Diplomacy and the War/Part 4/Chapter 1

by Julius Andrassy

CHAPTER I.

My Ministry at the Foreign Office and the October Revolution.

The Bulgarian news reached me on my estate in Siebenburgen during the shooting season. Bitter reality robbed me of the enjoyment of nature in one of the most beautiful mountainous and wooded districts. As soon as I heard of the secession of Bulgaria, I did not doubt for a moment that we ought to make peace at any price because, if we failed to do so now, the revolution would be inevitable. The internal situation in Hungary was particularly critical at this time. The administration was conducted by the Minority Cabinet of Wekerle, which had gone to pieces internally, was under the influence of its opponents, failed to carry through its programme, and was also not supported by the Crown. The Social Democrats were in touch only with the most extreme Radical Party, and in consequence of the competition between them they were incited to outdo each other rather than to exercise a restraining influence. The platform of electoral reform was substituted in an ever-increasing degree by a pacifist and anti-militarist programme. The weakness of the Government opened the gates to agitation which began to undermine the morale of the reserve divisions. Insubordination was the order of the day in the army and the navy. The excesses of certain German bodies of troops on Hungarian soil, and the increasing impression that the peace was only prevented by German militarism, began to create a tremendous hatred against Germany. The idea of making a separate peace acquired strength. The confusion on our frontiers was heightened by anarchy in the capital. The fight between parties grew daily in strength, and so did ambition. There were those who believed the nation was behind them, and thought that they were called upon, as Siegès declared concerning the tiers état, to be everything, whereas in reality they were nothing, and there were those who believed that they alone could save the nation, which would perish without them—all had the effect of pouring fuel upon the flames and of adding to the excitement of the public mind. Foreign money was also at work, and there was great danger that our internal front would collapse before the conclusion of peace and that we would be delivered into the hands of our enemy and have to depend on his mercy or cruelty.

Such were the circumstances when we, that is to say, Wekerle, Tisza, Apponyi and myself, received the invitation of Burian (October 5) to come to Vienna in order to discuss what should be done. He informed us that Germany's power had broken down to such an extent that, although she had accused especially us of cowardice, she now urged an armistice and the immediate conclusion of peace, and that she was, moreover, prepared to offer peace on the basis of Wilson's programme. This communication had the effect of a thunderclap upon me. In the very rooms where I had seen my father work for the interests of Hungary and the Monarchy with such distinction, in the very same hall where, under his guidance and imbued with the fairest hopes of the future of my country, I had begun to occupy myself with politics, in this very room I had to receive this catastrophic news.

I never believed that the theories of Wilson could be realized. Nor did I believe that unprejudiced truth would come to make itself felt, nor that there would be no difference in future between conqueror and vanquished, nor that secret diplomacy and secret alliances would cease, nor that the rights of small nations would be respected as much as the rights of the large ones, nor that the right of self-determination of all nations would be respected, nor that the colonies would be distributed in acordance with pure justice, nor that every state would be given an outlet to the sea and that the freedom of the seas would be assured to everyone alike during war and peace. In short, I did not believe the theories announced by the President of the American Republic. I regarded Wilson's statement to the effect that the majority of (ho nations did not any longer serve the desire for might of (he single nations, but that they served the aims of humanity, as completely erroneous. I felt that the propaganda of Wilson was a more destructive weapon against us than many army corps, but that, when peace came, his words would not be realized in deeds. It was particularly clear to me, from the very beginning, that, if the war was waged to the last stage, that is to say, until one of the opponents was forced upon his knees, then the only possibility was an imperialistic peace. The victor would exploit the acquired position for which he had paid the price of enormous danger and unparalleled sacrifice, and he would not allow himself to be impeded by any sort of moral impulse. Moreover, even among the masses, the love of humanity would not predominate but Chauvinism, the hatred against the vanquished enemy, the desire to punish him, and the effort to be compensated for the losses that had been sustained. Finally, I believe this phase will not be one of short duration.

None the less, I declared my readiness, in answer to Burian's summons, to accept the fourteen points of Wilson, together with the commentary upon them, as the basis for peace negotiations, because this was the only concrete peace proposal and I considered it probable that, if we tried to obtain new conditions from the Entente, these would be even more severe. Moreover, we had no free choice in the matter. The German opening of negotiations made the impression upon Burian that Germany would desert us and accept Wilson's proposals even if we did not agree to do the same.

I had hardly returned when I was summoned, together with Szterényi, Wekerle, Windischgraetz and Tisza, to Reichenau in order to have a consultation concerning the internal political situation with the King, who felt the necessity of establishing a definite Government (October 7). I was still in Vienna when His Majesty was informed that it was possible for me to enter into confidential negotiations with diplomats of the Entente concerning conditions of peace in Switzerland. Our peace-loving monarch thereupon dispatched me without delay (October 11). The information that had been given to His Majesty was, however, of an earlier date, and the situation had changed considerably in the meantime. The official negotiations had begun with Wilson so that confidential discussions would already have been inopportune. The diplomats of the Entente would only have been inclined to discuss matters with me if I had been officially empowered to conclude an agreement. This, however, was not the case.

In Switzerland I gathered the impression that the Entente realized fully her military superioritv, and that, especially as regards Germany, she was determined upon the most cruel method of procedure. The mere fact that the German military command demanded an immediate armistice was irrefutable proof that even Berlin regarded our position as hopeless. Public opinion of the Entente longed for a complete military victory, and they would have liked to conclude peace in Berlin as the Germans concluded peace in Paris in 1871. I further gathered the impression that the fate of Austria and Hungary had not yet been settled finally, but that our only chance of getting bearable conditions would be to convince the Entente that we intended to abandon the German alliance in future and that we were anxious to adopt an entirely new policy.

Several Austro-Polish and Hungarian politicians as well as myself received the news in Berne on October 17 that the Emperor had issued a manifesto in which he ordered the federation of Austria. This news was like the explosion of a bomb in its effect upon us. I asked myself a thousand questions. How was it possible to solve all the problems that arose through the manifesto during the war? How could the frontiers, the constitution, and the relation of the federal states to Hungary and Croatia be settled peaceably? Would this new formation not degenerate into a fight of everyone against everyone? During the war the lion's share of the battles fell to the Germans and the Hungarians in Austria. How could there be any hope of maintaining a fighting efficiency up to the conclusion of peace if those very elements which were directing the war were in danger of being beaten by a majority within the Monarchy? I was well aware that our dualism would not emerge from the European war untouched. In case of victory I would myself have been a supporter of Trialism with Poland. At an early period I had recognized the necessity of a solution of the Croatian problem, and, on the other hand, I never entertained any doubt that, in case of a defeat, federation would be inevitable for Austria, and that the Monarchy would have to be reorganized upon a new basis, adapted to the new relation between the powers. I also knew, however, that as soon as these questions were raised, without guarantees for the German element and the Hungarian states, there would be a desire for secession in Austria. I was certain, moreover, that the idea of an administrative union would gain support in Hungary and that the army would be disbanded. I also considered it probable that it would be impossible to satisfy the Slavs when the new organization took place, and that they would not bind themselves before they knew what was to be understood by the elastic principles of Wilson.

The object of the reorganization was the satisfaction of the non-Hungarian and non-German nationalities. Wilson was to be convinced by means of a fait accompli that there was a determination to adapt the situation to his principles. The effect of this step, however, had to be that the bitter feeling between the Germans and the Hungarians was raised to the highest pitch without being able to ensure that the other nations would be prepared to favour a programme as opposed to the proposal which promised them more, made by Wilson. It was not difficult to anticipate that, if we determined to reorganize the Monarchy upon a new basis at the time of our defeat, the Monarchy would inevitably collapse before we were able to sit down with a view to beginning negotiations. In order that no one else should annihilate us, we determined upon suicide. Before my journey to Switzerland I discussed this question fully with the King, and advised him to leave the constitutional form of the Monarchy untouched as long as peace was not concluded and to content himself with preparing for the new change after discussion with qualified statesmen. As far as I knew, all the Hungarian statesmen were against federation except Karolyi, who was given audience after us.

I was able to notice the destructive power of the manifesto in Berne. We, who had all pulled together yesterday, separated to-day, and every one of us was filled with the thought as to where he could find a safe haven for his state or his people. The derogatory influence of the manifesto became quite public as it could be seen, from the replies of the Czechs and the Southern Slavs, that the new policy was not the result of previous agreements but an experiment, and even those were unable to permit this in whose interests the experiment had been made. Before I returned home from Switzerland, the Hungarian Government had deduced the consequences of the new state of affairs. They had adopted the point of view of administrative union and declared that the Hungarian troops would be recalled from the frontiers of the Monarchy in order to protect the frontiers of Hungary. In the midst of the general confusion, Tisza let slip the fatal words: "We have lost the war."

I was appalled. The recall of the Hungarian troops signified the disruption of our front line and also military catastrophe. If I had been at home, I would have risked everything in order to prevent this declaration. In view of the military possibilities, I proposed that all resources at our disposal had to be concentrated for the protection of the Hungarian frontier against the danger that threatened us from Roumania and the Balkans, but the actual declaration that was given divided the army into its various elements. The Hungarian troops were destined for special purposes without regard to the fact that their removal violated military honour because this action endangered to a serious extent their brothers in arms and the whole front. And if the Hungarians did no longer consider it their duty to protect the positions they had occupied hitherto and to endure by the side of their comrades, would not the rest imitate them? Would the whole front not begin to waver and dissolve before it was possible to negotiate for peace? There was no doubt whatever that the confession of defeat destroyed the last rags of self-confidence, that a fearful panic was created, especially at a time when this confession brought about the Italian offensive which had been contemplated. How would it be possible for the internally corrupt army to resist? Would she not be faced by a catastrophe that would entail the sacrifice of thousands upon thousands?

As the negotiations which had been begun in conjunction with the Central Powers appeared to make the slowest progress, and as it was certain that as long as we negotiated together we could expect the most severe treatment, I returned home from Switzerland with the proposal that our late Ambassador in London, Count Mensdorff, should be sent to Berne with the mission of getting in touch with the Entente independently in order to secure our special interests. I advised that he should give a declaration to the effect that the Monarchy would be prepared, after the conclusion of peace, to abandon the old alliance and to guarantee the protection of the new status quo provided this means of procedure on the part of the Monarchy would be compensated by the hope of bearable conditions. I received the assurance that, in case anyone who was commissioned to undertake this matter was furnished with suitable authority on the part of our monarch, he would be received. Unfortunately, however, nothing was done in this direction.

When I returned, the Hungarian political crisis had not yet been solved. I saw, just as I had done before my departure, three possibilities of extricating ourselves from the crisis. One possibility would have been to put Tisza into power, who would then have had to re-institute order and commence the battle against those elements which Clemenceau had opposed in France. This solution, however, would not have been a happy one in my opinion, because it would have led immediately to revolution and it would have rendered peace impossible, because the Entente would have regarded this as the victory of the belligerent reaction. I gathered from all sides in Switzerland that Tisza was to the Entente what a red rag was to a bull, and that, together with Ludendorff—quite unjustly—he was made responsible for the war. In other words, it would have been impossible for him to negotiate on our behalf. It was now no longer a question of preparing for war, but a question of smoothing the path to peace. Our situation was totally different from the one in November, 1917, in France, when Clemenceau took over control. In our case victory was impossible, but in France it was only a question of the defeat of a momentary depression.

The second possible solution was the formation of a Cabinet of Karolyi, with the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, or to create a majority by means of force. In many of our circles this was regarded from the point of view of foreign policy as the most advantageous solution; I had, however, returned from Switzerland with the impression that Karolyi did not enjoy as much confidence from the Entente as his supporters boasted. His socialist, pacifist and revolutionary propaganda did not meet with the approval of those who had fought a bitter battle with the Socialists and the Pacifists at home, and who treated Karolyi's type of politician with the utmost severity. The very fact that it was possible for Karoyli to gain power might have endangered our southern and eastern frontiers, which were still defended by the German Army. It was only natural that in such circumstances the Germans would have made their way through Hungary as a result of the conviction that Karolyi would turn against them, and something might happen which unfortunately, and to the great disgrace of the Hungarian name, actually did happen with that noble general, General Mackensen, who had defended our frontiers successfully and to whom we owed so much gratitude. I was also opposed to the idea of transferring the power to Karolyi and his party from the point of view of internal politics, because I was afraid that demagogy would obtain the upper hand and that a revolution would be brought about which would really have been the product of the Government. One of my friends prophesied with sound calculation that, as soon as Karolyi was in a sufficiently powerful position, he would dethrone the King and all his followers by telephone.

During these negotiations I expressed the opinion to Jászi and Kunfi that, if their party gained power, it would inevitably lead to anti-Semitism and a pogrom, for the Government would have such a predominantly Jewish character that the people of Hungary would not accept it. It was our duty to introduce the Hungarian nation to such a policy as was demanded by the new European situation, and not to place a few radical supporters of a small côterie at the head of affairs under pretext of the European situation and to govern Hungary without the participation of her national politicians.

There remained a third solution. This possibility was to form a new Government with Karolyi and his supporters, with the Social Democrats and with the various nationalities, as well as those national elements who recognized that a new tendency and a new policy was demanded by the new situation. The common programme had to be as follows: quick peace, and even, if necessary, a separate peace with a new foreign policy, administrative union, a nationality-policy based upon the autonomy of the nationalities, international protection for the rights of the minority, new electoral reform laws, preservation of internal order at any price, and equally energetic representation of our patriotic tendency as opposed to internationalism. I was convinced that such a coalition would be supported by the majority in Parliament, and I would have been inclined to have joined such a combination, as I was convinced that a constellation which placed me in the same Cabinet with Karoyli would have been advantageous in regard to foreign affairs. The result of this would, of course, have been that I would have had to break with my past.

Nevertheless, I was determined to do so. The political situation in which the country found itself made it the one duty of every patriot to save as much as could be saved, and having sacrificed all other considerations, to adopt the path that was demanded by the given circumstances in the interests of the country.

Unfortunately, the solution that I longed for was subject to many impediments. With reference to Karolyi, I believed at one time that he was inclined to unite himself with us. His party, however, did not display the slightest desire to do so. When it became certain that we had lost the war, and when we had to give way to Karolyi in certain questions, public opinion believed that he alone was able to conclude a satisfactory peace and that it was only he who enjoyed the confidence of the Entente completely. His party believed, in view of the increasing popularity and respect of their leader, that the time had come for him to take over the Government single-handed. The most they would have done would have been to accept, for the sake of form, a few easy-going statesmen who did not belong to their party.

My solution also was not approved of by Count Tisza, although at this time we were working together harmoniously. Since the summer session we had opposed each other violently and publicly in the House, and since then our intercourse had ceased. When Burian invited us to come to Vienna (October 5) on account of the negotiations with regard to peace, we entered the same railway carriage. We sat down together and discussed the situation as if nothing had happened between us. The danger which threatened the country brought us together again. Unfortunately, however, we could not come to a complete agreement. Tisza did not consider Karolyi and his people as worthy of participation in the Government. The programme of the new coalition was antipathetic to him. He wanted to rally the Right of the Centre party, and did not object that I attempted negotiations with the Left. He did, however, say that this effort of mine would not succeed, and then we should hold together and take up the battle against the revolutionary element.

And so the crisis continued! We had a weak Government, conscious of the fact that they could not continue in power, at a time when a strong Government was essential. The evil of mistrust spread like a contagion. The agitation against everything that existed increased from day to day. When I arrived in Budapest (October 22) from Berne I received the gloomiest impression. Everything that I was able to observe had the effect of moral blows upon me. I held aloof from all party squabbles, and I was face to face with the most difficult and greatest problems of our national life. The influence of the deadly danger which encompassed our nation made me feel in all the fibres of my being that only co-operation and the complete exclusion of party and power considerations, and a division of labour, as dictated by the interests of the State, would be able to help us—if it was not too late already! Instead of this, hatred, ambition and dissension vied with each other in an unbridled and mad contest. Even the best patriotic feeling was subject to exaggeration, and to the revolutionary spirit which refused to wait any longer and which was determined to accept no compromise, but to settle everything once and for all radically. Moderate intelligence had lost command, and passion and overstrained nerves celebrated orgies. Authority lay in the dust. Everyone, even the most uneducated and frivolous, was bursting with thoughts that were to save the country. Everyone attempted to go his own way, thought he was independent, and wanted to listen only to his conscience, but actually was under the influence of mass-suggestion and merely screamed for that which everyone else demanded.

I determined not to be dissuaded from my conviction in any circumstances, even by a hair's-breadth. I wanted to remain absolutely faithful to what I considered right and necessary at the moment. I felt that I would be fighting against public opinion and that I would be swimming against the stream with little hope of success, but I was nevertheless determined upon energetic action. I used all my powers to bring about the coalition of the Left and Centre, and if this had been impossible, I wanted to unite the elements on the Right for purposes of opposition, in accordance with Tisza's advice, but only on the basis of a programme that was adapted to the new era. In this spirit I negotiated with Karolyi, the Radicals, the Social Democrats and the Labour Party. I met nowhere with opposition on principle, but nevertheless the realization of my schemes progressed slowly.

I also got in touch with Croatian politicians. The manifesto had also raised the Croatian question. If we did not want the sword to declare Croatia's independence on its own account, and if we did not want it to turn against us, we had to take the question in hand ourselves and bring it to a decision as soon as possible. Instead of the irresponsible Government of the moment, a responsible one had to be created, and the Croatians had to be given a free hand to place themselves under the sceptre of the Habsburgs according to their discretion, subject to the condition that they would guarantee for the time being the preservation of the Fiume provision and the protection of a connection to the sea. The Croatian politicians who had returned from Vienna transmitted the message of the King, that he was inclined to adopt such a solution as soon as he was protected in so doing by a responsible Hungarian Government that controlled the majority—otherwise, he was not able to do anything as he was bound by his oath. Personally, I had felt the urgency of the Croatian question for a long time. In the summer of 1918 I had stated in the Chamber of Deputies that I did not have any objection against a revision of the adjustments of 1886 if a responsible Government was constituted. At that time, however, my words did not exercise any effect. Under pressure of the situation I was now inclined to go a good deal further and to accept everything which seemed a suitable means of paralysing Irridentism.

When I entered the Chamber of Deputies on October 24, immediately after my negotiations with the Croatians, I found the Opposition in a very excited state of mind. I was immediately seized by every section of the Opposition parties for a consultation, during which passionate hatred was displayed against the President, Wekerle. The Opposition was determined to cause the downfall of the Government, and, if necessary, to continue the battle in the streets in order to seize the power for themselves.

For the present the battle was merely conducted with words and excitement. It was, however, noticeable that their patience was at an end and that it was necessary to make an end of this system of uncertainty and latent crisis which had already enervated public power for months in the past, at a time when it should have been intact and energetic. The disgusted Opposition did not put forward during this improvised session a revolutionary decision, because we, the leaders who were present, declared that Wekerle would resign anyhow and that the Opposition was prepared to take common action.

Ever since the Bulgarian affair, a portion of the Opposition had pressed me to place myself at the head of the attack. I did not do so. I knew that the Government did not meet the demands of the situation. I did not dare to cause the downfall of the existing Government until I had some guarantee that a new Government could be formed which could cope with the situation. In spite of all my efforts I was not able to obtain such a guarantee. I feared that an interregnum might take place. The crisis, however, could not be avoided.

After the session of the Opposition, I got into touch with the members of the Labour Party. They called upon me in great numbers. I realized that they had no more confidence in themselves, and that one could expect no more activity from them, and that they were aware that their regime was at an end. I also received an emissary from Wekerle, who informed me that Wekerle would follow my advice. I also had a conversation with Tisza, who seemed to have lost his usual determination. I propounded the programme which I thought necessary: electoral reform, immediate peace, co-operation with the Social Democrats, and I requested Tisza to give the Labour Party a free hand and to retire into the background himself.

I attempted to convince him that, if we wanted to obviate the revolution, or to throttle it in its incipience, we would have to bring about the necessary reforms without delay, as we had to guard against an increase of bitter feeling, and that we ought not to exclude those elements which were striving for power, and whose programme we had to carry out partially, but that at the same time we must surround these elements by other forces so that we were able to repress the turbulent factors and to suppress anarchy. I pointed out that in Germany also there was a new Government with a new system.

Tisza was now prepared for anything. He wanted to step aside, and to ensure that the new Cabinet would obtain the majority. For the first time he declared that he would not oppose an extension of electoral reform. He was ready to act in this manner, not because of any danger of revolution, for he believed that such a danger did not exist and that it was not worth while speaking of it, but because he recognized that, in the present circumstances, it was impossible to continue the Government without us.

How soul-racking a struggle must this indomitable man have had to go through before he gave this declaration! At this time I was in constant touch with Tisza. He once surprised me in the presence of Wekerle (October 6) by the remark that he had been deceived in his judgment of Burian. Burian, he said, had made mistakes which had destroyed Tisza's confidence in him. He, Tisza, was prepared to do everything that was in his power to bring about Burian's downfall. "There are only two people who can be his successor," said he. "You or myself. To-day I am out of the question, therefore one can only talk of you. I will do everything I can in the interests of your nomination."

On the following day we sat, together with Prince Windischgraetz, in the same carriage and drove to Vienna to be received in audience. I brought about a discussion of the necessity of electoral reform. Tisza held his head in both hands and said in a desperate voice: "What an unhappy country this is!" He wanted to put me, his opponent, into power, and I spoiled this patriotic effort of his by the dangerous idea which he thought would ruin Hungary and which he could not support in any circumstances. I argued with him in vain that it was now impossible to avoid this reform, which had to come about, and that he, Tisza, also, must be happy if he could succeed in satisfying the nationalities, with a general electoral reform, in defiance of Wilson, and so on.

Tisza would not give way. He attempted to prove that Europe would realize that we could not continue and that nobody could demand suicide from us.

This happened on October 7; and when, three weeks later, Tisza abandoned the idea of defending his strongest convictions, this was obviously a sign of the revolutionary atmosphere which he refused to recognize.

Having gained the impression that concentration was finally possible, I caused Wekerle to be informed that in my opinion he should resign and a Coalition Government ought to be instituted. Thereupon the President summoned all the party leaders to a discussion with him in the Chamber of Deputies. In the course of these discussions Tisza declared that he was ready to facilitate the creation of a new Government and to form a new Majority, if men like Albert Apponyi or myself would be asked to form the Cabinet, but he was not willing to do so on any account if Karolyi stood at the head of the new combination. Karolyi, who was present, declared boldly that the country would not be satisfied unless he was made President. No agreement was made except in so far that everybody knew that Wekerle had to resign.

We now had to find a successor with all speed. The greatest danger lay in the possibility of an interregnum. After the above-mentioned session, which had lasted until late in the evening, Karolyi dined in the circle of my family. I still attempted to bring about a Coalition Government of the Left parties, but in such a way that the whole power should not pass into Karolyi's hands.

In the meantime a telephonic communication came from the Royal Household, which had been given by Ludwig Windischgraetz, the Minister for Food, the Prince who had accompanied the King to Debreczen, to the effect that he wanted to speak to me in the course of the night in accordance with the highest command. Up to his arrival negotiations had to be held in abeyance. Karolyi took his leave of us; he was expected by friends at home. I learnt later on that at this time he had determined upon revolution and had constituted a national council of Radicals and the supporters of his own party of Social Democrats without any legal authority. Thereby the possibility of intercourse between us ceased. The political crisis became a family quarrel. Windischgraetz came in accordance with the order of the King, in order to offer me the portfolio for Foreign Affairs. The foreign policy of the ruler agreed with that which I had explained to him shortly after my return from Switzerland, when I was received by him in Schönbrunn. The King also expressed the wish that I would assist him in solving the Hungarian and Austrian crisis. In the meantime the position of the Austrian President had become untenable. If the King had asked me at that time to form a Hungarian Cabinet, I would also have accepted this. I had my connections in every direction, and it would perhaps have been easier for me than for anyone else, but personally I would have been faced by a tragic decision, because it was quite clear to me that I would have had to arrest Karolyi without delay. If duty had demanded it, I would also have been prepared to do this, but I was very glad that I was spared this painful and difficult task.

I do not in any way wish to conceal the fact that I would previously have rejoiced to accept the portfolio of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. My views as to the policy that should be adopted were so determined that I would have been glad to undertake the responsibility of executing them, because I had confidence in their correctness. But now the situation had been lost. And I only accepted the offer because at such times no man has the right to think of himself and his own future. One had to go where one was sent and where, one believed, one might still be of use.

I saw only one way out of the difficulty: a rapid and an immediate peace which, in my opinion, could only take one shape: namely, a separate peace. With a heavy heart I decided upon secession. Even if German policy had been instrumental in preventing the realization of peace at a time when this might have been accomplished under more advantageous conditions, and although the pan-Germans had strengthened the military party of the Entente, it is nevertheless indisputable that the Germans have defended our frontiers more than once heroically, successfully and faithfully, and that we cannot accuse them of any disloyalty. I felt the greatest reverence for this people of heroes in their misfortune; but "necessity knows no law," said Bethmann-Hollweg when he entered into Belgium.

I had no confidence that the Germans recognized the difficulty of the situation, because, if they had done so, their patriotic Kaiser would have abdicated in favour of his nephew, and the new Chancellor, the Prince of Baden, would not have been able to speak about making Alsace-Lorraine a separate German country. I was afraid that the German military command, having been roused from their first intoxication, would allow themselves to be persuaded by the conviction that they were ultimately unconquerable, in order to commence resistance once more. I also noticed that Wilson prolonged his negotiations. When I returned from Switzerland, I brought with me the certain knowledge that Germany and her allies would be proceeded against without any consideration whatever. The soil of France which had been devastated with merciless thoroughness was an eternal and unfortunately comprehensible source of hatred and revenge. We were unable to assist the Germans by the continuation of the war in any way. The hope that we could achieve an honourable peace by negotiation through co-operation and the display of power, was in my opinion the greatest self-deception. The Entente would inevitably have given way under pressure of this procedure to the demands of their military parties, and continued their irresistible offensive in order to be able to dictate the terms of peace in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. And these terms of peace would have been more severe than the present ones, because all of us would have had to shoulder the responsibility of the devastation of the last retreat, and, moreover, we would have had to suffer for it. The only way in which we could be of any use to the Germans was to convince them as soon as possible that only one possibility was left: the conclusion of peace—even if this peace was unfavourable. With regard to the future, it was in Germany's interest that the Monarchy should save itself and approach the Entente in order to be able to negotiate between Germany and the Entente later on. The old alliance could not be maintained anyhow, as in this event the Entente would have been forced to co-operate with a view to frustrating the enemy alliance by all means in their power. If we decided upon separating from each other and determined upon new paths, there was a possibility that we might secure conditions by means of which our existence could still be secured. And if too severe conditions had been imposed upon us after we had given up the alliance which was dangerous to the Entente, and after we had made it clear that we did not intend to continue our old policy, then the peace-loving and ultimately just verdict of the public opinion of the world would have condemned these conditions, which in turn would have weakened the Entente and strengthened us. Moreover, there was more at stake for us than for the Germans. It was impossible to destroy the Germans, even by the severest peace, and the German plenipotentiaries said truly during the armistice negotiations: "A people of seventy millions can suffer, but it cannot die." We, on the other hand, were not in a position to make a similar assertion. Austria, and especially Hungary, stood on the verge of destruction. We had risked our existence, but the Germans had only risked their position.

My main motive, however, was that the revolution could only be prevented by the offer of a separate peace. The main source of the revolutionary feeling in Hungary was the desire for peace and the conviction that we would never obtain peace in conjunction with Germany, and that we, moreover, were conscious of this fact and yet were prepared to sacrifice our country rather than secede from Germany.

To continue resistance until some sort of an honourable peace could be arrived at was impossible for this reason, namely, that the revolution would have prevented it, in Germany as well as in our own country.

As soon as I had convinced myself that there was no hope of victory, that every further sacrifice was in vain, that the conditions could not be improved upon, and that all further bloodshed could only lead to revolution, my conscience did not permit me to accept the responsibility for continuing the murder. Surely enough people had been destroyed already! Never again would I have found a second's peace if I had not opposed the continuation of this war of destruction.

Anyone who asserts that I have sacrificed the honour of the nation when I violated our duty as an ally gives a one-sided judgment. It was a question of a conflict between two duties of honour. Honour does not permit a nation to sacrifice her sons without prospect of gain. I valued this duty more highly than the duty of adhering to a contract which could not be upheld any longer, and whose purposes could no longer be achieved and which was unable to prove of advantage to either party.

A few voices were raised which regarded the secession as right, but quarrelled with the manner of the secession. It was said that we should have said openly that we refused to continue to fight, but we should not have made a separate peace. We should have avoided the evil appearance that we wanted to derive an advantage at the expense of our ally. Personally, I was not afraid of this appearance. The separate peace which Frederick II of Prussia concluded in order to acquire Silesia was disgraceful, but this secession was only painful and not disgraceful because its purpose was to save the existence of one's own people.

Moreover, even by aid of this solution the appearance of secession could not have been avoided because it would have necessitated an immediate and separate armistice. I was not prepared, for the sake of this semblance, to lose the possibility of being able to save the Monarchy. As soon as I was determined upon secession, my loyalty obliged me to inform the Germans with the greatest candour.

The first condition of successful operations on my part was that I was to be allowed a certain amount of time, and that I should constitute a Government in Hungary where the danger of an upheaval was greatest, which should either seize or break the sword of the revolution. I finally abandoned the attempt to make an agreement with tho Social Democrats and with Karolyi. The chief point of opposition between us was, firstly, that they wanted to secure immediate peace by surrender of arms, and secondly, that I was not to be the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of Karolyi for the Dual Monarchy but only for Hungary. I accepted neither of these conditions. I regarded the first condition as treason. If the remaining States did not throw away their arms, we could not do so either, and if we did it nevertheless we were utterly defenceless. Up to date we had at any rate known how to preserve our frontiers intact. If, however, we put down our arms, our defenceless country would have been a prey to the invasion of our neighbours. The danger which hitherto we had only been able to hold off by the heroic death of millions, we were to invite by means of a single stroke of the pen. Orpheus dared to walk in the midst of wild beasts because he trusted in his wonderful playing of the lyre. Many of us saw in pacifism and socialism the panacea which could protect us from the fury of our foe. I knew that the attempt to diverge victorious imperialism by kind words was not only ludicrously farcical but that the end was bound to be a tragedy and bring about the destruction of a brave and active nation. Laughter would be throttled with blood. I was convinced that we could not save our existence by calling upon Wilson's principles because Wilson would not remain the master of the situation, but Lloyd George and Clemenceau. I knew that our only chance of obtaining an acceptable peace lay in our ability to come to an agreement with this victorious imperialism, and also in our ability to convince this imperialism that the Monarchy was prepared to adapt its new constitution to the new order, and that the Monarchy was even prepared to offer their services to the Entente in so far as they were able to bring pressure to bear upon Germany to adapt herself to the new conditions.

In my opinion the calculations upon which Karolyi's policy was founded were erroneous. He believed that the war would be substituted immediately by a world revolution, which Karolyi expressed in the October delegation: "Pacifism will suppress all the military parties of the Entente." I was of opinion that a considerable time would follow the war during which the danger of revolution would be threatening, but I never seriously accepted the prophecy that the revolution would gain the mastery before the conclusion of peace in the victorious countries. I regarded the statement of Marshal Foch that a victory would be a guarantee against the Bolshevik danger as an exaggeration. Nevertheless, it is indubitable that victory must render an outbreak of revolution more difficult, and that the fate of a nation could not be based on such volatile prophecies, which would facilitate an outbreak of revolution at any moment. It was not for us to indulge in prophecies, but to come to an agreement in a humble spirit with the dominating powers. One cannot attempt to solve the questions of to-day with the possible possessors of power of to-morrow. A policy based on such principles is a gamble which may not be risked at the expense of a nation's existence. It would, moreover, have been a revolutionary measure to disarm the Hungarian troops immediately, because the King, in his capacity as Emperor of Austria, could not have permitted such a procedure. Karolyi and his supporters did not abide by this demand of theirs up to the end. They regarded the cause of the breach of the negotiations between myself and them as the preservation of the joint Ministry for Foreign Affairs. But it was not for me to give way in this matter either. The Constitution recognized only one common Minister for Foreign Affairs. Such a separation would have led immediately to revolution in Austria, because this country could not permit that the legal ties between both countries could suddenly be dissolved without its consent. Moreover, it would not have been suitable to demolish a common diplomacy at a moment when this very diplomacy had to take instant action in the interests of the conclusion of peace. It is much easier to destroy connections that we possess in foreign countries than to create new ones. Moreover, I had arrived at the conclusion that we could only secure bearable conditions if the support of the Entente could be obtained for some form of Danube federation, and if we were able to convince the Entente that it was both possible and desirable to form a group of states which accepted whatever peace had been decided upon without further thought, and which was willing and able to pursue a new policy. My main motive, however, was the conviction that the Entente would identify themselves with the most far-reaching aspirations of our small neighbours if they had to choose between an antagonistic Hungarian nation and a new friendly state.

I had only one doubt in my mind, namely, whether an opposition of interests between Austria and Hungary would not make itself felt to such an extent that common representation would have been impossible. This scruple, however, was removed by the consideration that the interests of those states who intended to live with each other in future were compatible with each other. Furthermore, I did not consider it necessary to present the world with the ludicrous situation of sending two Ministers of one and the same ruler to the peace negotiations in the presence of our enemies, each of which Ministers represented opposite points of view.

The idea of secession was unquestionably popular. Although social democracy, patriotism and internationalism worked intensely in the interests of the revolution, the revolutionary feeling re-created in the final moments of the collapse, all the old nationalistic and Chauvinistic feelings of the masses which had so often been offended against and never fully satisfied, and I noticed immediately how difficult it would be to support the preservation of the union. Requests reached me from all sides that I should demand immediately the union of administration. My conviction, however, did not permit me to diverge from those paths which in my opinion were alone able to lead us to the desired goal.

I sought a solution which should make it clear to all the world that we did not wish to return to Dualism, and that we also demanded an independent Hungary. I wanted to show that the existing and lawful ties and the common organism would only remain in force until the peace had determined the frontiers and decided which states and countries would remain together, because, without such decisions, the new order would have had no real foundation. It was also necessary to find a means by which the representative of the new State of Hungary as created by the manifesto should participate, together with the common Minister for Foreign Affairs, in all the peace negotiations and any other decisions which would have to be taken.

It did not seem as if such a solution would be impossible in Austria. In my opinion, the problem would have been more easy in our case because the common Minister for Foreign Affairs would have been an Hungarian. When my hopes began to wane that Karolyi and the Social Democrats would accept responsibility on such a basis, I tried to bring together a Government out of the remaining popular parties. This Government was not to be such as to constitute a challenge to the democratic elements, and it was to have a programme which should satisfy to the utmost limits the demands of the time, but which should, nevertheless, be determined to preserve law and order by force.

Before I accepted my nomination, I asked everyone concerned, all of whom gave me the satisfactory answer that a sufficient and reliable military force was at our disposal in Budapest, and that this force would receive the necessary orders to make use of their armed powers. At the critical moment, however, these expectations did not come to be realized. We opposed all determined revoluntionary powers without daring or being capable of using armed force. In the circumstances, it would have been better to have given way earlier. History has proved that the lawful constitution collapses when its representatives do not make concessions in time, or if they do not dare to continue the battle to the end once it has been started.

My undertaking was rendered almost hopeless by the fact that, when I travelled to Vienna, no Government had as yet been formed in Budapest which shared my point of view as to policy. I started on my journey without hope, but I was determined, no matter what might happen to me, to make the only possible attempt that was left to us. (October 25.) When I took over the Ministry, the situation was as follows:

The Revolution might break out at any moment in Budapest. Order had to be maintained by the weak Government which had already resigned and which had lost the confidence of the public. The most terrible news was announced from our fronts. The offensive of the Italians was continued with all its might. The first document into which I cast a glance was the report of the Archduke Joseph, that popular Hungarian soldier, who declared that the Hungarian troops did not wish to continue the fight at a great distance from the Hungarian frontier and that they wished to be ordered home. The realization of their desire would have involved the immediate collapse of the Italian front, and would have exposed us to all the ghastly consequences of such an event. We would have been exposed to the danger of the army becoming a devastating mob under pressure of the enemy barrage, and that they would spread destruction right and left throughout the country. In Austria I also found a Government that had fallen (Hussarek), and a chosen successor (Lammasch), who wanted to decentralize gradually and in a legal manner the administration which had been centralized hitherto. His labour, however, was rendered very difficult by the prevalent passion and by the mutual distrust and conflict which increased daily between German nationalism and Slavophile sentiment. I was received suspiciously in Vienna because I was a Hungarian. The first event during my Ministry was a wire from the Emperor Karl, in which he communicated to his ally the German Kaiser that Austria-Hungary was no longer capable of continuing the fight and was determined to conclude a separate peace, so that the revolution and complete collapse should be avoided (October 26). Thereupon I submitted my petition for a separate peace (October 28) to Wilson and all the rest of the enemy powers.

The calming influence of this measure was decreased because the Government crisis still reigned supreme in Budapest. The excitement was at its height. The demagogues were afraid that they would not succeed in bringing about peace and thereby lose their right to existence, and consequently they prepared all the more for rapid action. The mentality of these people was revealed by an interjection of the Deputy Johann Hock in the Chamber of Deputies: "After the peace they will hold us by the throat. At present we are doing it to them." The press in no way assisted me, but, quite on the contrary, made every effort to discredit me and to prevent the Entente from entering into negotiations with me. Now that the fetters of the Centre had been removed, the press found no moderation. They called me a servant of Germany, an annexionist, an oligarch, an intriguer, they called me "the Chancellor" who gave up Hungarian independence for the sake of his personal ambition, at a moment when it would have been possible to realize it. A destructive spirit spread through the newspapers. They did everything for the sake of popularity, and they were controlled by their subscribers and the extreme elements. In Austria the Germans called me a traitor and a deserter. It was quite impossible for me to defend myself against these insults, as the revelation of our weakness was not permissible. I was also attacked on account of my policy of concluding a separate peace by those who had made the continuation of the war impossible by their pacifism.

The situation could only have been saved if a quick answer had been received from the Entente and if negotiatons could have been begun without delay. Events took a different course. The tactics of the Entente consisted in prolonging the negotiations. It was easy for the Entente to wait. Our power of resistance had gradually been exhausted.

In the meantime the situation in Budapest became worse and worse hour by hour. No action was taken that was strong enough to paralyse the energetic and importunate procedure of the revolutionaries. During the long crisis discipline had been relaxed. The revolutionary party was confident of victory, and the party whose function it was to protect law and order had lost all faith in themselves. This wavering could be felt throughout every portion of the organism of the state. No one who has no faith in himself will gain the confidence of others. My step towards peace was regarded as a failure from its incipience, and public opinion expected an immediate and favourable peace only from Karolyi, a fact which gave him and the revolution an enormous power. Even the greatest enemies of Karolyi wished him to take power.

Tisza himself advised the nomination of Karolyi. The idea of the completely independent Hungarian became rapidly successful. I was convinced that a Hungary that was completely severed from Austria in diplomacy and in military power would be shut off from the outside world, surrounded by enemies, a prey to the leadership of completely inexperienced men, and destined to undergo a terrible catastrophe. I was also convinced that Karolyi would not be in a position to suppress the chaos and anarchy, and that the supporters of the social revolution would immediately gain power. Neither of these convictions of mine were shared by any number of people in the midst of the general confusion. The only thing that could have saved the situation would have been to arrest the National Assembly instantly, which had based itself with complete frankness on a revolutionary foundation, and military action should have been displayed with the greatest energy without delay. In addition, an unfortunate accident occurred which spoilt the situation completely. Relations between the King and Karolyi had become so close in Gödöllö that Karolyi came with His Majestv's special train to Vienna, and he was fully convinced that he would arrive as President. Instead of this, however, he arrived on October 28 at his home, having waited half a day in vain, without having been received in audience, and without having negotiated with the Austrian President or myself. Was it not obvious that he would be convinced that he had been deceived intentionally? His party was deeply hurt. The Archduke Joseph travelled in the same train as Karolyi from Vienna to Budapest with the mission of undertaking the solution of the crisis, and of being responsible, in his capacity as a soldier, for the absolute preservation of law and order. The negotiations of the Archduke led to the nomination of Hadek (October 29), who announced a correct programme, but who was unable to alter anything further in the situation. It was too late! Our fate was finally sealed because either we actually had no more forces, or because it was believed that we did not have any, we did not use violence, and violence was only displayed by the revolutionaries. Consequently, we had to capitulate within a short time.

Under the influence of the mob, Karolyi, before Hadek could form his ministry, was the successful leader of the revolution and was created President on the morning of October 31. On receipt of this news I immediately sent in my resignation. In fact, my presumptive successor, the brother of the previous Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Czernin, had already been selected when I remained in office at His Majesty's request. On the day of my resignation, the fifth day after our petition for a separate peace, news was received from the Entente which gave rise to great hopes that the Entente was prepared to negotiate and would make conditions which would save our existence. In the meantime our army did wonders. The army resisted for days, in spite of her corrupt interior. The soldiers at the front who were not touched by the agitation from behind fought heroically. The reserves, however, refused to obey and failed utterly. In such circumstances the resistance could only last for days, or perhaps only for hours, and consequently we decided to take steps in the interest of an immediate armistice. (October 29.) The illusions from which the German General Staff suffered were made plain by the reply they gave us when we informed them that we intended to demand an armistice (November). They told us to endure until snowfall set in in the passes in the Tyrol, and that they—the Germans—would help us on to our legs again in the spring. This is the news that we received at a time when we could not witness the unnecessary bloodshed for a single day longer, and even less so until the spring. And even if we had wanted to do so in vain, the internal and the external fronts would have collapsed before the spring, and we, the responsible personalities, would justly have ended on the gallows. The revolutionary party began to increase still further. The unmerciful logic of the laws of the world's history made themselves felt once more. Successful violence can never arrest its progress halfway. Having reigned lawfully for one day, the Cabinet of Karolyi became revolutionary. It will remain a sad and unforgettable memory to think of the night during which I was most urgently summoned to Schönbrunn by His Majesty. For a long time I was unable to obtain a vehicle, and I arrived late in the Imperial Palace. The brother of the Emperor met me half-way down the Mariahilferstrasse; Archduke Max had come to meet me with a motor in order to accelerate my journey. When I arrived in the Palace, the household urged me to hurry. I rushed upstairs, and I arrived through open doors in the study of His Majesty. The ruler stood at the telephone and handed me his second receiver. The Government of Budapest demanded that he should abdicate, and told him that, if he did not do so, bloodshed would be involved, he would be pursued and murdered, and not only he the King, but al.so the Archduke Joseph and the Ministers. His Majesty quite rightly did not want to hear anything of abdication, and did not wish to lose his crown on acount of a street revolution, seeing that he was tied to the crown by oath. The King of Hungary can only abdicate with the consent of the nation. The Government of Budapest petitioned thereupon to be relieved of their oath. So far the game was lost. Since the mob had given their support to Karolyi the power of the State lay in the dust, and as there was not a single statesman or a single party in Budapest which considered it possible to protect law and order, and since the army failed, the King was unable to do anything whatever. A few days earlier I had seen the only salvation in armed interference; to-day the preservation of a new and royal government, or even the attempt to do so, would only be useless bloodshed. For this reason His Majesty could do nothing for the moment but to avoid all interference with the business of government. This decision, however, did not involve abdication, nor did it involve his approval of what had happened and what was about to happen, but it only meant that the King was not in a position to create a Government that could give guarantees of preserving law and order. It meant, furthermore, that he did not interfere with the progress of affairs, and that he did not wish to accept the responsibility of shedding unnecessary blood until there was hope once more that he could insist upon his rights and fulfil his duties.

Rulers have often been dethroned in many different ways, but never in the way in which this fall occurred at Schönbrunn. I was a witness to a new historical drama, and I am ashamed that this novelty was born upon Hungarian soil. I had always been convinced that a revolution was only possible in Hungary in face of a ruler who violated the laws and broke his oath. This, at any rate, had been the case in the whole of our history. At present, however, there was no excuse for a revolution. It was not a question of fighting for peace, because no one desired peace more heartily than the King. There was also no necessity of a fight for an administrative union, because this had already been sanctioned, and, what is more, it was an inevitable consequence of the situation. Furthermore, there were now no impediments in the way of democratic electoral reform. Finally, no revolution was necessary in order to put the revolutionary leaders into power, because they already occupied that position.

This revolution, therefore, was only the revolution of hysteria, the product of the neuroticism of the war. The cause of its success was not to be found in the organization of the revolutionary party, its military power, or the correct sequence of its actions, but in the nervousness of the whole of society and the fear of all those who protected law and order. The last-named saw no way out of the terrible situation of the country, and they did not have confidence in an advantageous peace or any hopeful result of any kind. The energy to accept the terrible responsibility of power deserted them utterly. As the best men of the nation were unable to produce a satisfactory solution, they were glad at heart that other people pressed their claims. If in the battle of life anyone is opposed to those who strive for advancement regardlessly, the former will always be the loser, and even if he is more just, more able and more noble than his opponent. This is especially so during a revolution. The system which had been demolished by the unhappy ending of the war was not able to oppose those who thought themselves entitled to leadership, because they had seen the catastrophe coming and had opposed the policy which ended so tragically.

During the few days that I spent on the Ballhausplatz, I experienced the most terrible time of the whole of my political life. Every minute brought me the news of a new collapse. Croatia had seceded, Bohemia had made herself independent, in Austria the pan-German and Socialist element had gained supremacy, the power of the law was diminishing, and the strength of the revolution gained from day to day. The streets were agitated, the Foreign Office was under the protection of the police, and the republican idea began to gain a footing.

In Hungary the Government had committed the folly of letting the soldiers surrender their arms. In the midst of the most terrible attacks and the bloodiest struggles, our army received the coup de grâce from the rear—from the Hungarian Government. My mind was weighed down as it were with lead by the knowledge that the best of us were being murdered and butchered hopelessly and in vain, on account of the sins of others, without my being able to help or to save them.

Finally, we received the severe armistice conditions. During the night a council took place in the presence of the King. The conditions were accepted. The military leaders declared that it was impossible to continue the fight, every minute of the continuation of the battle might cost the lives of thousands and hundreds of thousands, and the retreating army might find herself in the most desperate position, as only a few lines of retreat were open to her. The new machinery of the Austrian state functioned slowly, and the newly created power was afraid of the responsibility, and although it wanted to bring about peace, it did not wish to accept the disgrace of accepting the severe conditions that were demanded. All of this cost time and blood. We were informed that the Hungarian and the South Slavonic sailors were fighting each other. The Admiralty insisted that, while preserving the rights of the other states, we should hand over to the South Slav states our men-of-war, and we should hand over the Danube monitors to the Hungarians. With a heavy heart we had to agree to the proposal, because we still believed that by this means the ships might yet be saved for the dynasty.

The tragic seriousness of our negotiations was interrupted again and again by the noise in the streets.

In the meantime I did everything I could without hesitation in order to materialize my original idea. It did not seem impossible to find a modus vivendi for Austria. Nobles and peasants, the plenipotentiaries of the German Austrians, all demanded recognition of their influence on the Ballhausplatz, and demanded the right of seeing all correspondence without insisting upon leadership and without speaking of secession. In fact, everything and everybody turned to me with the request that I should not give up my position and that I should save what could be saved. Even those who attacked me publicly attempted to persuade me in this way.

I made an effort to gather together the threads which led to satisfactory hopes. At first the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Prince Windischgraetz, and then the former Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London, Count Bensdorff, went to Switzerland in order to renew negotiations there. The revolution, however, had spoilt our last chances. Windischgraetz succeeded in getting in touch with the diplomats of the Entente, and gained the impression that it would still be possible to arrive at an agreement which could be accepted; but when Bensdorff arrived in Berne, the Monarchy, on behalf of which he wanted to negotiate, had already ceased to exist. The King's person, moreover, was in danger. In the midst of all the chaos, his bodyguard had dwindled. Schönbrunn was guarded by the cadets of the military college. The imperial and royal court, which a few days ago had been powerful and radiant, now began to wane openly as snow in the spring.

I took my resignation from His Majesty. My attempt had failed because it was too late. It was impossible for me to assist matters, and I had only damaged myself; but nevertheless, I am glad that I was able to try. I would have had to be eternally ashamed of myself if I had not accepted the call that was made upon me, and if I had not attempted to avert the catastrophe which I had clearly anticipated. Hungary, which contained only a weak social democratic element, and which was really thoroughly royalistic, and Austria, which worshipped the dynasty and was terrified by any violent action, could have resisted a revolution more successfully than any other country in the world. But under the weight of the old and new mistakes which had been committed on all sides, it was the passing whim of the mob that became master of the situation and buried alike the glorious Hungarian kingdom that had existed for 900 years and the proud creation of the Habsburgs.

The French revolution was brought about because the social element which should actually have taken the lead, because it commanded superior brains and the preponderance of property, wanted to obtain the upper hand legally as well as morally. The middle classes, which had been repressed, wanted to place themselves in the position of the nobility, and they wanted to realize those principles which were in direct opposition to the lawful circumstances, and which had been applied in England and America for a long time, and which were demanded by the whole of the French intelligentsia. The destructive aims of the revolution had therefore to be followed by a constructive era. The powerful tyranny of French society and of the French State was shaken, but only to fall from its summit upon its broad foundations.

The revolution, however, through which we had to live was not created by a similar necessity, but by an external political catastrophe. The power was not taken from the hands of the old section because the new section wanted to wield power according to a proven method. The new section was not in a position to demand exclusive power by virtue of their own services and by virtue of their own merits. They gained the power of government only in consequence of the momentary weakness and the momentary reversal of the old section. What will happen to a State which is made the prey of systems that have never been tried, and what will happen to a State when the power of government falls into hands which are not fitted for it, and is surrendered to elements who owe their triumph not to their own power but to the eternal changeability of the mood of the great events of the world?

The answer to this question would lead me beyond my real aim, because I had no part in politics in the post-revolutionary era. First of all I went into the country, and when I noticed that I could not even express my convictions in the press, and was condemned to complete inaction at home, I travelled to Switzerland (February, 1919) and attempted to work in the interests of the nation there. There I did everything that was humanly possible in order to fight for the rights of the nation and in order to secure the minimum of the conditions necessary to the existence of the Hungarian State. My labours were vain. It is no longer worth while to talk about them.

Nevertheless, I will continue the exposition of events. I will point briefly to the sad consequences of those events which I have already described, because they can best be characterized by their own consequences and because I see in the sad aftermath of the October revolution the tragic justification of my unsuccessful attempts.