Chessman v. Teets (354 U.S. 156)/Dissent Douglas

by William O. Douglas

United States Supreme Court

354 U.S. 156

Chessman  v.  Teets

 Argued: May 13, 1957. --- Decided: June 10, 1957

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice CLARK concurs, dissenting.

I agree with the general principle announced by the Court. But I think it is misapplied here. Its application to the facts results, I fear, in a needless detour in a case already long-drawn-out by many appeals. ^[1]

I agree that in a case like this it matters not whether the petitioner is guilty or innocent, whether his complaint is timely or tardy. We should respect a man's constitutional right whenever or however it is presented to us. My difficulty here is not with any principle the Court announces. My dissent is based on the conviction that, in substance, the requirements of due process have been fully satisfied, that to require more is to exalt a technicality.

To say that the settlement in this case was ex parte is to be technically accurate. But it is not to state the whole story. Chessman was not present in court when the record was settled. Nor was he represented there by a lawyer, for he had over and again refused to allow a state-appointed lawyer to represent him. Chessman, however, played an active role in the process of the settlement of the record. The early draft prepared by Fraser, the new reporter, was sent to him for his suggestions. That Chessman went over this draft with a fine-footh comb is evident from a reading of 200 odd corrections which he prepared. Of these proposals, about 80 were adopted and the rest refused. ^[2] Some of these proposals were specific, calling the court's attention to the use of a wrong word or phrase. Many were not specific. Some merely said that the reported version of certain testimony was garbled or incomplete or inaccurate. These generalized criticisms were never made specific. When Chessman made a generalized criticism, not once did he indicate such and such a fact had been omitted and prejudice shown, how an episode had been distorted and prejudice shown, where a date or name had been confused and prejudice shown, in what material respect an account was garbled and prejudice shown. Errors might have been made that were minor and inconsequential or major and fatal. From all that Chessman said to the California courts and from all he now says to this Court, it is impossible to conclude that there is any important, significant prejudicial error in the record on which the appeal in this case was taken. Certainly we are pointed to none. Only vague assertions are made. Not once is a finger placed on a crucial issue of the case and a showing made or attempted that on that issue the facts were distorted to Chessman's prejudice. The conclusion is irresistible that Chessman is playing a game with the courts, stalling for time while the facts of the case grow cold.

Much time is given to the fact that Fraser, the substitute reporter, was related to the prosecutor and to the fact that Fraser, in reconstructing the record talked with several witnesses for the State. Those circumstances conceivably could give rise to prejudice. Yet not once does Chessman say in what way the words of a witness on a critical issue are distorted so as to cause prejudice to Chessman's appeal. We know that there was no connivance between the prosecutor and the substitute reporter, for such was the finding of the District Court. Chessman v. Teets, 138 F.Supp. 761. And those findings are not subject to challenge, as we limited our grant of certiorari. What we are told-and all that we are told-is that Chessman should have been present in person or by an attorney at the hearing where the record was settled. Error is presumed because he was not present nor represented. But we should presume just the contrary, since Chessman had the opportunity to submit his version and indicate any errors in the reconstructed record and yet came up with no single omission, distortion, falsification, mistake, or error that could reasonably be said to be prejudicial.

A good illustration concerns the main issue on the appeal-the so-called confession obtained from Chessman. The confession was held admissible by the Supreme Court of California. People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 178-182, 238 P.2d 1001, 1008-1011. That was the main point in the petition for certiorari brought here in the 1951 Term. It presented the problem of the effect of prolonged detention by the police on the voluntary character of the confession, the type of problem presented in Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224; Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801; Turner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 69 S.Ct. 1352, 93 L.Ed. 1810; and Harris v. State of South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct. 1354, 93 L.Ed. 1815. The Court denied certiorari. Chessman v. People of State of California, 343 U.S. 915, 72 S.Ct. 650, 96 L.Ed. 1330.

In that petition Chessman claimed what he claims now-that he should have had a hearing on the settlement of the record. And he asserted that, if the transcript had been wholly accurate, it would be obvious that the confession was involuntary, while on the reconstructed record the question was more debatable.

The reconstructed record shows that Chessman was held incommunicado about 72 hours by the police before arraignment. During this time he was beaten to some extent. During this time he was interrogated off and on by the police. Only when he had made an oral confession was he arraigned. Not once in the earlier petition or in the present one or in any other motion paper did Chessman rebut the accuracy of the facts stated in the reconstructed record. He did not, for example, allege he was held longer than 72 hours. He did not say he was beaten more often or more severely than the reconstructed record shows. He did not assert that he was interrogated for longer periods or subjected to a greater ordeal than the reconstructed record states. Yet certainly he knows whether he was or whether he was not.

He advances no fact, no assertion, no evidence to show that on this critical issue in the case-and in my mind the most important one-the reconstructed record is distorted. I would presume accuracy, not error, in any record from any court. I would insist that this defendant make some showing of inaccuracy in a material way before I would send this record back for further reconstruction.

Only once during the long history of this case has Chessman pointed specifically to material inaccuracy or omission in the transcript. His charge of fraud, now set to rest by the findings of the District Court, was predicated upon a conspiracy to have expunged from the record certain specific remarks and instructions of the trial court. These omissions had not been mentioned in the long list of inaccuracies which Chessman submitted to the California courts. And, on these contentions, Chessman has now been given a hearing by the District Court, which found:

'8. The instructions given by the trial judge to the jury on May 21, 1948 were correctly and accurately reported in the transcript as prepared by Fraser. The trial judge did not instruct the jury at that time as alleged and testified to by petitioner. Petitioner's statements in this regard are false and perjurious.

'9. The allegation in the petition that the trial judge stated to the jury on May 21, when instructing them, that 'this defendant is one of the worse (sic) criminals I have had in my court's is false and perjurious. The trial judge made no such statement. Hence the transcript was correct in not including such statement.' 138 F.Supp. at pages 765-766.

To repeat, this is not a case of a helpless man who was given no opportunity to participate in the settlement of the record. He did participate in a real, vivid sense of the term. A lawyer who entered the case by appointment at this late stage would be utterly helpless, for he would have no idea what went on at the trial. When it came to the settlement of the record, California did all that reasonably could be required by sending the reconstructed record to Chessman for criticism. His specific criticisms were often accepted. ^[3] His general criticisms were not. ^[4] Since it was in his power to make the general criticisms specific, he was given that opportunity which due process of law requires. Yet he declined over and again to make the general criticisms specific, asking only that he be present at the hearing.

The habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts has been greatly under fire in recent years. I for one would hate to see it abolished or greatly curtailed by Congress. It has done high service in the administration of justice. Not uncommonly a case that is here on certiorari from a state court presents only darkly or obliquely an important constitutional issue. Perhaps, as in Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, the issue could not be raised at the trial. Perhaps the trial lawyer failed to present it clearly. Perhaps only after the trial were the full facts known. Perhaps the issue was poorly focused in the trial court's charge. On habeas corpus the facts can be fully developed; and perhaps only then can the basic constitutional defect be laid bare. Such, for example, was the situation in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270, 92 L.Ed. 1647; and Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948, where miscarriages of justice were prevented only through the writ of habeas corpus. And see Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 Yale L.J. 50.

But the fragile grounds upon which the present decision rests jeopardize the ancient writ for use by federal courts in state prosecutions. The present decision states in theory the ideal of due process. But the facts of this case cry out against its application here. Chessman has received due process over and again. He has had repeated reviews of every point in his case. The question of the adequacy of the reconstructed record has been here seven times. The question of Chessman's right to participate in the settlement proceedings has been here at least four times. ^[5] Not once before now did a single Justice vote to grant certiorari on that issue. If the failure to let Chessman, or a lawyer acting for him, participate in the hearing on the settlement of the record went to jurisdiction ^[6] (as it must for habeas corpus to issue), then we should have granted certiorari when the Supreme Court of California first held in People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 218 P.2d 769, 19 A.L.R.2d 1084, that the reconstructed record was a proper record for appeal. That decision of the California Supreme Court was announced May 19, 1950. We denied certiorari on October 9, 1950. Chessman v. People of State of California, 340 U.S. 840, 71 S.Ct. 29, 95 L.Ed. 616. Nearly seven years later we return to precisely the same issue and not only grant certiorari but order relief by way of habeas corpus.

On Chessman's first appeal, Justice Carter and Justice Edmonds dissented from the decision of the California Supreme Court, stating that in their view the necessity to use a reconstructed record in a capital case reqired a new trial. 35 Cal.2d 455, 468-473, 218 P.2d 769, 776-780, 19 A.L.R.2d 1084. That view to me makes sense as a matter of state law. But the Court today makes no such ruling. To order, after this long delay, a new record seems to me a futility. It must be remembered that Chessman was convicted on May 21, 1948-over nine years ago. It is difficult to see how, after that long lapse of time, the memory of any participant (if he is still alive) would be sharp enough to make any hearing meaningful. We meddle mischievously with the law when we issue the writ today. We do not act to remedy any injustice that has been demonstrated. When the whole history of the case is considered, we seize upon a technicality to undo what has been repeatedly sustained both by the California Supreme Court and by this Court. I would guard the ancient writ jealously, using it only to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice.

Before his appeal was heard by the California Supreme Court, Chessman moved in that court for orders augmenting and correcting the record, and for a dismissal of his automatic appeal. On May 19, 1950, the California Supreme Court granted the motion for augmentation of the record, insofar as it sought to have added to the transcript the voir dire examination of jurors and the prosecutor's opening statement. Further relief was denied. People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 218 P.2d 769, 19 A.L.R.2d 1084. On June 12, 1950, that court denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus without hearing or opinion. Chessman's petition for a writ of certiorari to review that decision was filed in this Court on July 31, 1950. No. 98, Misc., 1950 Term. In the petition, Chessman urged that he had been denied due process because he was not present at the hearing in which the trial judge considered objections to the transcript. Certiorari was denied on October 9, 1950. Chessman v. People of State of California, 340 U.S. 840, 71 S.Ct. 29, 95 L.Ed. 616.

Chessman then petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus and equitable relief. On December 4, 1950, the District Court discharged its order to show cause and dismissed the petition. On December 27, 1950, the District Court denied Chessman leave to appeal in forma pauperis, and, on January 9, 1951, denied a certificate of probable cause. On February 27, 1951, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for a certificate of probable cause and for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. On April 2, 1951, Chessman petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review that decision of the Court of Appeals, and for leave to file a petition for habeas corpus. No. 442, Misc., 1950 Term. In this Court, Chessman contended that the state court should be enjoined from deciding his pending appeal until it granted him a full hearing on the question of the adequacy of the record. Certiorari and the motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus were denied on May 14, 1951. Chessman v. People of State of California, 341 U.S. 929, 71 S.Ct. 800, 95 L.Ed. 1359.

The California Supreme Court affirmed Chessman's conviction on December 18, 1951. People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001. Chessman filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on February 20, 1952. No. 371, Misc., 1951 Term. In this Court he claimed that he had been denied due process because of the manner in which the record was prepared and particularly because he had been denied an opportunity to prove his factual contentions as to the inaccuracy of the transcript. It was also contended that he had been denied the opportunity to prepare for trial, that the confession introduced against him was coerced, that the prosecution had unfairly presented its case, that his defense had been unreasonably hampered at the trial, and that the statute under which he was sentenced to death was unconstitutional. Certiorari was denied on March 31, 1952. Chessman v. People of State of California, 343 U.S. 915, 72 S.Ct. 650, 96 L.Ed. 1330. Rehearing was denied on April 28, 1952. 343 U.S. 937, 72 S.Ct. 773, 96 L.Ed. 1344.

On May 19, 1952, Chessman filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The District Court denied the petition without hearing on June 9, 1952. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision in May 28, 1953. Chessman v. People, 205 F.2d 128. Petition for a writ of certiorari was filed November 9, 1953. No. 239, Misc., 1953 Term. Here, Chessman contended that he was entitled to a hearing on his contentions in the courts below that he was forced to go to trial unprepared, that coerced confessions had been introduced into evidence against him, that the prosecution and judge were guilty of misconduct. It was alleged that some of these matters could not have been properly determined by the California Supreme Court because of inadequacies in the record, which, it was alleged, had been fraudulently prepared without giving him the opportunity to prove the inaccuracy or fraud. Certiorari was denied on December 14, 1953. Chessman v. People of State of California, 346 U.S. 916, 74 S.Ct. 278, 98 L.Ed. 412. Rehearing was denied on February 1, 1954. 347 U.S. 908, 74 S.Ct. 430, 98 L.Ed. 1066.

On July 16, 1954, Chessman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of California. That petition was denied July 21, 1954, without written opinion. Collateral proceedings are: In re Chessman, 43 Cal.2d 296, 273 P.2d 263; In re Chessman, 43 Cal.2d 391, 274 P.2d 645; In re Chessman, 43 Cal.2d 408, 274 P.2d 645, 655. Chessman's petition for a writ of certiorari was filed August 14, 1954. No. 285, 1954 Term. He contended that the trial transcript had been fraudulently prepared by the prosecutor, reporter and trial judge. On October 25, 1954, certiorari was denied 'without prejudice to an application for a writ of habeas corpus in an appropriate United States District Court.' Chessman v. People of State of California, 348 U.S. 864, 75 S.Ct. 85, 95 L.Ed. 681.

Chessman applied to the United States District Court for the Northern Division of California for a writ of habeas corpus on December 30, 1954. The District Court dismissed the petition without a hearing on January 4, 1955. In re Chessman, 128 F.Supp. 600. On January 11, 1955, Chief Judge Denman of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a certificate of probable cause for appeal. Application of Chessman, 219 F.2d 162. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, on April 7, 1955, affirmed the District Court decision. Chessman v. Teets, 221 F.2d 276. Petition for a writ of certiorari was filed June 30, 1955. No. 196, 1955 Term. It was alleged that prejudicial statements of the trial judge at the trial had been deleted from the transcript as a result of a fraudulent conspiracy between the prosecuting attorney and the court reporter. It was also alleged that Chessman's right to be present at the 'vital stage of the proceedings' to settle the record had been 'summarily ignored.' On October 17, 1955, certiorari was granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case remanded to the District Court for a hearing on Chessman's allegations of fraud. Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3, 76 S.Ct. 34, 100 L.Ed. 4.

Hearings were ordered in the District Court, commencing January 9, 1956. Hearings were commenced on January 16, after Chessman was granted two continuances. The hearing lasted 7 days. Finding that there had been no fraud, and that the trial judge's statements and instructions to the jury had been accurately reported, the District Court discharged the writ on January 31, 1956. Chessman v. Teets, 138 F.Supp. 761. The Court of Appeals affirmed on October 18, 1956. Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205. Rehearing was denied on November 20, 1956. Chessman's seventh petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on February 1, 1957. No. 566, Misc., 1956 Term. We granted certiorari, limiting it to the question whether Chessman's failure to be represented in person or by counsel at the settlement proceedings deprived him of due process of law, thus excluding review on the issue of fraud. See 353 U.S. 928, 77 S.Ct. 720, 1 L.Ed.2d 722.

Notes

1. See the Appendix to this opinion.
2. These include many that relate to the crime of burglary, of which he was acquitted.
3. The trial judge resolved doubts in favor of the defendant. Thus he ruled 'The amendment * * * is ordered as suggested by the appellant, not because the Court has any recollection of that but to give the appellant the benefit of the doubt in the matter.'
4. A typical ruling by the trial court on a general objection is as follows:
5. See the Appendix to this opinion.
6. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461.