Colten v. Kentucky/Dissent Marshall
[p122] MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
In my view, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), requires a reversal of this case.
In this case the Court correctly evaluates Kentucky's procedure: "[A] defendant convicted after a trial or plea in an inferior court may not seek ordinary appellate review of the inferior court's ruling. His recourse is the trial de novo." From this the conclusion is reached that the "trial de novo" is not an appeal. What, then, is it?
[p123] The pertinent Kentucky Rules provide:
"12.02 Manner of Taking
- "(1) An appeal to the circuit court is taken by filing with the court thereof a certified copy of the judgment and the amount of costs, and causing to be executed before the clerk a bond to the effect that the defendant will pay the costs of the appeal and perform the judgment which may be rendered against him on the appeal; whereupon, the clerk shall issue an order to the judge or the justice rendering the judgment, to stay proceedings thereon, and to transmit to the office of said clerk all the original papers in the prosecution.
- "(2) The applicable provisions governing bail shall apply to the bond provided for in subsection (1).
- "(3) After the service of the order to stay proceedings, no execution shall be issued from the inferior court, and any officer on whom the order is served shall return the execution in his hands as suspended by appeal."
12.06 Schedule and Manner of Trial; Judgment
- "Appeals taken to the circuit court shall be docketed by the clerk thereof as a regular criminal prosecution and shall be tried anew, as if no judgment had been rendered, and the judgment shall be considered as affirmed to the extent of the punishment, if any, adjudged against the defendant in the circuit court, and thereupon he shall be adjudged to pay the costs of the appeal. If an appeal taken to the circuit court be dismissed, the judgment of the court from which it was taken shall stand affirmed and the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the party whose appeal is dismissed."
[p124] In Pearce this Court reaffirmed the restrictions upon heavier sentences after appeal:
"It can hardly be doubted that it would be a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state trial court to follow an announced practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside. Where, as in each of the cases before us, the original conviction has been set aside because of a constitutional error, the imposition of such a punishment, 'penalizing those who choose to exercise' constitutional rights, 'would be patently unconstitutional.' United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581. And the very threat inherent in the existence of such a punitive policy would, with respect to those still in prison, serve to 'chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.' Id., at 582. See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483. But even if the first conviction has been set aside for nonconstitutional error, the imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be no less a violation of due process of law. 'A new sentence, with enhanced punishment, based upon such a reason, would be a flagrant violation of the rights of the defendant.' Nichols v. United States, 106 F. 672, 679. A court is 'without right to... put a price on an appeal. A defendant's exercise of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered.... [I]t is unfair to use the great power given to the court to determine sentence to place a defendant in the dilemma of making an unfree choice.' Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F. 2d 713, 718. See Short v. United States, 120 U.S. [p125] App. D.C. 165, 167, 344 F. 2d 550, 552. 'This Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487.' Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-311." 395 U.S., at 723-725.
This Court today seeks to escape this determination by such conclusions as:
"Our view of the Kentucky two-tier system of administering criminal justice, however, does not lead us to believe, and there is nothing in the record or presented in the briefs to show, that the hazard of being penalized for seeking a new trial, which underlay the holding of Pearce, also inheres in the de novo trial arrangement. Nor are we convinced that defendants convicted in Kentucky's inferior courts would be deterred from seeking a second trial out of fear of judicial vindictiveness. The possibility of vindictiveness, found to exist in Pearce, is not inherent in the Kentucky two-tier system."
To the contrary, appellant's Jurisdictional Statement cites us to an order of the same judge who tried this case "de novo" in which he accepted a motion to dismiss an appeal in a similar case with the following statement:
"The Commonwealth Attorney has advised the Court that he does not wish to oppose the defendant's motion to dismiss.
"While the defendant may be correct in his assumption that the citizens of this community have a hostile attitude toward students who would [p126] attempt to disrupt the university, it may be that this hostility has been earned, and it is conceivable that a jury composed of citizens of this community might impose a more severe sentence than that imposed in the court below. Nonetheless, the Court after having reviewed the law submitted by the defendant and having conducted its own research of the law is of the opinion that the defendant has a right to dismiss his appeal and that he cannot be forced into a new trial if he does not desire to continue his appeal. For that reason the defendant's motion to have his appeal dismissed be and the same is hereby granted."
The record in this case also shows that the trial judge was informed of the lower $10 fine in the original trial and consequently knowingly increased it to $50. Finally, it should not be forgotten that under this Court's ruling today he could have increased it to $500 plus six months in jail.
The Court suggests that for some reason there is less danger of vindictive sentencing on the second trial in this context than after an ordinary appeal. Specifically, the Court faults the appellant for failing to present evidence that the danger of vindictiveness is as great here as in the precise context presented in Pearce. But Pearce did not rest on evidence that most trial judges are hostile to defendants who obtain a new trial after appeal. Pearce was based, rather, on the recognition that whenever a defendant is tried twice for the same offense, there is inherent in the situation the danger of vindictive sentencing the second time around, and that this danger will deter some defendants from seeking a second trial. This danger, with its deterrent effect, is exactly the same even though the second trial takes place in a different court from the first. Certainly a defendant has good reason to fear that his case will [p127] not be well received by a second court after he rejects a disposition as favorable as the sentence originally imposed in this case.
Pearce was directed toward a new trial after an appellate reversal. This case involves a new trial without an appellate reversal. The core problem is the second trial. In both cases we have a second full and complete trial. Pearce should control.