Decisive Battles Since Waterloo/Chapter 24
CHAPTER XXIV.
EL OBEID—ANNIHILATION OF HICKS PASHA'S ARMY—1883.
Soudan is an Arabic word abbreviated from Biled-es-Soudan, "The Country of the Blacks." On the map of Africa it stretches nearly across the continent between the sixth and sixteenth degrees of north latitude, and includes a vast area. The Egyptian Soudan, which is the Soudan of this chapter, includes the region drained by the White Nile and its immediate tributaries, the Blue Nile, the Atbara and Sobat rivers, together with the country between the Nile and the Red Sea, north of the boundary of Abyssinia. It may be roughly said to have an area of 2,500,000 square miles, with a population of about 12,000,000. One fourth of the inhabitants are Arabs and kindred tribes, and the remaining 9,000,000 are negroes. All the Arabs and many of the negroes are Moslems, but it is probable that fully half of the inhabitants of the Soudan do not belong to the religion of Mohammed, though it has made rapid strides among them during the last twenty years.
From the days of Moses to the present time the rulers of Egypt have been the reverse of mild in their treatment of their subjects. In all ages the Egyptian peasantry have been regarded as the property of the sovereign; the many changes of dynasty have made little difference in the lot of the laboring classes in the most fertile land of the globe. From the heights of the pyramids "Forty centuries look down upon us," and they are forty centuries of almost unvarying oppression. In the fourth dynasty of the ancient empire the pyramids were built by the unpaid labor of the people, and in the same way the great canal connecting Alexandria with the Nile was made by Mohammed Ali Pasha, the founder of the dynasty which now occupies the khedivial throne. The splendors of the ancient rulers have been imitated by those of modern times, and the result is that the country is oppressively burdened with taxation and hopelessly involved in debt. At present the foreign debt of the country exceeds £100,000,000, or $500,000,000, without including the Moukabalah, or forced interior debt, which amounts to many millions more. The population of Egypt proper is a little more than 5,000,000, so that the national indebtedness exceeds $100 for each and every man, woman, and child in the country. The land is wonderfully fertile, producing ordinarily three crops a year; but even with this fertility it is impossible to meet the expenses of a costly government and pay the interest on the enormous debt.
Mohammed Ali Pasha, who came to Egypt as a Turkish captain in 1799, and became ruler of the land and founder of the dynasty, was fond of war, and spent large sums of money in its prosecution. He began the conquest of the Soudan by sending his son to conquer Nubia and Sennaar; in 1822 he founded Khartoum, at the junction of the Blue and White Nile, and long before his death in 1848 he had the satisfaction of knowing that the flag of Egypt waved over a large area that it did not dominate when he ascended the throne. Except in war, he was not specially extravagant, but the same cannot be said of his successors, Abbas and Said Pashas. Abbas gave little attention to the affairs of the government; he spent a great deal of money on palaces, abolished the educational institutions which Mohammed Ali had established, and dissolved the army in order to have for his personal use the money which a military system would require. His successor, Said Pasha, was peacefully inclined, and undertook several public works. The Suez Canal was begun during his reign, and his memory is preserved in the name of Port Said, the artificial harbor at the Mediterranean entrance of the canal. But he had the mania for extravagancies which characterized his predecessor, and at his death in 1863 he left a legacy of debt to his successor, Ismail.
Little was done under Abbas Pasha and his successor, Said, for the extension of Egyptian dominion beyond what had been left by Mohammed Ali. The fever of conquest broke out anew with Ismail, and soon after his accession to the throne he sent his armies into the regions of the Upper Nile, which he rapidly added to his dominions. From Khartoum, which had been, since its foundation in 1822, the frontier city, his dominion was rapidly pushed into the Soudan, and in the ten years between 1868 and 1878 the Egyptian flag was carried more than 1,000 miles southward, till it floated on the shores of the Central African lakes. Mohammed Ali's conquests were undertaken largely with the view of obtaining soldiers for his army. The men of the Soudan were sent captive to Cairo and converted into soldiers, under the training of French officers; during and since Mohammed Ali's time the flower of the Egyptian army has been the Soudanese portion, and at times there have been not less than 25,000 or 30,000 soldiers under the flag, every man of whom came from the provinces of the Upper Nile. The Soudanese are naturally warlike, can endure heat, fatigue, and privation, and in every way are vastly superior to the fellaheen of Lower Egypt, whose courage and fighting qualities were extinguished centuries ago by the oppression under which they lived. The Soudanese did not specially object to being converted into soldiers, and if the pashas had been content with a few thousands of them annually, had kept the slave trade under proper restrictions, and avoided the imposition of enormous taxes and the cruelties accompanying their collection, Egypt would to-day be in possession of Central Africa down to the shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza.
A few years of Egyptian rule in the conquered provinces of Central Africa, served to rouse a spirit of hostility among the inhabitants, and make them ready for revolt. On the appearance of El Mahdi, in the summer of 1881, thousands flocked to his standard. He was a sheikh named Mohammed Achmet, the son of a carpenter, and a native of Dongola. He was born in 1842, and educated in a village near Khartoum. According to Moslem custom, religion was his principal study. In 1870 he became a sheikh, and after a brief sojourn at Korka, near Fashoda, he established himself on the island of Abba, in the White Nile. Here he set up as a holy man, or dervish, of the highest class, and soon obtained a great reputation for sanctity. After a while a considerable number of dervishes gathered around him, and his fame spread rapidly. He extended his influence and power by marrying daughters of the principal chiefs of the Baggara Arabs, the powerful tribes who inhabit the country west of the White Nile and southeast of Kordofan and Darfur. They were constantly at war with each other, and by his tact and influence Mohammed Achmet succeeded in bringing the various tribes into harmony.
In May, 1881, when living at Marabieh, near the island of Abba, he suddenly proclaimed himself to be the Messiah, or Prophet, whose coming had been foretold by Mohammed. His followers styled him El-Mahdi, an Arabic word, meaning simply a "leader," or "guide," and not found in the Koran. The Ulema of Khartoum[1] promptly pronounced against Mohammed Achmet; he was likewise repudiated at Cairo and Constantinople, and soon became known in Egypt and Turkey as the "False Prophet."
The intentions of Mohammed Achmet, as set forth in various proclamations, were as follows:
He taught universal law and religion, and community of goods. All who opposed his mission were to be destroyed, whether Christian, Mohammedan, or Pagan.
General Gordon gave his view of the Mahdi to the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, in London, on January 8th, 1884, saying: "I strongly suspect that he (the Mahdi) is a mere puppet put forward by Elyas, Zubair's father-in-law, and the largest slave-owner in Obeid, and that he has assumed a religious title to give color to the defence of the popular rights." Probably the suppression of the slave-trade had much to do with the insurrection, as most of the supporters of the Mahdi, more especially the Baggara tribes, owe all their wealth to the traffic in slaves, which the Egyptian government has for many years been taking measures to suppress or greatly curtail.
The Soudan rebellion was an echo of the revolt of Arabi Pasha in Lower Egypt. Arabi Pasha was the leader of the national party, which protested against the control of Egypt by foreigners, the exemption of foreigners living in Egypt from taxation, the diversion of the revenues of the country to the foreign creditors of Egypt while the officers of the army and other public servants remained unpaid, the employment of foreigners in public places when the same work could be done by Egyptians at one fifth the cost, and the general tyranny and oppression of the Turkish rulers of the country. The movement of the Mahdi began in the same way as that of Arabi, and, though it soon assumed a religious aspect, it was practically political at the start. The misrule of the Egyptians had made an intolerable state of things, and when the Mahdi raised the flag of rebellion the oppressed people, whether Pagans or Moslems, flocked around him. The best war cry for a rebellion in any part of the world is a religious one, and the Mahdi shrewdly proclaimed himself the divine messenger. Not long after his trial and banishment to Ceylon, Arabi Pasha said to an English visitor: "Rely on it, if Ceylon had been governed like the Soudan, you would have had your Mahdi to deal with; and had the Soudan been governed like Ceylon, we should never have heard of the Mahdi."
The time which the Mahdi had selected for rising was after the garrisons of the Soudan had been diminished for economical reasons. In July, 1881, the attention of Raouf Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan, was drawn to the Mahdi's claims and demands, and he sent a commission of inquiry from Khartoum to see the Mahdi at Marabieh, and learn the exact state of affairs. On the return of this commission, it was decided to send a military force of about 200 men to bring the Mahdi to Khartoum. The expedition started early in 1882, and reached the residence of the Mahdi, where it was attacked and defeated by his followers, 120 men and 2 officers being killed or captured. Another expedition met the same fate, being driven back with loss, and in June, 1882, Yussuf Pasha's army of the Soudan of 6,000 men was practically destroyed, all the soldiers, save a few hundreds, being killed or captured. The Mahdi then took the offensive; he attacked Bara, but was repulsed, and three times he attacked El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan. Finally, he captured Bara, and then El Obeid surrendered, most of the Egyptian garrison taking service with their captor.
On the 20th February, 1883, the Pashas Ala-ed-Deen and Suleiman Nyasi arrived at Khartoum. The latter was to take command of the troops; the duties of the former were not announced, though it was whispered that he was to be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan. On the 4th of March Colonel Hicks (late of Bombay Staff Corps), with 6 other English officers, arrived at Khartoum. Colonel Hicks had been appointed Chief of the Staff of the Army of the Soudan, with the local rank of Major-General. It was really intended that he should direct and be responsible for all preparations and movements. Practically, he was commander-in-chief, though ostensibly holding a subordinate position. The Mahdi's movement being, theoretically at least, a religious one, it was not considered advisable to place a foreigner and a non-Mussulman in command of the Egyptian forces, as the insurgent leader might use this circumstance to arouse the fanaticism of his adherents.
Suleiman Nyasi, whose military career dated back to the time of Mohammed Ali, was named commander-in-chief, but with the understanding that he was to follow and execute implicitly General Hicks' instructions and plans. Suleiman was old, stupid, and lazy, and also hostile to the work before him, and jealous of General Hicks. The result was, that he frequently acted quite contrary to the spirit of the instructions he had received at Cairo.
On the 18th March Major Farquhar, Hicks' companion officer, returned to Khartoum from a reconnoissance up the White Nile, and reported that the people along the western bank of the river were hostile. Four thousand five hundred rebels and 1,800 Baggara Arab cavalry were assembled at Marabieh and Abu Dynma, while at Jebel-Ain there was a considerable force from Kordofan. The news came from the latter country that the Mahdi's force was 100,000 strong; it was scattered at various points, but could be speedily brought together. The chiefs met at El Obeid once a week for orders and consultation, but the sheikhs of the Baggara tribes did not attend these meetings, owing to a quarrel with the Mahdi concerning the booty taken at El Obeid. At the loot of El Obeid, in January, 1883, the Mahdi was said to have taken more than £100,000 from the officials and notables, which he kept to himself, distributing nothing among his followers. On account of this worldly performance, many began to waver in their belief in his sanctity. In the hope of utilizing this discontent, General Hicks endeavored to open communications with the Baggara chiefs, and arrange a meeting with them.
On the 26th March Ala-ed-Deen Pasha was proclaimed at Khartoum as Governor-General of the Soudan, and on the same day Hussein Pasha left for Sennaar to relieve Abd-el-Kader Pasha of his military command. By this time the Mahdi had made rapid progress with his revolt. He had taken possession of Kordofan, Sennaar, and Darfur, and the forces under his command were variously estimated at from 100,000 to 200,000 strong.
General Hicks and staff left Khartoum by steamer on the 3d April, and arrived at Kawa on the 6th. An army of about 5,000 had been collected at Kawa, consisting of 5½ battalions of regular infantry, 1½ battalions of negroes, 5 guns, 2 Nordenfelts, and a squadron of Bashi-Bazouks.
On the 10th April General Hicks made a reconnoissance up the Nile. After steaming about an hour and a half, the boat was fired on from the western bank. As it advanced, many shots were fired at it, especially from a point opposite the island of Abba, where the rebels were behind trenches. On the 14th the general telegraphed to Cairo that he was anxious to get to Jebel-Ain, where the rebels were concentrating, but that he had great difficulty in obtaining supplies of food and ammunition.
It was not till the 23d April that the Egyptian army, nearly 5,000 strong, started to ascend the Nile from Kawa. Shots were fired from the banks almost continuously, and General Hicks learned from the chief of a Shillook village that the rebels were getting ready to attack the Egyptians on the march from Kawa. Having satisfied himself of the correctness of this information, General Hicks steamed back to the fort at Abu-Zea, to inform Tahier Bey, the commander of the Bashi-Bazouks, of the situation, and then joined the army, which was encamped opposite the northern end of the island of Abba, in expectation of an attack. On the 25th April some Arab cavalry appeared, but was put to flight by a few shells. On the night of the 27th there were several alarms, but no fighting of consequence.
The march was renewed on the 28th. On the 29th the rebels were reported about 2 miles distant, and advancing rapidly. They soon appeared in considerable force, both cavalry and infantry, and deployed into a long line, with the evident intention of attacking the angles of the square in which the Egyptian troops were formed. But the rebel cavalry scattered as soon as the shells began dropping among them, and fled in great confusion. In less than 30 minutes the whole rebel force was completely disorganized and in full flight. Their numbers were placed at 5,000 men, of whom they lost 500 in the battle, while the Egyptians lost only 2 killed and 5 wounded.
On the 1st of May it was ascertained that the rebels were crossing the river in strong force about 10 miles below Jebel-Ain. General Hicks sent Suleiman Pasha to intercept them, but he could not overtake them for want of cavalry; the infantry marched so slowly that it required two days to cover a distance of 12 miles. By the time General Hicks reached Jebel-Ain, he found that the whole district had been evacuated. He decided to return immediately to Duem, and prepare for an attack on Schatt, where the rebels were said to be assembling in large force, but before the Egyptians were ready to move the rebels again dispersed, and the western bank of the river was announced free from all but a few hostile bands.
The expedition to Kordofan could not be undertaken till after the rains, as the most of the wells in the desert would not be full until that time. To carry out the expedition successfully General Hicks asked the Khedive for full powers, which arrived on the 20th August. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the expedition to Kordofan, with the rank of General of Division. General Hicks' plan was to leave Khartoum early in September and march up the banks of the White Nile to Berair (16 miles below Duem) with 8,600 infantry, 1,400 cavalry and Bashi-Bazouks, 1 battery of Krupp field-guns, 2 batteries of mounted guns, 1 battery of Nordenfeldts, and 5,000 camels.
Leaving the river at Berair, he intended to advance on Bara, and then on El Obeid; leaving some of his troops in garrison on the way, he would reach El Obeid with 7,000 men, whom he considered sufficient to defeat the rebel forces.
He started accordingly on the 8th September and reached Zeraig about 30 miles from Duem on the last day of the month. A despatch from General Hicks, sent to Khartoum and telegraphed to Cairo on the 17th October, reported as follows: "The army has arrived within 28 miles of Sarakhna. We found water, but cannot establish military posts and lines of communication. The place is evacuated; the health of the troops is good but the heat is intense."
The last despatch received from General Hicks is dated October 3, 1883, and reads as follows:
I left Duem on the White Nile and established military posts of 200 men each in strongly fortified places, along the line of march. We marched to Schatt, and before reaching Zeraig I was informed by the governor-general of the Soudan that it was useless for me to expect any supplies to be pushed up from Duem; that the post would not guard the convoys; that the Arabs, although now absent from our line of route, would return after we had passed, and that they would be numerous, and the garrisons of the posts would not consider themselves strong enough to forward the supplies; that it would be dangerous, and I would find they would not run the risk. The governor-general requested me to give up the idea of having this line of posts, to abandon my line of communication and line of retreat, and to advance with the army en l'air, with 50 days' supply only, the Arabs closing in our rear.
I am naturally averse to this, and have therefore called a council, have had the matter explained, and requested the members to record their opinions.
For several weeks after the receipt of the foregoing despatch no news of the expeditionary force was received. Messengers were sent from Duem, along the various routes to Kordofan, but, for a long time, none of the few who came back brought any authentic news.
Finally, on the 19th November, a messenger, who had been unable to deliver his despatches to Ala-ed-Deen Pasha returned to Duem, bringing information of the total destruction of General Hicks' army. The discouraging intelligence was soon confirmed by Arab merchants and others who came from Kordofan. The events which terminated with this terrible disaster to the Egyptians are still to a certain extent shrouded in mystery. Nothing definite has ever been received from any of the Europeans accompanying the expedition, nor from any of the Egyptian staff officers, of a later date than General Hicks' despatch on the 3d October, quoted above.
The first account that appeared to be trustworthy was given by a camel-driver who went as servant to a native officer. He stated that the army on leaving Duem soon met the rebels, and engaged in skirmish with them, the Mahdi's men being beaten. It reached Rahad where there is a lake, and then marched to Alouba, where an encounter with the enemy was favorable to General Hicks. On the 2d of November the army left Alouba, and while marching through a forest, was surprised by a large force of rebels. The Egyptians formed square, and after fighting all day finally defeated them and drove them off. On Saturday, 3d November, the march was resumed, water becoming scarce. The rebels again appeared in force and surrounded the army. A serious engagement ensued with heavy losses on both sides, but the rebels were once more beaten. On their march next day they were heavily fired upon by large numbers of the enemy. The troops were suffering from thirst, but nevertheless fought the whole day. On the 5th, when they were approaching the wells on the road to Razghib, only half an hour distant, the rebels, who had been concealed in the forest, suddenly attacked the column on all sides. The Egyptians returned their fire, and a great battle raged. Towards mid-day, the entire force of the rebels made a general charge with guns, swords, and spears, and General Hicks and his whole army perished, except 200 Egyptian soldiers and a few negro servants, most of whom were wounded.
Besides the European officers believed to have perished, there were two newspaper correspondents, Edmund O'Donovan and Frank Vizetelly, who accompanied the expedition and have not since been heard of.
An extract of a letter from the Mahdi's Emir at Berber to Zubair, the greatest slave-dealer in the Soudan, has this information:
In 1886, the Cairo correspondent of the London Daily News discovered among the Egyptian police a man who says that he fought in the battle in which Hicks Pasha and his army were destroyed, and related a tale which the correspondent believed to be true. This man said that Hicks Pasha was misled, he believes purposely, into some brushwood while in search of water, and that while there he heard firing in the direction of half his army, which he had placed under the command of Ala-ed-Deen Pasha. Scouts reporting that the Arabs were attacking, Hicks Pasha closed up the square in which his troops had been marching, with the cavalry and camels in the centre, and the guns placed at proper intervals around. While the brushwood in front of the square was being cut the enemy appeared.
Closely examined, the speaker explained that Hicks Pasha was at the commencement on a red horse, but when all his men were falling he changed and got on a white horse, because his first horse was tired. Hicks Pasha and his six officers fought for half an hour alone; the battle lasted two hours and a half. The soldier who tells this story says that he escaped death, along with about 150 others, by declaring himself a Mussulman, and he was afterwards told by one of the Arabs: "Hicks Pasha was a terrible man; he killed a great many of us, and so did the other English officers." Other men talked with wonder of how this little English band kept them at bay. Two Englishmen who did not wear uniforms were among the killed. "One sketched, was a stout man, eagle-like nose, elderly, and gray hair. The other was a spare, tall man, with dark-brown hair, and narrow thin face"—evidently Vizetelly and O'Donovan. The correspondent's informant went on to say that, escaping to Khartoum, he became an orderly to General Gordon, that being sent down to meet the relieving force at Metemneh, he accompanied Sir Charles Wilson to near Khartoum, that afterwards he marched to Korti, and was sent thence to Cairo with four or five other soldiers who had come from Khartoum.
The destruction of Hicks Pasha's army gave the Mahdi control of all the country south of the junction of the Blue and White Niles, with the exception of a few unimportant posts whose garrisons held out. In 1884 he extended his power to the Red Sea, waged war with the British in and around Suakim, blockaded General Gordon at Khartoum, rejecting the title of "Sultan of Kordofan" which Gordon offered him, and compelled England to send an army under Lord Wolseley to Khartoum for the relief of Gordon.
- ↑ The Ulema is a body corresponding to the Synods in Christendom. They are appealed to by the Sultan respecting the right application of precepts of the Moslem faith.