China in Revolt/China and the Capitalist World
CHINA AND THE CAPITALIST
WORLD.
A Speech Delivered by Comrade Manuilsky.
I should like to direct the attention of the whole Comintern upon the Pacific problem as a whole, viz., upon the conflicts which develop where the paths of three Continents, America, Asia and Europe, cross one another. Three imperialist powers stand face to face there: The United States of North America, Japan and Great Britain.
The armed clash which may break out there in the future, will be of unimaginable violence and serious consequences. If prior to this fateful moment, no decisive battle has taken place between proletariat and bourgeoisie in England or the United States, if, until then the victorious Chinese national revolution does not change international relations on the shores of the Pacific, we may witness a war which, with respect to its grimness and the extent of its losses, will put the great imperialist war of 1914–18 in the shade. The British military writer, Bywater, defines the importance of the Pacific Ocean in the coming imperialist wars as follows:
"When, on November 21st, 1918, the German war fleet surrendered unconditionally to the victors, this meant the close of a brief but fateful chapter in the history of the struggle for the seas (the author had in mind the struggle in the North Sea between the German and British fleets). The next chapter begins in August 1919 when the newly created Pacific fleet of the United States passed through the Panama Canal on its way to its naval base in San Francisco."
And not only Bywater, but also a number of other military writers in America, Japan and Great Britain, are of the opinion that after the world war, which bled Europe white, after the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, the epoch of Pacific imperialism has dawned.
In the United States a law has been passed against Japanese immigration which arouses the deepest indignation of the Japanese people. One need only follow up the Japanese press, or give heed to the expressions of Japanese, military circles, in order to become aware of the full reality of the menace of a Pacific war. This is evidenced by last year's naval maneuvers off the Hawaiian Islands, which taught that this American naval base could be captured by Japan in the fight for the Pacific. The United States and Great Britain, are watching with great uneasiness the process of Japanese colonization on the shores of the Pacific.
Japan, a nation of 60 million inhabitants, tightly crowded upon the limited area of its islands (Nippon, Sikok and Kui-Siu) has a natural pressure towards the Philippines, towards the Malay Archipelago, towards the innumerable little islands scattered over the immeasurable surface of the Pacific Ocean. The British Dominion, Australia, is busy stirring up the nationalist passions of the white race, through its capitalist press reports on the "yellow peril". In order to justify the military fortification of Singapore, the British press exploits Japanese naval armaments and war preparations, by describing in detail the capacity of the Japanese guns, and by representing the launching of every new Japanese torpedo boat as a sign of the coming Japanese offensive against the old countries of capitalist culture. And in fact the naval program of 1923, which is to be completed in 1928, gives reason for some concern. Despite the restriction of the Washington Conference it has been possible for Japan to build a new fleet of 25 light cruisers, 90 destroyers, and 70 submarines.
In Japan itself, an active nationalist agitation is being carried on, directed primarily against the United States, as the power which stands in the way of Japan's further development, and which condemns it to colonial enslavement. In Japan the threatened war in the Pacific is discussed openly and unconcealed; speeches are made about it, whole books are written, plans are worked out for supplying Japan with raw materials in case of a blockade, etc. To be sure, this war factions sometimes veiled over by modern trade and financial relations which appear in the "peaceful guise" of an economic collaboration.
It is well-known e. g. that Japan is greatly interested in the American market for its export of silk and tea. Aside from this, Japan, as a result of its serious losses during the 1923 earthquake, was in need of American credit. The United States exploited this circumstance and penetrated more and more into Japan. Yet even if we discount a good part of the exaggeration inherent in this militarist agitation, the tremendous importance of the Pacific problem nevertheless remains an undeniable fact.
The Comintern, however, has devoted too little attention to this problem in the past: we were too much a European International. We were inclined to look all problems of world politics and of the international labor movement through the prism of European relations. Parties directly involved in the Pacific problem, such as the American and British, are also devoting but inadequate attention to it. Only after the outbreak of the Chinese national revolution did the question of conflicts in the Far East arouse our interest, and we looked attentively into the crystallizing grouping of forces on the Pacific. Yet the Chinese Revolution we have also thus far considered from the viewpoint of its perspectives of internal development; and we lay too little weight upon its significance as a factor which revolutionizes Pacific relationships as a whole.
The struggle in China, which raged for decades before the world war, 1914–1918, was a struggle for the partition of Asia, Here there met the imperialist paths of czarist Russia, Japan and Great Britain, In 1904 and 1905 the struggle between czarist Russia and Japan took place here, and from it Japan emerged firmly entrenched. Until recently, China was one of the objects of the struggle on the Pacific. By China's appearance as the subject of an active national revolutionary policy in Asia, it completely overturns "all analysis" and prophecies which military and Pacific experts have made concerning the probable grouping of forces. All these people proceeded from the premise of a split-up China, rendered powerless by internal conflicts, a country whose inescapable fate it is to be divided up into spheres of influence. They took as their starting point the ratio system between the United States, Japan and Great Britain, established by the Washington conference, without taking into consideration the new, potentially powerful factor of future Chinese policy.
The Chinese revolution can under certain conditions, first, hasten the armed clash of Big Powers on the a Pacific—"a possibility that bourgeois experts on the Pacific problem" put off for a number of years; second, it will exert a revolutionizing influence on the movement of all Asia, especially India, whose national-revolutionary movement seems to have been ebbing somewhat in recent years. This is likewise a point in the sharpening of antagonisms on the Pacific. That this view of the role of the Chinese Revolution is entirely justified is proven by the Indonesian uprising. This uprising also (side by side with the Chinese Revolution) moves the Pacific problem into the foreground.
There is ferment also in the Philippines. This summer Calvin Coolidge, the president of the United States, sent a certain Colonel Thompson on an investigation tour of the Philippines where agitation had been aroused among the population over the American plans to establish rubber plantations there. The honorable colonel returned with an extraordinarily optimistic report that the population of the Philippines had no strivings for independence but instead entertained a passionate desire to plant rubber for Mr. Firestone. At the same time, he was compelled to admit, however, that "the propaganda of certain politicians for the independence of the Philippines was finding response among the less-cultured strata."
At the present time there can be no great colonial movement that fails to cut deeply into the diplomatic web of international relations of the big capitalist bandits. Such a movement radically changes the relation of forces between them, sharpens their struggles, and stimulates their appetite. The Chinese Revolution and the colonial revolutionary movements have prospects of success because they occur at a time in which antagonisms on the Pacific are not lessening, but sharpening. A third circumstance that plays a certain role in the sharpening of the rivalry in the Pacific is the question of the British dominions. The struggle between Great Britain and the United States over such dominions as Canada, Australia, etc. is well-known. Under the pressure of extraordinary political and economic difficulties, England is more and more forced to orientate itself towards its colonies and dominions. Voices are already being heard in the British press asking whether it would not be better for Great Britain "to turn its back to Europe" and to direct its whole forces to the maintenance, regulation and establishment of closer economic relations with all the far-flung parts of the Empire scattered over land and sea. If England should actually embark upon this course, it would in a certain sense signify the victory of the policy of Pacific orientation.
Finally, the actuality of the Pacific problem is increased by changes within world economy. The whole post-war development was characterized by the shifting, slowly but uninterruptedly, of the center of gravity of world economy to the overseas countries. The tremendous development of capitalism in the United States goes hand in hand with a similar development in a whole series of "virgin countries"—Argentine, Brazil, Canada, Australia, etc. If a great economic crisis does not lead to an economic collapse here, then only an armed struggle on the Pacific Coast can create an immediate revolutionary situation in these overseas countries.
The great importance to world economy of the Asiatic and Pacific colonies must also be taken into consideration, If we take e. g. the share of Asia and of Europe in world trade, we find that Asia's share has risen considerably from the beginning of the world war to 1923. Thus in 1913 Europe's share in world trade amounted to 64,2%, while Asia's share amounted to only 10,1%. But in 1923 Europe's share was 51,9%, while that of Asia was 14,2%.
This phenomena as a whole forces us to enter more deeply into the antagonisms in the Pacific. From the beginning they are to be considered under a dual viewpoint:
1. as to the object of an investigation concerning a possible war in this section of the capitalist front so far removed from Europe;
2. as an investigation of the perspectives of the Chinese revolution in the light of the ripening antagonisms on the Pacific.
Before going into these, I should like to remark on this latter point that the whole constellation of forces on the Pacific, and primarily the relation of forces between the United States and Japan, gives us the possibility of predicting the victory of the Canton Government with some certainty. We have not the slightest occasion for pessimism. If the Canton Government, while simultaneously consolidating its internal situation by means of a closer alliance with the peasantry, will be able to exploit these contradictions skilfully, then it will undoubtedly emerge victorious from the Chinese toling masses' present herioc struggle for their national liberation.
American Imperialism in the Fight for the Pacific.
The objective role of attacker on the Pacific will in the future be played by the United States of North America, while the objective role of defenders falls to Great Britain and Japan. American imperialism is intricately bound up with the struggle for world hegemony. In the coming world war, if the fate of humanity is not previously fundamentally remodelled by the proletarian revolution, American imperialism will play the leading role. America is already arming now for this war on the Pacific; there is already an extensive literature which discusses this question in detail; and even the very time (1931–33) is set; plans of operations are described; in brief, the picture which we had several years before the war in Europe, is beginning to resurrect itself. At that time, prior to the world war, one could find in military literature detailed drafts of the German attack upon Belgium, which were later, in the first days of August 1914, carried into effect with photographic fidelity.
The whole development of American imperialism in the last 25 years testifies that this relentlessly approaching struggle on the Pacific is in no sense a creation of fantasy. The ruling classes also recognize this. Prof. Holl, of Sydney University, one of the most prominent experts on Pacific problems, expressed himself in the situation in the Pacific as follows:
"In studying the situation which has arisen on the Pacific," he said three months ago, "one cannot avoid a deep concern. This talk of the Pacific taking the place of the Atlantic as the international arena, must not be taken lightly. Precisely on the Pacific the apparatus for the settlement of international conflicts is weaker than anywhere."
And the same Holl complains with lyrical sorrow, that no such institution as the League of Nations prevails in the Pacific:
"The League of Nations, despite its shortcomings, is a body that tries to be of service in international questions (!). Yet it is impossible to turn to the League of Nations in any more important conflict because the United States is not a member."
It is, of course, an entirely debatable question as to how far the League of Nations can be an instrument "for settlement of international conflicts". Yet it is extraordinarily symptomatic of the entire international situation that it is just the Pacific Ocean which is not subject to the influence of even so powerless an institution like the European League of Nations.
The notorious Washington Conference (1921) gave rise to certain pacifist illusions, because it put a check on the growth of naval armaments. Yet it eliminated neither the cause nor the chances of the conflict, it merely deferred them. Prior to this conference, American imperialism worked tirelessly and persistently on the strengthening of its military-strategical positions in the fight for the Pacific, for the markets of the Far East. In 1898, as a result of the Spanish-American war, the Americans took Cuba from the Spaniards, an Island near the shores of Central America and the key to the Atlantic side of the future Panama Canal. At the same time, the United States annexed also another Island, Porto Rico, which is of great importance in guarding the entrance of the Panama Canal.
An additional result of the Spanish-American war was the annexation of the Philippines at the entrance of the South China Sea, on the Asiatic shores of the Pacific Ocean. The Philippines can be compared to a revolver, the muzzle of which is pointed at Japan. The revolver is dangerous, because at the very opening of the war it could be captured by Japan, since the Philippines lie opposite the Japanese naval base of Formosa. Yet the Philippines have economic importance also for the United States. It is well-known that the United States are absolutely dependent upon Britain for their supply of rubber. Investigations undertaken recently have shown that climatic and soil conditions are favorable for the raising of rubber in the Southern part of the islands. On the island of Mindanao and the small islands adjacent there can be accomodated at least 1,500,000 rubber trees which will produce approximately 200,000 tons of rubber, enough to supply the world market.
In the same year, 1898, the United States, by skilful utilization of the revolutionary movement in the Hawaiian Islands (on the way between the American Pacific coast and the Philippines), annexed also these islands and transformed them into one of the chief links in the chain of naval bases on the Pacific Ocean. In order to comprehend the importance of these islands in the struggle for the Pacific, one must take into consideration the fact that not a single ship can sail across the Pacific and back without at least running into one of their harbors. Aside from the Hawaiian Islands there is not another point on the Pacific where ships can supply themselves with coal and fresh water. Thanks to this importance the Hawaiian Islands might to a certain extent be reckoned as the Gibraltar of the Pacific Ocean. Here upon these islands at Pearl Harbor the American navy concentrates its aeroplane fleet consisting of 150 aeroplanes. A fleet of submarines alternative with torpedo boats. The dry dock can accomodate simultaneously a dreadnought and a cruiser. The range of the radio station in Hawaii includes China, Australia, and New York. In concrete barracks there is infantry equipped for gas warfare, mine throwers, ete. This is the switch-yard of the coming war in the Pacific Ocean. Only very recently the United States assigned 20 million dollars for further fortifications on Hawaii.
All these annexations were only the prelude to a step that is of dominant importance for the imperialist offensive of the United States on the Pacific—the building of the Panama Canal which was completed in August 1914. The cannons' roar of the imperialist war drowned out this event that signified a new Pacific epoch of American foreign policy, so that as a result it failed to receive the attention it deserved. But only after the opening of the Panama Canal which saved the, American fleet 8–10,000 miles and the hazardous trip around Tiera del Fuego and through the Magellan Straits, could American imperialism write upon its banners Roosevelt's words: "In the history of mankind there begins a Pacific era," and "the domination of the Pacific must belong to the United States." At the same time it must also be noted that the Washington Confernce, (which naive pacifist sheets designated as the beginning of a "peaceful" period in the development of Pacific relations), was nothing other than the carrying out of American plans of advance in the Pacific. At this very conference, the United States succeeded in isolating Japan and in breaking off the latter's alliance with Great Britain. A war by America, against the combined Anglo-Japanese fleet would have been an extremely difficult task. Japan, thanks to its military-strategic position, and its system of coastal fortifications, is almost impregnable against attack from the sea. It could be overcome only by a blockade extending over a period of years. But such a blockade is impossible for the American fleet if at the same time it must fight the British navy with its two strong bases on the Asiatic coast, in Hongkong and Singapore. From this standpoint the Washington Conference has strengthened the diplomatic position of the United States, while the possibility of a war between Japan and America is by no means eliminated, but on the contrary, it is increased. This military-strategic preparation on the part of America was in conformity also with its economic expansion.
The Essence of American "Pacifism".
In its economic program of expansion, American pacifism has passed through three stages:
Firstly, the Monroe Doctrine. The origin of this doctrine, "America for the Americans," coincided in point of time with that period in the development of the United States in which the markets of North and South America were the highest goal of the American bourgeoisie.
Secondly, at the end of the 19th century, when capitalism in the United States, as a result of its turbulent development, felt itself restricted within these confines, when the American bourgeoisie for the first time turned its eyes to the Pacific and to the Chinese markets, American capitalism unfurled a new banner upon which was blazoned the program of the "Open Door." The "Open Door" is the policy of every rising young imperialism that comes into the world somewhat belated, i. e. when the world is already divided among other capitalist rivals, When the United States made its appearance in China, it found that country under the practically unrestricted influence of Japan and Great Britain. Great Britain was the first capitalist country which had gained a foothold in China. With the aid of Hongkong, its frontier posts in the Far East, which had been occupied in 1842 under the terms of the Nanking Treaty, England had been working for decades in consolidating and extending its strongholds in China. On the other hand, however, the geographical situation of Japan made it easier for this young Japanese capitalism, which at the beginning of the 20th century was already considerably developed, to penetrate into China. The virile Japanese imperialism crowded England out of its strongholds step by step. Even though Japanese capital was still weak in Japan itself, it penetrated industry, stock companies, and participated as largest shareholder in the banks. It requires only a glance at the curve of Chinese imports from Japan and Great Britain to convince us of the rapid tempo of advance of Japanese capital in China. Thus in 1870 British imports constituted 37% of the total, Japanese about 2%. In 1923 British imports declined to 18%, Japanese rose to 23%. Thus matters stood when the United States appeared on the scene. In 1910, American imports in China amounted to about 5%, while in 1923 it had already outstripped Great Britain and amounted to 16%. The unsuccessful tariff conference of this year indicates the differences of interest that exist between the United States and Great Britain. Thus e. g. American exports to Asia prior to the war, amounted to only 4,6% of the total, while they rose to 12%, and thereby became a powerful competitor against English trade, which, in addition had been injured by the boycott. What else is there for American imperialism in China, than a policy of the "Open Door"?
The third phase of development of American imperialism begins after the world war of 1914–18, after the economic collapse of Europe which followed this war. The Dawes Plan is a program of the enslavement of European industrial countries by the far stronger American imperialism. American imperialism no longer contents itself with the countries of Asia, but it invades Europe. In addition to Germany, it also "cleaned up" Austria, it prepares "sanitation plans" for French finances, slinks unobserved into Italy, etc.
Each of these three periods of development of American imperialism also found its expression in the foreign policy of the United States. In view of the three expansion trends of the United States—America, Asia, Europe—this foreign policy is extremely complicated. In the struggle for the American continent the United States comes into sharp conflict with the annexation desires of British imperialism. In Canada as well as in Mexico and Brazil, and also in Chile and other smaller nations of the American continent, a stubborn battle for influence over these countries has been in progress for some years between the United States and Great Britain. This antagonism is extremely sharpened by the struggle of these strongest imperialist states over oil and rubber resources (America controls more than 70% of the total oil production, while England has practically a monopoly of the rubber supply).
The rubber war which we have witnessed for more than a year, has given renewed indication of the original sourses of these antagonisms between the United States and Great Britain. With no less clarity however, they appear also on the Asiatic Continent, where an economic rivalry is going on over the Chinese markets between American and English imperialism. This is the first factor which determines the policy of American imperialism, it is pushing America into an armed conflict on the Pacific with Great Britain. In the same manner in which the World war of 1914 was in the main determined by the British-German competition, the future world war will be a struggle between the United States and Great Britain for the position of world leadership. Only under two premises would this perspective be vitiated: if the proletarian revolution were to break out in these countries before the armed clash between them comes to a head, or else, if the disintegration of the British Empire takes on a more rapid tempo than heretofore, and if Great Britain were to be crowded out and forced to vacate its dominant position.
Much more complicated is the "European" policy of American imperialism. The distance between the United States and Europe is too great to permit the former to exert, today, any direct intervention in European affairs. Even in Asia, in the fight with Japan, the U. S. A. tries to shove forward a third power. All the more so does it avoid a direct mixing into European affairs. American imperialism intends to play, in our century, the same role that Great Britain played in the 19th century with respect to the Continent. The U. S. A. will exploit European antagonisms and make use of first one and then another of the bourgeois states or groups as the instruments of its policy. Thus far England has to a certain extent been the instrument of American policy. Yet it is by no means excluded. that the present rapprochement between France and Germany will be utilized by the U. S. A. against England. Yet precisely this need of America for some big power to serve as its tool is the cause of the prevalent "Anglo-American collaboration." This was the second, "European," face of American imperialist policy. This comrades, as e. g.. Comrade Radek, who put this phase of Anglo-American relations into the foreground, make the mistake of "Europeanizing" this phenomenon too much. It is obvious that this "collaboration" of American and British capital in Europe could not be without effect upon Anglo-American relations also in other parts of the world. But anyone who draws from this the conclusion of a lasting collaboration, who sees in this the decisive point of Anglo-American relations, embarks upon the road of vulgar pacifism. The "European pacifism" of the U.S. A. is a transitory policy determined by the fact that America is not prepared for direct intervention in European affairs. This "Pacifism," which for the time being contents itself with economic expansion, is no new phenomenon, for the history of diplomacy gives a plentitude of simalar expressions of "love of peace."
American Policy in China.
That American imperialism is by no means peaceable is clear from the whole history of its preparations for war on the Pacific. But even here the offensive of American imperialism takes on special forms. The military-strategic situation, the naval forces, and the coast defenses of the United States are for the time being still such as to serve only a defensive war. On the Pacific coast, all the way from the most important naval base in Puget Sound down to the border fortress at San Diego, a whole series of important points of naval importance are fortified, including the important harbor of San Francisco. These forts and naval bases guard the United States from attacks that might be made upon it from the Pacific.
The American navy is worse off, however, when it comes to offensive operations. Modern naval warfare demands, for successful operations on the seas, naval bases be not more than 500 miles apart. Nevertheless America has points of naval support on the Pacific, such as the Philippines, Pearl Harbor, etc., which because of the vast distances separating them from one another cannot insure the fighting efficiency of the American fleet. Sufficient to point out that the Philippines lie 7000 miles away from San Francisco, and Pearl Harbor 2100 miles from San Francisco and 4800 miles from the Philippines. Tm addition Japan would probably take possession of the Philippines, so close to the Asiatic coast, immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. Everybody knows this—that the capture of the Philippines will be the first task of the Japanese fleet. On this question America entertains no illusions whatever. Japan is furthermore irresistible on its strategic naval front, from the northern entrance to the Sea of Japan down to the southern section of the East China Sea.
Japan is much worse off on its flanks. In America there is being considered a project whereby, simultaneously with naval operations, a land army is to invade the shores of Japan. Theoretically such an attack could be executed by thrusts from two directions: 1) from the North, from Alaska, by way of Kamchatka in the southern Arctic Ocean down to northern Manchuria; b) from the South, through a landing on the coast of the South China Sea, (French Indo-China), and then into South and Central China. But both of these plans are bound up with tremendous hazards that the troops, transport, etc. may be sunk—and this contradiction between the economically aggressive role of American imperialism, and its military-strategic possibilities, determines the attitude of the United States towards China.
The United States has an interest in the rising of a more or less powerful State in eastern Asia, capable of challenging Japan for the domination of the Asiatic peoples of the Far East. Hence the "neutral" watchful-waiting attitude of the United States towards the military struggles now taking place in China. If the worst comes to the worst the United States is even ready to make a settlement with a victorious Canton Government, since the practical Yankees weigh the perspectives of the Chinese revolution from a business standpoint.
When the armed struggle is ended and the unification of China accomplished, and there enters the phase of economic construction, then the U. S. S. R. will be the only State honestly ready to support the economic resurrection of China. Yet the Americans assume that the U. S. 8. R. will for a long time be unable to come to the aid of the Chinese working masses on the economic field. The American imperialists are of the opinion that then their hour will have come. The workers and peasants of China will be compelled by force of circumstances to introduce the "American NEP.", and then it will be easy for the United States to make itself master of China. But once American imperialism has taken economic root in China, it will not be difficult for it to break the Japanese rule and to reject Japan's claims for mastery over the Eastern shore of the Pacific Ocean.
Only through such an economic enslavement can China become the arena of the struggle between the United States and Japan. For the same reason American imperialism considers it wise, in contrast to the brutal unadaptable British policy, to appear in China in white gloves. It prefers to apply the contributions which China must pay for the Boxer uprising, for "cultural" purposes for the Chinese. In the mission societies, American imperialism has an army to propagate its influence. It seeks to entice the Chinese bourgeois into American universities because it realizes that in the future they can be utilized as agents of American expansion in China. All these things are only an advance payment on a profitable business. The interest will have to be paid in the future by the toiling masses of China. This is the essence of American policy. There seems to be little use in discussing these questions with American jingoes.
The question once raised by Lenin for the Russian Revolution "Who—and for whom?" is certainly no idle question for the Chinese toiling masses. Great dangers await the great Chinese revolution on the day after its victory. They lie also at present in the web of international interests surrounding China. American imperialism is now the most dangerous, the most cunning, the strongest enemy of the toiling Chinese masses. If the national revolution were to pass into bourgeois channels it would have the "bourgeois democracy" in its wake. But the American imperialists are going to miscalculate, they are bound to miscalculate because they overlook the historical role which China is called upon to play in Asia and on the Pacific. That unclear Pan-Asiatic movement which Japan has thus far endeavored to master, which it has been trying to give the character of a race movement in order to turn it into a tool of its imperialist policy, will unquestionably take on a new face through the victory of the Chinese workers' and peasants' revolution. It will turn into-a vast movement of the Asiatic countries oppressed by world imperialism, for their liberation from the imperialist yoke. Japan, which jointly with the white imperialists played an active role in the suppression of the Boxer uprising in 1900, will not fulfil this mission. Only revolutionary China is qualified for this task, and this movement of the Asiatic peoples will be directed against Japanese imperialism as well as that of England and America.
At the same time liberated China will become the magnet for all the peoples of the yellow race, who inhabit the Philippines, Indonesia, and the numerous islands of the Pacific. China will become a major power on the Pacific; it will become a menacing threat for the capitalist world of three continents. China must inevitably clash with American imperialism because the problem of spreading its gigantic population out over the Pacific confronts it even more intensely than it does Japan. China will fulfil this task among the island inhabitants of the Pacific, not with fire and sword, but bound up with the process of the revolutionization of the native population. Yet this is not the most important task of the moment. The Kuomintang Party is now confronted with the chief problem of how it can exploit the antagonisms between the powers that encircle China in order to foster the cause of the revolution. America's position makes possible greater maneuvering. The plans of American imperialism constitute a terrifying economic and military-strategic menace to Japan.
Japan’s Policy in China.
American advances in China involve the very existence of Japanese imperialism. For Japan it is a question of—to be or not to be. This very danger may contribute to the hastening of the armed clash upon the Pacific between the U. S. A. and Japan. For Japan, China is a vast reservoir of raw material; it is to China that Japanese capital is exported. Manchuria is an especially important field into which Japanese capital is penetrating. Japan has no iron, its whole war industry to a large extend depends upon China. Japan contains only 0,1% of the world's iron supply. It receives about 40% of the iron required for industry from China, the balance from the U. S. A. and Great Britain, Japan has a powerful navy, and excellent imperialist army, yet if it is cut off from China, this means the loss of iron and steel supplies and a still greater dependence upon the capitalist countries against which it must wage war in the future. Therefore Japanese capitalism is to an increased extent concerned simultaneously with the import of iron from China, in penetrating into the centres of the metal industry itself, especially in the provinces of Shantung and partically Hankow, in order to grab the overwhelming majority of metal works.
In the summer of this year the "New York American" published a sensational document. It was a secret document of the Japanese General Staff on the question of preparatory measures to be taken by Japan in case of a war with the United States. This document appeared in the American press on June 6 and would be worthy of publication in full, were I not prevented by the narrow limits of my report. This document discloses the importance of China, particularly Manchuria, as a base of supplies during the war. The contents of the document can be summarized under four points: a) only the exploitation of the rich natural wealth of Manchuria and in parts also of Korea (iron, coal, oil, food supplies) will enable Japan properly to organize its defense; b) the necessity to establish an extensive net work of railways throughout Manchuria and Korea for the transport of the products; c) the guarantee of free sea passages across the Korean Straits and sea of Japan; d) the advisability of of a "policy of friendship" on the part of Japan towards China in order to assure the realization of the Japanese program of exploitation.
Important for Japan is also China's role with respect to coal exports. Thus of the total Japanese imports of coal, 80% come from China and Shantung. The same also applies to cotton; if Japan desires to free its textile industry from dependence upon America, Yet in China itself, Japan has concentrated more than a third of the textile industry in its hands, whereas British capital has captured only 5% of the textile factories. These figures alone do not give an exact picture, because Japan has used the crisis in the Chinese textile industry to buy up a part of the Chinese textile industry which outwardly continues to appear as "Chinese" enterprises. Japanese railway capital now holds first place. Even though Japan has no such banks as the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank which in practice handles all currency questions, it has nevertheless 31 smaller banks. And in recent times, especially after the Hongkonk events, Japan has made still further headway in China. It is sufficient to point out that Japan's favorable balance of trade with China during the first quarter of this year has doubled in comparison with the same period last year. Thanks to low wages in China, the profit of the Japanese capitalists in the textile industry takes on literally terrific dimensions. Thus, e. g. certain Japanese textile enterprises in China pay their stockholders 150% dividends. The military-strategic and the economic interests of Japan are too deeply anchored in China to tolerate a realization of the American plan. From this the laboring masses of China can draw three different conclusions: a) it must be taken into consideration already now that further American advance in China will compel Japan to launch a preventive war sooner than the American and Japanese war literature predicts, provided Japan succeeds in assuring British neutrality in this war. b) It must be considered that if this war on the Pacific breaks out before the unification of China, Japan will make a predatory attempt to occupy China in order to make herself master of the vital arteries required for its defense and for its industry. c) Of most practical importance for the present foreign policy of the Kuomintang is the circumstance that Japan is interested in preserving friendly relations with China precisely with an eye on future wars in the Pacific.
It may be predicted that if the Canton government succeeds by means of the Northern expedition not only in extending but also consolidating its basis, Japan will go over to a certain "defensive policy' and prefer to keep Northern China in its hands with the aid of Chang-Tso-lin rather than plunge into a dangerous adventure and thereby mobilize still broader masses of the Chinese people against itself. That such a perspective is by no means impossible is shown by the latest note of the Japanese government to Canton containing the four well-known questions as to whether the Canton government has the intention of extending the revolution into other countries, of establishing a Communist order in China, etc. Such questions would only give evidence of a more or less astounding naivite of Japanese diplomacy if they did not simultaneously serve the purposes of cloaking Japan's change from its former policy in China. Already since the Hongkong strike the Japanese have really dissociated themselves from the brutal British policy of conquest in China, thereby leaving the British alone to receive the blows of the national revolutionary movement. Japan's policy of an actual recognition of the Canton government is based upon the hope, on the basis of race relationship, to find sympathy with the Right Wing of the Kuomintang for a new alliance. Further more the Japanese cannot disregard the fact that an economic revival of China offers big possibilities to the marketing of Japanese industrial products. First of all the Chinese market is closest to Japan, secondly, the Japanese merchants have better knowledge of the market than have the others, and thirdly, the Japanese goods are, quality for quality, cheaper and more fit to meet the low purchasing power of the Chinese population.
But what is the promise of such a Japanese policy to British imperialism? Its complete isolation. The attempt of the British, after the massacre in Wanhsien, to bring about a joint intervention of all three Pacific powers, resulted in a failure. This failure reminded British imperialism that the times of Boxer uprising suppressions are gone for ever. Those methods with which the brazen British colonizers ruled in China, those unequal treaties like the treaty of Nankin, of Tsientsin in 1856, of Peking 1860, with the aid of which Britain created a privileged position for itself and burdened China with contributions—those methods must take their place in the archives of the British Museum. If Great Britain does not want to lose the positions it has conquered in the Far East, it must keep up with the times. This appears to be dawning even upon such conservative newspapers as the "Morning Post." Of late voices are heard more and more in England demanding a change of policy in China. British imperialism in China already looks like a whipped dog who has his tail between his legs and looks around in all directions for some way in which to carry off safely what he has stolen. It is the task of the Chinese revolution to give this dangerous thieving cur its death blow.
British imperialism is the deadly, most implacable foe of the Chinese revolution. America and Japan have not yet ruled in Asia, they are first making their imperialist bid for mastery. England is already an Asiatic State which must be driven from the strongholds it has build upon the Asiatic continent. And this struggle of the toiling masses of Asia against the British robbers is likewise one of the factors that may accelerate the bloody solution on the Pacific. Capitalist England, which in China is already being held in an iron ring by America and Japan, looks uneasily upon the possibility of a coming American expansion to China, and is making desperate efforts to launch a war to be fought by others. The fortification of the Singapore naval base which took place after England had signed the Washington treaty, proved that British Admiralty by no means considers impossible such a solution of the present struggle for Asia, for China and for the Pacific. The British government intends to spend about 9½ million pounds for the building of this naval base. If we are to credit the "Times" vast preparations are already in progress for the building of this base; dredges are at work, buildings are springing up like mushrooms, branch railway lines are being built, a gigantic naphtha station is being established.
Whither will the mouths of the guns of this naval base be pointed? Primarily against Japan, but what is even more important, is that these guns will also be directed against revolutionary China. It seems to me that we are underestimating the importance of this latter fact. The Communist press of all countries, and especially the British comrades, would otherwise have made some stir about it. This is not as yet to be observed. But the British Admiralty does not content itself with the naval base at Singapore. The British Admiralty has long had the intention to establish a naval base at Port Darwin, on the Northern coast of Australia for the protection of that dominion and New Zealand. Furthermore, there also crops up, after the seizure by England of the German colony "Bismarck Archipelago" after the war, the question of creating a new naval base in the German built town of Rabole, on Blanche Bay. The location of this naval base would be so central that neither Port Darwin nor any other Australian base could be compared with it. The naval base in Blanche Bay would be a new Malta in the heart of the Pacific. The Washington Conference forbade the British the establishment of this base, but the Washington treaty expires in 1931.
The future will show how these systematic preparations for war on the Pacific will end. It is difficult to make any predictions because of the complicated relations on the Pacific coasts. Yet two phases in the development of the Pacific conflict can be predicted with tolerable certainty. The first phase is the struggle of the United States against Japan. While England did tear up its treaty with Japan at the Washington Conference, it made no alliance with the United States. It kept its hands free and only made the reservation that in case of complications on.the Pacific a preliminary conference would be called of the four powers which signed the Washington treaty. This position enables England, in case of a war, to maneuver and to orientate itself in accordance with the situation. On the one hand it takes over the role of an arbitrator who sells his neutrality at the highest possible price, on the other hand, it is the one that eggs on others into war in order, when the foes clash, to seize the fruits of victory for itself. And the Washington treaty gives England the chance, in case of a war between the United States and Japan, of either remaining neutral or else participating in the war either on the side of Japan or the United States.
The present grouping of forces makes the second possibilty at least likely. It is now clear that England's intervention on the side of Japan would have the immediate result of its losing Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Japanese mastery of the Pacific subjects these dominions to a constant threat of attack. And if Canada, Australia or New Zealand feel themselves mutually bound up with the metropolis, this is only because the latter protects them from foreign attacks. The question of the Dominions, in the present phase of antagonisms on the shores of the Pacific, is the point that impels Great Britain, in case of a Japanese-American war, to an alliance with the United States. Hence the prospect of a joint attack by England the United States against Japan seems more likely. England is interested no less than the U. S. A. in the elimination of Japanese competition in the Far East, primarily in China. England could combine with Japan for a joint struggle only if the separation process of the Dominions was already so far advanced as to call into question the continued existence of the Empire. Nothing further would be left for British imperialism than.to stake all on a single card, in order to save its continued existence.
Absolute clarity prevails in the United States on this situation of Great Britain. In America the Singapore naval base is considered a point of support for a future joint campaign of the Anglo-American fleet against Japan. The strategic necessity of England to guard its possessions in the Pacific makes it very little likely that England will go into action. Every clash, even with France or Holland, threatens British possessions in the Pacific. England needs the freedom of the South China Sea which is a main highway to India, For this purpose England has established a protectorate over the north western portion of Borneo. England will never consent to Japanese occupation of the Philippines or of Indo-China, because this means a deadly danger to its naval base, Singapore. Furthermore, England is interested in maintaining the domination of the southern seas which in a certain sense form a corridor between two rows of islands which connect England and New Zealand. Japanese expansion becomes an immediate menace to Australia, New Zealand and the whole oceanic Archipelago. England would thereby be driven from the Pacific. Still more likely appears British neutrality during the first phase of the Pacific conflict, especially at the beginning of the campaign. England will prefer not to mix in the struggle from the first day in order to get herself into a position similar to that occupied by America in the European war from 1914 to 1918. The difficulties of the British government also speak in favor of this attitude. England is the country primarily threatened with a social-revolution. The ruling classes of England would therefore have to give this serious consideration before embarking upon a war adventure.
The struggle for the dividing up of the Japanese spoils, and the struggle between England and the United States for spheres of influence in Asia and the dominions, will be the second center of the armed conflicts. Will the capitalist world venture to plunge into this new blood bath? Will it not shrink back from the mood of the toiling masses, in whom still lives the remembrance of the devastation of the great imperialist war? There can be no doubt that fear of revolutionary upheavals holds the present capitalist governments within bounds. Yet the Pacific conflict, especially in its first phase, is dangerous for the Communist precisely because it takes place on a front so far distant from Europe. Its participants will be two countries which suffered least during the imperialist war of 1914–1918. The 50,000 American soldiers who fell on the French front are but a very small number in comparison with the sacrifices made by the European peoples. America and Japan were affected but lighly by the war, they saw only its victorious side.
And this danger the Comintern must foresee. We are a world party which does not close its eyes to its own weaknesses and its own mistakes. The British strike already showed our weak spots. If the European proletariat did not react sufficiently to such an event as the British General Strike, or to the miners' struggle, the question arises whether, in the face of a new war, when the situation becomes all the more complicated and difficult for a mass action, whether we are prepared for resistance. A specially responsible task confronts our Young Communist Parties of the Far East at this time, particularly the Chinese comrades. They must even now foresee all the tricks that the imperialist cliques will play upon them in the course of the victorious march of the Chinese revolution.
You will win, comrades, the whole international situation assures us of this. Yet even after you succeed in uniting China—you must not lose sight of this—the imperialist bands will continue the struggle through agents in your country, within your boundaries. Before the capitalist world sinks beneath the depths of the Pacific Ocean, it will probably make an attempt to fight in China. The victorious Canton government, at the head of the peasant masses, will have to be a barrier to these efforts also in the future.
Revolutionary China, which has become an active factor in Far Eastern politics, can become, in alliance with the U. S. S. R. the greatest world factor in the Far East. Your 400 millioned Hinterland in the Pacific Ocean, and its position in these wars, weighs in the scales so heavily that the imperialist governments cannot leave it out of reckoning when counting up their chances in an armed struggle. What the II. International failed to do during the imperialist war of 1914, the organized national workers' and peasants' State of the Chinese toiling masses will fulfil. And in the fulfilment of this historical mission, the awakening, rising China combines the greatness of the Chinese revolution, the greatness of its fate with the October revolution of our toiling masses, on the road to a workers' and peasants' alliance.
In alliance with the world proletariat, with its vanguard—the Communist world Party, China shall and will become the guardian of peace, the fighter against imperialist wars on the Pacific.
THE PREREQUISITES AND
TASKS OF THE CHINESE
REVOLUTION.
A Speech Delivered by Comrade Bucharin
at the Russian Party Conference.
I should now like to say a few words on China and the Chinese revolution, and must once more apologize for being compelled to quote a few figures, though for the last time in this report. This small crime can, however, scarcely be avoided in this case; it is objectively necessary. In the first place I must say that the fact of the Chinese revolution, and the present victorious advance of the united revolutionary troops, are in themselves factors of international importance. We all recollect very well how Comrade Lenin, in his last articles, prophesied that the broad masses of the Eastern peoples, and especially of China, would be drawn into the revolutionary stream. Our Party, and the Communist International, have long since discussed the principles upon which we are to meet such an eventuality. Taking the question in its most general form, I may recall to your memories Comrade Lenin's speech at the Second Congress of the Communist International, in which he pointed out the possibility that these. countries, in the course of their general