Cooper v. Roberts

by John Archibald Campbell

United States Supreme Court

59 U.S. 173

Cooper  v.  Roberts

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Michigan.

It is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Buel and Mr. Vinton, for the plaintiff in error, and Mr. Truman Smith, for the defendant.

Such of the points only as were included within the decision of the court will be noticed.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error first considered the questions which arose relative to the act of 23d June, 1836, granting school lands to Michigan.

1. Is it simply a law in the ordinary meaning of the term, and, as such, repealable at the will of the law-making power, or does it belong to that class of laws which are legislative compacts?

The counsel contended that it was a compact. 5 Stats. at Large, 59, 60.

2. If it be of the latter class, when did it take effect as a compact, and become obligatory on the parties to it?

It became obligatory on 25th July, 1836, that being the day on which the legislature of Michigan passed the act of acceptance. Revised Code of Michigan for 1846, 748; 2 Wheat. 196; 4 Harrington, 479; 9 Wheat. 469.

3. Does either possess the power to annul or change any of the essential terms of it, without the assent of the other?

Whether the grant of section 16 operated as a present grant, or was only a promise that it should be granted in futuro, makes no difference in the obligation of the United States.

4. Viewed as a compact, what are the rules and principles that govern it? And what are the obligations which the article respecting section 16 imposes on the United States?

The rules and principles which govern it are those which regulate contracts generally. 1 Pet. Cond. R. 453; 1 Tenn. 319; 3 Ohio, 572.

That the government cannot resume its grant, and that a grant is a contract executed, see New Orleans v. De Armas, 9 Pet. 236. There the court say: 'It is a principle applicable to every grant, that it cannot affect pre existing titles.' In Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, (same case, 2 Pet. Cond. R. 321,) held, that where the legislature had the authority to make a grant of lands, such grant, when made, vests an indefeasible and irrevocable title. And in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, Chief Justice Marshall said: 'A grant in its own nature amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a contract not to reassert that right; a party, therefore, is always estopped by his own grant.' Pollard's Lessee v. Hogan, 3 How. 212.

Whether a contract be executed or executory, it is equally binding on the parties to it. Fletcher v. Peck, 2 Pet. Cond. R. 321.

5. What is the meaning and effect of that clause in the article which provides, that where section sixteen has been sold or otherwise disposed of, other lands equivalent thereto and as contiguous as may be, shall be granted to the State?

This was to provide for prior and not subsequent sales. Assuming that the act of 1836 was only a promise, and that the act of March 1, 1847, embraced section sixteen, still, Michigan has the better right to it. But that act did not dispose of the mineral lands without reference to the school reservation.

1. Instead of the mineral lands being reserved by the act in pursuance to an established policy, it was a primary object of that act to put an end to the policy that had theretofore prevailed of reserving mineral lands from sale, and to dispose of them by sale as soon as practicable, and for the best price that could be obtained.

2. By the true interpretation of the second section of the act, section sixteen in every township of the district is expressly reserved from sale; and also such reservations as the President shall deem necessary for public uses, whether the same are mineral lands or not.

3. As the interpretation of the court conflicts with prior and existing legislative grants and obligations, those grants and obligations are entitled to the benefit of every legal presumption and inference in their favor; and such effect ought not to be given to the law, unless the intent to produce this conflict be expressed in manifest and undoubted language.

4. If the act had, in general terms, directed the sale of all the lands in the district, but was silent as to the lands previously dedicated and granted to schools, it would not have the effect to divert them from this special use.

Mr. Smith, for the defendants in error, contended:--

1. That the article in the act of 1836 was conceived in words of the future tense; and that the plaintiff below could not make out a title without a patent. 13 Pet. 516; 15 How. 433; 1 Op. Att. Gen. 273; 12 How. 76; 14 ibid. 274.

But if we assume that the first article of this compact operated to vest in the State of Michigan the fee, or a good and perfect title to these lands, then the next question is, whether that title has, through Williams, been transferred to the plaintiff? To answer which we must, as already mentioned, turn our attention both to the laws of the United States and of the State of Michigan.

Michigan had no power to sell this section without the assent of congress. The income of each section is to be applied to the support of schools in the township where it is situated, and the State has no power, without the consent of congress, to sell it for the purpose of creating a general fund. 14 How. 274.

This is shown by the numerous acts of congress granting permission to sell. 4 Stats. at Large, 237, 298; 5 ibid. 600; 10 ibid. 6.

The United States, in granting these lands, are the founders of a charity; 9 Cranch, 292; and their assent is necessary for a sale. 4 Wheat. 518.

But, assuming that the State of Michigan has the entire control of the lands, and can sell them without consulting either the United States or the inhabitants of the townships where situated; then the question arises, whether these lands were sold in conformity with the laws of the State?

The argument upon this point is omitted.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.

Notes