Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins

by the Supreme Court of the United States

United States Supreme Court

304 U.S. 64

Erie Railroad Co.  v.  Tompkins

Certeriori to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

No. 367  Argued: Jan. 31, 1938. --- Decided: April 25, 1938

Syllabus

1. The liability of a railroad company, for injury caused by negligent operation of its train to a pedestrian on a much-used, beaten path on its right-of-way along and near the rails, depends, in the absence of a federal or state statute, upon the unwritten law of the State where the accident occurred. Pp. 71 et seq.
2. A federal court exercising jurisdiction over such a case on the ground of diversity of citizenship, is not free to treat this question as one of so-called "general law," but must apply the state law as declared by the highest state court. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, overruled. Id.
3. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or "general," whether they be commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts. Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. P. 78.
4. In disapproving the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, the Court does not hold unconstitutional § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other Act of Congress. It merely declares that by applying the doctrine of that case rights which are reserved by the Constitution to the several States have been invaded. P. 79.

90 F.2d 603, reversed.

[p65] CERTIORARI, 302 U.S. 671, to review the affirmance of a judgment recovered against the railroad company in an action for personal injuries. The accident was in Pennsylvania. The action was in New York, jurisdiction being based on diversity of citizenship.

Argument for Petitioner

Mr. Theodore Kiendl, with whom Messrs. William C. Cannon and Harold W. Bissell were on the brief, for petitioner.

The Pennsylvania decisions denying permissive rights on longitudinal pathways as distinguished from crossings should have received due consideration in recognition of the elementary principle that the law to be applied is the lex loci delicti. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 380, p. 462

Whatever difficulties there may be in ascertaining the pertinent Pennsylvania law or in fixing the extent to which the federal courts are bound to recognize the pertinent decisions of the Pennsylvania courts, it is settled beyond question that it is the Pennsylvania law which the federal courts, quite as truly as: the state courts, are bound to ascertain and apply. There is no such thing as a federal common law applicable in such cases. Bucher v. Cheshire Railroad Co., 125 U.S. 555, 583–584; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478–479. See also Carroll County v. Smith, 111 U.S. 556, 563; McGuire v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 87 F.2d 112; Boston & Maine R. v. Breslin, 80 F.2d 749, (cert. denied, 297 U.S. 715); Moore v. Backus, 78 F.2d 571, (cert. denied, 296 U.S. 640); Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359; Public Service Ry. Co. v. Wursthorn, 278 F.408, (cert. denied, 259 U.S. 585); Keystone Wood Co. v. Susquehanna Boom Co., 240 F. 296, (cert. denied, 243 U.S. 655); Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 F. 1, 11, (cert. denied, 214 U.S. 518).

Although each State unquestionably hao the power to determine the particular conception of the common law [p66] adopted by it, and although the common law is acclaimed as being adaptable to changing conditions, the opinion of the court below is an unqualified pronouncement that it is beyond the power of the Pennsylvania courts to determine or evolve the law of Pennsylvania as to permissive rights on railroad rights-of-way in Pennsylvania. It would seem clear that this is a sweeping repudiation of the principle that the law to be applied is that of the State.

The Pennsylvania decisions should have been recognized as controlling because they had established the rule of law with sufficient definiteness and finality to constitute it a local rule of property, action or conduct, even though the question might otherwise have been regarded as mainly one of general law.

We do not question the finality of the holding of this Court in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, that the "laws of the several States" referred to in the Rules of Decision Act do not include state court decisions as such. But whether by virtue of the Act or of comity, it is well settled that such decisions are pertinent and, under certain circumstances, controlling in ascertaining or determining the law of the State.

It would be idle to deny that this Court, in matters of a general nature, has exhibited a marked reluctance to recognize nonconformist state rules as settling the question of state law. But even in cases where an asserted rule of the state courts has been rejected, it has been stated or implied that the asserted rule would govern if sufficiently established. Expressions to this effect occur with such frequency and consistency that they must be recognized as forming a part of the general doctrine on the subject.

As a matter of comity at least and by virtue of the Rules of Decision Act as well, the federal courts are bound to recognize an asserted rule of state law where [p67] the evidence in the form of state decisions is sufficiently conclusive, in other words, when the asserted rule is established with sufficient definiteness and finality.

The implication from the Swift case would seem to be that the federal courts would follow the state rule if established with such definiteness and finality that the state courts would no longer resort to the general sources of the common law or to general reasoning and legal analogies, but would regard the question as foreclosed in the State.

This Court has so indicated in many cases where the conclusion was that there was no state rule so firmly established as to exclude resort to general principles. Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495; Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black 418; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; New York Central R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368; Barber v. Pittsburgh, F. W. & C. Ry. Co., 166 U.S. 83; Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349; Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518.

Obviously, a case is not regarded as depending "upon the doctrines of commercial law and general jurisprudence" when the applicable state rule is established by state statute, even though the statute deals with a mafter which but for the statute would unquestionably come within the scope of commercial law and general jurisprudence. Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487; Marine Bank v. Kalt-Zimmers Co., 293 U.S. 357. It would seem equally obvious that a case is not to be regarded as depending "upon the doctrines of commercial and general jurisprudence" when there is an applicable state rule of property, action or conduct, definitely and finally established as such by decisions of the highest state court, even though the decisions deal with a matter [p68] which but for such established rule would unquestionably come within the scope of commercial law and general jurisprudence. Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 F. 1, 12; 214 U.S. 518; Bucher v. Cheshire Railroad Co., 125 U.S. 555; Byrne v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co., 61 F. 605.

The Pennsylvania decisions denying permissive rights on longitudinal pathways, as distinguished from crossings, declare a Pennsylvania rule sufficiently local in nature to be controlling, even though more definiteness and finality might be required in a rule of a more general nature. It rests expressly on a local policy relating to the efficient operation of railroads, a policy which presumably was dictated by local conditions.

Argument for Respondent

Mr. Fred H. Rees, with whom Messrs. Alexander L. Strouse and William Walsh were on the brief, for respondent.

In cases involving questions of general law, federal courts will exercise their independent judgment.

This doctrine, which is now elementary, found its inception in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1; has constantly been reaffirmed by. this Court and was most recently applied in the case of Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518.

Decisions of this Court, as well as logic and reason, have established that questions of the type here presented, involving railroad accidents, are questions of general law, upon which independent judgment may be exercised by federal courts. [Citing Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, and many other cases.]

There is no doctrine that where a rule is well established in a State, the question is one of local law and federal courts must follow the rule even though the rule might otherwise be regarded as one of general law.

Even if a question of local law were here involved, the same result must be reached, since petitioner relies upon [p69] a solitary Pennsylvania decision, clearly contrary to the weight of Pennsylvania decisions, and of doubtful applicability to the facts of the case at bar.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Notes