Eight chapters of Maimonides on Ethics/Chapter VIII

by Maimonides

Chapter VIII

Concerning the Natural Disposition of Man^[1]

It is impossible for man to be born endowed by nature from his very birth with either virtue or vice, just as it is impossible that he should be born skilled by nature in any particular art. It is possible, however, that through natural causes he may from birth be so constituted as to have a predilection for a particular virtue or vice, so that he will more readily practise it than any other.^[2] For instance, a man whose natural constitution inclines towards dryness, whose brain matter is clear and not overloaded with fluids, finds it much easier to learn, remember, and understand things than the phlegmatic man whose brain is encumbered with a great deal of humidity. But, if one who inclines constitutionally towards a certain excellence is left entirely without instruction, and if his faculties are not stimulated, he will undoubtedly remain ignorant. On the other hand, if one by nature dull and phlegmatic, possessing an abundance of humidity, is instructed and enlightened, he will, though with difficulty, it is true, gradually succeed in acquiring knowledge and understanding. In exactly the same way, he whose blood is somewhat warmer than is necessary has the requisite quality to make of him a brave man. Another, however, the temperament of whose heart is colder than it should be, is naturally inclined towards cowardice and fear, so that if he should be taught and trained to be a coward, he would easily become one. If, however, it be desired to make a brave man of him, he can without doubt become one, providing he receive the proper training which would require, of course, great exertion.

I have entered into this subject so thou mayest not believe the absurd ideas of astrologers, who falsely assert that the constellation at the time of one's birth determines whether one is to be virtuous or vicious, the individual being thus necessarily compelled to follow out a certain line of conduct. We, on the contrary, are convinced that our Law^[3] agrees with Greek philosophy, which substantiates with convincing proofs the contention that man's conduct is entirely in his own hands, that no compulsion is exerted, and that no external influence is brought to bear upon him that constrains him to be either virtuous or vicious, except inasmuch as, according to what we have said above, he may be by nature so constituted as to find it easy or hard, as the case may be, to do a certain thing; but that he must necessarily do, or refrain from doing, a certain thing is absolutely untrue.^[4] Were a man compelled to act according to the dictates of predestination, then the commands and prohibitions of the Law would become null and void, and the Law would be completely false, since man would have no freedom of choice in what he does. Moreover, it would be useless, in fact absolutely in vain, for man to study, to instruct, or attempt to learn an art, as it would be entirely impossible for him, on account of the external force compelling him, according to the opinion of those who hold this view, to keep from doing a certain act, from gaining certain knowledge, or from acquiring a certain characteristic. Reward and punishment, too, would be pure injustice, both as regards man towards man, and as between God and man.^[5] Suppose, under such conditions, that Simeon should kill Reuben. Why should the former be punished, seeing that he was constrained to do the killing, and Reuben was predestined to be slain? How could the Almighty, who is just and righteous, chastise Simeon for a deed which it was impossible for him to leave undone, and which, though he strove with all his might, he would be unable to avoid? If such were the true state of affairs, all precautionary measures, such as building houses, providing means of subsistence, fleeing when one fears danger, and so forth, would be absolutely useless, for that which is decreed beforehand must necessarily happen. This theory is, therefore, positively unsound, contrary to reason and common sense, subversive of the fundamental principles of religion, and attributes injustice to God (far be it from Him!). In reality, the undoubted truth of the matter is that man has full sway over all his actions. If he wishes to do a thing, he does it; if he does not wish to do it, he need not, without any external compulsion controlling him. Therefore, God very properly commanded man, saying, "See I have set before thee this day life and the good, death and evil .... therefore choose thou life",^[6] giving us, as regards these, freedom of choice. Consequently, punishment is inflicted upon those who disobey, and reward granted to the obedient, as it is said, "If thou wilt hearken", and "If thou wilt not hearken".^[7] Learning and teaching are also necessary, according to the commands, "Ye shall teach them to your children",^[8] "and ye shall do them and observe to do them",^[9] and, similarly, all the other passages referring to the study of the commandments. It is also necessary to take all the precautionary measures laid down in the Law, such as, "Thou shalt make a battlement for thy roof; that thou bring not blood upon thy house",^[10] "lest he die in the battle",^[11] "wherein shall he sleep?"^[12] , and "no man shall take to pledge the nether or the upper millstone",^[13] and many other passages in regard to precautions found in the Law and the Prophets.^[14]The statement found in the sayings of the Rabbis, "All is in the power of God except the fear of God"^[15] is, nevertheless, true, and in accord with what we have laid down here. Men are, however, very often prone to err in supposing that many of their actions, in reality the result of their own free will, are forced upon them, as, for instance, marrying a certain woman, or acquiring a certain amount of money. Such a supposition is untrue. If a man espouses and marry a woman legally, then she becomes his lawful wife, and by his marrying her he has fulfilled the divine command to increase and multiply. God, however, does not decree the fulfillment of a commandment. If, on the other hand, a man has consummated with a woman an unlawful marriage, he has committed a transgression. But God does not decree that a man shall sin. Again, suppose a man robs another of money, steals from him, or cheats him, and then uttering a false oath, denies it; if we should say that God had destined that this sum should pass into the hands of the one and out of the possession of the other, God would be preordaining an act of iniquity. Such, however, is not the case, but rather that all of man's actions, which are subject to his free will, undoubtedly either comply with, or transgress, God's commands; for, as has been explained in Chapter II, the commands and prohibitions of the Law refer only to those actions with regard to which man has absolute free choice to do, or refrain from doing. Moreover, to this faculty of the soul (i. e. the freedom of the will) "the fear of God" is subservient, and is, in consequence, not predestined by God, but, as we have explained, is entirely in the power of the human free will. By the word "all" (הכל), the Rabbis meant to designate only natural phenomena which are not influenced by the will of man, as whether a person is tall or short, whether it is rainy or dry, whether the air is pure or impure, and all other such things that happen in the world, and which have no connection with man's conduct.

In making this assertion that obedience or disobedience to the Law of God does not depend upon the power or will of God, but solely upon that of man himself, the sages followed the dictum of Jeremiah, who said, "Out of the mouth of God there cometh neither the bad nor the good".^[16] By the words "the bad" he meant vice, and by "the good", virtue; and, accordingly, he maintains that God does not preordain that any man should be vicious or virtuous. Since this is so, it behooves man to mourn and weep over the sins and the transgressions he has committed, as he has sinned of his own free will in accordance with what the prophet says, "Wherefore should a living man mourn? Let every man mourn because of his sins".^[17] He continues, then, to tell us that the remedy for this disease is in our own hands, for, as our misdeeds were the result of our own free will, we have, likewise, the power to repent of our evil deeds, and so he goes on to say, "Let us search through and investigate our ways, and let us return to the Lord. Let us lift up our heart with our hands to God, in the heavens". ^[18]

As regards the theory generally accepted by people, and likewise found in rabbinical and prophetical writings, that man's sitting and rising, and in fact all of his movements, are governed by the will and desire of God, it may be said that this is true only in one respect. Thus, for instance, when a stone is thrown into the air and falls to the ground, it is correct to say that the stone fell in accordance with the will of God, for it is true that God decreed that the earth and all that goes to make it up, should be the centre of attraction, so that when any part of it is thrown into the air, it is attracted back to the centre. Similarly, all the particles of fire ascend according to God's will, which preordained that fire should go upward.^[19] But it is wrong to suppose that when a certain part of the earth is thrown upward God wills at that very moment that it should fall. The Mutakalllimun^[20] are, however, of a different opinion in this regard, for I have heard them say that the Divine Will is constantly at work, decreeing everything from time to time.^[21] We do not agree with them, but believe that the Divine Will ordained everything at creation, and that all things, at all times, are regulated by the laws of nature, and run their natural course, in accordance with what Solomon said, "As it was, so it will ever be, as it was made so it continues, and there is nothing new under the sun".^[22] This occasioned the sages to say that all miracles which deviate from the natural course of events, whether they have already occured, or, according to promise, are to take place in the future, were fore-ordained by the Divine Will during the six days of creation, nature being then so constituted that those miracles which were to happen really did afterwards take place. Then, when such an occurence happened at its proper time, it may have been regarded as an absolute innovation, whereas in reality it was not.^[23]

The Rabbis expatiate very much upon this subject in the Midrash Koheleth and in other writings, one of their statements in reference to this matter being, "Everything follows its natural course".^[24] In everything that they said, you will always find that the Rabbis (peace be unto them!) avoided referring to the Divine Will as determining a particular event at a particular time. When, therefore, they said that man rises and sits down in accordance with the will of God, their meaning was that, when man was first created, his nature was so determined that rising up and sitting down were to be optional to him; but they as little meant that God wills at any special moment that man should or should not get up, as He determines at any given time that a certain stone should or should not fall to the ground.^[25] The sum and substance of the matter is, then, that thou shouldst believe that just as God willed that man should be upright in stature, broad-chested, and have fingers, likewise did He will that man should move or rest of his own accord, and that his actions should be such as his own free will dictates to him, without any outside influence or restraint, which fact God clearly states in the truthful Law, which elucidates this problem, when it says, "Behold, the man is become as one of us to know good and evil".^[26] The Targum, in paraphrasing this passage, explains the meaning of the words mimmenu lada'at ṭob wara'. Man has become the only being in the world who possesses a characteristic which no other being has in common with him. What is this characteristic? It is that by and of himself man can distinguish between good and evil, and do that which he pleases, with absolutely no restraint. Since, then, this is so, it would have even been possible for him to have stretched out his hand, and, taking of the tree of life, to have eaten of its fruit, and thus live forever.^[27]

Since it is an essential characteristic of man's makeup that he should of his own free will act morally or immorally, doing just as he chooses, it becomes necessary to teach him the ways of righteousness, to command and exhort him, to punish and reward him according to his deserts. It behooves man also to accustom himself to the practice of good deeds, until he acquires the virtues corresponding to those good deeds; and, furthermore, to abstain from evil deeds so that he may eradicate the vices that may have taken root in him. Let him not suppose that his characteristics have reached such a state that they are no longer subject to change, for any one of them may be altered from the good to the bad, and vice versa; and, moreover, all in accordance with his own free will. To confirm this theory, we have mentioned all these facts concerning the observances and the transgressions of the Law.

It now remains for us to explain another phase of this problem, which arises from the fact that there are several Scriptural passages in which some think they find proof that God preordains and forces man to disobedience. This being an erroneous opinion, it becomes our duty to explain these passages, since so many people are confused regarding them. One of these is that in which God said to Abraham, "and they (the Egyptians) will make them (the Israelites) serve, and they will afflict them".^[28] "Is it not evident", it is claimed, "that God decreed that the Egyptians should oppress the seed of Abraham? Then, why did He punish them, since, owing to divine predestination, it was inexorably decreed that they should enslave the Israelites?" The answer to this is as follows. Suppose God had said that of those who were to be born in the future, some were to be transgressors and others observers of the Law, some pious and some wicked. Such would take place, but it would by no means follow from this divine decree that a certain individual would necessarily have to do evil, or that another pious individual would be forced to do good. On the contrary, every evil-doer would become such of his own free will; if he preferred to be a righteous man, it would be in his power, and nothing could prevent him from becoming such. Likewise, if every righteous man preferred to do evil, nothing would hinder him, for God's decree was not pronounced against any certain individual, so that he might say, "It has already been decreed that I do this or that", but [these words] applied to the race in general, at the same time allowing every individual to retain his own free will, according to the very makeup of his nature. Consequently, every Egyptian who maltreated or oppressed the Israelites had it in his own power not to do them any injury unless he wanted to, for it was not ordained that any certain individual should harm them.^[29]

The same answer may also apply to another passage in which God says, "Behold, thou shalt sleep with thy fathers; and then will this people rise up and go astray after the gods of the stranger of the land".^[30] This is no more nor less than if God had said, "Whoever practises idolatry will meet with this or that treatment", but, if no transgressor should ever be found, then the threat of punishment for idolatry would become nullified, and the curses would all be ineffectual.^[31] The same is true of all punishments mentioned in the Law. As we cannot say that simply because we find the law of stoning for Sabbathbreakers [in the Torah] that he who desecrates the Sabbath was compelled to violate it, no more can we maintain that because certain maledictions occur there that those who practised idolatry, and upon whom these curses consequently fell, were predestined to be idol-worshippers. On the contrary, every one who practised idolatry did so of his own volition, and so received due punishment, in consonance with the passage, "Yea they have made a choice of their own ways ... so will I also make choice of their misfortune".^[32]

As regards, however, the words of God, "and I will harden the heart of Pharaoh",^[33] afterwards punishing him with death, there is much to be said, and from which there may be deduced an important principle. Weigh well what I say in this matter, reflect upon it, compare it with the words of others,^[34] and give preference to that which is best. If Pharaoh and his counsellors had committed no other sin than that of not permitting Israel to depart, I admit that the matter would be open to great doubt, for God had prevented them from releasing Israel according to the words, "For I have hardened his heart and the hearts of his servants".^[35] After that, to demand of Pharaoh that he send them forth while he was forced to do the contrary, and then to punish him because he did not dismiss them, finally putting him and all his followers to death, would undoubtedly be unjust, and would completely contradict all that we have previously said. Such, however, was not the real state of affairs, for Pharaoh and his followers, already of their own free will, without any constraint whatever, had rebelled by oppressing the strangers who were in their midst, having tyrannized over them with great injustice, as Scripture plainly states, "And he said unto his people, Behold, the people of the children of Israel is more numerous and mightier than we, come let us deal wisely with it".^[36] This they did through the dictates of their own free will and the evil passions of their hearts, without any external constraint forcing them thereto. The punishment which God then inflicted upon them was that He withheld from them the power of repentance, so that there should fall upon them that punishment which justice declared should he meted out to them. The fact that they were prevented from repenting manifested itself by Pharaoh's not dismissing them. This God had explained and told him, namely, that if He had merely wished to liberate Israel, He would have destroyed him and his adherents, and He would have brought out the Israelites; but, in addition to the liberation of his people, God wished to punish him because of his previous oppression of Israel, as it is said at the beginning of the matter, "And also that nation whom they shall serve will I likewise judge".^[37] It would have been impossible to have punished them, if they had repented; therefore repentance was withheld from them, and they continued to keep the children of Israel in bondage, as it says, "For even now I have stretched out my hand, etc. ... but for this cause have I allowed thee to remain".^[38]

No one can find fault with us when we say that God at times punishes man by withholding repentance from him, thus not allowing him free will as regards repentance, for God (blessed be He) knows the sinners, and His wisdom and equity mete out their punishment. Sometimes, He punishes only in this world, sometimes only in the world to come, sometimes in both. Furthermore, His punishment in this world is varied, sometimes being bodily, sometimes pecuniary, and sometimes both at once. Just as some of man's undertakings, which ordinarily are subject to his own free will, are frustrated by way of punishment, as for instance a man's hand being prevented from working so that he can do nothing with it, as was the case of Jeroboam, the son of Nebat^[39], or a man's eyes from seeing, as happened to the Sodomites who had assembled about Lot^[40], likewise does God withhold man's ability to use his free will in regard to repentance, so that it never at all occurs to him to repent, and he thus finally perishes in his wickedness. It is not necessary for us to know about God's wisdom so as to be able to ascertain why He inflicts precisely such punishment as He does and no other, just as little as we know why one species has a certain particular form and not another. It is sufficient for us to know the general principle, that God is righteous in all His ways, that He punishes the sinner according to his sin, and rewards the pious according to his righteousness.

If you should inquire why God repeatedly asked Pharaoh to release Israel which he was unable to do—while he, in spite of the plagues which befell him, persisted in his rebellion and stubbornness, which very rebelliousness and stubbornness was his punishment—and yet God would not in vain have asked him to do a thing which he could not do, then know that, this, too, was a part of God's wisdom, to teach Pharaoh that God can suspend man's freedom of will when it pleases Him to do so. So, God said to him (through Moses), "I desire that thou shouldst liberate them, but thou wilt not dismiss them, so that thou shouldst die". Pharaoh should have consented to release them, and therely disprove the words of the prophet (Moses) that he was unable to obey, but he had not the power. Thus, a great wonder was revealed to the people, as it is said, "In order that they may proclaim my name throughout the earth",^[41] namely, that it is possible for God to punish man by depriving him of his free will respecting a certain deed, while he, though realizing it, is, however, unable to influence his soul, and return to his former state of freedom of the will. Such was, likewise, the punishment of Sihon, King of Heshbon; for, on account of his former misdeed, to which he was not forced, God punished him by preventing him from granting the request of the Israelites, as a result of which they put him do death, as Scripture says, "But Sihon, the king of Heshbon, would not suffer our passing by him",^[42] etc. What has made this passage difficult for all commentators is their impression that Sihon was punished for not permitting Israel to pass through his land, just as they imagined that Pharaoh and his adherents were punished for not releasing Israel, and so they ask, "How could he (Sihon) be justly punished, since he was not a free agent?" These suppositions are incorrect, and the matter is as we have explained, namely, that Pharaoh and his adherents were punished by God because of their previous oppression of Israel, of which they did not repent, so that there befell them all the plagues; while Sihon's punishment, which consisted of his inability to do the will of Israel, thus resulting in his death, was due to the former deeds of oppression and injustice which he had practised in his kingdom.^[43]

God has, moreover, expressly stated through Isaiah that He punishes some transgressors by making it impossible for them to repent, which He does by the suspension of their free will. Thus, He says, "Obdurate will remain the heart of this people and their ears will be heavy and their eyes will be shut, lest ... they be converted and healing be granted them".^[44] The meaning of these words is so plain and obvious that they need no explanation. They are, however, a key to many unopened locks. Upon this principle also are based the words of Elijah (peace be unto him!) who, when speaking of the unbelievers of his time, said of them, "Thou hast turned their hearts back",^[45] which means that, as they have sinned of their own accord, their punishment from Thee is that Thou hast turned their hearts away from repentance, by not permitting them to exercise free will, and thus have a desire to forsake that sin, in consequence of which they persevere in their unbelief. So it is said, "Ephraim is bound to idols; let him alone",^[46] which means that since Ephraim has attached himself to idols of his own free will, and has become enamoured of them, his punishment consists in his being abandoned to his indulgence in them. This is the interpretation of the words "Let him alone". To one who understands subtle ideas, this explanation will appeal as being excellent.

Very different, however, is the meaning of what Isaiah said, "Why hast thou let us go astray, oh Lord, from Thy ways, and suffered our hearts to be hardened against Thy fear?"^[47] These words have no bearing upon the foregoing exposition. Their meaning is to be gathered from the context in which they occur. The prophet, bewailing the captivity, our residence among strangers, the cessation of our kingdom, and the sovereignty of the nations over us, says by way of prayer, "O God, if Israel continues to see this state of affairs in which the unbelievers wield the power, they will go astray from the path of truth, and their heart will incline away from Thy fear, as if Thou wast the cause of making those ignorant ones originally depart from the path of truth, as our teacher Moses said, 'Then will the nations which have heard Thy fame say in this manner that because the Lord was not able',"^[48] etc. For this reason, Isaiah said after that, "Return for the sake of Thy servants the tribes of Thy heritage",^[49] so that there should not be a blasphemy of God's name (by the heathens). Likewise, in the "minor prophets", there is found the opinion of those who, following the truth, were nevertheless conquered by the nations at the time of the exile, which passage, quoting their own words, reads, "Every one that doth evil is good in the eyes of the Lord, and in them he findeth delight, or else, where is the God of justice?"^[50] The prophet, quoting their own words which were occasioned by the length of the exile, continues, "Ye have said, It is vain to serve God; and what profit is it that we have kept His charge, and that we have walked contritely before the Lord of Hosts? And now we call the presumptuous happy; yea, built are they that practise wickedness"^[51], etc. Then, however, explicitly stating that God, in the future, will reveal the truth, he says, "And ye shall return, and see the difference between the righteous and the wicked".^[52]

These are the ambiguous passages in the Law and Scripture from which it might appear that God compels man to commit transgressions. We have, however, undoubtedly explained the meaning of these verses, and if one examines it very closely, he will find it a truthful explanation. We, therefore, hold to our original contention, namely, that obedience or transgression of the Law depends entirely upon man's free will; that he is the master of his own actions; that what he chooses not to do he leaves undone, although God may punish him for a sin which he has committed by depriving him of his free will, as we have made clear; furthermore, that the acquisition of virtues and vices is entirely in the power of man, in consequence of which it is his duty to strive to acquire virtues, which he alone can acquire for himself, as the Rabbis in their ethical sayings in this very tractate say, "If I am not for myself who will be for me?"^[53]

There is, however, one thing more relating to this problem about which we must say a few words, in order to treat in a comprehensive manner the subject-matter of this chapter. Although I had not intended at all to speak of it, necessity forces me to do so.^[54] This topic is the prescience of God,^[55] because it is with an argument based on this that our views are opposed by those who believe that man is predestined by God to do good or evil, and that man has no choice as to his conduct, since his volition is dependent upon God. The reason for their belief they base on the following statement. "Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect. If thou sayest that God does not know in advance, then great absurdities and destructive religious theories will result." Listen, therefore, to what I shall tell thee, reflect well upon it, for it is unquestionably the truth.^[56]

It is, indeed, an axiom of the science of the divine, i. e. metaphysics, that God (may He be blessed!) does not know by means of knowledge, and does not live by means of life,^[57] so that He and His knowledge may be considered two different things in the sense that this is true of man; for man is distinct from knowledge, and knowledge from man, in consequence of which they are two different things. If God knew by means of knowledge, He would necessarily be a plurality, and the primal essence would be composite, that is, consisting of God Himself, the knowledge by which He knows, the life by which He lives, the power by which He has strength, and similarly of all His attributes. I shall only mention one argument, simple and easily understood by all, though there are strong and convincing arguments and proofs that solve this difficulty. It is manifest that God is identical with His attributes and His attributes with Him, so that it may be said that He is the knowledge, the knower, and the known, and that He is the life, the living, and the source of His own life, the same being true of His other attributes. This conception is very hard to grasp, and thou shouldst not hope to thoroughly understand it by two or three lines in this treatise. There can only be imparted to thee a vague idea of it.^[58]

Now, in consequence of this important axiom, the Hebrew language does not allow the expression Ḥe Adonai (the life of God) as it does Ḥe Fara'oh^[59] (the life of Pharaoh), where the word ḥe (in the construct state) is related to the following noun, for the thing possessed and the possessor (in this case) are two different things. Such a construction cannot be used in regard to the relation of a thing to itself. Since the life of God is His essence, and His essence is His life, not being separate and distinct from each other, the word "life", therefore, cannot be put in the construct state, but the expression Ḥai Adonai^[60] (the living God) is used, the purpose of which is to denote that God and His life are one. ^[61]

Another accepted axiom of metaphysics is that human reason cannot fully conceive God in His true essence, because of the perfection of God's essence and the imperfection of our own reason, and because His essence is not due to causes through which it may be known.^[62] Furthermore, the inability of our reason to comprehend Him may be compared to the inability of our eyes to gaze at the sun, not because of the weakness of the sun's light, but because that light is more powerful than that which seeks to gaze into it.^[63] Much that has been said on this subject is self-evident truth.

From what we have said, it has been demonstrated also that we cannot comprehend God's knowledge, that our minds cannot grasp it all, for He is His knowledge, and His knowledge is He. This is an especially striking idea, but those (who raise the question of God's knowledge of the future) fail to grasp it to their dying day.^[64] They are, it is true, aware that the divine essence, as it is, is incomprehensible, yet they strive to comprehend God's knowledge, so that they may know it, but this is, of course, impossible. If the human reason could grasp His knowledge, it would be able also to define His essence, since both are one and the same, as the perfect knowledge of God is the comprehension of Him as He is in His essence, which consists of His knowledge, His will, His life, and all His other majestic attributes. Thus, we have shown how utterly futile is the pretension to define His knowledge. All that we can comprehend is that just as we know that God exists so are we cognizant of the fact that He knows. If we are asked, "What is the nature of God's knowledge?", we answer that we do not know any more than we know the nature of His true existence.^[65] Fault is found, moreover, with him who tries to grasp the truth of the divine existence, as expressed by the words, "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?"^[66]

Reflect, then, upon all that we have said, namely, that man has control over his actions, that it is by his own determination that he does either the right or the wrong, without, in either case, being controlled by fate, ^[67] and that, as a result of this divine commandment, teaching, preparation, reward, and punishment are proper. Of this there is absolutely no doubt. As regards, however, the character of God's knowledge, how He knows everything, this is, as we have explained, beyond the reach of human ken.

This is all that we purposed saying in this chapter, and it is now time for us to bring our words to an end, and begin the interpretation of this treatise^[68] to which these eight chapters are an introduction.

1. The title applies only to the first part of the chapter which is mainly a discussion of human free will, and is be supplemented by parts of M.'s Commentary on Abot, by H. Teshubah, V and VI, and Moreh, III, 16 21. On the contents of this chapter, see Jaraczewski, ZPhKr, XL VI, pp. 15-15; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 62 ff.
2. Cf. Eth. Nic., II, 1, "The virtues, then, come to be in us neither by nature nor in despite of nature, but we are furnished with a capacity for receiving them, and are perfected in them through custom". This applies to nations as well as to individuals; see Pirḳe Mosheh, c. XXV, fol. 53a.
3. Cf. Moreh, III, 17, Fifth Theory.
4. Saadia was the first Jewish philosopher to dwell at length upon the question of free will (Emunot we-Deot, III), being influenced by the discussions of Arabic theologians, although Philo, who generally followed the system of the Stoics, professed a belief in this doctrine (Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis, ed. Mangey, p. 279). He was followed by Baḥya (Ḥobot ha-Lebabot, III, 8); Ibn Zaddiḳ (Olam Ḳaṭon, p. 69, ed. Jellinek, Leipzig, 1854); Yehudah ha-Levi (Cuzari, pt. V, ed. Cassel, p. 418); Abraham Ibn Ezra (Yesod Morah, VII); and Ibn Daud (Emunah Bamah, p. 96, ed. Weil, Frankfurt a. M., 1842). For references to passages in M.'s works where he discusses free will, see p. 85 n. 1. M. undoubtedly had Eth. Nic. III in mind when he said that "Our Law agrees with Greek philosophy". See especially Eth. Nic. III, 5. 7, where are found the following statements, "So it seems as has been said, that man is the originator of his actions", and "if it is in our power to do and to forbear doing what is creditable or the contrary, and these respectively constitute the being good or bad, then the being good or vicious characters is in our power". See Rosin, Ethik, p. 5, n. 4, and p. 66, n. 1. Consult on this subject I. Broydé, in J. E., vol. V, art. Free Will, and works mentioned there; Wolff, Acht Capitel, Excursus, III, pp. 84—85; and Cohen, Characteristik, etc., in Moses ben Maimon, I, p. 76.
5. M. mentions the same argument in the Moreh, but it had often been advanced before him. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 67, n. 2.
6. Deut. XXX, 15. 19. Cf. H. Teshubah, V, 3.
7. Deut. XI, 27. 28.
8. Ibid., XI, 19.
9. Ibid., V, 1.
10. Ibid., XXII, 8.
11. Ibid XX, 5 or 7.
12. Ex. XXII, 26.
13. Deut. XXIV, 6.
14. See H. Teshubah, V, 4, and Moreh, III, 20; cf. Ibn Baud, Emunah Ramah, II, 6, 2, p. 96.
15. Berakot, 33b; Niddah, 16 b; Megillah, 25 a.
16. Lam. Ill, 38. This verse is, however, generally translated, "Out of the mouth of God, the Most High, cometh there not evil as well as good?", which is exactly the opposite of M.'s interpretation. This verse is also quoted in H. Teshubah, V, 2, where M. states that it is wholly in the power of man to be as righteous as Moses or as wicked as Jeroboam.
17. Lam. III, 39.
18. Ibid., III, 40—41. Of. H. Teshubah, loc. cit.
19. Aristotle uses the example of a stone and fire, in Eth. Nic., II, 1, to show that nature is not affected by custom. A stone by custom can never be brought to ascend, nor fire do descend. Moral virtues are, however, the result of custom.
20. See supra, c. I. p. 41, n. 2; and p. 77.
21. Cf. Moreh, I, 73. Sixth Proposition. See Munk, Guide, I, p. 286, n. 3.
22. Eccles. I, 9.
23. M. reiterates this view of the miracles in his Commentary on Abot, V, 6, which enumerates ten things created on the eve of the Sabbath of the week of creation. See Lipmann Heller, in Tosefot Yom-Tob, on this passage; and Hoffman, Mischnaioth, Seder Nezikin, Berlin, 1889, p. 353. Cf. Moreh, I, 66, and Munk, Guide, I, p. 296. M. also supported this view in Moreh, II, 29 where he refers to Genesis Rabbah, V, 4, and Exodus Rabbah, XXI, 6, which read, "When God created the world He made an agreement that the sea should divide, the fire not hurt, the lions not harm, the fish not swallow persons singled out by God for certain times, and thus the whole order of things changes whenever he finds it necessary." Consult on this subject Joel, Moses Maimonides, 1876, p. 77 ; Rosin, Ethik, p. 69, n. 5; "Wolff, Acht Capitel, Excursus, IV; Lazarus, Ethics, II, p. 77, n. 1; Kohler, art. Miracles, in J. E., vol. VIII, pp. 606-607; Geiger, Judaism and its History, p. 348.
24. `Abodah Zarah, 54b. See Lazarus, ibid., II, p. 74 ff.
25. Cf. M.'s Commentary on Abot, IV, 23 (Rawicz, Commentar, pp. 89 90); H. Teshubah, V, 4, and Moreh, III, 17, Fifth Theory. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 69, n. 6.
26. Gen. III, 22.
27. Cf. H. Teshubah, V, 1.
28. Gen. XV, 13.
29. Cf. H. Teshubah, VI, 5.
30. Deut. XXXI, 16.
31. Cf. H. T'shubah, loc. cit.
32. Isa. LXVI, 3. 4.
33. Ex. XIV, 4.
34. M. probably means Abraham ibn Ezra and Ibn Baud. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 24.
35. Ex., X, 1.
36. Ibid., I, 9, 10.
37. Gen. XV, 14.
38. Ex. IX, 15. 16. The same explanation for the hardening of Pharaoh's heart is given in H. Teshubah, VI, 3. On the withholding of repentance, see Schechter, Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology, p. 332.
39. See I K. XIII, 4.
40. See Gen. XIX, 11.
41. Ex. IX, 16.
42. Deut. II, 30. Cf. H. Teshubah, VI, 3.
43. M. cannot, however, point to any biblical passage that substantiates his contention that Sihon had previously committed injustice.
44. Isa. VI, 10, quoted also in H. Teshubah, VI, 3.
45. I K. XVIII, 37, quoted again in H. Teshubah, loc. cit., which also refers to Josh. XI, 20.
46. Hos. IV, 17.
47. Isa. LXIII, 17.
48. Num. XIV, 15. 16.
49. Isa., loc. cit.
50. Mal. II, 17.
51. Ibid., III, 14. 15.
52. Ibid., III, 18. Cf. Moreh, III, 19.
53. Abot, I, 14. Cf. M.'s commentary on this passage.
54. M. feels it necessary here to discuss philosophically the prescience of God, which he does reluctantly, as the Peraḳim are intended for readers not versed in philosophy. See Introduction, p. 11.
55. For M.'s discussion of God's knowledge, see Pereḳ Ḥeleḳ; H. Teshubah, V, 5; Yesode ha-Torah, II, 8-10; Moreh, I, 58, and III, 19-21. See Munk Guide, I, p. 301, n. 4.
56. For a list and the opinions of Jewish philosophers before M. who discussed this problem, see Rosin, Ethik, p. 73, n. 5.
57. Cf. Moreh, I, 57: וכן חי לא בחיים ויודע לא במדע, and Yesode ha-Torah, II, 10. See Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, p. 423, and note 94.
58. For an exhaustive discussion of the theories which M. merely mentions here, see Moreh, I, 50-51, on the attributes of God. See Munk, Guide, I, 50, p. 179 ff., passim; Kaufmann, ibid., p. 418 ff.; Cohen, Charakteristik, etc. in Moses ben Maimon, I, pp. 89-90.
59. Gen. XLII, 15.
60. Ruth, III, 13.
61. Cf. Yesode ha-Torah, II, 10, and Moreh, I, 58 (beg.). See Munk, Guide, I, p. 302, n. 3. The expressions חֵי אלהים (II Sam. II, 27), חֵי אל (Job XXVII, 2), and especially חֵי יהוה וחֵי נפשך (I Sam. XX, 3; XXV, 26, and II K. II, 2), and Jer. XXXVIII, 16 substantiate this novel linguistic argument of M. Amos VIII, 14 חֵי אלהיך דן is used in reference to the gods of idolators.
62. See Aristotle's Metaphysics, XXII, 9.
63. Cf. Moreh, I, 59, "All philosophers say, 'He has overpowered us by His grace, and it is invisible to us through the intensity of His light', like the sun which cannot be perceived by the eyes which are too weak to bear its rays". Cf. Baḥya, Ḥobot ha-Lebobot, I, 10. See Munk, Guide I, p. 252; Rosin, Ethik, pp. 75, n. 4; Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, pp. 324-325; 445, n.128; and Wolff, Acht Capitel, p. 80, n. 1.
64. See Hebrew text, c. VIII, p. 55, n. 37.
65. Cf. Moreh, III, 20-21.
66. Job XI, 7.
67. In his Commentary on Abot, III, 15, M. maintains that the phrase "Everything is foreseen (by God), but freedom of choice is given", is in harmony with his theory of the omniscience of God, which does not, however, deprive man of free will. See Rawicz, Commentar p. 75.
68. I.e., Abot