Diplomacy and the War/Part 1/Chapter 1

by Julius Andrassy

CHAPTER I.

Our War Motives.

At the moment when the revolver shots rang out in the streets of Serajevo, whose consequences plunged the world deeper into bloodshed and destruction than any other single human act, I was strongly opposed to the Cabinet of Tisza. The Government determined to demand a reckoning for the murder; and, notwithstanding my opposition to the Cabinet, I supported its foreign policy. The mass of the people did the same. The first question to which I must reply is, therefore: What motive caused us to support active opposition to Serbia?

Prior to the Napoleonic Coalition, the history of Europe was based upon the independent policy and mutual competition of single powers. When the Holy Alliance, which was born out of Napoleon's downfall, had failed, Europe reverted to the old system, but since the 'eighties of last century we have lived again in an age of great alliances.

Europe was divided into two camps. International policy was dominated, not by the relations of independent powers, but by the relations of the two great groups of powers. The object of forming the two groups was the safeguarding of peace, and the means to this end was the creation of the balance of power. Notwithstanding, the result of this system has been the outbreak of a war never precedented in history. Although I am of opinion that this system preserved the peace of Europe for a longer period than the conflict of independent nations could have done, I believe that such a conflict of nations could never have resulted in an upheaval so tremendous as the system of great alliances.

Clearly, it was impossible to increase armaments indefinitely at the rate necessitated by the system of big alliances; unless the growth of armaments was healthily limited by the growth of the economic burden, it was obvious that financial ruin, world revolution, or a world war must result sooner or later. Nothing but an international agreement to restrict armaments could prevent a catastrophe, and the fact that no such solution was found is the indictment of European diplomacy.

If we wish to understand the present crisis of the world we must examine how the groups of nations were formed, and how their relationship was poisoned.

The first step towards the system of alliances was taken by the leading statesmen of Germany and Hungary, Bismarck and Andrassy. They concluded an alliance between Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878. Andrassy did not wish to go any farther. The Triple Alliance was not his work, and neither Austrian nor Hungarian statesmen had any share in it. Andrassy's first thought always was to guard against the Russian danger, and he feared that an alliance with Italy would be regarded as hostile to France. He was afraid, moreover, that the inclusion of Italy into the Austro-German combination might lead to a Franco-Russian alliance. From the point of view of the Monarchy, he felt that a tête-à-tête with Germany promised better than a triple alliance which would bring Italy into the German orbit and thus further increase Germany's power. Andrassy would have preferred England to be the third member of the Alliance, and he had succeeded in bringing England and the Monarchy into closer touch before the Dual Alliance was signed. English policy and our own ran on parallel lines in the Balkans, and when the defensive agreement with Germany was presented, Andrassy wired to the Emperor Francis Joseph on August 31, 1879, that England should be informed of this agreement and, if possible, drawn into it. Bismarck favoured the suggestion, but unfortunately his hopes did not materialize.

After Andrassy was dismissed, Italy approached us, her traditional enemy, because she needed Germany's friendship, and the path to Berlin led through Vienna. Italy was anxious to form an alliance with Germany at that time, because France had frustrated her plans in Tunis, and because Italian public opinion had recognized the fact that, so long as she remained independent, she was unable to protect her interests in the Mediterranean for lack of sufficient power.

The result of Italy's entrance into the Triple Alliance was to bring about that which Andrassy wished to avoid, but which Bismarck had desired from the beginning, namely, opposition to France. When Bismarck in 1878 demanded that Austria-Hungary should undertake to support Germany actively in case of French aggression, Andrassy was not willing in any circumstances to pledge his assistance, because he feared that France would regard such action as a threat and might therefore draw nearer to Russian support. In fact, Andrassy, when pressed by Bismarck, declared that he would rather abandon the alliance than promise Austro-Hungarian support against France.

No sooner had the Triple Alliance been created than the danger of a Franco-Russian alliance became imminent, in spite of the natural opposition of the Republic to Czarism. Bismarck recognized this opposition and worked hard to avert the danger by fostering friendly relations with Russia, although they were disadvantageous to us. Nevertheless, he did not succeed in holding them apart. While Bismarck was Chancellor in 1888, the French granted their first loan to Russia, a sign of political intimacy and the first step that paved the way for the Franco-Russian alliance.

Hungary wished to uphold the Triple Alliance, partly because she had been on friendly terms with Italy since 1845, and partly because it was impossible to secure a balance of power without Italy in view of the Franco-Russian Alliance. The Ally whom we had hitherto despised would otherwise have joined the opposing group of nations. At the same time, loyal tenacity to the Alliance, once it was established, does not imply any responsibility for concluding it.

Moreover, the two groups of powers might quite well have lived together in amity and an encounter between them was by no means necessary. France, it is true, never fully accepted the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and clung with the whole force of French patriotism to the hope of revenge; and Gambetta certainly expressed their mentality truly when he said that France must always think of Alsace-Lorraine but never speak of it. An honest and dependable friendship between France and Germany was inconceivable; but in view of Germany's superior strength, it did not appear probable that France, which was visibly growing more peace-loving, would go to war for the sake of Alsace-Lorraine. In the early days of the Triple Alliance the greatest opposition existed between France and Italy. If this opposition had been accentuated in the smallest degree, war would have been inevitable. But as no such occasion arose, the European peace was preserved in spite of the Italian difficulty.

The Balkan problem would not necessarily have led to a catastrophe. I propose to go into this problem more fully because its investigation will reveal both the measure of Hungary's responsibility for, and also the ultimate causes of, the European War.

Since the Turkish race had lost its aggressive power, Hungary's chief danger was from Russian expansion, Pan-Slavism and Orthodoxy. Even Peter the Great had attempted to get into touch with those Serbs who fled from Turkish persecution into Hungary. Ever since then, the Czar had taken the whole of the Orthodox Slav world more and more under his wing. The Crimean War checked Russian ambition, but in the 'seventies the old danger became acute once more when Ignatiew incited the Russian Court to pursue an active Balkan policy. After the victories of the Russian Armies, it seemed as if the Czars would come to realize their ancient dreams by the erection of the double cross on the Hagia Sophia, and that Christendom in the Balkans would be ruled from Moscow.

If the idea of Ignatiew had materialized, then the situation for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would have been impossible. The Monarchy would have been paralysed economically as well as politically if Cettinje, Belgrade, Warsaw and Moscow had been subject to one ruler. She would have been surrounded by an iron ring, and her internal power of resistance would have been sapped. Irredentism would have gathered new force from the predominance of Czarism. Ignatiew himself revealed the danger that lay hidden in the Pan-Slavic idea, for in his memoirs he confesses candidly that his aims were not the formation of independent Slav States, but the union of all the Slavs under the Czars and the destruction of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In order to achieve this end, Russia intended to use the new Bulgaria as its tool. New Bulgaria was to be created against the will of the Turks, the Serbs, the Greeks and the Roumanians, and when it stood there, exposed to the hostility of all its neighbours, with only Russian support to look to, the new Bulgaria was to become a Russian dependency.

In contrast to the above, England and the Monarchy pursued a policy that considered the interests of the rest of the Balkan States and which wished to preserve Turkish power, so that the Straits and Constantinople remained in Turkish possession. The independence of the separate Christian nations was to be preserved in such a way that no individual Balkan State should obtain an artificial predominance. This policy came to be realized on broad lines at the Congress of Berlin.

In the circle of our enemies it became the fashion to trace the subsequent confusion in the Balkans to the Treaty of Berlin. This accusation is, however, totally unfounded. The Treaty of Berlin was not the cause but the result of the Balkan difficulty. The only criticism that can reasonably be levelled against the Treaty is that it failed to solve the Balkan problem finally. I consider, however, that it was an impossibility to find such a solution in 1878. The Bulgarian, the Balkan, and even the Great War—in fact, all the events that have occurred since the Berlin Congress—prove that the old Russian solution of establishing the predominance of Bulgaria was not possible without the stubborn opposition of the neighbouring States. Serbia went so far as to risk her existence rather than tolerate Bulgarian rule in Macedonia. A method of solving the Macedonian question which would have satisfied the desires of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia could be found neither then nor since. The one-sidedness of this criticism is best proved by the fact that precisely those accuse the Treaty of Berlin who are doing at present what the Congress of Berlin did originally: they oppose the supremacy of Bulgaria.

Personally, I do not believe the present solution of the Balkan question to be a permanent one. Bulgaria has shed so much blood for the new Bulgaria as laid down in the Treaty of San Stefano that she will be less ready to sacrifice the hope of realizing her ideals than ever.

The difficulties of the Balkan problem are as follows: the Balkan States do not possess any traditional, historical or natural boundaries. Nationality alone is the motive for creating the State, and the racial mixture is so complete that these national principles are the source of continual strife. The basis of a sound national life is a homogeneous territory knit together by economic ties possessing natural borders and a population united in sentiment. In the Balkans this factor of nationality, which insists on making itself felt, is not in harmony with those other factors which tend towards the formation of a State, and hence the eternal strife. The Balkans will scarcely attain a lasting peace if left to their own devices. Only federation could render such a peace possible, but mutual hatred is too strong, mutual understanding too weak, and the general standard oi civilization too low. The establishment of a world peace might bring about peace in the Balkans, but not vice versa. The Balkans remain the heel of Achilles in the armour of peace. In the circumstances it is crass injustice to attribute the disturbances in the Balkans to the policy which we advocated during the Congress of Berlin.

Let us now consider the Serbian question. I admit that the quarrel between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was the cause of the European catastrophe, brought about by the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I can only repeat what I have said. The conclusion of the Congress of Berlin was the result of the acute crisis of the Serbian question; it was an attempt at a solution but not the source of the crisis.

Those who see the origin of the quarrel in the mandate given to the Monarchy by the Berlin Congress maintain that it cut across the natural path of Serbia's ambition to possess Bosnia and Herzegovina, for whose liberty Serbia had in the past made great sacrifices, and that the occupation of these countries was bound to drive Serbia into enmity.

All these farts are correct, but the deduction is erroneous. The opposition was not created by our mere occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but because our occupation prevented the Serbs from expanding beyond those countries into territories which had always been part of the Monarchy. The Serbs would not have been content if Bosnia and Herzegovina had been ceded to them. Quite on the contrary; it would have spurred them on to strive with redoubled energy towards the sea and to stretch out a covetous hand upon Dalmatia and Croatia. It is true that the revolution of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Turkish regime was supported by Serbia and Montenegro, but it is equally true that the Miletics pursued a Pan-Serbian policy in the 'sixties, and they did so at the expense of the territorial integrity of Hungary. Finally, it is also true that the rising of the Crivosccie in Dalmatia was supported by Montenegro in the hope that this section of the country would turn towards the Black Mountains. The nearer Serbia approached to the sea, the more active would her efforts have become to realize her desire for a port. A Serbia which extended to the borders of Dalmatia could forgo Zara, Ragusa-Cattaro, much less than the Serbia whose boundary was formed by the Drina. To whatever extent the possibility of uniting the southern Slavs grew in probability, so did the desire to realize it increase in Belgrade. A long Croatian and Dalmatian border which could not be defended would only have made Irredentism more powerful and rendered the position of the Monarchy unbearable.

We occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to defend our path to the sea and our ancient possessions against the Pan-Serbian ideal. This ideal was not the result of the occupation, but the occupation was a means of defence against the Pan-Serbian ideal.

Moreover, the entire action was not a challenge to Serbia, nor was it directed against Serbia; nor did it humiliate the Slate of Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina did not belong to Serbia, we took these countries away from Turkey and not Serbia. The troops that opposed us were not Serbian troops, but Mohammedan landlords and the Mohammedan demagogy. Hadzi Loja inflamed the fanaticism of the Mussulman and not Pan-Serbian sentiment. Serbia would have been faced with far greater opposition than we were had she tried to occupy Bosnia, because the whole of the military power lay in Turkish hands. The Monarchy appeared, not as the conqueror of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but as the protector of Christendom with a mission to create order. No interested policy nor a desire for power led the Monarchy to Serajevo and to Mostar, but Europe had expressed its unanimous approval of England's proposal to establish us there, for no one else was considered to be in a position to establish law and order.

The Treaty of San Stefano, as revised in Berlin, was not favourable to Serbia. This treaty left Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish supremacy, although it could not be maintained there. The countries concerned had access to the sea only via Constantinople, and it was certain that these unfortunate provinces would remain the scene of unrest and bloodshed. Russia did remain the scene of unrest and bloodshed. Russia did not treat King Milan at all gently, and favoured Bulgaria. The Congress of Berlin gave territories to Serbia which had been destined by Russia for Bulgaria. This Congress did not create any opposition between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, but on the contrary, by increasing the power of Austria-Hungary in the vicinity of Serbia, it protected Serbian interests simultaneously. Serbia drew the natural deduction from the new situation; her policy assumed a new direction, and instead of the old pro-Russian policy, an Austro-Hungarian policy was pursued. The Treaty of Berlin was by no means the cause of that difference, which came into existence subsequently between us and Serbia, but quite on the contrary, we approached more closely to our neighbours. The Serbs felt that our will was to predominate in the Balkans, and therefore they accommodated themselves accordingly.

Unfortunately, our enemy spread abroad, as well as believed, that we wished to annex not only Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also Albania and Macedonia, and that Salonika was the real aim of our policy. Not a word of this is true. There was no trace of the conqueror's ambition in Andrassy. He wished to secure for us only economic relations and political influence, and it was for this reason that he attached so much weight to his desire to prevent Serbia and Montenegro from dividing between them the Sandshak Novibazar, which would cut us off from the Southern Balkans and surround us by a South-Slavonic Empire. There was no intention of endangering those Balkan States that were striving towards an independent and peaceable existence. The leading principle of Andrassy's policy was that the Monarchy should use its powers for the protection of the liberty of tiie separate nations, and especially against the avarice or paternal attitude of the Czars, as well as the possibility of revenge on the part of the Sultan. Andrassy wished to pursue at the same time such an economic policy as would draw us and the Balkans closer together and foster active economic relations between us. He was not bent on conquest, for the Monarchy already contained too many foreign nationalities, and the regions in question were mountainous and difficult of access. The task of governing them from a distance would not have been easy, and their acquisition would therefore have been of no benefit to Austria.

The powerful position which we had occupied since the Treaty of Berlin began to bear its fruit in the 'eighties. Bulgaria, which had been liberated by Russia but repressed in its free development, came to the Monarchy to seek shelter at the time of the Battenbergers and Stambulows. When Serbia went to war with Bulgaria, it was Prince Khevenhuller, our Ambassador, who saved Serbia. The ruler of Montenegro accepted a fixed annual salary from our Monarch. The sympathy and prestige which we had earned by our success in carrying out our own programme during the Russo-Turkish war, despite Russia's victories, we lost by the introduction of agricultural taxation and our enervated attitude towards the Bulgarian question. In spite of our mistakes, our position remained such that the peace of the Balkans would not have been disturbed had the European situation remained unchanged. The new political constellation, however, added strength to the Pan-Serbian interests, which we had repressed but failed to exterminate.

It was not inevitable that the Balkan policy outlined here should lead to permanent opposition between us and Russia. The spirit of Russian revenge was not conjured up by Andrassy, whose policy was loyal to Russia in every detail. Russia had occupied a humiliating position in Berlin because she did not execute the promises she had made to us. Before Russia had decided on the Balkan War, a treaty was made between her and Austria as follows: Russia was not to decide the consequences of the Russo-Turkish War alone, but to submit the question to the Assembly of Europe. Russia was not to establish a Christian State which would endanger other Balkan States and create an artificial supremacy in the Balkans; finally, if the status quo could not be maintained, Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be annexed by Austria-Hungary. Russia contravened this agreement in the Treaty of San Stefano and this same agreement was sanctioned in Berlin. Andrassy did not in any way wish to exploit the difficulty of Russia's situation for purposes of her humiliation, nor did he desire to secure temporary and dangerous advantages for this country. I well remember those critical times, when European peace trembled in the balance, and when Russia violated the duties she had undertaken, and it was questionable whether Russia would give way sufficiently to make agreement possible. My father counted with certainty on an easy victory. The Russian Army, enervated by two years of war, lying in front of Constantinople, was faced by a Turkish Army, still capable of action, and by England. The armed forces of Austria were in Russia's rear.

Roumania, aggravated by the loss of Bessarabia, was at that time on our side. My father told me often that, if this situation led to war, the captured Russian Army would be seen marching on the Ring in Vienna. He believed steadfastly that his fame would be as great as that of Cavour or Bismarck, but he did not want war. He used to say: Russia cannot be destroyed at one fell swoop like a dangerous individual, she will survive her defeat and arm for a war of revenge. The Monarchy, whose forces of existence will be drained, will have become exhausted before a fresh encounter takes place. For this reason, my father sought a solution which should not create irrevocable opposition of interests between Russia and ourselves.

In the beginning, feeling in Russia was, of course, very bitter, but the blame fell chiefly upon Bismarck, who had been expected to bring pressure to bear upon us in the interests of Russia. The anxiety of Russia, however, was allayed when the Monarchy subsequently concluded a protective alliance with Germany. In view oi the fact that the internal peace of Russia was jeopardized by Nihilism, Russia was neither able nor willing to pursue a policy of revenge, with the result that the old relation between the Czardom and the Monarchy was re-established. As early as the year 1881, the two Cabinets formed an agreement, and the two monarchs met in Skierniewiece in 1884.

This harmony was disturbed again owing to the Bulgarian question in 1888, but this new tension was not caused by any desire for revenge or the wish to repudiate the Treaty of Berlin. Irony of fate decreed that the origin of the difficulty lay in Russia's attempt to prevent the aggrandizement of Bulgaria, which she demanded against our wishes in Berlin. The Czar insisted now on the execution of the Treaty of Berlin, which gives weight to my statement that the policy created by Andrassy, Bismarck and Beaconsfield did not contain the seeds of lasting opposition to the Slavonic world. The crisis was a prolonged one, but when it was over, Russia and the Monarchy once more established a harmonious relationship in Balkan policy (1892–1908).

The mutual relations of these two groups of States only assumed a dangerous aspect when the Anglo-German opposition was added to the controversy. And it was this Anglo-German tension which emphasized all other points at issue.

The policy of Andrassy and Disraeli had brought England and Austria-Hungary into closer touch with each other. Gladstone brought about a breach, but Salisbury re-established the previous harmony. In connection with Salisbury's attitude, it is interesting to note that he describes as good news the intelligence that informed him, in 1879, that the German-Austro-Hungarian Alliance had been established. Later, when he was Prime Minister, he took our part with determination in the Bulgarian question, and assisted us in opposing the excessive demands of Russia.

In 1867 an agreement was reached between England, Italy and Austria-Hungary as to the independence of Bulgaria. When England increased her Navy in the same year, in accordance with her policy that her fleet must be at least as strong as the two next powerful navies put together, she had the French fleet in mind. England was in acute opposition lo France at this time, in connection with certain Colonial interests in Africa and Asia, so that England was much more in sympathy with the Triple Alliance than with the Franco-Russian agreement. In general, therefore, England raised her voice in our favour on the main question of international policy.

When the Emperor William II made his first visit to England, he was greeted by his future rival, the Prince of Wales, with the hope that the German Army and the British Navy would preserve universal peace. The young Emperor spoke in those days (i88g) of the traditions of the battles of Malplaquet and Waterloo. The first Chancellor who was nominated by the Emperor to pursue his personal policy was Caprivi, whose tendency was decidedly Anglophile (1890–1894). An agreement was made in 1890 between Germany and England, by which the important strategic island of Heligoland was given to Germany in exchange for African colonies. Germanv's naval power gained considerable strength by this procedure.

A few years later, Great Britain changed her policy considerably. She abandoned the policy of Pitt and Wellington, for which Palmerston started a war, and for which Beaconsfield was prepared to bring new sacrifices, and which was also approved of by Salisbury. The Empress of India, the protector of the Suez Canal, the greatest Mohammedan power, pursued a course which led her to the treaty by which Constantinople was to be left to the care of the Czar. British blood was spilt in order to destroy that powerful position which had been defended and built up by Englishmen.

How can such a change of policy be explained, especially in view of the general tenacity to tradition consistently displayed by England? The change is explained by the fact that Germany had altered, in the meantime, very considerably; internally she had developed enormous strength, and her aims had changed. Her economic forces, her exports and imports, grew rapidly, and emigration ceased. Germany's mercantile strength also became very much enlarged.

Bismarck had known more modest and more difficult times; he had served the King of Prussia, who did not cherish such far-reaching ambitions. In spite of his extraordinary political successes, his activity as a statesman, even after the foundation of the Empire, was marked by caution. As the leader of the new Empire, he never for a moment overlooked the danger of Germany's political and military position in the centre of Europe. He was continually afraid of foreign alliances. The Iron Chancellor did not dare to pursue an international policy with all his might. His plans and aspirations never exceeded the old limit, even after the attainment of the new position and after his victories. To a certain degree his activity remained within the confines of his previous Prussian policy, even when he saw himself at the head of the German Empire. He became more cautious than ever, because his previous boldness was only the result of the fact that the Prussian position had become untenable.

The Emperor William H, on the other hand, had attained so powerful a position from the very beginning as no monarch had inherited since Louis XIV. The two Napoleons had acquired their enormous power for themselves. Among those rulers who possessed as great a power as Germany by virtue of their birth, the Czar of Russia was limited by corruption and the condition of his people, and the King of England was handicapped by the British Constitution.

William II grew up in the consciousness of his enormous power. The knowledge of the developed state of German civilization, her economic resources, her capacity for organization, her numerical strength, together with the consciousness of German fame and the recognition of his own personal qualities, made him feel that he was chosen by God to express in every word and every action the enormous power which he had inherited, and to develop it still further to the advantage of his people and the glorification of his own name. He personified magnificently the whole of the German race at the time of its splendid development. His appearance alone was proof of his consciousness of power. His handshake was powerful and his eye was keen and commanding. He allowed one to perceive in each word and action the power that he wielded. If ever there has been a ruler who has lived and toiled in and for his nation, and who felt the whole grandeur of his people in his own person, it was William II.

The weak spot in the armour of Germany was her Navy. On land Germany was undoubtedly the strongest State; at sea she was negligible and occupied the sixth place in order of strength. The necessity of a stronger Navy became more and more apparent. Germany's foreign trade grew from day to day, and she possessed countless interests and wealth which could only be safeguarded by a fleet. The Navy is not only called upon to defend concluded business, but to prepare the way for further activity in the same direction. Prestige on the sea is by no means barren of material fruit.

Moreover, English blood flows in the veins of the Emperor, and his English preference for the sea urged him on to devote the whole of his energy and authority to the development of a fighting Navy (1897–1900–1905). In this way he infringed upon a domain that England dominated and will dominate, and where she has never allowed anyone to challenge her position.

Germany's attitude towards the Colonial problem also underwent a fundamental change. Bismarck said once that the Premiership of Salisbury was worth more to him than an African colony, and that he, Bismarck, had never had Colonial ambitions. He disbelieved in the Colonial theory to such an extent that he positively assisted France, his opponent, in their acquisition. His successor, Caprivi, once said that it was a piece of good fortune that Africa was occupied by other powers, because, if it should fall into German hands, the result would be British opposition. For him the question was "how small, and not how large, can I afford to make the Navy?"

During the reign of William H the Colonial problem became very acute in the minds of all Germans, although Germany actually acquired fewer possessions in that period than under Bismarck's régime. Nevertheless it is obvious, from all the Kaiser's actions and speeches, that he meant to seize every opportunity to increase and protect his Colonies, even at the risk of going to war. It was then that England realized that she had a powerful and determined rival in the partition of the world.

Although the Kaiser's policy was not solely directed to the acquisition of prestige, he departed from Bismarck's point of view, which would only have allowed him to enter into such a question if Germany's interests were directly concerned. It is characteristic of the Kaiser's attitude that he said, amongst other things, in a speech in 1900: "Without Germany and without the German Emperor no great decision must ever be taken. If this should happen, the position of Germany in the world would vanish for ever, and I do not purpose that this should come to pass. To employ suitable, and, if necessary, violent means ruthlessly is my duty, my fair privilege."

While Bismarck was delighted that France was longing to gain a footing in Tunis, and that England intended to subjugate Egypt, the Kaiser only saw, in such overseas expansion of the other great powers, a factor which forced Germany to expand on distant shores. This point of view involved a serious change of policy, and was a dangerous attitude for a country whose position is as continental as Germany's.

This change was one of the main causes of the war. Germany's policy met more and more with British opposition, and in an increasing number of places. In Eastern Asia the opposition became well-nigh permanent. The Kaiser began his policy in the Far East by forcing upon Japan a peace with China which was disadvantageous to victorious Japan and favourable to vanquished China. He did this without consulting the Empress of India, and in direct disagreement with France and Russia. Consequently, England and Japan, the two naval powers, felt injured, and were naturally driven into each other's arms. Another consequence was that China opened her harbours in gratitude to Russia and Germany, which again excited the jealousy of England and Japan. Japan answered the Kaiser's Eastern policy by arming to such a degree that her supremacy in the East became established. The Boxer Rising began, and was the reaction against the European invasion. William II began to execute his Colonial plans where they were most dangerous, because the interests of all the great powers were involved, and there was least justification, from the point of view of civilization, for such a policy, as he was faced here by the most cultured nations of the East.

At a later stage of this competition, England and Germany came closer together, when the Boxer Rising had been successfully put down by the mixed standing army, led by Germans, and when Russia, in taking China under her protection, had acquired an excessively good business. In 1900 England and Germany made an agreement which was directed against Russia for the maintenance of the status quo in China. But even this rapprochement only led to further opposition between England and Germany, because England interpreted this agreement to mean that Germany must prevent Russian expansion in Manchuria, and Germany refused to recognize this interpretation (1902) and approached Russia once more. At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Germany was therefore the friend of Russia, without being able to split the Franco-Russian Alliance, while England had become the ally of Japan.

Their opposition became so acute during the war that England declared to the German Ambassador that she would be forced to support Japan, even if the latter declared war against Germany, on account of the arms which had been supplied by Germany to Russia. In other words, England supported the yellow race against her German brother.

At the time of the Spanish-American War (1898) the trend of public opinion in England was strongly opposed to that of Germany. England sympathized with America, and Germany with Spain. Just as in the Balkan and the Russo-Japanese wars, England had placed her hopes upon the conqueror, Germany had placed hers upon the conquered.

It is a matter of public knowledge what a rift the Boer War created between the English and the German people. These two nations have been divided according to their respective sympathies and interests ever since the famous wire of the Kaiser (1896), the seizure of the German ships (1900) and Chamberlain's speech which insulted the German Army. The opposition between England and Germany was so strong that public opinion in England objected when the Governments of the two countries intended to take common action against the Republic of Venezuela.

When Canada and England had decided to enter into closer economic relations with each other, the opposition between Germany and England was increased still further. All the other nations accepted this policy of Chamberlain's, but Germany, on the other hand, used this occasion as a pretext to impose certain Customs duties which contravened the fundamental principles of British imperialism.

The Balkan question, which some time ago had brought Germany and England into closer contact, began to increase the breach of these two countries more than ever in the 'nineties. Bismarck did not pursue any special policy in the Balkans, except possibly that he supported Austria-Hungary, which worked hand in glove with England. But the Kaiser played a leading part in the Balkans, and his paths diverged widely from those of England. The Kaiser's Balkan policy was not even identical with that which Austria and Hungary had pursued since the days of Andrassy. His main object was no longer the protection of the Christian peoples of the Balkans, the pacification of the various nations by means of reforms and autonomies, but his aims were rather, firstly, to secure a military alliance with Turkey, and secondly, to exploit the whole of the Balkans as well as Asiatic Turkey. The Turkish military power, which had been called into existence under the supervision of German instructors, was to be given the task, in case of need, of threatening Egypt and the Suez Canal.

Such a policy would not even have been compatible with England's previous policy, that is to say, the policy of Beaconsfield.

The ideas of Andrassy and Beaconsfield were mutually complementary; the principles of establishing a balance of power in the Balkans and the predominance of England in Asiatic Turkey worked together admirably. But the Near Eastern and Balkan policy of the Kaiser precluded Beaconfield's policy completely, because they both attempted to acquire the protection of the Mussulman world.

This new tendency of German policy would have made England nervous at all times, but this was especially so in the existing circumstances, because the economic competition between England and Germany had become so keen as to render a war between them possible. The opposition between Germany's Turco-phile policy and the outlook of England was all the more apparent because England began to turn her political forces against Turkey. Owing to the agitation of Gladstone in connection with the Armenian massacres, English democracy was animated by considerable antagonism towards the Turks. The whole of the prevalent Turkish system was disliked by England, and Abdul Hamid was hated intensely. This antipathy had been counteracted in earlier days by Britain's anxiety lest, in the event of Turkish rule passing away, Russia would control Constantinople. But for the time being that possibility seemed to have lost its terror. Since Cyprus (1878), Egypt (1892) and the Sudan (1898–99) had been brought under English influence by Beaconsfield, Gladstone and Salisbury respectively, the result on India of the fate of Constantinople was not considered to be of the same importance as heretofore. It was regarded as much more dangerous that Turkey should be supported by Germany than that Russia should become the protector of Constantinople.

In this way it came about that in all those questions relating to the Balkans and the Near East which had acquired an international character, England and Germany were in opposite camps. Salisbury took the part of the Armenians and the Greeks, and the German Chancellor, von Bülow, took sides with the Turks (1897). Public opinion in England took a very serious view of a speech which the Kaiser delivered in Asia, declaring that 300,000,000 Mohammedans would always find in him their truest friend. How could England, with her many millions of Mohammedan subjects, be expected to receive such a statement by the Kaiser himself with equanimity? The German ideal of an economic imperialism embodied in the projected Baghdad railway, was not regarded in England as an economic move, but as a sign of a political desire for expansion, which again was looked upon with great anxiety.

England made every effort to frustrate these plans. As a matter of fact, all these differences were adjusted in one way or another, but they nevertheless contributed largely to the growing distrust between the two nations, and feeling between them ran so high that a final breach seemed imminent.

All the minor points of opposition and the whole tendency of the Kaiser's policy created the conviction in England that Germany was a danger to the British Empire. Many people feared a sudden invasion, and everybody felt that Germany's power was such as to render her a serious menace to England, to which some counteraction must be found. The Navy, according to English ideas, is a necessity for her but a luxury for Germany, and therefore it was almost regarded as a challenge that Germany, without taking any notice of English anxiety in this matter, continued to increase her navy.

The real purpose of Germany's naval activity was, as a matter of fact, the emancipation of Germany from England and the realization of the desire to reduce British predominance on the sea; but there was never any real question of attacking England. Germany proceeded to devote herself to this task with her usual thoroughness and power, so that she would have endangered England's security, which would have altered the position she had occupied in the world automatically.

Under William II Germany gradually acquired a position such as England had never permitted any State to acquire hitherto. And why should England make an exception in the case of Germany? Germany was not as dangerous for England as, for instance, the Catholic Philip II, King of Spain, or Louis XIV, Protector of the Stuarts, or Napoleon, all of whom had ruled the coastline opposite to England, or, if they did not control it, they had intended to subjugate it. At the same time, Germany's power and position was such that it is easily intelligible that England made every effort to defend herself against Germany. Great Britain did not succeed in coming to an agreement with Germany, and, I believe, chiefly on account of Germany's policy, which did not trust the possibility or the honesty of an English alliance, and which preferred to approach Russia. In view of this, it was only natural that England made every effort to be on friendly terms with her other rivals, in order to be unfettered in case England and Germany should meet in combat. England was spurred on to pursue a new policy on account of the fact that Germany's position grew in power from day to day, and this policy is associated with the name of King Edward VII. This policy had the effect of a challenge upon the German mind. Germany saw, in the efficiency of King Edward, a belligerent spirit, and she therefore determined all the more to secure her prestige and her political position in the world and to pursue her imperialistic policy. Germany's consciousness of power had been established by incomparable military victories and increased by her enormous economic development, and the English attitude was nothing but food for the German desire for aggrandizement.

The French Navy was fairly powerful, and England suffered it to be so. Italy, and especially France, had acquired far greater Colonial possessions in the last decade than Germany. England's nervousness, created by the German development, was consequently regarded by the German Empire as pure jealousy and envy.

The Entente Cordiale was established in 1904. An agreement was concluded between England and France which divided the European powers apparently into three groups, inasmuch as (he Entente was added to the Triple and the Dual Alliance. In point of fact, however, as France was a member of the Entente as well as the Dual Alliance, Russia became an ally of England, and in this way the European powers were divided into two ramps: the Entente, led by England, on the one hand, and the Triple Alliance, led by Germany, on the other. There were two bones of contention between these two groups: one was the Morocco question, and the other the everlasting problem of the Balkans.

In regard to Morocco, England and France had agreed that they would control the possessions of the Sultan of Turkey and the Sultan of Morocco. That is to say, they would control Egypt and Morocco without attempting to satisfy, or even to question, those nations amongst whom Germany was prominent, and who were interested economically (1904).

England and France guaranteed each other what Caillaux called "la liberté de conqûete." The problems described above brought us twice to the verge of a European war (1905 and 1911). On both occasions, however, an agreement was reached. None of the parties were quite satisfied with the solution; in France it rankled that she had to reckon with Germany, and that she had to sacrifice a Minister for Foreign Affairs on account of Germany and because she had to cede a portion of her African possessions. Germany, on the other hand, was disgusted because France had realized her aims completely in Morocco, because she had contravened previous arrangements, and because Germany was forced, in spite of all her efforts and her bellicose desires, to give way. Many sections in Germany regarded the compromise as humiliating, and public opinion expressed the belief that France had become predominant. At the Conference of Algeciras, most of the powers sympathized with France, which really gained more in position than Germany. The German terror, which had been a powerful factor during the lifetime of Bismarck, ceased in France.

The Entente began at this period to gain internal strength. In the beginning it was very difficult for the French to accept English friendship, for the agreement with England was preceded by severe humiliation on the part of France in Fashoda, and it was a condition of the Entente that France should give up for ever her policy of Colonial competition against England which she had pursued for several hundred years. The French are more passionate and more vain than the English, and therefore they are unable to forget as easily as their island neighbours. For this reason it was specially important that the Entente should support France on the Morocco question, because by this means French approbation was gained for the new system. England and France signed a military convention which was only to be put into execution if both Governments approved of the casus belli (1905–1906). This agreement was not formally binding, but on the one hand it made their relation more intimate, and on the other hand it implied the co-operation of both powers even in limes of peace. Another consequence of this agreement was also the creation of mutual dependence, and it rendered separation and independent action considerably more difficult.

Italy appears to have declared that she would not fight against France, although she was bound to do so in case of French aggression. France, on the other hand, agreed to allow Italy a free hand in Tripolis. This secret change found public support during the Moroccan crisis, and came to light lo the extent that Italy assumed a similar point of view to the French in the whole of the Moroccan question. Nothing but English support of the Triple Alliance could have altered Italy's attitude, because, in view of the long coastline and the oversea demands of Italy, she was not in a position to oppose the group of States which had the unchallenged supremacy on the sea. Once England associated herself with the Dual Alliance, Italy turned more decidedly towards the Entente.

The total result of the Moroccan crisis was a new spirit of hatred and resentment; in fact, the fire had been prepared which needed but a match to set it alight.

The Balkan question became more dangerous than ever at this time, because Serbia began to pursue a Pan-Serbian policy under Russian influence.

How did this happen?

The Russian Government knew that, so long as Serbia was under her influence, the Monarchy would stand as it were between two fires, and that those orthodox Serbs who lived within our borders would be subject to Czarist influence. Every Russian politician must have known that the pursuance of a Pan-Serbian policy under the direction of the Czar was a challenge to the very existence of Austria-Hungary. The integrity of the Monarchy was attacked by this policy in the very spot in which this integrity was of special value, because it endangered our one and only path to the sea.

If Russia did not wish to attack Austria-Hungary, Serbia, which was so far distant from her, was of no importance, either economically or politically. The only portions of the Balkans which were of any importance from the economic, military and political standpoints were those which lay in the neighbourhood of the Black Sea and the Straits. The protection of Serbia was only a tool in Russia's policy, which was directed against Austria-Hungary and Germany. As soon as Petrograd had taken the Pan-Serbian ideal under its wing, it was certain that, sooner or later, Russia would raise the Austro-Hungarian question.

All the proposals that were made by the Petrograd to the Viennese Court ever since the days of Catherine the Great up to Gortschakoff, assumed that it was a preliminary condition of coming to an agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy that Serbia should remain in the sphere of Russian influence. Kaunitz, Metternich, Buol, Andrassy, all of those Ministers for Foreign Affairs who occupied themselves with the Balkan question, have declared more than once that any attempt on the part of Russia to dominate Serbia meant war. Napoleon, who had the greatest knowledge of all strategic questions, said on several occasions that Belgrade was of vital importance to Austria-Hungary.

During the Bulgarian crisis in the eighties, Bismarck, in accordance with the above, interpreted the Treaty of Berlin to the effect that the Eastern Balkans, namely Bulgaria, were tinder Russian influence, whereas the Western Balkans, that is, chiefly Serbia, remained under Austro-Hungarian influence. He said that he pursued an Austrian policy in Serbia and a Russian policy in Bulgaria. Andrassy, as a matter of fact, did not accept this interpretation, because he did not only allow no Russian influence in Serbia, but he was of the opinion that the Treaty of Berlin excluded Russian influence in the whole of the Balkans.

There was no real difference of opinion with regard to Serbia, because everybody knew that the Treaty of Berlin did not sanction any Russian interference there.

Moreover, it cannot be assumed that Russia had traditional ties with Serbia of such a nature as would substitute the ties of mutual interest.

During the days of Napoleon, Russia sacrificed Serbia completely, which was fighting for its liberty, in order to secure Russian interests.

During the Treaty of San Stefano, Russia's attitude towards Serbia can hardly be described as friendly.

At the time when the armies of the Battenbergers threatened Belgrade, Austria, and not Russia, saved King Milan. Russia, moreover, had frequently sanctioned our annexation of Bosnia. She did so for the first time in Reichstag during the interview between Gortschakoff and Andrassy, and for the last time in Buchlau during the discussion between Iswolski and Berchtold.

When the Czar wanted to be on friendly terms with us, he admitted that Serbia came within our sphere. Even during the present crisis, Sasanow said to our Ambassador: "He has no feeling for the Slavs in the Balkans. They are a heavy burden."

For a long time Serbia endorsed the European attitude and worked hand in glove with the Austrian Monarchy. It was only after the withdrawal of King Milan that Serbia began to alter her course, and it was the dynasty of the Karagyorgyevics which placed Serbia permanently under the protection of Petrograd.

The cause of this change of policy is explained by the fact that the Monarchy had lost some of her prestige in the East which Russia had gained. Milan had approached us because our influence was decisive during the Congress of Berlin, but as soon as this influence weakened the Serbian relation to us changed accordingly.

There was an occasion on which Austria-Hungarv might have regained her influence in Belgrade and made it predominant. When the last Obrenovis had been murdered in a shameful manner, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposed to our Ambassador, Prince Lichtenstein, that we should occupy Belgrade, establish law and order, and take over the Government for a while. This action proves that the Russian interest in Serbia was not as constant and as profound as it was recently stated to be. The request to occupy Belgrade was not accepted, and the Dynasty of the Karagyorgyevics gained in strength, and this very dynasty, which owed her existence to us, took sides with Russia.

The first sign of our antagonism towards Serbia was an economic one Andrassy had intended to exploit the political situation created by the Treaty of Berlin, not by means of conquest, but by the creation of powerful economic relations which are tantamount to moral conquest. Instead of this, we wanted to close our borders towards the East by preventing the import of Serbian cattle in every way, as our activities had suffered considerably in the West owing to the im- position of German agricultural duties (1905). The unhappy demand that Serbia should order her guns in Skoda caused considerable dissatisfaction and estrangement. The extraordinary difficulties placed in the way of the cattle trade created bad feeling against us, just at the time that Serbia began to fear us less, because the Monarchy had been weakened owing to internal difficulties.

Embitterment and the belief that we were gradually becoming weaker led Serbia towards a Russian policy.

Serbia gained courage especially on the strength of the Anglo-Russian Alliance (1907–1908). The policy of Russia underwent a change at this time, in consequence of which Russia was inclined to accept the pro-Serbian policy of Serbia, in spite of the obvious dangers and the provocative character of such a procedure. The chief attention of the Czar Nicholas ever since his ascension to the throne was given to the Far East. The example of Bulgaria had proved that, notwithstanding the sacrifices that Russia had made, it was impossible to look to this state for satisfactory support. In spite of all her sacrifices, Russia was very nearly forced to surrender the whole of her influence in the Balkans, and she had to content herself finally with very small results. Russia was obliged to accept the Coburgs in spite of the fact that she had despised them in the beginning. Finally it became evident that the advantages which Russia had anticipated in the Balkans were relatively small compared with the advantages which Russia was able to secure for herself, economically and territorially, in Asia. In view of these considerations, Russia made every effort to subjugate the Far East.

Russia's efforts in this direction were frustrated, however, by the Japanese and by the influence of Great Britain. The reaction set in. Just as the failure of the Balkan policy had prepared the activity in Asia, so did the absence of success in Asia and the victories of Ojama and Toto facilitate the policy of Hartwig with its Serbophile tendency. The Czarist régime could, nevertheless, not endure inaction. Russia felt that continual interruption of her aggrandizement, which had not been impeded for hundreds of years, was dangerous to the Czarist prestige and might cause their downfall. Therefore the failure of one policy only bred the thought of further aggression; and for this reason an active policy in the Balkans was substituted for Asiatic activity. This Russian tendency was strengthened, moreover, by the anti-German policy of England. Consequently, Russia succeeded, in 1907 and 1908, in gaining a certain freedom of action in Europe soon after she had been met by an impenetrable obstacle in Asia.

The tension between Russia and ourselves was thrown into bolder relief because, just as Russia was anxious to make use of her position in order to pursue her old Balkan policy, we made arrangements to increase our activities there. While Russia was preoccupied in the Far East, our Minister for Foreign Affairs pursued a passive policy. Just at the time that Russia turned her attention once more to the Balkans, we had a Minister for Foreign Affairs who pursued the most self-conscious policy of aggression and who was determined to increase our prestige in the East and to multiply our economic activities. I refer to Freiherr von Aehrenthal. The first step of this energetic and ambitious statesman was to secure the railway communication with Salonika. This action alone caused considerable jealousy in Petrograd, although it was entirely justified and not aggressive in any way.

The tension became relaxed, because the policy of Iswolski had not yet taken an antagonistic direction. His policy required certain results in the East, but if they could be achieved in harmony with Russia, so much the better. Aehrenthal and Iswolski met in 1908 in Buchlau, and it seemed as if there was a possibility of reaching an agreement. In exchange for a suitable solution of the question of the Straits, Russia was inclined to support the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The discussion, however, did not define the manner of the solution nor its date. Aehrenthal, of course, proceeded to publish the annexation, and Iswolski felt that he had been betrayed because the question of the Straits had not been settled. The result was an acute diplomatic battle, in the course of which Serbia incited to war and a European war became imminent.

Aehrenthal, however, proved himself to be a calm and excellent fencer. He brought the diplomatic duel to a victorious conclusion. Europe recognized the annexation. The Triple Alliance proved itself powerful, although Italy did not turn out to be independent. The faithful and energetic attitude of Germany combined with the personal qualities of Aehrenthal to achieve the victory. Bülow believed that this diplomatic victory would break up the unity of the Entente, although this victory was disadvantageous.

The fundamental thought of this campaign, which was executed so admirably in its details, was wrong, and in the end became one of the causes of the European War. We had committed a definitely illegal action, and we had given an example to Italy which she hastened to imitate, partially because she felt that after our successes it was essential for her to give evidence of her prowess. This diplomatic feat did not gain for us a single man or a single halfpennv; nor did we gain in power in any way, but quite on the contrary, we had to give up the Sandschak Novibazar, we had to surrender our rights on the coastline of Montenegro, and we had to buy with money from Turkey what belonged to us already. We succeeded in turning Russia against us, but not in weakening her. The agitation in Serbia became more and more acute and hatred increased. Russia and Serbia armed themselves, and plans of revenge were hatched in Petrograd. Russia made an agreement with Japan (1909), approached Italy (1908–1909), and prepared in advance a solution of the question of the Straits. This solution was not found in conjunction with us, and Petrograd, therefore, strove to achieve the same purpose behind our backs. The Czar and the King of Italy met in Raccionigi, where they agreed to support each other in the question of the Straits and the question of Tripolis respectively (1909). Serbia and Montenegro had been estranged by the assassination of King Nikita, but now a reunion took place once more.

I was Minister of the Interior about this time. For the reasons given above, I opposed the annexation. I wanted to call Serbia to account and force her to sign an agreement by which her army would be disarmed, and by which the constant menace of Serbia would be removed.

Russia was not as yet ready to act, as it still suffered from the Japanese defeat, and her relation to this state had not yet been defined. I was of the opinion that Serbia would give way and that it would be possible to effect the disarmament. If Serbia should resist, she would be isolated. The recent publication of the diplomatic correspondence of Serbia showed that I was justified in taking this view. Iswolski said to the Serbian Ambassador quite definitely that Russia was not yet ready, and would not stir even if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia. I have placed this point of view of mine on record in writing in my ministerial programme.

Russia tried to approach us again under the inlluence of the Kaiser (1910–1911). This policy, however, was so Hitle in accordance with the tendency of public opinion in Russia that it could not be pursued. The hope of revenge had become rooted in the popular mind, and it was fanned into flame by the German policy in the Near East; that is to say, the Hamburg-Bagdad scheme. Russia felt that she was paralysed in the East, and she was now being reduced to inaction in the West.

The first triumph of Russian policy was her success in creating the union of the Balkans under Russian protection for the purpose of becoming a menace, firstly to Turkey, but secondly also to Austria and Hungary (1912). This union of the Balkans was a complete defeat of our policy, and it drove us in fact out of the Balkans. If this union had been consolidated under Russian influence, Russian revenge would have been complete, and the balance of power would have changed very much to our disadvantage.

I believed that, as soon as the Balkan States became federated, Turkish supremacy in Macedonia could not be upheld any longer, and that the Macedonian and Albanian possessions were nothing but a burden to the Sultan. In those davs I considered that the suitable counter-measure would have been for us to support the autonomy of Macedonia in accordance with the demand of the Balkan vStates, and that we should warn Turkey that, if she refused to give way, she was likely to lose her European possessions, and further, we should have undertaken to preserve the status quo ante, provided the federation of the Balkans respected our interests. I outUned this idea in the early days of the war (October, 1912), and described the proposal in greater detail before the delegation (November and December, 1913).

My proposal, however, was not carried out. Together with Russia, we made the impossible demand that the Christian States should be content, even in case of victory, with their previous boundaries. In consequence of this policy we made an agreement with Serbia, and were forced to protect our interests against our victorious neighbour, which led to continued antagonism and to the increasing probability of war. The final result was that Serbia continued her policy of territorial aggrandizement in spite of our well-known opposition, and finally became a more bitter enemy of ours than ever before.

The probability of a European war became so imminent during the Balkan War that Russia made every effort in all directions to improve her chances to safeguard herself against the ever-threatening dangers of the situation. Russia agreed in 1912 with Japan that, in case of a European crisis, Japan would protect Russian interests in the Far East, without occupying Russian territory, so that Kiautschou might be snatched from Germany. Russia also concluded a naval agreement with France, and massed troops on her western frontier under the pretext of a trial mobilization.

The fact that neither the Moroccan crisis nor the Balkan War led to a European conflagration showed that, at any rate at that time, no group of states desired a war and that the wish of preserving peace predominated in every cabinet.

Nevertheless, both these crises materially assisted in bringing about the European War. The Entente only remembered the German attitude in the Moroccan crisis, and thought that they saw in it the impossibility of tolerating German Imperialism. After the Balkan War, they only spoke of the ultimatum that we had delivered to Montenegro and Serbia. They forgot that Germany gave way completely in the Moroccan question, in spite of her advantageous military position which she occupied while Russia was still weak. They forgot that the Monarchy permitted the South Slavonic States to gain in strength and to realize in some degree their aggressive aims which they did not even attempt to hide. No one seemed to be aware that we had suffered territorial losses by our own creation of Albania, and that Novibazar, which had hitherto linked us to Albania, passed from our friends the Turks into the hands of our South Slavonic enemy; they forgot, further, that we proved up to the hill the fact that there was not a vestige of truth in the popular Salonika theory, because we allowed ourselves to be cut off from the Balkans by a South Slavonic ring.

We, on the other hand, only remembered that the Entente had wished for nothing except teaching Germany a severe lesson in Morocco and dictating international policv without Germany, so much so that Caillaux, the most peace-loving President of the French Republic, was able to crystallize his policy in the following words: "Le Maroc pour la France ou le conflit." The Entente took the aggressive policy of Serbia under her wing, although she did not possess any important local interests. The Entente forgot, however, that it was really obvious that they were anxious, in both questions, to take a prominent part in determining international policy in order to show that their chief consideration was, after all, the safeguarding of peace.

The consequences of the Balkan crises were even more harmful than those of the African problem, because it had been found possible to eliminate the mutual opposition in Morocco completely (1911), whereas this was not the case in the Balkans. The opposition of the Balkans, on the other hand, was such as might lead, even without the wish of the Great Powers, to war, as in the case of the Pan-Serbian ideal.

The victories gained by Belgrade had increased her courage, and she now strove after the realization of her national programme. Having succeeded in achieving her object in Macedonia, and having conquered Bulgaria as well as weakened Turkey, Belgrade prepared the Irridenta in Austria and in Hungary. An attempt was made to undermine our security within our own territory, with the object of creating a state of revolution so as to throw the Austro-Hungarian question into relief, and thereby prepare for war. Russia observed these proceedings with satisfaction and carefully ensured the tenacity to the Pan-Serbian idea in the political circles of the Serbian world.

Our leaders had to consider more and more what steps could be taken io put an end to this danger. I was convinced that Serbia must either be isolated and then broken by means of a war, or forced to adopt a course which would lead them to abandon the Pan-Serbian idea and to approach us in a genuine spirit. It was quite clear in my mind that this object could only be achieved without a European war if our foreign policv was given a certain change of direction.

In order to solve this problem, it was necessary to ensure inaction in connection with the Serbian question on the part of the two opposed groups of states. I considered this scheme practicable. There was no direct opposition between Austria-Hungary and France and England. It was obvious that an agreement was possible with Grey, and that Kngland regarded our position in the Balkans as harmless. We had to make use of this situation by becoming, as it were, the go-between between England and Germany; for it was the conflict of these two states which had created the difificultv of our political situation. There were means of finding an agreement; the only problem was to find the means. Distrust and hatred between both countries were powerful. At the same time, in none ot the main concrete questions was there any opposition of a nature which could only be settled by resort to arms. Neither of the two states in question controlled territory which was absolutely necessarv to the other one. If the territory of the one developed in strength, no danger accrued to the other party. Any antagonism, such as between France and England in India and South America, or between Prussia and Austria, or between Savoy and Austria, in reference to the German and Italian questions respectively, did not exist between English and German interests. Nor could any opposition which existed at the time be compared with the antagonism between Serbia and Bulgaria, or between Serbia and ourselves.

Bismarck once told a journalist that England would only be satisfied when Germany's economic development had been brought to a standstill. I never believed this statement for a moment, and I do not accept it even to-day. I was convinced that the means to an agreement was an undertaking with regard to naval expansion which assured British supremacy. I have always considered it the chief fault of our policy that we never made a serious attempt in this direction, and that we lost the initiative and came under the leadership of Berlin without succeeding in negotiating between Germany and England. I always held the opinion that an agreement would be far wiser in the interests of both than unlimited competition or even war.

If we had allayed Russian fears with regard to the Straits by throwing them open to her men-of-war, subject to the condition that only one battleship was to be allowed in Turkish waters at a time, I sincerely believe that the basis would have been found for a peaceable settlement of the Serbian question. It was my intention to prepare the way for this policy by getting into touch with French statesmen. Through the good offices of a Hungarian who was living in France (called Mannheim) I was to meet the one-time Minister Steg. The war, however, frustrated our meting.

With regard to Serbia, we would have had to bring about a complete change of policy at any price. We would then have supported such change of policy by concluding a good economic alliance and assuring her by this means an easy access to the sea, but of course without any corridor, and only by means of economic facilities.

The Entente would not have had to surrender Serbia, but only the Pan-Serbian idea, which was of value to them only as long as they intended to make war upon us, or as long as they believed that we wished to attack them. The whole idea would have lost all value to the Entente if my plan of arbitration had succeeded.

The realization of this plan would have made a solution of the Serbian question possible without the European War, and even without anv war at all; but in default of this plan, there was little hope of success. The mutual distrust and hatred of the two big alliances did not give rise to the hope that the Entente would stand by to watch us take the sword from Serbia's hand in case they might themselves have need of it soon.

Our Government also fell the necessity for removing the Serbian danger, but their chief fault lay in the fact that they had ceased to have an individual will in European affairs.

The Government pursued a Balkan policy, whereas the Serbian question could only be settled amicably provided an approach to European policy was made. The Serbian danger was a result of the European tension, and it could only be allayed without bloodshed by solving the main problem simultaneously.

Berchtold counted on having to settle with Serbia by force of arms as early as 1913. He was prevented from putting his conviction into practice by Italy's declaration that she would not support us in such an event. Just at the time that the unfortunate assassination occurred in Serajevo, Berchtold tried to paralyse the Serbian danger by altering the balance of power in the Balkans. A memorandum which was published recently, and written before the murder at Serajevo, shows that it had been intended to gain Bulgarian sympathy for this purpose, and to define Roumania's position, which was admirable in intention but not quite sufficient. The essence of the question lay in the improvement of our relation to the Entente.

Attempts were made in this direction, but not with sufficient determination. England and Germany succeeded in reaching agreements with regard to single questions. The question of the Portuguese Colonies was solved in 1913–1914; the problem of the Bagdad Railway was the subject of an agreement in 1914; but these agreements did not by any means solve those questions which were the main causes of the mutual distrust; though these agreements coincide with the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian agreements, they did not imply, as in the two last mentioned cases, a new change of policy.

The naval question could not be solved. After the Morocco crisis, and after the last war in the Balkans, an attempt was made, in the year 1912, to arrive at a solution of this question, but without success. The rivalry on the high seas continued between the two world powers. As far as the question of the Straits was concerned, nothing whatever happened, and feeling in Russia towards us became worse from day to day.

The part played by General Liman von Sanders caused further anxiety. His activity was regarded as an attempt to improve the Turkish Army while placing it under German command. The danger of German predominance in Constantinople became very imminent. The German Government gave way, and thereby solved this question in the way in which she had solved manv other questions in a friendly spirit, but the result was onlv an increase of the distrust which had arisen in settling several other points at issue previously.

The Russian press was up in arms, especially the Nowoje Wremja, which, under pretext of the Russo-German trade agreement, started a campaign against Germany. The Russian military command invented one occasion for war after another. The Minister of War boasted that he was ready for battle, and called upon France openly to arm. The mobilization was prepared, and not only by means of internal arrangements, which always assist mobilization, but also by means which only facilitated the mobilization then, and which would have represented a heavy financial loss if this mobilization were not carried out. Russia, for instance, kept under arms certain categories which were due to be discharged from their military service, by calling up other similar categories. By means of the transportation of troops and by massing them, the mobilization was really in progress. The Czar paid a visit to King Charles of Roumania and practically begged for his friendship.

The question of the Straits began to assume a more and more important part in Russian policy, because the state of Russian economy had suffered severely during the last Balkan war as the Dardanelles were not in Russian possession. Instead of trying to find an international solution, which would have been a feasible one, Russia's thoughts turned towards acquisition, which was a bellicose solution. Sasanow said in a public speech in February, 1914, that it was the historic mission of Russia to take possession of the Straits. He did not see the possibility of realizing this mission in the near future, but the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs could not take any responsibility for preserving the status quo in the Balkans, and therefore he thought it necessary, even then, to announce the military project of an occupation of the Straits. The whole of the Russian Government was in full agreement with the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the urgency and importance of this problem.

By this means Russian policy set itself an aim which could not be realized without a universal war.

The attempt at arbitration with England also strengthened the military party in Russia. The more the chance increased of finding a wav out of the Anglo-German opposition, the more did Russia attempt to render the relation within the Entente more intimate and to destroy the possibility of bridging relations between London and Berlin. Iswolski attempted to conclude a proper alliance with England in April, 1914. Negotiations were also begun in connection with a naval convention. Even the statesmen of France were surprised how much Grey was inclined to enter into a relation with Russia similar to the one with France. The competition in armaments increased everywhere enormously. In 1913 Germany made tremendous efforts to increase her power by internal development. France took refuge in the adoption of three years military service. Austria and Hungary developed their military power.

Such, then, was the position of the world at the time of the murder in Serajevo. This murder was not an isolated assassination, but it was the final link in a long chain of events. The air was charged, and the explosion took place. In this atmosphere of mutual distrust a question had to be solved which would have presented considerable difficulties even if the greatest confidence had existed; for the nature of the controversv was that Serbia demanded, on the basis of her nationality principle, that which was our undoubted and valuable property. The whole world felt that this was not done to a particular person, but that it was symbolic of the murder of the representative of the Monarchy. The whole world was aware that this murder had not been done by isolated fanatics, but that it was the result of the glowing hatred of a community—a hatred which had been heaped with the glowing coals of the official policy of the Serbian state. For this reason it was natural, and met with universal satisfaction, that the Monarchy decided to call Serbia to account and force her at all costs to disarm. The fact that the shot was fired by a Bosnian subject on Bosnian territory alters nothing in the situation; for this Bosnian was of Serbian nationality, pursued Serbian policy, and was the tool of an impulse that emanated from Serbia, and he wished to act in Serbia's interest. If the Entente point out that the life of the Czar had often been endangered by intrigues to murder him which were hatched on foreign territory, and that the President of the French Republic, Carnot, was assassinated by an Italian, and that, further, neither Russia nor France demanded satisfaction from those countries where the plot was originated, I reply that, although this is true, it does not prove anything because, in the case of Serajevo, the situation was different from any other. Generally it has been a question of anarchistic murders and not those perpetrated for national reasons and committed in pursuance of the antagonistic policy of a neighbouring state. The other assassinations referred to were not perpetrated in the interests of enemy states. The intentions of the murderers were repudiated and condemned by the country whose citizens were responsible. The question that I ask is, whether Franee would have accepted the murder of Sadi Carnot without a murmur if this deed had been the result of the agitation of the Italian press, dynasty and Government, which incited to the conquest of Nice, Savoy and Tunis, and which placed the dagger of agitation into the hands of fanatics so that they might draw their deadly weapon against the representative of the French Republic?

I have now given my answer to the first question, and I have shown the reasons why the large majority of the nation, as well as myself, accepted the news of the ultimatum without anxiety, in. spite of the fact that I knew nothing of the ultimatum previously, and that I did not consider our procedure advisable either then or at present. We simply felt that it was a question of protecting vital national interests and of supporting a defensive policy which was the duty of every patriot, whether he approved of the methods of the Government or not.

I admit that it is possible to be animated by a public spirit which would not think of resorting to physical force in such dangerous situations, even after such an act of defiance. I further concede that it is possible that an attitude could be taken up which inclined to abandon its own rights, or which is prepared to submit its most vital questions to an international jury. The nation which is prepared, in similar circumstances, to place its fate at the mercy of the love of justice of other peoples, has a moral right to demand that we should do the same. But such a nation does not exist, because, in similar circumstances, no one has staked independence upon the favour of a third party.

The question that had to be answered was not, whether the murder of Serajevo and the participation of Serbian society offered sufficient grounds before a strict court of justice for demanding satisfaction and imposing a penalty; but the question that had to be decided was, what guarantees were necessary in order to destroy for ever the Serbian policy which was associated with this murder and which continually threatened our existence and the peace of Europe? The Peace Palace at The Hague has never delivered judgment in such a case. Even the protagonists of international reform expressed the general opinion at that time that questions which related to national honour and national existence were not fit to be brought before any court of justice.

When Krüger demanded, in a question of similar importance, that England should be guided by the decision of a tribunal, England refused Kröger's demand. In the treaty that was concluded between England and France it was stated, expressis verbis, that questions of this sort did not come within the jurisdiction of any court. Accordingly, as we did not wish to entrust the question of our existence to the international convention at The Hague, we followed a policy which was hallowed by precedent. In view of the general altitude and the previous precedents, no nation has the right to make accusations against us. When the nation greeted the idea of calling Serbia to account with enthusiasm, and flocked to perform their miHtary duty, the nation felt that she was not only justified in her procedure but was also pursuing a purely defensive policy. The attitude which our nation adopted then is no reason why she should be ashamed now.

It is to be hoped that the terrible consequences of the present war will induce all nations to insist on settling international conflicts by peaceable means. If those principles, however, which it is hoped will predominate in the future, do not decide to condemn all peoples which have waged war hitherto, then no accusation can be brought against us, because there was not a single creature in Hungary that desired to go to war for the sake of conquest or aggrandizement. It was almost an axiom that there were sufficient non-Hungarians on Hungarian soil, and that it would be a mistake to risk even the life of a single human being for the sake of conquest. Moreover, we never imagined ourselves to be powerful enough to expect to play an important part in the policy of Europe, even as a result of war.

No one dared to hope for the defeat of Russia, which would have made it impossible for her for a long time to pursue an aggressive Czarist policy. No sensible Hungarian would have been prepared to sacrifice himself in order to force France and England to their knees and to establish the predominance of Germany on the Continent. Quite on the contrary, every small nation was interested, like our own, in preserving the balance of power, because her own downfall was rendered possible by a European conflagration. We only adopted the decision to declare war in order to preserve our own possessions. Any assertion to the contrary is either an error or a lie. The attitude of Tisza during the decisive Cabinet meeting is proof of my assertion. The very Hungarian who was accused more than anyone else of inciting to this war, and who was murdered for this reason, and who was Hungary's sole representative in the vital Cabinet meeting, was the man who suggested, before the assembly of the ministers, pro foro interno, and not for any tactical reason, that a resolution should be moved not to wage a war of conquest and not to acquire any Serbian territory. Amongst all those present, Tisza was the man whose attitude was the most peacful.