Debates in the Several State Conventions/Volume 5/Congress Mar. 1783
Monday, March 3.
The committee on revenues reported, in addition to the former articles recommended by them, a duty of two thirds of a dollar per one hundred and twelve pounds on all brown sugars; one dollar on all powdered, lumped, and clayed sugars, other than loaf sugars; one and one third of a dollar per one hundred and twelve pounds on all loaf sugars; one thirtieth of a dollar per pound on all Bohea teas, and one fifteenth of a dollar on all finer India teas. This report, without debate or opposition, was recommitted, to be incorporated with the general plan.
Tuesday, March 4, and Wednesday, March 5.
The motion of Mr. HAMILTON, on the Journal, relative to abatement of the quotas of distressed states, was rejected, partly because the principle was disapproved by some, and partly because it was thought improper to be separated from other objects to be recommended to the states. The latter motive produced the motion for postponing, which was lost.
The committee to whom had been referred the letters of resignation of Mr. Morris, reported, as their opinion, that it was not necessary for Congress immediately to take any steps thereon. They considered the resignation as conditional, and that, if it should eventually take place at the time designated, there was no necessity for immediate provision to be made.
Mr. BLAND moved, "that a committee be appointed to devise the most proper means of arranging the department of finance."
This motion produced, on these two days, lengthy and warm debates; Mr. LEE and Mr. BLAND, on one side, disparaging the administration of Mr. Morris, and throwing oblique censure on his character. They considered his letter as an insult to Congress; and Mr. LEE declared that the man who had published to all the world such a picture of our national character and finances was unfit to be a minister of the latter. On the other side, Mr. WILSON and Mr. HAMILTON went into a copious defence and panegyric of Mr. Morris; the ruin in which his resignation, if it should take place, would involve public credit and all the operations dependent on it; and the decency, though firmness, of his letters. The former observed, that the declaration of Mr. Morris, that he would not be the minister of injustice, could not be meant to reflect on Congress, because they had declared the funds desired by Mr. Morris to be necessary; and that the friends of the latter could not wish for a more honorable occasion for his retreat from public life, if they did not prefer the public interest to considerations of friendship. Other members were divided as to the propriety of the letters in question. In general, however, they were thought reprehensible; as in general, also, a conviction prevailed of the personal merit and public importance of Mr. Morris. All impartial members foresaw the most alarming consequences from his resignation. The prevailing objection to Mr. Bland's motion was, that its avowed object and tendency was to reëstablish a board, in place of a single minister of finance. Those who apprehended that, ultimately, this might be unavoidable, thought it so objectionable that nothing but the last necessity would justify it The motion of Mr. BLAND was lost, and a committee appointed, generally, on the letters of Mr. Morris.14
Thursday, March 6.
The committee on revenue made a report, which was ordered to be printed for each member, and to be taken up on Monday next.
Friday, March 7.
Printed copies of the report above-mentioned were delivered to each number as follows, viz.:
1. "Resolved, That it be recommended to the several states, as indispensably necessary to the restoration of public credit, and the punctual and honorable discharge of the public debts, to vest in the United States, in Congress assembled, a power to levy, for the use of the United States, a duty of five per cent., ad valorem, at the time and place of importation, upon all goods, wares, and merchandises of foreign growth and manufactures, which may be imported into any of the said states from any foreign port, island, or plantation, except arms, ammunition, clothing, and other articles imported on account of the United States, or any of them; and except wool-cards, cotton-cards, and wire for making them; and also except salt during the war.
2. "Also, a like duty of five per cent., ad valorem, on all prizes and prize goods condemned in the Court of Admiralty of these United States as lawful prize.
3. "Also, to levy a duty of one eighth of a dollar per bushel on all salt, imported as aforesaid, after the war; one fifteenth of a dollar per gallon on all wines; one thirtieth of a dollar per gallon on all rum and brandy; two thirds of a dollar per one- hundred and twelve pounds on all brown sugars; one dollar per one hundred and twelve pounds on all powdered, lump, and clayed sugars, other than loaf sugars; one and one third of a dollar per one hundred and twelve pounds on all loaf sugars; one thirtieth of a dollar per pound on all Bohea tea; and one fifteenth of a dollar per pound on all finer India teas, imported as aforesaid, after ——— ———, in addition to the five per cent. above mentioned.
4. "Provided, that none of the said duties shall be applied to any other purpose than the discharge of the interest, or principal, of the debts which shall have been contracted on the faith of the United States for supporting the present war, nor be continued for a longer term than twenty-five years; and provided, that the collectors of the said duties shall be appointed by the states within which their offices are to be respectively exercised; but when so appointed shall be amenable to, and removable by, the United States, in Congress assembled, alone; and, in case any state shall not make such appointment within ——— ———, alter notice given for that purpose, the appointment may then be made by the United States, in Congress assembled.
5. "That it be further recommended to the several states to establish for a like term, not exceeding twenty-five years, and to appropriate to the discharge of the interest and principal of the debts which shall have been contracted on the faith of the United States, for supporting the present war, substantial and effectual revenues, of such a nature as they may respectively judge most convenient, to the amount of ——— ——— ———, and in the proportion following, viz.:
. . .
The said revenues to be collected by persons appointed as aforesaid, but to be carried to the separate credit of the states within which they shall be collected, and be liquidated and adjusted among the states according to the quotas which may from time to time be allotted to them.
6. "That an annual account of the proceeds and application of the afore mentioned revenues shall be made out and transmitted to the several states, distinguishing the proceeds of each of the specified articles, and the amount of the whole revenue received from each state.
7. "That none of the preceding resolutions shall take effect until all of them shall be acceded to by every state; after which accession, however, they shall be considered as forming a mutual compact among all the states, and shall be irrevocable by any one or more of them without the concurrence of the whole, or a majority, of the United States in Congress assembled.
8. "That, as a further means, as well of hastening the extinguishment of the debts as of establishing the harmony of the United States, it be recommended to the states which have passed no acts towards complying with the resolutions of Congress of the sixth of September and the tenth of October, 1780, relative to territorial cessions, to make the liberal cessions therein recommended; and to the states which may have passed acts complying with the said resolutions in part only, to revise and complete such compliance.
9. "That, in order to remove all objections against a retrospective application of the constitutional rule of apportioning to the several states the charges and expenses which shall have been supplied for the common defence or general welfare, it be recommended to them to enable Congress to make such equitable exceptions and abatements as the particular circumstances of the states, from time to time, during the war, may be found to require.
10. "That, conformably to the liberal principles on which these recommendations are founded, and with a view to a more amicable and complete adjustment of all accounts between the United States and individual slates, all reasonable expenses which shall have been incurred by the states without the sanction of Congress, in their defence against, or attacks upon, British or savage enemies, either by sea or by land, and which shall be supported by satisfactory proofs shall be considered as part of the common charges incident to the present war, and be allowed as such.
11. "That, as a more convenient and certain rule of ascertaining the proportions to be supplied by the states, respectively, to the common treasury, the following alteration, in the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between these states, be, and the same is hereby, agreed to in Congress; and the several states are advised to authorize their respective delegates to subscribe and ratify the same, as part of the said instrument of union, in the words following, to wit:—
"'So much of the eighth of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the thirteen states of America as is contained in the words following, to wit,—"All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states, in proportion to the value of all land within each state granted to, or surveyed for, any person, as such land, and the buildings and improvements thereon, shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled shall, from time to time, direct and appoint,"—is hereby revoked and made void, and in place thereof it is declared and concluded, the same having been agreed to in a Congress of the United States, that all charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the number of inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, except Indians not paying taxes in each state; which number shall be triennially taken and transmitted to the United States, in Congress assembled, in such mode as they shall direct and appoint: provided, always, that in such numeration no persons shall be included who are bound to servitude for life, according to the laws of the state to which they belong, other than such as may be between the ages of ——— years.'"[1]
Monday, March 10.
The committee, consisting of Mr. Carroll, Mr. Dyer, and Mr. Mifflin, to whom was referred the report of the committee on two paragraphs of a report of the grand committee, brought in a report; and the report of the committee being taken into consideration, and amended, so as to read as follows,—
"That such officers as are now in service, and shall continue therein to the end of the war, shall be entitled to receive the sum of five years' full pay, in money or securities, on interest at six per cent. per annum, at the option of Congress, instead of the half-pay promised for life by the resolution of the twenty-first of October, 1780; the said securities to be such as shall be given to the other creditors of the United States; provided that it be at the option of the lines of the respective states, and not of officers individually in those lines, to accept or refuse the same; that all officers who have retired from service upon the promise of half-pay for life shall be entitled to the benefits of the above resolution; provided that those of the line of each state collectively shall agree thereto; that the same commutation shall extend to the corps not belonging to the lines of particular states, the acceptance or refusal to be determined by corps; that all officers entitled to half-pay for life, not included in the above resolution, may, collectively, agree to accept or refuse the commutation,"—
much debate passed relative to the proposed commutation of half-pay; some wishing it to take place on condition only that a majority of the whole army should concur; others preferring the plan above expressed, and not agreed to.
Tuesday, March 11.
The report entered on Friday, the 7th of March, was taken into consideration. It had been sent, by order of Congress, to the superintendent of finance for his remarks, which were also on the table. These remarks were, in substance, that it would be better to turn the five per cent., ad valorem, into a tariff", founded on an enumeration of the several classes of imports, to which ought to be added a few articles of exports; that, instead of an apportionment of the residue on the states, other general revenues—from a land-tax, reduced to one fourth of a dollar per hundred acres, with a house-tax, regulated by the numbers of windows, and an excise on all spirituous liquors, to be collected at the place of distillery—ought to be substituted, and, as well as the duties on trade, made coëxistent with the public debts; the whole to be collected by persons appointed by Congress alone. And that an alternative ought to be held out to the states, either to establish the permanent revenues for the interest, or to comply with a constitutional demand of the principal within a very short period.
In order to ascertain the sense of Congress on these ideas, it was proposed that the following short questions should be taken:—
1. Shall any taxes, to operate generally throughout the states, be recommended by Congress, other than duties on foreign commerce?
2. Shall the five per cent., ad valorem, be exchanged for a tariff?
3. Shall the alternative be adopted, as proposed by the superintendent of finance?
On the first question the states were—New Hampshire, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, no; Maryland, no; Virginia, no; six noes and five ayes—lost.
On the second question there were seven ayes.
The third question was not put, its impropriety being generally proclaimed.
In consequence of the second vote in favor of a tariff, the three first paragraphs of the report were recommitted, together with the letter from the superintendent of finance.
On the fourth paragraph, on motion of Mr. Dyer, after the word "war," in the fifth line, was inserted "agreeably to the resolution of the 16th of December last."
A motion was made by Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. WILSON to strike out the limitation of twenty-five years, and to make the revenue coexistent with the debts. This question was lost, the states being—New Hampshire, no; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, divided; New York, ay; New Jersey, ay; Pennsylvania, ay; Delaware ay; Maryland, ay; Virginia, no; North Carolina, ay; South Carolina, no.
A motion was made by Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. WILSON to strike out the clauses relative to the appointment of collectors, and to provide that the collectors should be inhabitants of the states within which they should collect; should be nominated by Congress, and appointed by the states; and in case such nomination should not be accepted or rejected within ——— days, it should stand good. On this question there were five ayes and six noes.
Wednesday, 12th, Thursday, 13th, Friday, 14th, and Saturday, 15th, of March.
These days were employed in reading the despatches brought on Wednesday morning by Captain Barney, commanding the Washington packet. They were dated from December the 4th to the 24th, from the ministers plenipotentiary for peace, with journals of preceding transactions; and were accompanied by the preliminary articles signed on the :30th of November, between the said ministers and Mr. Oswald, the British minister.
The terms granted to America appeared to Congress, on the whole, extremely liberal. It was observed by several, however, that the stipulation obliging Congress to recommend to the states a restitution of confiscated property, although it could scarcely be understood that the states would comply, had the appearance of sacrificing the dignity of Congress to the pride of the British king.
The separate and secret manner in which our ministers had proceeded with respect to France, and the confidential manner with respect to the British ministers, affected different members of Congress differently. Many of the most judicious members thought they had all been, in some measure, ensnared by the dexterity of the British minister; and particularly disapproved of the conduct of Mr. Jay, in submitting ta the enemy his jealousy of the French, without even the knowledge of Dr. Franklin, and of the unguarded manner in which he, Mr. Adams, and Dr. Franklin, had given, in writing, sentiments unfriendly to our ally, and serving as weapons for the insidious policy of the enemy. The separate article was most offensive, being considered as obtained by Great Britain, not for the sake of the territory ceded to her, but as a means of disuniting the United States and France, as inconsistent with the spirit of the alliance, and a dishonorable departure from the candor, rectitude, and plain dealing professed by Congress. The dilemma in which Congress were placed was sorely felt. If they should communicate to the French minister every thing, they exposed their own ministers, destroyed all confidence in them on the part of France, and might engage them in dangerous factions against Congress, which was the more to be apprehended, as the terms obtained by their management were popular in their nature. If Congress should conceal every thing, and the French court should, either from the enemy or otherwise, come to the knowledge of it, all confidence would be at an end between the allies; the enemy might be encouraged by it to make fresh experiments, and the public safety as well as the national honor be endangered. Upon the whole, it was thought and observed by many that our ministers, particularly Mr. Jay, instead of making allowances for, and affording facilities to France, in her delicate situation between Spain and the United States, had joined with the enemy in taking advantage of it to increase her perplexity; and that they had made the safety of their country depend on the sincerity of Lord Shelburne, which was suspected by all the world besides, and even by most of themselves. See Mr. Laurens's letter, December the 24th.
The displeasure of the French court at the neglect of our ministers to maintain a confidential intercourse, and particularly to communicate the preliminary articles before they were signed, was not only signified to the secretary of foreign affairs, but to sundry members, by the Chevalier de la Luzerne, To the former he showed a letter from Count de Vergennes, directing him to remonstrate to Congress against the conduct of the American ministers, which a subsequent letter countermanded, alleging that Dr. Franklin had given some explanations that had been admitted; and told Mr. Livingston that the American ministers had deceived him (De Vergennes) by telling him, a few days before the preliminary articles were signed, that the agreement on them was at a distance ; that when he carried the articles signed into council, the king expressed great indignation, and asked, if the Americans served him thus before peace was made, and whilst they were begging for aids, what was to be expected after peace, &c. To several members he mentioned that the king had been surprised and displeased, and that he said he did not think he had such allies to deal with. To one of them, who asked whether the court of France meant to complain of them to Congress, M. Marbois answered that great powers never complained, but that they felt and remembered. It did not appear, from any circumstances, that the separate article was known to the court of France, or to the Chevalier de la Luzerne.
The publication of the preliminary articles, excepting the separate article in the newspaper, was not a deliberate act of Congress. A hasty question for enjoining secrecy on certain parts of the despatches, which included those articles, was lost; and copies having been taken by members, and some of them handed to the delegates of Pennsylvania, one of them reached the printer. When the publication appeared, Congress in general regretted it, not only as tending too much to lull the states, but as leading France into suspicions that Congress favored the premature signature of the articles, and were, at least, willing to remove, in the minds of the people, the blame of delaying peace from Great Britain to France.15
Monday, March 17.
A letter was received from General Washington, enclosing two anonymous and inflammatory exhortations to the army to assemble, for the purpose of seeking, by other means, that justice which their country showed no disposition to afford them. The steps taken by the general to avert the gathering storm, and his professions of inflexible adherence to his duty to Congress and to his country, excited the most affectionate sentiments towards him. By private letters from the army, and other circumstances, there appeared good ground for suspecting that the civil creditors were intriguing, in order to inflame the army into such desperation as would produce a general provision for the public debts. These papers were committed to Mr. Gilman, Mr. Dyer, Mr. Clark, Mr. Rutledge, and Mr. Mercer. The appointment of these gentlemen was brought about by a few members, who wished to saddle with this embarrassment the men who had opposed the measures necessary for satisfying the army, viz., the half-pay and permanent funds; against one or other of which the individuals in question had voted.
This alarming intelligence from the army, added to the critical situation to which our affairs in Europe were reduced by the variance of our ministers with our ally, and to the difficulty of establishing the means of fulfilling the engagements and securing the harmony of the United States, and to the confusions apprehended from the approaching resignation of the superintendent of finance, gave peculiar awe and solemnity to the present moment, and oppressed the minds of Congress with an anxiety and distress which had been scarcely felt in any period of the revolution.
Tuesday, March 17.
On the report of the committee to whom the three paragraphs of the report on revenues (see March the 6th and 7th) had been recommitted, the said paragraphs were expunged, so as to admit the following amendments, which took place without opposition, viz.:—
"Resolved, That it be recommended to the several states, as indispensably necessary to the restoration of public credit, and the punctual and honorable discharge of the public debts, to vest in the United States in Congress assembled a power to levy, for the use of the United States, a duty,
| Upon all rum of Jamaica proof, per gallon, of | 4 | ninetieths | of a | dollar |
| Upon all other spiritous liquors, | 3 | do. | do. | |
| Upon Madeira wine, | 12 | do. | do. | |
| Upon the wines of Lisbon, Oporto, those called Sherry, and upon all French wines, | 6 | do. | do. | |
| Upon the wines called Malaga or Teneriffe, | 5 | do. | do. | |
| Upon all other wines | 4 | ninetieths | of a | dollar |
| Upon all common Bohea teas, per lb. | 6 | do. | do. | |
| Upon all other teas, | 24 | do. | do. | |
| Upon pepper, per lb. | 3 | do. | do. | |
| Upon brown sugar, per lb. | 1/2 | do. | do. | |
| Upon loaf sugar, | 2 | do. | do. | |
| Upon all other sugars, | 1 | do. | do. | |
| Upon molasses, per gallon, | 1 | do. | do. | |
| Upon cocoa and coffee, per lb. | 1 | do. | do. | |
| Upon salt, after the war, per bushel, | 1 | eighth | do. |
"And upon all goods, except arms, ammunition, and clothing, or other articles[2] imported for the use of the United States, a duty of five per cent., ad valorem:
"Provided, that there be allowed a bounty of one eighth of a dollar for every quintal of dried fish exported from the United States, and a like sum for every barrel of pickled fish, beef, or pork, to be paid or allowed to the exporter thereof, at the port from which they shall be so exported."
The arguments urged by Mr. WILSON in behalf of his motion for adding "also a tax of one quarter of a dollar per hundred acres on all located and surveyed lands within each of the states," other than those heretofore generally urged, were, that it was more moderate than had been paid before the revolution, and it could not be supposed the people would grudge to pay, as the price of their liberty, what they formerly paid to their oppressors; that if it was unequal, this inequality would be corrected by the states in other taxes; that, as the tax on trade would fall chiefly on the inhabitants of the lower country, who consumed the imports, the tax on land would affect those who were remote from the sea, and consumed little.
On the opposite side, it was alleged that such a tax was repugnant to the popular ideas of equality, and particularly, would never be acceded to by the Southern States, at least unless they were to be respectively credited for the amount; and, if such credit were to be given, it would be best to let the states choose such taxes as would best suit them.
A letter came in, and was read, from the secretary of foreign affairs, stating the perplexing alternative to which Congress were reduced, by the secret article relating to West Florida, either of dishonoring themselves by becoming a party to the concealment, or of wounding the feelings and destroying the influence of our ministers by disclosing the article to the French court; and proposing, as advisable, on the whole,—
1. That he be authorized to communicate the article in question to the French minister, in Buch manner as would best tend to remove the unfavorable impressions which might be made on the court of France as to the sincerity of Congress or their ministers.
2. That the said ministers be informed of this communication, and instructed to agree that the limit for West Florida, proposed in the separate article, be allowed to whatever power the said colony may be confirmed by a treaty of peace.
3. That it be declared to be the sense of Congress, that the preliminary articles between the United States and Great Britain are not to take effect until peace shall be actually signed between the kings of France and Great Britain.[3]
Ordered that to-morrow be assigned for the consideration of the said letter.
Wednesday, March 19.
A letter was read from the superintendent of finance, enclosing letters from Dr. Franklin, accompanied with extracts from the Count de Vergennes relative to money affairs, the superintendent thereupon declaring roundly that our credit was at an end, and that no further pecuniary aids were to be expected from Europe. Mr. RUTLEDGE denied these assertions, and expressed some indignation at them. Mr. BLAND said, that as the superintendent was of this opinion, it would be absurd for him to be minister of finance, and moved that the committee on his motion for arranging the department might be instructed to report without loss of time. This notion was negatived as censuring the committee; but it was understood to be the sense of Congress that they should report.16
The order of the day, viz., the letter from the secretary of foreign affairs, was taken up.
Mr. WOLCOTT conceived it unnecessary to waste time on the subject, as he presumed Congress would never so feu* censure the ministers who had obtained such terms for this country as to disavow their conduct.
Mr. CLARK was decided against communicating the separate article, which would be sacrificing meritorious ministers, and would rather injure than relieve our national honor. He admitted that the separate article put an advantage into the hands of the enemy, but did not, on the whole, deem it of any great consequence. He thought Congress ought to go no further than to inform the ministers that they were sorry for the necessity which had led them into the part they had taken, and to leave them to get rid of the embarrassment as to the separate article, in such way as they should judge best This expedient would save Congress, and spare our ministers, who might have been governed by reasons not known to Congress.
Mr. MERCER said, that, not meaning to give offence any where, he should speak his sentiments freely. He gave it as his clear and decided opinion, that the ministers had insulted Congress by sending them assertions, without proof, as reasons for violating their instructions, and throwing themselves into the confidence of Great Britain. He observed, that France, in order to make herself equal to the enemy, had been obliged to call for aid, and had drawn Spain, against her interest, into the war that it was probable that she had entered into some specific engagements for that purpose; that hence might be deduced the perplexity of her situation, of which advantage had been taken by Great Britain—an advantage in which our ministers had concurred—for sowing jealousies between France and the United States, and of which further advantage would be taken to alienate the minds of the people of this country from their ally, by presenting him as the obstacle to peace. The British court, he said, having gained this point, may easily frustrate the negotiation, and renew the war against divided enemies. He approved of the conduct of the Count de Vergennes in promoting a treaty, under the first commission to Oswald, as preferring the substance to the shadow, and proceeding from a desire of peace. The conduct of our ministers throughout, particularly in giving in writing every thing called for by the British minister expressive of distrust of France, was a mixture of follies which had no example, was a tragedy to America, and a comedy to all the world beside. He felt inexpressible indignation at their meanly stooping, as it were, to lick the dust from the feet of a nation whose hands were still dyed with the blood of their fellow, citizens. He reprobated the chicane and low cunning which marked the journals transmitted to Congress, and contrasted them with the honesty and good faith which became all nations, and particularly an infant republic. They proved that America had at once all the follies of youth and all the vices of old age; thinks it would be necessary to recall our ministers; fears that France may be already acquainted with all the transactions of our ministers, even with the separate article, and may be only waiting the reception given to it by Congress, to see how far the hopes of cutting off the right arm of Great Britain, by supporting our revolution, may have been well founded; and, in case of our basely disappointing her, may league with our enemy for our destruction, and for a division of the spoils. He was aware of the risks to which such a league would expose France of finally losing her share, but supposed that the British Islands might be made hostages for her security. He said America was too prone to depreciate political merit, and to suspect where there was no danger; that the honor of the king of France was dear to him; that he never would Betray or injure us, unless he should be provoked, and justified by treachery on our part For the present he acquiesced in the proposition of the secretary of foreign affairs; but, when the question should come to be put, he should be for a much more decisive resolution.
Mr. RUTLEDGE said, he hoped the character of our ministers would not be affected, much less their recall produced, by declamations against them; and that facts would be ascertained and stated, before any decision should be passed; that the Count de Vergennes had expressly declared to our ministers his desire that they might treat apart; alluded to, and animadverted upon, the instruction which submitted them to French councils; was of opinion that the separate article did not concern Franco, and therefore there was no necessity for communicating it to her; and that, as to Spain, she deserved nothing at our hands; she had treated us in a manner that forfeited all claim to our good offices or our confidence. She had not, as had been supposed, entered into the present war as an ally to our ally, for our support; but, as she herself had declared, as a principal, and on her own account. He said, he was for adhering religiously to the spirit and letter of the treaty with France; that our ministers had done so, and, if recalled or censured for the part they had acted, he was sure no man of spirit would take their place. He concluded with moving that the letter from the secretary of foreign affairs might be referred to a special committee, who might inquire into all the facts relative to the subject of it Mr. HOLTEN seconded the motion.
Mr. WILLIAMSON was opposed to harsh treatment of the ministers, who had shown great ability. He said, they had not infringed the treaty, and, as they had received the concurrence of the Count de Vergennes for treating apart, they had not, in that respect, violated their instructions. He proposed that Congress should express to the ministers their concern at the separate article, and leave them to get over the embarrassment as they should find best.
Mr. MERCER, in answer to Mr. RUTLEDGE, said, that his language with respect to the ministers was justified by their refusal to obey instructions; censured with great warmth the servile confidence of Mr. Jay, in particular, in the British ministers. He said, the separate article was a reproach to our character; and that, if Congress would not themselves disclose it, he would disclose it to his constituents, who would disdain to be united with those who patronize such dishonorable proceedings. He was called to order by the president, who said that the article in question was under an injunction of secrecy, and he could not permit the order of the House to be trampled upon.
Mr. LEE took notice that obligations in national affairs, as well as others, ought to be reciprocal, and he did not know that France had ever bound herself to like engagements, as to concert of negotiation, with those into which America had at different times been drawn. He thought it highly improper to censure ministers who had negotiated well; said that it was agreeable to practice, and necessary to the end proposed, for ministers, in particular emergencies, to swerve from strict instructions. France, he said, wanted to sacrifice our interests to her own, or those of Spain; that the French answer to the British memorial contained a passage which deserved attention on this subject She answered the reproaches of perfidy contained in that memorial by observing that, obligations being reciprocal, a breach on one side absolved the other. The Count de Vergennes, he was sure, was too much a master of negotiation not to approve the management of our ministers, instead of condemning it. No man lamented more than he did any diminution of the confidence between this country and France; but if the misfortune should ensue, it could not be denied that it had originated with France, who has endeavored to sacrifice our territorial rights—those very rights which by the treaty she had guarantied to us. He wished the preliminary articles had not been signed without the knowledge of France, but was persuaded that, in whatever light she might view it, she was too sensible of the necessity of our independence to her safety ever to abandon it. But let no censure fall on our ministers, who had, upon the whole, done what was best. He introduced the instruction of the fifteenth of June, 1781; proclaimed it to be the greatest opprobrium and stain to this country which it had ever exposed itself to; and that it was, in his judgment, the true cause of that distrust and coldness which prevailed between our ministers and the French court, inasmuch as it could not be viewed by the former without irritation and disgust. He was not surprised that those who considered France as the patron, rather than the ally, of this country, should be disposed to be obsequious to her; but he was not of that number.
Mr. HAMILTON urged the propriety of proceeding with coolness and circumspection. He thought it proper, in order to form a right judgment of the conduct of our ministers, that the views of the French and British courts should be examined. He admitted it as not improbable, that it had been the policy of France to procrastinate the definite acknowledgment of our independence on the part of Great Britain, in order to keep us more knit to herself, and until her own interests could be negotiated. The arguments, however, urged by our ministers on this subject, although strong, were not conclusive; as it was not certain that this policy, and not a desire of excluding obstacles to peace, had produced the opposition of the French court to our demands. Caution and vigilance, he thought, were justified by the appearance, and that alone. But compare this policy with that of Great Britain; survey the past cruelty and present duplicity of her councils; behold her watching every occasion, and trying every project, for dissolving the honorable ties which bind the United States to their ally; and then say on which side our resentments and jealousies ought to lie. With respect to the instructions submitting our ministers to the advice of France, he had disapproved it uniformly since it had come to his knowledge, but he had always judged it improper to repeal it. He disapproved highly of the conduct of our ministers in not showing the preliminary articles to our ally before they signed them, and still more so of their agreeing to the separate article. This conduct gave an advantage to the enemy, which they would not fail to improve for the purpose of inspiring France with indignation and distrust of the United States. He did not apprehend (with Mr. Mercer) any danger of a coalition between France and Great Britain against America, but foresaw the destruction of mutual confidence between France and the United States, which would be likely to ensue, and the danger which would result from it, in case the war should be continued. He observed, that Spain was an unwise nation; her policy narrow and jealous; her king old; her court divided, and the heir-apparent notoriously attached to Great Britain. From these circumstances he inferred an apprehension, that when Spain should come to know the part taken by America with respect to her, a separate treaty of peace might be resorted to. He thought a middle course best with respect to our ministers; that they ought to be commended in general; but that the communication of the separate article ought to take place. He observed, that our ministers were divided as to the policy of the court of France, but that they all were agreed in the necessity of being on the watch against Great Britain. He apprehended that if the ministers were to be recalled or reprehended, they would be disgusted, and head and foment parties in this country. He observed, particularly with respect to Mr. Jay, that, although he was a man of profound sagacity and pure integrity, yet he was of a suspicious temper, and that this trait might explain the extraordinary jealousies which he professed. He finally proposed that the ministers should be commended, and the separate article communicated. This motion was seconded by Mr. OSGOOD, as compared, however, with the proposition of the secretary for foreign affairs, and so far only as to be referred to a committee.
Mr. PETERS favored a moderate course, as most advisable. He thought it necessary that the separate article should be communicated, but that it would be less painful to the feelings of the ministers if the doing it were left to themselves; and was also in favor of giving the territory, annexed by the separate article to West Florida, to such power as might be vested with that colony in the treaty of peace.
Mr. BLAND said he was glad that every one seemed, at length, to be struck with the impropriety of the instruction submitting our ministers to the advice of the French court He represented it as the cause of all our difficulties, and moved that it might be referred to the committee, with the several propositions which had been made. Mr. LEE seconded the motion.
Mr. WILSON objected to Mr. BLAND'S motion, as not being in order. When moved in order, perhaps he might not oppose the substance of it. He said, he had never seen nor heard of the instruction it referred to until this morning, and that it had really astonished him; that this country ought to maintain an upright posture between all nations. But, however objectionable this step might have been in Congress, the magnanimity of our ally in declining to obtrude his advice on our ministers ought to have been a fresh motive to their confidence and respect. Although they deserved commendation in general for their services, in this respect they do not He was of opinion, that the spirit of the treaty with France forbade the signing of the preliminary articles without her consent, and that the separate article ought to be disclosed; but as the merits of our ministers entitled them to the mildest and most delicate mode in which it could be done, he wished the communication to be left to themselves, as they would be the best judges of the explanation which ought to be made for the concealment; and their feelings would be less wounded than if it were made without their intervention. He observed, that the separate article was not important in itself, and became so only by the mysterious silence in which it was wrapped up. A candid and open declaration from our ministers of the circumstances under which they acted, and the necessity produced by them of pursuing the course marked out by the interest of their country, would have been satisfactory to our ally—would have saved their own honor—and would not have endangered the objects for which they were negotiating.
Mr. HIGGINSON contended, that the facts stated by our ministers justified the part they had taken.
Mr. MADISON expressed his surprise at the attempts made to fix the blame of all our embarrassments on the instruction of June the fifteenth, 1781, when it appeared that no use had been made of the power given by it to the court of France that our Ministers had construed it in such a way as to leave them at full liberty and that no one in Congress pretended to blame them on that account. For himself, he was persuaded that their construction was just; the advice of France having been made a guide to them only in cases where the question respected the concessions of the United States to Great Britain necessary and proper for obtaining peace and an acknowledgment of independence; not where it respected concessions to other powers, and for other purposes. He reminded Congress of the change which had taken place in our affairs since that instruction was passed; and remarked the probability that many who were now, perhaps, the loudest in disclaiming, would, under the circumstances of that period, have been the foremost to adopt it.[4] He admitted, that the change of circumstances had rendered it inapplicable, but thought an express repeal of it might, at this crisis at least, have a bad effect. The instructions, he observed, for disregarding which our ministers had been blamed, and which, if obeyed, would have prevented the dilemma now felt, were those which required them to act in concert and in confidence with our ally; and these instructions, he said, had been repeatedly confirmed, in every stage of the revolution, by unanimous votes of Congress; several of the gentlemen present,[5] who now justified our ministers, having concurred in them, and one of them[6] having penned two of the acts, in one of which Congress went farther than they had done in any preceding act, by declaring that they would not make peace until the interests of our allies and friends, as well as of the United States, should be provided for.
As to the propriety of communicating to our ally the separate article, he thought it resulted clearly from considerations both of national honor and national security. He said, that Congress, having repeatedly assured their ally that they would take no step in a negotiation but in concert and in confidence with him, and having even published to the world solemn declarations to the same effect, would, if they abetted this concealment of their ministers, be considered by all nations as devoid of all constancy and good faith; unless a breach of these assurances and declarations could be justified by an absolute necessity, or some perfidy on the part of France; that it was manifest no such necessity could be pleaded; and as to perfidy on the part of France, nothing but suspicions and equivocal circumstances had been quoted in evidence of it,—and even in these it appeared that our ministers were divided; that the embarrassment in which France was placed by the interfering claims of Spain with the United States must have been foreseen by our ministers, and that the impartial public would expect that, instead of cooperating with Great Britain in taking advantage of this embarrassment, they ought to have made every allowance and given every facility to it, consistent with a regard to the rights of their constituents; that, admitting every fact alleged by our ministers to be true, it could by no means be inferred that the opposition made by France to our claims was the effect of any hostile or ambitious designs against them, or of any other design than that of reconciling them with those of Spain ; that the hostile aspect which the separate article, as well as the concealment of it, bore to Spain, would be regarded by the impartial world as a dishonorable alliance with our enemies against the interests of our friends; but notwithstanding the disappointments and even indignities which the United States had received from Spain, it could neither be denied nor concealed that the former had derived many substantial advantages from her taking part in the war, and had even obtained some pecuniary aids; that the United States had made professions corresponding with those obligations; that they had testified the important light in which they considered the support resulting to their cause from the arms of Spam by the importunity with which they had courted her alliance, by the concessions with which they had offered to purchase it, and by the anxiety which they expressed at every appearance of her separate negotiations for a peace with the common enemy.
That our national safety would be endangered by Congress making themselves a party to the concealment of the separate article, he thought could be questioned by no one. No definitive treaty of peace, he observed, had as yet taken place; the important articles between some of the belligerent parties had not even been adjusted; our insidious enemy was evidently laboring to sow dissensions among them; the incaution of our ministers had but too much facilitated them between the United States and France; a renewal of the war, therefore, in some form or other, was still to be apprehended; and what would be our situation if France and Spain had no confidence in us,—and what confidence could they have, if we did not disclaim the policy which had been followed by our ministers?
He took notice of the intimation given by the British minister to Mr. Adams, of an intended expedition from New York against West Florida, as a proof of the illicit confidence into which our ministers had been drawn, and urged the indispensable duty of Congress to communicate it to those concerned in it He hoped if a committee should be appointed—for which, however, he saw no necessity—that this would be included in their report, and that their report would be made with as little delay as possible.
In the event, the letter from the secretary of foreign affairs, with all the despatches, and the several propositions which had been made, were committed to Mr. Wilson, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Hamilton.
Thursday, March 20.
An instruction from the legislature of Virginia to their delegates, against admitting into the treaty of peace any stipulation for restoring confiscated property, was laid before Congress.
Also, resolutions of the executive council of Pennsylvania, requesting the delegates of that state to endeavor to obtain at least a reasonable term for making the payment of British debts stipulated in the preliminary articles lately received.
These papers were committed to Mr. Osgood, Mr. Mercer, and Mr. Fitzsimmons.
Mr. DYER, whose vote on the tenth day of March frustrated the commutation of the half-pay, made a proposition substantially the same, which was committed. This seemed to be extorted from him by the critical state of our affairs, himself personally, and his state, being opposed to it.
The motion of Mr. HAMILTON, on the Journals, was meant as a testimony on his part of the insufficiency of the report of the committee as to the establishment of revenues, and as a final trial of the sense of Congress with respect to the practicability and necessity of a general revenue equal to the public wants. The debates on it were chiefly a repetition of those used on former questions relative to that subject.
Mr. FITZSIMMONS, on this occasion, declared that, on mature reflection, he was convinced that a complete general revenue was unattainable from the states, was impracticable in the hands of Congress, and that the modified provision reported by the committee, if established by the states, would restore public credit among ourselves. He apprehended, however, that no limited funds would procure loans abroad, which would require funds commensurate to their duration.
Mr. HIGGINSON described all attempts of Congress to provide for the public debts out of the mode prescribed by the Confederation as nugatory; that the states would disregard them; that the impost of five per cent. had passed in Massachusetts by two voices only in the lower, and one in the upper, house; and that the governor had never formally assented to the law; that it was probable this law would be repealed, and almost certain that the extensive plans of Congress would be reprobated.
Friday, March 21.
The report on revenue was taken into consideration, and the fifth and sixth paragraphs, after discussion, being judged not sufficiently explicit, were recommitted to be made more so.
A motion was made by Mr. CLARK, seconded by Mr. BLAND, to complete so much of the report as related to an impost on trade, and send it to the states immediately, apart from the residue.
In support of this motion, it was urged that the impost was distinct in its nature, was more likely to be adopted, and ought not, therefore, to be delayed or hazarded by a connection with the other parts of the report. On the other side, it was contended that it was the duty of Congress to provide a system adequate to the public exigencies; and that such a system would be more likely to be adopted by the states than any partial or detached provision, as it would comprise objects agreeable, as well as disagreeable, to each of the states, and as all of them would feel a greater readiness to make mutual concessions, and to disregard local considerations, in proportion to the magnitude of the object held out to them.
The motion was disagreed to, New Jersey being in favor of it, and several other states divided.
Saturday, March 22.
A letter was received from General Washington, enclosing his address to the convention of officers, with the result of their consultations. The dissipation of the cloud which seemed to have been gathering afforded great pleasure, on the whole, to Congress; but it was observable that the part which the general had found it necessary, and thought it his duty, to take, would give birth to events much more serious, if they should not be obviated by the establishment of such funds as the general, as well as the army, had declared to be necessary.17
The report of the committee on Mr. Dyer's motion, in favor of a commutation for the half-pay, was agreed to. The preamble was objected to, but admitted at the entreaty of Mr. DYER, who supposed the considerations recited in it would tend to reconcile the state of Connecticut to the measure.
An order passed for granting thirty-five licenses for vessels belonging to Nantucket, to secure the whaling vessels against the penalty for double papers. This order was in consequence of a deputation to Congress representing the exposed situation of that island, the importance of the whale fishery to the United States, the danger of its being usurped by other nations, and the concurrence of the enemy in neutralizing such a number of vessels as would carry on the fisheries to an extent necessary for the support of the inhabitants.
The committee, to whom was referred the letter from the secretary of foreign affairs, with the foreign despatches, &c., reported,—
1. That our ministers be thanked for their zeal and services in negotiating the preliminary articles.
2. That they be instructed to make a communication of the separate article to the court of France, in such way as would best get over the concealment.
3. That the secretary of foreign affairs inform them that it is the wish of Congress that the preliminary articles had been communicated to the court of France before they had been executed.
Mr. DYER said he was opposed to the whole report; that he fully approved of every step taken by our ministers, as well towards Great Britain as towards France; that the separate article did not concern the interests of France, and therefore could not involve the good faith of the United States.
Mr. LEE agreed fully with Mr. Dyer; said that the special report of facts ought to have been made necessary for enabling Congress to form a just opinion of the conduct of the ministers; and moved, that the report might be recommitted. Mr. WOLCOTT seconded the motion, which was evidently made for the sole purpose of delay. It was opposed by Mr. CLARK, Mr. WILSON, and Mr. GORHAM, the first and last of whom had, however, no objection to postponing; by Mr. MERCER, who repeated his abhorrence of the confidence shown by our ministers to those of Great Britain; said, that it was about to realize the case of those who kicked down the ladder by which they had been elevated, and of the viper which was ready to destroy the family of the man in whose bosom it had been restored to life. He observed that it was unwise to prefer Great Britain to Spain as our neighbors in West Florida.
Mr. HIGGINSON supported the sentiments of Mr. Lee; said that the Count de Vergennes had released our ministers; and that he agreed with those who thought the instruction of June the 15th could relate only to questions directly between Great Britain and the United States.
Mr. HOLTEN thought there was no sufficient evidence for praise or blame; and that both ought to be suspended until the true reasons should be stated by the ministers. He supposed that the separate article had been made an ultimatum of the preliminaries of Great Britain; and that there might also be secret articles between Great Britain and France. If the latter were displeased, he conceived that she would officially notify it. Mr. RUTLEDGE was against recommitting, but for postponing. The motion for recommitting was disagreed to; but several states being for postponing, the vote was no index as to the main question.
It had been talked of, among sundry members, as very singular that the British minister should have confided to Mr. Adams an intended expedition from New York against West Florida; as very reprehensible in the latter to become the depositary of secrets hostile to the friends of his country, and that every motive of honor and prudence made it the duty of Congress to impart the matter to the Spaniards. To this effect, a motion was made by Mr. MERCER, seconded by Mr. MADISON. But it being near the usual hour of adjournment, the house being agitated by the debates on the separate article, and a large proportion of members predetermined against every measure which seemed in any manner to blame the ministers, and the eastern delegates, in general, extremely jealous of the honor of Mr. Adams, an adjournment was pressed and carried without any vote on the motion.
Monday, March 24.
On the day preceding this, intelligence arrived, which was this day laid before Congress, that the preliminaries for a general peace had been signed on the 20th of January. This intelligence was brought by a French cutter from Cadiz, despatched by Count d'Estaing to notify the event to all vessels at sea, and engaged, by the zeal of the Marquis de la Fayette, to convey it to Congress. This confirmation of peace produced the greater joy, as the preceding delay, the cautions of Mr. Laurens's letter of the 24th of December, and the general suspicions of Lord Shelburne's sincerity, had rendered an immediate and general peace extremely problematical in the minds of many.18
A letter was received from General Carleton through General Washington, enclosing a copy of the preliminary articles between Great Britain and the United States, with the separate article annexed.
Mr. CARROLL, after taking notice of the embarrassment under which Congress was placed by the injunction of secrecy as to the separate article, after it had probably been disclosed in Europe, and, it now appeared, was known at New York, called the attention of Congress again to that subject.
Mr. WOLCOTT still contended that it would be premature to take any step relative to it, until further communications should be received from our ministers.
Mr. GILMAN, being of the same opinion, moved that the business be postponed. Mr. LEE seconded the motion.
Mr. WILSON conceived it indispensably necessary that something should be done; that Congress deceived themselves if they supposed that the separate article was any secret at New York after it had been announced to them from Sir Guy Carleton. He professed a high respect for the character of the ministers, which had received fresh honor from the remarkable steadiness and great abilities displayed in the negotiations; but that their conduct with respect to the separate article could not be justified. He did not consider it as any violation of the instruction of June 15, 1781, the Count de Vergennes having happily released them from the obligation of it. But he considered it, with the signing of the preliminaries secretly, as a violation of the spirit of the treaty of alliance, as well as of the unanimous professions to the court of France, unanimous instructions to our ministers, and unanimous declarations to the world, that nothing should be discussed towards peace but in confidence, and in concert with our ally. He made great allowance for the ministers; saw how they were affected, and the reasons of it; but could not subscribe to the opinion that Congress ought to pass over the separate article in the manner that had been urged; Congress ought, he said, to disapprove of it, in the softest terms that could be devised, and, at all events, not to take part in its concealment.
Mr. BLAND treated the separate article with levity and ridicule, as in no respect concerning France, but Spain, with whom we had nothing to do.
Mr. CARROLL thought that, unless something expressive of our disapprobation of the article, and of its concealment, was done, it would be an indelible stain on our character.
Mr. CLARK contended that it was still improper to take any step, either for communicating officially, or for taking off the injunction of secrecy; that the article concerned Spain, and not France; but that if it should be communicated to the latter, she would hold herself bound to communicate it to the former; that hence an embarrassment might ensue; that it was, probably, this consideration which led the ministers to the concealment, and he thought they had acted right. He described the awkwardness attending a communication of it under present circumstances; remarking, finally, that nothing had been done contrary to the treaty, and that we were in possession of sufficient materials[7] to justify the suspicions which had been manifested.
Mr. RUTLEDGE was strenuous for postponing the subject; said that Congress had no occasion to meddle with it; that the ministers had done right; that they had maintained the honor of the United States after Congress had given it up; that the manœuvre practised by them was common in all courts, and was justifiable against Spain, who alone was affected by it; that instructions ought to be disregarded whenever the public good required it; and that he himself would never be bound by them when he thought them improper.
Mr. MERCER combated the dangerous tendency of the doctrine maintained by Mr. Rutledge with regard to instructions; and observed that, the delegates of Virginia having been unanimously instructed not to conclude or discuss any treaty of peace but in confidence and in concert with his Most Christian Majesty, he conceived himself as much bound, as he was of himself inclined, to disapprove every other mode of proceeding; and that he should call for the yeas and nays on the question for his justification to his constituents.
Mr. BLAND tartly said that he, of course, was instructed as well as his colleague, and should himself require the yeas and nays to justify an opposite conduct; that the instructions from his constituents went no farther than to prohibit any treaty without the concurrence of our ally;[8] which prohibition had not been violated in the case before Congress.
Mr. LEE was for postponing and burying in oblivion the whole transaction. He said that delicacy to France required this; since, if any thing should be done implying censure on our ministers, it must and ought to be done in such a way as to fall ultimately on France, whose unfaithful conduct had produced and justified that of our ministers. In all national intercourse, he said, a reciprocity was to be understood; and, as France had not communicated her views and proceedings to the American plenipotentiaries, the latter were not bound to communicate theirs. All instructions he conceived to be conditional in favor of the public good; and he cited the case mentioned by Sir William Temple, in which the Dutch ministers concluded, of themselves, an act which required the previous sanction of all the members of the republic.
Mr. HAMILTON said that, whilst he despised the man who would enslave himself to the policy even of our friends, he could not but lament the overweening readiness which appeared in many to suspect every thing on that side, and to throw themselves into the bosom of our enemies. He urged the necessity of vindicating our public honor by renouncing that concealment to which it was the wish of so many to make us parties.
Mr. WILSON, in answer to Mr. Lee, observed that the case mentioned by Sir William Temple was utterly inapplicable to the case in question; adding that the conduct of France had not, on the principle of reciprocity, justified our ministers in signing the provisional preliminaries without her knowledge, no such step having been taken on her part But whilst he found it to be his duty thus to note the faults of these gentlemen, he, with much greater pleasure, gave them praise for their firmness in refusing to treat with the British negotiator until he had produced a proper commission, in contending for the fisheries, and in adhering to our western claims.
Congress adjourned without any question.
Tuesday, March 25.
No Congress.
Wednesday, March 26.
Communication was made, through the secretary of foreign affairs, by the minister of France, as to the late negotiation, from letters received by him from the Count de Vergennes, dated in December last, and brought by the packet Washington. This communication showed, though delicately, that France was displeased with our ministers for signing the preliminary articles separately; that she had labored, by recommending mutual concessions, to compromise disputes between Spain and the United States, and that she was apprehensive that Great Britain would hereafter, as they already had endeavored to, sow discords between them. It signified that the "intimacy between our ministers and those of Great Britain" furnished a handle for this purpose.
Besides the public communication to Congress, other parts of letters from the Count de Vergennes were privately communicated to the president of Congress and to sundry members, expressing more particularly the dissatisfaction of the court of France at the conduct of our ministers, and urging the necessity of establishing permanent revenues for paying our debts and supporting a national character. The substance of these private communications, as taken on the 23d instant, by the president, is as follows:—
FINANCE.
"That the Count de Vergennes was alarmed at the extravagant demands of Dr. Franklin in behalf of the United States; that he was surprised, at the same time, that the inhabitants paid so little attention to doing something for themselves. If they could not be brought to give adequate funds for their defence during a dangerous war, it was not likely that so desirable an end could be accomplished when their fears were allayed by a general peace; that this reasoning affected the credit of the United States, and no one could be found who would risk their money under such circumstances; that the king would be glad to know what funds were provided for the security and payment of the ten millions borrowed by him in Holland; that the Count de Vergennes hardly dared to report in favor of the United States to the king and council, as money was so scarce that it would be with the greatest difficulty that even a email part of the requisition could be complied with. The causes of this scarcity were a five years' war, which had increased the expenses of government to an enormous amount—the exportation of large sums of specie to America for the support and pay of both Trench and English armies—the loans to America—the stoppage of bullion in South America, which prevented its flowing in the usual channels."[9]
A letter of a later date added,—
"That he had received the chevalier's letter of October, and rejoiced to find that Congress had provided funds for their debts, which gave him great encouragement, and he had prevailed On the comptroller-general to join him in a report to his majesty and council for six millions of livres for the United States to support the war; but assures the Chevalier de Luzerne that be must never again consent to a further application."
NEGOTIATIONS.
"He complains of being treated with great indelicacy by the American commissioners, they having signed the treaty without any confidential communication: that had France treated America with the same indelicacy, she might have signed the treaty first, as every thing between France and England was settled, but the king chose to keep faith with his allies, and, therefore, always refused to do any thing definitively till all his allies were ready; that this conduct had delayed the definitive treaty, England having considered herself as greatly strengthened by America; that Dr. Franklin waite3 on the Count de Vergennes, and acknowledged the indelicacy of their behavior, and had prevailed on him to bury it in oblivion; that the English were endeavoring all in their power to sow seeds of discord between our commissioners and the court of Spain, representing our claims to the westward as extravagant and inadmissible; that it became Congress to be attentive to this business, and to prevent the ill effects that it might be attended with; that the king had informed the court of Spain, that ho heartily wished that the United States might enjoy a cordial coalition with his Catholic Majesty, yet he should leave the whole affair entirely to the two states, and not interfere otherwise than as by his counsel and advice, when asked; that, although the United States had not been so well treated by Spain as might have been expected, yet that his majesty wished that America might reap the advantage of a beneficial treaty with Spain; that as the peace was not yet certain, it became all the powers at war to be ready for a vigorous campaign, and hoped Congress would exert themselves to aid the common cause by some offensive operations against the enemy; but if the British should evacuate the United States, the king earnestly hoped Congress would take the most decided measures to prevent any intercourse with the British, and particularly in the way of merchandise or supplying them with provisions, which would prove of the most dangerous tendency to the campaign in the West Indies; that the British now had hopes of opening an extensive trade with America, though the war should continue, which, if they should be disappointed in, might hasten the definitive treaty, as it would raise a clamor among the people of England."19
The chevalier added,—
"That as he had misinformed his court with regard to Congress having funded their debts, on which presumption the six millions had been granted, he hoped Congress would enable him in his next despatches to give some satisfactory account to his court on this head."
Thursday, March 27.[10]
Revenues taken up as reported March 7.
The fifth paragraph in the report on revenue having been judged not sufficiently explicit, and recommitted to be made more so, the following paragraph was received m its place, viz.: "That it be further recommended to the several states, to establish, for a term limited to twenty-five years, and to appropriate," &c., (to the word 2,000,000 of dollars annually,) which proportions shall be fixed and equalized, from time to time, according to such rule as is, or may be, prescribed by the Articles of Confederation; and in case the revenues so established and appropriated by any state shall at any time yield a sum exceeding its proportion, the excess shall be refunded to it and in case the same shall be found to be defective, the immediate deficiency shall be made good as soon as possible, and a future deficiency guarded against by an enlargement of the revenues established; provided that, until the rule of the confederation can be applied, the proportions of the 2,000,000 of dollars aforesaid shall be as follows, viz.:
This amendment was accepted; a motion of Mr. Clark to restrain this apportionment, in the first instance, to the term of two years, being first negatived. He contended that a valuation of land would probably never take place, and that it was uncertain whether the rule of numbers would be substituted, and, therefore, that the first apportionment might be continued throughout the twenty-five years, although it must be founded on the present relative wealth of the states, which would vary every year in favor of those which are the least populous.
This reasoning was not denied; but it was thought that such a limitation might leave an interval in which no apportionment would exist, whence confusion would proceed, and that an apprehension of it would destroy public credit.
A motion was made by Mr. BLAND, seconded by Mr. LEE, to go back to the first part of the report, and instead of the word "levy" an impost of five per cent, to substitute the word "collect" an impost, &c. It was urged, in favor of this motion, that the first word imported a legislative idea, and the latter an executive only, and consequently the latter might be less obnoxious to the states. On the other side, it was said that the states would be governed more by things than by terms; that if the meaning of both was the same, an alteration was unnecessary; that if not, as seemed to be the case, an alteration would be improper. It was particularly apprehended that if the term "collect" were to be used, the states might themselves fix the mode of collection; whereas it was indispensable that Congress should have that power, as well that it might be varied from time to time, as circumstances or experience should dictate, as that a uniformity might be observed throughout the states. On the motion of Mr. Clark, the negative was voted by a large majority, there being four ayes only.
On the eighth paragraph, there was no argument or opposition.
The ninth paragraph being considered by several as inaccurate in point of phraseology, a motion was made by Mr. MADISON to postpone it, to take into consideration the following, to wit:—
"That, in order to remove all objections against a retrospective application of the constitutional rule to the final apportionment on the several states of the moneys and supplies actually contributed in pursuance of requisitions of Congress, it be recommended to the states to enable the United States in Congress assembled to make such equitable abatements and alterations as the particular circumstances of the states, from time to time during the war, may require, and as will divide the burden among them in proportion to their respective abilities at the periods at which they were made."
On a question of striking out, the original paragraph was agreed to without opposition. On the question to insert the amendment of Mr. Madison, the votes of the states were, five ayes, six noes, viz.: New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no; the rest, ay.20
On the tenth paragraph, relative to expenses incurred by the states without the sanction of Congress, Mr. CLARK exclaimed against the unreasonableness of burdening the Union with all the extravagant expenditures of particular states, and moved that it might be struck out of the report Mr. HELMSLEY seconded the motion.
Mr. MADISON said, that the effects of rejecting this paragraph would be so extensive, that a full consideration of it ought at least to precede such a step; that the expenses referred to in the paragraph were, in part, such as would have been previously sanctioned by Congress, if application had been made, since similar ones had been so with respect to states within the vicinity of Congress, and, therefore, complaints of injustice would follow a refusal; that another part of the expenses had been incurred in support of claims to the territory of which cessions were asked by Congress, and, therefore, these could not be expected, if the expenses incident to them should be rejected; that it was probable, if no previous assurance were given on this point, it would be made a condition by the states ceding, as the cessions of territory would be made a condition by the states most anxious to obtain them; that by these means the whole plan would be either defeated, or the part thereof in question be ultimately forced on Congress, whilst they might with a good grace yield it in the first instance; not to mention that these unliquidated and unallowed claims would produce, hereafter, such contests and heats among the states as would probably destroy the plan, even if it should be acceded to by the states without this paragraph.
Mr. DYER was in favor of the paragraph.
Mr. RUTLEDGE opposed it as letting in a flood of claims which were founded on extravagant projects of the states.
Mr. HIGGINSON and Mr. GORHAM were earnest in favor of it, remarking that the distance of Massachusetts from Congress had denied a previous sanction to the militia operations against General Burgoyne, &c. The Penobscot expedition, also, had great weight with them.
Mr. WILLIAMSON was in favor of it.
Mr. WILSON said, he had always considered this country, with respect to the war, as forming one community; and that the states which, by their remoteness from Congress, had been obliged to incur expenses for their defence without previous sanction, ought to be placed on the same footing with those which had obtained this security; but he could not agree to put them on a better, which would be the case if their expenses should be sanctioned in the lump: he proposed, therefore, that these expenses should be limited to such as had been incurred in a necessary defence, and of which the object in each case should be approved by Congress.
Mr. MADISON agreed that the expressions in the paragraph were very loose, and that it would be proper to make them as definite as the case would admit: he supposed, however, that all operations against the enemy, within the limits assigned to the United States, might be considered as defensive, and in that view, the expedition against Penobscot might be so called. He observed that the term necessary left a discretion in the judge, as well as the term reasonable; and that it would be best, perhaps, for Congress to determine and declare that they would constitute a tribunal of impartial persons to decide, on oath, as to the propriety of claims of states not authorized heretofore by Congress. He said, this would be a better security to the states, and would be more satisfactory, than the decisions of Congress, the members of which did not act on oath, and brought with them the spirit of advocates for their respective states, rather than of impartial judges between them. He moved that the clause, with Mr. Wilson's proposition, be recommitted, which was agreed to without opposition.
(Eleventh and twelfth paragraphs.) Mr. BLAND, in opposition, said, that the value of land was the best rule, and that, at any rate, no change should be attempted until its practicability should be tried.
Mr. MADISON thought the value of land could never be justly or satisfactorily obtained; that it would ever be a source of contentions among the states; and that, as a repetition of the valuation would be within the course of the twenty-five years it would, unless exchanged for a more simple rule, mar the whole plan.
Mr. GORHAM was in favor of the paragraphs. He represented, in strong terms, the inequality and clamors produced by valuations of land in the state of Massachusetts, and the probability of the evils being increased among the states themselves, which were less tied together, and more likely to be jealous of each other.
Mr. WILLIAMSON was in favor of the paragraphs.
Mr. WILSON was strenuous in their favor; said he was in Congress when the Articles of Confederation directing a valuation of land were agreed to; that it was the effect of the impossibility of compromising the different ideas of the Eastern and Southern States, as to the value of slaves compared with the whites, the alternative in question.
Mr. CLARK was in favor of them. He said, that he was also in Congress when this article was decided; that the Southern States would have agreed to numbers in preference to the value of land, if half their slaves only should be included; but that the Eastern States would not concur in that proposition.
It was agreed, on all sides, that, instead of fixing the proportion by ages, as the report proposed, it would be best to fix the proportion in absolute numbers. With this view, and that the blank might be filled up, the clause was recommitted.
Friday, March 28.
The committee last mentioned reported that two blacks be rated as one freeman.
Mr. WOLCOTT was for rating them as four to three.
Mr. CARROLL as four to one.
Mr. WILLIAMSON said, he was principled against slavery; and that he thought slaves an encumbrance to society, instead of increasing its ability to pay taxes.
Mr. HIGGINSON as four to three.
Mr. RUTLEDGE said, for the sake of the object, he would agree to rate slaves as two to one, but he sincerely thought three to one would be a juster proportion.
Mr. HOLTEN as four to three.
Mr. OSGOOD said, he did not go beyond four to three.
On a question for rating them as three to two, the votes were. New Hampshire, ay; Massachusetts, no; Rhode Island, divided; Connecticut, ay; New Jersey, ay; Pennsylvania, ay; Delaware, ay; Maryland, no; Virginia, no; North Carolina, no; South Carolina, no.
The paragraph was then postponed, by general consent, some wishing for further time to deliberate on it, but it appearing to be the general opinion that no compromise would be agreed to.
After some further discussions on the report, in which the necessity of some simple and practicable rule of apportionment came fully into view, Mr. MADISON said that, in order to give a proof of the sincerity of his professions of liberality, he would propose that slaves should be rated as five to three. Mr. RUTLEDGE seconded the motion. Mr. WILSON said, he would sacrifice his opinion on this compromise.
Mr. LEE was against changing the rule, but gave it as his opinion that two slaves were not equal to one freeman.
On the question for five to three, it passed in the affirmative; New Hampshire, ay; Massachusetts, divided; Rhode Island, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, ay; Pennsylvania, ay; Maryland, ay; Virginia, ay; North Carolina, ay; South Carolina, ay.
A motion was then made by Mr. BLAND, seconded by Mr. LEE, to strike out the clause so amended, and, on the question, "Shall it stand?" it passed in the negative; New Hampshire, ay; Massachusetts, no; Rhode Island, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, ay; Pennsylvania, ay; Delaware, no; Maryland, ay; Virginia, ay; North Carolina, ay; South Carolina, no: so the clause was struck out.
The arguments used by those who were for rating slaves high were, that the expense of feeding and clothing them was as far below that incident to freemen as their industry and ingenuity were below those of freemen; and that the warm climate within which the states having slaves lay, compared with the rigorous climate and inferior fertility of the others, ought to have great weight in the case; and that the exports of the former states were greater than of the latter. On the other side, it was said that slaves were not put to labor as young as the children of laboring families; that, having no interest in their labor, they did as little as possible, and omitted every exertion of thought requisite to facilitate and expedite it; that if the exports of the states having slaves exceeded those of the others, their imports were in proportion, slaves being employed wholly in agriculture, not in manufactures, And that, in fact, the balance of trade formerly was much more against the Southern States than the others.
On the main question, New Hampshire, ay; Massachusetts, no; Rhode Island, no; Connecticut, no; New York, (Mr. Floyd, ay;) New Jersey, ay; Delaware, no; Maryland, ay; Virginia, ay; North Carolina, ay; South Carolina, no.
Saturday, March 29.
The objections urged against the motion of Mr. LEE, on the Journal, calling for a specific report of the superintendent of finance as to moneys passing through his hands, were, that the information demanded from the office of finance had, during a great part of the period, been laid before Congress, and was then actually on the table; that the term application of money was too indefinite, no two friends of the motion agreeing in the meaning of it; and that if it meant no more than immediate payments, under the warrants of the superintendent, to those who were to expend the money, it was unnecessary, the superintendent being already impressed with his duty on that subject; that if it meant the ultimate payment for articles or services for the public, it imposed a task that would be impracticable to the superintendent, and useless to Congress, who could no otherwise examine them than through the department of accounts, and the committees appointed half-yearly for inquiring into the whole proceedings; and that, if the motion were free from those objections, it ought to be so varied as to oblige the office of finance to report the information periodically; since it would otherwise depend on the memory or vigilance of members, and would, moreover, have the aspect of suspicion towards the officer called upon.
N. B. As the motion was made at first, the word "immediately" was used; which was changed for the words "as soon as may be," at the instance of Mr. HOLTEN.
The object of the motion of Mr. MADISON was to define and comprehend every information practicable and necessary for Congress to know, and to enable them to judge of the fidelity of their minister, and to make it a permanent part of his duty to afford it. The clause respecting copies of receipts was found, on discussion, not to accord with the mode of conducting business, and to be too voluminous a task; but the question was taken without a convenient opportunity of correcting it. The motion was negatived.21
Monday, March 31.
A letter was received from the governor of Rhode Island, with resolutions of the legislature of that state, justifying the conduct of Mr. Howell.22
On the arrival of the French cutter with the account of the signing of the general preliminaries, it was thought fit by Congress to hasten the effect of them by calling in the American cruisers. It was also thought by all not amiss to notify simply the intelligence to the British commanders at New York. In addition to this, it was proposed by the secretary of foreign affairs, and urged by the delegates of Pennsylvania, by Mr. LEE, Mr. RUTLEDGE, and others, that Congress should signify their desire and expectation that hostilities should be suspended at sea on the part of the enemy. The arguments urged were, that the effusion of blood might be immediately stopped, and the trade of the country rescued from depredation. It was observed, on the other side, that such a proposition derogated from the dignity of Congress; showed an undue precipitancy; that the intelligence was not authentic enough to justify the British commanders in complying with such an overture; and, therefore, that Congress would be exposed to the mortification of a refusal. The former consideration prevailed, and a verbal sanction was given to Mr. Livingston's expressing to the said commanders the expectation of Congress. This day their answers were received, addressed to Robert R. Livingston, Esq., &c. &c. &c., declining to accede to the stopping of hostilities at sea, and urging the necessity of authentic orders from Great Britain for that purpose. With their letters, Mr. Livingston communicated resolutions proposed from his office, "that, in consequence of these letters, the orders to the American cruisers should be revoked; and that the executives should be requested to embargo all vessels." Congress were generally sensible, after the receipt of these papers, that they had committed themselves in proposing to the British commanders, at New York, a stop to naval hostilities, and were exceedingly at a loss to extricate themselves. On one side, they were unwilling to publish to the world the affront they had received, especially as no written order had been given for the correspondence; and, on the other, it was necessary that the continuance of hostilities at sea should be made known to American citizens. Some were in favor of the revocation of hostilities; others proposed, as Colonel BLAND and General MIFFLIN, that the secretary of foreign affairs should be directed, verbally, to publish the letters from Carleton and Digby. This was negatived. The superscription was animadverted upon, particularly by Mr. MERCER, who said, that the letters ought to have been sent back unopened. Finally, it was agreed that any member might take copies and send them to the press, and that the subject should lie over for further consideration.23
- ↑ In the draft, as laid before the committee by ——— ———, in the tenth paragraph, the word "reasonable" before the word "expenses" was not inserted; but to the paragraph was added, "provided that this allowance shall not be extended to any expenses which shall be declared, by nine votes in Congress, to be manifestly unreasonable." In other respects the original draft was unaltered, except that a former resolution of Congress, in the words of the ninth paragraph, was incorporated by the secretary before it wont to the press.
- ↑ The other exception, as to the cards, and the wire for making them, &c., was struck out unanimously, on the motion of Mr. Clark; being considered as no longer necessary, and contrary to the general policy of encouraging necessary manufactures among ourselves.
- ↑ This was meant to guard against a construction that they were to take effect when peace should be agreed on by those powers, and the latter be ready to sign, although the former should be restrained until the other parties should be ready for signing.
- ↑ The committee who reported the instruction were Mr. Carroll, Mr. Jones, Mr. Witherspoon, Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Matthews. Mr. Witherspoon was particularly prominent throughout.
- ↑ Messrs. Bland, Lee, and Rutledge.
- ↑ Mr. Rutledge, who framed, in the committee, the first draft of the declaration made in September last, and the instruction about the same time. This was considerably altered, but not in that respect.
- ↑ Alluding, probably, to the intercepted letter from M. de Marbois.
- ↑ This construction of the instructions was palpably wrong.
- ↑ Another cause mentioned was the large balance of specie in favor of the northern powers during the war.
- ↑ This day not noted in the Journal, as in some other instances.