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Cool v. United States/Opinion of the Court

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Cool v. United States (1972)
Per Curiam Opinion of the Court
4674560Cool v. United States — Per Curiam Opinion of the Court1972
Court Documents
Case Syllabus
Per Curiam Opinion of the Court
Dissenting Opinion
Rehnquist

[p100] PER CURIAM.


The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.

In this case, the court below held in effect that in a criminal trial, the jury may be instructed to ignore defense testimony unless it believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony is true. That holding is fundamentally inconsistent with our prior decisions in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), and must therefore be reversed.

After a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty of possessing and concealing, with intent to defraud, counterfeit obligations of the United States. The evidence showed that on June 2, 1970, petitioner, her husband, and one Robert E. Voyles were traveling together by car between St. Louis, Missouri, and Brazil, Indiana. Upon reaching Brazil, Voyles left petitioner and her husband and passed two counterfeit bills at a local store. He was then arrested shortly after he entered the car in which petitioner and her husband were waiting.

After his arrest, Voyles was placed in the police car and taken to the station house. Petitioner and her [p101] husband were told to follow in their own car. A Mr. Baumunk testified that he saw petitioner throw a paper sack out of the car window as petitioner was following the police car. The bag was subsequently found to contain counterfeit bills. Police also found three counterfeit bills crumpled up under the right seat of petitioner's car.

Although petitioner testified in her own defense, she relied primarily on the testimony of Voyles. Voyles freely admitted his own guilt,[1] but steadfastly insisted that neither petitioner nor her husband had anything to do with the crime. He testified that petitioner had merely agreed to give him a ride and knew nothing about the counterfeit bills that he carried with him. When the car stopped in Brazil, Voyles allegedly removed some of the counterfeit bills from his satchel which he kept in petitioner's trunk, and concealed the rest of the bills in a sack which he placed under the front bumper by the headlight. The defense argued that it was this sack that Baumunk saw fall to the ground as petitioner drove to the police station. Voyles also stated that after he had rejoined petitioner, he saw police approaching the car and threw the remaining bills on his person onto the car floor, again without the knowledge of petitioner. Petitioner thus asserts that she was not in knowing possession of the bills on the car floor.

With the case in this posture, the Government's position clearly depended upon its ability to discredit Voyles, since his testimony was completely exculpatory. Over strenuous defense objection,[2] the trial judge gave the jury [p102] a lengthy "accomplice instruction" to be used in evaluating Voyles' testimony. After first defining the word "accomplice" and warning that an accomplice's testimony is "open to suspicion," the judge made the following statement: "However, I charge you that the testimony of an accomplice is competent evidence and it is for you to pass upon the credibility thereof. If the testimony carries conviction and you are convinced it is true beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should give it the same effect as you would to a witness not in any respect implicated in the alleged crime and you are not only justified, but it is your duty, not to throw this testimony out because it comes from a tainted source." (Emphasis added.)

The clear implication of this instruction was that the jury should disregard Voyles' testimony unless it was "convinced it is true beyond a reasonable doubt."[3] Such [p103] an instruction places an improper burden on the defense and allows the jury to convict despite its failure to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.[4]

Accomplice instructions have long been in use and have been repeatedly approved. See, e.g., Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 523-524 (1910). In most instances, they represent no more than a commonsense recognition that an accomplice may have a special interest in testifying, thus casting doubt upon his veracity. See, e.g., Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909). But in most of the recorded cases, the instruction has been used when the accomplice turned State's evidence and testified against the defendant. See generally McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d 29 (CA1 1967), and cases cited therein. No constitutional problem is posed when the judge instructs a jury to receive the prosecution's accomplice testimony "with care and caution." See, e.g., United States v. George, 319 F.2d 77, 80 (CA6 1963). Cf. United States v. Nolte, 440 F.2d 1124 (CA5 1971).

[p104] But there is an essential difference between instructing a jury on the care with which it should scrutinize certain evidence in determining how much weight to accord it and instructing a jury, as the judge did here, that as a predicate to the consideration of certain evidence, it must find it true beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Washington v. Texas, supra, we held that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to present to the jury exculpatory testimony of an accomplice. The instruction given below impermissibly obstructs the exercise of that right by totally excluding relevant evidence unless the jury makes a preliminary determination that it is extremely reliable.

Moreover, the instruction also has the effect of substantially reducing the Government's burden of proof. We held in In re Winship, supra, that the Constitution requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is possible that Voyles' testimony would have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, but that it was not considered because the testimony itself was not believable beyond a reasonable doubt. By creating an artificial barrier to the consideration of relevant defense testimony putatively credible by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial judge reduced the level of proof necessary for the Government to carry its burden. Indeed, where, as here, the defendant's case rests almost entirely on accomplice testimony, the effect of the judge's instructions is to require the defendant to establish its innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Because such a requirement is plainly inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence, the conviction must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.


It is so ordered.


Notes

[edit]
  1. At the time of his testimony, Voyles had already pleaded guilty to a charge of complicity in the possession and concealment of counterfeit notes.
  2. The dissent suggests that the defendant objected to the accomplice instruction solely on the ground that use of the word "accomplice" suggested that the defendant was guilty. Although the defense objection was not a model of clarity, it seems apparent that it was grounded more broadly on the trial judge's decision to give the standard accomplice instruction despite the fact that the accomplice was a defense witness. The defense attorney stated: "I take exception to Instruction No. 16, as it's misleading. I don't think it belongs in this cause. There was no accomplice testified [sic] for the Government, and this could mislead them as to the person who was accused of this crime and has already pled guilty, as making an accomplice of him, when actually he is not an accomplice, because they are not involved in the crime." (Emphasis added.) Certainly, the trial judge understood this objection to be directed to his decision to give the standard cautionary instruction even though the alleged accomplice was called by the defendant. In colloquy with the defense attorney, the judge stated: "The next, 'accomplice,' the evidence of both the Government and the defendants may be considered by the jury in determining the guilt or innocence, no matter who produces the witness.... Now there's a lot of inferences can be drawn from one item of evidence or another, and that's for the jury to decide. So long as there is some evidence, the instruction must be given. It hits both ways on that point." (Emphasis added.) Nor did the Court of Appeals indicate any doubt that defendant's objection was sufficient to preserve the point on appeal.
  3. True, the instruction was couched in positive terms. It told the jury to consider the evidence if it believed it true beyond a reasonable doubt. But the statement contained a negative pregnant as well. There is an unacceptable risk that jurors might have thought they were to reject the evidence—"throw [it] out," in the words of the trial judge—if they had a reasonable doubt as to its veracity.
  4. In the next paragraph of his instruction, the judge stated: "I further instruct you that testimony of an accomplice may alone and uncorroborated support your verdict of guilty of the charges in the Indictment if believed by you to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the charges in the Indictment against the defendants." In light of the fact that the only accomplice testimony in the case was exculpatory, this instruction was confusing to say the least. But even if it is assumed that Voyles' testimony was to some extent inculpatory, the instruction was still fundamentally unfair in that it told the jury that it could convict solely on the basis of accomplice testimony without telling it that it could acquit on this basis. Even had there been no other error, the conviction would have to be reversed on the basis of this instruction alone.