Eight chapters of Maimonides on Ethics/Chapter II

by Maimonides

Chapter II

Concerning the transgressions of the faculties of the soul and the designation of those faculties which are the seat of the virtues and the vices^[1]

Know that transgressions and observances of the Law have their origin only in two of the faculties of the soul, namely, the sensitive^[2] and the appetitive, and that to these two faculties alone are to be ascribed all transgressions and observances. The faculties of nutrition and imagination do not give rise to observance or transgression, for in connection with neither is there any conscious or voluntary act. That is, man cannot consciously suspend their functions, nor can he curtail any one of their activities. The proof of this is that the functions of both these faculties, the nutritive and the imaginative, continue to be operative when one is asleep, which is not true of any other of the soul’s faculties.^[3]

As regards the rational faculty, uncertainty prevails (among philosophers)^[4], but I maintain that observance and transgression may also originate in this faculty, in so far as one believes a true or a false doctrine, though no action which may be designated as an observance or a transgression results therefrom.^[5] Consequently, as I said above, these two faculties (the sensitive and the appetitive) alone really produce transgressions and observances.

Now, as for the virtues, they are of two kinds, moral and intellectual, with the corresponding two classes of vices.^[6] The intellectual virtues belong to the rational faculty. They are (1) wisdom, which is the knowledge of the direct and indirect causes of things based on a previous realization of the existence of those things, the causes of which have been investigated;^[7] (2) reason, consisting of (a) inborn, theoretical reason, that is, axioms,^[8] (b) the acquired intellect,^[9] which we need not discuss here, and (c) sagacity and intellectual cleverness, which is the ability to perceive quickly, and to grasp an idea without delay, or in a very short time. The vices of this faculty are the antitheses or the opposites of these virtues.

Moral virtues belong only to the appetitive faculty to which that of sensation in this connection is merely subservient.^[10] The virtues of this faculty are very numerous, being moderation, [i.e. fear of sin], liberality, honesty, meekness, humility, contentedness, [which the Rabbis call “wealth”, when they say, “Who is truly wealthy? He who is contented with his lot”^[11]], courage, [faith-fulness], and other virtues akin to these. The vices of this faculty consist of a deficiency or of an exaggeration of these qualities.

As regards the faculties of nutrition and imagination, it cannot be said that they have vices or virtues, but that the nutritive functions work properly or improperly; as, for instance, when one says that a man's digestion is good or bad, or that one's imagination is confused or clear. This does not mean, however, that they have virtues or vices.

So much we wished to discuss in this chapter.

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1. For a discussion of the contents of this chapter, see Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., p. 102 ff.; Jaraczewski, ZPhKr., XLVI p. 10; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 54 ff. On the title, see Hebrew text, c. II, p. 14, n. 1 and 2.
2. In ascribing transgressions and observances to the faculty of sensation, M. differs from Aristotle who asserts that sense is the originating cause of no moral action, since brutes, too, are possessed of sense, but are in no ways partakers of moral actions (Eth. Nic., VI, 2). M., however, draws a distinction between the sensitive faculty of man and that of animals. Sensation as applied to man and beast is a homonymous term, the sensitive faculty of man being different from that of all other animate beings. See supra, c. I, pp. 39—40.
3. M. differs from al-Farabi who ascribes participation in moral and immoral acts to all the faculties of the soul (התחלות הגמצאת, p. 35 ff.). The latter, however, does not consider nutrition to be one of the faculties. Abraham ibn Daud, including nutrition among the soul’s faculties, allots to each a cardinal virtue (Emunah Ramah, III, p. 110). Aristotle excludes the imagination as one of the faculties directly affecting the performance of virtues, but considers it as producing movement through the agency of appetency (De Anima, III, 10). M., later, departs somewhat from the view he holds in the Peraḳim regarding the imagination, and, in agreement with Aristotle, considers it to be bound up indirectly, through the appetitive faculty, with conscious activity (see Scheyer, ibid., pp. 98, and 105). This is the sense of the passage in Moreh, II, 4, where he states that animate beings move either by instinct (טבע considered equivalent to כח המתעורר), or by reason. Instinct he defines as the intention of an animate being to approach something agreeable, or to shun something disagreeable, as, for instance, to approach water on account of thirst, or to avoid the sun on account of its heat. He, then, goes on to say that it makes no difference whether the thing really exists or is imaginary, since the imagination of something agreeable or of something disagreeable likewise causes the animate being to move (כי בדמיון מה שהוא כנגד ומה שיאות יתנועע ג״כ החי). Furthermore, in Moreh, II, 12, he declares that all defects in speech or character are either the direct or indirect work of the imagination (כי כל חסרון בדבר או במדות הוא פעל הדמיון או נמשך אחר פעלו). In regard to prophecy, M. lays great stress upon the imagination (ibid., II, 35), considering prophecy to be the most perfect development of the imaginative faculty. During sleep this faculty is the same as when it receives prophecy, except that when asleep the imagination is not fully developed, and has not reached its highest perfection. See supra, c. I, p. 41, n. 1.
4. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 55, n. 1.
5. Cf. Moreh, II, 4, “But even a being that is endowed with the faculty of forming an idea, and possesses a soul with the faculty of moving, does not change its place on each occasion that it forms an idea; for an idea alone does not produce motion, as has been explained in (Aristotle’s) Metaphysics. We can easily understand this, when we consider how often we form ideas of certain things, yet do not move towards them, though we are able to do so; it is only when the desire arises for the thing imagined that we move in order to obtain it.” Cf. De Anima III, 10. The same thought is expressed in Eth. Nic. VI, 2, “And so since moral virtue is a disposition exercising choice, and choice is will consequent on deliberation, the reason must be true and the will right to constitute good choice, and what the reason affirms the will must pursue… But operation of the intellect by itself moves nothing, only when directed to a certain result—i.e. exercised in moral action...” See Scheyer, ibid., p. 103—104; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 56, n. 2.
6. Cf. Eth. Nic., (ἀρται ἠϑικα and διανοιτιτικαί) I, 11 (end); II, 1; VI, 2; Eudemian Ethics, II, 1; Millot ha-Higgayon, c. XIV (מעלות המדות מעלות דבוריות).
7. Wisdom (חכמה), according to M., is used of four different things (Moreh, III, 54). It denotes (1) the knowledge of those truths which lead to the knowledge of God, (2) the knowledge of any workmanship, (3) the acquisition of moral principles, and (4) cunning and subtlety. In Moreh, I, 69, where M. demonstrates that God is the Primal Cause, in agreement with Aristotle (Physics, II, 7), he asserts that everything owes its origin to four causes, the substance, the form, the agens (פועל), and the final cause (תכלית). These are sometimes direct (קרובים), and sometimes indirect (רחוקים), though each in itself is a cause (עלה or סבה, corresponding to Ar. علة‎ and سبب‎; αἰτία, αἴτιον. Cf. Munk, Guide, I, p. 313, n. 1.)
8. Literally, first impressions (המושכלות הראשונות; Ar. מעקולאת אלאול; ἀρχαι τῶν αποδεικτῶν αξιώματα, intelligibilia prima), which are fundamental principles or axioms that would need no proof even though man were left in his primitive state (Moreh, I, 51), and which are explained by common sense. There are four kinds of knowledge which need no demonstration, one of them being the knowledge of axioms, as, for instance, that the whole is greater than a part, that two is an even number, that two things equal to the same thing are equal to each other (Millot ha-Higgayon, c. XIV), and that one cannot both affirm and deny a thing. See Scheyer, note to Moreh, I, 51. Cf. Eth. Nic., VI, 6 on Intuitive Apprehension; Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., p. 16—17; and Munk, Guide, I, p. 128, n. 3.
9. For the definition and description of the acquired intellect (שכל הנקנה or שכל הנקנה הנאצל; Ar. אלעקל אלמסתפאר, νοῦς ἐπικτητος), see Moreh, I, 72; I. T. Glossary of Strange Words, sub voce (under ס); Scheyer, ibid., pp. 17—19, 39—93; Munk, Guide, I, pp. 307—308, note; Rosin, Ethik, p. 57, n. 1; Wolff, Acht Capitel, p. 11, n. 1; and idem, Mûsa b. Maimûns eschatologische Gedanken, p. 13, etc.
10. See Scheyer, ibid., pp. 104—105, and Rosin, ibid., p. 57, n. 4.
11. Abot, IV, 1.