Copyright, Its History and Its Law/Chapter 7
VII
Ownership of Copyright: Who May Secure Copyright
Persons
namedThe American code of 1909 names (sec. 8) "the author or proprietor of any work made the subject of copyright by this Act, or his executors, administrators, or assigns" as the persons in whom the copyright may lodge. It also provides specifically (sec. 62) that "the word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire."
The American law formerly named "the author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of any work, and the executors, administrators, or assigns of any such person" as the persons in whom copyright may lodge. The Librarian of Congress accordingly issued copyright certificates for books as to an "author" or "proprietor" only, assuming usually that an editor was the "author" and a publisher the "proprietor," and never going behind the claim set forth in the application. Under the new law the applicant is designated only as the "claimant," and no such distinction is made, except that the Copyright Office has an index card for proprietor, as well as author, when another than the author makes the application.
The author
primarilyThe author is the person primarily entitled to copyright. He may sell or otherwise transfer his production before it is copyrighted, in which case the new proprietor obtains all the common law rights of property, both in the manuscript and its publication, including the right to copyright. This common law right, including the right to copyright, may extend, Drone argues, to the finder of an unpublished manuscript, provided no one successfully disputes his ownership of his find, if the manuscript be copyrightable; but copyright is taken out by another person (as the publisher of the book), it is done impliedly in trust for the author, as is a usual custom among American publishers. The proprietor is defined to mean "the representative of an artist or author who might himself obtain copyright."
Claimant's
right to
registerThe Register of Copyrights is not a quasi judicial officer, as is the Commissioner of Patents, and he does not undertake to make decision as to the right of the claimant, this question being one for determination by the courts in specific instances. In cases of doubt, however, he may in practice, for the sake of convenience and of clearness of record, call the attention of the claimant to such doubt and invite explanation, but he probably would not be justified in refusing to register the application for a claimant who asserted his right to such entry. A former Librarian of Congress, then directly the copyright officer, used to say that he would enter copyright for any one on the Bible in King James' version if formal application were made to him, thus emphasizing the statement that he had no judicial authority. In the case of Everson v. John Russell Young, then Librarian of Congress, Judge Cole in 1889, while refusing the mandamus asked for, asserted incidentally that "the Librarian had no discretion." Where a second application is made for the entry of the same copyrightable work by a second party, the copyright officer would not decline to register the second application, if the claimant insisted on his right, after the fact of the first registration had been brought to the second claimant's notice, and the question of ownership would have to be brought before the courts. It is only in the case of works evidently not copyrightable, or in the case of claimants not entitled to apply for registration, as a citizen of a foreign country with which the United States has no copyright relations, or n other cases evidently beyond the scope of the law, that the copyright officer would exercise discretion and decline to make the record.
Employer as
authorThe provision of the new code specifically including as author (sec. 62) "an employer in the case of author works made for hire" is new in American law, but it adopts previous decisions of the courts. It does not, however, adjudicate the application or specific definition of this phrase, which remains in large measure a
question of contract. Earlier copyright decisions were to the effect that the authorship may inhere in the employer, if the design of the work is so far his as to make him the virtual creator and the actual writer a deputy merely; but that he is not an author who "merely suggests the subject, and has no share in the design or execution of the work." But under the new law, the case turns upon the meaning of "employment," which would be clear in the case of writers paid wages or salary for doing the work on an ency-
clopaedia, but might not be clear in the case of an author paid in advance or on account by a publisher, though working on a general plan suggested or invented by the publisher. In such cases the proprietary right, including the right to secure copyright, depends upon the contract, implied or express, and the courts will decide this according to the law of contracts. In Boucicault v. Fox, in 1862, Judge Shipman, in the U.S. Circuit Court, held, as to the play "The octoroon," that "a man's intellectual productions are peculiarly his own, and he will not be deemed to have parted with his right and transferred it to his employer until a valid agreement to that effect is adduced." It is safer in all cases, for the protection of the employer and for the sake of clear relations with the actual person who does the work, that there should be a definite contract.
When a salaried law reporter had been employed by the State of New York under a law that the copyright of the Reports should vest in the State, Judge Nelson for the Circuit Court of Appeals, in 1852, in Little v. Gould, held as valid an entry by the Secretary of State, "in trust for the State of New York," though no formal assignment had been made.
Implied
ownershipIn the absence of specific contract, or even in some cases of specific contract, many cross-questions may arise which the law does not and cannot determine in advance. In the case of a book "with illustrations by John Leech," where Leech retained the cop5n-ight of the designs, though the publishers owned the wood on which he had drawn them, an English court held to a distinction between the copyright and the right to the material, and directed the publishers to waive their
lesser right and surrender the blocks, in view of the circumstances of the contract.
Protection
outside of
copyrightMost of the cases arising as to ownership are, in fact, issues outside of copyright law, as when in 1883 in Clemens v. Belford, in the U.S. Circuit Court in Illinois, Samuel L. Clemens vainly sought to restrain the use of his pen-name, " Mark Twain," in a collection of his uncopyrighted papers, Judge Blodgett holding that whoever has a right to publish has a right to state authorship, though an author can restrain the publication over his name of things he did not write. The same doctrine was upheld in 1910 in Ellis v. Hurst, where a publisher had printed with the real name of the author some non-copyright books which Edward S. Ellis had put forth under a pseudonym. Judge Greenbaum, in the N.Y. Supreme Court, held that the law insuring right of privacy does not prevent the use of a writer's name on a book undoubtedly of his writing.
In 1908 Mr. Clemens sought in vain to prevent the use by others of his pseudonym, "Mark Twain," by incorporating a company with this name, planning thus to secure the exclusive use of the name for this corporation and practically obtaining a continuing trade-mark protection for it under this device. But that an author may protect a nom de plume of settled use independent of copyright or trade-mark was held in Landa v. Greenberg in 1908, in Chancery Division.
Work in
cyclopedaeiasWhen, as in the case of a cyclopaedia, many persons are employed at the offices of an employer, using
his materials and facilities, and especially if on salary, the courts would undoubtedly uphold his full proprietorship in their work. Where outside persons contribute special articles, the presumption would probably be that the ownership of the copyright, for that special publication, vested in the employer, but that neither he, without the author's consent, nor the author, without his consent, could publish the article in other competing shape. In Bullen v. Aflalo, the House of Lords, in 1903, reversing the lower courts, protected the proprietors of an encyclopaedia who had purchased articles from authors, against reprints of the material elsewhere, by the authors themselves, on the ground "that the right to obtain copyright was intended to pass to the publisher, otherwise he would
get nothing from his bargain; and unless the publisher and proprietor of the encyclopaedia stood in the shoes of the actual writer and was the proprietor of the copyright, he would have nothing for his money, because the articles might be published by others and he would have no remedy, not having the copyright."
Association
of author's
nameThe right of a contributor to have his name associated with his work in the case of an encyclopaedia, at issue in Basil Jones v. American Law Book Co., where the individual writer's name was replaced by that of a distinguished jurist, though upheld in 1905 by Judge McCall in the N.Y. Supreme Court, was denied in the reversal of this decision in 1908 by the Appellate Division through Judge Houghton.
Added
material and
alterationWhere a publisher had affixed additional material to a copyrighted book, the author was denied relief in Holloway v. Bradley, in 1886, by Judge Butler in the U.S. Circuit Court; but this decision would not hold where the added material was so placed as to give the false impression that it was written by the
author of the copyrighted work. Thus in 1910, in Gilbert v. Workman, Sir W.S. Gilbert obtained an order in the Chancery Division through Justice Neville against the interpolation of a song into his copyrighted opera without his consent.
Seperate
registra-
tion of con-
triubtionsThis would hold true to like extent in respect to alterations, which might be permissible when in the nature of proof-reading correction or editorial revision, but contrary to equity when they pervert, obscure, or otherwise misrepresent the author.
In respect to composite works, the new American code indicates (sec. 23) that there may be separate registration of contributions, inferentially in the person of "an individual author," as distinguished from the general entry for copyright of the composite work. This doubtless refers to the practice, for instance, of the entry in his own name of his specific work, by a novelist or other contributor to a periodical, in addition to the general entry of the number of the periodical of which it is a copyrightable component part. The only direct effect is to give to the specific author prima facie evidence of ownership in his specific contribution, as distinguished from the right of the proprietor of the general copyright, and in some respects the clause is ambiguous and perhaps misleading, making it the more desirable that the relation of the individual author should be defined by contract. It is not really in conflict, however, with the principle that there cannot be two copyrights in the same work, as the evident distinction implied is that the proprietor of the general copyright holds the right for publication in the periodical and that the specific author reserves the right of publication in other form, which distinction is sufficiently provided for as a matter of contract and does not depend upon specific entry of the contribution. The wisest course may be for the proprietor of the periodical or other composite work to reassign his interest in the specific contribution, as was done by the proprietors of the Smart Set as adjudicated in the case of Dam v. Kirke La Shelle Co., cited in the chapter on dramatic and musical copyright, and thus remove possible doubt as to ownership.
Anonymous
worksThere is no specific reference in the new American code as to anonymous or pseudonymous works, except as to duration of copyright. In practice, the Copyright Office assumes that the applicant for the entry of an anonymous or pseudonymous work is the qualified and legal author or proprietor, and any disputed question of fact would ultimately be decided by tlae courts.
Joint au-
thorshipThere may be joint authorship in a work of common design, in which case the joint authors will become owners in common of the undivided property; but mere alterations or work on specific parts could not justify claim to more than such alterations or parts. The copyright would naturally be entered in both names, but as one copyright; it was held in 1902, in Mifflin v. Dutton, by the U.S. Supreme Court, that "there cannot be duplicate copyrights of the same book in different names." If one of the joint authors and not the other should apply for entry, the Copyright Office would in practice probably record the copyright claim on the presumption that the author was acting in the common interest; but if two joint authors applied simultaneously and severally, the question of ownership would have to be settled by the courts.
Corporate
bodiesA corporate body, even though not incorporated under statute, is considered an author in the case of its own proceedings or similar publications, and in 1903 Justice Holmes rendered the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lith. Co., though the court was divided on the subject, that a copyright taken in the name of the Courier Lithographing Company, which was only the trade name of the complainant, was valid.
Posthumous
worksIn the case of posthumous works, the person entitled to copyright would be the executor, administrator, or the heirs of the author, and the owner of an unpublished manuscript could probably enter and maintain copyright in the absence of other legal claimant.
The Peary
casesThe first important case under the new American code, in September, 1909, dealt with the question who may obtain copyright. On the report of the discovery of the North Pole, the New York Herald procured from Dr. Cook his account of his journey and copyrighted it on its publication in the Herald, — which copyright does not seem to have been questioned. Immediately thereafter came Commander Peary's account of his polar journey, for which the New York Times had contracted with him before his departure in the previous year. The Peary report was published simultaneously by the New York Times and the London Times, but the difference of five hours
enabled the correspondents of the New York Sun and World to cable the report to their respective papers in time for publication at the same hour in America as in the New York Times. Anticipating this course, the New York Times had taken the precaution to publish the report in pamphlet or " book" form some hours before newspaper publication, and
to copyright this as a book. When an injunction was asked in the U. S. Circuit Court from Judge Hand, that judge granted the injunction, but on the required production of the contract in court, dissolved his injunction on the ground that the contract between Peary and the New York Times gave to the Times only the right to news publication and specifically
reserved to Peary magazine and book rights. He inferred thus that the Times had no right to copyright the news report as a book, and was not the agent of the author for that purpose. Opposing
decisionsTo the contrary, Judge Grosscup in Chicago, in an exactly similar case against the Chicago Inter-Ocean and other Chicago papers, and with the contract before him, maintained the copyright by the Times. The two contradictory decisions have not so far been adjudicated in the higher courts. It will be observed that the question is not strictly one of copyright, but of contract, and that it is not denied that the news report, in the literary form given it by the author, was a proper subject of copyright, though the news of the discovery of the North Pole might not be copyrightable. Judge Hand perhaps erred in assuming that there could be separate copyright for news, magazine, or book publication, overlooking the fact that Peary had conferred on the Times authority to protect the report sent to it by cable, while reserving to himself rights in magazine or book publication of his material,
whether in the same or different form.
Renewal
rightsIn the renewal of copyright, the new American code follows the previous law in differentiating the persons entitled to renew the copyright. It provides (sec. 23) that in the case of a posthumous composite or corporate work originally copyrighted by the proprietor thereof or a work made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal; but in other cases, including a separately registered contribution by an individual to a composite work, the author or the widow, widower or children, or, if such be not living, the author's executors or next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal. This means that there can be no renewal by an assignee proprietor, and that in the absence of natural heirs of a personal author, no person is entitled to a renewal of his copyright. The new law has been specifically construed to this effect by the Attorney-General in his opinion of February 3, 1910. It should be noted that the word "administrators," included in the provision as to original application (sec. 8), is omitted from the provision as to renewal (sec. 23) including renewal of existing copyrights (sec. 24), indicating that while an author may make bequest of copyright for the renewal term, which right may then be claimed by his executor, the right to renew lapses when he makes no will and has no next of kin to inherit the right of renewal.
AssigmentsSpecific provision as to the method and record of the transfer of copyrights by assignments are contained in the following provisions of the code of 1909: "(Sec. 42.) That copyright secured under this or previous Acts of the United States may be assigned, granted, or mortgaged by an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of the copyright, or may be bequeathed by will. "(Sec. 43.) That every assignment of copyright executed in a foreign country shall be acknowledged by the assignor before a consular officer or secretary of legation of the United States authorized by law to administer oaths or perform notarial acts. The certificate of such acknowledgment under the hand and official seal of such consular officer or secretary of legation shall be prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument.
Assignment
record"(Sec. 44.) That every assignment of copyright shall be recorded in the copyright office within three calendar months after its execution in the United States or within six calendar months after its execution without the limits of the United States, in default of which it shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, whose Eissignment has been duly recorded.
"(Sec. 45.) That the register of copyrights shall, upon payment of the prescribed fee, record such assignment, and shall return it to the sender with a certificate of record attached under seal of the copyright office, and upon the payment of the fee prescribed by this Act he shall furnish to any person requesting the same a certified copy thereof under the said seal.
Subsitution
of name"(Sec. 46). That when an assignment of the copyright in a specified book or other work has been recorded the assignee may substitute his name for that of the assignor in the statutory notice of copyright prescribed by this Act."
It should be noted that this last provision, authorizing the substitution of a name, is applicable only to the general copyright in a work, and not to a divided right; otherwise there would seem to be more than one copyright in the same work. The Copyright Office will, however, record assignments of specific or divided rights without reference to this power of substitution. Further assignment from one assignee to another is permissible to any extent, and in cases of repeated assignment of a general copyright there may be further substitution of names.
WitnessesThere is no specific requirement as to the witnessing of assignments, which would therefore follow the usual principles of law. This was, however, an important question in England, and under the early English statute the courts held that assignments must be in writing, attested by two witnesses; the later statute of Victoria modified the language, and the new English code requires assignment in writing signed by the owner or his authorized agent, without specifying witnesses. But assignment of common-law rights (as in an unpublished manuscript) may doubtless be by word of mouth.
"Outrights"
and renewalWhere an author sells his entire rights "outright," and renewal he cannot transfer the right to take out renewal, but he may directly or by inference bind himself to apply for such renewal in the interest of the new proprietor. Under such a contract, this proprietor could probably require him by equity proceedings to take this step. Such a contract, however, would not bar the author from his right to renewal under the copyright law and through the Copyright Office, although it is possible that the courts might enjoin an author from renewal or assignment of a renewed copyright in the interest of another than the original assignee. It should be noted that in the case of composite, corporate or like impersonal works, copyrighted under the new code, renewal is not restricted to the original proprietor, though by
analogy this should be the practice; but that in the case of renewal of copyrights existing before July 1, 1909, and in extension of the present renewal terms, the use of the phrase "such proprietor," referring back to "the original proprietor," does make such limitation.
Proof of
proprietor-
shipWhere the copyright proprietor of record is not the author, the courts may require him to prove his rights, in default of which the copyright certificate will be adjudged null and void, as was done in 1909 by the Circuit Court of Appeals both in Bosselman v. Richardson, where a son copyrighted paintings by his father and failed to prove that they had not before been published, and in Saake v. Lederer, where the court canceled the copyright of the play "Old Heidelberg" because Lederer had obtained from the German author only a license to perform and not a right to copyright.
Foreign
citizensAs to copyright by others than citizens of the country, the law of 1909 provides (sec. 8) "that the copyright secured by this Act shall extend to the work of an author or proprietor who is a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation, only:
"(a) When an alien author or proprietor shall be domiciled within the United States at the time of the first publication of his work; or
"(b) When the foreign state or nation of which such author or proprietor is a citizen or subject grants, either by treaty, convention, agreement, or law, to citizens of the United States the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as to its own citizens, or copyright protection substantially equal to the protection secured to such foreign author under this Act, or by treaty; or when such foreign state or nation is a party to an international agreement which provides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by the terms of which agreement the United States may, at its pleasure, become a party thereto.
"The existence of the reciprocal conditions aforesaid shall be determined by the President of the United States, by proclamation made from time to time, as the purposes of this Act may require."
Earlier
provisionsEarlier The Revised Statutes formerly extended copyright provisions to "a citizen of the United States or resident therein or his widow or children," and the act of 1891 provided for a quasi international copyright on a basis similar to that in subsection (b), cited above, of the law of 1909, i.e. on a basis of reciprocity. The new American code practically adopts the features both
of the Revised Statutes and the act of 1891, though with verbal and substantial differences. The word "domiciled" is new in the law and has yet to be construed in a copyright case, but it is presumably the equivalent of "resident." The new Rules and Regulations of the Copyright Office use the phrase "(2) a resident alien domiciled in the United States at the time of the first publication of his work."
ResidenceA resident, under the American decisions, is a person who intends to reside permanently in this country. It is decided by the intention of the resident. A person who is residing here without intention of permanence probably cannot maintain copyright under this clause. For English copyright, on the contrary, a person temporarily residing in His Majesty's dominions has been considered a resident." The United States" would doubtless be construed to include territories and dependencies, as specific jurisdiction is given (sec. 34) to stated courts in Alaska, Hawaii the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico, in addition to the general decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court.
Under the statute of Anne the English courts differed persistently on the question whether a non-resident foreigner could obtain British copyright by first publication within the British dominions, until in 1854, in the ultimate case of Jefferys v. Boosey, the House of Lords, after consulting the judges, of whom six denied and four sustained the contention, decided unanimously that a non-resident foreigner could not acquire copyright by first publication. Under the law of 1842, the question was again raised, in view of the variation of the language from that in the statute of Anne; in 1868, in the case of Routledge v. Low, in which an American author claimed copyright for his work first published in London while he resided for a few days in Canada, the House of Lords held that a foreigner might thus obtain copyright by temporary residence within the British dominions and indicated, but did not decide, that a foreigner could obtain copyright by first publication, even if not temporarily resident within the British dominions. After the passage of the "international copyright amendment" in 1891, the American law authorities consulted with the law officers of the Crown, who rendered a decision that foreign authors were entitled to British copyright on the sole condition of first publication, and on this decision the President based his proclamation of reciprocal relations with Great Britain. The new British measure retains first publication within the included parts of the Empire as the essential condition, except in unpublished works, unless otherwise provided under international copyright, though the Crown may withdraw this privilege from foreigners whose countries do not assure reciprocity.
Intending
citizensThe provision of subsection (a) is chiefly useful, it would seem, to protect intending citizens who have applied for naturalization papers and incidentally renounced their previous allegiance to another power and thus put themselves beyond the pale of the international conventions.
Time
of first
publication"First publication" is not limited in terms to the United States, and the "alien author or proprietor," provided he makes application under this clause and is not a citizen of a country with which the United States has a copyright convention, must therefore be domiciled here, it would seem, at the time of first publication, in whatever country that may be.
Non-quali-
fied authors
cannot
transferIt has twice been decided, both prior to and since the "international copyright amendment" of 1891, that a foreign author not qualified to secure a copyright cannot indirectly obtain one by assignment to an American or other proprietor. In 1890 J. M. Barrie assigned to J. W. Lovell, and he to the U.S. Book Company, his American rights in "The little minister," and after the act of 1891 the latter endeavored to restrain a dramatization of the story. Judge Jenkins held with the lower court that the foreign author could transfer only, prior to the act, the right to publish from advance sheets and not the right to copyright. In the case of Bong v. Campbell Art Co., in which it was sought to protect under the act of 1891 a work by a Peruvian painter, Hernandez, whose country had no international relations with the United States, through transfer to a German proprietor, whose country had reciprocal relations, it was held in 1909 by the U. S. Supreme Court, through Justice McKenna, that an author who is a citizen of a country with which the United States has no copyright relations cannot indirectly obtain American copyright by making a citizen of a country with which the United States has copyright relations the proprietor of his work. A proprietor has been construed by the courts to mean merely an assignee of a qualified author. It is evident, therefore, despite the ambiguous phrasing of the statute, that an assignee proprietor, though domiciled in the United States at the time of first publication of a work, could not obtain copyright unless the author were so domiciled, for the contrary ruling would nullify the general purport of the law by permitting an assignee to acquire rights which the non-qualified author could not secure. The evident construction of the word "proprietor" in this clause is as proprietor of an impersonal work and not an assignee proprietor. The Rules and Regulations of the Copyright Office, construing the code of 1909, say specifically (2): "If the author of the work should
be a person who could not himself claim the benefit of the copyright act, the proprietor cannot claim it."
Foreign
ownershipBut it seems that a foreigner may enter copyright in the work of a citizen or resident author — it being foreign authorship, not ownership, which the law refuses to protect, though this point has not been judicially determined. Under the provision (sec. 62) of the new American code giving copyright to an employer as author "in the case of works made for hire," it would seem that a person entitled to make copyright entry might, as an employer, obtain copyright on the work of an alien employee not domiciled here and not otherwise entitled to enter copyright; but it is probable that this construction would not extend
to a separate or separable work, as this would be contrary to the principles adjudicated as above cited.
The complicated question of the ownership and the right to secure copyright in translations from foreign works or into foreign languages, under this international copyright provision, is covered under translation in the preceding chapter on subject-matter of copyright.
Proclaimed
countriesUnder the provisions of the international copyright clause of 1 89 1 Presidential proclamations have designated as countries with which the United States has copyright relations (July 1, 1891) Belgium, France, Great Britain and her possessions, Switzerland; (April 15, 1892) Germany; (Octobers 32, 1892) Italy; (May 8, 1893) Denmark; (July 20, 1893) Portugal; (July 10, 1895) Spain; (February 27, 1896) Mexico; (May 25, 1896) Chile; (October 19, 1899) Costa Rica; (November 20, 1899) Holland and possessions; (November 17, 1903) Cuba; (January 13, 1904) China — this treaty of October 8, 1903, protecting for ten years books, maps, prints or engravings "especially prepared for the use and education of the Chinese
people," or "translation into Chinese of any book," but leaving to Chinese subjects liberty to make "original translations into Chinese"; (July i, 1905) Norway; (May 17, 1906) Japan — this treaty of November 10, 1905, also excepting translations, and (August 11, 1908) additionally protecting Japanese relations in China and Korea; (September 20, 1907) Austria,
not including Hungary; and (April 9, 1908) under the Pan American convention signed in Mexico City, January 27, 1902, effective from July i, 1908, Guatemala, Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua.
Under act
of 1909Under the provisions of the act of 1909, the President of the United States issued a general proclamation, dated April 9, 1910, certifying anew to the existence of reciprocal relations with the above-mentioned countries, under the arrangements of the new act, as from its effective date July 1, 1909. This accepted such relations as continuous and uninterrupted, without the necessity of new treaties, with the effect that international copyrights before July 1, 1909, were under the arrangements of the act of 1891 and from and after that date under the arrangements of the code of 1909. Luxemburg was added by proclamation of June 29, 1910, and Sweden by that of May 26, 1911. Proclamations of December 8, 1910, as to Germany, and June 14, I9ii,as to Belgium, Luxemburg and Norway, proclaimed reciprocal relations as to mechanical reproductions.
The ratification of the Buenos Aires convention Buenos Aires
conventionby the U. S. Senate, February 16, 1911, has the effect of authorizing the President to proclaim reciprocal relations with other countries which are parties to that treaty, as each ratifies the convention.
The new
British codeThe new British measure specifies that "the author The new of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright," except where an engraving, photograph, or portrait is ordered for valuable consideration or where work is done in the course of employment. The owner may assign the copyright in writing, "either wholly or partially, and either generally or subject to limitations to any particular country, and either for the whole term of the copyright or for any part thereof, and may grant any interest in the right by license"; in case of partial assignment, the original owner and the assignee become respectively the owners of the residual and assigned portions of the copyright. But any assignment, except by will, becomes null and void twenty-five years after the death of the author when the entire rights revert to his heirs.
Foreign
practiceIn general the statutes of most of the copyright countries designate "authors" and their "assigns and heirs" as the persons who may obtain copyright. The Australian law of 1905 defines " author " to include " the personal representatives of an author."
In certain countries the laws specifically mention as persons who may secure copyright "joint authors," "proprietors" in some countries and "publishers" in other countries of anonymous and pseudonymous, posthumous or unpublished works, periodicals and composite works, "corporate bodies," "translators," "editors, compilers or adapters" and "persons who give a commission for a portrait or photograph."