Chaucer's Works (ed. Skeat) Vol. II/Boethius Book V
BOOK V.
Prose I.
Dixerat, orationisque cursum.
She hadde seyd, and torned the cours of hir resoun to some
othre thinges to ben treted and to ben y-sped. Thanne seyde I,
'Certes, rightful is thyn amonestinge and ful digne by auctoritee.
But that thou seidest whylom, that the questioun of the divyne
purviaunce is enlaced with many other questiouns, I understonde 5
wel and proeve it by the same thing. But I axe yif that thou
wenest that hap be any thing in any weys; and, yif thou wenest
that hap be anything, what is it?'
Thanne quod she, 'I haste me to yilden and assoilen to thee
the dette of my bihest, and to shewen and opnen the wey, by 10
which wey thou mayst come ayein to thy contree. But al-be-it
so that the thinges which that thou axest ben right profitable to
knowe, yit ben they diverse somwhat fro the path of my purpos;
and it is to douten that thou ne be maked wery by mis-weyes, so
that thou ne mayst nat suffyce to mesuren the right wey.' 15
'Ne doute thee ther-of nothing,' quod I. 'For, for to knowen
thilke thinges to-gedere, in the whiche thinges I delyte me greetly,
that shal ben to me in stede of reste; sin it is nat to douten of
the thinges folwinge, whan every syde of thy disputacioun shal han
be stedefast to me by undoutous feith.' 20
Thanne seyde she, 'That manere wol I don thee'; and bigan
to speken right thus. 'Certes,' quod she, 'yif any wight diffinisshe
hap in this manere, that is to seyn, that "hap is bitydinge
y-brought forth by foolish moevinge and by no knettinge of
causes," I conferme that hap nis right naught in no wyse; and I 25
deme al-outrely that hap nis, ne dwelleth but a voice, as who seith,
but an ydel word, with-outen any significacioun of thing submitted
to that vois. For what place mighte ben left, or dwellinge,
to folye and to disordenaunce, sin that god ledeth and constreineth
alle thinges by ordre? For this sentence is verray and 30
sooth, that "nothing ne hath his beinge of naught"; to the
whiche sentence none of thise olde folk ne withseyde never; al-be-it
so that they ne understoden ne meneden it naught by god,
prince and beginnere of werkinge, but they casten [it] as a manere
foundement of subiect material, that is to seyn, of the nature of 35
alle resoun. And yif that any thing is woxen or comen of no
causes, than shal it seme that thilke thing is comen or woxen of
naught; but yif this ne may nat ben don, thanne is it nat possible,
that hap be any swich thing as I have diffinisshed a litel heer-biforn.'
'How shal it thanne be?' quod I. 'Nis ther thanne no-thing 40
that by right may be cleped either "hap" or elles "aventure of
fortune"; or is ther aught, al-be-it so that it is hid fro the peple,
to which these wordes ben covenable?'
'Myn Aristotulis,' quod she, 'in the book of his Phisik, diffinissheth
this thing by short resoun, and neigh to the sothe.' 45
'In which manere?' quod I.
'As ofte,' quod she, 'as men doon any thing for grace of any
other thing, and an-other thing than thilke thing that men
entenden to don bitydeth by some causes, it is cleped "hap."
Right as a man dalf the erthe by cause of tilyinge of the feeld, 50
and founde ther a gobet of gold bidolven, thanne wenen folk that
it is bifalle by fortunous bitydinge. But, for sothe, it nis nat of
naught, for it hath his propre causes; of whiche causes the cours
unforeseyn and unwar semeth to han maked hap. For yif the
tilyere of the feld ne dolve nat in the erthe, and yif the hyder of 55
the gold ne hadde hid the gold in thilke place, the gold ne hadde
nat been founde. Thise ben thanne the causes of the abregginge
of fortuit hap, the which abregginge of fortuit hap comth of causes
encountringe and flowinge to-gidere to hem-self, and nat by the
entencioun of the doer. For neither the hyder of the gold ne the 60
delver of the feeld ne understoden nat that the gold sholde han
ben founde; but, as I sayde, it bitidde and ran to-gidere that he
dalf ther-as that other hadde hid the gold. Now may I thus
diffinisshe "hap." Hap is an unwar bitydinge of causes assembled
in thinges that ben don for som other thing. But thilke ordre, 65
procedinge by an uneschuable bindinge to-gidere, which that
descendeth fro the welle of purviaunce that ordeineth alle thinges
in hir places and in hir tymes, maketh that the causes rennen and
assemblen to-gidere.
Pr. I. 1. C. by cours (wrongly); A. Ed. the cours. 4. C. whilom; A. som tyme. // the (2)] C. thy. 8. A. any (for any thing). // C. it is; A. Ed. is it. 9. C. Ed. to the; A. the to the; Cax. to the the (= to thee the). 13. C. and yit; A. Ed. om. and. 19. A. disputisoun. 19, 20. C. han be; Ed. haue ben; A. be. 22, 23. C. deffenysshe; but diffinysshed in 39. // C. glosses bitydinge by i. euentum. 24. A. knyttyng. 31. A. om. the. 33. C. -stondyn; A. -stoden. // C. meneden or meueden; A. moeueden (not in the Latin text). 34. I supply it. 35. A. om. the. 38. C. om. yif (Lat. quod si). 43. C. convenable. 50. C. to tylyinge; A. of tylienge. 52. A. fallen. 53. C. of nawht (de nihilo); A. for nauȝt. 55. C. of the feld (agri); A. in the erthe. // C. in the erthe (humum); A. in the felde. 57. A. abreggynge; C. abriggynge (but abreggynge 2nd time). 58. A. fortune (!), for fortuit; twice. 66. A. vneschewable.
Metre I.
Rupis Achemenie scopulis, ubi uersa sequentum.
Tigris and Eufrates resolven and springen of oo welle, in the
cragges of the roche of the contree of Achemenie, ther-as the
fleinge bataile ficcheth hir dartes, retorned in the brestes of hem
that folwen hem. And sone after tho same riveres, Tigris and
Eufrates, unioinen and departen hir wateres. And yif they comen 5
to-gideres, and ben assembled and cleped to-gidere into o cours,
thanne moten thilke thinges fleten to-gidere which that the water
of the entrechaunginge flood bringeth. The shippes and the
stokkes arraced with the flood moten assemblen; and the wateres
y-medled wrappeth or implyeth many fortunel happes or maneres; 10
the whiche wandringe happes, natheles, thilke declyninge lownesse
of the erthe and the flowinge ordre of the slydinge water governeth.
Right so Fortune, that semeth as that it fleteth with slaked or
ungovernede brydles, it suffereth brydles, that is to seyn, to be
governed, and passeth by thilke lawe, that is to seyn, by thilke 15
divyne ordenaunce.'
Me. I. 1. A. om. and after Tigris. 3. A. om. bataile. 8. C. entrechaungynge, glossed i. alterni. 10. A. fortuned. 11. C. declynynge, glossed decliuitas. 13. A. om. that (2). 15. thilke] A. the.
Prose II.
Animaduerto, inquam.
'This understonde I wel,' quod I, 'and I acorde wel that it is
right as thou seyst. But I axe yif ther be any libertee of free wil
in this ordre of causes that clyven thus to-gidere in hem-self; or
elles I wolde witen yif that the destinal cheyne constreineth the
movinges of the corages of men?' 5
'Yis,' quod she; 'ther is libertee of free wil. Ne ther ne was
nevere no nature of resoun that it ne hadde libertee of free wil.
For every thing that may naturely usen resoun, it hath doom by
which it decerneth and demeth every thing; thanne knoweth it,
by it-self, thinges that ben to fleen and thinges that ben to desiren. 10
And thilke thing that any wight demeth to ben desired, that axeth
or desireth he; and fleeth thilke thing that he troweth ben to
fleen. Wherfore in alle thinges that resoun is, in hem also is
libertee of willinge and of nillinge. But I ne ordeyne nat, as who
seyth, I ne graunte nat, that this libertee be evene-lyk in alle 15
thinges. Forwhy in the sovereines devynes substaunces, that is
to seyn, in spirits, Iugement is more cleer, and wil nat y-corumped,
and might redy to speden thinges that ben desired. But the
soules of men moten nedes be more free whan they loken hem in
the speculacioun or lokinge of the devyne thought, and lasse free 20
whan they slyden in-to the bodies; and yit lasse free whan they
ben gadered to-gidere and comprehended in erthely membres.
But the laste servage is whan that they ben yeven to vyces, and
han y-falle from the possessioun of hir propre resoun. For after
that they han cast awey hir eyen fro the light of the sovereyn 25
soothfastnesse to lowe thinges and derke, anon they derken by
the cloude of ignoraunce and ben troubled by felonous talents; to
the whiche talents whan they aprochen and asenten, they hepen
and encresen the servage which they han ioyned to hem-self; and
in this manere they ben caitifs fro hir propre libertee. The whiche 30
thinges, nathelesse, the lokinge of the devyne purviaunce seeth,
that alle thinges biholdeth and seeth fro eterne, and ordeineth
hem everich in hir merites as they ben predestinat: and it is seyd
in Greek, that "alle thinges he seeth and alle thinges he hereth."
Pr. II. 1. A. Ed. quod I; C. om. // C. Ed. acorde me; A. acorde wel. 2. C. of; A. or (wrongly); Lat. arbitrii. 3. C. hym; A. Ed. hem. 5. C. mouynges (motus); A. moeueuynge (!). 12. A. om. thilke. // C. to ben fleen; A. ben to fleen; Ed. be to flyen. 16. C. dyuynes; A. deuynes (as often in C). 17. C. wil nat I-coromped (uoluntas incorrupta); A. wil nat be corumped (wrongly). 18. C. myht (potestas); A. hath myȝt. 27. C. clowdes; A. Ed. cloude (nube). 27, 8. Ed. A. to the; C. om. the. 31. A. purueaunce. 34. The last clause, in the original, is in Greek.
Metre II.
Puro clarum lumine Phebum.
Homer with the hony mouth, that is to seyn, Homer with the
swete ditees, singeth, that the sonne is cleer by pure light; natheles
yit ne may it nat, by the infirme light of his bemes, breken or
percen the inwarde entrailes of the erthe, or elles of the see. So
ne seeth nat god, maker of the grete world: to him, that loketh 5
alle thinges from an heigh, ne withstondeth nat no thinges by
hevinesse of erthe; ne the night ne withstondeth nat to him by
the blake cloudes. Thilke god seeth, in oo strok of thought, alle
thinges that ben, or weren, or sholle comen; and thilke god, for
he loketh and seeth alle thinges alone, thou mayst seyn that he is 10
the verray sonne.'
Me. II. 3. A. inferme. 6. C. om. nat. 7. C. heuynesse (mole); A. heuynesses. 8. C. strokk, glossed i. ictu.
Prose III.
Tum ego, en, inquam.
Thanne seyde I, 'now am I confounded by a more hard doute
than I was.'
'What doute is that?' quod she. 'For certes, I coniecte now
by whiche thinges thou art troubled.'
'It semeth,' quod I, 'to repugnen and to contrarien greetly, 5
that god knoweth biforn alle thinges, and that ther is any freedom
of libertee. For yif so be that god loketh alle thinges biforn, ne
god ne may nat ben desseived in no manere, than mot it nedes
been, that alle thinges bityden the whiche that the purviaunce of
god hath seyn biforn to comen. For which, yif that god 10
knoweth biforn nat only the werkes of men, but also hir conseiles
and hir willes, thanne ne shal ther be no libertee of arbitre; ne,
certes, ther ne may be noon other dede, ne no wil, but thilke
which that the divyne purviaunce, that may nat ben desseived,
hath feled biforn. For yif that they mighten wrythen awey in 15
othre manere than they ben purveyed, than sholde ther be no
stedefast prescience of thing to comen, but rather an uncertein
opinioun; the whiche thing to trowen of god, I deme it felonye
and unleveful. Ne I ne proeve nat thilke same resoun, as who
seyth, I ne alowe nat, or I ne preyse nat, thilke same resoun, by 20
which that som men wenen that they mowen assoilen and
unknitten the knotte of this questioun. For, certes, they seyn
that thing nis nat to comen for that the purviaunce of god hath
seyn it biforn that is to comen, but rather the contrarye, and that
is this: that, for that the thing is to comen, therfore ne may it 25
nat ben hid fro the purviaunce of god; and in this manere this
necessitee slydeth ayein in-to the contrarye partye: ne it ne
bihoveth nat, nedes, that thinges bityden that ben purvyed, but
it bihoveth, nedes, that thinges that ben to comen ben y-porveyed:
but as it were y-travailed, as who seyth, that thilke answere 30
procedeth right as thogh men travaileden, or weren bisy to enqueren,
the whiche thing is cause of the whiche thing:—as, whether the
prescience is cause of the necessitee of thinges to comen, or elles
that the necessitee of thinges to comen is cause of the purviaunce.
But I ne enforce me nat now to shewen it, that the bitydinge of 35
thinges y-wist biforn is necessarie, how so or in what manere
that the ordre of causes hath it-self; al-thogh that it ne seme nat
that the prescience bringe in necessitee of bitydinge to thinges to
comen. For certes, yif that any wight sitteth, it bihoveth by
necessitee that the opinioun be sooth of him that coniecteth that 40
he sitteth; and ayeinward also is it of the contrarye: yif the
opinioun be sooth of any wight for that he sitteth, it bihoveth by
necessitee that he sitte. Thanne is heer necessitee in that oon
and in that other: for in that oon is necessitee of sittinge, and,
certes, in that other is necessitee of sooth. But therfore ne 45
sitteth nat a wight, for that the opinioun of the sittinge is sooth;
but the opinioun is rather sooth, for that a wight sitteth biforn.
And thus, al-thogh that the cause of the sooth cometh of that
other syde (as who seyth, that al-thogh the cause of sooth comth
of the sitting, and nat of the trewe opinioun), algates yit is ther 50
comune necessitee in that oon and in that other. Thus sheweth
it, that I may make semblable skiles of the purviaunce of god
and of thinges to comen. For althogh that, for that thinges ben
to comen, ther-fore ben they purveyed, nat, certes, for that they
ben purveyed, ther-fore ne bityde they nat. Yit natheles, 55
bihoveth it by necessitee, that either the thinges to comen ben
y-purveyed of god, or elles that the thinges that ben purveyed of
god bityden. And this thing only suffiseth y-nough to destroyen
the freedom of oure arbitre, that is to seyn, of oure free wil. But
now, certes, sheweth it wel, how fer fro the sothe and how up-so-doun 60
is this thing that we seyn, that the bitydinge of temporel
thinges is cause of the eterne prescience. But for to wenen that
god purvyeth the thinges to comen for they ben to comen, what
other thing is it but for to wene that thilke thinges that bitidden
whylom ben causes of thilke soverein purvyaunce that is in god? 65
And her-to I adde yit this thing: that, right as whan that I wot
that a thing is, it bihoveth by necessitee that thilke selve thing be;
and eek, whan I have knowe that any thing shal bityden, so
byhoveth it by necessitee that thilke thing bityde:—so folweth it
thanne, that the bitydinge of the thing y-wist biforn ne may nat 70
ben eschued. And at the laste, yif that any wight wene a thing
to ben other weyes thanne it is, it is nat only unscience, but it is
deceivable opinioun ful diverse and fer fro the sothe of science.
Wherfore, yif any thing be so to comen, that the bitydinge of hit
ne be nat certein ne necessarie, who may weten biforn that thilke 75
thing is to comen? For right as science ne may nat ben medled
with falsnesse (as who seyth, that yif I wot a thing, it ne may nat
be false that I ne wot it), right so thilke thing that is conceived by
science ne may nat ben non other weys than as it is conceived.
For that is the cause why that science wanteth lesing (as who 80
seyth, why that witinge ne receiveth nat lesinge of that it wot); for
it bihoveth, by necessitee, that every thing be right as science
comprehendeth it to be. What shal I thanne seyn? In whiche
manere knoweth god biforn the thinges to comen, yif they ne be
nat certein? For yif that he deme that they ben to comen 85
uneschewably, and so may be that it is possible that they ne
shollen nat comen, god is deceived. But nat only to trowen that
god is deceived, but for to speke it with mouth, it is a felonous
sinne. But yif that god wot that, right so as thinges ben to
comen, so shullen they comen—so that he wite egaly, as who 90
seyth, indifferently, that thinges mowen ben doon or elles nat
y-doon—what is thilke prescience that ne comprehendeth no
certein thing ne stable? Or elles what difference is ther bitwixe
the prescience and thilke Iape-worthy divyninge of Tiresie the
divynour, that seyde: "Al that I seye," quod he, "either it shal be, 95
or elles it ne shal nat be?" Or elles how mochel is worth the
devyne prescience more than the opinioun of mankinde, yif so be
that it demeth the thinges uncertein, as men doon; of the whiche
domes of men the bitydinge nis nat certein? But yif so be that
non uncertein thing ne may ben in him that is right certein welle 100
of alle thinges, thanne is the bitydinge certein of thilke thinges
whiche he hath wist biforn fermely to comen. For which it
folweth, that the freedom of the conseiles and of the werkes of
mankind nis non, sin that the thoght of god, that seeth alle
thinges without errour of falsnesse, bindeth and constreineth 105
hem to a bitydinge by necessitee. And yif this thing be ones
y-graunted and received, that is to seyn, that ther nis no free wille,
than sheweth it wel, how greet destruccioun and how grete
damages ther folwen of thinges of mankinde. For in ydel ben
ther thanne purposed and bihight medes to gode folk, and peynes 110
to badde folk, sin that no moevinge of free corage voluntarie ne
hath nat deserved hem, that is to seyn, neither mede ne peyne; and
it sholde seme thanne, that thilke thing is alderworst, which that
is now demed for aldermost iust and most rightful, that is to seyn,
that shrewes ben punisshed, or elles that gode folk ben y-gerdoned: 115
the whiche folk, sin that hir propre wil ne sent hem nat to that oon
ne to that other, that is to seyn, neither to gode ne to harm, but constreineth
hem certein necessitee of thinges to comen: thanne ne
shollen ther nevere ben, ne nevere weren, vyce ne vertu, but it
sholde rather ben confusioun of alle desertes medled with-outen 120
discrecioun. And yit ther folweth an-other inconvenient, of the
whiche ther ne may ben thoght no more felonous ne more wikke;
and that is this: that, so as the ordre of thinges is y-led and
comth of the purviaunce of god, ne that no-thing nis leveful to
the conseiles of mankinde (as who seyth, that men han no power to 125
doon no-thing, ne wilne no-thing), than folweth it, that oure vyces
ben referred to the maker of alle good (as who seyth, than folweth
it, that god oughte han the blame of oure vyces, sin he constreineth us
by necessitee to doon vyces). Thanne is ther no resoun to hopen in
god, ne for to preyen to god; for what sholde any wight hopen to 130
god, or why sholde he preyen to god, sin that the ordenaunce of
destinee, which that ne may nat ben inclyned, knitteth and streineth
alle thinges that men may desiren? Thanne sholde ther be doon
awey thilke only allyaunce bitwixen god and men, that is to seyn,
to hopen and to preyen. But by the prys of rightwisnesse and of 135
verray mekenesse we deserven the gerdoun of the divyne grace,
which that is inestimable, that is to seyn, that it is so greet, that it
ne may nat ben ful y-preysed. And this is only the manere, that is
to seyn, hope and preyeres, for which it semeth that men mowen
speke with god, and by resoun of supplicacioun be conioined to 140
thilke cleernesse, that nis nat aproched no rather or that men
beseken it and impetren it. And yif men wene nat that hope ne
preyeres ne han no strengthes, by the necessitee of thinges to
comen y-received, what thing is ther thanne by whiche we mowen
ben conioined and clyven to thilke soverein prince of thinges? 145
For which it bihoveth, by necessitee, that the linage of mankinde,
as thou songe a litel her-biforn, be departed and unioined from
his welle, and failen of his biginninge, that is to seyn, god.
Pr. III. 9. A. purueaunce. 14. A. om. that (1). 18. C. of; A. on. 24. C. om. it. // C. but; glossed s. aiunt. 25. C. om. is (1). // A. that therfore. 28. A. om. nat. // A. ypurueid. 28, 9. A. om. but it bihoveth ... y-porveyed. 32. A. whiche thinges (for 2nd the whiche thing). // C. weyther. 34. C. puruyaunce; glossed s. prouidencie. 35. C. it; glossed illud. 38. A. of thinges. 48, 9. A. om. the sooth cometh ... cause of. 53. C. Ed. that for that; A. for that that. 58. A. bitiden by necessite; C. has the gloss—s. by necessite. 60. A. om. certes. 60, 1. C. vp so down; glossed prepostere. 62. A. is the cause. 63. A. om. the. 64, 5. A. bitiden som-tyme. 71. C. at the laste; glossed i. postremo. 74. A. so that the. 75. A. om. biforn. 79. A. om. nat. // C. as it is; A. it is be. 82. A. om. be. 85. C. he; glossed s. deus. // C. they; glossed s. thynges. 86. C. vneschwably; glossed i. memorabiliter (!) 87. C. A. desseyued (twice). 92. A. don. 94. C. Iape worthi; glossed i. ridiculo. 100. A. om. ne. 102. C. he; glossed s. deus. // C. fermely; glossed i. firmiter. 106. A. om. this. 107. C. resseyuyd; A. receyued. 108. C. destruccyoun; glossed i. occasus. 110. C. Meedes to; A. medes of. 113. A. alther-worste. 114. A. alther-moste. 116. C. hir; A. the. // A. om. ne before sent. 120. C. dissertes; A. desertes. 121. For of the, read than; see note. 122. A. ne (for no). 128. A. om. us. 129. A. to han hopen. 135. A. preis. 136. C. desseruyn; A. deserue. 139. A. om. men. 142. Ed. impetren; C. impetrent (!); A. emprenten. // A. om. nat. // A. om. hope. 143. C. om. no. 144. C. I-resseyuyd (glossed i. graunted); A. y-resceiued. 147. C. thou; glossed s. philosophie. // C. her by-forn, libro 4o metro sexto [line 35].
Metre III.
Quenam discors federa rerum.
What discordable cause hath to-rent and unioined the bindinge,
or the alliaunce, of thinges, that is to seyn, the coniunccioun of god
and man? Whiche god hath establisshed so greet bataile bitwixen
thise two soothfast or verray thinges, that is to seyn,
bitwixen the purviaunce of god and free wil, that they ben singuler 5
and devyded, ne that they ne wolen nat be medeled ne coupled
to-gidere? But ther nis no discord to the verray thinges, but they
clyven, certein, alwey to hem-self. But the thought of man, confounded
and overthrowen by the dirke membres of the body, ne
may nat, by fyr of his derked looking, that is to seyn, by the vigour 10
of his insighte, whyl the soule is in the body, knowe the thinne
subtil knittinges of thinges. But wherfore enchaufeth it so, by so
greet love, to finden thilke notes of sooth y-covered; that is to
seyn, wherfore enchaufeth the thoght of man by so greet desyr to
knowen thilke notificacions that ben y-hid under the covertoures of 15
sooth? Wot it aught thilke thing that it, anguissous, desireth to
knowe? As who seith, nay; for no man travaileth for to witen
thinges that he wot. And therfore the texte seith thus: but who
travaileth to witen thinges y-knowe? And yif that he ne knoweth
hem nat, what seketh thilke blinde thoght? What is he that 20
desireth any thing of which he wot right naught? As who seith,
who so desireth any thing, nedes, somwhat he knoweth of it; or
elles, he ne coude nat desire it. Or who may folwen thinges that ne
ben nat y-wist? And thogh that he seke tho thinges, wher shal he
finde hem? What wight, that is al unconninge and ignoraunt, 25
may knowen the forme that is y-founde? But whan the soule
biholdeth and seeth the heye thoght, that is to seyn, god, than
knoweth it to-gidere the somme and the singularitees, that is to
seyn, the principles and everich by him-self.
But now, whyl the soule is hid in the cloude and in the derkenesse 30
of the membres of the body, it ne hath nat al for-yeten
it-self, but it with-holdeth the somme of thinges, and leseth the
singularitees. Thanne, who-so that seeketh soothnesse, he nis in
neither nother habite; for he noot nat al, ne he ne hath nat al
foryeten: but yit him remembreth the somme of thinges that he 35
with-holdeth, and axeth conseil, and retreteth deepliche thinges
y-seyn biforn, that is to seyn, the grete somme in his minde: so that
he mowe adden the parties that he hath for-yeten to thilke that he
hath with-holden.'
Me. III. 1. C. vnioygnyd, glossed s. ne se compaciantur similiter. 2. C. coniuncciouns; A. coniunccioun. 3. C. man, quasi dicat, nullus. // C. which that god; A. Ed. whiche god (quis Deus). 6. C. deuydyd, quasi dicat, non est ita. 7. A. om. the. // C. thinges, s. prudencia et liberum arbitrium. 8. A. cleuen. 10. A. dirk. 12. C. it, s. anima. 13. A. note (Lat. notas). 16. C. it, s. anima. 18. After thus, A. adds—Si enim anima ignorat istas subtiles connexiones, responde, vnde est quod desiderat scire cum nil ignotum possit desiderare; but both C. and Ed. omit this. 21. wot] C. not. // C. nawht, quasi dicat, non. 24. A. om. that. 26. C. yfownde, quasi dicat, nullus. 29. A. Ed. principles; C. principulis. 34. A. nouthir habit. 36. C. retretith, i. retractat; A. tretith.
Prose IV.
Tum illa: Vetus, inquit, hec est.
Thanne seide she: 'this is,' quod she, 'the olde question of
the purviaunce of god; and Marcus Tullius, whan he devyded the
divynaciouns, that is to seyn, in his book that he wroot of divynaciouns,
he moevede gretly this questioun; and thou thy-self has y-sought
it mochel, and outrely, and longe; but yit ne hath it nat ben 5
determined ne y-sped fermely and diligently of any of yow. And
the cause of this derkenesse and of this difficultee is, for that the
moevinge of the resoun of mankinde ne may nat moeven to (that
is to seyn, applyen or ioinen to) the simplicitee of the devyne
prescience; the whiche simplicitee of the devyne prescience, yif 10
that men mighten thinken it in any maner, that is to seyn, that yif
men mighten thinken and comprehenden the thinges as god seeth
hem, thanne ne sholde ther dwellen outrely no doute: the whiche
resoun and cause of difficultee I shal assaye at the laste to shewe
and to speden, whan I have first y-spended and answered to tho 15
resouns by which thou art y-moeved. For I axe why thou wenest
that thilke resouns of hem that assoilen this questioun ne ben
nat speedful y-nough ne sufficient: the whiche solucioun, or the
whiche resoun, for that it demeth that the prescience nis nat cause
of necessitee to thinges to comen, than ne weneth it nat that 20
freedom of wil be destorbed or y-let by prescience. For ne
drawestow nat arguments from elles-where of the necessitee of
thinges to-comen (as who seith, any other wey than thus) but that
thilke thinges that the prescience wot biforn ne mowen nat unbityde?
That is to seyn, that they moten bityde. But thanne, yif 25
that prescience ne putteth no necessitee to thinges to comen, as
thou thy-self hast confessed it and biknowen a litel her-biforn, what
cause or what is it (as who seith, ther may no cause be) by which
that the endes voluntarie of thinges mighten be constreined to
certein bitydinge? For by grace of positioun, so that thou mowe 30
the betere understonde this that folweth, I pose, per impossibile,
that ther be no prescience. Thanne axe I,' quod she, 'in as
mochel as apertieneth to that, sholden thanne thinges that comen
of free wil ben constreined to bityden by necessitee?'
Boece. 'Nay,' quod I. 35
'Thanne ayeinward,' quod she, 'I suppose that ther be prescience,
but that it ne putteth no necessitee to thinges; thanne
trowe I, that thilke selve freedom of wil shal dwellen al hool and
absolut and unbounden. But thou wolt seyn that, al-be-it so that
prescience nis nat cause of the necessitee of bitydinge to thinges 40
to comen, algates yit it is a signe that the thinges ben to bityden
by necessitee. By this manere thanne, al-thogh the prescience
ne hadde never y-ben, yit algate or at the leeste weye it is certein
thing, that the endes and bitydinges of thinges to comen sholden
ben necessarie. For every signe sheweth and signifyeth only what 45
the thing is, but it ne maketh nat the thing that it signifyeth. For
which it bihoveth first to shewen, that no-thing ne bitydeth that it
ne bitydeth by necessitee, so that it may appere that the prescience
is signe of this necessitee; or elles, yif ther nere no necessitee,
certes, thilke prescience ne mighte nat be signe of thing that nis 50
nat. But certes, it is now certein that the proeve of this,
y-sustened by stidefast resoun, ne shal nat ben lad ne proeved by
signes ne by arguments y-taken fro with-oute, but by causes
covenable and necessarie. But thou mayst seyn, how may it be
that the thinges ne bityden nat that ben y-purveyed to comen? 55
But, certes, right as we trowen that tho thinges which that the
purviance wot biforn to comen ne ben nat to bityden; but that
ne sholden we nat demen; but rather, al-thogh that they shal
bityden, yit ne have they no necessitee of hir kinde to bityden.
And this maystow lightly aperceiven by this that I shal seyn. For 60
we seen many thinges whan they ben don biforn oure eyen, right
as men seen the cartere worken in the torninge or atempringe or
adressinge of hise cartes or charietes. And by this manere (as
who seith, maystow understonde) of alle othere workmen. Is ther
thanne any necessitee, as who seith, in oure lokinge, that constreineth 65
or compelleth any of thilke thinges to ben don so?'
Boece. 'Nay,' quod I; 'for in ydel and in veyn were al the
effect of craft, yif that alle thinges weren moeved by constreininge;'
that is to seyn, by constreininge of oure eyen or of oure sight.
Philosophie. 'The thinges thanne,' quod she, 'that, whan men 70
doon hem, ne han no necessitee that men doon hem, eek tho
same thinges, first or they ben doon, they ben to comen with-oute
necessitee. For-why ther ben somme thinges to bityden, of which
the endes and the bitydinges of hem ben absolut and quit of alle
necessitee. For certes, I ne trowe nat that any man wolde seyn 75
this: that tho thinges that men doon now, that they ne weren to
bityden first or they weren y-doon; and thilke same thinges,
al-thogh that men had y-wist hem biforn, yit they han free
bitydinges. For right as science of thinges present ne bringeth in
no necessitee to thinges that men doon, right so the prescience of 80
thinges to comen ne bringeth in no necessitee to thinges to
bityden. But thou mayst seyn, that of thilke same it is y-douted,
as whether that of thilke thinges that ne han non issues and
bitydinges necessaries, yif ther-of may ben any prescience; for
certes, they semen to discorden. For thou wenest that, yif that 85
thinges ben y-seyn biforn, that necessitee folweth hem; and yif
necessitee faileth hem, they ne mighten nat ben wist biforn, and
that no-thing ne may ben comprehended by science but certein;
and yif tho thinges that ne han no certein bitydinges ben purveyed
as certein, it sholde ben dirknesse of opinioun, nat soothfastnesse 90
of science. And thou wenest that it be diverse fro the hoolnesse
of science that any man sholde deme a thing to ben other-weys
thanne it is it-self. And the cause of this erroure is, that of alle
the thinges that every wight hath y-knowe, they wenen that tho
thinges been y-knowe al-oonly by the strengthe and by the nature 95
of the thinges that ben y-wist or y-knowe; and it is al the
contrarie. For al that ever is y-knowe, it is rather comprehended
and knowen, nat after his strengthe and his nature, but after the
facultee, that is to seyn, the power and the nature, of hem that
knowen. And, for that this thing shal mowen shewen by a short 100
ensaumple: the same roundnesse of a body, other-weys the sighte
of the eye knoweth it, and other-weyes the touchinge. The
lokinge, by castinge of his bemes, waiteth and seeth from afer al
the body to-gidere, with-oute moevinge of it-self; but the touchinge
clyveth and conioineth to the rounde body, and moeveth aboute 105
the environinge, and comprehendeth by parties the roundnesse.
And the man him-self, other-weys wit biholdeth him, and
other-weys imaginacioun, and other-weys resoun, and other-weys
intelligence. For the wit comprehendeth withoute-forth the
figure of the body of the man that is establissed in the 110
matere subiect; but the imaginacioun comprehendeth only the
figure withoute the matere. Resoun surmounteth imaginacioun,
and comprehendeth by universal lokinge the comune spece that
is in the singuler peces. But the eye of intelligence is heyere; for
it surmounteth the environinge of the universitee, and looketh, 115
over that, by pure subtilitee of thoght, thilke same simple forme
of man that is perdurably in the divyne thoght. In whiche this
oughte greetly to ben considered, that the heyeste strengthe to
comprehenden thinges enbraseth and contieneth the lowere
strengthe; but the lowere strengthe ne aryseth nat in no manere 120
to heyere strengthe. For wit ne may no-thing comprehende out
of matere, ne the imaginacioun ne loketh nat the universels
speces, ne resoun taketh nat the simple forme so as intelligence
taketh it; but intelligence, that looketh al aboven, whan it hath
comprehended the forme, it knoweth and demeth alle the thinges 125
that ben under that forme. But she knoweth hem in thilke manere
in the whiche it comprehendeth thilke same simple forme that
ne may never ben knowen to none of that other; that is to seyn,
to none of tho three forseide thinges of the sowle. For it knoweth
the universitee of resoun, and the figure of the imaginacioun, 130
and the sensible material conceived by wit; ne it ne useth nat nor
of resoun ne of imaginacioun ne of wit withoute-forth; but it
biholdeth alle thinges, so as I shal seye, by a strok of thought
formely, withoute discours or collacioun. Certes resoun, whan it
looketh any-thing universel, it ne useth nat of imaginacioun, nor 135
of witte, and algates yit it comprehendeth the thinges imaginable
and sensible; for resoun is she that diffinisseth the universel of hir
conseyte right thus:—man is a resonable two-foted beest. And
how so that this knowinge is universel, yet nis ther no wight that
ne woot wel that a man is a thing imaginable and sensible; and 140
this same considereth wel resoun; but that nis nat by imaginacioun
nor by wit, but it looketh it by a resonable concepcioun. Also
imaginacioun, al-be-it so that it taketh of wit the beginninges to
seen and to formen the figures, algates, al-thogh that wit ne were
nat present, yit it environeth and comprehendeth alle thinges 145
sensible; nat by resoun sensible of deminge, but by resoun
imaginatif. Seestow nat thanne that alle the thinges, in knowinge,
usen more of hir facultee or of hir power than they doon of the
facultee or power of thinges that ben y-knowe? Ne that nis nat
wrong; for so as every Iugement is the dede or doinge of him 150
that demeth, it bihoveth that every wight performe the werk and
his entencioun, nat of foreine power, but of his propre power.
Pr. IV. 2. C. deuynede; Ed. deuyded; A. deuided; distribuit. 7. C. dirknesse; A. derkenesse. // A. om. 2nd of this. 11, 12. A. om. mighten thinken it ... yif men. 15. A. om. y-spended and. // C. the; A. tho. 22. A. drawest thou. 24. A. thinge. // A. om. ne. 28. A. om. or what. 29. C. A. gloss endes by exitus. 30. Ed. posycion (Lat. positionis); C. A. possessioun; and C. glosses For ... possessioun by uerbi gratia. 31. A. inpossibile; C. per impossibile (as a gloss). 37. Ed. it; C. is. 44. C. endes, i. exitus. // A. and the (for and). 46. C. thing is, i. se eius significatum. // C. maketh, glossed causat. 47, 48. A. om. that it ne bitydeth. 48, 49. C. om. so that ... necessitee. 51. A. preue. 52. A. stedfast. // A. proued. 57. C. but that; A. om. that. 58. A. om. that. 60. A. maist thou. 62. A. and in attempryng or in adressyng. 63. A. chariottes. 64. A. mayst thou. 65. A. om. that. 66. C. om. thilke. // C. so, quasi dicat, non. 70. A. thise thingus. 80, 81. A. om. that men doon ... to thinges. 83. C. Ed. issues; A. endes; C. adds—i. exitus. 87, 88. C. and yif (wrongly); A. Ed. and that. 91-93. A. om. And thou ... is it-self here, but inserts the same in a wrong place (131 below). 99. A. om. 2nd the. 100. A. Ed. that; C. om. // Ed. thing; C. A. om. 103. C. after; A. afer; Ed. a-ferre. 105. C. body, glossed orbis; A. body, glossed orbi (Lat. orbi). 109. A. fro with-outen furthe. 111. C. comprehendeth, vel iudicat. 111, 2. A. om. comprehendeth ... imaginacioun. 113. C. Ed. by; A. by an. // C. A. (gloss) speciem. 120, 121. A. om. but the ... strengthe. // A. Ed. For; C. om. 124. A. Ed. it; C. om. // A. but the. // A. Ed. that; C. om. 126. C. she; glossed intelligence. // C. Ed. in; A. vndir. 131. Here A. wrongly inserts a clause omitted above (91-93). 136. A. om. it. // A. comprendith. 139. A. om. is. 140. A. om. a thing. 142. A. om. a. 147. A. Sest thou. 148. A. of faculte or of power. 149. A. Ed. no (for nat). 150. A. or the.
Metre IV.
Quondam porticus attulit.
The Porche, that is to seyn, a gate of the town of Athenes ther-as
philosophres hadden hir congregacioun to desputen, thilke Porche
broughte som-tyme olde men, ful derke in hir sentences, that is to
seyn, philosophres that highten Stoiciens, that wenden that images
and sensibilitees, that is to seyn, sensible imaginaciouns, or elles 5
imaginaciouns of sensible thinges, weren empreinted in-to sowles
fro bodies withoute-forth; as who seith, that thilke Stoiciens wenden
that the sowle hadde ben naked of it-self, as a mirour or a clene
parchemin, so that alle figures mosten first comen fro thinges fro
withoute-forth in-to sowles, and ben empreinted in-to sowles: Text: 10
right as we ben wont som-tyme, by a swifte pointel, to ficchen
lettres empreinted in the smothenesse or in the pleinnesse of the
table of wex or in parchemin that ne hath no figure ne note in it.
Glose. But now argueth Boece ayeins that opinioun, and seith
thus: But yif the thryvinge sowle ne unpleyteth no-thing, that is 15
to seyn, ne doth no-thing, by his propre moevinges, but suffreth and
lyth subgit to tho figures and to tho notes of bodies withoute-forth,
and yildeth images ydel and veyn in the manere of a mirour,
whennes thryveth thanne or whennes comth thilke knowinge in
our sowle, that discerneth and biholdeth alle thinges? And 20
whennes is thilke strengthe that biholdeth the singuler thinges;
or whennes is the strengthe that devydeth thinges y-knowe; and
thilke strengthe that gadereth to-gidere the thinges devyded; and
the strengthe that cheseth his entrechaunged wey? For som-tyme
it heveth up the heved, that is to seyn, that it heveth up the entencioun 25
to right heye thinges; and som-tyme it descendeth in-to
right lowe thinges. And whan it retorneth in-to him-self, it reproeveth
and destroyeth the false thinges by the trewe thinges.
Certes, this strengthe is cause more efficient, and mochel
more mighty to seen and to knowe thinges, than thilke cause that 30
suffreth and receiveth the notes and the figures impressed in
maner of matere. Algates the passioun, that is to seyn, the
suffraunce or the wit, in the quike body, goth biforn, excitinge and
moevinge the strengthes of the thought. Right so as whan that
cleernesse smyteth the eyen and moeveth hem to seen, or right so 35
as vois or soun hurteleth to the eres and commoeveth hem to
herkne, than is the strengthe of the thought y-moeved and
excited, and clepeth forth, to semblable moevinges, the speces
that it halt with-inne it-self; and addeth tho speces to the notes
and to the thinges withoute-forth, and medleth the images of 40
thinges withoute-forth to tho formes y-hidde with-inne him-self.
Me. IV. 3. C. dirke; A. Ed. derke. 5. A. om. and. 9. A. om. first. 10. A. inprentid; C. apreyntyd (but emprientyd just below, and enpreynted above). 12. A. emprentid. 13. A. om. 2nd. ne. 14. A. Ed. that; C. the. 15. A. vnplitith. 17. A. subgit; Ed. subiecte; C. om. // A. the (for tho); twice. 20. A. Ed. discernith; C. decerneth. 26. C. heye thinges, i. principijs. // C. dessendith; A. discendith. 27. C. lowe thynges, s. conclusiones. // A. repreuith. 29. C. strengthe, s. anima. 31. C. resseyuyth; A. resceyueth; Ed. receyueth. // C. A. inpressed; Ed. impressed. 36. A. hurtlith. 38. C. Ed. to; A. the (Lat. Ad). 40. A. medeleth. 41. A. to the forme.
Prose V.
Quod si in corporibus sentiendis.
But what yif that in bodies to ben feled, that is to seyn, in the
takinge of knowelechinge of bodily thinges, and al-be-it so that the
qualitees of bodies, that ben obiecte fro withoute-forth, moeven
and entalenten the instruments of the wittes; and al-be-it so that
the passioun of the body, that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce, 5
goth to-forn the strengthe of the workinge corage, the which
passioun or suffraunce clepeth forth the dede of the thoght in him-self,
and moeveth and exciteth in this mene whyle the formes that
resten withinne-forth; and yif that, in sensible bodies, as I have
seyd, our corage nis nat y-taught or empreinted by passioun to 10
knowe thise thinges, but demeth and knoweth, of his owne strengthe,
the passioun or suffraunce subiect to the body: moche more
thanne tho thinges that ben absolut and quite fro alle talents
or affecciouns of bodies, as god or his aungeles, ne folwen nat in
discerninge thinges obiect fro withoute-forth, but they accomplisshen 15
and speden the dede of hir thoght. By this resoun
thanne ther comen many maner knowinges to dyverse and
differinge substaunces. For the wit of the body, the whiche
wit is naked and despoiled of alle other knowinges, thilke wit
comth to beestes that ne mowen nat moeven hem-self her and 20
ther, as oystres and muscules, and other swiche shelle-fish of the
see, that clyven and ben norisshed to roches. But the imaginacioun
comth to remuable beestes, that semen to han talent to
fleen or to desiren any thing. But resoun is al-only to the linage
of mankinde, right as intelligence is only [to] the devyne nature: 25
of which it folweth, that thilke knowinge is more worth than thise
othre, sin it knoweth by his propre nature nat only his subiect, as
who seith, it ne knoweth nat al-only that apertieneth properly to his
knowinge, but it knoweth the subiects of alle other knowinges.
But how shal it thanne be, yif that wit and imaginacioun stryven 30
ayein resoninge, and seyn, that of thilke universel thing that
resoun weneth to seen, that it nis right naught? For wit and
imaginacioun seyn that that, that is sensible or imaginable, it ne
may nat be universel. Thanne is either the Iugement of resoun
sooth, ne that ther nis nothing sensible; or elles, for that resoun 35
wot wel that many thinges ben subiect to wit and to imaginacioun,
thanne is the concepcioun of resoun veyn and false, which that
loketh and comprehendeth that that is sensible and singuler as
universel. And yif that resoun wolde answeren ayein to thise
two, that is to seyn, to witte and to imaginacioun, and seyn, that 40
soothly she hir-self, that is to seyn, resoun, loketh and comprehendeth,
by resoun of universalitee, bothe that that is sensible
and that that is imaginable; and that thilke two, that is to seyn,
wit and imaginacioun, ne mowen nat strecchen ne enhansen hem-self
to the knowinge of universalitee, for that the knowinge of 45
hem ne may exceden ne surmounte the bodily figures: certes, of
the knowinge of thinges, men oughten rather yeven credence to
the more stedefast and to the more parfit Iugement. In this
maner stryvinge thanne, we that han strengthe of resoninge and
of imagininge and of wit, that is to seyn, by resoun and by imaginacioun 50
and by wit, we sholde rather preyse the cause of resoun; as
who seith, than the cause of wit and of imaginacioun.
Semblable thing is it, that the resoun of mankinde ne weneth
nat that the devyne intelligence bi-holdeth or knoweth thinges to
comen, but right as the resoun of mankinde knoweth hem. For 55
thou arguest and seyst thus: that yif it ne seme nat to men that
some thinges han certein and necessarie bitydinges, they ne
mowen nat ben wist biforn certeinly to bityden. And thanne
nis ther no prescience of thilke thinges; and yif we trowe that
prescience be in thise thinges, thanne is ther no-thing that it ne 60
bitydeth by necessitee. But certes, yif we mighten han the Iugement
of the devyne thoght, as we ben parsoneres of resoun, right
so as we han demed that it behoveth that imaginacioun and wit
be binethe resoun, right so wolde we demen that it were rightful
thing, that mannes resoun oughte to submitten it-self and to ben 65
binethe the divyne thoght. For which, yif that we mowen, as
who seith, that, yif that we mowen, I counseyle, that we enhanse us
in-to the heighte of thilke sovereyn intelligence; for ther shal
resoun wel seen that, that it ne may nat biholden in it-self. And
certes that is this, in what maner the prescience of god seeth alle 70
thinges certeins and diffinisshed, al-thogh they ne han no certein
issues or bitydinges; ne this is non opinioun, but it is rather the
simplicitee of the sovereyn science, that nis nat enclosed nor
y-shet within none boundes.
Pr. V. 1. A. om. yif (Lat. Quod si). 5. C. A. witte; Ed. wytte. // A. om. or the. 6, 7. A. om. goth ... suffraunce. 10. A. enprentid; C. emprienpted. 20, 1. A. here ne there. // A. muscles. 25. I supply to. 26, 7. C. thise oothre; A. is other. 29. A. subgitz. 31. Ed. vnyuersal thynge; A. vniuersel thinges; C. vniuersels thinges (Lat. uniuersale). 35. C. soth; Ed. sothe; A. om. // C. sensible, quod absurdum est. 41. C. seyn; A. seyn that. 44. C. enhansen; A. enhaunsen. 45. Ed. the knowing; A. knowynge; C. knowy (Lat. cognitionem). 46. A. figure. 48. C. stidefast; A. stedfast. 51. C. and we; A. Ed. om. and. 52. C. Ed. and of; A. or. 56. A. Ed. ne; C. om. 58. A. om. And. 59. A. om. ther. 61. C. bideth (!). 62. C. parsoneres; A. parsoners; Ed. parteners. 63. A. om. 1st that. 65. A. summitten. 66. C. yif that; Ed. if; A. that yif. 71. C. diffinysshed; A. difinissed. 72. A. Ed. is; C. nis.
Metre V.
Quam uariis terris animalia permeant figuris.
The beestes passen by the erthes by ful diverse figures. For
som of hem han hir bodies straught and crepen in the dust, and
drawen after hem a tras or a foruh y-continued; that is to seyn, as
nadres or snakes. And other beestes, by the wandringe lightnesse
of hir winges, beten the windes, and over-swimmen the spaces of 5
the longe eyr by moist fleeinge. And other beestes gladen hem-self
to diggen hir tras or hir steppes in the erthe with hir goings
or with hir feet, and to goon either by the grene feldes, or elles to
walken under the wodes. And al-be-it so that thou seest that
they alle discorden by diverse formes, algates hir faces, enclined, 10
hevieth hir dulle wittes. Only the linage of man heveth heyeste
his heye heved, and stondeth light with his up-right body, and
biholdeth the erthes under him. And, but-yif thou, erthely man,
wexest yvel out of thy wit, this figure amonesteth thee, that axest
the hevene with thy righte visage, and hast areysed thy fore-heved, 15
to beren up a-heigh thy corage; so that thy thoght ne be nat
y-hevied ne put lowe under fote, sin that thy body is so heye
areysed.
Me. V. 3. C. traas; A. trais; Ed. trace. // C. forwh; A. forghe; Ed. forough. // A. Ed. continued. 4. A. addres; Ed. nedders. // A. om. the. 7. C. A. traas. // A. goynge (Lat. gressibus). 8. C. feeldes. // A. om. elles. 10. A. om. faces. // A. enclini[n]g. 13. A. erthe (Lat. terras). // A. om. And. 16. A. on heye.
Prose VI.
Quoniam igitur, uti paullo ante.
Therfor thanne, as I have shewed a litel her-biforn, that al
thing that is y-wist nis nat knowen by his nature propre, but by
the nature of hem that comprehenden it, lat us loke now, in as
mochel as it is leveful to us, as who seith, lat us loke now as we
mowen, which that the estat is of the devyne substaunce; so that 5
we mowen eek knowen what his science is. The commune Iugement
of alle creatures resonables thanne is this: that god is eterne.
Lat us considere thanne what is eternitee; for certes that shal
shewen us to-gidere the devyne nature and the devyne science.
Eternitee, thanne, is parfit possessioun and al-togidere of lyf 10
interminable; and that sheweth more cleerly by the comparisoun
or the collacioun of temporel thinges. For al thing that liveth in
tyme it is present, and procedeth fro preterits in-to futures, that is
to seyn, fro tyme passed in-to tyme cominge; ne ther nis no-thing
establisshed in tyme that may enbracen to-gider al the space of 15
his lyf. For certes, yit ne hath it taken the tyme of to-morwe, and
it hath lost the tyme of yisterday. And certes, in the lyf of this
day, ye ne liven no more but right as in the moevable and
transitorie moment. Thanne thilke thing that suffreth temporel
condicioun, al-thogh that it never bigan to be, ne thogh it never 20
cese for to be, as Aristotle demed of the world, and al-thogh that
the lyf of it be strecched with infinitee of tyme, yit algates nis
it no swich thing that men mighten trowen by right that it is
eterne. For al-thogh that it comprehende and embrace the space
of lyf infinit, yit algates ne embraceth it nat the space of the lyf 25
al-togider; for it ne hath nat the futures that ne ben nat yit, ne it
ne hath no lenger the preterits that ben y-doon or y-passed. But
thilke thing thanne, that hath and comprehendeth to-gider al the
plentee of the lyf interminable, to whom ther ne faileth naught of
the future, and to whom ther nis naught of the preterit escaped 30
nor y-passed, thilke same is y-witnessed and y-proeved by right to
be eterne. And it bihoveth by necessitee that thilke thing be
al-wey present to him-self, and compotent; as who seith, al-wey
present to him-self, and so mighty that al be right at his plesaunce;
and that he have al present the infinitee of the moevable tyme. 35
Wher-for som men trowen wrongfully that, whan they heren that
it semede to Plato that this world ne hadde never beginninge
of tyme, ne that it never shal han failinge, they wenen in this
maner that this world be maked coeterne with his maker; as who
seith, they wene that this world and god ben maked togider eterne, 40
and that is a wrongful weninge. For other thing is it to ben y-lad
by lyf interminable, as Plato graunted to the world, and other
thing is it to embrace to-gider al the present of the lyf interminable,
the whiche thing it is cleer and manifest that it is propre to the
devyne thoght. 45
Ne it ne sholde nat semen to us, that god is elder thanne
thinges that ben y-maked by quantitee of tyme, but rather by
the propretee of his simple nature. For this ilke infinit moevinge
of temporel thinges folweth this presentarie estat of lyf unmoevable;
and so as it ne may nat countrefeten it ne feynen it ne be evenlyke 50
to it for the inmoevabletee, that is to seyn, that is in the
eternitee of god, it faileth and falleth in-to moevinge fro the simplicitee
of the presence of god, and disencreseth in-to the infinit
quantitee of future and of preterit: and so as it ne may nat han
to-gider al the plentee of the lyf, algates yit, for as moche as it 55
ne ceseth never for to ben in som maner, it semeth som-del to us,
that it folweth and resembleth thilke thing that it ne may nat
atayne to ne fulfillen, and bindeth it-self to som maner presence
of this litel and swifte moment: the which presence of this litel
and swifte moment, for that it bereth a maner image or lyknesse 60
of the ay-dwellinge presence of god, it graunteth, to swiche maner
thinges as it bitydeth to, that it semeth hem as thise thinges han
y-ben, and ben.
And, for that the presence of swich litel moment ne may nat
dwelle, ther-for it ravisshed and took the infinit wey of tyme, that 65
is to seyn, by successioun; and by this maner is it y-doon, for that
it sholde continue the lyf in goinge, of the whiche lyf it ne mighte
nat enbrace the plentee in dwellinge. And for-thy, yif we wollen
putten worthy names to thinges, and folwen Plato, lat us seye
thanne soothly, that god is eterne, and the world is perpetuel. 70
Thanne, sin that every Iugement knoweth and comprehendeth by
his owne nature thinges that ben subiect un-to him, ther is soothly
to god, al-weys, an eterne and presentarie estat; and the science
of him, that over-passeth al temporel moevement, dwelleth in the
simplicitee of his presence, and embraceth and considereth alle 75
the infinit spaces of tymes, preterits and futures, and loketh, in
his simple knowinge, alle thinges of preterit right as they weren
y-doon presently right now. Yif thou wolt thanne thenken and
avyse the prescience, by which it knoweth alle thinges, thou ne
shal nat demen it as prescience of thinges to comen, but thou 80
shalt demen it more rightfully that it is science of presence or of
instaunce, that never ne faileth. For which it nis nat y-cleped
"previdence," but it sholde rather ben cleped "purviaunce," that
is establisshed ful fer fro right lowe thinges, and biholdeth from
a-fer alle thinges, right as it were fro the heye heighte of thinges. 85
Why axestow thanne, or why desputestow thanne, that thilke
thinges ben doon by necessitee whiche that ben y-seyn and
knowen by the devyne sighte, sin that, forsothe, men ne maken
nat thilke thinges necessarie which that they seen ben y-doon in
hir sighte? For addeth thy biholdinge any necessitee to thilke 90
thinges that thou biholdest presente?'
'Nay,' quod I.
Philosophie. 'Certes, thanne, if men mighte maken any digne
comparisoun or collacioun of the presence devyne and of the
presence of mankinde, right so as ye seen some thinges in this 95
temporel present, right so seeth god alle thinges by his eterne
present. Wher-fore this devyne prescience ne chaungeth nat the
nature ne the propretee of thinges, but biholdeth swiche thinges
present to him-ward as they shullen bityde to yow-ward in tyme
to comen. Ne it confoundeth nat the Iugement of thinges; but 100
by o sighte of his thought, he knoweth the thinges to comen, as
wel necessarie as nat necessarie. Right so as whan ye seen
to-gider a man walken on the erthe and the sonne arysen in
the hevene, al-be-it so that ye seen and biholden that oon and
that other to-gider, yit natheles ye demen and discernen that that 105
oon is voluntarie and that other necessarie. Right so thanne the
devyne lookinge, biholdinge alle thinges under him, ne troubleth
nat the qualitee of thinges that ben certeinly present to him-ward;
but, as to the condicioun of tyme, forsothe, they ben future. For
which it folweth, that this nis noon opinioun, but rather a stedefast 110
knowinge, y-strengthed by soothnesse, that, whanne that god
knoweth anything to be, he ne unwot nat that thilke thing wanteth
necessitee to be; this is to seyn, that, whan that god knoweth any
thing to bityde, he wot wel that it ne hath no necessitee to bityde.
And yif thou seyst heer, that thilke thing that god seeth to 115
bityde, it ne may nat unbityde (as who seith, it mot bityde), and
thilke thing that ne may nat unbityde it mot bityde by necessitee,
and that thou streyne me by this name of necessitee: certes,
I wol wel confessen and biknowe a thing of ful sad trouthe, but
unnethe shal ther any wight mowe seen it or come ther-to, but-yif 120
that he be biholder of the devyne thoght. For I wol answeren
thee thus: that thilke thing that is future, whan it is referred
to the devyne knowinge, thanne is it necessarie; but certes, whan it
is understonden in his owne kinde, men seen it is outrely free,
and absolut fro alle necessitee. 125
For certes, ther ben two maneres of necessitee. That oon
necessitee is simple, as thus: that it bihoveth by necessitee, that
alle men be mortal or deedly. Another necessitee is conditionel,
as thus: yif thou wost that a man walketh, it bihoveth by necessitee
that he walke. Thilke thing thanne that any wight hath y-knowe 130
to be, it ne may ben non other weyes thanne he knoweth it to be.
But this condicioun ne draweth nat with hir thilke necessitee
simple. For certes, this necessitee conditionel, the propre nature
of it ne maketh it nat, but the adieccioun of the condicioun
maketh it. For no necessitee ne constreyneth a man to gon, 135
that goth by his propre wil; al-be-it so that, whan he goth,
that it is necessarie that he goth. Right on this same maner
thanne, yif that the purviaunce of god seeth any thing present,
than mot thilke thing ben by necessitee, al-thogh that it ne have
no necessitee of his owne nature. But certes, the futures that 140
bityden by freedom of arbitre, god seeth hem alle to-gider present.
Thise thinges thanne, yif they ben referred to the devyne sighte,
thanne ben they maked necessarie by the condicioun of the
devyne knowinge. But certes, yif thilke thinges be considered
by hem-self, they ben absolut of necessitee, and ne forleten nat ne 145
cesen nat of the libertee of hir owne nature. Thanne, certes,
with-oute doute, alle the thinges shollen ben doon which that
god wot biforn that they ben to comen. But som of hem comen
and bityden of free arbitre or of free wille, that, al-be-it so that
they bityden, yit algates ne lese they nat hir propre nature in 150
beinge; by the which first, or that they weren y-doon, they
hadden power nat to han bitid.'
Boece. 'What is this to seyn thanne,' quod I, 'that thinges ne
ben nat necessarie by hir propre nature, so as they comen in alle
maneres in the lyknesse of necessitee by the condicioun of the 155
devyne science?'
Philosophie. 'This is the difference,' quod she; 'that tho
thinges that I purposede thee a litel heer-biforn, that is to seyn,
the sonne arysinge and the man walkinge, that, ther-whyles that
thilke thinges been y-doon, they ne mighte nat ben undoon; 160
natheles, that oon of hem, or it was y-doon, it bihoved by necessitee
that it was y-doon, but nat that other. Right so is it
here, that the thinges that god hath present, with-oute doute they
shollen been. But som of hem descendeth of the nature of
thinges, as the sonne arysinge; and som descendeth of the power 165
of the doeres, as the man walkinge. Thanne seide I no wrong,
that yif these thinges ben referred to the devyne knowinge, thanne
ben they necessarie; and yif they ben considered by hem-self,
thanne ben they absolut fro the bond of necessitee. Right so as
alle thinges that apereth or sheweth to the wittes, yif thou referre 170
it to resoun, it is universel; and yif thou referre it or loke it
to it-self, than is it singuler. But now, yif thou seyst thus, that
yif it be in my power to chaunge my purpos, than shal I voide the
purviaunce of god, whan that, peraventure, I shal han chaunged
the thinges that he knoweth biforn, thanne shal I answere thee 175
thus. Certes, thou mayst wel chaunge thy purpos; but, for as
mochel as the present soothnesse of the devyne purviaunce biholdeth
that thou mayst chaunge thy purpos, and whether thou
wolt chaunge it or no, and whiderward that thou torne it, thou ne
mayst nat eschuen the devyne prescience; right as thou ne mayst 180
nat fleen the sighte of the presente eye, al-though that thou torne
thy-self by thy free wil in-to dyverse acciouns. But thou mayst
seyn ayein: "How shal it thanne be? Shal nat the devyne
science be chaunged by my disposicioun, whan that I wol o thing
now, and now another? And thilke prescience, ne semeth it nat 185
to entrechaunge stoundes of knowinge;"' as who seith, ne shal it
nat seme to us, that the devyne prescience entrechaungeth hise dyverse
stoundes of knowinge, so that it knowe sum-tyme o thing and sum-tyme
the contrarie of that thing?
'No, forsothe,' quod I. 190
Philosophie. 'For the devyne sighte renneth to-forn and seeth alle
futures, and clepeth hem ayein, and retorneth hem to the presence
of his propre knowinge; ne he ne entrechaungeth nat, so as thou
wenest, the stoundes of forknowinge, as now this, now that; but
he ay-dwellinge comth biforn, and embraceth at o strook alle thy 195
mutaciouns. And this presence to comprehenden and to seen
alle thinges, god ne hath nat taken it of the bitydinge of thinges
to come, but of his propre simplicitee. And her-by is assoiled
thilke thing that thou puttest a litel her-biforn, that is to seyn,
that it is unworthy thing to seyn, that our futures yeven cause of 200
the science of god. For certes, this strengthe of the devyne
science, which that embraceth alle thinges by his presentarie
knowinge, establissheth maner to alle thinges, and it ne oweth
naught to latter thinges; and sin that these thinges ben thus,
that is to seyn, sin that necessitee nis nat in thinges by the devyne 205
prescience, than is ther freedom of arbitre, that dwelleth hool and
unwemmed to mortal men. Ne the lawes ne purposen nat
wikkedly medes and peynes to the willinges of men that ben
unbounden and quite of alle necessitee. And god, biholder and
for-witer of alle thinges, dwelleth above; and the present eternitee 210
of his sighte renneth alwey with the dyverse qualitee of oure
dedes, despensinge and ordeyninge medes to goode men, and
torments to wikked men. Ne in ydel ne in veyn ne ben ther nat
put in god hope and preyeres, that ne mowen nat ben unspeedful
ne with-oute effect, whan they ben rightful. 215
Withstond thanne and eschue thou vyces; worshipe and love
thou virtues; areys thy corage to rightful hopes; yilde thou
humble preyeres a-heigh. Gret necessitee of prowesse and vertu
is encharged and commaunded to yow, yif ye nil nat dissimulen;
sin that ye worken and doon, that is to seyn, your dedes or your 220
workes, biforn the eyen of the Iuge that seeth and demeth alle
thinges.' To whom be glorye and worshipe by infinit tymes. Amen.
Pr. VI. 1, 2. C. alle thinges; A. Ed. al thing (Lat. omne). 6. A. om. eek. 12. A. om. the. // C. alle; A. al. 16. A. the morwe. 17. A. that (for the tyme). 18. A. this (for the). 20. A. om. it. 22. C. strechched. 25. A. braceth. 30. C. preterite; A. preterit. 31. C. I-witnesshed; A. ywitnessed. // C. and; A. or. 34. A. plesaunce; C. pleasaunce. 35. A. infinit. 41. A. it (for that). 43. A. embracen. 49. A. of the lijf. 53. A. om. the. // C. in-to; A. to. 58. A. presence; C. presensse. 64. A. om. that. 65. A. om. it. // C. Infynyte; A. infinit. 73. A. alwey to god. 78. C. thinken; A. thenke. 81. A. om. it. 83. A. prouidence; C. puruydence (glossed prouidentia); but see note. 86. A. disputest thou. 88. A. yknowen. 101. C. o; Ed. one; A. of (!); Lat. unoque. 104. A. om. the. 106. A. om. the. 110. C. stidefast; A. stedfast. 116. A. bitide; C. bide (miswritten; 2nd time). 120. A. om. mowe. 124. A. om. is. 134. A. nauȝt (for nat). 135, 6. A. om. gon that. 141. A. presentz. 142. A. om. yif. 143. C. by; A. to (Lat. per). 149. A. om. 1st free. 150. C. in; A. ne (wrongly). 161. A. byhoued; Ed. behoueth; C. houyd (!). 169. A. om. as. 170. Ed. apereth; C. apiereth; A. appiereth. 178. C. wheyther; A. whethir. 179. A. om. ne. 186. A. knowynges (Lat. noscendi). 189. Ed. of that thing; C. A. om. 190. Ed. quod she (for quod I; wrongly). 193. A. om. so. 194. A. om. as. 203. A. awith nat. 205, 6. C. om. that is ... prescience; Ed. and A. have it. 213. C. torment; A. tourmentz (supplicia). 214. A. nat; Ed. not; C. ne. 216. C. withston (sic). 218. A. an heyȝe. 222. C. To whom be goye (sic) and worshipe bi Infynyt tymes. AMEN; which A. Ed. (perhaps rightly) omit.