Conro v. Crane (94 U.S. 441)/Opinion of the Court

by Morrison Waite

United States Supreme Court

94 U.S. 441

Conro  v.  Crane

It must now be considered as settled that appeals do not lie to this court from the decisions of the circuit courts in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction under the bankrupt law. In Wiswall et al. v. Campbell et al., 93 U.S. 347, we held that 'a proceeding in bankruptcy, from its commencement to its close upon the final settlement of the estate, is but one suit. The several motions made and acts done in the bankrupt court in the progress of the cause are . . . but parts of the suit in bankruptcy, from which they cannot be separated.' And again: 'Every person submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the bankrupt court in the progress of the cause, for the purpose of having his rights in the estate determined, makes himself a party to the suit, and is bound by what is judicially determined in the legitimate course of the proceeding.' And in Sandusky v. National Bank, 23 Wall. 293, it was decided, that 'any order made in the progress of the cause may be subsequently set aside and vacated, upon proper showing made, provided rights have not become vested under it which will be disturbed by the vacation.'

These principles are decisive of this case. The rights of the parties grow out of a sale made by the court under the authority of sect. 5065, Rev. Stat. The bids were received by the provisional assignee; but the court determined which should be accepted, and gave directions as to the transfer of title. Clearly, then, what was done both as to the first and second sale was in the course of the bankruptcy proceeding, and part of that suit. As such, it was subject to revision in the Circuit Court under its supervisory jurisdiction.

Both Hodgkins and Conro & Carkin submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court to the extent that was necessary for the completion of their respective purchases. Conro & Carkin were parties to the proceeding by which the sale to Hodgkins was set aside, and that to them made. Having been in court when the order under which their claim was made, they can properly be brought in to answer a motion to set it aside. Such a motion would not be a new suit, but a new proceeding in the old suit in bankruptcy, and therefore not subject to revision here upon appeal.

This was evidently the understanding of the parties at the time; for the original petition of Hodgkins and Crane was filed in the District Court sitting in bankruptcy, and the petition for review purports, on its face, to be filed under sect. 4986, Rev. Stat., which confers the supervisory jurisdiction.

Appeal dismissed.

Notes