Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996

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Public Law 104-114
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996
by the 104th Congress of the United States

Pub.L. 104−114, 110 Stat. 785, H.R. 927, enacted March 12, 1996

Public Law 104-115

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4633803Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 —

Pub.L. 104−114, 110 Stat. 785, H.R. 927, enacted March 12, 1996

1996the 104th Congress of the United States

104^TH UNITED STATES CONGRESS
2^ND SESSION

An Act
To seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Section 1. Short Title; Table of Contents.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the "Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996".

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings.

Sec. 3. Purposes.

Sec. 4. Definitions.

Sec. 5. Severability.

Section 2. Findings.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The economy of Cuba has experienced a decline of at least 60 percent in the last 5 years as a result of—

(A) the end of its subsidization by the former Soviet Union of between 5 billion and 6 billion dollars annually;

(B) 36 years of communist tyranny and economic mismanagement by the Castro government;

(C) the extreme decline in trade between Cuba and the countries of the former Soviet bloc; and

(D) the stated policy of the Russian Government and the countries of the former Soviet bloc to conduct economic relations with Cuba on strictly commercial terms.

(2) At the same time, the welfare and health of the Cuban people have substantially deteriorated as a result of this economic decline and the refusal of the Castro regime to permit free and fair democratic elections in Cuba.

(3) The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it will not engage in any substantive political reforms that would lead to democracy, a market economy, or an economic recovery.

(4) The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on free and fair democratic elections, and continuing violations of fundamental human rights, have isolated the Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western Hemisphere.

(5) As long as free elections are not held in Cuba, the economic condition of the country and the welfare of the Cuban people will not improve in any significant way.

(6) The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to improve their condition and has led thousands of Cuban citizens to risk or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape from Cuba to freedom.

(7) Radio Marti and Television Marti have both been effective vehicles for providing the people of Cuba with news and information and have helped to bolster the morale of the people of Cuba living under tyranny.

(8) The consistent policy of the United States towards Cuba since the beginning of the Castro regime, carried out by both Democratic and Republican administrations, has sought to keep faith with the people of Cuba, and has been effective in sanctioning the totalitarian Castro regime.

(9) The United States has shown a deep commitment, and considers it a moral obligation, to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

(10) The Congress has historically and consistently manifested its solidarity and the solidarity of the American people with the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.

(11) The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 calls upon the President to encourage the governments of countries that conduct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes of that Act.

(12) Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 made by the FREEDOM Support Act require that the President, in providing economic assistance to Russia and the emerging Eurasian democracies, take into account the extent to which they are acting to "terminate support for the communist regime in Cuba, including removal of troops, closing military facilities, and ceasing trade subsidies and economic, nuclear, and other assistance".

(13) The Cuban Government engages in the illegal international narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from justice in the United States.

(14) The Castro government threatens international peace and security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups dedicated to international violence.

(15) The Castro government has utilized from its inception and continues to utilize torture in various forms (including by psychiatry), as well as execution, exile, confiscation, political imprisonment, and other forms of terror and repression, as means of retaining power.

(16) Fidel Castro has defined democratic pluralism as "pluralistic garbage" and continues to make clear that he has no intention of tolerating the democratization of Cuban society.

(17) The Castro government holds innocent Cubans hostage in Cuba by no fault of the hostages themselves solely because relatives have escaped the country.

(18) Although a signatory state to the 1928 Inter-American Convention on Asylum and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which protects the right to leave one's own country), Cuba nevertheless surrounds embassies in its capital by armed forces to thwart the right of its citizens to seek asylum and systematically denies that right to the Cuban people, punishing them by imprisonment for seeking to leave the country and killing them for attempting to do so (as demonstrated in the case of the confirmed murder of over 40 men, women, and children who were seeking to leave Cuba on July 13, 1994).

(19) The Castro government continues to utilize blackmail, such as the immigration crisis with which it threatened the United States in the summer of 1994, and other unacceptable and illegal forms of conduct to influence the actions of sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere in violation of the Charter of the Organization of American States and other international agreements and international law.

(20) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights situation in Cuba and has taken the extraordinary step of appointing a Special Rapporteur.

(21) The Cuban Government has consistently refused access to the Special Rapporteur and formally expressed its decision not to "implement so much as one comma" of the United Nations Resolutions appointing the Rapporteur.

(22) The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 47-139 on December 19, 1992, Resolution 48-142 on December 20, 1993, and Resolution 49-200 on December 23, 1994, referencing the Special Rapporteur's reports to the United Nations and condemning violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba.

(23) Article 39 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides that the United Nations Security Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken..., to maintain or restore international peace and security.".

(24) The United Nations has determined that massive and systematic violations of human rights may constitute a "threat to peace" under Article 39 and has imposed sanctions due to such violations of human rights in the cases of Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia.

(25) In the case of Haiti, a neighbor of Cuba not as close to the United States as Cuba, the United States led an effort to obtain and did obtain a United Nations Security Council embargo and blockade against that country due to the existence of a military dictatorship in power less than 3 years.

(26) United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 of July 21, 1994, subsequently authorized the use of "all necessary means" to restore the "democratically elected government of Haiti", and the democratically elected government of Haiti was restored to power on October 15, 1994.

(27) The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive manner to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 36 years, and the continued failure to do so constitutes ethically improper conduct by the international community.

(28) For the past 36 years, the Cuban Government has posed and continues to pose a national security threat to the United States.

Section 3. Purposes.

The purposes of this Act are—

(1) to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining the community of democratic countries that are flourishing in the Western Hemisphere;

(2) to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government;

(3) to provide for the continued national security of the United States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro government of terrorism, theft of property from United States nationals by the Castro government, and the political manipulation by the Castro government of the desire of Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the United States;

(4) to encourage the holding of free and fair democratic elections in Cuba, conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observers;

(5) to provide a policy framework for United States support to the Cuban people in response to the formation of a transition government or a democratically elected government in Cuba; and

(6) to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.

Section 4. Definitions.

As used in this Act, the following terms have the following meanings:

(1) AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF A FOREIGN STATE.—The term "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" has the meaning given that term in section 1603 (b) of title 28, United States Code.

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(3) COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY.—The term "commercial activity" has the meaning given that term in section 1603 (d) of title 28, United States Code.

(4) CONFISCATED.—As used in titles I and III, the term confiscated refers to—

(A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban Government of ownership or control of property, on or after January 1, 1959—

(i) without the property having been returned or adequate and effective compensation provided; or

(ii) without the claim to the property having been settled pursuant to an international claims settlement agreement or other mutually accepted settlement procedure; and

(B) the repudiation by the Cuban Government of, the default by the Cuban Government on, or the failure of the Cuban Government to pay, on or after January 1, 1959—

(i) a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government;

(ii) a debt which is a charge on property nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government; or

(iii) a debt which was incurred by the Cuban Government in satisfaction or settlement of a confiscated property claim.

(5) CUBAN GOVERNMENT.—

(A) The term "Cuban Government" includes the government of any political subdivision of Cuba, and any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.

(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term "agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba" means an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 1603 (b) of title 28, United States Code, with each reference in such section to "a foreign state" deemed to be a reference to "Cuba".

(6) DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN CUBA.—The term "democratically elected government in Cuba" means a government determined by the President to have met the requirements of section 206.

(7) ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF CUBA.—The term "economic embargo of Cuba" refers to:

(A) the economic embargo (including all restrictions on trade or transactions with, and travel to or from, Cuba, and all restrictions on transactions in property in which Cuba or nationals of Cuba have an interest) that was imposed against Cuba pursuant to section 620 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370 (a)), section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5 (b)), the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6001 and following), or any other provision of law; and

(b) the restrictions imposed by section 902 (c) of the Food Security Act of 1985.

(8) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term "foreign national" means—

(A) an alien; or

(B) any corporation, trust, partnership, or other juridical entity not organized under the laws of the United States, or of any State, the District of Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

(9) KNOWINGLY.—The term "knowingly" means with knowledge or having reason to know.

(10) OFFICIAL OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT OR THE RULING POLITICAL PARTY IN CUBA.—The term "official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba" refers to any member of the Council of Ministers, Council of State, central committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, or the Politburo of Cuba, or their equivalents.

(11) PERSON.—The term "person" means any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.

(12) PROPERTY.—

(A) The term "property" means any property (including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and any other form of intellectual property), whether real, personal, or mixed, and any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest.

(B) For purposes of title III of this Act, the term "property" does not include real property used for residential purposes unless, as of the date of the enactment of this Act—

(i) the claim to the property is held by a United States national and the claim has been certified under title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949; or

(ii) the property is occupied by an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.

(13) TRAFFICS.—

(A) As used in title III, and except as provided in subparagraph (B), a person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally—

(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,

(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or

(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person,

without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the property.

(B) The term "traffics" does not include—

(i) the delivery of international telecommunication signals to Cuba;

(ii) the trading of holding of securities publicly traded or held, unless the trading is with or by a person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be a specially designated national;

(iii) transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to Cuba, to the extent that such transactions and uses of property are necessary to the conduct of such travel; or

(iv) transactions and uses of property by a person who is both a citizen of Cuba and a resident of Cuba, and who is not an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.

(14) TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IN CUBA.—The term "transition government in Cuba" means a government that the President determines is a transition government consistent with the requirements and factors set forth in section 205.

(15) UNITED STATES NATIONAL.—The term "United States national" means—

(A) any United States citizen; or

(B) any other legal entity which is organized under the laws of the United States, or of any State, the District of Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States, and which has its principal place of business in the United States.

Section 5. Severability.

If any provision of this Act or the amendments made by this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this act, the amendments made by this Act, or the application thereof to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected by such invalidation.

Approved March 12, 1996.

Legislative History

HOUSE REPORTS: Nos. 104-202, Pt. 1 (Comm. on International Relations) and 104-468 (Comm. of Conference).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

Vol. 141 (1995): Sept. 20, considered and passed house; Oct. 11-13, 17-19, considered and passed Senate, amended.

Vol. 142 (1996): Mar. 5, Senate agreed to conference report; Mar. 6, House agreed to conference report.

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 32 (1996):

Mar. 12, Presidential remarks and statement.

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.mw-parser-output .wst-anchor:target{background-color:rgba(100,149,237,0.1);color:#202122;outline:1px solid cornflowerblue}Section 1. Short Title; Table of Contents.

TITLE I — Strengthening International Sanctions Against the Castro Government

TITLE II — Assistance to a Free and Independent Cuba

TITLE III — Protection of Property Rights of United States Nationals

TITLE IV — Exclusion of Certain Aliens