the Roman mind of Ambrose, too, but he
never rises to the same heights, nor moves the heart as deeply as
does his disciple of Milan. Jerome is a, more learned exegetist,
better equipped in respect of Scriptural erudition; he is even purer
in his style; but, despite his impetuous ardour, he is less animated,
less striking, than his correspondent of Hippo. Athanasius, too, is
subtile in the metaphysical analysis of dogma, but he does not appeal
to the heart and take hold of the soul like the African Doctor.
Origen played the part of initiator in the Eastern Church, just as
Augustine did in the Western, but his influence, unfortunate in more
ways than one, was exercised rather in the sphere of speculative
intelligence, while that of Augustine, owing to the qualities of his
heart, extended far beyond the realm of theology. Bossuet, who of all
geniuses most closely resembles Augustine by his elevation and his
universality, is his superior in the skilfulness and artistic finish
of his works, but he has not the alluring tenderness of soul; and if
Augustine fulminates less, he attracts more powerfully, subjugating
the mind with gentleness.
Thus may Augustine's universal influence in all succeeding ages be
explained: it is due to combined gifts of heart and mind. Speculative
genius alone does not sway the multitude; the Christian world, apart
from professional theologians, does not read Thomas Aquinas. On the
other hand, without the clear, definite idea of dogma, mysticism
founders as soon as reason awakes and discovers the emptiness of
metaphors: this is always the fate of vague pietism, whether it
recognize Christ or not, whether It be extolled by Schleiermacher,
Sabatier, or their disciples. But to Augustine's genius, at once
enlightened and ardent, the whole soul is accessible, and the whole
Church, both teachers and taught, is permeated by his sentiments and
ideas. A. Harnack, more than any other critic, admires and describes
Augustine's influence over all the life of Christian people. If
Thomas Aquinas is the Doctor of the Schools, Augustine is, according
to Harnack, the inspirer and restorer of Christian piety. If Thomas
inspires the canons of Trent, Augustine, besides having formed Thomas
himself, inspires the inner life of the Church and is the soul of all
the great reforms effected within its pale. In his "Essence of
Christianity" (14th lesson, 1900, p. 161) Harnack shows how Catholics
and Protestants live upon the piety of Augustine. "His living has
been incessantly relived in the course of the fifteen hundred years
that have followed. Even to our days interior and living piety among
Catholics, as well as the mode of its expression, has been
essentially Augustinian: the soul is permeated by his sentiment, it
feels as he felt and rethinks his thoughts. It is the same with many
Protestants also, and they are by no means among the worst. And even
those to whom dogma is but a relic of the past proclaim that
Augustine's influence will live forever."
This genuine emotion is also the veil that hides certain faults from
the reader or else makes him oblivious of them. Says Eucken: "Never
could Augustine have exercised all the influence he has exercised if
it had not been that, in spite of the rhetorical artifice of his
utterance, absolute sincerity reigned in the inmost recesses of his
soul." His frequent repetitions are excused because they are the
expression of his deep feeling. Schaff says: "His books, with all the
faults and repetitions of isolated parts, are a spontaneous outflow
from the marvellous treasures of his highly-gifted mind and his truly
pious heart." (St. Augustine, p. 96.) But we must also acknowledge
that his passion is the source of exaggerations and at times of
errors that are fraught with real danger for the inattentive or badly
disposed reader. Out of sheer love for Augustine certain theologians
have endeavoured to justify all he wrote, to admire all, and to
proclaim him infallible, but nothing could be more detrimental to his
glory than such excess of praise. The reaction already referred to
arises partly from this. We must recognize that the passion for truth
sometimes fixes its attention too much upon one side of a complex
question; his too absolute formulæ, lacking qualification, false in
appearance now in one sense now in another. "The oratorical
temperament that was his in such a high degree," says Becker, very
truly (Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, 15 April, 1902, p. 379), "the
kind of exaltation that befitted his rich imagination and his loving
soul, are not the most reliable in philosophical speculations." Such
is the origin of the contradictions alleged against him and of the
errors ascribed to him by the predestinarians of all ages. Here we
see the rôle of the more frigid minds of Scholasticism. Thomas
Aquinas was a necessary corrective to Augustine. He is less great,
less original, and, above all, less animated; but the calm didactics
of his intellectualism enable him to castigate Augustine's
exaggerations with rigorous criticism, to impart exactitude and
precision to his terms — in one word, to prepare a dictionary with
which the African Doctor may be read without danger.
II. HIS SYSTEM OF GRACE
It is unquestionably in the great Doctor's solution of the eternal
problem of freedom and grace — of the part taken by God and by man,
in the affair of salvation — that his thought stands forth as most
personal, most powerful, and most disputed. Most personal, for he was
the first of all to synthesize the great theories of the Fall, grace,
and free will; and moreover it is he who, to reconcile them all, has
furnished us with a profound explanation which is in very truth his,
and of which we can find no trace in his predecessors. Hence, the
term Augustinism is often exclusively used to designate his system of
grace. Most powerful, for, as all admit, it was he above all others
who won the triumph of liberty against the Manichæans, and of grace
against the Pelagians. His doctrine has, in the main, been solemnly
accepted by the Church, and we know that the canons of the Council of
Orange are borrowed from his works. Most disputed, also. like St.
Paul, whose teachings he develops, he has often been quoted, often
not understood. Friends and enemies have exploited his teaching in
the most diverse senses. It has not been grasped, not only by the
opponents of liberty, and hence by the Reformers of the sixteenth
century, but even today, by Protestant critics the most opposed to
the cruel predestinationism of Calvin and Luther who father that
doctrine on St. Augustine. A technical study would be out of place
here; it will be sufficient to enunciate the most salient thoughts,
to enable the reader to find his bearings.
(1) It is regarded as incontestable today that the system of
Augustine was complete in his mind from the year 397 — that is, from
the beginning of his episcopate, when he wrote his answers to the
"quæstiones Diversæ" of Simplician. It is to this book that
Augustine, in his last years, refers the Semipelagians for the
explanation of his real thought. This important fact, to which for a
long time no attention was paid, has been recognized by Neander and
established by Gangaut, and also by recent critics, such as Loofs,
Reuter, Turmel, Jules Martin (see also Cunningham, St. Austin, 1886,
pp. 80 and 175). It will not, therefore, be possible to deny the
authority of these texts on the pretext that Augustine in his old age
adopted a system more antagonistic to liberty.
(2) The system of Pelagius can today be better understood than
heretofore. Pelagius doubtless denied original sin, and the
immortality and integrity of Adam; in a word, the whole supernatural
order. But the parent idea of his system, which was of stoic origin,
was nothing else than the complete "emancipation" of human liberty
with regard to God, and its limitless power for good and for evil. It
depended on man to attain by himself, without the grace of God, a
stoic impeccability and even insensibility, or the absolute control
of his passions. It was scarcely suspected, even up to our time, what
frightful rigorism resulted from this exaggeration of the powers of
liberty. Since perfection was possible, it was of obligation. There
was no longer any distinction between precepts and counsels. Whatever
was good was a duty. There was no longer any distinction between
mortal and venial sin. Every useless word merited hell, and even
excluded from the Church the children of God. All this has been
established by hitherto unedited documents which Caspari has
published (Briefe, Abhandlungen, und Predigten, Christiania, 1890).
(3) The system of St. Augustine in opposition to this rests on three
fundamental principles:
+ God is absolute Master, by His grace, of all the determinations of
the will;
+ man remains free, even under the action of grace;
+ the reconciliation of these two truths rests on the manner of the Divine government.
Absolute sovereignty of God over the will
This principle, in opposition to the emancipation of Pelagius, has
not always been understood in its entire significance. We think that
numberless texts of the holy Doctor signify that not only does every
meritorious act require supernatural grace, but also that every act
of virtue, even of infidels, should be ascribed to a Gift of God, not
indeed to a supernatural grace (as Baius and the Jansenists pretend),
but to a specially efficacious providence which has prepared this
good movement of the will (Retractations, I, ix, n. 6). It is not, as
theologians very wisely remark, that the will cannot accomplish that
act of natural virtue, but it is a fact that without this
providential benefit it would not. Many misunderstandings have arisen
because this principle has not been comprehended, and in particular
the great medieval theology, which adopted it and made it the basis
of its system of liberty, has not been justly appreciated. But many
have been afraid of these affirmations which are so sweeping, because
they have not grasped the nature of God's gift, which leaves freedom
intact. The fact has been too much lost sight of that Augustine
distinguishes very explicitly two orders of grace: the grace of
natural virtues (the simple gift of Providence, which prepares
efficacious motives for the will); and grace for salutary and
supernatural acts, given with the first preludes of faith. The latter
is the grace of the sons, gratia fliorum; the former is the grace of
all men, a grace which even strangers and infidels (filii
concubinarum, as St. Augustine says) can receive (De Patientiâ,
xxvii, n. 28).
Man remains free, even under the action of grace
The second principle, the affirmation of liberty even under the
action of efficacious grace, has always been safeguarded, and there
is not one of his anti-Pelagian works even of the latest, which does
not positively proclaim a complete power of choice in man; "not but
what it does not depend on the free choice of the will to embrace the
faith or reject it, but in the elect this will is prepared by God"
(De Prædest. SS., n. 10). The great Doctor did not reproach the
Pelagians with requiring a power to choose between good and evil; in
fact he proclaims with them that without that power there is no
responsibility, no merit, no demerit; but he reproaches them with
exaggerating this power. Julian of Eclanum, denying the sway of
concupiscence, conceives free will as a balance in perfect
equilibrium. Augustine protests: this absolute equilibrium existed in
Adam; it was destroyed after original sin; the will has to struggle
and react against an inclination to evil, but it remains mistress of
its choice (Opus imperfectum contra Julianum, III, cxvii). Thus, when
he says that we have lost freedom in consequence of the sin of Adam,
he is careful to explain that this lost freedom is not the liberty of
choosing between good and evil, because without it we could not help
sinning, but the perfect liberty which was calm and without struggle,
and which was enjoyed by Adam in virtue of his original integrity.
The reconciliation of these two truths
But is there not between these two principles an irremediable
antinomy? On the one hand, there is affirmed an absolute and
unreserved power in God of directing the choice of our will, of
converting every hardened sinner, or of letting every created will
harden itself; and on the other hand, it is affirmed that the
rejection or acceptance of grace or of temptation depends on our free
will. Is not this a contradiction? Very many modern critics, among
whom are Loofs and Harnack, have considered these two affirmations as
irreconcilable. But it is because, according to them, Augustinian
grace is an irresistible impulse given by God, just as in the absence
of it every temptation inevitably overcomes the will. But in reality
all antinomy disappears if we have the key of the system; and this
key is found in the third principle: the Augustinian explanation of
the Divine government of wills, a theory so original, so profound,
and yet absolutely unknown to the most perspicacious critics,
Harnack, Loofs, and the rest.
Here are the main lines of this theory: The will never decides
without a motive, without the attraction of some good which it
perceives in the object. Now, although the will may be free in
presence of every motive, still, as a matter of fact it takes
different resolutions according to the different motives presented to
it. In that is the whole secret of the influence exercised, for
instance, by eloquence (the orator can do no more than present
motives), by meditation, or by good reading. What a power over the
will would not a man possess who could, at his own pleasure, at any
moment, and in the most striking manner, present this or the other
motive of action? — But such is God's privilege. St. Augustine has
remarked that man is not the master of his first thoughts; he can
exert an influence on the course of his reflections, but he himself
cannot determine the objects, the images, and, consequently, the
motives which present themselves to his mind. Now, as chance is only
a word, it is God who determines at His pleasure these first
perceptions of men, either by the prepared providential action of
exterior causes, or interiorly by a Divine illumination given to the
soul. — let us take one last step with Augustine: Not only does God
send at His pleasure those attractive motives which inspire the will
with its determinations, but, before choosing between these
illuminations of the natural and the supernatural order, God knows
the response which the soul, with all freedom, will make to each of
them. Thus, in the Divine knowledge, there is for each created will
an indefinite series of motives which de facto (but very freely) win
the consent to what is good. God, therefore, can, at His pleasure,
obtain the salvation of Judas, if He wishes, or let Peter go down to
perdition. No freedom, as a matter of fact, will resist what He has
planned, although it always keeps the power of going to perdition.
Consequently, it is God alone, in His perfect independence, who
determines, by the choice of such a motive or such an inspiration (of
which he knows the future influence), whether the will is going to
decide for good or for evil. Hence, the man who has acted well must
thank God for having sent him an inspiration which was foreseen to be
efficacious, while that favour has been denied to another. A
fortiori, every one of the elect owes it to the Divine goodness alone
that he has received a series of graces which God saw to be
infallibly, though freely, bound up with final perseverance.
Assuredly we may reject this theory, for the Church, which always
maintains the two principles of the absolute dependence of the will
and of freedom, has not yet adopted as its own this reconciliation of
the two extremes. We may ask where and how God knows the effect of
these graces. Augustine has always affirmed the fact; he has never
inquired about the mode; and it is here that Molinism has added to
and developed his thoughts, in attempting to answer this question.
But can the thinker, who created and until his dying day maintained
this system which is so logically concatenated, be accused of
fatalism and Manichæism?
It remains to be shown that our interpretation exactly reproduces the
thought of the great Doctor. The texts are too numerous and too long
to be reproduced here. But there is one work of Augustine, dating
from the year 397, in which he clearly explains his thought — a work
which he not only did not disavow later on, but to which in
particular he referred, at the end of his career, those of his
readers who were troubled by his constant affirmation of grace. For
example, to the monks of Adrumetum who thought that liberty was
irreconcilable with this affirmation, he addressed a copy of this
book "De Diversis quæstionibus ad Simplicianum," feeling sure that
their doubts would be dissipated. There, in fact, he formulates his
thoughts with great clearness. Simplician had asked how he should
understand the Epistle to the Romans 9, on the predestination of
Jacob and Esau. Augustine first lays down the fundamental principle
of St. Paul, that every good will comes from grace, so that no man
can take glory to himself for his merits, and this grace is so sure
of its results that human liberty will never in reality resist it,
although it has the power to do so. Then he affirms that this
efficacious grace is not necessary for us to be able to act well, but
because, in fact, without it we would not wish to act well. From that
arises the great difficulty: How does the power of resisting grace
fit in with the certainty of the result? And it is here that
Augustine replies: There are many ways of inviting faith. Souls being
differently disposed, God knows what invitation will be accepted,
what other will not be accepted. Only those are the elect for whom
God chooses the invitation which is foreseen to be efficacious, but
God could convert them all: "Cujus autem miseretur, sic cum vocat,
quomodo scit ei congruere ut vocantem non respuat" (op. cit., I, q.
ii, n. 2, 12, 13).
Is there in this a vestige of an irresistible grace or of that
impulse against which it is impossible to fight, forcing some to
good, and others to sin and hell? It cannot be too often repeated
that this is not an idea flung off in passing, but a fundamental
explanation which if not understood leaves us in the impossibility of
grasping anything of his doctrine; but if it is seized Augustine
entertains no feelings of uneasiness on the score of freedom. In fact
he supposes freedom everywhere, and reverts incessantly to that
knowledge on God's part which precedes predestination, directs it,
and assures its infallible result. In the "De Done perseverantiæ"
(xvii, n. 42), written at the end of his life, he explains the whole
of predestination by the choice of the vocation which is foreseen as
efficacious. Thus is explained the chief part attributed to that
external providence which prepares, by ill health, by warnings, etc.,
the good thoughts which it knows will bring about good resolutions.
Finally, this explanation alone harmonizes with the moral action
which he attributes to victorious grace. Nowhere does Augustine
represent it as an irresistible impulse impressed by the stronger on
the weaker. It is always an appeal, an invitation which attracts and
seeks to persuade. He describes this attraction, which is without
violence, under the graceful image of dainties offered to a child,
green leaves offered to a sheep (In Joannem, tract. xxvi, n. 5). And
always the infallibility of the result is assured by the Divine
knowledge which directs the choice of the invitation.
(4) The Augustinian predestination presents no new difficulty if one
has understood the function of this Divine knowledge in the choice of
graces. The problem is reduced to this: Does God in his creative
decree and, before any act of human liberty, determine by an
immutable choice the elect and the reprobate? — Must the elect
during eternity thank God only for having rewarded their merits, or
must they also thank Him for having, prior to any merit on their
part, chosen them to the meriting of this reward? One system, that of
the Semipelagians, decides in favour of man: God predestines to
salvation all alike, and gives to all an equal measure of grace;
human liberty alone decides whether one is lost or saved; from which
we must logically conclude (and they really insinuated it) that the
number of the elect is not fixed or certain. The opposite system,
that of the Predestinationists (the Semipelagians falsely ascribed
this view to the Doctor of Hippo), affirms not only a privileged
choice of the elect by God, but at the same time (a) the
predestination of the reprobate to hell and (b) the absolute
powerlessness of one or the other to escape from the irresistible
impulse which drags them either to good or to evil. This is the
system of Calvin.
Between these two extreme opinions Augustine formulated (not
invented) the Catholic dogma, which affirms these two truths at the
same time:
+ the eternal choice of the elect by God is very real, very gratuitous, and constitutes the grace of graces;
+ but this decree does not destroy the Divine will to save all men, which, moreover, is not realized except by the human liberty that leaves to the elect full power to fall and to the non-elect full power to rise.
Here is how the theory of St. Augustine, already explained, forces us
to conceive of the Divine decree: Before all decision to create the
world, the infinite knowledge of God presents to Him all the graces,
and different series of graces, which He can prepare for each soul,
along with the consent or refusal which would follow in each
circumstance, and that in millions and millions of possible
combinations. Thus He sees that if Peter had received such another
grace, he would not have been converted; and if on the contrary such
another Divine appeal had been heard in the heart of Judas, he would
have done penance and been saved. Thus, for each man in particular
there are in the thought of God, limitless possible histories, some
histories of virtue and salvation, others of crime and damnation; and
God will be free in choosing such a world, such a series of graces,
and in determining the future history and final destiny of each soul.
And this is precisely what He does when, among all possible worlds,
by an absolutely free act, He decides to realize the actual world
with all the circumstances of its historic evolutions, with all the
graces which in fact have been and will be distributed until the end
of the world, and consequently with all the elect and all the
reprobate who God foresaw would be in it if de facto He created it.
Now in the Divine decree, according to Augustine, and according to
the Catholic Faith on this point, which has been formulated by him,
the two elements pointed out above appear:
+ The certain and gratuitous choice of the elect — God decreeing,
indeed, to create the world and to give it such a series of graces
with such a concatenation of circumstances as should bring about
freely, but infallibly, such and such results (for example, the
despair of Judas and the repentance of Peter), decides, at the same
time, the name, the place, the number of the citizens of the future
heavenly Jerusalem. The choice is immutable; the list closed. It is
evident, indeed, that only those of whom God knows beforehand that
they will wish to co-operate with the grace decreed by Him will be
saved. It is a gratuitous choice, the gift of gifts, in virtue of
which even our merits are a gratuitous benefit, a gift which
precedes all our merits. No one, in fact, is able to merit this
election. God could, among other possible worlds, have chosen one
in which other series of graces would have brought about other
results. He saw combinations in which Peter would have been
impenitent and Judas converted. It is therefore prior to any merit
of Peter, or any fault of Judas, that God decided to give them the
graces which saved Peter and not Judas. God does not wish to give
paradise gratuitously to any one; but He gives very gratuitously to
Peter the graces with which He knows Peter will be saved. —
Mysterious choice! Not that it interferes with liberty, but because
to this question: Why did not God, seeing that another grace would
have saved Judas, give it to him? Faith can only answer, with
Augustine: O Mystery! O Altitudo! (De Spiritu et litterâ, xxxiv, n.
60).
+ But this decree includes also the second element of the Catholic dogma: the very sincere will of God to give to all men the power of saving themselves and the power of damning themselves. According to Augustine, God, in his creative decree, has expressly excluded every order of things in which grace would deprive man of his liberty, every situation in which man would not have the power to resist sin, and thus Augustine brushes aside that predestinationism which has been attributed to him. Listen to him speaking to the Manichæans: "All can be saved if they wish"; and in his "Retractations" (I, x), far from correcting this assertion, he confirms it emphatically: "It is true, entirely true, that all men can, if they wish." But he always goes back to the providential preparation. In his sermons he says to all: "It depends on you to be elect" (In Ps. cxx, n. 11, etc.); "Who are the elect? You, if you wish it" (In Ps. Lxxiii, n. 5). But, you will say, according to Augustine, the lists of the elect and reprobate are closed. Now if the non-elect can gain heaven, if all the elect can be lost, why should not some pass from one list to the other? You forget the celebrated explanation of Augustine: When God made His plan, He knew infallibly, before His choice, what would be the response of the wills of men to His graces. If, then, the lists are definitive, if no one will pass from one series to the other, it is not because anyone cannot (on the contrary, all can), it is because God knew with infallible knowledge that no one would wish to. Thus I cannot effect that God should destine me to another series of graces than that which He has fixed, but, with this grace, if I do not save myself it will not be because I am not able, but because I do not wish to.
Such are the two essential elements of Augustinian and Catholic
predestination. This is the dogma common to all the schools, and
formulated by all theologians: predestination in its entirety is
absolutely gratuitous (ante merita). We have to insist on this,
because many have seen in this immutable and gratuitous choice only a
hard thesis peculiar to St. Augustine, whereas it is pure dogma
(barring the mode of conciliation, which the Church still leaves
free). With that established, the long debates of theologians on
special predestination to glory ante or post merita are far from
having the importance that some attach to them. (For a fuller
treatment of this subtile problem see the "Dict. de théol. cath., I,
coll. 2402 sqq.) I do not think St. Augustine entered that debate; in
his time, only dogma was in question. But it does not seem
historically permissible to maintain, as many writers have, that
Augustine first taught the milder system (post merita), up to the
year 416 (In Joan. evang., tract. xii, n. 12) and that afterwards,
towards 418, he shifted his ground and went to the extreme of harsh
assertion, amounting even to predestinationism. We repeat, the facts
absolutely refute this view. The ancient texts, even of 397, are as
affirmative and as categorical as those of his last years, as critics
like Loofs and Reuter have shown. If, therefore, it is shown that at
that time he inclined to the milder opinion, there is no reason to
think that he did not persevere in that sentiment.
(5) The part which Augustine had in the doctrine of Original Sin has
been brought to light and determined only recently.
In the first place, It is no longer possible to maintain seriously,
as was formerly the fashion (even among certain Catholics, like
Richard Simon), that Augustine invented in the Church the hitherto
unknown doctrine of original sin, or at least was the first to
introduce the idea of punishment and sin. Dorner himself (Augustinus,
p. 146) disposed of this assertion, which lacks verisimilitude. In
this doctrine of the primal fall Augustine distinguished, with
greater insistency and clearness than his predecessors, the
punishment and the sin — the chastisement which strips the children
of Adam of all the original privileges — and the fault, which
consists in this, that the crime of Adam, the cause of the fall is,
without having been committed personally by his children,
nevertheless in a certain measure imputed to them, in virtue of the
moral union established by God between the head of the human family
and his descendants.
To pretend that in this matter Augustine was an innovator, and that
before him the Fathers affirmed the punishment of the sin of Adam in
his sons, but did not speak of the fault, is a historical error now
proved to demonstration. We may discuss the thought of this or that
pre Augustinian Father, but, taking them as a whole, there is no room
for doubt. The Protestant R. Seeberg (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte,
I, p. 256), after the example of many others, proclaims it by
referring to Tertullian, Commodian, St. Cyprian, and St. Ambrose. The
expressions, fault, sin, stain (culpa, peccatum, macula) are repeated
in a way to dispel all doubt. The truth is that original sin, while
being sin, is of a nature essentially different from other faults,
and does not exact a personal act of the will of the children of Adam
in order to be responsible for the fault of their father, which is
morally imputed to them. Consequently, the Fathers — the Greeks
especially — have insisted on its penal and afflictive character,
which is most in evidence, while Augustine was led by the polemics of
the Pelagians (and only by them) to lay emphasis on the moral aspect
of the fault of the human race in its first father.
With regard to Adam's state before the fall Augustine not only
affirmed, against Pelagius, the gifts of immortality, impassibility,
integrity, freedom from error, and, above all, the sanctifying grace
of Divine adoption, but he emphasized its absolutely gratuitous and
supernatural character. Doubtless, considering the matter
historically and de facto, it was only the sin of Adam that inflicted
death on us — Augustine repeats it again and again — because God
had safeguarded us against the law of our nature. But de jure neither
immortality nor the other graces were our due, and Augustine
recognized this in affirming that God could have made the condition
in which we were actually born the primitive condition of our first
parents. That assertion alone is the very reverse of Jansenism. It
is, moreover, formally confirmed in the "Retractations" (I, ix, n.
6).
(6) Does this mean that we must praise everything in St. Augustine's
explanation of grace? Certainly not. And we shall note the
improvements made by the Church, through her doctors, in the original
Augustinism. Some exaggerations have been abandoned, as, for
instance, the condemnation to hell of children dying without baptism.
Obscure and ambiguous formulæ have been eliminated. We must say
frankly that Augustine's literary method of emphasizing his thought
by exaggerated expressions, issuing in troublesome paradoxes, has
often obscured his doctrine, aroused opposition in many minds, or led
them into error. Also, it is above all important, in order to
comprehend his doctrine, to compile an Augustinian dictionary, not a
priori, but after an objective study of his texts. The work would be
long and laborious, but how many prejudices it would dispel!
The Protestant historian Ph. Schaff (St. Augustine, p. 102) writes:
"The great genius of the African Church, from whom the Middle Ages
and the Reformation have received an impulse alike powerful, though
in different directions, has not yet fulfilled the work marked out
for him in the counsels of Divine Wisdom. He serves as a bond of
union between the two antagonistic sections of Western Christendom,
and encourages the hope that a time may come when the injustice and
bitterness of strife will be forgiven and forgotten, and the discords
of the past be drowned forever in the sweet harmonies of perfect
knowledge and perfect love." May this dream be realized!
III. AUGUSTINISM IN HISTORY
The influence of the Doctor of Hippo has been so exceptional in the
Church, that, after having indicated its general characteristics (see
above), it is proper to indicate the principal phases of the
historical development of his doctrine. The word Augustinism
designates at times the entire group of philosophical doctrines of
Augustine, at others, it is restricted to his system of grace. Hence,
(1) philosophical Augustinism; (2) theological Augustinism on grace;
(3) laws which governed the mitigation of Augustinism.
(1) Philosophical Augustinism
In the history of philosophical Augustinism we may distinguish three
very distinct phases. First, the period of its almost exclusive
triumph in the West, up to the thirteenth century. During the long
ages which were darkened by the invasion of the barbarians, but which
were nevertheless burdened with the responsibility of safeguarding
the sciences of the future, we may say that Augustine was the Great
Master of the West. He was absolutely without a rival, or if there
was one, it was one of his disciples, Gregory the Great, who, after
being formed in his school, popularized his theories. The rôle of
Origen, who engrafted neo-Platonism on the Christian schools of the
East, was that of Augustine in the West, with the difference,
however, that the Bishop of Hippo was better able to detach the
truths of Platonism from the dreams of Oriental imagination. Hence, a
current of Platonic ideas was started which will never cease to act
upon Western thought. This influence shows itself in various ways. It
is found in the compilers of this period, who are so numerous and so
well deserving of recognition — such as Isidore, Bede, Alcuin — who
drew abundantly from the works of Augustine, just as did the
preachers of the sixth century, and notably St. Cæsarius. In the
controversies, especially in the great disputes of the ninth and
twelfth centuries on the validity of Simoniacal ordinations, the text
of Augustine plays the principal part. Carl Mirbt has published on
this point a very interesting study: "Die Stellung Augustins in der
Publizistik des gregorianischen Kirchenstreits" (Leipzig, 1888). In
the pre-Thomistic period of Scholasticism, then in process of
formation, namely, from Anselm to Albert the Great, Augustine is the
great inspirer of all the masters, such as Anselm, Abelard, Hugo of
St. Victor, who is called by his contemporaries, another Augustine,
or even the soul of Augustine. And it is proper to remark, with
Cunningham (Saint Austin, p. 178), that from the time of Anselm the
cult of Augustinian ideas exercised an enormous influence on English
thought in the Middle Ages. As regards Peter Lombard, his Sentences
are little else than an effort to synthesize the Augustinian
theories.
While they do not form a system as rigidly bound together as Thomism,
yet Father Mandonnet (in his learned study of Siger de Brabant) and
M. de Wulf (on Gilles de Lessines) have been able to group these
theories together. And here let us present a summary sketch of those
theses regarded in the thirteenth century as Augustinian, and over
which the battle was fought. First, the fusion of theology and
philosophy; the preference given to Plato over Aristotle — the
latter representing rationalism, which was mistrusted, whilst the
idealism of Plate exerted a strong attraction — wisdom regarded
rather as the philosophy of the Good than the philosophy of the True.
As a consequence, the disciples of Augustine always have a pronounced
tinge of mysticism, while the disciples of St. Thomas may be
recognized by their very accentuated intellectualism. In psychology
the illuminating and immediate action of God is the origin of our
intellectual knowledge (at times it is pure ontologism); and the
faculties of the soul are made substantially identical with the soul
itself. They are its functions, and not distinct entities (a thesis
which was to keep its own partisans in the Scholasticism of the
future and to be adopted by Descartes); the soul is a substance even
without the body, so that after death, it is truly a person. In
cosmology, besides the celebrated thesis of rationes seminales, which
some have recently attempted to interpret in favour of evolutionism,
Augustinism admitted the multiplicity of substantial forms in
compound beings, especially in man. But especially in the
impossibility of creation ab æterno, or the essentially temporal
character of every creature which is subject to change, we have one
of the ideas of Augustine which his disciples defended with greater
constancy and, it would appear, with greater success.
A second period of very active struggles came in the thirteenth
century, and this has only lately been recognized. Renan (Averroes,
p. 259) and others believed that the war against Thomism, which was
just then beginning, was caused by the infatuation of the Franciscans
for Averroism; but if the Franciscan Order showed itself on the whole
opposed to St. Thomas, it was simply from a certain horror at
philosophical innovations and at the neglect of Augustinism. The
doctrinal revolution brought about by Albert the Great and Thomas
Aquinas in favour of Aristotle startled the old School of Augustinism
among the Dominicans as well as among the Franciscans, but especially
among the latter, who were the disciples of the eminent Augustinian
doctor, St. Bonaventure. This will explain the condemnations,
hitherto little understood, of many propositions of St. Thomas
Aquinas three years after his death, on the 7th of March, 1277, by
the Bishop of Paris, and on the 18th of March, 1277, by the
Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, a Dominican. The
Augustinian school represented tradition; Thomism, progress. The
censure of 1277 was the last victory of a too rigid Augustinism. The
happy fusion of the two methods in the two orders of Franciscans and
Dominicans little by little brought about an agreement on certain
points without excluding differences on others which were yet obscure
(as, for instance, the unity or the multiplicity of forms), at the
same time that it made for progress in all the schools. We know that
the canonization of St. Thomas caused the withdrawal of the
condemnations of Paris (14 February, 1325). Moreover, the wisdom or
the moderation of the new school contributed powerfully to its
triumph. Albert the Great and St. Thomas, far from being adversaries
of St. Augustine, as they were reported to be, placed themselves in
his school, and while modifying certain theories, took over into
their system the doctrine of the African bishop. How many articles in
the "Summa" of St. Thomas have no other object than to incorporate in
theology this or the other theory which was cherished by St.
Augustine (to take only one example, that of exemplar ideas in God).
Hence, there was no longer any school strictly Augustinian, because
every school was such. They all eliminated certain special points and
retained the same veneration for the master.
From the third period of the fifteenth century to our days we see
less of the special progress of philosophical Augustinism than
certain tendencies of an exaggerated revival of Platonism. In the
fifteenth century Bessarion (1472) and Marsilio Ficino (1499) used
Augustine's name for the purpose of enthroning Plate in the Church
and excluding Aristotle. In the seventeenth century it is impossible
to deny certain resemblances between Cartesianism and the philosophy
of St. Augustine. Malebranche was wrong in ascribing his own
ontologism to the great Doctor, as were also many of his successors
in the nineteenth century.
(2) Theological Augustinism
The history of Augustine's system of grace seems to blend almost
indistinguishably with the progressive developments of this dogma.
Here it must suffice, first, to enumerate the principal phases;
secondly, to trace the general laws of development which mitigated
Augustinism in the Church.
After the death of Augustine, a whole century of fierce contests
(430-529) ended in the triumph of fierce contests (430-529) ended in
the triumph of moderate Augustinism. In vain had Pope St. Celestine
(431) sanctioned the teachings of the Doctor of Hippo. The
Semipelagians of the south of France could not understand the
predilection of God for the elect, and in order to attack the works
of St. Augustine they made use of the occasionally exaggerated
formulæ of St. Fulgentius, or of the real errors of certain isolated
predestinationists, as, for example, Lucidus, who was condemned in
the Council of Arles (475). Happily, Prosper of Aquitaine, by his
moderation, and also the unknown author of "De Vocatione omnium
gentium," by his consoling thesis on the appeal addressed to all,
opened the way to an agreement. And finally, St. Cæsarius of Arles
obtained from Pope Felix IV a series of Capitula which were solemnly
promulgated at Orange, and gave their consecration to the triumph of
Augustinism (529). In the ninth century, a new victory was gained
over the predestinationism of Gottschalk in the assemblies of
Savonnières and Toucy (859-860). The doctrine of the Divine will to
save all men and the universality of redemption was thus consecrated
by the public teaching of the Church. In the Middle Ages these two
truths are developed by the great Doctors of the Church. Faithful to
the principles of Augustinism, they place in especial relief his
theory on Divine Providence, which prepares at its pleasure the
determinations of the will by exterior events and interior
inspirations.
In the fourteenth century a strong current of predestinationism is
evident. Today it is admitted that the origin of this tendency goes
back to Thomas Bradwardin, a celebrated professor of Oxford, who died
Archbishop of Canterbury (1349), and whom the best critics, along
with Loofs and Harnack, recognize to have been the inspirer of Wyclif
himself. His book "De causâ Dei contra Pelagium" gave rise in Paris
to disputes on Augustinian "predetermination," a word which, it had
been thought, was invented by Banes in the sixteenth century. In
spite of the opposition of theologians, the idea of absolute
determinism in the name of St. Augustine was adopted by Wyclif
(1324-87), who formulated his universal fatalism, the necessity of
good for the elect and of evil for the rest. He fancied that he found
in the Augustinian doctrine the strange conception which became for
him a central doctrine that overthrew all morality and all
ecclesiastical, and even civil, government. According as one is
predestined or not, everything changes its nature. The same sins are
mortal in the non-elect which are venial in the predestined. The same
acts of virtue are meritorious predestined, even if he be actually a
wicked man which are of no value in the non-elect. The sacraments
administered by one who is not predestined are always invalid; more
than that, no jurisdiction exists in a prelate, even a pope, if he be
not predestined. In the same way, there is no power, even civil or
political, in a prince who is not one of the elect, and no right of
property in the sinner or the non elect. Such is the basis on which
Wyclif established the communism which aroused the socialist mobs in
England. It is incontestable that he was fond of quoting Augustine as
his authority; and his disciples, as we are assured by Thomas Netter
Waldensis (Doctrinale, I, xxxiv, § 5), were continually boasting of
the profound knowledge of their great Doctor, whom they called with
emphasis "John of Augustine," Shirley, in his introduction to
"Zizaniorum Fasciculi," has even pretended that the theories of
Wyclif on God, on the Incarnation, and even on property, were the
purest Augustinian inspiration, but even a superficial comparison, if
this were the place to make it, would show how baseless such an
assertion is. In the sixteenth century the heritage of Wyclif and
Hus, his disciple, was always accepted in the name of Augustinism by
the leaders of the Reformation. Divine predestination from all
eternity separating the elect, who were to be snatched out of the
mass of perdition, from the reprobate who were destined to hell, as
well as the irresistible impulse of God drawing some to salvation and
others to sin — such was the fundamental doctrine of the
Reformation. Calvinism even adopted a system which was "logically
more consistent, but practically more revolting," as Schaff puts it
(St. Augustine, p. 104), by which the decree of reprobation of the
non-elect would be independent of the fall of Adam and of original
sin (Supralapsarianism). It was certain that these harsh doctrines
would bring their reaction, and in spite of the severities of the
Synod of Dordrecht, which it would be interesting to compare with the
Council of Trent in the matter of moderation, Arminianism triumphed
over the Calvinistic thesis.
We must note here that even Protestant critics, with a loyalty which
does them honour, have in these latter times vindicated Augustine
from the false interpretations of Calvin. Dorner, in his "Gesch. der
prot. Théologie," had already shown the instinctive repugnance of
Anglican theologians to the horrible theories of Calvin. W.
Cunningham (Saint Austin, p. 82 sqq.) has very frankly called
attention to the complete doctrinal opposition on fundamental points
which exists between the Doctor of Hippo and the French Reformers. In
the first place, as regards the state of human nature, which is,
according to Calvin, totally depraved, for Catholics it is very
difficult to grasp the Protestant conception of original sin which,
for Calvin and Luther, is not, as for us, the moral degradation and
the stain imprinted on the soul of every son of Adam by the fault of
the father which is imputable to each member of the family. It is not
the deprivation of grace and of all other super-natural gifts; it is
not even concupiscence, understood in the ordinary sense of the word,
as the struggle of base and selfish instincts against the virtuous
tendencies of the soul; it is a profound and complete subversion of
human nature' it is the physical alteration of the very substance of
our soul. Our faculties, understanding, and will, if not entirely
destroyed, are at least mutilated, powerless, and chained to evil.
For the Reformers, original sin is not a sin, it is the sin, and the
permanent sin, living in us and causing a continual stream of new
sins to spring from our nature, which is radically corrupt and evil.
For, as our being is evil, every act of ours is equally evil. Thus,
the Protestant theologians do not ordinarily speak of the sins of
mankind, but only of the sin, which makes us what we are and defiles
everything. Hence arose the paradox of Luther: that even in an act of
perfect charity a man sins mortally, because he acts with a vitiated
nature. Hence that other paradox: that this sin can never be effaced,
but remains entire, even after justification, although it will not be
any longer imputed; to efface it, it would be necessary to modify
physically this human being which is sin. Calvin, without going so
far as Luther, has nevertheless insisted on this total corruption.
"Let it stand, therefore, as an indubitable truth which no engines
can shake," says he (Institution II, v, § 19), "that the mind of man
is so entirely alienated from the righteousness of God that he cannot
conceive, desire, or design anything but what is weak, distorted,
foul, impure or iniquitous, that his heart is so thoroughly environed
by sin that it can breathe out nothing but corruption and rottenness;
that if some men occasionally make a show of goodness their mind is
ever interwoven with hypocrisy and deceit, their soul inwardly bound
with the fetters of wickedness." "Now," says Cunningham, "this
doctrine, whatever there may be to be said for it, is not the
doctrine of Saint Austin. He held that sin is the defect of a good
nature which retains elements of goodness, even in its most diseased
and corrupted state, and he gives no countenance, whatever to this
modern opinion of total depravity." It is the same with Calvin's
affirmation of the irresistible action of God on the will. Cunningham
shows that these doctrines are irreconcilable with liberty and
responsibility, whereas, on the contrary, "St. Austin is careful to
attempt to harmonize the belief in God's omnipotence with human
responsibility" (St. Austin, p. 86). The Council of Trent was
therefore faithful to the true spirit of the African Doctor, and
maintained pure Augustinism in the bosom of the Church, by Its
definitions against the two opposite excesses. Against Pelagianism it
reaffirmed original sin and the absolute necessity of grace (Sess.
VI, can. 2); against Protestant predestinationism it proclaimed the
freedom of man, with his double power of resisting grace (posse
dissentire si velit — Sess. VI, can. 4) and of doing good or evil,
even before embracing the Faith (can. 6 and 7).
In the seventeenth century Jansenism adopted, while modifying it, the
Protestant conception of original sin and the state of fallen man. No
more than Luther did the Jansenists admit the two orders, natural and
supernatural. All the gifts which Adam had received immortality,
knowledge, integrity, sanctifying grace — are absolutely required by
the nature of man. Original sin is, therefore, again regarded as a
profound alteration of human nature. From which the Jansenists
conclude that the key to St. Augustine's system is to be found in the
essential difference of the Divine government and of grace, before
and after the Fall of Adam. Before the Fall Adam enjoyed complete
liberty, and grace gave him the power of resisting or obeying; after
the Fall there was no longer in men liberty properly so called; there
was only spontaneity (libertas a coactione, and not libertas a
necessitate). Grace, or delectation in the good, is essentially
efficacious, and necessarily victorious once it is superior in degree
to the opposite concupiscence. The struggle, which was prolonged for
two centuries, led to a more profound study of the Doctor of Hippo
and prepared the way for the definite triumph of Augustinism, but of
an Augustinism mitigated in accordance with laws which we must now
indicate.
(3) Laws which governed the mitigation of Augustinism
In spite of what Protestant critics may have said, the Church has
always been faithful to the fundamental principles defended by
Augustine against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, on original sin,
the necessity and gratuity of grace, the absolute dependence on God
for salvation. Nevertheless, great progress was made along the line
of gradual mitigation. For it cannot be denied that the doctrine
formulated at Trent, and taught by all our theologians, produces an
impression of greater suavity and greater clarity than this or that
passage in the works of St. Augustine. The causes of this softening
down, and the successive phases of this progress were as follows:
+ First, theologians began to distinguish more clearly between the
natural order and the supernatural, and hence the Fall of Adam no
longer appeared as a corruption of human nature in its constituent
parts; it is the loss of the whole order of supernatural elevation.
St. Thomas (Summa, I:85:1) formulates the great law of the
preservation, in guilty Adam's children, of all the faculties in
their essential integrity: "Sin (even original) neither takes away
nor diminishes the natural endowments." Thus the most rigorist
Thomists, Alvarez, Lemos, Contenson, agree with the great Doctor
that the sin of Adam has not enfeebled (intrinsece) the natural
moral forces of humanity.
+ Secondly, such consoling and fundamental truths as God's desire to
save all men, and the redeeming death of Christ which was really
offered and accepted for all peoples and all individuals — these
truths, which Augustine never denied, but which he left too much in
the background and as it were hidden under the terrible formulas of
the doctrine of predestination, have been placed in the full light,
have been developed, and applied to infidel nations, and have at
last entered into the ordinary teaching of theology. Thus our
Doctors, without detracting in the least from the sovereignty and
justice of God, have risen to the highest idea of His goodness:
that God so sincerely desires the salvation of all as to give
absolutely to all, immediately or mediately, the means necessary
for salvation, and always with the desire that man should consent
to employ those means. No one falls into hell except by his own
fault. Even infidels will be accountable for their infidelity. St.
Thomas expresses the thought of all when he says: "It is the common
teaching that if a man born among the barbarous and infidel nations
really does what lies in his power, God will reveal to him what is
necessary for salvation, either by interior inspirations or by
sending him a preacher of the Faith" (In Lib. II Sententiarum,
dist. 23, Q. viii,a.4,ad 4am). We must not dissemble the fact that
this law changes the whole aspect of Divine Providence, and that
St. Augustine had left it too much in the shade, insisting only
upon the other aspect of the problem: namely, that God, while
making a sufficing appeal to all, is nevertheless not bound to
choose always that appeal which shall in fact be efficacious and
shall be accepted, provided that the refusal of consent be due to
the obstinacy of the sinner's will and not to its lack of power.
Thus the Doctors most eagerly approved the axiom, Facienti quod in
se est Deus non denegat gratiam — God does not refuse grace to one
who does what he can.
+ Thirdly, from principles taught by Augustine consequences have been
drawn which are clearly derived from them, but which he had not
pointed out. Thus it is incontestably a principle of St. Augustine
that no one sins in an act which he cannot avoid — "Quis enim
peccat in eo quod caveri non potest?" This passage from "De libero
arbitrio" (III, xviii, n. 50) is anterior to the year 395; but far
from retracting it he approves and explains it, in 415, in the "De
naturâ et gratiâ," lxvii, n. 80. From that pregnant principle
theologians have concluded, first, that grace sufficient to conquer
temptations never fails anyone, even an infidel; then, against the
Jansenists, they have added that, to deserve its name of sufficient
grace, it ought to give a real power which is complete even
relatively to the actual difficulties. No doubt theologians have
groped about, hesitated, even denied; but today there are very few
who would dare not to recognize in St. Augustine the affirmation of
the possibility of not sinning.
+ Fourthly, certain secondary assertions, which encumbered, but did
not make part of the dogma, have been lopped off from the doctrine
of Augustine. Thus the Church, which, with Augustine, has always
denied entrance into Heaven to unbaptized children, has not adopted
the severity of the great Doctor in condemning such children to
bodily pains, however slight. And little by little the milder
teaching of St. Thomas was to prevail in theology and was even to
be vindicated against unjust censure when Pius VI condemned the
pseudo-synod of Pistoja. At last Augustine's obscure formulæ were
abandoned or corrected, so as to avoid regrettable confusions. Thus
the expressions which seemed to identify original sin with
concupiscence have given way to clearer formulæ without departing
from the real meaning which Augustine sought to express.
Discussion, however, is not yet ended within the Church. On most of
those points which concern especially the manner of the Divine action
Thomists and Molinists disagree, the former holding out for an
irresistible predetermination, the latter maintaining, with
Augustine, a grace whose infallible efficacy is revealed by the
Divine knowledge. But both of these views affirm the grace of God and
the liberty of man. The lively controversies aroused by the
"Concordia" of Molina (1588) and the long conferences de auxiliis
held at Rome, before Popes Clement VIII and Paul V, are well known.
There is no doubt that a majority of the theologian-consultors
thought they discovered an opposition between Molina and St.
Augustine. But their verdict was not approved, and (what is of great
importance in the history of Augustinism) it is certain that they
asked for the condemnation of doctrines which are today universally
taught in all the schools. Thus, in the project of censure reproduced
by Serry ("Historia Congregationis de Auxiliis," append., p. 166) the
first proposition is this: "In statu naturæ lapsæ potest homo, cum
solo concursu generali Dei, efficere opus bonum morale, quod in
ordine ad finem hominis naturalem sit veræ virtutis opus, referendo
illud in Deum, sicut referri potest ac deberet in statu naturali" (In
the state of fallen nature man can with only the general concursus of
God do a good moral work which may be a work of true virtue with
regard to the natural end of man by referring it to God, as it can
and ought to be referred in the natural state). Thus they sought to
condemn the doctrine held by all the Scholastics (with the exception
of Gregory of Rimini), and sanctioned since then by the condemnation
of Proposition lvii of Baius. For a long time it was said that the
pope had prepared a Bull to condemn Molina; but today we learn from
an autograph document of Paul V that liberty was left to the two
schools until a new Apostolic decision was given (Schneeman
"Controversiarum de Div. grat.," 1881, p. 289). Soon after, a third
interpretation of Augustinism was offered in the Church, that of
Noris, Belleli, and other partisans of moral predetermination. This
system has been called Augustinianism. To this school belong a number
of theologians who, with Thomassin, essayed to explain the infallible
action of grace without admitting either the scientia media of the
Molinists or the physical predetermination of the Thomists. A
detailed study of this interpretation of St. Augustine may be found
in Vacant's "Dictionnaire de théologie catholique," I, cols.
2485-2501; here I can only mention one very important document, the
last in which the Holy See has expressed its mind on the various
theories of theologians for reconciling grace and liberty. This is
the Brief of Benedict XIV (13 July, 1748) which declares that the
three schools — Thomist, Augustinian (Noris), and Molinist — have
full right to defend their theories. The Brief concludes with these
words: "This Apostolic See favours the liberty of the schools; none
of the systems proposed to reconcile the liberty of man with the
omnipotence of God has been thus far condemned (op. cit., co1. 2555).
In conclusion we must indicate briefly the official authority which
the Church attributes to St. Augustine in the questions of grace.
Numerous and solemn are the eulogies of St. Augustine's doctrine
pronounced by the popes. For instance, St. Gelasius I (1 November,
493), St. Hormisdas (13 August, 520), Boniface II and the Fathers of
Orange (529), John II (534), and many others. But the most important
document, that which ought to serve to interpret all the others,
because it precedes and inspires them, is the celebrated letter of
St. Celestine I (431), in which the pope guarantees not only the
orthodoxy of Augustine against his detractors, but also the great
merit of his doctrine: "So great was his knowledge that my
predecessors have always placed him in the rank of the masters," etc.
This letter is accompanied by a series of ten dogmatic capitula the
origin of which is uncertain, but which have always been regarded, at
least since Pope Hormisdas, as expressing the faith of the Church.
Now these extracts from African councils and pontifical decisions end
with this restriction: "As to the questions which are more profound
and difficult, and which have given rise to these controversies, we
do not think it necessary to impose the solution of them." — In
presence of these documents emanating from so high a source, ought we
to say that the Church has adopted all the teaching of St. Augustine
on grace so that it is never permissible to depart from that
teaching? Three answers have been given:
+ For some, the authority of St. Augustine is absolute and
irrefragable. The Jansenists went so far as to formulate, with
Havermans, this proposition, condemned by Alexander VIII (7
December, 1690): "Ubi quis invenerit doctrinam in Augustino clare
fundatam, illam absolute potest tenere et docere, non respiciendo
ad ullam pontificis bullam" (Where one has found a doctrine clearly
based on St. Augustine, he can hold and teach it absolutely without
referring to any pontifical Bull). This is inadmissible. None of
the pontifical approbations has a meaning so absolute, and the
capitula make an express reservation for the profound and difficult
questions. The popes themselves have permitted a departure from the
thought of St. Augustine in the matter of the lot of children dying
without baptism (Bull "Auctorem Fidei," 28 August, 1794).
+ Others again have concluded that the eulogies in question are
merely vague formulæ leaving full liberty to withdraw from St.
Augustine and to blame him on every point. Thus Launoy, Richard
Simon, and others have maintained that Augustine had been in error
on the very gist of the problem, and had really taught
predestinationism. But that would imply that for fifteen centuries
the Church took as its guide an adversary of its faith.
+ We must conclude, with the greater number of theologians, that
Augustine has a real normative authority, hedged about, however,
with reserves and wise limitations. In the capital questions which
constitute the faith of the Church in those matters the Doctor of
Hippo is truly the authoritative witness of tradition; for example,
on the existence of original sin, the necessity of grace, at least
for every salutary act; the gratuitousness of the gift of God which
precedes all merit of man because it is the cause of it; the
predilection for the elect and, on the other hand, the liberty of
man and his responsibility for his transgressions. But the
secondary problems, concerning the mode rather than the fact, are
left by the Church to the prudent study of theologians. Thus all
schools unite in a great respect for the assertions of St.
Augustine.
At present this attitude of fidelity and respect is all the more
remarkable as Protestants, who were formerly so bitter in defending
the predestination of Calvin, are today almost unanimous in rejecting
what they themselves call "the boldest defiance ever given to reason
and conscience" (Grétillat, "Dogmatique," III, p. 329).
Schleiermacher, it is true, maintains it, but he adds to it the
Origenist theory of universal salvation by the final restoration of
all creatures, and he is followed in this by Farrar Lobstein,
Pfister, and others. The Calvinist dogma is today, especially in
England, altogether abandoned, and often replaced by pure Pelagianism
(Beyschlag). But among Protestant critics the best are drawing near
to the Catholic interpretation of St. Augustine, as, for example,
Grétillat, in Switzerland, and Stevens, Bruce, and Mozley (On the
Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination), in England. Sanday (Romans,
p. 50) also declares the mystery to be unfathomable for man yet
solved by God: "And so our solution of the problem of Free-will, and
of the problems of history and of individual salvation, must finally
lie in the full acceptance and realization of what is implied by the
infinity and the omniscience of God." These concluding words recall
the true system of Augustine and permit us to hope that at least on
this question there may be a union of the two Churches in a wise
Augustinism.
EUGÈNE PORTALIÉ