Cruz v. Arizona

by Supreme Court of the United States

Note: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CRUZ v. ARIZONA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
No. 21–846. Argued November 1, 2022—Decided February 22, 2023

Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz was found guilty of capital murder by an Arizona jury and sentenced to death. Both at trial and on direct appeal, Cruz argued that under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154, he should have been allowed to inform the jury that a life sentence in Arizona would be without parole. The trial court and Arizona Supreme Court held that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme did not trigger application of Simmons. After Cruz’s conviction became final, this Court held in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613 (per curiam), that it was fundamental error to conclude that Simmons “did not apply” in Arizona. Id., at 615. Cruz then sought to raise the Simmons issue again in a state postconviction petition under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g), which permits a defendant to bring a successive petition if “there has been a significant change in the law that, if applicable to the defendant’s case, would probably overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence.” The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after concluding that Lynch was not “a significant change in the law.”

Held: The Arizona Supreme Court’s holding that Lynch was not a significant change in the law is an exceptional case where a state-court judgment rests on such a novel and unforeseeable interpretation of a state-court procedural rule that the decision is not adequate to foreclose review of the federal claim. Pp. 7–14.

(a) This Court does not decide a question of federal law in a case if the state-court judgment “rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729. In this case the Court focuses on the requirement of adequacy; whether Arizona’s “state procedural ruling is adequate is itself a question of federal law.” Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. 53, 60. A state procedural ruling that is “ ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ ” will ordinarily “be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim.” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U. S. 362, 376. This case is an exception, however, implicating this Court’s rule that “an unforeseeable and unsupported state-court decision on a question of state procedure does not constitute an adequate ground to preclude this Court’s review of a federal question.” Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 354.

At issue here is the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision that Cruz’s motion for postconviction relief failed to satisfy Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g) because Lynch did not result in “a significant change in the law.” That court reasoned that Lynch was not a significant change in the law because it relied on Simmons, which was clearly established law at the time of Cruz’s trial. It so held even though Lynch overruled binding Arizona precedent foreclosing Simmons relief for Arizona capital defendants, and even though the Arizona Supreme Court had previously explained that the “archetype” of a “significant change in the law” is the overruling of “previously binding case law.” State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 118, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1178. While the court reasoned that a significant change in the application of a law is not the same as a significant change in the law itself, Arizona can point to no other Rule 32.1(g) decision supporting that distinction. This interpretation of Rule 32.1(g) is entirely new and conflicts with prior Arizona case law. The novelty arises from the way in which the Arizona Supreme Court disregarded the effect of Lynch on Arizona law. Ordinarily, Arizona courts applying Rule 32.1(g) focus on how a decision changes the law that is operative in the State. Here, however, the Arizona Supreme Court disregarded the many state precedents overruled by Lynch, focusing instead on whether Lynch had wrought a significant change in federal law. Because the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation is so novel and unforeseeable, it cannot constitute an adequate state procedural ground for the challenged decision.

Arizona’s interpretation generates a catch-22 for Cruz and other similarly situated capital defendants that only serves to compound its novelty. To obtain relief under Rule 32.1(g), a defendant must establish not just a significant change in the law but also that the law in question applies retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288. Prior to the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision below, it was possible to show that Lynch both was a “significant change in the law” and satisfied retroactivity because it merely applied Simmons. On the interpretation adopted below, however, the argument that Lynch applied “settled” federal law for retroactivity purposes also implies that Lynch does not represent a “significant change in the law.” Earlier Rule 32.1(g) decisions did not generate this catch-22. Given the Court’s conclusion that the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Rule 32.1(g) to Lynch is so novel and unfounded that it does not constitute an adequate state procedural ground, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the decision below is also independent of federal law. Pp. 7–11.

(b) Counterarguments presented in this case offer various reformulations of the argument that Lynch was not a “significant change in the law” for Rule 32.1(g) purposes, but they fail to grapple with the basic point that Lynch reversed previously binding Arizona Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Lynch was a summary reversal did not justify the Arizona Supreme Court in treating Lynch differently than other transformative decisions of this Court. Although Lynch did not change this Court’s interpretation of Simmons, it did change the operation of Simmons by Arizona courts in a way that matters for Rule 32.1(g). And it makes no difference that Lynch did not alter federal law. The analytic focus of Arizona courts applying Rule 32.1(g) has always been on the impact to Arizona law. Nor does this Court’s interpretation forestall Arizona’s ability to develop its Rule 32.1(g) jurisprudence in new contexts. That the Arizona Supreme Court had never before applied Rule 32.1(g) to a summary reversal did not present a new context in this case. Finally, no effective parallel can be drawn between Rule 32.1(g) and very different procedural rules governing federal prisoners, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §§2255(f), (h). Pp. 11–14.

251 Ariz. 203, 487 P. 3d 991, vacated and remanded.

Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Barrett, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined.