Doyle v. Continental Insurance Company/Dissent Bradley

by Joseph P. Bradley

United States Supreme Court

94 U.S. 535

Doyle  v.  Continental Insurance Company

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE and MR. JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting.

I feel obliged to dissent from the judgment of the court in this case.

The following is a brief statement of the reasons for my opinion:--

Though a State may have the power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to the inconvenience, of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business within its jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon their doing so. Total prohibition may produce suffering, and may manifest a spirit of unfriendliness towards sister States; but prohibition, except upon conditions derogatory to the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United States, is mischievous, and productive of hostility and disloyalty to the general government. If a State is unwise enough to legislate the one, it has no constitutional power to legislate the other. The citizens of the United States, whether as individuals or associations, corporate or incorporate, have a constitutional right, in proper cases, to resort to the courts of the United States. Any agreement, stipulation, or State law precluding them from this right is absolutely void,-just as void as would be an agreement not to resort to the State courts for redress of wrongs, or defence of unjust actions; or as would be a city ordinance prohibiting an appeal to the State courts from municipal prosecutions.

The questions arising upon these Wisconsin laws have already been considered by this court in the case of Insurance Company v. Morse, and we held and adjudged that the agreement which the company was compelled to make, not to remove a suit into the Federal courts, was absolutely void. In principle, this case does not differ a particle from that. The State legislation of 1872, under which, and in obedience to which, the license of the appellees is threatened to be revoked, is just as unconstitutional and just as void as the agreement was in the former case.

The argument used, that the greater always includes the less, and, therefore, if the State may exclude the appellees without any cause, it may exclude them for a bad cause, is not sound. It is just as unsound as it would be for me to say, that, because I may without cause refuse to receive a man as my tenant, therefore I may make it a condition of his tenancy that he shall take the life of my enemy, or rob my neighbor of his property.

The conditions of society and the modes of doing business in this country are such that a large part of its transactions is conducted through the agency of corporations. This is especially true with regard to the business of banking, insurance, and transportation. Individuals cannot safely engage in enterprises of this sort, requiring large capital. They can only be successfully carried out by corporations, in which individuals may safely join their small contributions without endangering their entire fortunes. The shut these institutions out of neighboring States would not only cripple their energies, but would deprive the people of these States of the benefits of heir enterprise. The business of insurance, particularly, can only be carried on with entire safety by scattering the risks over large areas of territory, so as to secure the benefits of the most extended average. The needs of the country require that corporations-at least those of a commercial or financial character-should be able to transact business in different States. If these States can, at will, deprive them of the right to resort to the courts of the United States, then, in large portions of the country, the government and laws of the United States may be nullified and rendered inoperative with regard to a large class of transactions constitutionally belonging to their jurisdiction.

The whole thing, however free from intentional disloyalty, is derogatory to that mutual comity and respect which ought to prevail between the State and general governments, and ought to meet the condemnation of the courts whenever brought within their proper cognizance.

In my judgment, the decree for injunction ought to be affirmed.

Notes