De Lima v. Bidwell/Dissent McKenna

by Joseph McKenna

United States Supreme Court

182 U.S. 1

De Lima  v.  Bidwell

 Argued: January 8, 9, 10, 11, 1901. --- Decided: May 27, 1901

Mr. Justice McKenna, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice White, dissenting:

Mr. Justice Shiras, Mr. Justice White, and myself are unable to concur in the conclusion of the court, and the importance of the case justifies an expression of the grounds of our dissent.

Settle whether Porto Rico is 'foreign country' or 'domestic territory,' to use the antithesis of the opinion of the court, and, it is said, you settle the controversy in this litigation. But in what sense, foreign or domestic? Abstractly and unqualifiedly,-to the full extent that those words imply,-or limitedly, in the sense that the word 'foreign' is used in the customs laws of the United States? If abstractly, the case turns upon a definition, and the issue becomes singleand simple, presenting no difficulty, and yet the arguments at bar have ranged over all the powers of government, and this court divides in opinion. If at the time the duties which are complained of were levied, Porto Rico was as much a foreign country as it was before the war with Spain; if it was as much domestic territory as New York now is, there would be no serious controversy in the case. If the former, the terms and the intention of the Dingley act would apply. If the latter, whatever its words or intention, it could not be applied. Between these extremes there are other relations, and that Porto Rico occupied one of them, and its products hence were subject to duties under the Dingley Tariff act, can be demonstrated. Indeed, we have the authority of a member of the majority of the court, and the organ of the court's opinion in this case, that even if Porto Rico were domestic territory its products could be legally subjected to tariff duties. This principle is expressed by him in Downes v. Bidwell, 181 U.S.-, post, 770, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770. The other members of the court, though agreeing with him in the case at bar, do not agree with him in Downes v. Bidwell. They assert that Porto Rico, being a territory of the United States, tariff duties on its products are inhibited by the Constitution of the United States. Their judgment and his only unite in the case at bar, and we may assume that the reasoning of the opinion just announced is the road which has brought them together, and, assuming further that such reasoning is the best judicial support of the conclusion it is presented to establish, we address ourselves to the consideration of that reasoning.

(1) The statement of the opinion is that whether the cargoes of sugar were subject to duty depends solely upon the question whether Porto Rico was a foreign country at the time they were shipped, and a foreign country is defined to be, following Chief Justice Marshall, "one exclusively within the sovereignty of a foreign nation' and without the sovereignty of the United States.' This makes sovereignty the test, and gives a rule as sure and exact in its application as it is clear and simple in its expression. There is no difficulty in applying it. Difficulty comes with attempts to limit it. The difference between our country and one not ours would seem to be of substance, not needing words to explain the difference, but defying words to confound it, and having the consequence of carrying, not only one law, but all laws. The court does not go so far, and why? Is there weakness in the logic, or do its consequences repel? The argument of the court certainly proceeds as if the test is universal, illustrations are used to make it unmistakable.

Under the effect of the treaty of cession and our government of Porto Rico, it is said, if the question was broadly presented whether it was 'a foreign country or domestic territory,' there would be as little hesitation in answering the question as there would be in determining the ownership of a house deeded in fee simple to a purchaser, after he had gone into possession, paid taxes, and made improvements, without let or hindrance from his vendor. And we would have as little hesitation in applying all of the consequences and concomitants of ownership. But we do not care to join issue on an illustration, although it may suggest wrong principles. We submit that the administration of a government has more complexity-must consider more things-than the management of a piece of real estate. But even the conveyance of real estate may be conditional, all of the incidents of ownership not immediately applying. However, we need not dwell on insufficient analogies. There are better ones. The history of our country has examples of the acquisition of foreign territory,-examples of what relation such territory bears to the United States,-authorities, executive, legislative, and judicial, as to what was wise in statesmanship, as well as what was legal and constitutional, in withholding or extending our laws to such territory; and finding these examples and authorities in the way the opinion of the court attempts to answer or distinguish or overrule them.

United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246, 4 L. 562, is reviewed. In that case, Castine, port of the United States, was in temporary occupation by the British during the war of 1812, and it was declared to be a foreign country within the meaning of our customs laws; as much, the court said by Mr. Justice Story, as if 'Castine had been a foreign territory ceded by treaty to the United States, and the goods had been previously imported there.' In other words, not a cession to another country, but the accidental occupation by the armed forces of another country, made a port in the state of Maine foreign territory. The conclusion had the sanction of great names and the authority of this court. Temporary sovereignty, not permanent dominion, was seemingly made the test.

Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603, 13 L. ed. 276, is also reviewed. The case involved the legality of duties levied in Philadelphia upon goods imported from Tampico. Tampico was a port of Mexico temporarily occupied by the United States forces,-the exact condition which, in the Rice Case, made a port in one of the states of our Union English territory. Tampico was nevertheless held to be a foreign country within the meaning of our revenue laws. In other words, the military occupation and the sovereignty which attended it, which determined in the Rice Case, was rejected in the Fleming Case. There is apparent antagonism between the cases, and the court in the case at bar observe it. And, strangely enough, that which is 'somewhat of the converse' (to quote the court in the case at bar) of the Rice Case is held sufficient for the judgment in the Fleming Case, and other grounds of decision are declared to be dicta.

An attempt is made, however, to reconcile the cases, and we think they can be reconciled, but not upon the grounds stated by the court in the opinion in the case at bar. Harmony cannot be established between them by that which in the Fleming Case is the converse of the Rice Case, and by rejecting as dicta all other grounds as unnecessary to the judgment in the Fleming Case. However, we will proceed to the consideration of the latter case.

Delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Taney substantially said that the boundaries of our country could not be enlarged or diminished by the advance or retreat of armies, and based his opinion besides and the judgment of the case on the absence of an act of Congress establishing a customhouse at Tampico and authorizing the appointment of a collector, 'and consequently there was no officer of the United States authorized by law to grant the clearance and authenticate the coasting manifest of the cargo, in the manner directed by law, where the voyage is from one port of the United States to another,' and the necessity of a legal permit and coasting manifest was expressly asserted. He further said:

'This construction of the revenue laws has been uniformly given by the administrative department of the government in every case that has come before it. And it has, indeed, been given in cases where there appears to have been stronger ground for regarding the place of shipment as a domestic port. For after Florida had been ceded to the United States, and the forces of the United States had taken possession of Pensacola, it was decided by the Treasury Department that goods imported from Pensacola before an act of Congress was passed erecting it into a collection district, and authorizing the appointment of a collector, were liable to duty. That is that, although Florida had by cession actually become a part of the United States and was in our possession, yet, under our revenue laws, its ports must be regarded as foreign until they were established as domestic by act of Congress; and it appears that this decision was sanctioned at the time by the Attorney General of the United States, the law officer of the government. And although not so directly applicable to the case before us, yet the decisions of the Treasury Department in relation to Amelia island, and certain ports in Louisiana, after that province had been ceded to the United States, were both made upon the same grounds. And in the latter case, after a customhouse had been established by law at New Orleans, the collector at that place was instructed to regard as foreign ports Baton Rouge and other settlements still in the possession of Spain, whether on the Mississippi, Iberville, or the seacoast. The department in no instance that we are aware of, since the establishment of the government, has ever recognized a place in a newly acquired country as a domestic port, from which the coasting trade might be carried on, unless it had been previously made so by act of Congress.'

The opinion in the case at bar disregards this reasoning and the conclusion from it, and says: 'While we see no reason to doubt the conclusion of the court (in Fleming v. Page) that the port of Tampico was still a foreign port, it is not perceived why the fact that there was no act of Congress establishing a customhouse there, or authorizing the appointment of a collector, should have prevented the collector appointed by the military commander from granting the usual documents required to be issued to a vessel engaged in the coasting trade.' Such power, it was said, 'a military commander may be presumed to have,' but, 'of course, he would have no power to make a domestic port of what was in reality a foreign port.' But why did it remain a foreign port? Castine did not remain a domestic port. We, however, need not dwell any longer on this point, for, under the latest utterances of this court, the test of dominion breaks down. Cuba is under the dominion of the United States. We held in the Neely Case, 180 U.S. 109, ante, 302, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 302, that it is a foreign country.

We think that Fleming v. Page is disposed of too summarily by the majority in the case at bar, and we have shown that it is not antagonistic to the Castine Case. Both cases recognized inevitable conditions. At Castine the instrumentalities of the custom laws had been devested; at Tampico they had not been invested, and hence the language of the court: 'The department, in no instance that we are aware of, since the establishment of the government, has ever recognized a place in a newly acquired country as a domestic port, from which the coasting trade might be carried on, unless it had been previously made so by act of Congress.'

We submit that the principle upon which Fleming v. Page was based is still a proper principle for judicial application. Does it not make government provident, not haphazard, ignoring circumstances and producing good or ill accidentally? Does it not leave to the executive and the legislative departments that which pertains to them? Did it not stand as a guide to the executive, -a warrant of action, so far as action might affect private rights? Indeed, what is of greater concern, so far as action might affect great public interests? It should, we submit, be accepted as a precedent. It is wise in practice; considerate of what government must regard, and of the different functions of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments and of their independence. Why should it, then, be discarded as dictum? If constancy of judicial decision is necessary to regulate the relations and property rights of individuals, is not constancy of decision the more necessary when it may influence or has influenced the action of a nation? If the other departments of the government must look to the judicial for light, that light should burn steadily. It should not, like the exhalations of a marsh, shine to mislead.

The case of Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 14 L. ed. 889, is relied on especially. The curiosity of that case is that all parties cite it, and this court even finds it as convenient and as variously adaptive. It therefore challenges the application of the wise maxim expressed by Chief Justice Marshall, 'That general expressions in every opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.' And certainly to ascertain the meaning of the court we must see what was before the court, and interpret its opinion by that, and, if there is confusion in its language, it may resolve itself into satisfactory meaning.

It is cited to sustain the proposition that immediately upon the cession of territory it becomes a part of the United States, 'instantly bound and privileged by the laws which Congress had passed to raise a revenue from duties on imports and tonnage.' This is the strongest expression of the case. It is attempted to be made its controlling one,-the point decided. It was neither the point decided nor was it the controlling expression. It was immediately accompanied by the qualification, 'as there is nothing differently stipulated in the treaty in respect to commerce.' The effect of the qualification the opinion in the present case does not explicitly notice, and we shall attempt to show with what meaning the expression was used, and what was decided.

The case involved the legality of duties on imports into California between the 3d of February, 1848, and the 13th of November, 1849. The time was divided by the plaintiffs in the case 'into two portions,' the court said, 'to each of which they supposed that different rules of law attached;' and, further, that 'the claim covered various amounts of money which were paid at intervals between the 3d day of February, 1848, and the 13th of November, 1849.' The first of those dates was that of the treaty of peace between the United States and Mexico, and the latter when Mr. Collier, a person who had been regularly appointed collector at that port, entered upon the performance of the duties of his office. 'During the whole of this period it was alleged by the plaintiffs that there existed no legal authority to receive or collect any duty whatever accruing upon goods imported from foreign countries.'

Meeting the contention and replying to it fully, the court held that the duties were legally levied and collected during the whole of the period-from the 3d of February, 1848, until some time in the following fall-under the war tariff instituted by Governor Mason; after that under the Walker tariff. In other words, before and after cession, under the war tariff. Speaking of that tariff the court said: 'They (duties) were paid until some time in the fall of 1848, at the rate of the war tariff, which had been established early in the year before by the direction of the President of the United States.' And speaking of the action of Governor Mason and the law which sanctioned it, it was further said:

'He may not have comprehended fully the principle applicable to what he might rightly do in such a case, but he felt rightly, and acted accordingly. He determined, in the absence of all instruction, to maintain the existing government. The territory had been ceded as a conquest, and was to be preserved and governed as such until the sovereignty to which it had passed had legislated for it. That sovereignty was the United States, under the Constitution, by which power had been given to Congress to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, with the power also to admit new states into this Union, with only such limitations as are expressed in the section in which this power is given. The government, of which Colonel Mason was the executive, had its origin in the lawful exercise of a belligerent right over a conquered territory. It had been instituted during the war by the command of the President of the United States. It was the government when the territory was ceded as a conquest, and it did not cease as a matter of course or as a necessary consequence of the restoration of peace. The President might have dissolved it by withdrawing the army and navy officers who administered it, but he did not do so. Congress could have put an end to it, but that was not done. The right inference from the inaction of both is that it was meant to be continued until it had been legislatively changed. No presumption of a contrary intention can be made. Whatever may have been the causes of delay, it must be presumed that the delay was consistent with the true policy of the government. And the more so, as it was continued until the people of the territory met in convention to form a state government, which was subsequently recognized by Congress under its power to admit new states into the Union.'

And further replying to the contention that there was neither treaty not law permitting the collection of duties, 'it having been shown that the ratification of the treaty made California a part of the United States, and that as soon as it became so the territory became subject to the acts which were in force to regulate foreign commerce with the United States, after those had ceased which had been instituted for its regulation as a belligerent right.'

An important inquiry is, When did the laws cease 'which had been instituted for the regulation of the territory as a belligerent right,' and how did they cease? The answer is instant, they ceased when the President withdrew them and because he withdrew them. The laws of Congress did not instantly apply upon the cession. There was an interval of time, during which they did not apply, and if there can be such interval, who is to judge of what duration it shall be? Who can but the political department of the government? and how impracticable any other ruling would be. It is not for the judiciary to question it. It involves circumstances which the judiciary can take no account of or estimate. It is essentially a political function.

We have quoted largely from Cross v. Harrison because it is made the pivot of the opinion of the court in the present case, and we will recur to it again. But it should be said now that some of the expressions may be accounted for and understood by the state of precedent opinion.

It is a matter of some surprise that the only explicit provision of the Constitution of the United States in regard to the territory not embraced within the jurisdiction of a state is expressed in the following provision: 'The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States.' What was meant by it, what its relation was to other provisions of the Constitution, was the subject of discussion. Gouveneur Morris, who wrote the provision, subsequently declared that it was intended to confer power to govern acquisitions of territory as 'provinces and allow them no voice in our councils.' He admitted, however, that it was not expressed more pointedly in order to avert opposition. In his mind it certainly contemplated the government of after-acquired territory. In Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691, however, the provision was declared to be confined, and was intended to be confined, to the territory which at that time belonged to the United States. 'It was a special provision for a known and particular territory, and to meet a present emergency, and nothing more.' This conclusion was claimed to be established by the history of the times, 'as well as the careful terms in which the article is framed.' We will not stop to reconcile this conflict between him who wrote the provision and the court who interpreted it. The conflict was but an incident in the evolution of opinion. And there were other conflicts, or rather diversities of view, caused or encouraged by the silences of the Constitution. That instrument contained no provision for acquiring new territory. The power was derived from the powers of making war and of making peace, and might be accomplished by conquest or by treaty. There was a question, however, of the effect of an acquisition. It is certain that Mr. Jefferson doubted the power of incorporating new territory into the Union without an amendment to the Constitution, and the debates in Congress exhibit the diverse views held by public men on the relation which such territory would bear to the United States, the application of the laws to and the power of Congress over the acquired territory under the Constitution. We shall not stop to quote the debtes. That will be done in a subsequent case, and the conclusion which they demonstrate expressed. It is only necessary for us to observe that distinctions always existed between territory which might be acquired (whether by purchase or by conquest) and that which was within the acknowledged limits of the United States, and also that which might be acquired by the establishment of a disputed line. These distinctions were conspicuous in the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, at circuit, in the case of American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L. ed. 242. In that case the relation of Florida to the United States was necessary to be considered, and of that relation the learned Justice said:

'It is obvious that there is a material distinction between the territory now under consideration and that which is acquired from the aborigines (whether by purchase or conquest), within the acknowledged limits of the United States, as also that which is acquired by the establishment of a disputed line. As to both these, there can be no question that the sovereignty of the state or territory within which it lies, and of the United States, immediately attach, producing a complete subjection to all the laws and institutions of the two governments, local and general, unless modified by treaty. The question now to be considered relates to territories previously subject to the acknowledged jurisdiction of another sovereign; such as was Florida to the Crown of Spain. And on this subject we have the most explicit proof that the understanding of our public functionaries is that the government and laws of the United States do not extend to such territory by the mere act of cession.' The italics are ours.

All the history and utterances of the past declare the same way.

And how important those utterances and decisive of the present controversy! They were not the utterances of inattention and ignorance, and therefore to be discarded. They were the utterances of men whose actions illustrated them. They were the utterances of men (to borrow the thought of Benton) whose sacrifices made the Constitution possible, whose genius conceived and wrote it. Shall it be said that the farther time separates us from them the better we understand them,-better than they understood themselves?

American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton came to this court and was argued by Mr. Webster. We may quote what he said. His views were more than those of an advocate. He expressed them elsewhere when a different, if not higher, duty demanded reflection, consideration, and sincerity. 'What is Florida?' he asked. 'It is no part of the United States. How can it be? How is it represented? Do the laws of the United States reach Florida? Not unless by particular provisions.' And, responding to the argument, the court decided through Chief Justice Marshall that the judicial power of the United States, as declared by the Constitution, did not extend to Florida, and the title to 356 bales of cotton was held to pass by a sale under the order of a court, which consisted of a notary and five jurors, established by an act of the governor and council of Florida.

From the light of previous opinions the language of Mr. Justice Wayne, in Cross v. Harrison, receives explanation. The treaty with Mexico, following the war, defined the 'boundaries of the United States,' and made the reclaimed territory, which included California, a part of the United States. In other words, the acquisition (if it can be called such) of California was in recognition of boundaries, and hence the learned Justice called it a part of the United States. But not uniformly. Mark this sentence: 'But after the ratification of the treaty, California became a part of the United States, or a ceded, conquered territory.' That his language marked a distinction there can be no doubt, but it was of no consequence to observe. The principle enforced did not need it. In either case the action of the President was the potent thing.

2. The line of judicial precedents relied upon in the opinion of the court in the case at bar ends with Cross v. Harrison, and the practice and rulings of the executive departments of the government are considered. They are said to be in accordance with the ruling ascribed to Cross v. Harrison, with but a single exception. If there is one legal exception the rule is gone. It is not a case where an exception can prove the rule; it is one where the exception destroys the rule. The exception was Louisiana. Between December 20, 1803, when possession was delivered to the United States, and March 25, 1804, when the act of February 24 became effective, Louisiana was treated as a foreign country under the customs laws; but this, the court in the opinion just announced says, 'is manifestly inconsistent with the position subsequently taken by this court in Cross v. Harrison, wherein it is said of the action of Mr. Harrison in California: 'That war tariff, however, was abandoned as soon as the military governor had received from Washington information of the exchange and ratification of the treaty with Mexico, and duties were afterwards levied in conformity with such as Congress had imposed upon foreign merchandise imported into the other ports of the United States, Upper California having been ceded by the treaty to the United States. This last was done with the assent of the Executive of the United States, or without any interference to prevent it. Indeed, from the letter from the then Secretary of the Treasury, we cannot doubt that the action of the military governor of California was recognized as allowable and lawful by Mr. Polk and his cabinet.' After saying that, and this action having been recognized by the President, Mr. Justice Wayne adds: 'We think it was a rightful and correct recognition under all the circumstances, and when we say rightful we mean that it was constitutional, although Congress had not passed an act to extend the collection of tonnage and import duties to the ports of California."

If the laws of Congress instantly applied, why was the recognition of the President necessary? They could gain no legal efficacy from such recognition which they did not have without it, under the supposition that they applied on cession by their own force. Surely so obvious a consequence would have occurred to the court in Cross v. Harrison, and we cannot believe that the court used its language carelessly or uselessly. If the assent and recognition of the President were not necessary, why dwell upon them? Why so confuse the statement of a simple principle,-simple in application and expression,-and cast doubt upon it by unnecessary qualifications? The case, therefore, is not inconsistent with the ruling in regard to Louisiana. For a period of time after the cession of Louisiana, President Jefferson treated it as foreign territory under the custom laws, and duties were levied upon its products, and no one disputed the legality of it. If the instance was not the same as in Cross v. Harrison, the principle was the same. There was not an immediate change upon the cession of either California or Louisiana. In California, duties were levied for a time under the war tariff, and afterwards under the act of Congress; and of the latter it was said: 'This last was done with the assent of the Executive of the United States, or without any interference to prevent it.' And this, it was further said, was 'recognized as allowable and lawful by Mr. Polk and his cabinet.' We are disposed to ask again, was the language inadvertent? Did not the court use it with full consciousness of its meaning and its necessity? Was the court in confusion as to the principles which applied, and jumbled them together without seeing or making a distinction between the force of the act of Congress of itself, and the action of the President in giving it efficacy, the necessity of its being recognized as 'allowable and lawful by Mr. Polk and his cabinet?' Surely not. Rights were involved which depended upon the legality of the war tariff both before and after cession, and that legality was intended to be and was passed upon and sustained. An automatic effect was not given to the act of Congress as it is given in the case at bar. The act was applied by the President, not in simple execution of it, but as giving it legal effect. And it was this that the court said 'was a rightful and correct recognition under all the circumstances.' 'Rightful,' because 'it was constitutional, although Congress had not passed an act to extend the collection of tonnage and import duties to the ports of California.' In other words, an act of Congress was not necessary to extend the collection of duties; the power of the President was sufficient, and of that power the court left no doubt. Speaking of the duties which were collected under the war tariff after the cession, it was observed, 'but after the ratification of the treaty, California became a part of the United States, or a ceded, conquered territory. Our inquiry here is to be, whether or not the cession gave any right to the plaintiffs to have the duties restored to them which they may have paid between the ratifications and exchange of the treaty and the notification of that fact by our government to the military governor of California. It was not received by him until two months after the ratification, and not then with any instructions or even remote intimation from the President that the civil and military government which had been instituted during the war was discontinued. Up to that time, whether such an intimation had or had not been given, duties had been collected under the war tariff, strictly in conformity with the instructions which had been received from Washington.' Comment would seem to be unnecessary to make this passage clear. If the act of Congress applied by cession, it applied immediately. It could not be delayed by taking time for notice. Besides, it would by its own force displace all other provisions, and would not need for operation upon rights or the creation of rights, that the President give instructions or intimations, near or remote, 'that the civil and military government which had been instituted during the war was discontinued.' But we need not comment further. We may use the language of the court in summarizing its conclusion:

'Our conclusion from what has been said is that the civil government of California, organized as it was from a right of conquest, did not cease or become defunct in consequence of the signature of the treaty or from its ratification. We think it was continued over a ceded conquest, without any violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that until Congress legislated for it the duties upon foreign goods imported into San Francisco were legally demanded and lawfully received by Mr. Harrison, the collector of the port, who received his appointment, according to instructions from Washington, from Governor Mason.'

This explicit statement, as well as the analysis and review which have first been made, leaves no ground to sustain the conclusion that Cross v. Harrison held that the tariff laws of the United States were immediately operative in California without regard to the exercise of the President's discretion putting them in force. But purely for argument's sake we may concede the contrary. The decision must have been, in any conception, based on the provisions of the treaty with Mexico. The court said so. But the treaty with Spain, instead of providing for incorporating the ceded territory into the United States, as did the treaty with Mexico, expressly declares that the status of the ceded territory is to be determined by Congress. This difference in the treaties removes Cross v. Harrison as a factor in the judgment of the case at bar, supposing its interpretation, in the opinion we are reviewing, be correct.

3. The opinion of the court says: 'On March 1, 1845, Congress adopted a joint resolution consenting to the annexation of Texas upon certain conditions (5 Stat. at L. 797) but it was not until December 29, 1845, that it was formally admitted as a state. 9 Stat. at L. 108. In this interval, and on July 29, 1845, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a circular letter directing the collectors to collect duties upon all imports from Texas into the United States until Congress had further acted. Of course, there could be no question that Texas remained a foreign state until December 29, when she was formally admitted. The circular, therefore, is of no pertinence to the question here involved.' We think otherwise. Even after her admission as a state it was deemed necessary to extend the laws of the United States to her. 9 Stat. at L. 1, chap. 1. She was an example, as Florida was, as to what Congress believed to be necessary, and Oregon and Alaska are like examples. The simple rule of the automatic action of the custom and revenue laws seemingly did not occur to anybody; not even as to incorporated territory nor to a new state formed from foreign territory. Nor, as we have seen, did such theory seem to be sustainable when Chief Justice Tancy announced in Fleming v. Page a contrary conclusion.

4. But independent of precedent the court says it is 'irresistibly impelled to the same conclusion.' The argument is mainly based upon the treaty-making power invested in the President and Senate. A treaty made by that power is said to be the supreme law of the land,-as efficacious as an act of Congress; and, if subsequent and inconsistent with an act of Congress, repeals it. This must be granted, and also that 'one of the ordinary incidents of a treaty is the cession of territory,' and that 'the territory thus acquired is acquired as absolutely as if the annexation were made, as in the case of Texas and Hawaii, by an act of Congress.' But to tell us of the sources of the treaty-making power and to define the extent of that power helps us very little to the solution of the present problem.

The question occurs, What has the treaty-making power done? Is the treaty with Spain inconsistent with the Dingley act, and was it intended to work the repeal of that act? That act when passed was undoubtedly intended to apply to products from Porto Rico, and, we suppose, it will not be contended, in determining whether the treaty has rendered the act inoperative, the terms of the treaty are not to be looked at? Assuredly the treaty cannot have an automatic force contrary to its terms. That is, it cannot be contended that the automatic force of the treaty is greater than the force of the treaty itself.

This court said, speaking by Mr. Justice Brown, in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383:

'In the future growth of the nation, as heretofore, it is not impossible that Congress may see fit to annex territories whose jurisprudence is that of the civil law. One of the considerations moving to such annexation might be the very fact that the territory so annexed should enter the Union with its traditions, laws, and systems of administration unchanged. It would be a narrow construction of the Constitution to require them to abandon these, or to substitute for a system which represented the growth of generations of inhabitants a jurisprudence with which they had had no previous acquaintance or sympathy.'

The statement being accepted, may not a fiscal system be as important as other matters of administration? May not a change of taxation, new burdens of taxation suddenly imposed, be worthy of consideration?

'The opinion of the case at bar has not discussed the treaty. It takes it for granted that the cession of Porto Rico was absolute, and the conclusion that it is not a foreign country, within the meaning of the revenue laws, is deduced from that. But necessarily that depends upon the treaty, and interpretation is called for. The power of Congress over ceded territory is asserted in the opinion in somewhat absolute terms,-it 'involves the right to govern and dispose of it.' This being so, it would seem to be certain that the treaty-making power would not forestall Congress, or accept with the cession of territory the destruction of the fiscal and industrial policies of the country. We should hesitate to so pronounce for reasons which must occur to everyone, except upon the compulsion of the clearest expression.

The opinion of the court further says: 'Territory thus acquired (by treaty) can remain a foreign country under the tariff laws only upon one of two theories: Either that the word 'foreign' applies to such countries as were foreign at the time the statute was enacted, notwithstanding any subsequent change in their condition, or that they remain foreign under the tariff laws until Congress has formally embraced them within the customs union of the states.' Both theories are rejected as untenable. The first because, 'while a statute is presumed to speak from the time of its enactment, it embraces all such persons or things as subsequently fall within its scope.' But what constitutes the scope of a statute,-its letter inevitably, or may its spirit be regarded as interpreting and applying its letter? In other words, shall the purpose of its enactment be executed or defeated? There can be but one answer to these questions, nor can confidence in the answer be lessened by the analogies used by the court.

The law against selling liquors to minors, it is said, contemplates all minors,-those existing and those which may come into being afterwards. Very true, but the purpose of the law is that. The same with territories (to use another illustration of the opinion) being bound as states when they come into the Union. But these illustrations assume that the territory referred to was incorporated by the treaty into the United States, an ever-recurring and misleading fallacy, in our judgment.

Let us, however, look at the argument under the wrong assumption of incorporation. The provisions of the Constitution for the admission of new states contemplate the consequences of statehood,-contemplate territories ceasing to be bound as such and becoming bound as states. In other words, those provisions regard the future, and have their purpose fulfilled, not defeated, by territories becoming states. But a tariff law does not contemplate additions to or subtractions from itself. It may be said to be occasional. It regards certain conditions, and may be dependent upon them, whether it be enacted for revenue only or for protection and revenue. Its entire plan may be impaired or be destroyed by change in any part. The revenues of the government may be lessened, even taken away by change; the industrial policy of the country may be destroyed by change. We are repelled by the argument which leads to such consequences, whether regarding our own country or the foreign country made 'domestic.' If 'domestic' as to what comes from it, it is 'domestic' as to what goes to it, and its customs laws, as well as our customs laws, may be cast into confusion, and its business and affairs deranged before there is possibility of action.

As we have already said, to set the word 'foreign' in antithesis to the word 'domestic' proves nothing. Their opposition does not express the controversy. The controversy is narrower. It is whether a particular tariff law applies. That, indeed, may be the consequence of the principle that all laws apply, or that customs laws apply by reason of the provision of the Constitution which requires duties, imposts, and excises to be uniform throughout the United States, and the treaty-making power cannot prevent the application of that provision. That principle is asserted by counsel, and is very simple, but, applied as counsel apply it, is fraught with grave consequences. It takes this great country out of the world and shuts it up within itself. It binds and cripples the power to make war and peace. It may take away the fruits of victory, and, if we may contemplate the possibility of disaster, it may take away the means of mitigating that. All those great and necessary powers, are, as a consequence of the argument, limited by the necessity to make some impost or excise 'uniform throughout the United States.'

The treaty-making power is as much a constitutional power as the legislative or judicial powers. It is a supreme attribute of sovereignty, but often less determined in its exercise than others,-more dependent on contingency, and may be less optional. It may precede war or follow war,-command or be commanded by war. The kind or direction of its exercise cannot always be predicted or marked. There can be no verbal limitations upon it, and, wisely, none were attempted. Whatever restraints should be put upon it might have to yield to the greater restraints of life or death,-not only material prosperity, but national existence. These, of course, are extreme contingencies, but they are not impossible, and are necessary to be regarded when limitations are urged which take no account of them. We do not mean to say that there are no limitations. They are certainly not those which counsel urge. Besides, the contention of counsel is answered by the Canter Case. The difference between military occupation of a territory and its cession at the treaty of peace was noted. 'If it be ceded by the treaty,' the court said, 'the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed, either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its new master shall impose.' What is the significance of this? It would seem like useless language; its purpose often defeated if the Constitution and laws of the conqueror, and, to drop from the abstract and supposing this country the conqueror, if our Constitution and laws, immediately apply on cession of territory. The terms which may be granted or received would be, to a certain and important extent, predetermined. Neither we nor the conquered nation would have any choice in the new situation, could make no accommodation to exigency, would stand bound in a helpless fatality. Whatever might be the interests, temporary or permanent, whatever might be the condition or fitness of the ceded territory, the effect on it or on us, the territory would become a part of the United States with all that implies. It is only true to say that counsel shrink somewhat from the consequences of their contention, or if 'shrink' be too strong an expression, deny that it can be carried to the nationalization of uncivilized tribes. Whether that limitation can be logically justified we are not called upon to say. There may be no ready test of the civilized and uncivilized, between those who are capable of self-government and those who are not, available to the judiciary, or which could be applied or enforced by the judiciary. Upon what degree of civilization could civil and political rights under the Constitution be awarded by courts? The question suggests the difficulties, and how essentially the whole matter is legislative, not judicial. Nor can those difficulties be put out of contemplation, under the assumption that the principles which we may declare will have no other consequence than to affect duties upon a cargo of sugar. We need not, however, dwell on this part of the discussion. From our construction of the powers of the government and of the treaty with Spain the danger of the nationalization of savage tribes cannot arise.

These views answer, in our judgment, the chief arguments of the opinion, but to make a complete reply and to justify a different conclusion we should consider and interpret the treaty with Spain. We will, however, not do so now. It has been done in the concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, and it is not necessary to anticipate the statements and reasoning of that opinion.

We said at the outset that it could be demonstrated that Porto Rico occupied a relation to the United States between that of being a foreign country absolutely and of being domestic territory absolutely, and because of that relation its products were subject to the duties imposed by the Dingley act. And, concluding, we say we believe that, in this opinion and the one referred to, we have made that demonstration; made it from the Constitution itself, the immediate and continued practice under the Constitution, judicial authority, and the treaty with Spain. And that demonstration does more than declare the legality of the duties which were levied upon the sugars of the plaintiff in error. It vindicates the government from national and international weakness. It exhibits the Constitution as a charter of great and vital authorities, with limitations indeed, but with such limitations as serve and assist government, not destroy it; which, though fully enforced, yet enable the United States to have what it was intended to have-'an equal station among the Powers of the earth,' and to do all 'Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do,'-and confidently do, able to secure the fullest fruits of their performance. All powers of government, placed in harmony under the Constitution; the rights and liberties of every citizen secured, put to no hazard of loss or impairment; the power of the nation also secured in its great station, enabled to move with strength and dignity and effect among the other nations of the earth to such purpose as it may undertake or to such destiny as it may be called.

The judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.

I am compelled to dissent from the judgment in this case. It appears to me irreconcilable with the unanimous opinion of this court in Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603, 13 L. ed. 276, and with the opinions of the majority of the Justices in the case, this day decided, of Downes v. Bidwell, 181 U.S. -, post, 770, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770.

Notes