Decisive Battles Since Waterloo/Chapter 21
CHAPTER XXI.
FALL OF PLEVNA—1877.
Ever since Turkey obtained a footing in Europe the Christian inhabitants of her territories have been the victims of oppression. The extent of this oppression has varied from time to time according to the caprices of the rulers at Constantinople or in the provincial capitals, and is no doubt greatly influenced by the conduct of the subject people. They are naturally opposed to Moslem rule even under its mildest forms, and whenever it becomes severe their first thoughts are for insurrection.
Russia has been for a century and more the champion of the Christian populations groaning under the Turkish yoke, and her wars with Turkey have grown out of her sympathy for the suffering Christians of that country and its dependencies. The war of 1827-28 came from the aid which Russia had given to the Greeks in their war for independence; the Crimean war grew out of a quarrel over the custody of the holy places in Palestine, and the refusal of Turkey to place certain of her Christian subjects under Russian protection; and the war of 1877-78 was brought about by the barbarities of the Turks in the Danubian provinces, where the Christian inhabitants were numerically greater than the Moslems.
The success of Turkey against Russia in the Crimean war, owing to the aid of England, France, and Sardinia, added to the insolence of the Turks, and led to cruelties to their Christian subjects. Heavy taxes were laid upon the Christian peasants throughout the rural districts of Servia, Montenegro, and the other Turkish provinces; the Porte requiring the provinces to contribute a certain amount of money annually, which was extorted from the people by the local rulers. And not only was this tax extorted, but the local rulers generally added large sums for their own pockets, and each subordinate concerned in the collection did the same. The consequence was that the people were severely oppressed, and found it impossible, even with the greatest industry and the closest economy, to satisfy the demands of those who ruled over them.
This state of affairs naturally led to insurrection, which the Turks proceeded to put down with an iron hand. The revolted provinces were overrun by Turkish troops, and though they fought bravely the armies of the insurgents were conquered. The most horrible reprisals were taken on the villagers throughout Bulgaria and Servia, especially in the former. Men, women, and children were ruthlessly slaughtered by the Turks or by their irregular cavalry, known as "Bashi-Bazouks." Hundreds of villages were wiped out of existence; the inhabitants, without regard to age or sex, being killed or driven away, and the houses burned to the ground. The whole country threatened to become a desert, unless, perhaps, it should be re-populated by Moslems. The accounts of the Bulgarian atrocities caused great excitement in England in 1876. Many meetings were held to protest against further support of Turkey by England, and the question became an important one in diplomacy. The British government issued, in April, 1877, a proclamation of neutrality in the war which then seemed imminent between Russia and Turkey.
At the suggestion of Russia, the great powers of Europe united in a convention, with the avowed object of preserving peace between the governments of the Czar and the Sultan. After much deliberation a protocol was drawn up, in which a reciprocal disarming of Russia and Turkey was proposed, and Turkey on her part should give a guaranty for the proper treatment of her Christian subjects. Evidently the signatory powers had little faith in the efficacy of the protocol, as three of them made separate declarations before signing it. Their lack of faith was justified by the result, as on the 9th April Turkey indignantly rejected the protocol, and very plainly declared her intention of ignoring "what had been decided without her and against her."
Russia had already massed large numbers of troops on her frontier, and Turkey was also engaged in the work of mobilization. On the 24th April the Emperor of Russia issued a manifesto to his subjects, in which he recited the interest of the empire in the Christian population of the Balkan peninsula, and the general desire that their condition should be ameliorated. He declared that all efforts at peace had been exhausted, and he found himself compelled by the haughty obstinacy of the Porte to proceed to more decided acts. He had given the orders for the army to cross the frontier, and the advance upon Turkey was begun without delay. Every thing had been in readiness for some time, and the army moved promptly when the long-expected order was given.
The Turks had not been idle, though their preparations were by no means as complete as those of Russia. They had massed heavy bodies of troops along the Danube, and were prepared to resist the movements of the Russians south of that stream; they were confident of victory, their confidence having been greatly inspired by their previous victories over the Servians, who were assisted by many Russian volunteers in the Servian rank and file, and by a goodly number of Russian officers, who tendered their services with the full approval of the Czar. Rustchuk, Widin, and Silistria were strongly garrisoned, and the fortifications which still remained from the Crimean war and the war of 1827-28 were made more formidable than ever before. It was estimated that Rustchuk alone would require an army of 80,000 men for at least three months to effect its reduction, while Widin and Silistria would each require as many more. On the other hand, the Russians were equally certain of success. They did not propose to sit down in siege-working, but, while leaving a small force sufficient to keep the Turkish garrisons from venturing too far from their walls, they would move to the rear of the fortresses and advance upon the Balkans.
At the outset Russia miscalculated her powers. She thought she would be able to conduct the campaign with 200,000 men, and this was the force at hand when she made her first move. Turkey had at that time 250,000 men under arms, of whom fully 150,000 were available for service on the Danube at the time war was declared. Four months later Turkey had 220,000 men facing the Russians, and the latter were compelled to make a fresh levy and bring up their reserves.
The "Army of the South," as the Russian invading force was called, was under the immediate command of the Grand Duke Nicholas, and consisted of seven army corps with two brigades of rifles. The field artillery amounted to about 800 guns, most of them breech-loaders, and there was a powerful siege train which was expected to be useful in the reduction of the works that barred the way to Constantinople. The infantry was armed with breech-loaders which had been made from muzzle-loaders, converted by the Krenk (Austrian) system, which had been declined by other governments. Against it the Turks brought the Peabody rifle, an American weapon of far greater range than the Russian one; the latter was only effective at 1,200 yards, while the Peabody could be relied upon for good work up to at least 2,000 yards. The infantry arms played an important part in the resistance which the Turks made to the Russian advance.
The Russian artillery was equally inferior to that of the Turks. The Turks had steel guns manufactured by Krupp, while the Russian guns were of bronze, and of less range and accuracy than those of the Krupp system. The cavalry of the Russians was superior to that of the Turks, both in strength and efficiency. A division of cavalry was attached to each army corps, and in every cavalry division there was a full regiment of Cossacks. The Cossacks are the same that they have been through all the wars of Russia, irregular troops serving without pay, their service being given in place of taxes. The men are the owners of the horses they ride, and also of their clothing and equipments, their arms being furnished by government. They are probably the finest light cavalry in the world, and the amount of marching they can do is something astonishing. Horses and men can undergo an amount of fatigue that would paralyze any other horsemen in the world with the possible exception of the North American Indians and the Guachos of South America. The Cossacks are fine riders, and their horses are trained to lie down at the word of command and remain perfectly still, while their owners fire over them in repelling a real or imaginary attack of the enemy. The Cossacks have an allowance for provisions and forage, and generally manage to save something, although they keep themselves and their chargers in good condition. Their reputation for living off the enemy is equal to that of irregular cavalry generally, though not as bad as that of the Bashi-Bazouks.
The Bashi-Bazouks of the Turks were recruited among the Bulgarians and Roumelians, and a goodly portion of them were originally thieves and local guerillas. In several instances robber chiefs who were "wanted" by the authorities were pardoned for their past offences, on condition that they would enlist men for the service, and take commands in the field, and it is easy to see what kind of marauders would thus be created when they had military authority for their actions. They were a terror to the Christian inhabitants of the country, as they did not scruple to add murder to robbery when the individual who was the victim made any protestations. Most of the massacres in Bulgaria before the war broke out were the work of the Bashi-Bazouks, and while the war was in progress they proved nearly as great a pest to the Moslem inhabitants as they did to the Christians. The Nizam, or regular troops of the Turkish army, were of very good material; many of them came from the Asiatic provinces of Turkey, and when well drilled they made excellent soldiers. The faith of Islam teaches that a Moslem who dies fighting for the preservation of his religion, goes straight to paradise, according to the teachings of Mohammed, the Russian is an infidel, and consequently the war with Russia had a religious aspect. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that the Turkish soldiers manifested an almost stoical indifference to death, and fought bravely to the last.
Russia was at a disadvantage in one respect. She had no fleet of war ships to cope with the ironclad fleet of the Turks, and consequently the latter had practically the control of the Black Sea. Without transports and a fleet of war ships to protect them, Russia was compelled to march her troops by land and across the Danube, where she ran the risk of an encounter with the Turkish gun-boats which patrolled that river. Early in the war two of the Turkish gun-boats on the Danube were destroyed by torpedoes, and in a little while the Russians filled the lower Danube with such a net-work of torpedoes, that the Turkish gun-boats dared not venture among them.
From the frontier the line of advance for the Russians was by the railway to Galatz and thence to Bucharest, the capital of Roumania. The Roumanians made hearty cause with the Russians, whom they joined in declaring war on Turkey, and sent a contingent to the field. From Bucharest a line of railway reaches to Giurgevo on the Danube; Giurgevo is opposite to Rustchuk. whence the Turks had a railway to Varna, an important military and naval station. Where the Danube would be crossed was a mystery which the Russians concealed with the skill for which they are famous. If a Russian does not wish to tell you any thing he will be exasperatingly courteous under all your interrogatories, but the extraction of the information is far more difficult than the historical process of drawing sunbeams from cucumbers. Batteries were erected opposite Rustchuk, and for days and days the Russians kept up a steady fire upon that town and its fortifications. Meantime, the preparations for the crossing went on; the Russian divisions were massed at several points on the river's bank, and hundreds of pontoons were made ready.
The first crossing was made at Galatz, on the 22d June, by General Zimmermann, who went over with two regiments in pontoons and drove out the Turks who were posted on the heights on the opposite shore. Having obtained a footing in the Dobrudja, as the peninsula between the Danube and Black Sea is called, the Russians were able to throw bridges over the great stream, by which the whole left wing of the army moved across. Meantime the right wing, on the 26th June, sent a pontoon force over the Danube from Simnitza, under command of General Skobeleff, who drove out the small force of Turks posted there, though not without hard fighting. More pontoons followed, and then a bridge was thrown across on which the army could march. It is related of Skobeleff that he urged his father, a lieutenant-general of Cossacks, to swim his whole division over the Danube. The elder Skobeleff refused, whereupon the younger swam the river accompanied by a Kirghese servant and three Russian orderlies. The three orderlies and their horses were drowned, but Skobeleff and the Kirghese got over safely.
By the first week of July the whole Russian army was safely encamped on the southern bank of the Danube, and getting in readiness to assume the offensive. It took some days to accumulate the needed supplies and bring them over, so that the advance did not begin in force until after the middle of the month. But before that time General Gourko, with the advance and the 8th corps, had pushed forward on the road to the Balkans, heading first for Tirnova. The Russians had determined to follow the lines of the Yantra and Vid rivers in their advance to the south; both flow from the mountains in a northerly direction to reach the Danube, the Yantra coming in to the east of Sistova, and the Vid beyond Nicopolis to the westward.
On the 5th July the cavalry occupied Biela, which lies on the great road, and on the 7th Gourko was in possession of Tirnova. The plan was for the 12th and 13th corps to form the left of the army and ascend the valley of the Yantra, while the centre followed the Great Road leading to the passes of the Balkans. The 9th corps was to compose the right flank, and after capturing Nicopolis, go up the valley of the Vid. The 11th and 4th corps were to form the reserve, and be sent wherever they might be most needed. The Emperor joined the army at Biela on the 8th or 9th. Gourko was soon reported past the Balkans; Nicopolis was captured by Baron Krudener; and every thing seemed to be progressing favorably for the Russians, who had not thus far met any considerable force of the enemy. News came from Constantinople that the Turkish government was greatly alarmed at the successful passage of the Danube by the Russians, and had removed and banished the commander of the army, Abdul Kerim Pasha.
The first check of the Russians was at Plevna. They had previously captured Nicopolis with its garrison of 7,000 men, having themselves lost about 1,300 officers and men killed and wounded. Orders had been given to occupy Plevna as soon as possible, and Baron Krudener sent forward General Schilder-Schuldner to carry out the orders. There had been reports of the advance of a Turkish army from Widin, marching on the Russian flank, under command of Osman Pasha, and other reports of a column moving from Sophia. Due credence seems not to have been given to these reports, and Baron Krudener was not aware of the Turkish advance until it was close upon him. Schilder-Schuldner had 6,500 men and 46 guns in the division with which he went to capture Plevna; he was attacked by a vastly superior force of Turks before he had reached his objective point, and the first battle of Plevna was disastrous to the Russians.
A brigade of Don Cossacks had been ordered to join Schilder-Schuldner's command. They were taking their dinner on the 19th, when the cannonade opened about eight miles to the southeast, right in the direction they were going. As soon as possible they hurried on in the hope of finding him, but found themselves cut off by a column of Turkish infantry, which lay stretched across the road. There was some sharp fighting with the infantry and artillery of the command, and when night came on neither party had any decided advantage. On the morning of the 20th the Turks began the fighting at Bukova, just north of Plevna, where they engaged the Russian right. The Russian centre attacked the heights of Grivitza, to the east of Plevna, and after a hard struggle drove out the Turks from some of their positions, and forced them fairly into Plevna. On the Russian left the Turks were driven back, but not without heavy losses by the Russians, and some of the regiments suffered so severely that they were put in retreat.
While the Russians were considering the fight nearly over, and thinking that another attack would put them in possession of Plevna, the streets of that town seemed to vomit forth Turkish troops by the thousand. On and on 
they came till the hills were covered with red caps, and it was speedily apparent that they far outnumbered the Russians. Ten, twenty, yes, forty thousand Turks were there to confront the Russian column, less than ten thousand strong, and having the advantage of position on the hills above the Russians. The latter made a heroic defence, but it was of no use. Nearly 3,000 men and 74 officers were killed or wounded, and so many artillery horses were killed that the Russians abandoned seventeen caissons and several guns. The Russians retired to Nicopolis, and the Turks set to work to strengthen Plevna, as they realized that the Russians would speedily attempt its capture.
A few days sufficed to put Plevna in condition to resist attacks, as the Turks are adepts in the construction of fortifications. Careful students of the military operations in Bulgaria in 1877-78 say that the Turks far excelled the Russians in this line of work; the Turkish soldier fights far better behind entrenchments than in the open field, while the matter of protection does not make a great difference to the Russian. In this campaign the Russians found what they had never before encountered—the long-range rifles in the hands of the Turks did effective work before the Russian breech-loaders could get within shooting distance. The Russians learned a lesson in intrenching and protecting themselves behind cover, but they did not learn it until after many a good soldier had bitten the dust.
From the 20th to the 30th of July the Russians were engaged in bringing up reinforcements and getting ready for another attack. An order came for the assault of the Turkish position; Baron Krudener did not believe the assault advisable, but the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas left him no discretion. The baron and his engineers had studied the Turkish position with great care, and realized that there would be a heavy loss of men in attacking the Turkish defences, behind which were 40,000 soldiers under command of Osman Pasha and armed with the far-reaching Peabody rifle. The Turkish entrenchment line ran through a series of villages, lying in a semicircular order round Plevna, about five miles distant from it, and touching the river Vid on both flanks.
General Skobeleff (the younger) was assigned to the temporary command of the brigade of Cossacks in Prince Schahofskoy's division, and sent to occupy, if possible, the town of Loftcha, an important position between Plevna and the Balkans. It was a dangerous movement for the brigade, as the march would be on the flank of the enemy and likely to meet with resistance both at its destination and while en route. But Skobeleff was ready for it, as he was always ready for any hazardous enterprise, and in a very short time after receiving his orders he was prepared to move.
The night between the 29th and 30th was spent in completing preparations for the assault, but on the morning of the latter day it was decided to postpone it for another twenty-four hours in order to give the troops further time for rest. A council of war was held in the afternoon, at which it was arranged that the attack should be made at 5 a.m. on the 31st; it was to be concentric, and as nearly simultaneous as possible. The night was very wet and the troops could not begin their advance before six o'clock in consequence of the ground being heavily soaked. In all there was an attacking force of about 32,000 infantry, with three brigades of cavalry, and 160 guns. Baron Krudener held the right, with the whole 31st division in his fighting line, and three regiments of the 9th division in reserve. He was to assault in two columns, with a brigade in each column, and fall upon the Turkish left flank from Grivitza towards the Vid River.
Prince Schahofskoy held the Russian left with a fighting line of one brigade from the 32d division and one from the 30th. He was to assault the Turkish left from Radisova, and had one brigade of the 30th division in reserve at Pelisat. Skobeleff was on the flank of the left attack with one brigade of Cossacks, a battalion of infantry, and a battery, to watch the line between Plevna and Loftcha, and prevent a movement of the Turks for outflanking Schahofskoy. General Lazareff occupied a similar position on Baron Krudener's right to prevent a flanking movement in that direction. The odds against the Russians were very great, as they were inferior to the Turks in number, while the latter had the advantage of fighting behind defences and their arms were superior to those of the Russians. But the order had been given and it must be obeyed.
Another circumstance to the Russian disadvantage was that a wide gap existed between Krudener and Schahofskoy, and another between the latter officer and Skobeleff. Krudener and Schahofskoy were fully two miles apart, too far for prompt communication, especially when it is remembered that the Turkish position was in the form of a horse-shoe, and a courier riding between the two attacking columns would be compelled to make a wide detour to be out of the Turkish line of fire. Thus the two assaulting forces were practically independent, and a disaster to one could not be promptly known to the other, while the Turks, with their short interior line, would have great advantages.
Plevna stands in the hollow of a valley with a general trend from north to south, except where it falls off in a plain on the old Sophia road. It is surrounded by hills and rugged ravines at all points of the compass, and every inch of ground had been utilized by the Turks for the construction of breastworks and rifle-pits. Generally speaking, there were three lines of defence, one within the other, so that if the Turks should be driven from the outer line, they would by no means be conquered. The bastions bristled with guns and swarmed with men, and in the little plain at the edge of the town, Osman Pasha had a reserve of 20,000 men, which he could move in any desired direction. South of the town runs the road to Loftcha, and it was this road which Skobeleff was appointed to watch.
The advance began simultaneously on both wings of the Russian army, about seven o'clock. By eight o'clock the right centre had come within range of the Turkish fire, but it did not halt until it was within 3,000 yards of the front of the redoubt and could bring its artillery into action. In a little while five batteries were in full action, and though the Turkish fire was rendered somewhat irregular, it was not by any means stopped. The artillery was kept in play for several hours, the infantry not being advanced to the assault until after one o'clock. Schahofskoy made better progress than did Krudener, the former being well up to the Turkish front, while the latter was still pounding away at the longest range of his artillery. Schahofskoy grew impatient and ordered an assault.
Away went the Russian infantry in a solid line, straight for the Turkish defences. The Turkish artillery plowed the advancing line with shells, and though numbers of men fell, the advance was steadily maintained. The Turkish artillery is supported by that of the Turkish infantry, to which the Russians reply, and the roar of the musketry is terrific and continuous. The Russian line becomes disorganized during the advance, but there is a concentration about a hundred yards in front of the Turkish line, and then with a wild shout the Russians are into the ditch and over the first line of works. The fleeing Turks are bayoneted by the Muscovites, and were there no second line of works to be carried the Russians would be masters of the situation.
The fire of the Turks was so severe that the Russians were unable to stand up against it. There had been a terrible loss of men, the ground was covered with dead and wounded, the Peabody rifles in Turkish hands poured out volley after volley so rapidly that it was literally a rain-storm of bullets that fell upon the Russians. The bravest troops in the world could not live in such a storm, and in disorder the late assailants fell back across the undulating ground, over which they had advanced. Schahofskoy's column was completely broken, and though he brought up his reserves and made another attempt, it was evident to all that the capture of Plevna on this side was hopeless.
On the other side of the Russian line, Baron Krudener had begun the attack with his artillery, and followed it about two in the afternoon with an advance of the infantry. When they were fully a mile distant from the Turkish redoubt the men began falling before the bullets of the Peabody rifles, and the column was obliged to advance in this way until it had reached a point where its own Krenk rifles could be made to tell. By the time it reached the foot of the redoubt the ranks had been terribly thinned, but the Russians with a loud cheer carried the first line of works. They would have been driven out immediately had it not been for the rush of the 2d battalion, which came to their support, and not a moment too soon. The Russians carried the second line in the same way as they had taken the first, and drove the Turks up the slopes of the Grivitza redoubt. From this redoubt a furious fire was opened and prevented a further advance of the now greatly weakened Russians. Nay, more, it turned the advance into a retreat, and the retreat left behind it great numbers of dead and wounded.
Later in the day another assault was made, but to no purpose, other than to add to the number of the killed and disabled. It was a useless slaughter of brave men, with scarcely a hope of success.
Meantime Skobeleff had pushed his reconnaissance towards the Loftcha road, getting possession of the Green Hills after considerable hard fighting. He obtained a position whence he could look into Plevna and see the force that the Turks still held in reserve, a force sufficient to take the offensive and follow up the Russians so vigorously as to make doubtful the escape of Schahofskoy's shattered battalions. After the repulse of the Russians the Turks pushed forward several brigades that threatened to separate Krudener and Schahofskoy, and at one time the latter was completely enveloped on three sides. Had it not been for Skobeleff he might have been caught on the fourth side, and his line of retreat altogether cut off.
As soon as Skobeleff saw the Turkish strength in reserve he comprehended the peril of the situation. Schahofskoy's left and rear might be imperilled by a swing to the south of a Turkish division, and Skobeleff determined not to give them a chance to undertake it. With a few squadrons of Cossacks, supported by a light battery, he dashed forward, as though ready to give battle. The Turkish division which might have cut off Schahofskoy was compelled to fight this insignificant force, which kept it occupied all through the afternoon.
Previous to this affair Skobeleff had been in disfavor with the Emperor in consequence of stories affecting his conduct in Central Asia, stories which his enemies had persistently circulated. After the passage of the Danube the Emperor embraced the other officers who took part in it, but turned on his heel when Skobeleff stood before him. After the brilliant service thus described, together with other exploits that made his name famous, the Emperor made public acknowledgment of his appreciation by rising at a banquet and proposing the health of General Skobeleff. The immediate cause of the Emperor's change of heart was the skill and daring displayed by Skobeleff in leading the assault upon the Turkish position in Loftcha on the 3d September.
The losses of the Russians in the attack on Plevna on the 31st July were 170 officers and 7,136 men. Of the latter 2,400 were shot dead on the battle-field, and many of the wounded were murdered by the Bashi-Bazouks. The 126th regiment that led the assault under Schahofskoy lost 725 killed and 1,200 wounded, or 75 per cent. of its total strength. The 121st regiment, which led the assault under Krudener, lost almost as heavily, and neither regiment was able to re-form until the next morning. The entire command was in no condition to remain in front of Plevna, as it could not have combated successfully an attack by the Turks. Orders were given to fall back to the line of the river Osma, which enters the Danube near Nicopolis. The repulse of Krudener's column threatened the safety of the bridge at Sistova, and the movements of the retiring columns were planned with a view to protect that important crossing over the Danube.
There was nothing for the Russians to do but send for reinforcements, and wait until they arrived. The advance into Turkey had received a severe check, from which recovery was not easy. From the offensive the Russians were thrown upon the defensive, and all as the result of a single battle of six or eight hours' duration. Happily for Russia, the Turkish army had no competent leader, or the army of the Czar might have been captured or drowned in the Danube. The Turks had three armies in the field, with an aggregate strength of more than 150,000; they were near enough together to render concentration possible, and with such an army the weakened Russians would have fared badly. Mehemet Ali was at Shumla with 65,000 men; Osman Pasha at Plevna, with 50,000, and Suleiman Pasha at Yeni Zagra, with 40,000. Suleiman was engaged in watching Gourko, and that astute general, on hearing of the disaster at Plevna, was considerably concerned for his line of retreat.
The order of the Czar for reinforcements was quickly issued, and resulted in the despatch of 120,000 regulars and 180,000 militia for the front. With these reinforcements went 460 pieces of artillery with the necessary ammunition, and the railways were taxed to the utmost of their ability for the transport of provisions and material of war. The militia were incorporated into the old regiments to take the places of the men whose bodies were rotting on the slopes of Plevna, the Turks taking no trouble to bury their enemy's dead. General Gourko took up his position in the Shipka Pass whence Suleiman Pasha sought in vain to dislodge him, losing far more men than the Russians lost in the same time. Towards the end of August the Russian reinforcements were assembled in such numbers that an advance could again be ventured, and accordingly the Muscovite columns were once more pushed out into Bulgaria.
The Russians were getting ready for their third attack upon Plevna, aided by the Roumanians, who had sent nearly 40,000 men into the field. The first move in the attack was to send Generals Imeretinsky and Skobeleff to capture Loftcha, which was accomplished in fine style, the Turks being driven out of the forts at that point, and 3,000 men of their retreating column lanced or sabred by the Cossacks during their flight for safety. Having Loftcha in their possession, the Russians proposed to encircle Plevna, and gradually draw in their lines till they forced a surrender. The total Russian and Roumanian force for the attack of Plevna amounted to 90,000 men and 440 guns, while the Turks were estimated to have about 36,000 men—and Osman Pasha. Prince Charles of Roumania was assigned to the command of all the Russo-Roumanian forces around Plevna, with General Zotoff as second in command. The Grand Duke Nicholas ordered an attack at as early a date as possible, and was confident that the great superiority in numbers would this time bring victory. The Emperor and the Grand Duke Nicholas came in person to witness the assault, establishing their head-quarters near those of Prince Charles.
The attack began with a bombardment on the 6th September, the Russians bringing a large part of their artillery into play, including the heavy siege guns which had been slowly dragged by oxen from the banks of the Danube to the points where they were mounted. The Russian fire was severe, and if it had been directed against stone fortifications would have battered them down in a little while. But the military engineer knows the comparatively slight effect of artillery upon earthworks, and as all the defences of Plevna were simply the earth of which the hills were composed, the Russian fire did little more than dismount some of the Turkish cannon, and keep the men confined to their bomb-proofs, with the exception of those who were working the guns that replied to the assailants. The Turkish fire was slow but steady; the Turks did not seem inclined to be in a hurry, and they evidently felt that they could afford to let the Russians pile tons and tons of iron inside their works, and add the solid masses of metal to the earth which formed the bastions and redoubts.
Since the repulse of Krudener and Schahofskoy on the 30th of July, Osman Pasha had greatly strengthened the defences of Plevna. When Krudener's assault failed there were no fortifications on the Grivitza knoll east of Plevna, nor on the Krishin heights a mile and a half southwest of the town. The Green Hills which Skobeleff carried and held for a time during the second battle of Plevna were also without fortifications at that time, but by the 1st of September all these commanding positions had been crowned with works and were connected by a series of rifle-pits and trenches. It was evident that the Turkish engineers were thoroughly competent for their work, and they had thrown around Plevna a line of defences that would certainly give the Russians a great deal of trouble. And so the sequel proved.
The bombardment lasted with varying intervals of a few hours at a time from the 6th to the 11th September, comparatively little use being made of the infantry and cavalry on most parts of the line. The general positions were much the same as at the time of the second battle of Plevna, Skobeleff having the extreme left. The Roumanian army was posted among the hills to the northwest of Grivitza, while Krudener with the 9th corps was to the south of Grivitza, with his line extending round to Radischevo. General Kryloff with the 4th corps was to the left of Baron Krudener, while General Skobeleff, as before stated, held the extreme left, which extended round to the Loftcha road.
The Russians were disappointed at the slight effect of their artillery on the Turkish redoubts, especially where the siege train under Krudener had been pounding all day at the Grivitza defences. On the extreme left Skobeleff was impatient at the slow work of the artillery, and determined to make use of his other forces. After firing awhile with his heavy guns at the redoubts on the Krishin heights, he closed in within short range, and then sent the 5th and 8th regiments to attack the Turkish infantry, which was deployed along the line of the Green Hills. He drove back the Turks until he was fairly within range of the guns of Krishin, which of course made his position untenable, and he was forced to retire. At one time he was within 1,500 yards of Plevna, but he could not retain his position as long as the Turks were still in possession of their redoubts. But he hung on to the southern knoll of the Green Hills in spite of repeated attempts to dislodge him.
The 8th and 9th passed without any important change in the relations of the contending armies. The Turks on the Grivitza ridge did not reply to the Russian fire on the 9th, and consequently Prince Charles thought they might have been driven out. or possibly the guns were disabled. He ordered an assault with infantry, but it was met with such a heavy fire of small-arms that the Russians were driven back before they reached the foot of the earthworks. It was afterwards learned that the Turks had ceased firing because they were short of ammunition, and wished to utilize as much as possible the scanty stock that remained to them. On the 10th their batteries were nearly all silenced, but any movement on the part of the Russian infantry showed that the Turks were fully alive to the situation, and when the occasion demanded, their works swarmed with men.
After repulsing the infantry attack on the Grivitza redoubt, the Turks made an assault upon Skobeleff, at the Green Hills, but were driven back in disorder by the infantry commanded by that dashing officer. On the morning of the 10th, Skobeleff determined to occupy the second knoll in front of the Krishin redoubt, the place he had taken and briefly held on the first day of the attack. His men made a rush, and then rapidly threw up an earthwork behind which they could bid defiance to the Turkish riflemen. As soon as the earthwork was completed Skobeleff brought his guns forward and made ready for the work of the next day—the grand assault.
The plan was to open the day with a heavy bombardment, which was to be continued until three in the afternoon, the time set for the infantry assault. But all through the afternoon and night of the 10th it rained heavily, and the ground became a mass of mud in which it was difficult to move. In the morning of the 11th there was a heavy fog which hung over the entire valley; the Turks took advantage of it by pushing out a column of infantry to drive Skobeleff from the position he had taken the previous day, but they were unsuccessful. The fighting was not severe, as the Turks retired on finding their opponents were ready for them, and the Russians did not pursue through fear of falling into a trap. Both 
sides evidently wished to wait until the fog lifted, but by ten o'clock Skobeleff grew impatient, and sent his men to capture a third knoll still nearer the Krishin redoubt, though then protected from its fire by the fog.
Skobeleff's men were somewhat disturbed by the Turks in the neighboring rifle-pits, and there was a good deal of firing between them. While this fight was going on, the Turks made a sortie in the direction of Kryloff's front; under cover of the fog they were fairly within the Russian lines before they were perceived, but as soon as the firing began they were promptly repulsed. The 63d regiment met and defeated them; it was joined by the 117th, and together they not only drove the Turks back, but followed them into their redoubts. Here they found themselves caught in a trap, as the redoubts were full of men, and a terrible fire of bullets was poured on the Russians from all sides. Fully half the men and most of the officers were killed or wounded, and only a small contingent out of those two regiments managed to make its way back to the Russian lines. It was a severe blow to Kryloff, as it completely paralyzed his left wing.
The Roumanians with two divisions attacked the Grivitza redoubt from the north and east, while a Russian brigade attacked it from the south. In spite of the assault on three sides, the Turks were able to hurl back their assailants. By some miscalculation the Roumanian and Russian assaults were not delivered simultaneously; there was an interval of half an hour between the assaults of the two Roumanian divisions, while the Russian assault was still half an hour later. The columns were beaten in detail and with heavy loss, especially in officers, until about five o'clock when the redoubt was carried. The losses of the allies in the afternoon's battle were nearly 4,000, including 78 officers. Repeated assaults were made upon redoubt No. 10, but though they lost no officers and 5,200 men, the Russians were unable to carry it. The Turks stoutly defended their position and made every shot tell.
Skobeleff was for a time more successful than the other generals directing the attack, as he clung to the positions he had gained in spite of the Turkish fire that raked his lines from three directions. Mounted on a white horse, and dressed in a white uniform, such as he always wore when going into battle, he led the charge against a double redoubt in the bend of the Loftcha road, close to Plevna. All his escort were killed or wounded, his horse was killed beneath him, and his sword was cut in two by a cannon-shot. But onward he pushed, and carried the redoubt, losing 3,000 men in the effort.
And now came the question of holding the redoubt. It was taken about six o'clock in the afternoon, and Skobeleff sent immediately for reinforcements, but they never came. All through the night he retained his position, and in the morning he was heavily assailed by masses of Turkish infantry, who advanced under cover of the artillery fire from the Krishin redoubt. The Turks were repulsed, but they returned to the assault as soon as they could re-form and fresh troops could join them. Five times did they attack Skobeleff's rapidly diminishing forces, and five times were they driven back. Towards the close of the day they attacked for the sixth time, and as their battalions came surging on, Skobeleff was at his tent on a wooded hill near the redoubt. When word came that the Turks were assaulting, he mounted his horse and rode towards the redoubt, out of which his men came streaming in a disorganized, straggling mass. They were dying of thirst, hunger, and fatigue, and worn out with almost continuous fighting for forty-eight hours. The repulse of the Russians at other parts of the line had enabled the Turks to gather an overwhelming force to drive Skobeleff out of the redoubt, and at last they succeeded. One bastion was held to the last by a young officer, who was slaughtered with all his men around him.
A correspondent of the Daily News met Skobeleff just after this occurrence, and thus describes him:
He was in a fearful state of excitement and fury. His uniform was covered with mud and filth; his sword broken; his Cross of St, George twisted around on his shoulder; his face black with powder and smoke; his eyes haggard and blood-shot, and his voice quite gone. I never before saw such a picture of battle as he presented. I saw him again in his tent at night. He was quite calm and collected. He said: "I have done my best; I could do no more. My detachment is half destroyed; my regiments do not exist; I have no officers left; they sent me no reinforcements, and I have lost three guns." "Why did they refuse you reinforcements?" I asked; "who was to blame?" "I blame nobody," he replied. "It is the will of God."
Military critics commenting on this battle say that the Russians had abundant troops that had not been under fire, and there was no real difficulty about sending Skobeleff sufficient reinforcements to enable him to hold his position. If he could have held it until the heavy artillery was placed in position, the capture of Plevna was practically assured. But the Russian commanders had found themselves so severely handled that they had enough of fighting, and determined that Plevna could be taken by siege better than by assault. The Russian killed and wounded were estimated at 18,000 to 20,000, and the Turkish about 5,000 less than the Russian.
The capture by assault having been given up, the Russians sat down to invoke the aid of that engine, more powerful than all their batteries, the engine of starvation. Osman Pasha was to be starved into surrender, and for this purpose the Guards were called from Russia and the army of the Czar was strengthened in the same way it had been strengthened after the disaster of the second attack on Plevna, One by one the roads leading into Plevna were occupied, but it was nearly two months from the terrible 
battle of the 11th September before the routes for supplies and reinforcements destined for Osman Pasha could be secured. The investment was completed on the 3d November; 120,000 Russians and Roumanians were around Plevna, and the siege works were pushed with all the skill and vigor that engineering science and autocratic power could bring to bear. Osman Pasha and his 40,000 soldiers were shut up in Plevna and cut off from all communication with the rest of the Turkish forces.
Elsewhere the Turkish armies were busy with movements for the relief of Plevna, and sanguinary encounters took place between them and the Russian forces in the valley of the Lorn and among the Balkans. But as all these enterprises failed of their object, though the Russians were made to suffer severely, they did not affect the one great object in view—the capture of Plevna.
Starvation was at work from the 3d of November, when the investment was completed. Spies brought intelligence that the men were on reduced rations and every available article of food was being devoured. Ammunition was scarce, and the Turks rarely replied to the Russian artillery fire. It became known to the Russians that Osman Pasha was preparing for a sortie, and the Russian trenches were kept full of men day and night. All the outposts were doubled or trebled, and every precaution was taken against surprise.
On the 9th December a spy brought the news that three days' rations had been issued to the troops in Plevna, together with one hundred and fifty cartridges and a new pair of sandals to each man. About ten o'clock at night another spy came in and said that the Turkish troops were concentrating near the bridge over the Vid, and about the same time a telegram from the Russians on the other side of Plevna reported the movements of a great number of lights in the town, an unusual occurrence. Evidently the hour of the sortie was approaching.
At eight o'clock on the morning of the 10th another spy brought the news that the Krishin redoubt had been abandoned. He was so confident of the truth of his assertion that he offered to go along with the Russians and lead the way into the redoubt at the risk of being killed if his statement were false. General Skobeleff ordered a cautious advance in the direction of the Krishin redoubt, and in a short time the Russians were in possession of it, no resistance being offered. It was now certain that the sortie was to begin at daybreak, and word was sent along the whole Russian line to be ready for it. Skobeleff ordered the captured positions to be put immediately in a state of defence in case the Turks should fail in the sortie and then try to retake them.
In the gray of the morning the stillness was broken suddenly by the booming of some thirty or forty cannon, that announced the aggressive action of the Turks. They were trying to cut their way out of Plevna, and this was the opening of the movement. During the night they had withdrawn their troops from their various positions, all the way from Grivitza to the Green Hills, and concentrated for one last attempt. If they should fail, surrender was inevitable, for it would be impossible for them to retake the Krishin and other redoubts, into which the Russians had thrown their own men and were ready to pour a destructive fire all over Plevna.
The Russian artillery replied with great promptness, and then came the rattle of the infantry fire as the Turkish masses deployed and came out to the front of the Russian line. The attack was directed against the position of the grenadiers north of the Sophia road, and was made under cover of the wagon-train, which the Turks brought with them as a sort of moving breastwork. So many of the bullocks drawing the wagons were killed or frightened into running away that this strategy did not long avail, and then the Turks made a dash upon the line of trenches held by the Siberian regiment. It was like one of Skobeleff's charges, and was so impetuous that the Turks carried the line of trenches and the batteries, bayoneting the artillerymen and capturing all the guns inside the line of works. The Siberian regiment was almost annihilated, and had it not been for the promptness of the Russian generals, who immediately brought up the first brigade of grenadiers, the attempt to break the Russian investment might have succeeded.
The fighting was as fierce as any that had taken place in all the previous struggles for the possession of Plevna; the Turks held on to the guns with all the obstinacy of their race, and equally obstinate were the Russians in their efforts to retake them. The Russian grenadiers poured swiftly in; by half-past eight o'clock the sortie was repulsed, and the few Turks that remained alive and uninjured were fleeing back in the direction of the town.
The sortie had been stopped, but the fighting continued for several hours, though there were no great losses after the contest for the possession of the battery, as both parties were under cover. The Russians expected the Turks would make another assault and were determined to defeat it, while the Turks were apprehensive that the Russians would charge and drive them into the gorge where the town stands.
Towards noon the firing gradually died away and only an occasional shot broke the stillness. About half-past twelve a white flag was displayed on the Turkish front and was greeted with a loud shout of triumph that rolled along the entire Russian lines. The long agony was over, and Plevna was about to be surrendered.
A Turkish officer bearing a white flag rode out towards the Russian lines, and after some parley returned to Plevna to send out an officer of Osman Pasha's staff. The latter came and was met by General Skobeleff, and after a little delay the surrender of Plevna was made. It was an unconditional surrender. In fact, under the circumstances, neither side could have expected less. The Grand Duke and all the Russian generals complimented Osman Pasha on the splendid defence he had made, and he was treated with every courtesy that could be shown to one whom they earnestly respected for his valor and his military genius.
With the fall of Plevna and the surrender of its garrison of 40,000 men, the Turkish opposition practically ceased. Within a month from that event General Gourko had captured Sophia, and General Radetsky took the village of Shipka, in the Shipka Pass, and compelled the surrender of a Turkish army of 23,000 men, 4 pashas, 92 guns, and 10 standards. Gourko and Skobeleff advanced upon Philippopolis by different routes and narrowly missed capturing Suleiman Pasha with his entire force. Skobeleff advanced upon Adrianople, which the Turks abandoned, and Slivno and Yeni-Zagra were occupied, all inside of thirty days, Plevna had made the Russians the masters of the situation and they advanced upon Constantinople, the Turks retiring before them, and occasionally making a feeble resistance.
Turkey asked the mediation of England, and finally, despairing of her aid, signed an armistice that became the basis of the treaty of San Stefano, which was signed by the treaty powers on the 3d of March, 1878. The treaty guaranteed the erection of Bulgaria into an autonomous tributary principality, with a national Christian government and a native militia; the independence of Montenegro, with an increase of territory; the independence of Roumania and Servia with a territorial indemnity; the introduction of administrative reforms into Bosnia and Herzegovina; and lastly, an indemnity in money to Russia for the cost of the war.
By the subsequent Congress of Berlin Russia was stripped of some of the fruits of her conquest, Turkey 
receiving back again about 2,000,000 of population and 30,000 square miles of territory. The treaty of San Stefano was modified in several other features,—Batoum was made a free commercial port, and the treaty of Paris was held to be maintained in all the points where it was not modified by the Congress of Berlin. Altogether Russia had good reason to complain that she was not allowed to enjoy what she had won by the force of arms, and the way was left open for troubles in the not distant future.
Russia is said to have lost nearly 100,000 men in the campaign of 1877-78, and to have expended not less than £120,000,000. The cost of the war on the Turkish side, both in men and money, is said to have been about three fourths that of the Russians, but the exact figures have never been published on either side.
